Chapter 8: Supplying the Armies: Equipment
(1) Class II and IV Shortages in General
With the exception of a few critical items, the shortages in Class II and IV supplies in the combat zone, like the shortages in other classes, could initially be laid to the deficiencies of inland transportation. Class II and IV items were especially handicapped in this respect, for the staples of supply—gasoline, ammunition, and rations—had first call on available lift and replacement of destroyed or worn-out equipment had to be postponed as long as possible. In September, out of an average daily tonnage allocation to the First Army of 4,076 tons, only 442 tons could be assigned to Class II and IV items, against which only 322 tons were actually delivered. There was some improvement in October, but of an allocation of 5,880 tons, Class II and IV supplies were still assigned less than 1,000 tons, against which deliveries came to 637.1 Even these figures exaggerate actual performance, for the receipts included many items which the Communications Zone added as “fillers” and which the armies had not requisitioned. Moreover, the true supply picture was distorted by the emphasis on tonnages at the expense of items. A ton of radio spare parts, as signal officers pointed out, could be worth 2,000 tons of pole line hardware.2
In September and October the armies’ critical lists grew longer every week. Shortages initially resulting from inadequate transportation were in many cases aggravated and perpetuated by unexpected demands arising from the armies’ advanced positions, by higher rates of attrition than originally expected, and finally by production shortfalls in the United States. Supply shortages were common to all the technical services, but the most serious ones were in the signal, engineer, quartermaster, and ordnance services.
In the signal service the most persistent shortages which affected operations were in radios, spare parts, batteries, and field wire. Field wire was used at the rate of about 66,000 miles per month when available, but shortages forced strict rationing and permitted allocations of barely half this amount. In November First Army reported 4,700 miles on hand, which it calculated was sufficient for only one and one-half days of large-scale operations, and reported shortages of between 10,000 and 17,000 miles. By contrast, Seventh Army listed normal requirements of only 250 miles
per day, which were being met to the extent of only 30 miles.3
In the engineer service the shortage of bridging provided an example of unexpected demand arising from the armies’ advanced positions. Third Army successively crossed the Marne, Meuse, and Moselle in addition to smaller streams in September, and in that one month built 52 treadway, 6 heavy ponton, 2 infantry support, 170 timber trestle, and 67 Bailey bridges. Demolitions were more and more extensive as the advance slowed down, and in the area of the XII Corps, southeast of Châlons, all bridges over the main streams had to be reconstructed.
Shortages of tactical bridging made it imperative that Bailey bridges be replaced as rapidly as possible by more permanent structures so that the tactical bridging could be shipped forward and reused. Although relatively small amounts of tactical bridging were needed in October, when operations almost came to a standstill, both First and Third Armies took the opportunity to replace temporary bridges with more permanent timber structures. To meet the requirements for lumber for this purpose Third Army alone placed contracts with twenty-one French mills. Late in October the armies again called for large shipments of bridging and stream-crossing equipment in preparation for a possible break-through to the Rhine in the coming offensive. By that time the forward shipment of supplies had been complicated by an additional factor—mud—which made some of the stocks in the Normandy depots inaccessible.4
The shortage of paper also proved a major engineer supply problem, for the demand for maps exceeded all expectations. French paper stocks were far from adequate, and engineers eventually printed about 10,000,000 maps on the reverse side of captured German maps.5
In the quartermaster service clothing, tentage, and mess equipment, including stoves, were the most persistent shortages. The supply of quartermaster Class II and IV items, like that in the other services, first presented difficulties in August with the inability of transportation to meet the demands growing out of the unexpected tactical developments. Class II and IV supplies were relegated to positions low on the priority list as long as gasoline, rations, and ammunition remained the more urgent needs. In September, of 54,200 tons offloaded in the ports, only 15,400 were cleared, leaving a backlog of nearly 40,000 tons. By December the backlog had grown to 88,600 tons.6 Of a total average lift of 4,076 tons allocated to the First Army in September, only 102 tons were earmarked for quartermaster Class II and IV supplies, and the average daily delivery during the month was only 39 tons.7
Meanwhile shortages originally caused by the inadequacy of inland transportation were made more acute by port discharge deficiencies and to a lesser extent by the inability to move stocks across the Channel from the United Kingdom. At the end of September there were seventy-five ships in the theater commodity-loaded with all types of quartermaster supplies, for which only fourteen berths were available. At the end of October the theater had eighty such ships and only eighteen berths in which they could be worked.8 Backlogs of quartermaster supplies, both in loaded ships and stored in the port areas, continued high even after Antwerp’s opening, and were not completely eliminated until February 1945.
The shortage of coaster shipping for cross-Channel movement meanwhile voided the planned reduction of U.K. stocks. Receipts from the United Kingdom in August totaled 29,000 tons, representing but 53 percent of the 55,000 tons allocated. General Littlejohn appreciated the reasons for deferring the movement of Class II and IV supplies in the first few months. But early in September he became concerned with the possible effects on winterization requirements. On 7 September he informed General Lee that the month’s Class II and IV quartermaster lift requirements alone totaled 56,750 tons, 10,000 of which were needed for the movement of winter clothing, 10,350 tons for winter tentage, 29,500 for combat maintenance, and 900 tons of clothing for prisoners of war. The issue of winter clothing, he insisted, had to be completed by 1 October if the fighting efficiency of troops was to be maintained.
Littlejohn proposed to carry out the winterization program by a 6,000-ton airlift, partially from the United Kingdom and partially from Normandy Base Section, and by shipments via LST and small coasters to Brittany ports, to a discharge point in the Seine, and to a rail connection in the Calais area.9 General Stratton immediately turned down the request for air transport and ruled out most of the other proposals as infeasible at the moment. Cross-Channel tonnage allocations at the time were dictated largely by what the 12th Army Group decided should be moved forward on the Continent, and in view of the current tactical situation and attendant optimism concerning a quick end to the fighting there was little likelihood that the field commands would favor a diversion of transportation, including airlift, from the movement of gasoline to the movement of clothing.10
General Littlejohn persisted in emphasizing the urgency of the winterization program, however, and shortly thereafter put the issue of the needed allocations directly up to General Bradley.11 The change in the tactical situation in the next few weeks, while it brought no immediate improvement in transport, permitted a shift in emphasis. Late in the month the chief quartermaster reached an agreement with the theater
G-4 on plans for shipping clothing from the United Kingdom to the Continent and for its movement to the forward areas. The operation finally got under way in the first week of October, and on the 13th General Littlejohn announced that the winter clothing and equipment then available in the theater had been delivered to the armies. Approximately 6,500 tons of clothing overshoes, blankets, and other equipment were moved forward, 41 percent of it by air.12
(2) The Case of the Winter Uniform
Transportation was only one aspect of the winterization problem. Behind this problem lay more basic shortcomings, particularly with respect to winter clothing. Viewed in retrospect, it is clear that planning and decision-making in both the War Department and the theater, as well as coordination between the two, left something to be desired.
A controversy eventually developed over winter clothing that involved questions of both quality and quantity. Inadequacies of the winter uniform in Europe on both counts were several times brought to the attention of the public via the newspapers. Critical articles appearing in January and February 1945—particularly one in the Washington Post–finally evoked an angry blast from General Littlejohn, who charged that a malicious campaign had been launched to discredit him. The articles precipitated one of the most acrimonious intra-service squabbles of the entire war, and finally led to an investigation.13
The Washington Post article had given due recognition to such factors as the abnormal severity of the 1944–45 winter in Europe, the unexpectedly high attrition of clothing during the summer and fall, and the unfortunate habits of American soldiers regarding the proper fitting of clothing. But the article struck a sensitive spot in implying that the theater had placed its orders too late to ensure adequate early winter protection against wet cold weather and that it had failed to adopt combat-tested items recommended by the War Department. Most of the controversy over winter clothing centered on these two closely related points.14
U.S. forces had already experienced the distress of operating without adequate clothing. In the winter of 1943–44 the Fifth Army in Italy had found the
then standard field uniform inadequate to protect its troops fighting in the mountains around Naples.15 Meanwhile, The Quartermaster General had developed a simplified uniform, based on the layering principle, and adaptable to combat wear in cold wet climates, which the Army Ground Forces had approved for standardization, “subject to minor modifications,” as early as March 1943.16 Late in February 1944, The Quartermaster General sent Capt. William F. Pounder, an officer in the Research and Development Branch, Military Planning Division, OQMG, to England to familiarize ETOUSA officials with the new items and explain their advantages. The items recommended had undergone tests in either the continental United States or Alaska, and they were now sent to the Mediterranean theater as well where they were tested on troops of the 3rd Infantry Division in the Anzio beachhead. While the Italian test was not exhaustive, particularly from the point of view of performance in severe weather, the Mediterranean theater found the new uniform far superior to the combination then in use and eventually equipped the three divisions that it provided for the Seventh Army, which operated in France the following winter, as well as the Fifth Army, with the new clothing.17
The main items recommended which distinguished the proposed uniform from the one then in use were the M1943 sateen field jacket, the high-neck wool sweater, the combat service boot, the shoepac, and the leather glove with wool insert. General Littlejohn had already had a preview of the new items on a visit to the United States in November 1943, and they evoked considerable interest when they were shown to the chief quartermaster and his staff in the United Kingdom. The M1943 field jacket, a wind- and water-repellent garment with a pile liner which could be worn over a jacket or sweater in cold weather and which became the item of greatest controversy, was initially well received, since it was to replace the unsatisfactory 1941 Parsons jacket. But General Littlejohn was not satisfied with the production figures which Captain Pounder was able to furnish and, lacking assurance that the new jacket would be delivered in sufficient quantities to dress units uniformly, stated that he would make no special effort to procure it.18 Pounder continued to press for decisions on various articles he had brought with him, and advised early requisition of accepted items. But
General Dwight D. Eisenhower wearing the Eisenhower jacket, Paris, August 1944
he was unsuccessful, and he eventually returned to the United States.19
While the theater quartermaster initially rejected the new M1943 jacket on the ground of uncertainty as to its availability, other considerations appear to have influenced his decision. A new waist-length wool jacket, designed to replace the wool serge coat and to double for combat and dress, had been under development in both the United States and the theater for some time.20 Theater commanders, including General Eisenhower, desired a wool jacket resembling the one that was part of the widely admired English “battle dress,” and General Bradley, in March, expressed his opinion that such a jacket, made of rough wool, would be warm enough to protect a soldier in combat without an outer jacket or overcoat. In any case, it could be worn in cold wet weather under the loose-fitting M1943 jacket if this became available, and the theater now urged the War Department to adopt the type of wool jacket it desired.21 In mid-March 1944 it asked for 4,259,000 of these jackets to be delivered by the end of 1944. Early the next month, on a visit to the United States, General Littlejohn obtained acceptance of the basic design of the new short wool jacket, and after his return to London the War Department notified the theater that it had settled on the design of the jacket and scheduled shipments of 2,600,000 in the last quarter of 1944.22
The War Department had never intended, however, that the “Eisenhower jacket,” as the ETO model was later called, should replace the new M1943 jacket. In May it informed the theater that the latter, worn in combination with the high-neck wool sweater, had
been approved and was intended to replace the old Parsons jacket. Because of decreasing stocks and size shortages of the old 1941 jacket, shipments of the M1943 were already being set up against requisitions from the theater. But the theater now made it clear that it did not desire the M1943 jacket, except in limited numbers for parachutists, and it called attention to an agreement which General Littlejohn had reached with General Clay of the Requirements Division, ASF, during his visit to the United States in April under which the old-type field jackets were to be supplied pending the initial deliveries of the new Eisenhower jacket.23
Obviously concerned over the possible consequences of the theater’s decisions, the War Department asked that the matter be checked with Supreme Headquarters. The War Department met General Littlejohn’s original objection by assuring the theater that it could have the 1943 jacket, presumably in the needed quantities, if it so desired.24 A few days later Maj. Gen. Edmund B. Gregory, The Quartermaster General, forwarded a study prepared by the Research and Development Branch summarizing all the data then available from field and laboratory tests on the merits of the various items. General Gregory left no doubt of his misgivings over the adequacy of the theater’s proposed winter uniform, which consisted of the wool field jacket, the overcoat, and the raincoat: the raincoat, he said, could not be considered a combat garment; the overcoat provided entirely inadequate protection against rain and wind, as had been amply demonstrated in Italy; and the combined bulk and weight of the raincoat and overcoat seriously impaired the mobility of the soldier. ETOUSA’s rejection of both the 1943 jacket and the high-neck sweater, in Gregory’s words, “would leave troops [in the European theater] without any garment designed for efficiency in wet cold climates.”25
The theater nevertheless on 1 June confirmed its earlier decision on the 1943 jacket, although it now decided to accept the high-neck sweater. Both Generals Bradley and Hodges, according to the theater quartermaster, had concluded that the overcoat was a necessary part of the winter uniform, and Generals Smith and Crawford at SHAEF had concurred in these recommendations. Two weeks later the theater placed a requisition for 2,250,000 of the sweaters, of which the New York Port agreed to deliver 1,750,000 by September.26
Officers in the Research and Development Branch of the OQMG were clearly disturbed over the theater’s decision. Col. Georges F. Doriot, chief of the branch, pointing out that the winter climate of northeastern France and Belgium was similar to that of Italy, predicted a repetition of the experience of
American troops in Italy during the preceding winter, if ETOUSA persisted in adopting a uniform which, in his opinion, had already been proved inadequate. Captain Pounder likewise had emphasized to the theater quartermaster the point that the area in which U.S. troops could be expected to be operating fell into the wet cold classification and warned that U.S. troops would be improperly clothed unless such items as shoepacs, ski socks, and the woolen sleeping bag, in addition to the 1943 jacket, were adopted. In view of ETOUSA’s recent communications, however, the OQMG had no choice but to eliminate requirements for the 1943 jacket for the European theater except for the limited needs for parachutists, and to divert production to other items.27
On 20 June the theater startled the OQMG with an urgent request for all available information on winter clothing for operations in cold wet climates, information which the War Department had sought with indifferent success to have the theater consider earlier. Colonel Doriot promptly forwarded the desired data and took the opportunity to urge the theater chief quartermaster again to accept the M1943 jacket and to issue it in addition to the high-neck sweater and wool field jacket. Without it, he warned, the front-line soldier would not be adequately protected against cold wet conditions. Both the overcoat and the raincoat, he pointed out, had failed to meet this requirement where mobility was desired. Time was already running desperately short for getting production under way which would meet ETOUSA’s needs for the coming winter.28 But nothing came of this exchange, at least for the moment, and a note of resentment at the War Department’s repeated urgings was indicated in General Littlejohn’s remark early in July that it was not his policy “to force these new items down the throat of troops.”29
General Littlejohn held high hopes at first of getting the required quantities of the much desired Eisenhower jacket. But deliveries of both finished garments and cloth from the United States lagged from the start, and prospects of meeting the original commitment faded rapidly. Early in July the chief quartermaster concluded that it would be at least six months before a sizable number of troops could be supplied with the new jacket.30 Nevertheless, he refrained from making any requests which might divert production from that program. Pending receipt of the new jacket, therefore, he preferred to take substitutes, such as the obsolescent Parsons jacket and even the wool serge blouse, rather than accept the newer 1943 jacket, receipts of which he claimed were already complicating his supply situation. Early in July he asked the War Department to ship the entire
remaining stock of 479,000 of the old 1941 jackets to the European theater.31
The chief quartermaster had also placed great emphasis, as had General Eisenhower, on the desirability of having a dressy uniform, and was hopeful throughout the summer that this requirement would be met by the new wool jacket. His concern over appearance in fact led him to protest repeatedly against the shipment of trousers of a lighter shade which did not match the jacket.32
Littlejohn’s determination on this point was encouraged by the course of tactical operations after the breakout at the end of July. The mounting optimism of the next few weeks was soon reflected in theater supply policy. The OCQM expressed its confidence as early as 15 August that the war would not go into another winter. On that date it submitted a requisition to the War Department for winter clothing specially designed for severe cold for one field army—353,000 men—but purely as a precautionary measure and not in anticipation of any need arising from tactical developments.33
The decision not to requisition special winter clothing earlier had been deliberate and understandable. The theater chief quartermaster had decided on the basis of an analysis of the climatic map of Europe that no special cold climate clothing would be needed. A comparison of the climatic map with the expected rate of the Allied advance showed that U.S. forces would not enter the “cold wet” area, beginning roughly with the Ardennes, until D plus 330, or May 1945. But the phase lines on which those plans had been based represented the course of operations as expected before D Day and hardly constituted a valid basis for planning in mid-August.34
The mid-August requisition, according to the OQMG in Washington, was already one month late in arriving, judged by the theater’s own policy recommendation on the requisitioning of winter clothing.35 More important than the tardiness of the order, however, was its size, which appeared far too small to the OQMG. But when the War Department queried the theater and pointed out that the size of the requisition would result in production cutbacks, the theater on 5 September confirmed the requisition.36 General Littlejohn expressed his own optimism at this time in a personal letter to General Gregory, in which he wrote: “You and I know that
Serving a hot meal to cold infantrymen, Belgium, January 1945. Note cloth overshoes worn by the men
the serious fighting cannot long continue.”37
The confidence which these messages reflected was not confined to the office of the ETOUSA quartermaster. Headquarters, Communications Zone, had asked all the supply services to review their requirements and prepare stop orders in anticipation of the expected end of hostilities. The chief quartermaster even took measures to control the issue of winter clothing to ensure that occupation troops would be the first to get it.
The halt of the pursuit in mid-September and the prospect of winter operations gradually dissipated the rampant optimism which had begun to influence supply policy. Moreover, the slowing down in operations brought to light a new factor to complicate the supply of clothing—the discovery that maintenance and replacement factors had been far from adequate. During the pursuit, General Littlejohn pointed out, it had been impossible to obtain accurate data on either stocks on hand or consumption. Now it was found that wear and tear had been much heavier than expected in units constantly on the move, and that men had lost or discarded large quantities of individual equipment despite attempts to enforce supply discipline.
General Littlejohn estimated that the consumption of major items of clothing and equipment had been at a rate two and one half times that prescribed by War Department maintenance factors.38
With this additional argument the ETOUSA quartermaster on 18 September placed the first of several requests for large quantities of winter clothing and equipment, asserting that he was now confronted with the necessity of completely re-equipping a minimum of one million men, about 100,000 French territorials, and a large number of prisoners of war. He asked that the supplies be made available for distribution on the Continent not later than 10 October.39 In the next two weeks the theater made an appeal for additional quantities of winter equipment, including blankets and sleeping bags. The shortage of blankets was especially critical, having been aggravated by the large number of prisoners (300,000 at the time). On 10 October the theater quartermaster indicated that an additional 500,000 men would have to be re-equipped within the next sixty days.40
Much as it deplored the theater’s resort to emergency requisitioning, there was little the War Department could now do but attempt to meet what apparently were legitimate needs. General Gregory assured the theater quartermaster that his office would do everything possible to provide men in the European theater with a serviceable uniform from stocks available in the United States, although he could not promise to provide matched items for “promenades on the streets of Paris.” He also took the occasion to remind the ETOUSA quartermaster of the efforts which the OQMG had made to supply the theater with adequate equipment. “As you know,” he wrote, “my office has on several occasions made definite recommendations to you as to the proper uniform required for the climate in which you are now operating. In addition to these recommendations being made from a climatology point of view, they were also made from a production point of view, considering the over-all size and deployment of the United States Army.”41
The reference to production suggested that the emergency requisitions for large amounts of winter clothing would not be easily met on such short notice. The Requirements Branch of OQMG pointed out that between 18 September and 1 October the theater had requested 850,000 overcoats after indicating in August that it needed only 45,000 in addition to those previously shipped. At the end of July the theater stated a need for 450,000 overshoes for the remainder of the year, which, with those already in stock would have permitted issue to 75 percent of the troops. But in the last week of September the theater had suddenly placed a demand for an additional 1,173,000 pairs. Calls
were also made for 2,900,000 wool drawers and 2,500,000 wool undershirts over and above previous requests for 1944.42
The War Department was able to fill the 18 September requisition with little trouble, although it drained U.S. stocks in many items. Filling the subsequent requests required certain substitutions, including some used overshoes,43 and led The Quartermaster General to ask the theater quartermaster to review all woolen clothing requirements and to make as many reductions as possible. He warned that any additional requests would have to be accompanied by detailed justification.44
In mid-October the theater submitted the first of several recommended revisions of replacement factors and asked for approval of requisitions based on the new tables. Most of the new factors exceeded those currently authorized by 100 to 150 percent and were greeted with a critical eye in the OQMG. Requests for such changes almost invariably precipitated a long argument between the theater and the War Department. The War Department’s hesitancy about approving increases was inspired in part by the belief that a basic misunderstanding existed on the part of theater officials as to the purpose of replacement factors. The War Department had repeatedly contended that excessive consumption for short periods of time did not warrant radical revisions. Replacement factors, it emphasized, were not established to meet the needs arising from temporary fluctuations in consumption, but rather the average losses or maintenance needs over a long period of time. Replacement factors were used for procurement or production planning, especially for items having a long lead time, and there was an understandable reluctance to change them unless a definite long-term trend was indicated. Excessive losses resulting from unusual and nonrecurring situations, the War Department insisted, should be met through special requisitions. It was particularly hesitant to permit upward revisions for winter clothing items in which it suspected that initial issue requirements had entered into the theater’s demands. Troops were only beginning to wear the overcoat, for example, for which a 100 percent increase in the replacement factor was requested. The War Department consequently refused to give blanket approval to the theater’s requests for increases. Subsequent recommendations submitted by the theater in November and December were also partially rejected.45
Deliveries made against the September and October requisitions were largely completed by mid-December. Meanwhile, receipts of the wool jacket, which
Parsons Jacket 1941 is worn by Field Artillery men, Belgium, January 1945
the theater so ardently desired, had not risen above a trickle.46 Production of the Eisenhower jacket had encountered one difficulty after another, and it became more and more evident in the fall that the War Department would not meet its commitments to deliver 2,600,000 by the end of the year. In mid-September only 14,000 had been shipped against a scheduled delivery of 500,000 in that month.47 Despite this disappointing performance, General Littlejohn continued to omit the M1943 jacket from the list of acceptable substitutes. On 2 October he asked for an additional 1,500,000 of the old Parsons jackets, but had to accept some substitutes, including wool serge overcoats. Troops expressed a strong dislike for the overcoat, however, frequently discarding it in fast-moving situations, and at the end of the month the chief quartermaster acknowledged that it was unsatisfactory as a combat garment and canceled his earlier acceptance of it as a substitute for the 1941 jacket. Faced with shortages in the wool jacket and the rejection of the overcoat, the chief quartermaster now asked the New York Port for 800,000 M1943 jackets to meet deficiencies in all types of jackets to the end of 1944. The War Department immediately assured him that practically the entire requisition could be filled.48
Despite efforts to expedite the delivery of clothing called for in the September and October requisitions, front-line troops fought through a large part of the winter inadequately clothed. Third Army reported in November that 60 percent of its troops lacked sweaters, 50 percent lacked a fourth blanket, and 20 percent lacked overshoes in the proper size. Smaller percentages needed jackets and raincoats.49 The problem became
most acute in December when the weather turned bitterly cold and damp. Frantic efforts were made to supply clothing which would provide the necessary protection. Uniformity and standardization consequently went out the window, for troops wore what was available, including arctic and limited standard items. Lack of a suitable outer garment led them to don additional woolen undershirts and socks. Improvement finally came in January with the arrival and distribution of clothing from the United States.50
The story of the field jacket was closely paralleled in the case of the shoepac, one of the major items which differentiated the uniform recommended by the War Department from that initially adopted by the theater. The shoepac is essentially a combination rubber and leather boot which gives far better protection against water than either the leather boot or cloth overshoe. It was designed to fit over two pairs of socks, one of them a heavy ski sock, and had removable insoles. Later models of the shoepac gave the needed arch support which the combat boot had provided.
In some ways the footwear problem was more complex, and there was more room for legitimate differences of opinion as to what constituted adequate protection under winter conditions. In all its contacts with the theater on the subject of winter clothing, and during the visits of General Littlejohn to Washington and of Captain Pounder to London, the OQMG had consistently included either overshoes or shoepacs in its recommendations. On the basis of tests it had recommended the shoepac as the most suitable item for combat troops under the conditions expected on the Continent.51
Early in July 1944 General Littlejohn indicated his awareness of the problem when he wrote to the OQMG that he unquestionably would be called on to furnish overshoes or the equivalent thereof to all men in the theater for the coming winter and indicated that this would necessitate a substantial requisition at an early date.52 The requisition which he submitted two weeks later, however, called for sufficient overshoes to equip only 75 percent of U.S. troops on the assumption that the combat boot, which was then beginning to replace the old service shoe with leggings, would suffice for a portion of the continental strength. The first request for shoepacs was made on 15 August as part of the requisition for special winter clothing and equipment for one field army.
With the onset of cold wet weather in September it was realized that the combat boot, although an excellent dry weather item, did not offer suitable protection against water and mud, and that 100 percent of the troops on the Continent would need overshoes. The combat boot, like the flesh-out service shoe, was not leak-proof, and troops used both the authorized dubbing and the forbidden shoe polish in an attempt to waterproof
them. Late in September the theater made the first of its supplementary requisitions, calling for 293,000 overshoes. Within two weeks it submitted an additional request for 1,300,000. Early in December it submitted its needs for the first three months of 1945, calling for 500,000 overshoes and an equal number of shoepacs.53
The shortage which the theater faced pending the receipt of these supplementary shipments was aggravated from another source. Shoes and boots which had been fitted during the summer, when men were wearing light woolen or cotton socks, became too tight when worn with two or more pairs of heavy woolen socks. The inevitable result was a demand for larger sizes. This requirement led to a demand for larger overshoes as well. Size tariffs did not allow for the needed high proportion of E, double-E, and triple-E widths. The OQMG’s adoption of a special winter tariff which allowed for greater widths in all types of footgear did not meet the theater’s immediate needs. Overshoes in the larger sizes were lacking well into January. To make matters worse, the cloth-type overshoe tore easily and leaked badly, and the first shoepacs were of an early model which lacked a raised heel and an arch support. Meanwhile many troops adopted the expedient of wearing overshoes without shoes or boots, using several pairs of socks and improvised cardboard insoles.
The lack of adequate footwear became inseparably associated with the precipitate rise in the incidence of trench foot which occurred in the second week of November. Trench foot eventually caused more than 46,000 men to be hospitalized and accounted for 9.25 percent of all the casualties suffered on the Continent. Trench foot is an injury, not an infection. Its cause is long exposure to cold and wet conditions which result in crippling injury to the blood vessels and muscle tissues of the feet. Trench foot is characterized by discoloration and painful swelling, and requires evacuation and prolonged hospital treatment. A large percentage of those affected were unable to return to combat duty; some could no longer perform any military service. The highest rates normally occurred among units (usually infantry divisions) living under wet and cold conditions in relatively static situations. Cold wet conditions, however, were only the most constant factor in the cause of the injury. Failure to rotate troops, improper foot care, and inadequate footgear and clothing, all contributed to the high incidence.
The European theater had been warned about trench foot. The experience of the previous winter in Italy had led the War Department to advise the theater in the summer of 1944 on methods of prevention and control. Theater headquarters in turn drew up directives which were duly passed down through the various echelons. But the seriousness of trench foot as a casualty producer was not widely appreciated outside of a few units which had already had experience with it (as in the 6th Army Group, for example), and the instructions, particularly regarding individual care of the feet, were poorly enforced. Numerous cases of trench foot were reported during the fall. But the problem suddenly became
serious with the launching of Third Army’s offensive in the second week of November, when 1,500 cases were hospitalized. In calling attention to this precipitate rise in trench foot casualties, Col. Alvin L. Gorby, the 12th Army Group surgeon, noted that the condition was largely preventable and called for a campaign to combat it.
The 12th Army Group shortly thereafter issued a circular directing its subordinate commands to enforce preventive measures and threatening disciplinary action for noncompliance.54 But a vigorous theater-wide control program which emphasized command responsibility in enforcing foot care was not launched until the end of January 1945. Training directives, pamphlets, and various media of public communications, such as The Stars and Stripes and Army Talks, were then employed to give the widest possible publicity to the nature and seriousness of trench foot and to the measures by which it could be combated. More important, the major commands now formed trench foot control teams, usually consisting of a line officer and a quartermaster or S-4 officer, to work with unit surgeons and to assist in training and in the supervision of control measures. In addition, noncommissioned officers of demonstrated ability and experience were designated at the company level to supervise and check on foot discipline and to ensure that certain routine preventive measures were taken by individual soldiers, such as the proper wearing of clothing, keeping feet dry and avoiding constriction, and massaging the feet to improve circulation.55 These measures, aided by more moderate weather, brought a distinct improvement in the next two months. By that time, however, the loss of personnel from trench foot and frostbite already approximated the strength of three divisions in the 12th Army Group.
The importance of effective indoctrination, discipline, and individual hygiene in the control of trench foot had been amply demonstrated. Incidence had varied greatly in units with the same type of footgear and living under substantially the same conditions. The effectiveness of control measures, moreover, was found to be directly related to the state of discipline of a unit. Poor discipline was reflected in a high venereal disease rate, a high court-martial rate, a high AWOL rate, and a high trench foot rate.56
Nevertheless, lack of adequate winter clothing and footgear was recognized as an important contributory cause of the casualties resulting from cold.57 Because healthy feet depend in part on a warm body and hands, the War Department had from the beginning emphasized that its proposed winter uniform, whose individual items complemented each other, be considered as a whole. Lack of proper body clothing therefore contributed to foot troubles.
As to footgear itself, the OQMG apparently did not regard any single combination as completely satisfactory
for all situations. In defending the ETOUSA clothing record, the theater quartermaster later called attention to a War Department statement that the shoepac was not necessarily the answer to trench foot, and that the combination of service shoes with overshoes was probably the best combination under most conditions on the Continent. But the service shoe-overshoe combination was admittedly a heavy and awkward combination in any situation requiring mobility, and combat troops frequently discarded the overshoes. The War Department, having concluded that the shoepac was the best article for unusual wet and cold conditions in which men were compelled to stand in water for long periods, had recommended its adoption for combat troops in the spring of 1944.
That the shoepac was not the sole answer to trench foot was shown by experience in the Seventh Army, which was 90 percent equipped with the shoepac and still suffered a sizable number of casualties.58 But the incidence had not been as high as in other armies. This could probably be attributed to the fact that the veteran Seventh Army was somewhat more trench foot conscious as a result of its earlier experiences. But the ETOUSA chief surgeon pointed out that a survey of one general hospital revealed that there were 29 percent fewer cases among troops who wore the shoepac. In many cases the shoepacs had failed to prevent trench foot only because of faulty instruction in their use and fitting.59 The theater chief surgeon
Infantryman wearing a field jacket M-1943 tries on a new pair of shoepacs with wool ski socks, January 1945
had reported as early as December 1944 that the shoepac had been found to be the only mechanical aid which contributed substantially to the prevention of trench foot.60
It appears to have been clearly established that trench foot would have been much less prevalent had combat troops been equipped with the shoepac, whatever the shortcomings of the earlier models. Beyond the requisition for one
field army, ETOUSA did not request additional quantities of the shoepacs until December. In the case of footwear, therefore, as in the case of other items of clothing, it was the War Department’s view that the theater had not given full consideration to experiential data from other theaters and that the chief quartermaster had been slow to adopt winter clothing items which on the basis of both tests and combat experience had been proved superior to the uniform proposed by the ETO.
Responsibility for providing adequate clothing obviously was shared by the theater and the War Department, and responsibility for the shortcomings in this field must also be shared, although in precisely what degree it is difficult to say. Assigning blame for failures in the supply of adequate winter clothing in the winter of 1944–45 is not a simple matter, for some of the decisions on winter clothing had complex origins. An investigation of the clothing controversy was carried out by a committee headed by Col. Charles Garside in the spring of 1945. The investigation dealt almost exclusively with the question of supply—that is, quantity—and not with the adequacy of the uniform from the point of view of protection. The results were inconclusive. In general, the committee found that both the theater quartermaster and the OQMG had planned and acted with intelligence and foresight to meet winter clothing problems, and explained the difficulties over clothing supply as stemming largely from unforeseeable circumstances such as production problems in the United States, transportation difficulties in the theater, extraordinarily high attrition rates, and misjudgment with regard to the end of the fighting in the theater.61
Maj. Gen. Clinton F. Robinson, chief of the Control Division in the ASF, reviewing the investigating committee’s findings for General Somervell, did not accept them in their entirety. He concluded that aside from the unforeseeable difficulties both the War Department and the theater had been remiss in some respects, the War Department primarily for the lateness or inadequacy of research, the theater for improper requisitioning practices and failure to forward requisitions sufficiently far in advance.62
The controversy over the adequacy of various items of clothing—that is, the question of quality—is more complex. To begin with, the Army had been long in arriving at final decisions with respect to various development items in winter clothing. There were conflicting schools of thought within the QMC, and the merits of different principles or theories—the layering idea versus others, for example—were being debated at least as late as December 1943, when a new Table of Equipment was adopted. Personality conflicts clearly account for some of the controversy which developed between General Littlejohn and the OQMG, and these arose at least in part from the fact that the theater quartermaster had personally sponsored and
promoted the ETO jacket in the theater.63
To what extent the problem of availability—that is, production—entered into the theater’s initial rejection of certain items of the War Department’s recommended winter uniform is hard to say. General Littlejohn made much of the lack of assurance on this point in explaining his original decision not to requisition some of the new items. The War Department tended to discount this argument. General Gregory later pointed out that his recommendations had been made with production capabilities in mind, and General Lutes also later claimed that the new 1943 jacket was being produced in ample quantities beginning late in 1943. The implication was that the War Department would not have offered the theater the new items if they could not have been made available in the required quantities, and that the theater’s rejection was not justified on that count.64
It is clear in any case that the War Department and the theater had not come to an understanding as to what would be required by, and what should be supplied to, the theater, particularly with respect to outer garments of the winter uniform. It is perhaps surprising that there should have been room for debate about the make-up of the combat uniform as late as the spring of 1944. From the theater’s point of view there apparently was enough uncertainty and indefiniteness about the question to permit it to plead its own interests and preferences. The War Department was obviously reluctant to impose its decisions and judgment on the theater in the matter. Its indulgence in this respect was not abnormal. The independence which the theater enjoyed in many matters was in line with traditional policy. It was one which the War Department had reason to regret on occasion, most notably, for example, in the handling of manpower resources.65 Perhaps this is the most serious indictment that can be made in the controversy over winter clothing. Whatever the indictment, one incontrovertible fact stands out: the ETOUSA combat soldier wore a uniform that was deficient in proper protection against the cold wet conditions under which he had to fight in the winter of 1944–45.
By the late winter, as the result of substitutions and improvisation, the outstanding characteristic of the ETOUSA uniform was its lack of standardization and simplicity. By that time seventy different items had been issued, including six types of jackets and seven types of trousers, creating insurmountable supply problems.66 In mid-January General Littlejohn summoned the quartermasters of all the major commands to a conference for the purpose of eliminating some of the unsatisfactory items and of reaching an agreement on a single winter combat uniform. Littlejohn had
first planned to call such a meeting in December, but the Ardennes counteroffensive caused it to be postponed.
Little was accomplished at the conference which finally met at Paris on 29 January, for the quartermasters of the 12th Army Group saw no point in discussing items with which most U.S. forces had had no experience. To the First, Third, and Ninth Armies the M1943 combat uniform—consisting of the M1943 jacket with pile liner, the high-neck sweater, the ETO jacket, scarf, and woolen underwear and shirt—was largely an unknown quantity. Col. James W. Younger, the Army Group quartermaster, expressed astonishment that it had not even been made available for field tests.67 Representatives of the 12th Army Group asked for an opportunity to test the 1943 uniform before attempting any decision, and the chief quartermaster agreed to make available small quantities of the complete uniform for tests in all three armies, in the Ninth Air Force, and in the XVIII Airborne Corps.
These units had hardly had sufficient opportunity to test the uniform when the second clothing conference met on 17 March, attended by representatives of the major commands, the chief quartermaster, the chief surgeon, and the OQMG, including a shoe expert from the War Production Board.68 The conference disclosed a wide range of opinion among the armies on the various items, and there was complete accord on only a few items such as underwear and shirts, and on the demand that leather be reversed on the combat boot. The greatest controversy arose over the type of jacket to be adopted. Third Army, which had carried out tests in the 4th Armored and 26th Infantry Divisions, particularly favored the ensemble designed for armored units, which included a widely admired combat jacket. But the production of this ensemble had already been terminated in the United States.
The diversity of opinion on many items led General Littlejohn to appoint a committee headed by Colonel Younger to consolidate the many recommendations and summarize the consensus of the conference. On the most controversial item the tabulation of preferences was not conclusive, for four of the five armies voted for both the M1943 jacket and the armored combat jacket. But the final uniform recommendations of the committee closely resembled the M1943 uniform that the War Department had repeatedly proposed, which included the wool field jacket (for dress wear), the M1943 combat jacket (modified somewhat), shoepacs, service boots, a trench-coat type of field coat, ponchos, and leather gloves with wool inserts.69
The conference made certain compromises
because of known production limitations, and was not completely successful in deciding on a simple, single uniform. But it proposed the elimination of 21 items then authorized for issue in the theater, the reduction in the number of sizes by 59, and a reduction in the number of basic fabrics from 10 to 4.70
General Littlejohn’s personal report to The Quartermaster General on the results of the conference, in which he underscored the armies’ preference for the armored combat jacket, only rekindled the old controversy between the OQMG and the office of the theater quartermaster. General Gregory’s reply strongly suggested that the theater quartermaster’s conclusions did not accurately represent those of the clothing conference. More important, he considered General Littlejohn’s conclusions inadequately supported by experiential data, for they were based largely on the experience of men who had not had an adequate opportunity to test the complete 1943 uniform. Admitting the popularity of the armored combat jacket and trousers, General Gregory showed that the preponderance of evidence from those who had used both the M1943 uniform and the former combination had indicated a decided preference for the 1943 ensemble. Only the Fifth and Seventh Armies, he maintained, had had any substantial measure of experience with the items comprising the authorized uniform, and he found it highly significant that those experienced organizations had arrived at the same conclusions.71 The whole argument had of course long since become academic so far as the ETOUSA soldier in the winter of 1944–45 was concerned.
(3) Weapons and Vehicles
Shortages of ordnance equipment were probably the most serious in the Class II and IV category because of the immediate and direct effect which the lack of both tactical and cargo vehicles and weapons could have on operations. Shortages ranged from major items such as tanks, trucks, and artillery pieces to tires and tire patches, trailers, automatic weapons, fire control equipment, and antifreeze.
While transportation affected deliveries in the late summer and fall, shortages of ordnance equipment were mainly the result of high attrition and inadequate receipts in the theater. Early in November SHAEF provided the War Department with statistics to illustrate the rate at which supplies were being
consumed or expended in the European theater. Every day, it reported, nearly 1,200 small arms weapons, 1,300 bayonets, and 5,000 tires were lost. Every month 700 mortars, 375 medium and 125 light tanks, 900 2½-ton trucks, 1,500 jeeps, 100 cannon of various calibers, and 150 tubes had to be replaced. These were total losses, and did not take into account unserviceable equipment which could be repaired. In the latter category, for example, were the 100 2½-ton trucks which had to be taken off the Red Ball route every day.72 Lack of spare parts for these vehicles and of adequate maintenance and repair facilities resulted in a rising number of deadlined vehicles. These totaled 15,000 in November.73
The shortage of many Class II and IV items was attributed in part to War Department replacement or maintenance factors, which the theater claimed did not match monthly losses. The First Army showed that the loss rate for the 4.2-inch mortar, for example, was approximately double the authorized 12.5 percent per month, and stated that the consumption rates for all signal equipment were far above the maintenance rates established by the War Department.74 The importance of having adequate replacement factors lay in the fact that it was on the basis of them that theater reserve levels were established. Consumption of supplies or losses of equipment which greatly exceeded the maintenance or replacement factors could result in a sudden reduction of reserves because of the normally long lag in delivery time.
The problem of replacement factors was nowhere better illustrated than in the case of the medium tank. Attempts to get the replacement factor for the M4 tank revised had a long history, dating back to preinvasion days when the theater had predicted that losses in the landings would not be covered by the currently authorized factor of 7 percent. As with other items of equipment, however, the War Department insisted that any requests for revision must be backed by experiential data from actual combat. In June it raised the factor to 9 percent, but, as before, mainly on the basis of experience in Italy, for no conclusive data were yet available from operations in France.
Losses in the first three months were considerably above the existing replacement factor, and thus tended to confirm the theater’s earlier assertions. In mid-August ETOUSA reported that its reserves were exhausted; by mid-September it was finding it increasingly difficult to keep armored units at their authorized Table of Organization and Equipment (T/O&E) strength.75 The War Department meanwhile had agreed
to expedite the shipment of tanks already released. But receipts did not meet requirements despite the lower losses which attended the revision to more static operations in the next few months. Losses in September came to 16.5 percent of the theater’s T/O&E strength as compared with 25.3 percent in August. In October the rate fell to 9.8 percent. In November the rate advanced to 11.2 percent and in December shot up to 22.8, reflecting the greatly intensified combat activity.76
Early in October the War Department had announced an increase in the replacement factor for the medium tank from 9 to 11 percent. But this revision was made on the basis of the combined loss experience of 9.9 percent in the North African and European theaters in the month of July, and did not reflect the experience of August and September. By October the cumulative loss rate, according to the 12th Army Group, was nearer 20 percent in the European theater.77 Revisions in the replacement factor consequently lagged far behind current experience.
Under these circumstances the theater found it impossible to maintain units at their authorized strength, to say nothing of reconstituting reserves. At the end of September First Army, having operated with approximately 85 percent of its authorized strength in tanks during the month, adopted the expedient of temporarily suspending the Tables of Organization and Equipment of armored units so far as medium tanks were concerned, and reducing the authorized strengths in order to effect an equitable distribution of the available tanks and to establish a small reserve. The new T/O&E’s temporarily cut the authorized strengths in 75-mm. and 76-mm. gun tanks from 232 to 200 for armored divisions organized under the old T/O&E (the 2nd and 3rd Divisions only), from 168 to 150 for divisions organized under the latest T/O&E (all remaining armored divisions), and from 54 to 50 for separate tank battalions. The Ninth Army later adopted the same provisional T/O&E’s for its armored formations.78
The situation saw no improvement during the fall months. By the end of November there were on hand in the theater only 3,344 tanks against a T/O&E requirement of 3,409 and an authorized on-hand reserve requirement of 937.79 No true reserve existed, therefore. The 12th Army Group reported
that two of its tank battalions had fewer than ten serviceable tanks, and field commanders in general deplored the fact that armored units had to operate at from 10 to 25 percent below authorized strength. Furthermore, the current theater troop basis failed to provide the one tank battalion per infantry division which field commanders considered a necessary minimum. As a partial remedy steps were taken to convert two battalions of the 10th Armored Group to composite tank battalions for use with infantry divisions.80
The field commands had continued to urge the theater to obtain a higher replacement factor, arguing that a larger flow of replacement tanks was imperative if the habitual infantry-tank cooperation which had characterized all operations thus far was to continue. The 12th Army Group noted that at no time since the middle of August had the armies had their full T/O&E allowance of tanks, and that not since the early days of the Normandy beachhead had they possessed a reserve. It maintained that a 25 percent reserve in each army was an operational necessity.81
One factor which plagued all supply between the zone of interior and the theater, and which never seemed to get sufficient consideration, was the time lag between the submission of requisitions and the eventual delivery of replacements. Because of the handling problem involved in the case of tanks, this time lag had a marked bearing on the theater’s supply position. Time required to submit loss reports to the War Department and to obtain releases of replacement tanks, time required to move tanks from factories to ports and to load them for shipment, time required for unloading in the theater in the absence of adequate discharge facilities, and delays in reporting losses, including tanks deadlined for lack of spare parts, all contributed to what must have seemed an interminable lag between requisition and delivery. In addition, the large number of tanks habitually under repair in the various echelons appeared to justify increasing the reserve factor. Theater officials were cognizant of these factors in the supply of tanks as well as other items, and it was for this reason that they had requested and been granted a sixty-day shipping factor in addition to the seventy-five-day reserve level. The low replacement factor, however, had become the more vital consideration, and it was the focal point of all attempts to remedy the situation.
Improvement finally came in December, the month of reckoning for several other major logistic problems, partly as the result of the first-hand investigation which Lt. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, Director of Operations, ASF, made during his visit to the theater. The theater presented the ASF official with an exhaustive analysis of its medium tank situation. It concluded that with currently scheduled receipts it would meet its T/O&E needs for the next two months, but predicted that it would be short approximately 1,100 tanks against its authorized reserves. It argued that a large portion of the reserve must be on hand to provide a cushion against
losses. Additional tanks totaling 22 percent of the T/O&E—the equivalent of the sixty-day shipping and order time at 11 percent per month—it stated, should be on release and in the pipeline to ensure adequate maintenance requirements. On this basis it asked for the release of 1,102 tanks for January lift in addition to those already scheduled. The analysis and request were also dispatched to the War Department.82
As was so often the case, the theater’s data conflicted with the picture as seen in the War Department, partly because of the different replacement factors used and partly because of the War Department’s habit of considering all tanks, whether actually on hand in the theater or just released, as part of the theater’s assets. The theater and the War Department rarely saw eye to eye on this matter, as was also evidenced in the argument over ammunition.83 On the other hand, the theater had used a replacement factor of only 13.1 percent in its computations, far below the exaggerated claims of 25 percent which had repeatedly been made by the armies.
In any case, General Lutes was now completely convinced that the theater’s shortage of medium tanks was much more critical than indicated by the War Department studies, and he agreed that it was imperative to ship additional tanks to Europe as quickly as possible and to raise the replacement factor. On 17 December officials in Washington went over the entire problem with the Lutes mission in a transatlantic telephone conference. Washington now accepted the theater’s computations and agreed to release 1,010 medium tanks in addition to the 250 scheduled for delivery to the port by the end of January.
Only two days before this the War Department had raised the replacement factor from 11 to 14 percent. On General Lutes’ recommendations it now agreed to raise it still further, to 20 percent, but with the understanding that this was a temporary concession and was to apply only during the next critical months, or until 1 May 1945.84 In a memorandum to General Somervell several days later Lutes admitted that a higher replacement factor should have been adopted earlier even though there were doubts as to whether U.S. production could have met the demand. The theater later reported a cumulative loss rate of only 12.8 percent through January 1945.85
While the War Department’s action promised to place the theater in a healthy situation by the end of February, it provided no answer to the plight in which the theater found itself as a result of the Ardennes counteroffensive. First Army’s medium tank losses in December were to total nearly 400, three times the casualties suffered in the preceding
Medium tanks ready for shipment from Marseille to combat areas, 10 February 1945
month.86 To meet its immediate replacement needs the theater had to seek relief closer at hand. On 19 December it appealed to its neighbor to the south, the Mediterranean theater, to release seventy-five tanks which had been consigned to U.S. forces in Italy but which for some reason had been unloaded at Marseille and were already in Delta Base Section. ETOUSA proposed to repay this loan by asking the War Department to divert to the Mediterranean an equal number then being loaded at New York for shipment to Europe. General McNarney, the MTOUSA commander, readily agreed. In fact, a few days later the Mediterranean theater announced that it was releasing a total of 150 tanks for transfer to France.87
ETOUSA next asked 21 Army Group to survey its resources to determine whether any number of tanks up to 500 could be made available, promising repayment in February. Montgomery responded by offering to release 351 tanks to U.S. forces, 254 of which were delivered to the First Army and 97 to the Third before the end of the month.88
British forces could easily afford such a transfer, for they held disproportionately high reserves—totaling 1,900 Shermans—in the United Kingdom. At the end of the month General Somervell directed Maj. Gen. James K. Crain, U.S. executive of the London Munitions Assignments Board (LMAB), to bid for 1,000 of these tanks. Somervell pointed out that the establishment of a 35-percent reserve for both U.S. and British forces and the restoration of equality between the two would actually require the transfer of 1,147 tanks.
But these instructions were rescinded. In view of the measures recently taken to meet ETOUSA’s shortages from the United States, it was decided instead to assign the entire output of U.S. production to U.S. forces until their reserves in Europe totaled 2,000, which was expected to require four months. Complete parity on a percentage basis was not expected to be achieved before June, since British forces were promised a hundred mediums per month beginning in April. Under these arrangements no attempt was to be made to repay the loan of 351 tanks made by 21 Army Group in December. In any event, action had finally been taken to correct the misdistribution of reserves between the two forces.89
Efforts to provide the theater with armor of better quality continued throughout the fall and winter, but with little tangible result for the theater in this period. Production, and consequently deliveries, of the 76-mm. gun tank fell behind schedule, in part because of design changes in suspension and tracks and because of tooling up for the newer 90-mm. gun tank.90 The theater therefore took no action to request the complete elimination of the 75-mm. gun tank until January 1945, although priority was given to the loading of the 76-mm. gun model in the New York Port whenever possible. While the theater received increasing numbers of the 76s, the obsolescent short-barreled 75 continued to be the principal weapon of armored units throughout the fall and winter.91
Equipping 300 M4s with British 17-pounder guns, plans for which had been made in August 1944, was postponed again and again because of the shortage of reserves with which to make the conversion.92 Improved ammunition, high-velocity, armor-piercing (HVAP), for the 76-mm. gun was shipped to the theater in this period, but receipts amounted to less than two rounds per gun per month until March 1945.93
The 105-mm. howitzer tank, first hailed as meeting the need for a tank with better high explosive ammunition,
arrived in satisfactory numbers and was never in critical supply. But this tank did not live up to expectations because of its lack of a powered turret traverse. A later model contained the desired power traverse mechanism, but tanks so equipped did not reach the New York Port until the final month of hostilities and never saw combat.
The 90-mm. gun tank, first known as the T26 and later as the M26 or Pershing, and long-awaited as the answer to the theater’s need for armament that could match the Germans’, did not become available for shipment until January 1945. A token number first saw action on 15 February. Theater officials had twice revised their recommendations as to the ratio in which they desired the 105-mm. howitzer tank and the newer 90-mm. gun tank supplied. Before D Day they had advised a ratio of one 90-mm. gun tank to three 105s. In October, on the basis of combat experience with the latter, they recommended a ratio of two to one. Early in January 1945 the ratio was further altered to four to one in favor of the 90-mm. gun tank.94
The shortage of trucks was evident early in the fall and extended well into the winter. All armies reported critical deficiencies and a high deadline rate, and in October representatives of SHAEF, ETOUSA, and 12th Army Group met to establish priorities for the issue of vehicles.95 Operational losses had far exceeded War Department replacement factors and by the end of November had exhausted continental reserves. Lack of the desired percentage of heavy duty trucks (over 2½ tons) had accentuated the rapid deterioration, for the smaller 2½-ton general purpose vehicle was not well suited to long-distance hauling, which, along with overloading and improper maintenance, accounted for a high mortality rate. Trucks with larger capacity had been in production in the United States for more than a year, partly as a result of pressure applied since the North African campaign. But heavy duty vehicles had never been manufactured in large numbers in the United States, and production thus far had fallen short of the goals. Pressure to turn out heavy duty vehicles meanwhile had a detrimental effect on the production of the standard types, with resulting deficits in the output of 2½-ton trucks also. In both cases the foundry industry, which was unable to expand rapidly enough to supply the castings for the full complements of axles, transmissions, and engines, was the most persistent bottleneck.96
Like most deficiencies, the vehicle shortage had many ramifications. More vehicles were actually made available to the New York Port than could be shipped to the theater in the fall months of 1944. Lack of port capacity on the Continent, with its resultant accumulation of ships in European waters, had led the War
Department to cut the number of sailings to the theater. The higher priority given to the shipment of weapons, combat vehicles, tires and tubes, antifreeze, and all types of spare parts for the equipment already in the theater left little space for vehicles on the allotted commodity-loaders, with the result that virtually no general purpose vehicles could be lifted in November and December. Paradoxically, the theater claimed late in December that, despite the over-all port deficiency, unused discharge capacity actually existed in both the U.K. ports and at Cherbourg which, though unsuitable for other types of supplies, could have accepted thirty vehicle ships and thus given the theater about 30,000 badly needed trucks.97 But General Lutes, when told of this during his visit to the theater in December, found no evidence that theater officials had made a point of this in communications with the War Department.98
Early in January the theater claimed shortages of 33,000 vehicles and estimated that with currently scheduled shipments it would still be short about 30,000 on 1 February and 35,000 on 1 March. To meet at least part of this deficit it initially asked the War Department to dispatch twenty-five ships solidly loaded with vehicles for arrival in February. After a more searching review of the theater’s future needs, which considered the requirements for operations beyond the Rhine and took into account the civil relief needs and the poor prospects for local procurement, General Somervell, who was then in the theater, increased the requisition to thirty ships for February and directed that an additional fifty be dispatched for March arrival. Maj. Gen. Charles P. Gross, the Chief of Transportation in Washington, at first questioned the theater’s ability to receive such numbers in view of the continuing bank of idle ships in European waters. But Somervell was apparently convinced of the theater’s discharge capacity and ordered the shipments set up without further discussion.99 Shipments made against this directive brought substantial relief by the time of the Rhine crossing in March.
Tires were another item in which truly critical shortages developed in the fall of 1944. The War Department had actually warned all major commands of potential shortages as early as December 1943, and announced its allocations policy, just as it had for other supplies in which it was known that production would fail to meet demands. Headquarters, ETOUSA, passed this information on to its subordinate commands and directed them to enforce rigid compliance
with preventive maintenance and conservation standards.100
Enforcement of these well-conceived regulations was something less than ideal. This, plus the grueling conditions which accounted for a high mortality of vehicles, only accentuated the shortages already caused by production shortfalls in the United States. It was soon apparent that the War Department replacement factor of 7.5 percent was much too low in view of the constant use to which vehicles had been put. By early September every command was aware of the deterioration which was snowballing into critical proportions. An inspection of trucks in the Advance Section at that time revealed that 70 percent of its vehicles had already run an average of 10,000 miles. Even assuming 100 percent tread wear, which did not take into account tires replaced because of damage resulting from cuts, overload breaks, or accidents, the average mileage expectancy of tires was calculated to be about 12,000 miles. From this it was evident that several thousand tires would have to be replaced within the next few weeks. The same situation could be assumed to apply in other commands.101
Replacement of worn-out tires fell behind as early as September. By the end of November the 12th Army Group, then deeply engaged in its autumn offensive, claimed that the lack of tires was actually affecting operations.102 No immediate and substantial relief was in sight. On the basis of available stocks and foreseeable replacements from the United States the Communications Zone in fact concluded that the theater faced an emergency of the gravest nature. Repair and retreading had fallen far behind for lack of materials, particularly camelback. Delays in the shipment of this vital commodity, combined with the small shipment of new tires, led the Communications Zone to predict a deficit of at least 250,000 tires by the end of January and the deadlining of 10 percent of the theater’s vehicles. General Lee, while describing the dark outlook at a command and staff conference early in December, noted that the chief of transportation had already been forced to deadline all one-ton trailers and one thousand vehicles for lack of tires.103
Some measures had already been taken to meet the crisis. In November Brig. Gen. Hugh C. Minton, director of the Production Division, ASF, had arrived in the theater to survey local productive capacity, and after an inspection of eight plants in France and Belgium recommended the reactivation of the local industrial capacity. Late in the month representatives from SHAEF and the Communications Zone met and decided to form a rubber committee which was to promote the development of civilian resources for tire production and repair
on the Continent and allocate a fair share of the tires produced to civilian and military needs. Representatives from the G-4 and G-5 Divisions of both SHAEF and the Communications Zone, SHAEF Mission to France, the General Purchasing Agent, and the theater ordnance officer were appointed to the committee, which immediately took steps to restore the tire industry to production.
The program did not promise substantial relief in the immediate future. As was the case in several other attempts at local procurement, it created as many problems as it solved. Production in France and Belgium depended on the import of raw materials and on the allocation of transportation and power, all of which were critically short, and in addition entailed the division of the product between military and civilian needs. The program got under way in good time, however, and bore the first fruit on 4 January, when the first tire was turned out from American synthetics at the Goodrich plant in Paris. Before the end of the month the Goodrich plant was producing at a rate of 4,000 tires per month and the Michelin plant at the rate of 2,000. Before long six plants were in operation in France and Belgium. The War Department also considered the possibility of procurement in Spain, but the shortage of carbon black made this impossible. In fact, lack of this vital component forced cutbacks in U.S. production and threatened to force suspension of the program in Europe.104
The theater had also launched a vigorous campaign to enforce preventive maintenance. Tire inspections had shown that 40 percent of all replacement needs could be laid to underinflation, overloading, or other abuses. The widest possible publicity was therefore given to the importance of preventive maintenance, including such points as proper tire pressure, maximum speeds, rotation of tires, proper wheel alignment, avoidance of overloading, and daily inspections for cuts and bruises. Both The Stars and Stripes and the Armed Forces Network radio were enlisted in the campaign to make vehicle drivers conservation conscious, and a slogan contest was held, with prizes in the form of War Bonds and two-day passes to Paris.105
The War Department meanwhile had been bending every effort to increase its shipments to the theater. To meet emergency needs it combed the zone of interior for extra tires, collecting all stocks from posts, camps, and stations, removing tires from all unserviceable vehicles that were not immediately repairable, and stripping spares from all vehicles except for minimum emergency pools for convoy operations. Increasing production proved a thorny problem, partly because of material and manpower shortages, but also because of bad labor relations in the rubber industry. Labor and management eventually signed an agreement which brought about a moratorium in labor disputes affecting tire production. The War Department at the same
time released skilled workers to tire plants to ease the manpower shortages.106 By these expedients the desperate theater shortage was gradually eased.
Production shortfalls in vehicles and tires were fairly symptomatic of the difficulties which had plagued munitions output in general. In both cases the shortages had been foreseen for several months, for they had resulted in part from a general slackening of effort in the United States. The production of munitions had fallen off as early as November 1943 and had remained for several months at levels unequal to expected demands. The contagious optimism growing out of the midsummer pursuit in France encouraged this trend, causing workers to leave factories turning out badly needed munitions to seek other employment. These developments, combined with the increasing demands arising from unexpected consumption and attrition in the active theaters, inevitably led to critical deficits.
The War Department had taken measures to counteract this trend with a determined drive to stimulate production. In an attempt to ease the manpower shortage General Somervell in the summer of 1944 first secured the release of servicemen to foundries, and then secured authorization to furlough up to 2,500 men for ninety-day periods to aid in the manufacture of 105-mm. shells. At the same time the ASF enlisted the help of the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, and the Military Affairs (Mead) Committee of the Senate to impress upon labor the need for greater output. General Eisenhower had already made an appeal via the press in August for the maximum flow of munitions. Early in January General Somervell asked the Supreme Commander to send a message to both management and labor emphasizing the critical needs of the European theater.107