Chapter 10: The Troop Build-Up August 1944–March 1945
(1) The Flow of Divisions
Logistic difficulties in the fall of 1944 logically should have had an adverse effect on the scheduled build-up of U.S. forces in the European theater, at least on the Continent. On the contrary, the flow of American units was actually accelerated in the face of the bad port and transportation situation in the fall of 1944, and the build-up of the original troop basis was completed substantially ahead of schedule. In the end, a much larger number of troops went to the European theater than had been planned.
Theater officials had considered the possibility of an acceleration in the build-up as early as June. At that date, however, there was little in the way of experiential data to indicate the advisability of such a course. A decision still had not been reached at the time of the breakout at the end of July, although General Eisenhower by that time had asked the War Department to add one division to the scheduled September shipments in order to maintain the level in the United Kingdom at four.
At the end of July there were 22 divisions in the theater, 18 of which were on the Continent, and plans at the time called for the shipment of about 4 divisions each month from the United States to complete the build-up of 47 by the end of January 1945.1 By the first week of September (D plus 90) there were 26 divisions in the theater (exclusive of the 3 in southern France), 20 of which were then on the Continent as compared with the scheduled 21.
Meanwhile, early in August, when the tactical situation suddenly took an unexpected turn, the War Department made the first of several proposals to speed the flow of divisions from the United States. Anticipating the early capture of the Brittany and Loire ports and the likelihood that ETOUSA might want to expedite the flow of troops from the United States directly to the Continent, it offered to advance the shipment of two infantry divisions (the 26th and 104th) by about two weeks, from early September to late August, if ETOUSA could make an immediate decision.
General Eisenhower, who was anxious
to exploit the favorable situation then developing in France, promptly accepted the offer. He recognized that there might be administrative difficulties, for there were doubts about the capacity of both the British ports and continental beaches and ports to handle additional divisions before the end of September, but it was agreed that the difficulties could be overcome somehow.2
The advancement of two divisions by two weeks hardly constituted a radical alteration in plans. But the War Department quickly followed up with a proposal much more far-reaching in its implications. On 11 August, two days after the theater had agreed to the first speedup, the War Department proposed to ship in September not only the three divisions which remained on the schedule for that month, but all five divisions on the October schedule as well, thus advancing the entire build-up by a month and five divisions. In offering the speed-up it indicated that in most cases the only limiting factor was the time needed to pack equipment and move it to the ports for loading.3
General Eisenhower was elated with the prospects for a speedier build-up of additional combat strength. But supply officials received the offer with strong misgivings, claiming that it threatened serious complications in the cargo shipping situation. The Communications Zone earlier had announced a minimum requirement for 285 shiploads of cargo plus the equivalent of another 27 loads on tanker decks and in War Shipping Administration ships for September arrival. The War Department had already indicated in July that it could provide only 200 of that number because of the shortage of shipping. Protests from the theater were of no avail. In fact, early in August, coincident with the first acceleration in divisional movements, the War Department announced a further cut of 21 ships, reducing the allocation to 179 cargoes. Within a few days, to the astonishment of the theater, it proposed to cancel another 20, which would have reduced the September arrivals to 159.
The Communications Zone vigorously protested these proposals, arguing that the intended cancellations would result in withholding supplies and equipment of the highest operational priority from the theater. It now asked the War Department to restore as many ships as possible up to 250, which it regarded as an irreducible minimum. General Eisenhower supported this request, at least to the extent of restoring the two most recent cuts, totaling 41 ships. He was anxious to have the additional speed-up in the flow of divisions, however, and indicated that the theater was prepared to accept the difficulties it would entail.4
Transportation officials in Washington did not share ETOUSA’s anxieties over cargo shipping, pointing out that current sailing schedules would more
than match the theater’s most optimistic forecasts of its discharge capabilities. They assured the theater that they could easily step up sailings at any time if its discharge rate indicated that the port backlogs were being reduced. Nevertheless, the War Department relented and met a large part of the theater’s request, raising the September allocation to 220 ships plus an equivalent of 35 loads on tanker decks.5
At this time—mid-August—the War Department also forecast the availability of divisions for later shipments—that is, beyond September—and asked the theater whether it wanted the gains extended by advancing the sailing dates of divisions originally scheduled for later shipment. In fact, it actually offered a further acceleration in the flow, for it proposed to ship in October all 3 divisions originally scheduled for November and, in addition, 3 of those scheduled for December. This would advance the build-up by almost two months and by a total of 6 divisions, and would bring the U.S. build-up in Europe to 42 divisions sometime in November. Again the War Department asked for a prompt decision because of the need to start the reconditioning, packing, moving, and loading of equipment.6
As could be expected, the latest proposal aroused new fears among those responsible for the logistic support of U.S. forces. COMZ staff officers were particularly apprehensive over the effect which the speed-up would have on the theater’s balance of service and combat troops, for the War Department had given no assurance that the divisions would be accompanied by adequate service troops. In fact, it had repeatedly told the theater that it could not increase the flow of engineer, medical, and signal units in line with the shipments of combat units. General Eyster, the ETOUSA G-3, estimated that the proposed shipments would lower the division slice to about 38,000 men by the end of October and would cause a serious thinning out of logistic support. Colonel Whipple, the SHAEF logistic plans chief, supported this view, asserting that such a reduction would be acceptable only if the new divisions were to relieve combat-weary units, which would therefore not have to be supported at full combat scales. General Stratton, the G-4, predicted in addition that critical shortages of supplies, notably in ordnance and signal Class II items, and in ammunition, would develop.7
The speed-up also had serious implications with regard to the continental ports. Receiving, staging, and equipping the sixteen divisions which would arrive in the nine weeks between 9 September and 12 November would impose a heavy administrative burden in the port areas, involving troops which were badly needed to support the forces already in the field. Shipments arriving directly from the United States would have to be accepted either at the beaches or at
Cherbourg. But the Normandy beaches were expected to deteriorate rapidly in September. Cherbourg, with extremely limited capacity, was the only port thus far restored possessing facilities suitable for handling heavy cargo, and its use for troop units would involve the diversion of important cargo.8 On this basis alone Colonel Whipple advised limiting the shipment of divisions to one per convoy in October instead of the two proposed. At this time U.S. forces were already crossing the Seine, and Whipple accurately foresaw that logistic difficulties would shortly become the major factor limiting operations. He recommended that the provision of additional service troops be given a higher priority than the movement of combat units, and, in anticipation of the inevitable delays in the development of rail transportation, that the introduction of motor transport be given greater emphasis.9
Despite these warnings the theater decided to accept the War Department’s proposed schedule of shipments, its reply of 20 August stating only that it “understood” that the flow of service troops would not be prejudiced.10
With the acceptance of the War Department’s plan of shipments through October only five divisions of the original forty-seven-division troop basis remained to be scheduled for shipment. By mid-August it was taken for granted, however, that the European theater would get the nine divisions in the undeployed reserve which the War Department had tentatively earmarked for ETOUSA a month before. Fourteen divisions therefore remained to be shipped to Europe after October, and the question now arose as to how these should be scheduled.
Thus far the War Department had anticipated no difficulties in carrying out the speed-up, for all the divisions involved had been maneuver-trained at one time or another, and could be adequately outfitted by withholding equipment from units remaining in the United States. Thereafter, however, the pinch would begin to be felt in both training and equipment. Late in August the War Department informed the theater of the training status of each of the remaining divisions, and also listed the equipment shortages which would affect the combat readiness of units remaining to be shipped. It offered alternative shipping schedules, the more accelerated of the two involving some sacrifice in combined maneuver training, and left it to the theater to choose between the two. It offered to make some revisions in training and production schedules based on the theater’s estimate of its needs.11
Theater officials hesitated to ask for the speedier build-up at the expense of combined maneuver training. But in
the end it requested the best possible flow schedule, subject only to the condition that units be fully equipped.12 On this basis the War Department offered revised build-up schedules indicating the readiness dates for divisions with varying levels of training. It revealed that the major equipment shortages were in combat ordnance items and would affect mainly the readiness of armored divisions.13 With this information the theater decided on a somewhat accelerated flow, which called for 1 division in November, 5 in December, 3 in January, 3 in February, and 1 in March.14 This schedule made it possible for all divisions shipped after October to have the equivalent of one month’s maneuver training at their home stations.15
Apparently anticipating some of the internal difficulties which might attend the accelerated flow of divisions, the theater commander meanwhile considered the possibility of diverting two or three divisions from northern France and routing them through Marseille, where port capacity was expected to be more adequate. The War Department, when queried on 5 September as to the shipping implications, replied on the following day that the switch could be made, and presented alternate schemes for carrying out the suggestion. Much depended on whether the theater desired general-purpose vehicles to accompany the units, for the vehicles of the October divisions had already been released for preshipment and were consigned to northern ports. The War Department suggested that ETOUSA arrange a loan of vehicles from the North African theater, which it could repay later. But General Devers proposed to solve the problem by providing vehicles from stocks already available in southern France and by borrowing from other units.
Meanwhile the War Department had emphasized that it must have a decision within four days (10 September) in order to implement the plan. On 7 September SHAEF cabled its acceptance of the plan to ship the 11th Armored Division and the 99th and 103rd Infantry Divisions through Marseille. Transmission of the message was delayed an entire week, partially as the result of the disruption in communications occasioned by the movement of both COMZ and SHAEF headquarters to the Continent at this time. On 13 September, having received no word from ETOUSA, Washington notified the theater that its proposal to divert the above-named divisions was no longer possible. The War Department offered to divert four other divisions, however, if notification was received by the 21st. ETOUSA asked that three of the four divisions be shipped to Marseille as proposed, and the War Department accordingly made arrangements to divert the 14th Armored
Table 7: OVERLORD divisional build-up D plus 90 to D plus 210*
| Date | Total Theater Build-up | Continental Build-up | ||||
| Original Plan | Actual | Original Plan (Plan X) | Plan Y† | Plan Z† | Actual | |
| D plus 90 (4 September 1944) | 24 | 26 | 21 | – | – | 20‡ |
| D plus 120 (4 October 1944) | 29 | 33 | 25 | 27 | – | 30 |
| D plus 150 (3 November 1944) | 34 | 41 | 30 | 34 | 35 | 34 |
| D plus 180 (3 December 1944) | – | 44 | – | – | 41 | 39 |
| D plus 210 (2 January 1945) | – | 49 | – | – | – | 46 |
* Exclusive of the three divisions in Operation DRAGOON.
† See Logistical Support I, 454-55.
‡ Exclusive of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, which had returned to the United Kingdom.
and the 100th and 103rd Infantry Divisions, scheduled for early October shipment, to southern France.16 The three divisions arrived at Marseille between 20 and 29 October.
The stepped-up flow of divisions in the north soon brought its problems, as supply officials had predicted. Eight divisions arrived in France in September. Three of them crossed over from the United Kingdom; 5 came directly from the United States, the first troop convoy arriving at Cherbourg on 7 September with elements of the 26th and 104th Infantry Divisions. These arrivals raised the theater’s strength to 33 divisions on D plus 120 (4 October), 4 divisions above the build-up originally planned, and brought the continental strength up to 30 for a gain of 5 over the build-up scheduled for that date. (Table 7)
Increasing difficulties attended the introduction of this extra combat strength onto the Continent in the face of the acute transportation shortage and the failure to take Brest. The wisdom of the policy was soon questioned in view of the inability of the theater to support additional units in combat. Four of the divisions (the 104th, 44th, and 102nd Infantry and the 10th Armored) did not see action for at least five weeks, and one (the 9th Armored) remained uncommitted as a unit until mid-December. Lack of equipment, some of which had to be discharged in the United Kingdom, was a major contributing cause.
Divisions continued to cross over to the Continent from England in the next months. Except for the three diversions to Marseille, however, not a single division
Table 8: Divisional build-up in the European Theater, 1942–1945
| Unit | Arrival in theater f | Arrival on Continent f | Entry into combat | Days of Combat |
| 29th Infantry | 11 October 42 | 6 June 44 | 7 June 44 | 242 |
| 5th Infantry | 9 August 43 | 9 July 44 | 16 July 44 | 270 |
| 101st Airborne | 15 September 43 | 6 June 44 | 6 June 44 | 214 |
| 3rd Armored | 15 September 43 | 24 June 44 | 9 July 44 | 231 |
| 28th Infantry | 18 October 43 | 24 July 44 | 27 July 44 | 196 |
| 2nd Infantry | 19 October 43 | 8 June 44 | 8 June 44 | 303 |
| 1st Infantrya | 5 November 43 | 6 June 44 | 6 June 44 | 292 |
| 2nd Armoredb | 24 November 43 | 9 June 44 | 2 July 44 | 223 |
| 9th Infantryb | 27 November 43 | 10 June 44 | 14 June 44 | 264 |
| 82nd Airborne | 9 December 43 | 6 June 44 | 6 June 44 | 194 |
| 8th Infantry | 15 December 43 | 4 July 44 | 8 July 44 | 266 |
| 4th Armored | 8 January 44 | 13 July 44 | 28 July 44 | 230 |
| 4th Infantry | 28 January 44 | 6 June 44 | 6 June 44 | 299 |
| 30th Infantry | 22 February 44 | 14 June 44 | 15 June 44 | 282 |
| 5th Armored | 23 February 44 | 25 July 44 | 2 August 44 | 161 |
| 6th Armored | 25 February 44 | 18 July 44 | 28 July 44 | 226 |
| 90th Infantry | 5 April 44 | 8 June 44 | 10 June 44 | 308 |
| 79th Infantry | 17 April 44 | 14 June 44 | 19 June 44 | 248 |
| 83rd Infantry | 19 April 44 | 19 June 44 | 27 June 44 | 244 |
| 35th Infantry | 26 May 44 | 8 July 44 | 11 July 44 | 264 |
| 7th Armored | 13 June 44 | 10 August 44 | 14 August 44 | 172 |
| 80th Infantry | 7 July 44 | 3 August 44 | 8 August 44 | 239 |
| 94th Infantry | 11 August 44 | 5 September 44 | 17 September 44 | 183 |
| 3rd Infantryc | 15 August 44 | 15 August 44 | 15 August 44 | 233 |
| 36th Infantryc | 15 August 44 | 15 August 44 | 15 August 44 | 227 |
| 45th Infantryc | 15 August 44 | 15 August 44 | 15 August 44 | 230 |
| 95th Infantry | 17 August 44 | 19 September 44 | 20 October 44 | 151 |
| 17th Airborne | 25 August 44 | 24 December 44 | 25 December 44 | 45 |
| 9th Armored | 27 August 44 | 25 September 44 | 16 December 44 | 91 |
| 26th Infantryd | 7 September 44 | 19 September 44 | 12 October 44 | 199 |
| 104th Infantryd | 7 September 44 | 7 September 44 | 24 October 44 | 178 |
| 44th Infantryd | 15 September 44 | 15 September 44 | 24 October 44 | 230 |
| 102nd Infantryd | 22 September 44 | 23 September 44 | 26 October 44 | 178 |
| 10th Armoredd | 23 September 44 | 23 September 44 | 2 November 44 | 124 |
| 84th Infantryd | 1 October 44 | 1 November 44 | 18 November 44 | 152 |
| 12th Armored | 2 October 44 | 9 November 44 | 7 December 44 | 102 |
| 11th Armored | 5 October 44 | 17 December 44 | 23 December 44 | 96 |
| 99th Infantry | 10 October 44 | 6 November 44 | 9 November 44 | 151 |
| 75th Infantry | 20 October 44 | 13 December 44 | 25 December 44 | 94 |
| 103rd Infantrye | 20 October 44 | 20 October 44 | 11 November 44 | 147 |
| 100th Infantrye | 20 October 44 | 20 October 44 | 9 November 44 | 163 |
| 78th Infantry | 25 October 44 | 22 November 44 | 13 December 44 | 125 |
| 14th Armorede | 29 October 44 | 29 October 44 | 20 November 44 | 133 |
| 106th Infantry | 1 November 44 | 26 November 44 | 10 December 44 | 63 |
| 87th Infantry | 13 November 44 | 3 December 44 | 13 December 44 | 134 |
| 8th Armored | 21 November 44 | 6 January 45 | 23 February 45 | 63 |
| 66th Infantry | 26 November 44 | 26 December 44 | 1 January 45 | 91 |
| 69th Infantry | 13 December 44 | 26 January 45 | 11 February 45 | 65 |
| 76th Infantry | 21 December 44 | 17 January 45 | 19 January 45 | 95 |
| 63rd Infantrye | 14 January 45 | 14 January 45 | 6 February 45 | 119 |
| 42nd Infantrye | 18 January 45 | 18 January 45 | 17 February 45 | 106 |
| 70th Infantrye | 18 January 45 | 18 January 45 | 3 February 45 | 83 |
| 65th Infantryd | 21 January 45 | 21 January 45 | 9 March 45 | 5 |
| 89th Infantryd | 22 January 45 | 22 January 45 | 12 March 45 | 57 |
| 13th Armoredd | 29 January 45 | 29 January 45 | 10 April 45 | 16 |
| 71st Infantryd | 6 February 45 | 6 February 45 | 12 March 45 | 49 |
| 13th Airborne | 6 February 45 | 10 February 45 | No combat | None |
| 16th Armoredd | 11 February 45 | 11 February 45 | 5 May 45 | 3 |
| 20th Armored | 17 February 45 | 21 February 45 | 24 April 45 | 8 |
| 86th Infantryd | 3 March 45 | 3 March 45 | 29 March 45 | 34 |
| 97th Infantryd | 3 March 45 | 5 March 45 | 1 April 45 | 31 |
a First arrived in European Theater of Operations 7 August 1942 and participated in North African and Sicilian operations. The 1st Armored and 34th Infantry Divisions also came to the European theater in 1942 and, like the 1st Division, went to North Africa in November of that year. Neither of them ever saw action in the European Theater of Operations, however, and they are excluded from this list.
b Saw action earlier in North African theater.
c Landed in southern France from North African theater as part of DRAGOON invasion force.
d Entered northern France directly from the United States.
e Entered southern France directly from the United States. Infantry regiments of 63rd, 42nd, and 70th Divisions arrived early in December 1944 and saw action in advance of the divisions proper.
f All arrival dates—for both the theater and Continent—are the dates on which the main echelon of the division headquarters closed. The arrival of a division usually extended over several days and in some cases several weeks. There are minor discrepancies between the arrival dates given here and those given on page 457 of Logistical Support I for the months of June and July 1944 because different sources were used.
Source: Order of Battle: Divisions, European Theater, prep by Hist Sec ETOUSA, 1945.
[Table data merged onto previous page]
was again accepted directly from the United States in continental ports until January 1945. (Table 8)
In October the War Department proposed a further modification in the build-up plan. Inspired in part by plans which the Combined Chiefs of Staff were considering for an all-out effort to end the war before the winter, and in part by the desire to relieve combat-weary infantrymen with fresh troops, General Marshall suggested an immediate speedup in the shipment of the infantry regiments of divisions scheduled for later shipment. The idea was that the units be rotated with regiments of divisions already in the field. Under this plan the organic supporting and service troop units of the divisions would arrive later and eventually marry up with the infantry. Marshall proposed advancing the shipment of the regiments of all twelve of the infantry divisions remaining to be shipped.
The theater immediately approved the scheme for the infantry elements of three divisions (the 87th, 75th, and 106th), portions of which were already loading. But it was not enthusiastic about applying the idea to all the remaining divisions. General Bradley, in particular, raised objections in the conviction that it was bad practice to break up units, and that it would create both
training and equipment problems for the rumps of the divisions in the United States. Moreover, he feared that advancing the infantry elements of additional divisions would affect striking power at the very time when the logistic situation would support a general offensive.17
General Eisenhower forwarded the 12th Army Group commander’s views to the Army Chief of Staff, pointing out, in addition, the logistic troubles of the theater. ETOUSA was already incapable of supporting the divisions available to it, and would be unable to do so until Antwerp was opened; it had accepted the earlier accelerations, he said, only so that it could rotate units and thus relieve tired troops. Eisenhower therefore advised against a speed-up of infantry regiments beyond the three already under way.18
General Marshall believed it extremely important to relieve combat-weary infantry with fresh units and asked the theater commander to reconsider. At the same time he apparently wished to allay any fears about a delay in the shipment of the remaining portions of the divisions. He indicated that the three divisions whose regiments were being advanced could sail by mid-November, and that the remaining elements of the other nine divisions could follow their regiments by mid-December.19
This proposed schedule completely ignored the theater’s logistic dilemma, whose seriousness the War Department obviously did not yet comprehend. In reply, the theater pointed out that it could not possibly accept the heavy elements of the divisions at the proposed rates, either on the Continent or in the United Kingdom, for the equipment involved alone amounted to nearly 500,000 tons of cargo.20 As matters stood, nine regiments of three infantry divisions then in the United Kingdom were already available as relief regiments for nine of the eighteen divisions in the 12th Army Group. The nine regiments of the 87th, 75th, and 106th Divisions were due to arrive in the United Kingdom at the beginning of November and would provide similar reinforcements for all the remaining divisions in the 12th Army Group.
General Eisenhower proposed, therefore, that the regiments of only three of the remaining nine divisions earmarked for ETOUSA be shipped in advance of their divisions in November in order to ensure a reserve of three complete infantry divisions for the theater. In view of the port situation on the Continent and the lack of accommodations in the United Kingdom he asked that no additional units be shipped except for the “residues” of the 87th, 75th, and 106th Divisions, already scheduled for mid-November. To provide similar reinforcement of the 6th Army Group he asked that the regiments of three additional divisions be shipped directly to Marseille late in November. This schedule, he pointed out, would provide a
relief regiment for each of the 25 infantry divisions in France plus 2 extra, and would also provide a strategic reserve of at least 3 infantry divisions in the United Kingdom in addition to whatever armored units were not committed.21 This schedule General Eisenhower considered the maximum allowed by the theater’s tight logistic situation. Any plan calling for a faster flow, he asserted, would necessitate receiving units on the Continent, where they would have to be held near the ports.22
The theater commander asked the War Department for a week’s deferment on a decision regarding the three divisions remaining in the United States and on the shipment of the heavy equipment of those whose infantry elements were being accelerated. On 1 November he made known his wishes regarding those units. Because of continuing administrative difficulties, particularly the delay in the opening of Antwerp, he asked that the residues of only three divisions (the 66th, 69th, and 76th) be shipped to the United Kingdom in December. For January he requested the shipment directly to southern France of the residues of the three divisions (42nd, 63rd, and 70th) whose infantry elements were already being preshipped to Marseille, and the shipment of three complete divisions (the 13th Armored and the 65th and 89th Infantry) to northern France on the assumption that Antwerp would then be open. This would complete the shipment of the residues of all nine divisions whose infantry had been preshipped. ETOUSA asked that all February shipments, including one airborne, one infantry, and two armored divisions, be sent directly to northern France. Three of the twelve divisions whose infantry elements the War Department had urged be advanced were to be shipped as whole divisions according to this plan, although the theater agreed to accept the infantry elements of these three divisions as well if arrangements for their preshipment were already too far advanced. But the War Department agreed to follow the suggested schedule.23
As of this date—1 November—there were 41 divisions in the theater, 34 of them (exclusive of the original 3 in the DRAGOON force) on the Continent and 7 in the United Kingdom. The effect of the earlier accelerations was strikingly evident, for the over-all buildup was now ahead of its original schedule by 7 divisions. Logistic difficulties on the Continent had forced several of the divisions to stop over in the United Kingdom temporarily, however, and the 34 divisions on the Continent thus far actually represented a gain of only 4 over earlier build-up plans. (See Table 7.)
The shipping schedule outlined by the theater early in November was followed
substantially as agreed in the next two months. But not all of the preshipped infantry regiments were committed in a relief role as originally conceived. Theater officials, none too enthusiastic over the idea from the start, did not consider the experiment successful. Removing infantry regiments from their parent organizations and placing them under strange headquarters, even temporarily, created problems of both command control and supply. In the end the theater reconstituted at least two of the nine divisions as complete units in England before transferring them to the Continent.
Two final changes were made in the theater build-up, one involving an additional acceleration and one a further augmentation of the troop basis. Early in January 1945 the War Department offered to advance the sailing dates of the four divisions on the ETOUSA troop list still in the United States. The theater accepted the proposal, and the 71st Infantry, 13th Airborne, and the 16th and 20th Armored Divisions, previously scheduled for shipment in February, each eventually gained about a week in its departure. This brought the number of divisions shipped to the European theater to fifty-six, plus the three of the DRAGOON force.
Meanwhile General Eisenhower, impressed by the offensive spirit the enemy was displaying in the Ardennes and alarmed over the possibility of enemy reinforcement from the east, made an urgent appeal for additional combat strength, even suggesting the consideration of diversions from other theaters. Only two divisions not already allocated to ETOUSA still remained in the United States, both of them earmarked for the Pacific. The Joint Chiefs nevertheless approved the allocation of the two divisions to the ETOUSA troop basis. Both divisions (the 86th and 97th Infantry) arrived early in March, completing the build-up and raising the theater’s final strength to sixty-one divisions.24 Of this total, one—the 13th Airborne—was never committed, and two—the 16th and 20th Armored Divisions—saw only a few days of combat.25
The speed-up in the shipment of U.S. forces to the European theater had its repercussions in the United Kingdom as well as on the Continent. ETOUSA had expected to close out U.S. installations in the United Kingdom fairly rapidly after the launching of ANVIL in accordance with the Reverse BOLERO or RHUMBA plan. The transfer of supplies to the Continent had lagged from the start, however, and had made it necessary for U.S. forces to retain depot facilities in England much longer than planned.26 The stepped-up flow of divisions from the United States created more serious complications, for many of
the units had to be diverted to the United Kingdom, where handling of their equipment added to the burden of English ports and inland transport, and where many troop accommodations had already been turned back to the British.
On the assumption that divisions would proceed from the United States directly to the Continent beginning in September, the RHUMBA plan had provided that U.S. field forces should be completely cleared out of the United Kingdom and that the total U.S. strength there should be reduced to about 650,000 (including an expected 137,000 hospital patients) by the end of October 1944.27 Shipments to France proceeded more or less according to schedule throughout the summer, and at the end of September only 34,000 field force troops, including only one division, remained in England. Total U.S. strength there was down to about 688,000 men. (Table 9) The acceptance of eight divisions in France that month completely saturated Continental port, beach, and transportation facilities, however, and when two more divisions (the 84th Infantry and 12th Armored) arrived in European waters at the end of the month there was no choice but to divert them to the United Kingdom.
Both U.S. and British officials had foreseen the possibility that a few divisions might have to be accepted in the United Kingdom in view of the new schedule of shipments, and they had made arrangements to accommodate up to three at a time. But they hardly expected the flood which was to follow. In the next three months twelve divisions had to be accepted in the United Kingdom—in fact, all the divisions shipped from the United States in that period except for those diverted to Marseille. Early in October British officials, recognizing the operational necessity therefor, reluctantly agreed to make additional facilities available so that seven divisions could be accommodated. By the end of the month they had been prevailed upon to increase the number to nine. In the meantime, however, they asked the Combined Chiefs to defer sailings in order to limit the number accommodated in the United Kingdom at any one time to six. The diversions had already caused port discharge as well as accommodations problems, for they involved the handling of vehicles and other equipment as well as personnel.28
It was partly because of these considerations that SHAEF urged the War Department not to carry out the acceleration of infantry regiments which it proposed in October. In submitting its counterplan on 1 November SHAEF noted that to keep more than six divisions in the United Kingdom would necessitate the withdrawal to the United Kingdom of service troops badly needed on the Continent.29 The number of divisions in the United Kingdom actually rose to seven at one time in October.
Transfers to the Continent improved somewhat in November. But there still were five divisions in the United Kingdom at the end of the month, and U.S.
Table 9: Theater strength by major component, May 1944–April 1945
| Date | Total | Field forces | Air forces | Communications zone | Non-operating b | GFRS c | Divisions d | |
| 31 May 44 | Theater | e 1,526,965 | 640,635 | 426,819 | 366,310 | 93,201 | (f) | 20 |
| 30 June 44 | Theater | g 1,625,000 | 670,709 | 430,660 | 378,296 | 54,017 | 101,528 | 22 |
| Continent | (h) | (h) | (h) | (h) | (h) | (h) | 13 | |
| U.K. | (h) | (h) | (h) | (h) | (h) | (h) | 9 | |
| 31 Jul 44 | Theater | 1,770,845 | 725,259 | 447,818 | 413,056 | 66,426 | 118,286 | 22 |
| Continent | 860,649 | 563,638 | 88,251 | 181,548 | 27,212 | (e) | 18 | |
| U.K. | 910,196 | 161,621 | 339,567 | 244,603 | 144,405 | (e) | I 4 | |
| 31 Aug 44 | Theater | 1,905,261 | 755,603 | 449,688 | 479,359 | 85,275 | 135,336 | 26 |
| Continent | 1,075,681 | 610,780 | 100,028 | 310,747 | 2,787 | 54,250 | 20 | |
| U.K. | 829,580 | 144,823 | 347,660 | 180,537 | 82,488 | 81,086 | 6 | |
| 30 Sep 44 | Theater | 2,041,023 | 854,148 | 442,711 | 500,804 | 92,040 | 151,320 | 31 |
| Continent | 1,353,079 | 820,407 | 132,726 | 329,288 | 19,104 | 51,554 | 30 | |
| U.K. | 687,944 | 33,741 | 309,985 | 171,516 | 72,936 | 99,766 | 1 | |
| 31 Oct 44 | Theater | 2,196,785 | 1,006,190 | 435,384 | 538,636 | 90,604 | 125,967 | 40 |
| Continent | 1,566,224 | 908,522 | 154,496 | 391,592 | 19,368 | 92,246 | 33 | |
| U.K. | 630,561 | 97,668 | 280,888 | 147,044 | 71,240 | 33,721 | 7 | |
| 30 Nov 44 | Theater | 2,588,983 | 1,259,295 | 450,370 | 623,048 | 141,269 | 115,001 | 47 |
| Continent | 1,906,441 | 1,114,455 | 176,533 | 475,495 | 58,182 | 81,776 | 42 | |
| U.K. | 682,542 | 144,840 | 273,837 | 147,583 | 83,087 | 33,225 | 5 | |
| 31 Dec 44 | Theater | 2,699,467 | 1,315,201 | 443,634 | 657,129 | 172,078 | 111,375 | 52 |
| Continent | 2,022,749 | 1,196,999 | 178,151 | 513,349 | 52,331 | 81,919 | 49 | |
| U.K. | 676,718 | 118,202 | 265,483 | 143,830 | 119,747 | 29,456 | 3 | |
| 31 Jan 45 | Theater | 2,829,039 | 1,402,060 | 440,517 | 654,525 | 195,337 | 136,600 | 55 |
| Continent | 2,179,026 | 1,333,132 | 179,285 | 519,653 | 62,671 | 84,285 | 55 | |
| U.K. | 650,013 | 68,928 | 261,232 | 134,872 | 132,666 | 52,315 | 0 | |
| 28 Feb 45 | Theater | 2,935,000 | 1,506,000 | 440,000 | 666,000 | 164,000 | 159,000 | 59 |
| Continent | 2,329,000 | 1,448,000 | 196,000 | 540,000 | 49,000 | 96,000 | 59 | |
| U.K. | 606,000 | 58,000 | 224,000 | 126,000 | 115,000 | 63,000 | 0 | |
| 31 Mar 45 | Theater | 3,051,000 | 1,633,000 | 458,000 | 633,000 | 158,000 | 169,000 | 61 |
| Continent | 2,853,000 | 1,617,000 | 214,000 | 529,000 | 65,000 | 128,000 | 61 | |
| U.K. | 498,000 | 16,000 | 244,000 | 104,000 | 93,000 | 41,000 | 0 | |
| 30 Apr 45 | Theater | 3,059,942 | 1,613,004 | 482,785 | 652,779 | 128,305 | 183,096 | 61 |
| Continent | 2,628,082 | 1,612,734 | 259,223 | 544,005 | 70,194 | 141,926 | 61 | |
| U.K. | 431,860 | 270 | 223,535 | 108,774 | 58,111 | 41,170 | 0 |
b. Mainly hospital patients.
c. Ground Force Replacement System.
d. Discrepancies between these figures and Table 8 as to the number of divisions on the Continent and in the United Kingdom are accounted for by the fact that divisions were often split as of the end of the month. Dates of arrival in Table 8 are for headquarters, regardless of the location of the bulk of the division.
e. Does not include 14,430 men in Iceland on 31 May 1944.
f. Included in nonoperating total for this date.
g. Does not include 13,444 men in Iceland on 30 June 1944.
h. Breakdown unavailable for June.
i. Includes the two airborne divisions which had returned to the United Kingdom.
Source: Progress Reports, Hq ETOUSA Jun 44-May 45, ETO Adm. U.S. Forces in Southern France, including the three divisions in Operation DRAGOON, are included for the first time in the 30 November figures. These data are preliminary, unaudited figures prepared for command purposes and, while differing slightly from the audited DA AG strengths, have been used throughout this volume because of the subdivision into air, ground, and service troops. This breakdown is unavailable in DA AG reports.
troop strength there at one time during that month exceeded 700,000, of which 165,000 comprised field forces.30 The situation did not improve noticeably with the opening of Antwerp. In December the Communications Zone, strained to meet urgent operational commitments attending the sudden change in the tactical situation when the Germans broke through in the Ardennes, asked the British to accept additional troop convoys. The request did not entail the release of additional accommodations, but it did mean postponing relief for the congested British ports and railways. British officials agreed to accept an additional convoy as a matter of paramount military necessity. No additional divisions actually were routed through England. The last division to be accepted in the United Kingdom (the 76th Infantry) debarked on 21 December, and by mid-January 1945 all U.S. divisions had been transferred to the Continent.31
The difficulties attending the acceleration of the divisional build-up demonstrated rather pointedly the futility of attempting to commit more combat strength than was logistically supportable. For at least three months in the fall of 1944 U.S. administrative resources were simply unequal to the task of supporting all the available divisions in combat. Logistic planners had in fact before D Day predicted with remarkable accuracy that port discharge and transportation deficiencies rather than the availability of divisions would be the factors limiting the strength that could be committed against the enemy beginning at about D plus 120 (early October). Several divisions consequently remained idle after arriving in the theater, some of them in the United Kingdom, and some on the Continent in the vicinity of the ports.
(2) Service and Supporting Troops
Part of the problem of accelerating the build-up lay in the inadequacy of physical facilities on the Continent—mainly ports and transportation. Almost as important was the shortage of service troops. Plans had called for a division slice of about 40,000 men, 15,000 of which were to consist of corps and army troops (both service and supporting units) and 10,000 of communications zone troops. On this basis the War Department in February 1944 had authorized a theater troop strength of 2,390,000 men, including air forces.
The War Department had insisted that requests for service troops be kept at the absolute minimum when the troop basis was prepared in 1943 and the technical service chiefs considered their final allotments inadequate in many categories. Moreover, there was no certainty that they had requested the various types of troop units in proper proportion, for requirements could not be accurately foreseen. The troop basis therefore had little stability, and literally hundreds of changes were eventually made to meet the shifting needs.
As could be expected, many deficiencies
and some surpluses developed. Every service chief had to resort to the expedient of using units in work for which they had not been organized or trained, and in some cases had to deactivate units in order to get manpower for more urgently needed types. The experience of the engineers was fairly typical. Lack of sufficient depot troops forced the Corps of Engineers to assign an engineer general service regiment to depot operations even before D Day. Failure to close out the depots in the United Kingdom after D Day aggravated the shortage and led to the assignment of additional construction units to depot and maintenance operations. Twelve base equipment companies likewise were employed entirely in depot and maintenance operations and never performed the functions for which they were trained. Shortages of petroleum distribution companies, resulting from the rapid extension of the pipelines, were also met in part by the assignment of general service regiments to assist in the operation of the pipelines, and finally by the conversion of engineer combat battalions. Similarly, to meet a severe shortage of forestry companies, the engineers relied increasingly on general service regiments and combat engineer battalions to help in logging operations, and on civilian labor and prisoners of war to augment available units.32
The entire problem had been greatly aggravated in the summer and fall of 1944, at first by the sudden and rapid extension of the lines of communication, and then by the speed-up in the shipment of divisional formations without adequate supporting tails. COMZ officials had voiced their fears that the division slice would suffer a reduction when the transfer of divisions from the United Kingdom was suddenly accelerated in July. Their fears were hardly justified at the time, for the continental slice at the end of that month came to well over 43,000, and the theater slice to more than 50,000. The proportion of service troop support in France actually rose somewhat in August, when only two divisions were added to the continental strength. This did not necessarily mean that the slice was in proper balance as to types of units, and acute shortages were in fact already developing, particularly in transportation, depot, and maintenance units.
Added misgivings over the adequacy of service troop support arose as the result of the War Department’s augmentation of the theater’s troop basis by nine divisions, and as a result of the decision made in August to speed the shipment of divisions from the zone of interior without assurance that they would have their required complement of service and supporting troops. The Communications Zone at first estimated that the theater would need about 80,000 additional service and supporting troops for the increased divisional strength.33 In mid-August it submitted a longer list to SHAEF, admitting that it had included certain increases not justified by the additional divisions because they were needed to remedy existing shortages.
General Bull, anticipating the objections these requests would raise in Washington, asked the G-4 and the medical, signal, and engineer officers at SHAEF to go over them carefully in light of operational experience thus far and operations planned for the future. The G-3 was especially conscious of the several warnings which the War Department had sounded on manpower limitations, and felt that every effort should be made to limit requests for additional personnel by exploring the possibilities of converting units in which there were surpluses and in utilizing liberated manpower for service activities. Any augmentation of the existing troop basis, he felt, would have to be met by the conversion of units already in the theater or by the elimination of a like number of personnel from the troop basis.34
Only a few days later the War Department in fact pointed out where ETOUSA could make an important saving in manpower. The troop basis agreed to earlier had authorized the European theater 198 antiaircraft artillery battalions, 111 of which were either already in the theater or en route. The War Department felt that in view of the air superiority which it enjoyed ETOUSA could well afford to cancel some of the flow scheduled for the next few months so that the surplus could be converted into units for which there was greater need.35 The theater agreed, and shortly thereafter reduced its requirement for antiaircraft artillery to 146 battalions. It also informed the War Department that it was considering other reductions and that it intended to convert certain units already in the theater, such as smoke generator units, to other use.36
The cancellation of antiaircraft artillery units represented a saving of about 38,000 men, which ETOUSA expected to apply as a credit for units which it needed to meet deficiencies in the troop basis. It particularly desired additional truck drivers and counterintelligence troops, for which it had already submitted a request. But the War Department promptly disabused the theater of any such idea, and informed ETOUSA that it was simply deleting the 38,000 men from the troop basis. By War Department calculations, the European theater as of 1 August already had an over-strength of nearly 145,000 men, which constituted nearly half of the entire over-strength of the Army. ETOUSA, the War Department pointed out, still enjoyed a high priority for men and supplies, even at the cost of withholding badly needed units from other theaters. But in view of the fact that U.S. resources were insufficient to meet all
requirements, the theater would hereafter have to submit detailed justification for any requests for augmentation of its existing troop basis.37
Theater officials were plainly chagrined by the War Department’s refusal. They had understood that the theater would get additional units by presenting justification for them and by offering cuts in existing allotments, conditions which had been met. Now the War Department had offered nothing in return for its sacrifices. Why, it asked, were further deletions necessary, and precisely what was the War Department’s policy?38
General Bull supported the Communications Zone in its stand. The need for additional service and supporting troops, he argued, had been clearly established by the experience of the past few months, in particular by the unexpected extension of the lines of communication. The pursuit across northern France, for example, had necessitated the over-strengthening of all truck and troop transport companies. This, the theater felt, was certainly sufficient justification for the request for additional drivers.39
For the moment, at least, the War Department was unmoved by these explanations. Once again it called attention to the generous way in which the European theater had been treated with respect to the world-wide allocation of manpower. The simple fact was that savings had to be made. Where units originally authorized were no longer required there was no choice but to recover such resources for the satisfaction of other needs. In accord with this necessity the War Department announced that it was placing the recently canceled antiaircraft artillery units in the undeployed reserve to help meet the need for service and supporting troops for the additional nine divisions recently allotted the European theater. It asserted, moreover, that there was nothing inviolate about troop bases; they could be reduced as well as augmented. And it made clear that it had no intention of relinquishing its authority to control activation, inactivation, augmentation, and reorganization in such a way as to ensure the maximum exploitation of the nation’s manpower resources. The implication was clear that the theater still did not appreciate the seriousness of the nation’s manpower difficulties.40
Meanwhile the theater had revised its requirement for service and supporting troops needed for the nine additional divisions, the amended request totaling about 100,000 men. ETOUSA claimed that it no longer possessed an over-strength from which the needed units might be formed, for it had absorbed all surplus manpower in the process of
augmenting truck companies so as to permit twenty-four-hour operation, and in the organization of provisional MP units to handle the large bag of prisoners of war and guard supply shipments against pilfering. The activation of sixteen MP battalions and of sixteen prisoner of war overhead detachments had absorbed about 13,500 men. As a matter of bookkeeping the War Department now added the MP battalions to the theater’s troop basis and deleted a like number from units carried in the undeployed reserve. In the case of the prisoner of war detachments it merely legalized an increase in the theater’s overhead allotment.41
The War Department eventually authorized 123,000 men to provide the service and supporting troop complement for the nine divisions. But it continued to balk at the theater’s request for augmentations to the existing troop basis, particularly the request for 16,000 additional drivers, pointing out that ETOUSA had offered no compensating deletions. It finally approved the request for driver augmentation teams, but only on condition that the increase be accompanied by the inactivation of ten field artillery battalions which had been earmarked for ETOUSA in the undeployed reserve. The War Department wanted it clearly understood that the theater would be unable to get the field artillery units later if it elected to accept the driver augmentation.42
Any proposal to delete combat units from the troop basis naturally concerned the field commands. Theater headquarters therefore took the matter up with 12th Army Group, asking that it review its needs and recommend cancellations to compensate for the desired augmentations. Twelfth Army Group’s first reaction was to oppose any cut in the field force troop basis, at the same time arguing the absolute necessity for the requested augmentations. General Bradley apparently felt, however, that the need for additional service and supporting units outweighed that for combat units, and, after reconsidering, concurred in the surrender of the field artillery battalions in order to cover the driver augmentations. In fact, the field forces were willing to accept the inactivation of additional combat units in case the other augmentations they desired—involving about 10,000 men for army, corps, and division headquarters, corps and divisional signal and MP units, and military intelligence personnel requested by 6th Army Group—could be obtained in no other way. Twelfth Army Group nominated the 20th Armored Division, due to arrive in February, for inactivation, should that be necessary.43
General Bull was not ready to accede to these proposals without a careful consideration
of the consequences. He immediately asked General Crawford for a thorough review of the service support needs in the light of future operational plans in hopes of forestalling the inactivation of some or all of the field artillery battalions. The G-3 particularly questioned the need for 16,000 additional drivers. He admitted that driver augmentations had been necessary at the time of the Red Ball Express, but suspected that they would constitute a luxury in view of the increasingly serious manpower shortages.44
Bull’s request led to the issuance of a directive to all the technical services asking them to review their service troop requirements. Once again the continuing competition over the slicing of the manpower pie was clearly evident. As might have been expected, G-4 officials and the technical service chiefs were unanimous in their opposition to any sacrifice of service units, and they were not lacking in arguments. The issue, as Crawford put it, really resolved itself into the necessity to decide between the G-3 and the G-4 estimate as to the course of future operations—that is, between the G-3’s estimate that continued heavy resistance well into the summer of 1945 required that the theater have additional field artillery at its disposal, and the G-4’s anticipation of a possible break-through into Germany, which would require that truck transportation be brought up to its maximum efficiency and potential so that it could support a sustained drive over extended lines of communication. Reinforcing the G-4 viewpoint was the urgent requirement to clear the mounting tonnages being discharged in the ports. Crawford noted, moreover, that there was little prospect that ammunition supply would improve sufficiently by the summer of 1945 to permit the 8-inch howitzer battalions already in the theater to expend ammunition at the 12th Army Group’s desired rates. This prospect, plus the lateness of their availability, seemed to depreciate the value of the ten battalions.
The service chiefs were equally appalled at the thought of losing manpower to compensate for other activations. Most of them could go beyond defending their current troop bases and show that they were already deficient in manpower and strained to provide the theater’s minimum service needs. The chief quartermaster, for example, argued that his requirements would rise, if anything, because it would be impossible to rely on prisoners of war as extensively for labor after entering Germany. In the view of the service chiefs, the need for every unit in the troop basis had long since been thoroughly justified. Service troop needs, they argued, had been kept to the lowest possible figures in the preparation of the theater troop basis. The War Department, admitting that it had not provided sufficient service troops in the world-wide troop basis, had made additional cuts. Finally, ETOUSA’s troop basis had been drawn up on the assumption that it would have to support only four armies. But it had had to help make up deficiencies in the DRAGOON force, and had also borne the brunt of deletions to provide unforeseen non-T/O overheads for SHAEF and
other headquarters. In short, the technical services considered any deletions of service troop units as inadmissible.45
The carefully documented case presented by the G-4 and the technical service chiefs apparently failed to convince the G-3. General Bull continued to oppose the inactivation of both the field artillery battalions and the 20th Armored Division, and thought the matter should be examined further. Late in December he asked the theater G-3, General Eyster, for additional information on which to base a decision.46
The Communications Zone, hoping at least to settle the matter of the field artillery inactivations, pressed the two army groups to come to an agreement on their desires regarding the various augmentations and reorganizations they had requested for army, corps, and division headquarters. More specifically, it wanted to know whether the army groups would carry out the proposed changes at the expense of combat units or through the cancellation of the truck drivers, and, if so, what units they would be willing to delete to compensate for the changes.47
The two army groups, apparently taking courage from General Bull’s hesitation, now replied that they could not sacrifice any combat strength after all. Both commands listed the augmentations they desired for the planned reorganizations without offering any sacrifices of combat strength. The 12th Army Group asserted, moreover, that the provision of additional personnel to permit truck companies to operate sixteen to twenty hours per day was absolutely mandatory. Withdrawal of the driver augmentation teams, it said, would merely result in a requirement for additional truck companies. The army group’s solution was simple: it recommended that ETOUSA ask the War Department to reconsider the presently established ceiling for the theater and authorize the needed troops.48
The army group replies hardly answered the theater’s question. They indicated, moreover, that the field commands were totally ignorant of the appeals which the theater had already made to the War Department, and of the conditions which the latter had laid down for any additions to the theater’s troop strength.49 Nevertheless, the 12th Army Group refused to compromise and again tossed the problem back into the lap of theater headquarters. All the requested augmentations, it asserted, were essential and of equal priority; the deletion
of as many as 10,000 combat troops (involved in the deactivation of an armored division) would seriously unbalance the field force troop basis. Army group saw no solution except an increase in the troop basis. Once again it urged the theater to make an effort to convince the War Department that this would be necessary.50
SHAEF G-3 officials had come to similar conclusions from an independent study. The original service and supporting slice of 27,680 men, they argued, was the minimum and proper requirement for the support of each division, based on the past eight months’ operations. On 31 December the theater had 1,392,100 service and supporting troops. This number provided a slice of 26,800, which was barely adequate for the support of the fifty-two divisions then present. The theater troop basis currently authorized a strength of 1,535,600 service and support troops, which would support not more than fifty-five divisions on the basis of a 27,680-man slice. The support of sixty-one divisions, which recently had been authorized the theater, consequently required the addition of another 153,100 men to the troop basis, raising the total ground and service force basis to 2,404,800 men. G-3 officials calculated that the increase should be apportioned in the ratio of 25.8 percent for combat and supporting troops, 68 percent for service troops, and 6.2 percent for miscellaneous overhead and administrative services.51
The outlook for obtaining such an augmentation was dark indeed. By late January, in fact, matters seemed to have reached an impasse, the theater at that time having requested augmentations totaling nearly 29,000 men, against which the War Department had offered about 3,600 men from the undeployed reserve without requiring compensating deletions. In the meantime the signal service had requested an additional 18,000 men; but it was obvious that that request would not get favorable consideration.52
At the end of January, ETOUSA, despairing of getting any concessions from the field forces, informed SHAEF that it had about decided to ask the War Department for an increase in the troop basis.53 Meanwhile, however, it had also determined on certain downward revisions of its earlier requests. Based on a restudy of its requirements it now decided to pare its total request by about 6,000 men, from 28,700 to 22,600, the bulk of the saving to be effected through a reorganization of some of the theater’s truck companies. Against this requirement the War Department was ready to make available to the theater 3,656 men without compensating deletions, 5,600 as the result of inactivations of artillery units in the undeployed reserve, 11,056 in miscellaneous units in the United States not specifically earmarked for the European theater, and 2,771 men resulting from a transfer of certain artillery units to the Mediterranean
theater, for a total of 23,083. Minor adjustments led to a slightly different allocation, but agreement was finally reached with War Department officials early in February.54 The sacrifice of the field artillery battalions proved the proper decision. German resistance was completely broken by mid-March, and the theater’s most urgent need thereafter was for service support, particularly in transportation.
Little hope remained that the theater would get the 153,100 men estimated as needed to fill out the troop basis for all sixty-one divisions. General Bull concluded that on the basis of past experience the theater could expect no additional help from the zone of interior, and guessed that it would have to meet the deficit from its own resources.55 General Crawford believed the shortages might be offset by more extensive use of civilians and prisoners of war, and by additional conversions of the less critical military units into the types needed. The theater had, in fact, already taken steps to utilize prisoners on a bigger scale.56
The theater’s service troop problem had been aggravated by basic weaknesses in the composition of French forces in the 6th Army Group, and also by the problem of distribution within the theater caused by the transfer of combat strength from one area to another. The problem of properly apportioning service troops between the north and the south arose as soon as the DRAGOON forces came under SHAEF’s control, in connection with both the transfer to the 6th Army Group of three divisions already in the theater and the proposed diversion to Marseille of three divisions scheduled for arrival in October.
A misunderstanding immediately arose as to the intent of the diversion to Marseille. The 6th Army Group assumed that the three divisions were to be added to the forces in southern France, and its G-4, Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Adcock, went to Paris in mid-September to submit a list of the service troops required by the 6th Army Group to support the units in combat. The 12th Army Group was under the impression that the three divisions were being routed through Marseille only because of congestion on the northern lines of communication, and naturally opposed the loss of combat units originally scheduled for assignment to its control, to say nothing of the prospect of sacrificing service and supporting units as well. In view of its own logistic difficulties, however, it could hardly deny the logic of committing those divisions in an area where there was greater likelihood of providing adequate support, although the diversion entailed a delay in the build-up of the newly arrived Ninth Army. As COMZ and SHAEF supply
officials pointed out, the divisions could well be spared, since they were in excess of the number that could be supported in the north.57
Of much greater concern to supply staffs was the proposed transfer of service and support units. Such transfers obviously could have no other result than to reduce the scale of support in the north, where supply was already strained, and would therefore be contrary to SHAEF’s declared policy directive giving operations in the north the highest priority. With these considerations in mind Colonel Whipple, the SHAEF chief of logistical plans, recommended that the transfers of service troops southward for the support of more than the ten divisions originally allotted to operations in southern France be approved only insofar as they could be spared without impairing the efforts of the 21 and 12th Army Groups.58
SHAEF meanwhile confirmed the 6th Army Group’s claim that the three disputed divisions were intended for use in the south. Both the Communications Zone and 12th Army Group had already drawn up tentative lists of units which they were willing to have transferred in the event SHAEF should so decide, and on 22-23 September representatives of SHAEF, the Communications Zone, and the two army groups met at Lyon to agree on the exact number of units of each type that were to be transferred to southern France.59
In the course of the conference General Devers’ chief of staff, Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, admitted that the requests originally made by the 6th Army Group included units required to meet earlier shortages in the DRAGOON troop basis. These were quickly discounted, for the conference had no authority to remedy basic deficiencies or compensate for original shortages. Moreover, 12th Army Group certainly would have objected to such adjustments, or would at least have countered with claims of its own. Nor was there, in view of the overall shortages in the theater, any thought of providing the diverted units with anything like “normal” administrative tails specified in logistical planning factors. Instead, the principle was generally followed of considering the total number of units of particular types available in the theater and making an equitable redistribution so as to provide approximately equal support to all divisions in the theater. On this basis SHAEF on 29 September ordered the transfer of a specific number of service and supporting troop units, totaling about 29,000 men, to 6th Army Group for the support of the six divisions scheduled for transfer or diversion to southern France—that is, the XV Corps, consisting of the 2nd French Armored and the 79th U.S. Infantry Divisions, plus one division to be designated later,60 and the three divisions
which were to arrive at Marseille the next month (the 100th and 103rd Infantry and 14th Armored Divisions).61
Hopes were high at this time that the southern line of communications might develop surplus capacity which could help sustain forces in the north. General Adcock, in arguing for additional service units for the southern army group, had asserted, in fact, that the ports and Line of communications of southern France had a potential capability of supporting the entire Third Army in addition to the recently augmented DRAGOON force of sixteen divisions.62 With this prospect in mind, COMZ officials of both the European and Mediterranean theaters met at Dijon on 11-12 October to consider additional transfers of service troops for the purpose of developing the maximum capacity of the Rhône line of communications. SOLOC planned to develop rail facilities in southern France sufficiently to handle 20,000 tons per day, 4,000 of which would be in excess of its own needs. For this purpose it badly needed engineer and signal troops, truck companies, and port battalions, its total requirement coming to about 38,000 men.63
SOLOC’s bid again raised the question as to the relative adequacy of logistic support in the two areas. Although it considered the request reasonable, the Communications Zone at first opposed any additional transfers on the ground that they could not be spared without seriously affecting the support of the 12th Army Group. Operations in the north had higher priority than those in the south, and the Communications Zone was making every effort in October to rebuild the supply structure supporting the 12th Army Group so that the offensive could be resumed early the next month.
Supply officers at SHAEF reacted similarly. Colonel Whipple, after a restudy of the respective troop bases of the northern and southern forces, concluded that any additional diversions would provide the southern forces with more nearly adequate logistic support than those in the north. Completion of the transfers and diversions then in progress, he calculated, would result in division slices of about 39,000 and 34,500 men respectively for the ANVIL and DRAGOON forces. These were admittedly short of the 40,000 and 42,500 respectively originally planned for the two areas.64
Two developments had occurred, however, which were completely disrupting plans for the adequate support of U.S. forces in the north. The recent accelerations in the flow of divisions from the United States were so unbalancing the troop basis that forces in northern France would be short five average administrative tails by December. Furthermore, the rapid extension of lines of communications in August and September had so thinned out the
available logistical resources that the planned slice, designed to operate a road line of communications of no more than 150 miles, could no longer adequately support a division at the German border. Colonel Whipple estimated that thirty divisional tails were adequate to support only about twenty divisions in the existing circumstances. On the other hand, twelve tails in southern France, he argued, could support an equal number of divisions in the Belfort gap, as planned. Summing up, he asserted that the 12th Army Group must get first consideration as long as its operations had higher priority.65
The Communications Zone, probably because it better appreciated the logistic straits of the theater and the value of any additional line-of-communications capacity that might be developed, was willing to meet at least part of the 6th Army Group request. It suggested the transfer of about 15,000 men, some of them to come from its own resources, some from the 12th Army Group. But protests from the latter resulted in the major portion of the allotment being made from the Communications Zone. The SHAEF G-4 finally determined exactly what units were to be transferred on the basis of operational priorities, and on 21 October ordered the transfers.66
Although the 12th Army Group had avoided a major raid on its own resources, it realized that transfers from the Communications Zone would ultimately have their effect on the combat zone. It was particularly concerned about the loss of ordnance maintenance units, and stated that the effect would soon be evident unless replacements were provided. Moreover, it suspected, with some justification, that the 6th Army Group bid had again included troop units which were not required solely for the planned development of the Rhône line of communications, but to correct original deficiencies in its troop basis. If such was the case, the 12th Army Group requested that the theater ask the War Department for additional service troops to compensate for reductions in the planned proportion of service to combat troops. But ETOUSA disapproved this request, having only recently been turned down on the matter of the credit for the deleted antiaircraft artillery battalions.
The recent transfers continued to worry the 12th Army Group, which feared future raids. In its view, the theater was not facing up to the basic deficiencies in the troop basis, and it was dissatisfied with what it considered a haphazard manner of meeting crises by shuffling resources between the various areas in the theater. Uncertainty as to future action on service troops obviously troubled the field commands, just as uncertainty over supply was also affecting operational planning at this time.
The army group wanted a definite allocation of units available or due from the United States so that it would know what it could count on having. SHAEF recognized the reasonableness of the request and late in November instructed the Communications Zone to make a firm allocation of service units between the field forces and the Communications Zone. Such an allocation was finally made early in February 1945.67
Early in November 6th Army Group again had requested additional service troops, mainly because of the situation in the First French Army. The French had been willing enough to form combat divisions, but had been notoriously remiss about activating and training the required complements of service and supporting troops. U.S. forces consequently had been forced to provide a larger and larger share of First French Army’s logistic support in southern France.68 SHAEF considered the new requests, admitted their reasonableness and desirability, but finally disallowed them. The strained logistic situation, it noted, plus the fact that operational priorities continued to favor forces in the north, simply prohibited additional transfers from the north.69
Despairing of obtaining additional troops, General Larkin, the SOLOC commander, now urged both Delta Base Section and CONAD to organize a much fuller utilization of German prisoners of war. SOLOC was already making extensive use of Italian service units.70 Attempts were also made to employ civilian labor, but the demand far exceeded the supply. The Seventh Army had found, for example, that the Germans had removed most of the able-bodied men from Alsace. What manpower remained was either needed for the civilian economy or was being recruited by the French military services.71
Determining precisely what the scale of service support on the northern and southern lines of communications was at any one time was a highly controversial matter, as was always the case where statistics were involved. On 1 December, for example, the division slice within the 6th Army Group exceeded 30,000 men while that of the 12th was in the neighborhood of only 27,000. Compensating for this seeming imbalance, however, was the fact that each division on the northern line of communications was supported by about 11,300 service troops in the communications zone, while in the south the corresponding figure, according to ETOUSA, was only 8,600. The total theater slice on the two lines of communications therefore appeared to be roughly in
balance, totaling 38,000 in the north and 39,000 in the south.
But there were other factors to consider. The ETOUSA G-3 pointed out in December that the SOLOC totals did not include about 20,000 men in the Italian service units, which were employed in support of the forces in southern France. Their inclusion, on the basis of the nine U.S. divisions then operational in the 6th Army Group, raised the slice of the southern France forces from 8,600 to 10,800.72 General Larkin was quick to challenge the basis on which this comparison had been made. For one thing, it had taken no account of the eight divisions of the First French Army, the support of which was fully as much a responsibility of SOLOC as was the support of the Seventh U.S. Army, but for which the French had thus far provided only 18,300 service troops. Moreover, he noted that Italian service units could not be counted as having the same effectiveness as trained U.S. military units. More properly, Larkin maintained, SOLOC, with a strength of 106,464 service troops (88,164 U.S. and 18,300 French) was supporting 17 divisions (9 U.S. and 8 French), the COMZ slice thus averaging only 6,262 men.73
In the meantime two further augmentations of the 6th Army Group’s combat strength, one of them temporary, had added to SOLOC’s service troop difficulties. Early in December the nine infantry regiments of the 42nd, 63rd, and 70th Divisions arrived at Marseille minus their normal divisional service support. Later in the month the 6th Army Group acquired another division (the 87th Infantry) as the result of the shift in the army group boundary arising out of the situation in the Ardennes. Sixth Army Group’s strength thus rose to twenty-one divisions. The latter acquisition turned out to be temporary; but the nine infantry regiments, although initially intended for employment on a rotational basis, were the advance elements of three full divisions. SOLOC and 6th Army Group therefore took the occasion to request additional service troops.
As of mid-January nothing had yet come of this request, and General Devers again appealed for additional service troops, noting that the separate infantry regiments had been employed constantly since their arrival without adequate service or combat support, and that the arrival of the remaining elements of the divisions within the next few days would shortly necessitate the support of the complete units. Members of the SOLOC staff repeated this plea at a conference with Generals Lee and Somervell a few days later, and noted that additional French divisions were also scheduled for activation and commitment. SOLOC officials claimed that the COMZ service troop slice in southern France had dropped to 4,425 men, and argued that southern France was critically short of service troops despite the maximum use of prisoners, Italians, and civilians.74
SHAEF at this time made an additional allocation of service units based
on the assignment of 12 U.S. divisions to the 6th Army Group. Almost simultaneously it transferred the equivalent of another corps to the 6th Army Group for the Colmar operation, which gave the 6th Army Group a strength of 16 U.S. and 9 French divisions. SHAEF made a supplementary loan of service units for the support of this additional combat strength, ordering the 12th Army Group to release about 12,000 troops for this purpose with the assurance that they would be returned.75
Upon the completion of the Colmar operation in February 6th Army Group asked that it be permitted to retain certain of the units, especially combat engineers, which had been attached when it had taken over a portion of the Third Army front in December. But SHAEF refused, and by the end of February the divisions temporarily attached to 6th Army Group, along with the accompanying service and support troops, were returned northward.76
In the meantime ETOUSA completed the theater-wide reallocation which had been undertaken some months before at the urging of both army groups. By the end of February, therefore, a satisfactory redistribution was under way on the basis of a strength of twelve U.S. divisions in the 6th Army Group and forty-five in the 12th.
The service troop allocation was again under revision when hostilities came to an end. At the end of April the 6th Army Group had a combat zone slice of 30,500 as against a slice of 26,500 in the 12th Army Group. The over-all COMZ slice at that time came to 8,919 on the Continent, and to 10,700 in the theater as a whole.77
Effecting an equitable distribution of service troops within the theater was difficult at best. Varying local conditions and circumstances on the two principal lines of communication made it impossible to assign units purely on a mathematical basis, and the ratio of combat strength between the two army groups was constantly being upset. Both army groups, and particularly the 6th, were understandably impatient with the interminable delays in adjustments which were called for with the shifts in combat units, and argued for a procedure which would provide a more automatic shift in logistic support with the alterations in combat strength. The difficulties attested, moreover, to the fact that the southern forces had not been completely integrated into the European theater structure. In logistic matters SOLOC had long maintained ties with the Mediterranean theater. In some respects complete integration with the European theater was never accomplished.