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Chapter 7: The ANVIL Beachhead

On the transport and fire support ships offshore, first light on 15 August revealed a clear, calm Mediterranean day. Although cool at first, variable light surface breezes promised that temperatures ashore would rise sharply during the morning. Coastward, a bank of mist, thickening inland into the fog that had helped scatter the paratroopers, partially obscured the beaches, leaving only the forbidding peaks of the Maures and the Esterel clearly visible. As the fog began to dissipate after sunrise at 0638, smoke and dust from air and naval bombardment continued to keep the coastline hazy, and visibility dropped to as little as fifty yards off several assault beaches for a while. Despite all the information supplied by the vast Allied intelligence effort, no one could be certain of what German defenses were hidden by that late summer veil.1

The 3rd Division Lands

The first objective of the 3rd Infantry Division was to secure the squat St. Tropez peninsula on the left, or southwestern, section of the ANVIL beachline (SeeMap 6). The area was defended by the fourth, or Ost, battalion of the 765th Grenadier Regiment (242nd Division), supported by two field artillery battalions and one coast artillery battery. Seventh Army planners had chosen two beaches for the 3rd Division’s assault: one on the southern base of the peninsula off Cavalaire Bay, and a second at the head of the peninsula just south of St. Tropez. Temporarily, the northern side of the peninsula, including the narrow St. Tropez gulf, would be avoided.

The 3rd Division’s southernmost beach was ALPHA RED, located on the shores of Cavalaire Bay. The landing area consisted of low, mostly bare sand dunes backed by a narrow band of pines twenty to thirty yards deep. The coastal road, N-559,2 lay beyond

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Map 6: The Seventh Army 
Assault, 15–16 August 1944

Map 6: The Seventh Army Assault, 15–16 August 1944

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the pines, while the narrow-gauge railroad that skirted the coast ran parallel to N-559, swinging inland near the center of ALPHA RED. Cultivated fields lay beyond the eastern half of the beach; and on the west, rocky, pine-clad foothills rose just inland. On the left, Route N-559 passed by the resort town of Cavalaire-sur-Mer and wound south and southwest along the coastal hills to Cape Negre, six miles away; on the right, the coastal route turned north at the eastern edge of the beach, cutting through the lightly wooded, low hills along the inland base of the St. Tropez peninsula for about six miles to the opposite side of the cape.

About six miles northeast of ALPHA RED, at the end of the peninsula, lay the 3rd Division’s other assault beach, ALPHA YELLOW. The landing area offered over two good miles of excellent beach on which the entire 3rd Division could easily have landed. But exits were poor. A narrow, one-lane road that might not hold up under heavy military traffic led north to St. Tropez, and there was no direct route west across the peninsula to Route N-559.

ALPHA RED was the assault beach for the 3rd Division’s 7th Infantry regiment. The regimental left was to drive inland about two miles to secure dominant high ground and then push southwestward along the coast via N-559 toward Cape Negre. The center was to advance north along N-599 to the junction with Route N-98 and be prepared to move southwest into the interior along N-98 about eight miles to La Mole. The right was to probe into the St. Tropez peninsula. The 30th Infantry was to follow the 7th Infantry ashore at 0900 and advance north across the base of the peninsula to secure Cogolin, a road junction town on N-98, about three miles inland from the head of St. Tropez gulf. Subsequently the 30th Infantry was to push westward along a third-class road toward Collobrieres, about fifteen miles northwest of ALPHA RED and in the heart of the Maures massif. To the 15th Infantry, landing at ALPHA YELLOW, fell the tasks of clearing the peninsula and seizing St. Tropez. These missions completed, the 15th was to assemble in reserve near Cogolin.

Air and naval bombardment took place generally as planned at both ALPHA RED and YELLOW, while minesweepers efficiently accomplished their tasks. About 0715 Apex craft—radio-controlled LCVPs loaded with high explosives—started shoreward at ALPHA RED. Some hit concrete tetrahedrons armed with mines, thereby opening channels through these offshore obstacles; others went on to detonate on the beach, exploding mines. Preceded by twenty-one rocket-equipped landing craft, the leading assault wave at ALPHA RED started shoreward about 0630. The rockets blasted the shoreline between 0750 and 0756, and were quickly followed by the first troops and several DD tanks. One tank hit a mine and sank, as did two LCVPs carrying men of the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, resulting in sixty casualties. Later waves landed generally according to schedule, although mines, both offshore and on the beach, damaged a few additional craft and forced landing control officers to close the right flank of the beach for some time. The 30th

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Infantry started ashore at 0920, twenty minutes late, but by 1015 the regiment and most of the artillery scheduled for ALPHA RED were ashore. General O’Daniel, commanding the 3rd Division, came ashore at ALPHA RED about 1045.

Opposition at the beach was negligible, but inland the 7th Infantry came under small-arms, machine-gun, and mortar fire from elements of the 242nd Division. During the morning the most stubborn opposition centered at Cavalaire-sur-Mer and nearby Cape Cavalaire, but the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, cleared the area by 1030. Accompanied by tanks and tank destroyers, the battalion continued west astride Route N-599 toward the area held by the French African Commando Group. Picking up part of the French unit, the 3rd Battalion probed onward until dusk, halting before a German strongpoint at Layet Point, a mile southwest of Cape Negre and over seven miles southwest of ALPHA RED.

In the center the 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, struck out from ALPHA RED sometime around noon, pushing northwest over rugged coastal foothills of the Maures to reach Route N-98, a mile east of La Mole, at 1630. On the right the 2nd Battalion, encountering scattered resistance, moved north along N-559, marched into Cogolin during the afternoon, and then advanced southwest along Route N-98. Both 7th Infantry battalions joined the French commandos, who had already cleared La Mole, and moved into the town at dark.

The 30th Infantry, driving rapidly north from ALPHA RED behind the 7th, cut across the base of the peninsula to the head of the St. Tropez gulf, where it joined elements of both the 3rd Division’s 15th regiment and units of the 45th Division. The 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry, passed through Cogolin about 1400 and then struck west for Collobrieres, which fell at 2000, fully twenty-four hours earlier than had been expected. The rest of the 30th Infantry started northwest across the Maures from Cogolin about 1700; by nightfall leading elements were scarcely five miles short of Le Luc, at the center of the Toulon–St. Raphael corridor.

The 15th Infantry’s assault at ALPHA YELLOW, executed on schedule, followed the pattern at ALPHA RED. Again mines rather than German fire caused the few casualties suffered. Ost troops of the 242nd Division, stunned by the air and naval bombardment, surrendered at the earliest opportunity. The 1st Battalion, 15th Infantry, struck directly inland and by 1400 secured the high ground in the center of the St. Tropez peninsula, overrunning a German strongpoint in the process and suffering eight casualties while capturing forty prisoners.3

On the right, the 3rd Battalion, delayed by skirmishes with withdrawing troops of the 242nd Division, reached St. Tropez about 1500 to find that misdropped troopers of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion, aided by the FFI, had already cleared most of the town. Remaining resistance was centered at the Citadel, a medieval fortress on the eastern outskirts of St. Tropez. But before the 15th Infantry

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could organize a concerted attack, the paratroopers induced the small German garrison of sixty-seven men to surrender.

The 2nd Battalion followed the rest of the 15th Infantry ashore, marched overland to the St. Tropez area, and joined elements of the 30th Infantry and the 45th Division. Meanwhile, patrols of the 15th Infantry, aided by the 3rd Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, cleaned out bypassed portions of the St. Tropez peninsula. By dark the 15th Infantry was assembling at Cogolin in division reserve.

The Assault in the Center

The 45th Division’s DELTA beaches lay along the shores of Bougnon Bay, about eight miles north of ALPHA YELLOW and across the mouth of the St. Tropez gulf. The division’s landing areas were again defended by only a single battalion, the 1st Battalion of the 765th Grenadiers, backed by one field artillery battalion and one naval battery. DELTA RED, southernmost of the DELTA beaches, was located about a mile and a half north of Ste. Maxime, and the others, GREEN, YELLOW, and BLUE, were a few miles farther up the coast, separated by 500- to 1,000-yard stretches of less hospitable shoreline. Behind the beaches, Route N-98, hugging the coastal contours, pointed the way southwest to Ste. Maxime and northward to St. Raphael. Rising, cultivated slopes led inland for about half a mile before giving way to the steeper, wooded hills of the Maures.

No offshore obstacles existed at the DELTA beaches, and the preassault air and naval bombardment had already destroyed much of the artillery the Germans had emplaced to defend the area. On the morning of D-day, only one 75-mm. gun fired a few ineffective rounds at landing craft before an American destroyer silenced the piece. Three 81-mm. mortars on Cape Sardineaux let go about sixty rounds before they too were destroyed, while a 20-mm. automatic cannon at the northeastern limit of Bougnon Bay fired ineffectively for some time. Other German weapons in the area were in firing condition on D-day, but the weight of the air and naval bombardment, together with last-minute rocket barrages, discouraged the crews. In the end, most of the defenders at gun emplacements and other strongpoints in the DELTA beach region readily surrendered to 45th Division troops.

At DELTA RED and DELTA GREEN a few rounds of mortar fire and some small-arms fire harassed the 157th Infantry’s leading wave, which went ashore at 0802. The 3rd Battalion swung southwest from DELTA RED along Route N-98 toward Ste. Maxime, encountering only weak, scattered opposition in the area. At Ste. Maxime resistance was more determined, and the battalion had to call on naval gunfire support before securing the town about 1530. Then, led by a platoon of light tanks from the 117th Cavalry Squadron, the battalion moved on to the southwest, halting at dusk along the western shore of the St. Tropez gulf after meeting troops from the 3rd Division.

The 1st Battalion, 157th Infantry, landed unopposed at DELTA GREEN and advanced generally through the Maures along a stream valley to Plan

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de la Tour, about five miles inland from Ste. Maxime. The 2nd Battalion followed the 3rd ashore over DELTA RED and moved without opposition onto high ground some three or four miles west and southwest of Ste. Maxime.

In the 45th Division’s center, the 2nd Battalion, 180th Infantry, started ashore at DELTA YELLOW about 0758, encountered negligible resistance, and at dusk was in control of high ground four miles northwest of its beach, pushing deeper into the Maures. At DELTA BLUE on the right the 1st Battalion encountered little opposition (although land mines disabled four DD tanks), but ran into increasingly stubborn resistance as it swung north along Route N-98. By dusk the main body was scarcely a mile and a half beyond DELTA BLUE, although other elements, having marched over hills just inland, had reached N-98 a mile and a half farther north. During the evening, patrols probed northward to St. Aygulf, four miles north along Route N-98 from DELTA BLUE, and found well-defended German strongpoints at the southern edge of town.

The 3rd Battalion, 180th Infantry, drove due north and inland from DELTA BLUE, following a poor road over rough, semi-forested hills. The battalion ran into strong resistance from elements of the 242nd Division and at dark was still maneuvering to clear high ground about two miles north of DELTA BLUE. Late in the afternoon a platoon of the 45th Reconnaissance Troop struck northward from Ste. Maxime along a third-class road (D-25) that led to Le Muy, twelve miles away. It was this platoon that, about 2030, met elements of the 509th Parachute Infantry Battalion south of Le Muy. The 45th Division had not required the services of its third regiment, the 179th Infantry, on D-day, and the unit landed without incident to assemble in reserve near Ste. Maxime.

The 36th Division on the Right

As fortune would have it, the Germans had concentrated most of their defenses in the area to be assaulted by the “hard luck” 36th Division. The short stretch of coastline between the mouth of the Argens River north to Antheor Cove was defended by the 765th Grenadier Regiment’s 2nd Battalion, backed by a field artillery battalion, a naval battery, and the 1038th Antitank Battalion. The area included the small port of St. Raphael and, slightly inland, the town of Frejus. In addition, the 3rd Battalion, 765th Grenadiers, was in reserve in the Frejus region, and the fourth, or Ost, battalion of the 239th Grenadiers (148th Division) held the area north of Antheor Cove for six miles to Theoule-sur-Mer.

The primary beach of the 36th Division was CAMEL GREEN, where the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 141st Infantry, 36th Division, were scheduled to land. Situated a little over three miles east of St. Raphael, the landing area was backed by a steep embankment on top of which ran Route N-98 and the main-line, standard-gauge railroad, which emerged from the Toulon–St. Raphael corridor at St. Raphael to continue along the coast toward Cannes and Nice. Beyond the embankment were stone quarries cut deep into the sharply rising, scrub

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covered hills of the Esterel. Three miles northeast of CAMEL GREEN lay tiny CAMEL BLUE, the assault beach for the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry. Situated at the head of Antheor Cove, the beach gave way a scant ten yards inland to the Route N-98 embankment, beyond which the main railroad crossed a narrow gorge via an eight-span bridge.

To the 141st Infantry fell the task of carrying out the main part of the 36th Division’s initial mission, that is, securing the right flank of the VI Corps. Once it landed, the regiment was to concentrate its efforts on clearing the shores of Agay Roadstead, between CAMEL GREEN and CAMEL BLUE, so that the division could use an excellent strand at the top of the roadstead for general unloading. Next, the 1st Battalion was to swing northeast along the coast toward Theoule-sur-Mer and La Napoule, at the eastern end of the Army beachhead line, a little over six miles beyond CAMEL BLUE. The rest of the regiment was to strike north across the Esterel to the Army beachhead line and Route N-7, which ran along the inland slopes of the Esterel from Frejus to Cannes.

The 143rd Infantry, following the 141st ashore at CAMEL GREEN, was to drive rapidly westward in the opposite direction to seize St. Raphael and support the landing of the 142nd Infantry over CAMEL RED, the 36th Division’s third beach located at the head of the Frejus gulf. CAMEL RED gave direct access to Frejus, to a small airfield, and to the road net of the Argens valley sector of the Toulon–St. Raphael corridor and, in general, promised to provide the best beaches in the entire VI Corps assault area for the discharge of both troops and cargo. The CAMEL RED region was also the logical area in which to establish a base for a major thrust toward Le Muy and objectives farther west.

Once ashore at CAMEL RED, the 142nd Infantry was to strike inland for about a mile to clear Frejus and then push westward along Route N-7 toward the 1st Airborne Task Force. If necessary, the regiment was to help the airborne troops seize Le Muy, ten miles up the Argens valley from Frejus. However, because of expected German opposition at CAMEL RED, the 142d’s assault was not scheduled until 1400 in the afternoon. In the event that the 142nd could not land at CAMEL RED, the regiment was to come ashore over CAMEL GREEN, swing inland past the 143rd Infantry, and descend upon Frejus and CAMEL RED from behind.

The landings of the 36th Division also began on schedule. At CAMEL GREEN, the initial assault waves found no underwater obstacles and at first encountered little opposition. From 0900 to 1300 sporadic fire from German artillery on high ground to the west and northwest harassed unloading operations, but caused little damage and few casualties; it was finally halted by naval gunfire. At CAMEL BLUE farther east some machine-gun fire had greeted the first waves, but all firing ceased by 0900. As at the St. Tropez beaches, many of the Ost troops began surrendering as soon as the American troops advanced beyond the shoreline.

By 1000 the 141st had secured both CAMEL GREEN and CAMEL BLUE, but at Agay Roadstead the 1st and 2nd Battalions met stubborn opposition

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from elements of the 242nd Division, and it was 1700 before the roadstead’s shoreline was secure. The 2nd Battalion then headed up a twisting road across the Esterel; by sunset, about 2030, it was less than a mile from Route N-7 and over two miles inland from La Napoule.4 The 1st Battalion, which had to backtrack to CAMEL BLUE after helping out at the Agay Roadstead, was two miles north of BLUE by dark, having encountered only scattered opposition from 148th Division troops along winding Route N-98. The 3rd Battalion, relieved at GREEN in midafternoon by other division units, began moving north over the Esterel along back roads in between the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The 141st Infantry’s casualties for the day were approximately five men killed and twenty-five wounded, almost all incurred during the action at Agay Roadstead.

The 143rd Infantry ran into more opposition to the west. After assembling at CAMEL GREEN, its 1st and 3rd Battalions advanced west and northwest to secure high ground along the slopes of the Esterel and a mile or two inland. Closer to the coast, the 2nd also moved west, heading directly toward St. Raphael, but encountered stubborn resistance from a series of strongpoints controlling N-98, the shore road. Mortar and artillery fire from the right also harassed the battalion, while scattered groups of German infantry on hills just inland helped slow progress. By 1400, when the 142nd Infantry was scheduled to make its afternoon assault over CAMEL RED, forward elements of the 2nd Battalion, 143rd Infantry, had not yet reached St. Raphael and could not assist; and the closest troops of the 180th Infantry, 45th Division (which VI Corps had hoped would also be able to support the 142nd Infantry), were still a good four miles south of CAMEL RED at 1400. The 142nd regiment would have to make what was expected to be one of the most critical landings alone.

CAMEL RED

During the morning of 15 August, after the success of the main landings was assured, naval and air echelons went forward with preparations for the CAMEL RED assault. Here, for the first time, the attackers met considerable opposition. The Germans, recognizing the importance of the CAMEL RED area, had developed a much stronger network of coastal defenses there. Static installations included a minefield across the Frejus gulf, single and double rows of mined concrete tetrahedrons at the shoreline, and, on the beach, two rows of double-apron barbed wire, a concrete antitank wall seven feet high and over three feet thick, a twelve-foot-deep antitank ditch on the seaward side of the wall, and extensive fields of land mines on the beach, on the nearby airfield, and on the roads and paths leading inland. There were machine-gun positions in the antitank wall, and pillboxes and other strongpoints just behind it. Larger emplacements, a few holding 88-mm. guns, enfiladed the beach from the harbor front at St.

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Pillbox guards bridge to 
St

Pillbox guards bridge to St. Raphael. Supporting installations are behind it.

Raphael. Inside the town the defenders had turned many buildings into lesser defensive works, and booby traps and mines were plentiful. Artillery dominating the beach included a battery of 75-mm. guns and another of 105-mm. in hills south of the Argens River; another 105-mm. battery emplaced in rising ground a mile north of St. Raphael; two batteries of 100-mm. howitzers on high ground northwest of the port; and various light antiaircraft batteries sprinkled throughout the region. Finally, the 1038th Antitank Gun Battalion had zeroed in on CAMEL RED and its approaches with eight or ten of the newest model 88-mm. guns. Towed from place to place as the occasion demanded, these weapons had been unscathed by the preassault bombardment. Infantry in the area included at least two reinforced companies of the 2nd Battalion, 765th Grenadiers (242nd Division).

The strength of the defenses was soon apparent. About 1100, minesweepers clearing the deep-water approaches came under fire from German artillery that covering destroyers were unable to neutralize, and had to retire. From approximately 1205 to 1220 over ninety B-24 medium bombers dropped nearly 200 tons of high explosives in the CAMEL RED area. But when the shallow-water minesweepers darted shoreward again about 1235, they found that the aerial bombardment had likewise failed to reduce the volume of German fire,

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and the minesweepers again retired under heavy shelling. Apex drone boats went in about 1300 and also received fire; all but three of the drones malfunctioned, and some had to be destroyed by Navy ships.

Meanwhile, four destroyers, two cruisers, and a battleship began a final 45-minute bombardment. The assault waves of LCVPs had already formed and, led by rocket craft, started shoreward shortly thereafter. At 1400 the leading wave was about 3,000 yards offshore and under fire from German artillery, when Capt. Leo B. Schulten, USN, commanding the CAMEL RED assault group of Task Force 87 under Rear Adm. Spencer S. Lewis, temporarily halted the landing. Initially he decided to postpone the assault on CAMEL RED until 1430. At the same time, he informed Admiral Lewis of the situation and requested instructions.

Schulten’s message placed Lewis in a dilemma. The TF 87 commander had no desire to cancel the landing, but sending the 142nd Infantry ashore as planned over CAMEL RED seemed a serious error. Obviously the preassault bombardment had failed to neutralize the German artillery; the minesweeping had been incomplete; and the drones had accomplished little. Admiral Lewis also believed that Schulten’s postponement had already cost them whatever shock effect the air and naval bombardments might have had, thus allowing German defenders time to recover and reoccupy any vacated positions. Chances for tactical surprise had certainly been lost, and sending the assault forces in now would undoubtedly result in heavy casualties for both the ground and naval forces involved.

Lewis first attempted to consult with the 36th Division commander, General Dahlquist. Since he and Dahlquist had prepared alternate plans for landing the 142nd Infantry at CAMEL GREEN, the admiral knew he could make the switch with a minimum of confusion. Moreover, reports from shore indicated that the 36th Division could probably secure CAMEL RED by an overland attack, while CAMEL GREEN was proving to be a far better unloading beach than expected. On the other hand, Dahlquist, who had been ashore since 1000, might need the 142nd Infantry to land at CAMEL RED for tactical reasons. Accordingly, between 1400 and 1415, Lewis tried to reach the division commander by radio, but, since adequate ship-to-shore communications had not yet been established, the effort was unsuccessful. Reluctant to delay his decision any longer, at 1415 Lewis directed Schulten to cancel the CAMEL RED assault and land the 142nd over CAMEL GREEN, which had long since been secured by the 141st Infantry.

The 142nd Infantry started ashore at CAMEL GREEN about 1515, and before 1600 its leading units had started north through rear elements of the 143rd Infantry, which continued its push southwest along the coast, still encountering determined resistance. Two miles inland from CAMEL GREEN the 142nd Infantry wheeled westward, under orders to reach positions from which it could launch an attack into Frejus by 2000. However, the distance involved, the slow movement through the steep, wooded hills, and some skirmishing with German units—probably the 765th’s reserve

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battalion—combined to delay progress, and darkness found the 142d’s forward elements still three miles from the town. Yet the prognosis was good. The regiment’s casualties for the day were only five men wounded—certainly far fewer than there would have been if the unit had made an assault at CAMEL RED—and the progress of both the 142nd and the 143rd together with the airborne blocking force had just about sealed off the entire Frejus area. The only serious loss occurred that night when the Luftwaffe launched its only effective air sortie against the beachhead; JU-88 twin-engined light bombers managed to hit and sink LST-282 off Agay Roadstead with radio-controlled bombs, resulting in forty casualties and the loss of several 36th Division artillery pieces.

The 1st Airborne Task Force

Since the British 2nd Independent Parachute Brigade had failed to take Le Muy on D-day, the 550th Glider Infantry Battalion, supported by part of the 509th Parachute Battalion, undertook the task shortly after midnight on 16 August.5 The two units launched their first attack at 0200, but, making little progress against stubborn resistance, they withdrew at daylight and returned at 0900 with artillery support. The two battalions then pushed slowly into the town. Toward midafternoon, tanks of the 191st Tank Battalion, attached to the 45th Division, rumbled up the road across the Maures from Ste. Maxime to lend a hand; and the last defenders of Le Muy surrendered shortly thereafter.

Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion, 551st Parachute Infantry, had set out west for Draguignan, where elements of the LXII Corps headquarters still held out. By 2300 on the 16th, the battalion had cleared most of the town and captured part of the corps staff as well as Brig. Gen. Ludwig Bieringer, the German military governor of the Var department.

West of Le Muy, at Les Arcs, the 517th Parachute Infantry had begun to run into the first signs of an organized German response. True to his decision at dusk on the 15th, General von Schwerin had continued preparations at Vidauban to attack toward Le Muy and relieve the LXII Corps headquarters at Draguignan. By 0700 on the 16th, he had finally managed to assemble about four infantry battalions from the 244th Division, two 105-mm. howitzers from the same division, and a couple of heavy weapons platoons and the assault company from his former division headquarters. Moving several miles northeast from Vidauban, the German force split at a road junction just south of Les Arcs—one group heading north for Les Arcs, and the other, intending to strike for Le Muy, temporarily holding at the junction.

The first German group entered Les Arcs about 0730, threw out a small American outpost, and gained a foothold on rising terrain north of town, while the 517th Parachute Infantry held along the hills to the northeast and east. About 0930 the 517th’s paratroopers were joined by

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Maj

Maj. Gen. Ludwig Bieringer, a prisoner of war. General Frederick is on the passenger side of the jeep.

the 2nd Battalion of the 180th Infantry, 45th Division, which had made its way over the Maures massif via back roads and trails. It had passed through Vidauban—then inexplicably empty of Germans—and, aided by a platoon from the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion, began clearing Route N-7, which threatened the German rear. A few hours later, elements of the 157th Infantry, 45th Division, approached Vidauban from the south and found the town again occupied by Germans, but they managed to clear the area of hostile troops by 1530. Late in the day, reinforced by its 3rd Battalion, the 517th Parachute Infantry launched an attack of its own, and by dusk had virtually surrounded Les Arcs.

Doomed to failure before it started, General von Schwerin’s counterattack now collapsed, and the remaining Germans in the vicinity of Vidauban and Les Arcs withdrew to the west and northwest under cover of darkness. During the day’s fighting, the Germans had lost not only many heavy weapons and vehicles, but also the equivalent of two infantry battalions of the 244th Division against forces of the 1st Airborne Task Force and the 45th Infantry Division. The action at Les Arcs was also the last significant engagement of the 1st Airborne Task Force in the Toulon–St. Raphael corridor. By the morning of 17 August the airborne forces were in firm control of their objective area, including the railroad-highway junction

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Troops of 45th Division 
wade ashore near Ste

Troops of 45th Division wade ashore near Ste. Maxime.

towns of Le Muy, La Motte, Trans-en-Provence, and Les Arcs, which both blocked the main entrances to the beachhead and secured the inland approaches to Toulon. Shortly before noon on the 17th, major elements of the 36th Division began to arrive at Le Muy from the Frejus area, and the initial mission of the airborne force ended.

The Advance to the BLUE Line

German opposition during the night of 15–16 August and throughout the 16th was strongest on VI Corps’ far left, beyond Cape Negre, and on the right, along the Argens valley for about five miles inland. In the southwest, the 7th Infantry, 3rd Division, drove toward Toulon in two columns—the 3rd Battalion and the French commandos along the coastal road (Route N-559) and the rest of the regiment about three miles inland along Route N-98.6 The German strongpoint at Layet Point, where the Allied coastal force had been halted late on the 15th, fell early on the morning of the 16th, but the area was not entirely cleared until almost 1500. Against scattered opposition, the coastal force pushed on

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and by nightfall had patrols in Le Lavandou, about three miles beyond Layet Point.

Starting out from La Mole about 0330 on the 16th, the 7th Infantry’s inland column halted at 0730 in front of a strong 242nd Division roadblock about seven miles beyond La Mole. Defensive fire and rugged terrain delayed progress for the rest of the day, but during the night the American units, guided by the FFI, began flanking marches that were to carry them past the obstacle early on the 17th.

North of the 7th Infantry, the 30th Infantry regiment also swept westward in two columns. About 1000 a small group started out from Collobrieres opposed mainly by 242nd Division artillery, antitank, and mortar fire; it emerged from the mountains about 1600 at Pierrefeu in the Toulon–St. Raphael corridor. The unit had broken through a heavily wooded, easily defensible section of the Maures and was a good eight miles west of the Army beachhead line. Meanwhile, other elements of the 30th Infantry regiment had reached Gonfaron, ten miles northeast of Collobrieres on Route N-97, the main highway through the southwestern section of the Toulon–St. Raphael corridor. By dusk on the 16th the main body of the 30th Infantry was assembled at Gonfaron, with patrols active to the west and southwest.

North of the 3rd Division, units of the 45th Division that had completed their missions along the coast marched across the northeastern portion of the Maures on the 16th, pushing west and assisting the paratroopers at Vidauban. By the following day, 17 August, the division had cleared a wide area south of the Argens River from Frejus to Le Luc and stood astride the central portion of the Toulon–St. Raphael corridor. Above the 45th, units of the 36th Division had secured the coast on the 16th and then pushed scattered German elements off the Esterel massif before swinging west to join the airborne units at Le Muy. By the 17th they occupied a broad area on the VI Corps’ right flank, from Theoule-sur-Mer, at the northern end of the blue line, to the region around Draguignan a few miles northwest of Le Muy.

The 36th Division seemed to work harder for its gains. Shortly before dawn on the 16th, units of the 142nd Infantry had entered Frejus unopposed, but soon became involved in a series of minor skirmishes after daybreak. They were unable to secure the town until 1330, and then met further resistance while pushing up the Argens valley that afternoon. Along the coast, the 143rd had cleared St. Raphael by 0930, but, as expected, encountered stubborn resistance from 242nd Division elements in the CAMEL RED area. Meanwhile, north of Frejus and St. Raphael, 141st Infantry units ran into a second counterattacking force along Route N-7 in the northeastern corner of the Esterel. A German motorized column, probably consisting of part of the reserve battalion of the 239th Grenadiers, 148th Division, came rolling south along the highway early in the morning from the direction of Cannes. The infantrymen of the regiment’s 2nd Battalion easily dispersed these Riviera rangers, who apparently had little knowledge of the rapid American advance. However, to prevent further excursion

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from this quarter, the 141st regiment’s 1st Battalion and some divisional engineers moved up to La Napoule, destroying a local highway and railroad bridge just south of the town.

An Appraisal

On both 15 and 16 August the VI Corps had penetrated farther and more easily than planners had thought possible. Except on the far west, in the sector of the 7th Infantry, VI Corps and the 1st Airborne Task Force had reached and crossed the Army beachhead, or blue, line. By the end of D plus 1 Truscott’s forces thus had a firm hold on the vital Toulon–St. Raphael corridor, making it nearly impossible for German ground forces to launch a significant attack on the Allied beachline. Although German resistance had stiffened somewhat on the 16th, it was still spotty and much weaker than expected. In fact, the Germans had failed to make any strong or coordinated attempt to contain the beachhead, and the VI Corps found no indication that the Germans had any firm front line. Resistance had been disorganized and confined to widely separated strongpoints; counterattacks had been highly localized and uncoordinated with units defending the beachline. In addition, intelligence officers at VI Corps and Seventh Army could find no indications that the Nineteenth Army was massing forces for a major counteroffensive, and could only assume that the Germans would attempt to delay further penetrations while preparing stronger defenses at Toulon.

The ANVIL commanders had other reasons to be optimistic. By the 16th they had confirmed the low caliber of the German units that were facing their forces. Captured documents and interrogation reports showed that the vast majority of the 2,300 prisoners taken by Seventh Army units were either overage Germans or members of Ost units. In addition, Allied losses had been much lower than expected on D-day, with only about 95 killed and 385 soldiers wounded.7 Furthermore, instead of rising sharply on the 16th as many planners had expected, VI Corps casualties were somewhat lower than they had been on the 15th. Losses of equipment and matériel had also been relatively insignificant. Despite the misgivings of Churchill, the ANVIL landings, according to the U.S. Navy historian Samuel Eliot Morison, had been “an example of an almost perfect amphibious operation from the point of view of training, timing, Army-Navy-Air Force cooperation, performance, and results.”8

Just about the only major controversy regarding this initial phase stemmed from Admiral Lewis’ decision to back away from the CAMEL RED beach and put the 36th Division’s 142nd Infantry regiment ashore on CAMEL GREEN. The division commander, General Dahlquist, later approved the decision and regretted only that

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the concerned regiment could not have been scheduled for CAMEL GREEN from the beginning. The delay at CAMEL RED had wasted six or seven hours. On the other hand, he believed that to have planned to land almost his entire division over CAMEL GREEN would have been unsound. Truscott, however, was later extremely critical of the decision, holding that the failure to carry out the assault on CAMEL RED forced his units to spend an extra day securing the beach from the land approaches, directly causing delays in the landing of Combat Command Sudre and ground echelons of the tactical air force, which in turn delayed the seizure and occupation of airfields near Frejus and in the Argens valley. According to Truscott, the net result was the lack of close air support for the VI Corps in the critical days that followed and his own inability to send Sudre’s armored unit “northwest or north as ... planned.” Thus he termed the decision “a grave error which merited reprimand at least, and most certainly no congratulation,” adding that, “except for the otherwise astounding success of the assault, it might have had even graver consequences.”9

Truscott’s criticism appears unjustified. The 36th Division did not secure the St. Raphael–Frejus area until midafternoon on 16 August, and even then the task of clearing offshore and beach obstacles proved to be so great that Army engineers and Navy demolition experts were unable to open CAMEL RED for discharge operations until 1900 on 17 August, D plus 2. Thus, even if the 142nd Infantry, regardless of casualties, had secured CAMEL RED during the afternoon of 15 August, the beach would not have been ready to receive CC Sudre or any other unit until late on the 16th at the earliest.

Truscott’s own plans had called for the French armored command to land sometime on the 16th, with “first priority” to CAMEL RED.10 But Sudre’s force actually landed over the 45th Division beaches during the night of 15–16 August, and was assembled ashore earlier than would have been the case if it had landed over CAMEL RED on the 16th in accordance with Truscott’s original plans. From its assembly point near Ste. Maxime, CC Sudre could have started north along Route N-98 on the morning of the 16th and would have reached the Argens valley no later than it would have if the unit had landed over CAMEL RED on the 16th. Truscott could also have sent the unit north into the Argens valley over the Ste. Maxime–Le Muy road on the 16th. The 45th Division had already established liaison with the 1st Airborne Task Force along this road, and during the afternoon of the 16th a platoon of the 191st Tank Battalion, attached to the 45th Division, reached Le Muy over the same road. Had Sudre’s armor followed that route on the 16th, it might well have reached Le Muy considerably sooner than if it had landed at CAMEL RED during the afternoon of that day.

But the entire matter is academic. Well before 15 August, Patch had decided that CC Sudre would have to be returned to de Lattre’s control soon

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after the landings. Truscott could not have sent it “northwest or north.” Realizing this, Truscott had made plans to put together Task Force Butler for a possible drive north and northwest of the beachhead area, and had expected CC Sudre to attack generally westward in the region south of the Durance River. In the end, Sudre’s armor began to reach the middle of the Toulon–St. Raphael corridor during the night of 16–17 August, certainly no later than it could have if put ashore over CAMEL RED on the afternoon of the 16th in accordance with preassault plans.

Truscott’s remarks about delays in airfield construction and lack of air support east of the Rhone are also difficult to support. Even if the 142nd Infantry had landed on CAMEL RED as scheduled, it is doubtful that engineers could have begun work on the airfields near Frejus before the 17th, when surveys actually began. Moreover, existing and potential airfield sites in the Argens valley and in the Toulon–St. Raphael corridor were all in VI Corps’ hands as soon as or earlier than anyone had expected.11 But the rapid Allied penetration, combined with adverse soil conditions in the beachhead area, forced aviation engineers to make drastic revisions in construction plans; unloading delays at both ALPHA and CAMEL beaches also slowed airfield progress. In the beachhead area engineers could not meet construction schedules: the crash (emergency) airstrip was opened two days late, three of the four planned dry-weather fields were four days behind schedule, and the rapid advance inland prompted engineers to cancel the fourth. On the other hand, a field at Sisteron, sixty miles northwest of CAMEL RED and not planned before the assault, was open on 23 August; a field at Le Luc was ready on the 25th, a week ahead of schedule; and one at Cuers, also in the Toulon–St. Raphael corridor, was operational on D plus 12, ten days ahead of schedule. Thus it is unlikely that the failure of the 142nd Infantry to land at CAMEL RED on the afternoon of D-day had any bearing on close air support for the VI Corps east of the Rhone.12 Truscott’s postwar contentions may signify little more than his frustrations with some aspects of the campaign that followed.

Certainly for Truscott, the evening of 16 August was filled with both elation and expectation. For all practical purposes, his forces had gained the initial objectives that the Seventh Army had assigned to them, and had done so twenty-four to forty-eight hours before most planners had thought possible. The next stage, according to the Seventh Army’s invasion directive, was to reorganize the assault force and mount an aggressive drive to the west and northwest. Considering

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the apparent German weakness all along his front, Truscott was eager to begin executing this second phase as soon as possible. A strong advance inland toward Toulon and the Rhone would also keep the Germans off balance, making it increasingly difficult for them to concentrate enough forces to contain the Allied beachhead area. With Patch’s approval, Truscott issued the new attack orders before dark on the 16th.