Appendix U
Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944. - 3 December 1943 (CCS 397 Rev)
MEMORANDUM BY THE U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFF
1. We are agreed that every effort should be exerted to bring the U.S.S.R. into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date, and that plans should be prepared in that event.
2. We are agreed that plans should be prepared for operations in the event that Germany is defeated earlier than the fall of 1944.
3. A schedule of proposed operations and projected target dates for planning purposes is given in the appendix to the Enclosure.1 The operations envisaged are based on a concept of obtaining strategic objectives and bases from which to conduct further operations to force the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest practicable date. The operations are in consonance with the over-all objectives and over-all strategic concept agreed upon at QUADRANT and reaffirmed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in C.C.S. 380/2, and with provisions of C.C.S 417 (Over-all Plan for the Defeat of Japan).
4. General. In addition to the specific objectives hereinafter indicated supporting operations should be conducted. Both the specific and supporting operations will be designed to destroy the Japanese fleet at an early date; to secure maximum attrition of enemy air forces; to intensify air, submarine, and mining operations against enemy shipping and lines of communication; to establish air and sea blockade of the main Japanese islands; to continue efforts to keep China in the war; and to enable us to launch land and carrier based air operations against Japan.
5. North Pacific. Plans for the North Pacific involve the augmentation of base facilities and defensive installations in the Aleutians in preparation for entry into the Kuriles and Soviet territory in the event of Russian collaboration. Naval surface and submarine action, including raids on the Japanese fishing fleet will be carried out. Preparations will be made for executing very long range strategic bombing against the Kuriles and northern Japan.
6. Central, South and Southwest Pacific. The advance along the New Guinea–N.E.I.–Philippine axis will proceed concurrently with operations for the capture of the Mandated Islands. A strategic bombing force will be established in Guam, Tinian, and Saipan for strategic bombing of Japan proper. Air bombardment of targets in the N.E.I.–Philippine Area and the aerial neutralization of Rabaul will be intensified.
7. China. Our efforts in the China Area should have as their objective the intensification of land and air operations in and from China and the build-up of the U.S.A.A.F. and the Chinese army arid air forces. It shall include also
the establishing, without materially affecting other approved operations, of a very long range strategic bombing force at Calcutta, with advanced bases at Chengtu to attack vital targets in the Japanese “inner zone.”2
8. Southeast Asia. Operations for the capture of Upper Burma in the spring of 1944 in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China, and an amphibious operation at approximately the same time. Continuance of operations during the autumn of 1944 within the limits of the forces available ... to extend the position held in Upper Burma.
Should the means be available, additional ground, sea and air offensive operations including carrier borne raids, with the object of maintaining pressure on the enemy, inducing dispersion of his forces, and attaining the maximum attrition practicable on his air and naval forces and shipping.
9. As more carriers become available, the operations set forth should be supplemented, between scheduled operational dates as practicable, with massed carrier task force strikes against selected vital targets.
10. The completion of these operations will place the United Nations in positions from which to use most advantageously the great air, ground, and naval resources which will be at our disposal after Germany is defeated.
ENCLOSURE
A schedule of operations for 1944 is set forth in the Appendix.3 Target dates which have been determined after careful consideration of prospective means and of time and space factors, are presented for planning purposes only. We are convinced that the sequence of operations must be flexible; we must be prepared to take all manner of short cuts made possible by developments in the situation. The four primary developments which may permit short cuts are:
a. Early defeat of the Japanese Fleet.
b. Sudden withdrawal of Japanese forces from areas (as from Kiska) .
c. Increase in our means such as by acceleration of the assault ship-building program and by an earlier defeat of Germany than 1 October 1944.
d. The early collaboration of the U.S.S.R. in the war against Japan. We have directed that further study be conducted and plans made and kept up to date for the conditions assumed in c. and d.
We have directed that special attention be given to the optimum employment of the enormous air forces which will be released upon the defeat of Germany.
We have directed that a study be made for the optimum use, timing and deployment in the war against Japan in very long range bombers.