Appendix O
Extract from the Final Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister at the Quadrant Conference, 24 August 1943 (CCS 319/5)
1. In previous memoranda (C.C.S. 319 and C.C.S. 319/2) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present Conference regarding operations in the main theaters of war. These amended conclusions have been related to resources available, and an agreed summary is submitted herewith.
I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE
2. In conjunction with RUSSIA and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS powers.
II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR
3. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE.
4. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.
5. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.
III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT.
6. Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE and the BRITISH ISLES.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.
d. Continue the disruption of AXIS sea communications.
e. Intensify the air offensive against the AXIS Powers in EUROPE.
f. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the AXIS citadel.
g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia.
h. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of CHINA as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against JAPAN.
i. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of TURKEY in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also paragraph 62.)
j. To prepare the French Forces in AFRICA to fulfill an active role in the war against the AXIS Powers.
IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT
The War Against JAPAN
20. Long-term strategy
We have made a preliminary study of long-term strategy for the defeat of JAPAN and are of the opinion that the following factors require particular emphasis:
a. The dependence of JAPAN upon air power, naval power, and shipping for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.
b. The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to JAPAN’s air force, naval forces, and shipping by all possible means in all possible areas.
c. The advantage to be gained and the time to be saved by a more extensive use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations, both in the strategic field and in conjunction with operations on land.
21. We consider that great advantage may be obtained, by modern and untried methods, from the vast resources which, with the defeat of Germany, will become available to the United Nations. We have in mind:
a. A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the United Nations air forces in CHINA as well as of the ground troops for their defense by employing the large numbers of load carrying aircraft available to open an “air road” to CHINA.
b. The employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent largely upon air supply lines.
c. The use of special equipment, such as artificial harbors, HABBAKUKS, etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be deployed in unexpected and undeveloped areas.
22. From every point of view operations should be framed to force the defeat of JAPAN as soon as possible after the defeat of GERMANY. Planning should be on the basis of accomplishing this within twelve months of that event. Decisions as to specific operations which will insure a rapid course of events must await further examination on the lines indicated above.
23. The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against JAPAN must be in accord with the over-all objective and strategic concept reaffirmed in Sections I and II above (paragraphs 2-5) .
24. We are agreed that the reorientation of forces from the European Theater to the PACIFIC and FAR EAST should be started as soon as the German situation, in our opinion, so allows.
25. The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC, shall be provided by the UNITED STATES, and for operations from the West by GREAT BRITAIN, except for special types not available to GREAT BRITAIN which will be provided by the UNITED STATES. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all Governments concerned.
26. Specific operations 1943–44
We have found it impracticable during QUADRANT to arrive at all the necessary decisions for operations in the war against JAPAN in 1943–44. We therefore propose that, as soon as the necessary further examinations have been made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held wherever may be most convenient, unless agreement is reached through the ordinary channels. There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which we feel able to make at once.
27. Operations in the Pacific 1943–44.
We approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff for operations in the PACIFIC in 1943–44 as follows:
28. Gilberts
The seizure and consolidation of the GILBERTS preparatory to a further advance into the MARSHALLS.
29. Marshalls
The seizure of the MARSHALL ISLANDS (including WAKE and KUSAIE) preparatory to a westward advance through the central PACIFIC. 30. Ponape
The capture of PONAPE preparatory to operations against the TRUK area.
31. Carolines (Truk area)
The seizure of the eastern CAROLINES as far west as WOLEAI and the establishment of a fleet base at TRUK.
32. Palau Islands
The capture of the PALAUS including YAP.
33. Operations against Guam and the Japanese Marianas
The seizure of GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS.
34. Paramushiru.
Consideration of operations against PARAMUSHIRU and the KURILES.
35. Operations in the New Guinea—Bismarcks—Admiralty Islands subsequent to current operations
The seizure or neutralization of eastern NEW GUINEA as far west as WEWAK and including the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. RABAUL is to be neutralized rather than captured.
36. Operations in NEW GUINEA subsequent to the WEWAK-KAVIENG Operation
An advance along the north coast of NEW GUINEA as far west as VOGELKOP, by step-by-step airborne-waterborne advances.
37. Operations in INDIA-BURMA-CHINA Theater, 1943–44
To carry out operations for the capture of UPPER BURMA in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with CHINA. Target date mid-February 1944.
It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by recent floods.
38. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the Spring of 1944. Pending a decision on the particular operation, the scale of these preparations should be of the order of those contemplated at TRIDENT for the capture of AKYAB and RAMREE.
39. To continue the preparation of INDIA as a base for the operations eventually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command.
40. To continue to build up and increase the air routes and air supplies of CHINA, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:
a. Keeping CHINA in the war.
b. Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
c. Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in CHINA.
d. Equipping Chinese ground forces.
41. We have decided that our main effort should be put into offensive operations with the object of establishing land communications with CHINA and improving and securing the air route. Priorities cannot be rigid and we therefore propose to instruct the Supreme Commander in formulating his proposals to regard this decision as a guide and to bear in mind the importance of the longer term development of the lines of communication.