Foreword
This book, the third in a projected five-volume series, continues the comprehensive history of Marine Corps operations in World War II. The story of individual campaigns, once told in separate detail in preliminary monographs, has been reevaluated and rewritten to show events in proper proportion to each other and in correct perspective to the war as a whole. New material, particularly from Japanese sources, which has become available since the writing of the monographs, has been included to provide fresh insight into the Marine Corps’ contribution to the final victory in the Pacific.
During the period covered in these pages, we learned a great deal about the theory and practice of amphibious warfare. But most of all we confirmed the basic soundness of the doctrine which had been developed in prewar years by a dedicated and farsighted group of Navy and Marine Corps officers. These men, the leaders and workers in the evolution of modern amphibious tactics and techniques, served their country well. Anticipating the demands of a vast naval campaign in the Pacific, they developed requirements and tested prototypes for the landing craft and vehicles which first began to appear in large numbers at the time of the Central Pacific battles. Many of the senior officers among these prewar teachers and planners were the commanders who led the forces afloat and ashore in the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas.
Allied strategy envisioned two converging drives upon the inner core of Japanese defenses, one mounted in the Southwest Pacific under General MacArthur’s command, the other in the Central Pacific under Admiral Nimitz. Although Marines fought on land and in the air in the campaign to isolate Rabaul, and played a part significant beyond their numbers, it was in the Central Pacific that the majority of Fleet Marine Force units saw action. Here, a smoothly functioning Navy-Marine Corps team, ably supported by Army ground and air units, took part in a series of amphibious assaults that ranged in complexity from the seizure of tiny and heavily-defended islets, where there was little room for maneuver and no respite from combat, to large islands where two and three divisions could advance in concert.
It was my privilege to take part in much of this campaign, first as operations officer with Tactical Group 1 in the Marshalls and later in the same capacity with the 2nd Marine Division in the Marianas. I prize the
associations formed then with the officers and men who won the victories, not only those of the Marine Corps but also those of the other services in our joint commands. Sparked by knowledge hard-won at Tarawa, we were able to plan and execute effectively the operations at Kwajalein and move forward, on incredibly short notice, to Eniwetok, seizing there the islands that guarded the lagoon from which most of our ships staged for the Marianas. In the fighting for Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, Marines proved conclusively that their demonstrated effectiveness in short-term amphibious assault carried over to extended combat ashore.
As the narrative in this volume clearly shows, victory against a foe as determined and as competent as the Japanese could not have been won without a high cost in the lives of the men who did the fighting. Our advance from Tarawa to Guam was paid for in the blood of brave men, ordinary Americans whose sacrifice for their country should never be forgotten. Nor will it be by those who were honored to serve with them.
Wallace M. Greene, Jr.
General, U.S. Marine corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Reviewed and approved 8 December 1965