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Appendix H: The Cost of the Campaigns

Battle casualties of U.S. Army ground combat forces, Luzon and the Southern Philippines, 1945

a Killed Wounded Total
Luzon
– Shobu Area b 4,035 12,155 16,190
– Shimbu Area c 1,020 3,615 4,635
– Kembu Area 835 3,380 4,215
– Manila d 1,010 5,565 6,575
– Corregidor e 240 675 915
– Bataan f 315 1,285 1,600
– Southern Luzon g 255 880 1,135
– Bicol Peninsula 95 475 570
– Miscellaneous h 505 1,530 2,035
– Subtotal 8,310 29,560 37,870
Central and Southern Philippines i
– Mindoro and the Visayan Passages j 125 255 380
– Palawan and offshore islets 15 60 75
– Zamboanga Peninsula 220 665 885
– Sulu Archipelago 35 130 165
– Panay and offshore islets 20 50 70
– Northern Negros 370 1,025 1,395
– Cebu and Mactan 420 1,730 2,150
– Bohol Island 10 15 25
– Southern Negros 35 180 215
– Eastern Mindanao 820 2,880 3,700
– Subtotal 2,070 6,990 9,060
– Grand total 10,380 36,550 46,930

a. While primarily reflecting the casualties of ground combat units, the figures in the table include the casualties of ASCOM units while under Sixth Army control from 9 January to 13 February, and also include the casualties of ground service units attached directly to ground combat units. Such casualties were usually reported as those of division, corps, and army troops. Because of many obvious duplications, it is impossible to derive any reliable figures for service units as a whole. There being no reliable figures except for the USAFIP(NL), guerrilla casualties are not included. Slight differences between the figures given in the text and those in the table are explained on the one hand by differences in time coverage and on the other by the fact that the text figures are normally those of the infantry regiments alone. As an example of the differences in time coverage, it can be noted that the text’s figures for Corregidor are as of 4 March, while the table’s figures carry the casualties through the end of the war.

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b. Includes XIV Corps casualties only from 9 through 17 January; I Corps casualties from 9 January through 30 June; Eighth Army casualties from 1 July through the end of the war.

c. Includes XIV Corps casualties (except for units in the Kembu area) during the last stages of the approach to Manila, 31 January-3 February, and also the casualties of all units engaged against the Shimbu Group from 20 February to the end of the war,

d. Covers the period 3 February-4 March only.

e. Includes jump casualties of the 503rd Parachute RCT and casualties incurred on the smaller islands of Manila Bay.

f. Includes XI Corps operations from the Zambales landing beaches to the northwestern base of Bataan Peninsula and also operations on Grande Island.

g. Includes jump casualties of the 511th Parachute Infantry and all other 11th Airborne Division casualties through 4 February.

h. Includes Army casualties resulting from kamikaze raids at Lingayen Gulf; ASCOM units to 13 February; the casualties of corps and army troops that cannot be placed on the ground (for example, the XIV Corps had operations at Manila and against the Kembu and Shimbu Groups under way at the same time); and the casualties of attached service units after 13 February.

i. Excludes Leyte and Samar except for the operations in northwestern Samar and on offshore islets that were part of the Eighth Army’s campaign to clear the Visayan Passages.

j. Includes Army casualties resulting from kamikaze attacks and includes both Sixth and Eighth Army operations on Mindoro.

Source: The table is based upon all relevant American sources cited in the text. The primary sources are, for the most part, the regimental and divisional records. Casualties of corps and army troops are derived from the records of the Sixth and Eighth Armies and the I, X, XI, and XIV Corps. The table comprises deliberate approximations because various sets of sources are mutually irreconcilable. In general, since the Japanese took very few prisoners, the figures for Missing in Action are included in the Killed in Action column. Missing in action figures for all echelons of the commands were very incomplete and contradictory. The figures in this table will not necessarily agree with the official figures arrived at by The Adjutant General after the war. In this connection, however, it should be noted that a similar breakdown relative to location cannot be obtained from the latter source.

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Japanese casualties, Luzon and the Southern Philippines, 1945

Initial Strength a Prisoners of War Surrendered after 15 Aug 45 Killed or Died b
Luzon
– Shobu Area c 152,000 4,415 50,000 96,085
– Shimbu Area d 50,000 2,010 6,300 48,690
– Kembu Area 30,000 510 1,500 27,990
– Manila 17,000 915 0 11,585 d
– Corregidor e 5,670 35 0 5,635
– Bataan f 4,000 340 150 3,510
– Southern Luzon 13,500 260 2,500 9,240 d
– Bicol Peninsula 3,515 565 150 2,800
– Subtotal 275,685 9,050 61,100 205,535
Central and Southern Philippines g
– Mindoro and the Visayan Passages 2,900 105 65 2,730
– Palawan and offshore islets 1,750 20 10 1,720h
– Zamboanga Peninsula 8,900 1,105 1,385 6,410
– Sulu Archipelago 3,900 30 90 3,780
– Panay and Guimaras 2,835 45 1,560 1,230
– Northern Negros 13,600 350 6,170 7,080
– Cebu and Mactan 14,500 405 8,550 5,545
– Bohol Island 330 15 50 265
– Southern Negros 1,300 20 880 400
– Eastern Mindanao 55,850 600 34,150 21,100
– Subtotal 105,865 2,695 52,910 50,260
– Grand total 381,550 11,745 114,010 255,795

a. All figures include civilians, of whom there were, originally, about 23,500 on Luzon and approximately 14,780 in the central and southern islands. This total of 38,280 Japanese civilians included government officials and families; civilian employees of the armed forces, many of whom had a quasi-military status before 9 January 1945; businessmen and their families; farmers and their families, especially on Mindanao; and some families of service personnel. Except for the extremely aged and the very young, almost all these Japanese civilians came to serve the armed forces in one way or another. For example, on Luzon most male civilians were ultimately drafted into the service to help form provisional infantry battalions, while on Mindanao many male civilians were used as fillers in combat units or were formed into labor organizations. Lack of information makes it impossible to furnish any breakdown for civilian casualties.

b. Includes both the Japanese killed as a direct result of military operations and those who died of disease and starvation. Most of the latter succumbed after organized resistance ceased and units broke up into small groups foraging for food.

c. Includes the original strength of the Shobu Group (roughly 141,000) plus about 10,000 other troops, mainly of the 105th Division, who were transferred northward from the Shimbu Group during January.

d. The initial strength figure for the Shimbu Group excludes the 105th Division contingent that was transferred to the Shobu Group; it includes approximately 4,500 troops of the Manila Naval Defense Force who escaped entrapment in Manila and a group of some 2,500 men who made their way northward to the Shimbu area from southern Luzon before the evacuation route around the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay was cut. The casualty figures for Manila and southern Luzon, reflecting these redeployments, are accordingly considerably lower than the initial strength in both areas, while the casualty figures for the Shimbu Group are higher than the initial strength figure.

e. Includes the smaller islands in Manila Bay. A few Japanese – no reliable figures can be found – swam from Corregidor and Bataan and were killed or captured there. There is, therefore, some obvious but minor error in both the Corregidor and Bataan figures.

f. Includes XI Corps operations from the Zambales landing beaches to the northwestern base of Bataan Peninsula and also operations on Grande Island. See also note c.

g. Excludes Leyte and Samar, except for the operations in northwestern Samar and on offshore islets that were part of the Eighth Army’s campaign to clear the Visayan Passages.

h. Some Japanese carried as killed or died on Palawan undoubtedly escaped to Borneo by small craft, but no reliable figures can be found for such an exodus.

Source: The table is based upon all relevant Japanese and American sources cited in the text. Since virtually all sets of figures employed are mutually irreconciliable, the table represents deliberate approximations.