Appendix B
General Outline of Policy of Future War Guidance, Adopted by Liaison Conference, 7 March 1942, and Report of Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff to Emperor 13 March 1942
1. In order to bring BRITAIN to submission and to demoralize the UNITED STATES, positive measures shall be taken by seizing opportunities to expand our acquired war gains, and by building a political and military structure capable of withstanding a protracted war.
2. By holding the occupied areas and major communication lines, and by expediting the development and utilization of key resources for national defense; efforts shall be made to establish a self-sufficient structure, and to increase the nation’s war potential.
3. More positive and definite measures of war guidance shall be adopted by taking the following situations into consideration: Our national power, the progress of operations, the German-Soviet war situation, the relations between the UNITED STATES and the SOVIET UNION, and the trend in CHUNGKING.
4. Our policy toward the SOVIET UNION shall be based on the “Plan for Expediting the Termination of the War against the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, the NETHERLANDS, and CHIANG Kai-shek,” adopted on 5 Nov 41; and the “Measures to be Immediately Effected in Line with the Development of the Situation,” adopted on to Jan 42. However, under the present circumstances, no efforts shall be made to mediate a peace between GERMANY and the SOVIET UNION.
5. Our policy toward CHUNGKING shall be based on the “Matters Concerning Measures to be taken toward CHUNGKING, in Line with the Development of the Situation,” adopted on 24 Dec 41.
6. Cooperation with GERMANY and ITALY shall be based on the “Plan for Expediting the Termination of the War against the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, the NETHERLANDS and CHIANG Kai-shek,” adopted on 15 Nov 41.
Report to the Throne
We humbly report to Your Majesty on behalf of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Government.
At this point, when our initial operations are about to come to a favorable end by dint of the august virtue of Your Majesty, the Imperial General Headquarters and the Government have, after a careful appraisal, since the latter part of February, of our acquired war gains and their effect, the changes in the world situation, and the present war potentialities of our Empire, agreed on the “General Outline on Future War Guidance.” We will now give our explanations.
1. Regarding the general outline on war guidance to be effected hereafter in the war against the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN:
Various measures must be planned and executed in anticipation of a protracted war. It will not only be most difficult to defeat the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN in a short period, but, the war cannot be brought to an end through compromise.
It is essential to further expand the political and military advantages achieved through glorious victories since the opening of hostilities, by utilizing the present war situation to establish a political and strategic structure capable of withstanding a protracted war. We must take every possible step, within the limits of our national power, to force the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN to remain on the defensive. Any definite measure of vital significance to be effected in this connection will be given thorough study, and will be presented to Your Majesty for approval each time.
2. Regarding the need for building national power and fighting power for the successful prosecution of a protracted war.
We deem it highly essential to constantly maintain resilience in our national defense, and build up the nation’s war potential so that we will be capable of taking the steps necessary to cope with the progress of situation.
If a nation should lose its resilience in national defense while prosecuting a war, and become unable to rally from an enemy blow; the result would be short of her desired goal, no matter what victory she might achieve in the process. This is amply proved in the precious lessons learned from the annals of war.
Consequently, in our Empire’s war guidance policy, we have especially emphasized that, while taking steps to bring the enemy to submission, we must fully build up the nation’s war potential to cope with a protracted war.
3. Regarding the adoption of a new and more positive measure of war guidance.
We have made it clear that the question of whether to adopt new and more positive measures for war guidance for the attainment of the objective of the Greater East Asia War should be decided after careful study, not only of the war gains acquired so far, but other factors of extensive and profound significance; such as, the enemy’s national power and ours, especially the increase in the fighting power on both sides; the progress of our operations, our relations with the SOVIET UNION and CHINA, the German-Soviet war, and various other factors.
By “more positive measures of war guidance” we mean such measures as the invasion of INDIA and AUSTRALIA.
4. Regarding the measures to be immediately taken toward the SOVIET UNION.
We have made it clear that the measures to be taken toward the SOVIET UNION will be based on the established policy which was adopted earlier at a liaison conference. The essentials of that policy are as follows:
a. Utmost efforts shall be made to prevent the expansion of hostilities.
b. JAPAN shall endeavor to the utmost to prevent war with the SOVIET UNION while operations are being conducted in the Southern Area.
c. While maintaining peace between JAPAN and the SOVIET UNION, efforts shall be made to prevent the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN from strengthening their cooperation with the SOVIET UNION, and to alienate the latter from the former, if possible. However, this does not imply that our military preparations against the SOVIET UNION will be neglected, and it is our belief that all possible operations preparations should be made to achieve a quick and decisive victory in case of war.
With regard to the peace between GERMANY and the SOVIET UNION, not only does a compromise seem utterly hopeless, under the present circumstances, but we fear that our mediatory efforts at this point would be detrimental to Japanese-German relations, and would also mean risking a complication in Japanese-Soviet relations. Consequently, we have made it clear that we have no intention of taking any positive steps toward mediation.
5. Regarding the measures to be immediately taken toward Chungking:
We have made it clear that measures toward Chungking will be based on the policy which was adopted at the earlier conference that, “taking advantage of the restlessness in the Chungking Regime which was caused by our application of strong pressure on a vulnerable spot of theirs; our measures toward Chungking shall be shifted, at a proper time, from intelligence activities to activities to bring the regime to submission. The time and method therefore shall be decided at a liaison conference.”
Meanwhile, the campaign in BURMA is progressing faster than originally expected, and RANGOON is already in our hands. We believe that our progress in BURMA is already having serious effects on the Chungking Regime, but since we greatly fear that any attempt to bring the Chungking Regime to submission, at too early a stage, would produce an adverse result, our intention is to postpone it to a date that will be decided later.
6. Regarding measures to be taken toward GERMANY and ITALY.
Since we keenly realized that strengthening cooperation with GERMANY and ITALY will become increasingly necessary to achieve our war aims, we have decided that we must adhere closely to the established policy regarding cooperation with GERMANY and ITALY.
We hereby respectfully report to Your Majesty.
13 Mar 42
Prime Minister TO JO Hideki
Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO Osami
Chief of the Army General Staff SUGIYAMA Gen