Editor’s Preface
Air View of Narvik From the Northwest
The military series of the United Kingdom History of the Second World War, of which Dr Derry’s volume on the campaign in Norway is the first to appear, has been planned in accordance with a Government decision announced to the House of Commons on 25th November 1946. The purpose of the history, said the then Prime Minister, was ‘to provide a broad survey of events from an inter-Service point of view rather than separate accounts of the parts played by each of the three Services’. The historians have thus felt themselves under no obligation to tell the story of operations in the same detail as was thought appropriate in the case of the war of 1914–18. For such detailed narratives the student must turn to the unit or formation histories of which many have already appeared. We have set ourselves to present a single series of volumes in which the whole military story, and every part of it, is treated from an inter-Service aspect. Here and elsewhere throughout our work the word ‘military’ is used to cover the activities of all three fighting Services, as distinct from the other sides of the national war effort which are treated in the Civil Histories edited by Professor W. K. Hancock.
Even on the military side, however, it seemed that a ‘broad survey’ which confined itself to a description of campaigns and operations would fail to give a satisfactory account of how the war of 1939–45 was waged. The vast area over which operations were progressively extended, the number and the variety of the campaigns being fought simultaneously, the constant need of coordinating policy and strategy with governments overseas, together with the centralisation of command rendered possible by modern systems of communication—all these increased the range and importance of the part played by the supreme authority at home and seemed to demand that a fuller treatment of the higher direction of the war should be attempted than has been usual in military histories. It was accordingly decided to allot several volumes to Grand Strategy as devised in Whitehall and at Washington, including one volume on developments prior to the actual outbreak of war in September 1939.
For the rest, the history has been planned to cover the following themes or theatres: the defence of the United Kingdom, the maritime war viewed as a whole, the two campaigns of the early period in Norway and in northwest Europe, the strategic air offensive, and the three epic series of military operations on the grand scale in the Mediterranean and Middle East, in the Far East, and again in the northwest of Europe in 1944 and 1945. Additional volumes have been allotted to the history of Civil Affairs or Military Government
in view of the novelty and importance of the problems involved in this field of military responsibility.
In order to avoid undue detail, the standpoint from which campaigns have been viewed is that of the theatre commander. The intention has been to treat all the campaigns on the same scale; but it must be confessed that ins some cases when the total forces involved were small, as in Norway in 1940 and in the Western Desert in the early phases, the narrative has descended to describe the operations of detached units in greater detail than their size would normally justify.
No doubt the proposed dual treatment of strategic problems, at the Whitehall level and at the level of theatre headquarters, involves a risk, indeed a certainty, of some overlapping. This would be the case even if it were not our aim, as it is, to make each group of volumes intelligible by itself and to that extent self-contained. We cannot, unfortunately, assume that the general reader, for whom as much as for military students our history is intended, will be prepared to buy or read the whole of our twenty or thirty volumes. We think that a moderate amount of overlapping is excusable and may even be welcomed if it avoids the necessity of constant reference to other volumes
The description of a war waged by allies, in which ‘integration’ was successfully carried to lengths unattempted in previous campaigns, raised further problems. Granted that our commission is to write the history not of the Second World War as a whole but of the military effort of the United Kingdom, on what principle ought we to handle campaigns or actions in which men from the United Kingdom and from other nations fought side by side? Where United Kingdom forces served under foreign or Dominion command, or vice versa, it seems clear that decisions or actions of our fellow combatants must be described with sufficient fullness to preserve a proper balance in the story. On the other hand it is not desirable to duplicate the accounts given in the histories sponsored by our Allies and the other nations of the British Commonwealth, especially when the primary sources are under their control. Arrangements have indeed been made with them for mutual information on points of special interest and for an exchange of drafts; it is hoped that these arrangements will at least reduce the likelihood of controversy due to ignorance of another nation’s point of view, though they will not, of course, eliminate differences of interpretation. It has not been possible to make such arrangement in the case of the USSR.
With regard to German military records, however, the Allied historians are fortunate to an unprecedented degree, in having access to a mass of original documents, some of them of the highest importance, which were captured during the occupation of Germany
and are now held under joint Anglo-American control. In the case of the other enemy Powers, both the volume and the value of the documents captured are considerably less and details of their military plans and operations have of necessity been obtained from more conventional sources of information.
To the official United Kingdom records we have been allowed full access, and we have done our best to supplement them by reference to unofficial accounts, published and unpublished, written and oral. We have felt bound, however, to respect the requirements of military ‘security ‘, and in some cases cipher telegrams have been paraphrased, though not in such a way as to affect the sense. In accordance with the recognised British constitutional principle we have not held ourselves free to reveal individual differences of opinion with in the War Cabinet nor, as a rule, to lift the veil of Civil Service anonymity.
We have taken it as our prime duty to present an accurate narrative of events. But events, properly speaking, include plans and intentions as well as actions, and it is the duty of a historian, as opposed to a mere annalist, to say why, as well as how, things happened as they did. He must interpret, not merely narrate, and interpretation implies a personal judgement. In any case, the need to select from the vast mass of material implies a personal judgement of what is most relevant and important.
We all share the contemporary outlook, and some of us are laymen in military matters it would be unbecoming in us to attempt to pronounce what a commander should have done or should not have done in a particular situation. Our ideal would be to let the facts speak for themselves, to point out how such a decision led to such a result, and to leave speculation and moralising to the strategists; but the facts can only speak to our readers as we have selected and presented them, and we have not shrunk from stating what seemed to us the lessons that emerged from a particular course of events.
Lord Tedder has remarked that as a nation ‘we have a tendency to concentrate too much on our successes and our enemies failures and consequently to draw our lessons too much from the final stages of war’, when ‘after some years of lavish expenditure’ the Commander knows that he can more or less ‘count on a blank cheque’. ‘Surely’, he says, ‘it is the problems of the early stages of the war which we should study. Those are the difficult problems; those are the practical problems which we and every democratic nation have to solve. There are no big battalions or blank cheques then. Here is the real and vital test of our defence policies’1
Lord Tedder’s words may serve as a reply to any critic who objects that in a ‘broad survey’ of the Second World War the space allotted,
in Dr Derry’s volume, to what was after all a minor campaign is excessive. The Norway episode was, it is true, in a sense a sideshow; the forces engaged, except on the naval side, were comparatively small and the losses light. But it was the first campaign of the war in which all three Services were involved and it revealed before the eyes of the world how lamentably deficient were our military preparations and organisation compared with our political commitments and our urgent needs. It is right that not only the results of our unpreparedness should be indicated in broad outline, but enough detail should be given to show where and why the shoe pinched. The lessons of the Norway campaign were learnt and applied, with triumphant effect, before the end of the war. But, if Lord Tedder is correct, that does not make them less worthy of study now, when once again democracies are living in dangerous times and have critical decisions to take.
It is normally the duty and desire of a historian to support his assertions and arguments by detailed references to his authorities. Such references serve partly as an indication of his sources, partly as a challenge to his readers to verify his statements. Where, however, the main authorities are official documents which are not at present, and for some time are not likely to be, open to public inspection, published references have comparatively little point, since the challenge cannot be taken up. The nature of the material used can, we think, in most cases be sufficiently indicated in the prefaces or bibliographical notes to the several volumes. Accordingly our usual practice has been that explained by Professor Hancock in his introduction to the Civil Histories,2 ‘It has been decided not to clutter the published pages with references to official files which are not yet generally available to students. In the published series, footnotes have been confined to material that is already accessible. The completed documentation has been given in confidential print. There it will be immediately available to critical readers within the Government service. No doubt it will become available in due time to the historians of a future generation. The official historians of this generation have consciously submitted their work to the professional verdict of the future’.
In the use of enemy documents the historians’ labours have been immensely lightened by the help of their colleagues charged with the collection, collation and interpretation of this vast mass of material. Work on the German and Italian documents has been directed by Mr Brian Melland; Colonel G. T. Wards has advised with regard to the Japanese. Valuable assistance in this matter has also been rendered by Commander M. G. Saunders RN, of the
Admiralty Historical Section, and by Squadron Leader L. A. Jackets, of the Air Historical Branch.
The maps have been prepared under the experienced direction of Colonel T. M. M. Penney, of the Cabinet Office Historical Section. The spelling of the place-names follows in the main the system approved at an informal conference of the British and American experts in October 1947, but current usage has been adhered to where not to do so would be pedantic. In the representation of Allied and enemy troops the conventional symbols and colours, where used, are those officially recognised during the war. Apart from the fact that work on some of our maps had begun before November 1950, when the British Army changed its system, it seemed natural to follow the convention used in contemporary maps.
The appointment of a civilian editor to be responsible for the production of the military histories made it desirable that on general questions as well as special points, he should be able frequently to consult authorities whose opinions on Service matters would command respect; I am fortunate to have had so helpful a panel of advisers as Vice Admiral Sir Geoffrey Blake, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Pownall, Air Chief Marshals Sir Douglas Evill and Sir Guy Garrod, and Lieutenant General Sir Ian Jacob. These distinguished officers not only have given me the benefit of their experience and judgement in the planning of the history and the selection of writers but have read and commented on the volumes in draft; in all these matters, however, responsibility rests with the Editor alone.
The history could not have been written without the constant assistance of the Service Historical Sections, and the historians would express their gratitude to Rear Admiral R. M. Bellairs, Brigadier H. B. Latham, Mr J. C. Nerney, and also Lieutenant General Sir Desmond Anderson, of the War Office, and their staffs. The monographs, narratives and summaries produced by the Service Departments have greatly reduced the labours, though not the responsibilities, of the historians, and the staffs concerned have been lavish of their help in supplying information and comment. Similar acknowledgements are due to the authors of the Civil Histories, and we are grateful to Mr Yates Smith, of the Imperial War Museum, and to other librarians for the loan of books.
Finally, the historians in general, and the Editor in particular, are deeply indebted to Mr A. B. Acheson of the Cabinet Office. His advice and help have been of the greatest service to us in many ways; indeed, without the relief provided by Mr Acheson in administrative matters, a part time editor could hardly have performed his task.
J. R. M. B.
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