Chapter 4: North Africa
Transportation for the invasion of North Africa, the first major Allied offensive of the war, was a combined enterprise drawing on both American and British shipping. After the initial phase, during which U.S. troops and cargo were forwarded from both the United Kingdom and the United States, the American forces received their principal support directly from the United States. The bulk of the men and materiel had to be moved approximately 3,400 miles1 across the Atlantic during a time of intensive Axis submarine warfare and when naval escorts and ocean shipping space were at a premium. In order to land personnel and cargo and transport them to the fighting front, the Americans had to engage in port, railway, and motor transport operations. (Map 3) These activities not only required close coordination with the British but also involved the French, who owned the basic transportation facilities, and the local Arab population.
In many respects the campaign was a pioneering venture in wartime transportation operations. Without extensive experience in planning, mounting, and supporting a large assault force, the U.S. Army had much to learn and encountered numerous difficulties. Yet, despite limited facilities, adverse weather, language barriers, and grave shortages of men and equipment, the necessary transportation job was done.2
The Strategic Background
When, in July 1942, the U.S. and British leaders decided to undertake the invasion of French North Africa, the Allied military outlook was bleak. In Europe the Germans had driven the Soviet Army back toward the Caucasus, in Africa the British had lost Tobruk, and in the Far East the Japanese had advanced almost as far south as Australia. Although American strategic planners believed that a North African invasion might well rule out a cross-Channel operation during 1943, there were numerous advantages to be gained from such an operation. It would bring American forces into action against the enemy at an early date and would provide additional bases from which to attack Axis-held Europe. From a shipping point of view, the operation would open the Mediterranean route to the Middle East and India, thereby making unnecessary the long voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. While the projected invasion obviously did not meet Stalin’s demand for a second front on the
European continent, it at least won his acquiescence.3
The abrupt shift from preparations for an invasion of the European continent to an entirely different operation necessitated radical readjustments in planning and preparations. Limitations of time, the delay in reaching a final determination of the objectives, strength, and timing of the invasion, and other factors created serious logistical difficulties, and, as one student of military logistics has noted, “turned the whole process of preparation into a feat of improvisation.”4
In late October 1942, approximately three months after the decision to undertake the invasion, three task forces, totaling some 107,000 American and British troops, set sail under naval escort for North Africa. Two forces (the Center and Eastern) were mounted from the United Kingdom to capture, respectively, Oran and Algiers. A third force (the Western) was dispatched from the United States to seize Casablanca. The landings took place as scheduled on 8 November, and within forty-eight hours the major ports and airfields in French Morocco and Algeria had been secured. Then followed the race to occupy Tunisia ahead of the Axis. This race the Allies lost, since the Germans reacted swiftly. They seized the ports of Tunis and Bizerte and rushed in sufficient reinforcements to halt the Allies just short of the Tunisian plain. The onset of winter rains brought a temporary stalemate, marked by bitter but indecisive fighting.
In the ensuing contest in 1943 the initial advantages of transportation and supply fell to the Axis powers. They had relatively short air and sea lines of communication between Italy and Tunisia, while the Allies had to transport most of their men and supplies over the broad and dangerous Atlantic to Casablanca, whence supplies had to be hauled 1,400 miles overland to Tunisia or through the Strait of Gibraltar to Mediterranean ports closer to the fighting front, notably Oran and Algiers. Nevertheless, by exploiting and expanding available port facilities and improving rail and highway transportation operations, the Allies were able to bring in and sustain a far larger force than the enemy. After repulsing the German thrust through Kasserine Pass in central Tunisia in February, the Allies regained the initiative and in April launched an offensive aimed at Tunis and Bizerte. Of considerable assistance in the support of the advancing American forces were the arrival in North Africa of motor transport and rail equipment, shipped by special convoy from the United States, and the utilization of small forward ports to the east of Algiers. At the same time the Allies were increasingly successful in cutting off Axis support by sea and air, thereby hastening the surrender of the enemy in May 1943.5
Plans and Preparations
The period of active planning for the North African invasion began in late July 1942 when the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS)6 directed that the planning for
Map 3: Lines of Communication in North Africa
Oran and Algiers should take place in London and that for Casablanca in Washington. The code name TORCH was assigned to the operation, and early in August 1942 General Eisenhower was appointed Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Force. In the same month at Norfolk House in London, under General Eisenhower’s deputy, Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Mark W. Clark, a combined staff of American and British officers began working on the plans for the invasion. The theater chief of transportation, Colonel Ross, was represented at Norfolk House by his principal planner, Colonel Stewart. Among other transportation officers who assisted in the planning was the chief of the Transportation Corps Planning Division in Washington, Colonel Stokes, who helped coordinate the planning in the United Kingdom with that in the United States.7
Map merged onto previous page
The planners worked under several serious handicaps. Divergent American and British interests had to be reconciled and decisions reached as to what each nation would contribute to the common effort. The many details that had to be ironed out between the two widely separated planning centers in London and Washington resulted in voluminous communications, which on occasion developed into a veritable “transatlantic essay contest.”8 American supplies and equipment shipped to the United Kingdom, which could be made available for the invasion, sometimes were lost en route or were misplaced in the theater, necessitating duplicate and even triplicate shipments from all-too-often inadequate stocks.
The entire operation was hemmed in by various contingencies. The French might resist the Allied invaders, or the Spanish might prove hostile. Even the weather was a worry, since it could hinder the landings. Moreover, the July decision had left undetermined the time, size, and
place of the initial assaults. There was considerable disagreement as to whether or not there should be simultaneous landings outside and inside the Mediterranean. At one point in August, when it appeared that the naval strength available would not support three major landings simultaneously, General Eisenhower recommended abandoning the assault on Casablanca and concentrating the attack inside the Mediterranean with a view to a swift advance into Tunisia. This course of action was considered too hazardous in Washington, and Casablanca was retained as an objective. Finally, in September, agreement was reached on simultaneous inside and outside landings, the troop strength for the assault was made predominantly American, and D Day was set tentatively for early November. The delay in arriving at these decisions inevitably complicated the task of determining over-all military requirements and made difficult the job of providing the necessary supplies, equipment, and transportation to effect and support the invasion.9
In the aggregate, the TORCH planners were confronted by two distinct sets of limiting factors. The first pertained primarily to the assault phase, when plans hinged upon securing the required naval escorts and combat loaders for the invading forces.10 The second related to the support phase, when the principal limitations were the size and frequency of ocean convoys and the capacity of ports in the theater to accommodate them. The tight shipping situation was relieved insofar as TORCH was concerned by the high priority accorded that operation. Troop and cargo vessels were withdrawn from other important programs, including BOLERO and the convoys to the northern Soviet ports. Despite minor crises that developed from time to time,11 sufficient vessels were provided. The basic problem was not shipping, but rather the number of vessels the navies could safely escort. Slow cargo convoys originating in American waters were limited to forty-five vessels by the U.S. Navy, and similar convoys from the United Kingdom were restricted by the Royal Navy to fifty-five ships. Fast troop convoys from the United States and the United Kingdom were limited, respectively, to twenty and twenty-five vessels. These convoy limitations were to exercise a highly restrictive influence on the flow of supplies into the theater and caused the Army repeatedly to request their relaxation. The situation was eased beginning early in 1943 by adding special convoys to the regular schedule and by permitting fast tankers to sail unescorted from the Caribbean. It was further eased in April when the Navy’s February authorization of 60-vessel convoys was put into effect. The convoy restrictions, even when liberalized, proved a greater limitation on the support of the North African campaign
than the theater’s port accommodation and discharge capacity. With few exceptions, the ports were to be capable of unloading greater tonnages than the convoys could bring in.12
In preparation for the invasion the Transportation Corps planners in London made a careful study of the port, rail, and highway facilities in French North Africa. Detailed reports, including maps, were prepared for all the important ports on the basis of the latest available intelligence. The key figure in the planning for the projected port activity was an experienced steamship man, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Chester F. Sharp. After a survey of the berthing capacity of each port in peacetime and after due allowance for possible enemy demolition or interference, Sharp computed the number of hatches that presumably could be worked at given periods in each port. Then he tried to determine how many tons of cargo per hour could be discharged by inexperienced troop labor under combat conditions. Believing that the British estimate of four dead-weight tons per hour per hatch was too conservative, he used the figure of ten dead-weight tons, which later proved to be close to the average. In order to attain the maximum discharge, the Americans contemplated the extensive use of mechanical cargo-handling equipment such as fork-lift trucks and crawler cranes. The Transportation Corps procured as much of this equipment as possible from the United Kingdom and then got the remainder directly from the United States.13
As developed by late September 1942, TORCH plans were based on the assumption that 73 berths would be available immediately at the captured Allied ports, and that additional ports with anchorage for 20 vessels would be taken within two weeks. Of these 93 berths, 56 were located at the western and central ports, principally Casablanca and Oran, which would be seized and operated by the Americans. A U.S. port headquarters was to be assigned to each of the two major port areas, to arrive shortly after the initial landings. The eastern ports, including Algiers, Philippeville, and Bône, were to be operated by the British.14
Maj. (later Col.) Sidney H. Bingham was chiefly responsible for planning the U.S. Army railway operations in North Africa. Considerable enemy destruction was anticipated, but luckily did not materialize. Only one railway line ran from Casablanca via Oran to Tunisia. Early in October 1942, General Eisenhower estimated that he would require at the outset approximately 50 locomotives, 600 covered cars, 400 open railway cars, and 50 war flats, and that ultimately 250 locomotives and 2,700 covered and 1,800 open cars would be needed. Further communication resulted in an agreement that the Western and Center Task Forces would call for the required railway equipment after a preliminary survey in the field.15
Since the enemy might have rendered the railways inoperative, the Transportation Corps planners had to be prepared to rely on port clearance by truck, if necessary. Aerial photographs and peacetime maps were examined to determine the
road network and the railway system leading from each port area, as well as the space within the dock area for maneuvering trucks. Detailed highway transportation reports were worked out by two highway traffic experts, Capt. (later Lt. Col.) Franklin M. Kreml and Capt. George W. Barton. All pertinent logistical factors were considered, even to the time required for one man to load a standard 2½-ton truck with rations. Road and dump signs were prepared and procedures were developed for over-the-road control of highway movements. According to Kreml, it was estimated that from D Day to D plus 30 a total of 5,100 tons per day could be moved by truck out of Oran, a target figure only about 100 tons per day below the actual achievement for this period.16
The Case of the Missing Supplies
The supply requirements of the U.S. forces in North Africa were of deep concern to the Transportation Corps planners, both in London and in Washington, since the planners had to know approximately what would have to be moved to a given port by a given date and what ships were available. As the invasion drew near, the supply picture was characterized by uncertainty and confusion that on occasion bordered on chaos. On 21 August 1942 General Somervell’s chief of staff called attention to the disturbing lack of firm data on supply and shipping requirements. Early in September the situation became even more alarming when General Eisenhower disclosed that a large part of the supplies and equipment presumed to be in the United Kingdom and available for TORCH could not be located in time to meet the deadline and therefore would have to be replaced from the United States.17
The reasons for this situation could be found on both sides of the Atlantic. In the summer of 1942 the Americans were still converting newly acquired warehouses in the British Isles into U.S. Army depots. The depots generally had insufficient and inexperienced personnel. Storage had been hasty, primarily with a view to removing cargo as quickly as possible from the port areas in order to prevent congestion. Adequate inventories were not yet complete. Frequently, poor packing, marking, and documentation of shipments from the zone of interior had plagued the theater. Much equipment had arrived broken or damaged, and many items were not properly identified on the shipping containers or in the cargo manifests. All these shortcomings had been reported to Washington and vigorously denounced by the theater chief of transportation. With respect to the current crisis, he stated that the depot situation in the United Kingdom was bad, and that the stocks were unbalanced. Of one thing he was certain—the Transportation Corps had delivered the goods to the supply services, even though the latter did not know what was in their depots.18
A transatlantic exchange of cables ultimately revealed that some of the missing items had been located, others were on the way from the United States, and still others were not absolutely essential.
Nevertheless, a total of approximately 260,000 measurement tons of U.S. supplies and equipment needed in the United Kingdom to meet early (D plus 5) TORCH requirements was lacking and had to be procured from American and British sources. For example, even though ample ammunition should have been sent to the theater, 11,000,000 rounds of ammunition had to be borrowed from the British. The immediate need was met, but only by frantic effort and at a heavy cost in additional shipping. Initially, sixteen cargo vessels were requested to move the 176,000 measurement tons of special high-priority items that had to be in the United Kingdom by 20 October 1942. The remaining 84,000 measurement tons were to be forwarded in subsequent shipments. Changes made by theater headquarters in London and the failure of certain items to arrive in time for loading resulted in modification of the original shipping plan, but the fact remained that much valuable cargo space had been expended, both for the materiel poured into Britain that could not be located and for the necessary replacements of that materiel.19
Last-minute requests from the theater became so frequent and vexing as to cause Washington to notify the theater that no further changes would be made in the first supporting convoy from the United States unless dictated by “urgent strategic reasons.” Efforts were also made to get the theater to provide early advance information on its requirements for subsequent convoys and to set a time limit for unavoidable changes. Because of the apparent absence of adequate data about incoming cargo and the sheer inability of supply service personnel to identify items listed on the cargo manifests, the theater frequently and on occasion knowingly duplicated its requests. This practice, wasteful both of supplies and shipping, came to a head in mid-October 1942, when a demand for additional ordnance material led to a tart observation by General Somervell that all items had been shipped at least twice and most items three times. In Washington this period of confusion and duplication left an impression not readily forgotten.20
Meanwhile, the theater had been working on a complete plan for the support of TORCH. The plan, forwarded to the War Department late in October 1942, provided that initially each task force was to be supplied by the base from which it was launched. The Western Task Force (WTF) was to have direct supply from the United States from the beginning. The Center Task Force (CTF) and the predominantly British Eastern Task Force (ETF) were to be supplied from the United Kingdom, with the latter drawing its supplies through British channels. Both the WTF and the CTF were to submit their requisitions to the theater SOS in London for screening and subsequent forwarding to Washington. Also, substantial reserves of supplies and ammunition were to be built up rapidly in North Africa and in the United Kingdom.
The plan was opposed by the SOS in Washington, principally on the grounds that the establishment of a separate TORCH reserve in the United Kingdom would unduly complicate supply procedures and necessitate double handling, and that more direct and expeditious
support would be forthcoming if both the CTF and the WTF requisitioned directly on the New York Port of Embarkation. After some controversy a compromise was reached in early December 1942, to be observed pending the transfer to the United States of the entire responsibility for the direct supply of the U.S. forces in North Africa. The arrangement provided for a far smaller supply reserve in the United Kingdom than contemplated earlier. As before, the WTF would be supplied from the New York port, but would now requisition directly on it. The CTF would be supplied as far as practicable by convoys from the United States, supplemented by shipments from the small U.K. supply reserve. This force would requisition on London, where European theater headquarters would determine what it could provide, and then requisition the remainder from the New York port. The U.S. elements of the ETF were to be supplied from American or, if required, British stocks in the United Kingdom. This dual supply line remained in effect until February 1943, when out-loadings from the United Kingdom for the support of American forces in North Africa were substantially completed.21
Mounting the Task Forces in Britain
The convoys for the North African invasion had to bring troops and cargo from widely separated areas, necessitating careful scheduling to insure arrival at the desired time and place.22 As previously indicated, within the United Kingdom the brunt of the work involved in the control of movements of troops and materiel for TORCH was performed by the British.23 A small American liaison group, later known as the Export Movement Division, represented the theater chief of transportation at the British War Office, where priorities were set and movement orders were prepared. General Ross tried to have the movement orders issued in ample time to assure complete preparation of the units, and on the whole he was able to accomplish this aim. A few Ground Forces and Air Forces unit commanders balked at moving until compliance was directed by General Eisenhower, but otherwise the outbound troop traffic proceeded smoothly.
Within the United Kingdom, all loading plans for outbound cargo were made in London and each depot was given detailed shipping instructions on the items that it was to furnish. In the initial convoys from the United Kingdom all the cargo ships were loaded with assorted supplies so as to minimize the loss in the event of sinkings. Last-minute changes affecting both troops and cargo were frequent and bothersome. The principal difficulty for the Transportation Corps arose from poor coordination between the ports and depots on supply shipments. The outloading was accomplished under pressure and a heavy cloak of secrecy. According to Ross, with so much “hush-hush” prevailing confusion at times was to be expected.24
After brief amphibious training, in mid-October 1942 the two assault forces embarked from the Glasgow and Liverpool port areas on combat-loaded vessels, which were then assembled in the Firth of Clyde to take part in a final rehearsal for the invasion. The principal U.S. Army components in the expedition were elements of the 1st and 34th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Armored Division, together with several groups from the Eighth Air Force. The first convoys from the United Kingdom were loaded and dispatched entirely under British supervision, but with some assistance by Transportation Corps personnel. On 26 October 1942 both task forces set sail for North Africa, and they arrived at Oran and Algiers on 8 November. Aboard the convoys KMF-1 and KMS-1 were 46,920 American troops and 26,690 British troops, together with a total of 54,827 long tons of U.S. and British cargo.25
The United States Prepares for the Invasion
While the Americans and British in the United Kingdom made ready for their role in TORCH, the operation had become a prime concern of the War and Navy Departments and the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.26 Since the United States was not only to mount and support roughly one third of the attacking force, but was also to be increasingly relied upon to furnish the supplies, equipment, and ships for the forces to be dispatched from the British Isles, Washington became almost as important a center for plans and operations as Eisenhower’s headquarters in London. In the United States the Transportation Corps helped to get the vessels needed for the invasion. The Transportation Corps Planning Division prepared numerous studies, varying in detail with the changing tactical objectives, on North African port, rail, and highway capacities. The Chief of Transportation assigned representatives to the Western Task Force G-4 and to the TORCH committee, as well as transportation officers and units for transportation operations in North Africa. The ports of embarkation at New York and Hampton Roads assisted in mounting the assault convoy of the Western Task Force and gave subsequent support to the U.S. Army in North Africa.
One of the first tasks was to secure enough American combat loaders to move the assault forces, since the British had the lift for only four regimental com-ba.t teams. To fill this need twelve small vessels were hastily converted (six by the Army and six by the Navy) into modified combat loaders. The conversion entailed installing landing-boat davits, increasing the capacity of the booms, providing more troop space, adding armament, and arranging quarters for the Navy crew that was to operate the vessel. The twelve ships were obtained principally at the expense of the BOLERO program. So limited was the time that several were still in the yards when the loading began at Hampton Roads.27
Apart from working on the broader problems of determining the over-all shipping and supply requirements for TORCH and the number of service troops needed to support an estimated total invasion force of approximately 240,000 men, the planners in the United States were confronted with the immediate and pressing task of arranging for the mounting of the assault convoy of the Western Task Force. Entirely American, the initial contingent of 33,737 men was scheduled to sail under U.S. naval escort from Hampton Roads to French Morocco in October 1942. Under the command of Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) George S. Patton, Jr., the Western Task Force was drawn chiefly from the 3rd and 9th Infantry Divisions and the 2nd Armored Division. For the operation General Patton’s men were organized into three subtask forces. The “Z” subtask force, commanded by Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., was assigned to the capture of Mehdia, near Port-Lyautey, and the adjacent airfield. Under the command of Maj. Gen. Jonathan W. Anderson, the “Y” subtask force, the largest of the three, was to seize Fedala preliminary to the taking of Casablanca. The “X” subtask force, under Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, was to occupy the small coastal port of Safi, southwest of Casablanca.
Early in August General Patton’s staff began to assemble in Washington to determine the requirements in ships, troops, and materiel for the Western Task Force. Although the projected size of the force remained fairly stable, the troop list fluctuated considerably, as combat units replaced service units and air force troops were substituted for ground force troops in the assault convoy. Corresponding changes had to be made in the cargo. The original plan called for more organic equipment, tanks, ammunition, and supplies than the available ships would hold. This problem was attacked by reducing the amount of armor to be included and by obtaining the seatrain New Jersey (later redesignated the USS Lakehurst) to move the tanks that could not be loaded in the other vessels. In addition, a cut of 50 percent was made in the initial organizational equipment, and the level of supply was reduced to 10 units of fire and to 45 days for rations. The Transportation Corps Planning Division assisted Patton’s staff throughout this period, and one transportation officer, Maj. (later Lt. Col.) Charles F. Tank, was detailed for full-time duty with the Western Task Force, which he eventually accompanied to North Africa.28
Most of the loading of the assault convoy took place at the newly activated Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, under the command of Brig. Gen. John R. Kilpatrick. The 28 combat-loaded vessels were to be readied in two groups or flights, the one of 13 vessels for the smaller “X” and “Z” subtask forces and the other of 15 ships for the larger “Y” subtask force.29 Each subtask force commander was made responsible for embarking his own contingent. However, the loading plan for each ship was prepared by a transport
quartermaster, whose principal purpose was to make available for immediate discharge the combat vehicles, ammunition, and supplies required by the units aboard that particular vessel. Ammunition and rations in prescribed amounts were placed in each vehicle, additional amounts were carried by each soldier, and the remainder was stowed in easily accessible spaces on the transport. The seatrain New Jersey was loaded at New York to ease the strain on the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, and six vessels were partially loaded by the Navy at New York and sent to Hampton Roads.
An elaborate system had been devised by the War Department for marking and forwarding the cargo for each ship, but changes in the assignment of troops, weapons, and vehicles from one vessel to another soon brought confusion. Both ammunition and rations should have been sent to the port in bulk, rather than in individual shipments, and then distributed to the task force as required. Engineer, signal, medical, chemical warfare, and ordnance supplies (other than ammunition) were assembled in a single warehouse at Newport News, where cube and weight were readily calculated for use in planning stowage and where delivery could be made to each ship as the need arose.30
The loading operations at Hampton Roads were beset with difficulties. Freight poured into the port, often without adequate identification. Separated by the bay, the piers at Newport News and Norfolk were served by different railways, and shipments consigned to “Hampton Roads” sometimes went to the wrong terminal, necessitating troublesome tracing and transshipment. Despite excellent cooperation, both the Army and the Navy were hampered by inexperienced personnel and drastic time limitations. General Patton’s staff was never assembled in one spot until the very last moment, a factor hindering effective planning.
Moreover, the Transportation Corps installations that could have helped were all new and undeveloped. The Richmond Holding and Reconsignment Point was not yet prepared to give satisfactory service. The port of embarkation at Hampton Roads had been established only recently, and since its staging area was not completed General Patton’s three divisions had to be staged at nearby camps in Virginia and North Carolina. Because the landings in North Africa might have to be made through surf and over the beaches, all combat vehicles had to be waterproofed and processed to prevent rust and corrosion, and facilities for this purpose had to be improvised.
At the insistence of the Army and the Navy and to provide firsthand knowledge of loading and unloading, early in October a practice run of the “Y” contingent was arranged, which included a landing exercise at Solomons Island in the Chesapeake Bay and the discharge of troops and vehicles at the port of Baltimore.31 By mid-October the bulk of the cargo had been stowed on the ships of the “X” and “Z” subtask forces. A considerable amount of ammunition that arrived at the last moment had to be lashed to the decks. Beginning on 22 October the “Y” force loaded the last of its cargo.
There were some disconcerting eleventh-hour developments. The six transports that had been partially loaded at New York had to be unloaded and then reloaded to fit final loading plans of the transport quartermasters. The transport Lee developed engine trouble, and her troops and cargo had to be shifted to the Calvert, a hurried task accomplished in only thirty-five hours. The Contessa, a small light-draft boat that had at one time been a banana boat of Honduran registry, was chartered at the last minute to carry aviation gasoline and bombs up the winding, shallow Sebou River to a strategic airfield at Port-Lyautey. The Contessa reached Norfolk too late to sail with the assault convoy since emergency repairs had to be made, and several vacancies in her crew had to be filled by volunteers from seamen jailed at Norfolk for minor offenses.32
While the Contessa was being readied, the final topping off of cargo took place for the main convoy. On 23 October the last of the troops embarked. By dawn of the following day the ships (Convoy UGF-1) bearing the Western Task Force took to the open sea, escorted by U.S. naval craft, all under the command of Rear Adm. Henry Kent Hewitt. Aboard were 33,843 U.S. troops and 93,102 measurement tons of U.S. Army cargo.33
Organization of Transportation in North Africa
The commanders of the three task forces that converged upon French North Africa on 8 November 1942 were responsible for the control of military transportation within their respective areas during the first phase. The Western and Center Task Forces were assigned SOS staffs, including transportation personnel, which arrived in the assault and early support convoys and served as the advance echelons of base sections that were to assume direction of supply and transportation activities. Shortly after the landings, the Mediterranean Base Section was officially activated at Oran under Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Thomas B. Larkin, and a similar headquarters, the Atlantic Base Section, was set up at Casablanca under Brig. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson. The transportation organizations of the two base sections were headed, respectively, by Colonel Stewart and Col. Thomas H. Stanley. No provision was made for an American logistical organization in the Eastern Task Force’s area, where supply and transportation activities were controlled by the British. At the end of 1942 the two base sections were released from the control of the task forces and placed under the Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ), which had been transferred from Gibraltar and the United Kingdom to Algiers.34
Meanwhile, a combined transportation organization had begun operating in AFHQ. Planning for such an organization had begun in London in August 1942, when a G-4 section (Supply and Evacuation) was established under Col.
(later Brig. Gen.) Archelaus L. Hamblen (American). This office differed from the normal U.S. Army G-4 section in that it did not include transportation functions, which were placed in a separate Movements and Transportation Section, headed by Col. (later Brigadier) A. T. de Rhe Philipe (British), the senior Allied transportation officer on the staff.35 This organization was to provide the framework for cooperating American and British transportation staffs. As outlined in AFHQ movement and transportation instructions, issued by General Eisenhower on 20 October 1942 as a guide to the task forces, the U.S. Army Transportation Corps staff and the British Q (Movements) staff were in principle to form a combined Movements and Transportation organization:36 Both staffs were to be individually responsible through their own normal channels of command to the Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ, for the efficient employment of their respective services. Together, they were to be responsible for policy and for allocation of facilities to the various operating areas in accordance with the requirements of the theater commander. At the outset certain common measures were enjoined, such as standard documentation for rail shipments and the pooling of available transportation facilities as soon as contact was established between the task forces. The instructions also provided for the establishment of a North African Shipping Board (NASBO). Headed by a civilian BMWT official, and representing both American and British interests, NASBO was to serve as a coordinating agency for all shipping matters arising in the TORCH area.37
No U.S. Army officer was selected to head the American side of the AFHQ transportation organization before the invasion, in large part because of uncertainty regarding the status of Colonel Ross. At various times during the preinvasion period it appeared that he would be assigned to either Larkin or Wilson, or that he would go with Hamblen and serve in the transportation section at AFHQ. General Lee desired to retain Ross in the European theater, and Ross himself considered the possible assignments in North Africa as demotions. Finally, in mid-October Ross was notified that he would go with General Larkin, who wanted him to set up the port operation at Oran. Although his orders placed him on temporary duty with the Center Task Force and called for his return to the United Kingdom by the end of the year, he feared he might well be retained and assigned to some subordinate transportation job at AFHQ.38
Arriving at Oran with the D-plus-3 convoy, Ross remained at that port until about 20 November 1942 when, as top-ranking Transportation Corps officer, he moved to Algiers to set up the American
side of the transportation organization at AFHQ. Ross dutifully accepted this last assignment, but with grave misgivings. With a meager staff, he had to battle to operate independently of the British and to maintain the separate identity of the American transportation organization under a compromise AFHQ arrangement. On 1 January 1943, when the Office of the Chief of Transportation, AFHQ, had begun to shape up, Ross had only five officers. They consisted of a deputy chief of transportation (Lt. Col. Thomas Fuller), an executive officer (Maj. Francis J. Murdoch, Jr.), a Water Section (Colonel Sharp and Maj. John T. Danaher), and a Rail Section (Major Zinnecker), together with an Administrative and Statistical Section staffed by four enlisted men. Three other sections (Operational Planning, Air, and Highway) were contemplated but not yet staffed.39
Colonel Ross wrestled with these problems until late January 1943, when he left for Washington before returning to his post as chief of transportation for the European theater. He was succeeded temporarily by his deputy, and on 13 February 1943 Colonel Stewart became chief of transportation in North Africa. Stewart was to hold this post for more than two years, ultimately attaining the rank of brigadier general. His office was located in the St. George Hotel in Algiers in the same room with his British counterpart, Brigadier de Rhe Philipe.
Following activation on 4 February 1943 of the North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (NATOUSA), Colonel Stewart, as the senior Transportation Corps staff officer, AFHQ, was designated the chief of a corresponding transportation section of the headquarters staff, NATOUSA. This unusual arrangement was the consequence of the shortage of personnel and office space which made it necessary to use U.S. staff officers at Algiers in a dual capacity, sometimes representing the U.S. Army theater and sometimes the international AFHQ. Stewart, like the others, had to be mindful of the theater G-4’s admonition to be aware in each action of what hat he was wearing.
As U.S. chief of transportation in the theater, Stewart served as adviser to the newly appointed Commanding General, Communications Zone (U.S.), and the AFHQ G-4, and represented U.S. interests in discussions and decisions affecting transportation.40 He was responsible to the Communications Zone commander for the efficient operation of the Transportation Corps, for coordination with British Q Movements in the planning and execution of movements, and for the preparation of transportation policies and directives for issuance to the base sections. Operating under the policy that all possible command, administrative, and operational functions were decentralized to the base section commanders, Stewart coordinated matters involving more than
one base section and/or British, and/or French transportation. He allocated transportation troops and equipment to the base sections, and he exercised such over-all control as was required to insure efficient operation of the Transportation Corps throughout the theater.41
Although the preinvasion planning had called for the eventual establishment of an SOS headquarters to coordinate the efforts of the base sections, such an organization did not come into being until after the activation of NATOUSA. Headquarters, SOS, NATOUSA, was set up at Oran in mid-February 1943, under General Larkin, to direct U.S. supply activities in the theater. The SOS was given control of functions relating to supply and administration in the base sections, but command of the sections was retained by theater headquarters. Within the SOS a Transportation Section was created, headed by Major McKenzie, who functioned primarily in an advisory, planning, and liaison capacity on transportation matters.42 In time, the Transportation Section’s functions were expanded, and ultimately it was assigned responsibility for the staff supervision of all transportation facilities in the U.S. communications zone, but these changes were not made until after the close of the North African campaign.43 In the meantime, Colonel Stewart continued to perform his coordinating and supervisory functions on the Allied and theater headquarters levels and retained authority to deal directly with both SOS and base section transportation officers on operational matters.44
Shortly after the establishment of the SOS, the base section structure was rounded out by the activation of a new Eastern Base Section (EBS), under the command of Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Arthur W. Pence, with Lt. Col. Edward T. Barrett as the transportation officer. The EBS headquarters was at first located at Constantine. The primary purpose of this base section was to strengthen the long supply line to the U.S. II Corps, which was soon to join in the final Allied offensive in North Africa.45
As Chief of Transportation, NATO-USA, serving in a dual capacity at AFHQ, Colonel Stewart had his hands full in the critical spring days of 1943 when the Axis power was being broken in North Africa. With limited personnel he had to supervise rapidly expanding transportation activity in the wake of the advancing Allied forces. To the highly important Water Section, which was responsible for the supervision of shipping and port operations, were added Rail, Air, Operational Planning, and Highway Sections.46 In addition, Stewart had to contrive satisfactory working
arrangements with his British and French colleagues, whose methods and procedures frequently differed from those of the Americans.
The multiplicity of transportation organizations within the theater, although confusing, did not prove a serious defect because the necessary coordination was achieved by having a single individual (Colonel Stewart) serve both as senior American transportation officer on the AFHQ staff and the U.S. theater chief of transportation. In view of the dual relationship between AFHQ and NATOUSA, the division of U.S. communications zone functions between NATOUSA and SOS NATOUSA, and the relative autonomy of the Military Railway Service, Stewart faced a situation that was not in accord with the book. Nevertheless, being a resourceful person who got along well with others, he obtained results with the means at hand, winning the respect and support of both Allied and American associates.47
Port and Shipping Activities
The task of developing an effective transportation system of necessity began at the ports, which were the initial objectives of the Allied assault forces and the funnels through which were poured the men and materiel required for the campaign. On 8 November 1942 the three task forces made simultaneous landings in North Africa. The Center Task Force landed near Oran, but was hindered in its advance on that port city by stiff French resistance. Assistance in breaking the deadlock was provided by a transportation officer, Colonel Barrett, who persuaded a French railway crew to deliver a trainload of ammunition to the embattled 18th Infantry Regiment.48 Meanwhile, the British-American Eastern Task Force had debarked and moved against Algiers, and the Western Task Force had landed in French Morocco to capture Safi, Fedala, and Mehdia, and then to seize Casablanca. Five U.S. transports were sunk during the assault phase, four by enemy submarines in Moroccan waters and one by bombing and torpedoing off Algiers.
The early landings in French Morocco were marked by delay and confusion. Fortunately, the weather was excellent and the opposition of the French short-lived, and General Patton’s ships were soon discharging directly onto the piers of Safi and Fedala. The high ground swells of the Moroccan coastal waters caused considerable damage to the landing craft that brought the first troops and supplies ashore. Here as at Algiers, and to a lesser extent at Oran, many craft were lost or disabled, and others failed to reach the right beach because of faulty navigation by inexperienced crews, defective equipment, and poor construction. By 11 November 1942 all hostilities had ceased, and thereafter cargo operations generally could proceed at all occupied ports without interruption. Direct discharge at the docks in Casablanca did not begin until 13 November, pending the arrival of the D-plus-5 follow-up convoy.49
Following the assault landings, Casablanca and Oran were used as the two main ports of entry for the U.S. Army. Possessing extensive port facilities and representing insurance against enemy closure of the Strait of Gibraltar, Casablanca remained important throughout the North African campaign. However, beginning early in 1943 an increasing proportion of the incoming tonnage was shipped into the Mediterranean for discharge at Oran and smaller ports in its vicinity, and after March Casablanca was no longer used to capacity.50 Algiers remained in British hands.
Although the practice of having separate U.S. or British operation of ports generally was observed, in preparation for the final offensive a number of small British-controlled ports to the east of Algiers were made available for use by the Americans. Two of these ports, Philippeville and Bône, which were located close to the U.S. advance depots at Constantine and Tebessa, materially eased the pressure on the long overland supply lines emanating from the major ports in the west. Bizerte, the last major port developed by the U.S. Army in North Africa, was taken at the conclusion of the campaign. Together with Oran, it played an important part in the support of later operations in the Mediterranean.
Although each port under U.S. control had its own special difficulties, certain problems were common to all. Some port rehabilitation was inevitable, ranging from comparatively little at Casablanca and Oran to extensive reconstruction at Bizerte. The available port facilities generally had to be supplemented from U.S. or British resources. -Language was a formidable barrier, since few Americans knew French and fewer still Arabic. Labor had to be recruited locally and strict supervision was necessary to insure any degree of efficiency. Pilferage was common and troublesome. Successful accomplishment of discharge operations required careful coordination with the connecting rail and motor transport facilities, which at first were extremely limited.51
Casablanca
Casablanca had an excellent artificial harbor built around an old fishing port and protected by a long breakwater. The two main docks, the Commercial and the Phosphate, were well equipped with modern cargo-handling equipment, possessed ample storage space, and had direct rail connections. Sunken and damaged French vessels, including the huge battleship Jean Bart, blocked a few berths but caused no serious difficulty. Early reports of extensive damage by American air and naval action at Casablanca were exaggerated, and the excellent facilities available at this modern port permitted the ready discharge of large amounts of cargo. Limited use was made of the two berths at Safi, the single berth at Fedala, and also a few outlying ports, but Casablanca became the principal port in French Morocco for both inbound and outbound U.S. Army shipments.52
Despite the favorable port conditions, cargo operations at Casablanca got off to a bad start amid haste, confusion, and friction that soon culminated in an acute attack of port congestion. The ships of the assault convoy had been hurriedly
unloaded in order to speed their return to the United States and to make way for the D-plus-5 convoy. In the absence of port troops, the Army’s poorly organized work details were unequal to the task of cargo handling and had to be assisted by Navy personnel. The docks were piled high with miscellaneous supplies and equipment, literally dumped from the landing craft and lighters in helter-skelter fashion. Together with ammunition, packaged gasoline, and field rations, for which the invaders had immediate use, the assault ships brought much excess and unauthorized equipment smuggled aboard at Hampton Roads by eager beavers anxious not to be caught short overseas. Because of the disorder on the docks at Casablanca, the Army had to “forage” for wanted items, and since there were insufficient guards the natives pilfered almost at will. This messy situation still prevailed when the first Transportation Corps port organization arrived.53
The 6th Port, under the command of Col. Howard Parrish, landed at Casablanca on 19 November 1942 with the D-plus-5 convoy, which brought the first large contingent of service troops. Colonel Parrish had only two port battalions, the 382nd and the 384th, neither of which had ever worked on a water front.54 Except for a few seasoned longshoremen, railway workers, and truck drivers, these men lacked experience and training. Within a short time after arrival, both units had pitched pup tents in a large empty lot and had begun work.
The difficulties of the 382nd were typical. It found the Phosphate Pier cluttered with dunnage, boxes, crates, and drums from the D-Day convoy, which had to be cleared before their own ships could be unloaded. Little cargo gear was available, and rope slings were used extensively, even for heavy lifts. There was a shortage of motor and rail transport to clear the docks. Rain fell on the first day and frequently thereafter. At the end of a twelve-hour shift of hard work the men returned to cold, damp beds. Cold chow, at first K and then C rations, was the rule until the unit could set up its mess equipment. Because of the confusion and congestion on the piers, unsatisfactory working conditions, and fatigue and lowered vitality among the men, the tonnage output of the 382nd at first was not impressive. By 29 November 1942, through the joint effort of the 382nd and 384th Port Battalions and a few attached units, almost all the cargo in the D-plus-5 ships had been discharged. The officers and men concerned were subsequently commended by General Patton for doing what at first was thought humanly impossible.
En route to Casablanca the 6th Port had been ordered to operate directly under the G-4, Col. Walter J. Muller, of the Western Task Force. During the unloading of the D-plus-5 convoy the G-4 and his staff kept a close check on port operations, applying constant pressure to clear the piers and to expedite cargo discharge. On occasion the G-4 and other superior officers on General Patton’s staff issued direct orders to subordinate officers of the 6th Port without consulting its commander. Colonel Parrish objected to this “interference,”55 which naturally caused
some friction. Relations between Muller and Parrish became strained, the former questioning the latter’s competence and threatening his relief. On 2 December 1942, the day after the arrival of the D-plus-20 convoy, while Colonel Parrish was ill, Colonel Muller by verbal order placed his executive officer, Colonel Tank, in direct charge of port operations, leaving Colonel Parrish responsible solely for administration and port commander in name only. Parrish protested this action as irregular and appealed to the Chief of Transportation in Washington for clarification of the status of his command, which he mistakenly assumed was an exempted station. His protest was without avail since General Patton, who supported his G-4, obviously had the authority and intended to run the port operation at Casablanca.56 Parrish remained in nominal command of the 6th Port until mid-January 1943.
Apart from the friction between G-4 and the port commander, which was not conducive to high morale, the basic difficulty at Casablanca at the outset was one of insufficient means. In retrospect, both Tank and Parrish agreed that there was a shortage of motor and rail transport and of supporting service units.57 Except for the two port battalions, military manpower was limited and native labor at best was inefficient. Although the 6th Port had been promised 200 2½-ton cargo trucks with 1-ton cargo trailers per day and enough relief drivers to permit around-the-clock operation, the maximum number of trucks furnished for port clearance in a single shift during November 1942 was only 72 because of diversions to other missions.
After Colonel Tank took over in December, additional troop and native labor and more cargo-handling equipment became available, which greatly facilitated cargo discharge and dock clearance. Although Tank was recognized as a conscientious and capable officer, some of the more experienced members of the 6th Port did not always see eye to eye with him on port operations. They seriously doubted the wisdom of spreading the gangs over an entire convoy rather than concentrating upon the complete discharge of individual vessels one at a time. Tank, however, was under pressure to work the maximum number of ships. Both Tank and the 6th Port quickly ran into the periodic Transportation Corps overseas nightmare, that of cargo being discharged faster than it could be cleared from the port area by the available port, motor, and rail facilities.58
Despite the acute shortage of rail and motor transport, the second supporting cargo convoy, which consisted of twenty-five ships (132,362 long tons) and arrived on 1 December, was completely discharged by 20 December 1942. Outloading, which later was to become a major activity at Casablanca, began with this convoy. Outbound shipments fell into two main categories—cork, phosphate, and scrap iron shipped to the zone of interior, and troops and cargo sent to the forward areas. The next convoy, UGF-3, arrived on Christmas Eve carrying mostly personnel and little cargo. Under a full African moon and with sirens sounding to warn of the first enemy air raid since the
landings, 23,043 passengers were safely debarked from eleven ships.59
Toward the close of 1942 port congestion ceased, and the lot of the harassed 6th Port began to improve. In mid-December the two port battalions moved from their miserable bivouac areas into more desirable quarters, the 382nd to a warehouse and the 384th to a balloon hangar. During the following month morale was further lifted when the mail with their new APO address finally caught up with the men. The arrival of two other port battalions, the 379th and 480th, provided much needed military personnel. Arabs were employed in sizable shifts, averaging about 1,000 per day, and proved fairly satisfactory as dock labor when closely supervised. When the Western Task Force somewhat reluctantly relinquished control at Casablanca to the Atlantic Base Section on 7 January 1943, the 6th Port had become an efficient-working organi-zation.60
During the ensuing months at Casablanca U.S. troops and cargo were regularly discharged and forwarded to the combat area. The maximum port activity was attained in March 1943, when 156,769 measurement tons were discharged. Although the outloading of salvaged and captured materials, the evacuation of the American sick and wounded, and the removal of enemy prisoners of war assumed increasing importance during the spring and summer, the over-all port traffic declined. Because of the increased emphasis on the use of the Mediterranean ports, which had shorter lines of communications to the Tunisian front, Casablanca was no longer used to capacity. Following the end of Axis resistance in North Africa in May 1943, the port lapsed into a secondary role. After handling approximately 1.5 million measurement tons, two thirds of it incoming cargo, during the first nine months of its operation, Casablanca was the scene of minor U.S. transportation activity until the fall of 1945.61
Oran
When measured in troops debarked and cargo discharged, Oran and its sub-ports far surpassed Casablanca and its satellites during the North African cam-paign.62 The 3rd Port began activity at Oran on 12 November 1942, under the command of Colonel Lastayo. The unit had gained some experience at the Bristol Channel ports in the United Kingdom and was far better prepared than the 6th Port for assignment in North Africa. From the beginning, Lastayo maintained close liaison with the Commanding General, Center Task Force, and he worked in close collaboration with the Mediterranean Base Section (MBS) commander (Larkin) and the MBS transportation officer (Stewart). Subsequently, Oran became the principal port of the Mediterranean Base Section. Mers el Kebir, Nemours, Mostaganem, and Arzew, all nearby, were employed to handle the overflow from Oran.
Although only a roadstead shielded by a breakwater, Mers el Kebir received considerable cargo during the first phase of
the invasion. The small artificial harbor of Nemours, to the west of Oran, was not used extensively until the summer of 1943. Mostaganem and Arzew, both linked with Oran by rail, had fairly adequate cargo-handling equipment, and during February 1943, their peak month of activity, they discharged 28,138 and 32,781 long tons, respectively.
At Oran the port area consisted of a narrow strip of land at the base of a steep cliff, above which lay the city. The U.S. Army operated at three piers, normally using fourteen berths to discharge cargo. The port was well supplied with heavy lift equipment, including four floating cranes ranging in capacity from 100 to 150 tons, but the equipment was not immediately available. The first unloading, therefore, was done with ship’s gear, supplemented by the organizational equipment of the 397th and 399th Port Battalions. At the outset, to facilitate maintenance, cargo gear was pooled at Mers el Kebir and Oran. It included among other things, 10 fork-lift trucks, 6 mobile 1½-ton cranes, 10 warehouse tractors, 15 warehouse trailers, rope and wire nets, shackles, bridles, trays, and pallets for about 15 vessels.
After landing at Mers el Kebir the men of the 3rd Port marched the six miles to Oran. There they found a disorganized port, the quays littered with barrels of wine and other merchandise, the warehouses in disorder, and the harbor strewn with sunken craft. Since storage space was very much limited, prompt clearance of cargo was needed to prevent congestion. Fortunately, the port facilities were intact and the berths accessible. The principal operating problem was to find sufficient manpower to work around the clock. Wherever possible, native labor was obtained in order to release American soldiers for other duties and to benefit the local economy. Some civilians were employed directly, others were engaged through a labor syndicate, which discharged vessels under contract on a tonnage basis. As many as 3,000 civilians were employed at the port, the menial tasks falling to the natives, Undernourished, ill clad, poor workers, and frequently pilferers, they had to be watched at all times. In addition to the natives, at the peak of operations the 3rd Port used six or seven port battalions.63
Apart from the labor situation, the major problem was to keep the cargo moving. Port clearance was dependent largely on motor transport, since the rail network allowed direct access to the ships at only a few points. Instead of having each supply service move its own items from port to depot, a provisional freight dispatch company, the 6697th, was set up in port headquarters to control and direct each movement and operate a motor pool. The 3rd Port had two hundred 2½-ton trucks constantly at its service. These were supplemented daily by 125 to 150 privately owned French trucks, all flat beds from 12 to 23 feet long. The French vehicles burned wood or charcoal, were old, and were in poor mechanical condition. The acquisition of large U.S. Army semitrailers, which could carry heavy and oversize items such as piling and rails, permitted the release of many inferior French trucks. Port clearance was expedited by the gradual increase in the number of U.S. Army trucks of various types, greater
speed in loading and unloading vehicles, and improved control of motor transport. Truck strength at the port reached the peak on 25 May 1943, when 479 trucks were used during the day and 474 during the night to haul 7,546 tons of freight.
It was soon found that the Table of Organization for the port was inadequate. Continuous operation at Oran and its sub-ports required more officers and enlisted men than were available. No provision had been made for a Port Provost Marshal Section, although it was urgently needed to direct the effort against pilferage and possible sabotage. At the outset the number of guards was grossly inadequate, consisting of two engineer companies transformed overnight into military police. By far the most acute problem was to suppress the pilfering fostered by the fantastic prices of the local black market. A summary court procedure was employed to mete out prompt punishment, and fifty-one cases were brought to trial in a single day. In addition to the natives, merchant seamen were frequent offenders, and U.S. military personnel were also involved. As a precaution against pilfering, all inbound and outbound cargo was funneled through a single gate at the port. Any items likely to be stolen, such as subsistence, post exchange supplies, and whiskey, had to be accompanied by guards.
Cargo discharge at Oran reached a new high in February 1943, when a total of 206,195 long tons was unloaded from 38 Liberty ships. Thereafter, as the fighting extended eastward, other ports were developed nearer to the front. Nonetheless, Oran remained important both for the supply of American troops in North Africa and for the outloading of U.S. Army cargo For the later campaigns in Sicily, Italy, and southern France.64
Philippeville, Bône, and Bizerte
As previously noted, the Eastern Base Section was created early in 1943, primarily to strengthen the long supply line to Tunisia. Despite all efforts exerted to utilize both rail and highway routes into eastern Algeria from Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers, the available facilities simply did not suffice to move the volume of materiel needed by the Allied troops. The small British-controlled port of Philippeville, located about 400 miles east of Oran, afforded a partial solution, although it had been severely bombed, could not receive vessels of deep draft, and had a maximum daily capacity of only 1,500 long tons. As soon as possible the harbor was dredged to accommodate ships drawing up to twenty-two feet, and American port personnel and mechanized equipment were brought in to assist the British. By March 1943 ever-increasing amounts of cargo were being discharged at Philippeville, to be forwarded by rail and motor transport south to the newly established general depot at Ouled Rahmoun and thence east to the advance dump at Tebessa.65
In preparation for the final drive in the Tunisian campaign, use had to be made of ports east of Philippeville. Late in March 1943 the British-held port of Bône was pressed into service for the Americans. Its harbor had thirty feet of water and could therefore take fully loaded Liberty vessels, but the almost constant air raids hampered cargo discharge. Subsequently, port
operations were pushed still farther eastward to La Calle and Tabarka, two minor coastal ports where U.S. Army cargo was discharged from vessels of shallow draft, including British and American landing craft and a fleet of fourteen small Cornish fishing boats that were dispatched daily from Bône. This water route was supplemented by an overland route that used a meter-gauge railway as far as La Calle and motor transport the remainder of the distance to Tabarka. Philippeville and Bône, though useful, were soon supplanted by the strategically located port of Bizerte, which came under the 8th Port in late May 1943.66
Bizerte had suffered severely from Allied bombing and Axis destruction, the surrounding waters were dotted with the hulks of sunken enemy vessels, and the city was in ruins. The main port of Bizerte lay at the head of a narrow channel leading from the Mediterranean into the deep land-locked Lake of Bizerte, at the end of which were the docks at Ferryville. The proximity of this port area to Sicily, coupled with the good rail and highway facilities of northern Tunisia, made Bizerte a valuable base. The first U.S. cargo had to be unloaded from coasters to lighters. Meanwhile, the harbor and the entrance to the lake were cleared of obstructions and berthing space was readied. Two Liberty ships began discharging at pier side on 12 June.
Supporting port facilities in need of repair, such as damaged roads and broken water mains, were reconditioned as quickly as possible. Because of frequent enemy air raids all discharged cargo had to be removed immediately from the port area. In the latter part of June 1943 general cargo was being unloaded at the rate of 3,000 or more long tons per day, and bulk petroleum products frequently increased the total daily discharge to well over 10,000 long tons. During the following summer Bizerte became a major port of embarkation for the assault and follow-up forces for the Sicilian and Italian campaigns.67
Port and Shipping Problems
In the course of the North African campaign numerous problems were encountered in the conduct of shipping and port activities. Most of them were also to be found in other theaters, but since the spotlight was thrown first on North Africa the lessons learned there were given early and wide circulation.68 The experience of the Transportation Corps indicated that the planning and preparations for overseas port operations should be made in detail, including provision for berthing space for at least the first two cargo convoys; adequate port equipment such as fork-lift and hand trucks, crawler cranes, dollies, pallets, cables, ropes, tools, and acetylene torches; and sufficient trained port personnel to work around the clock. The choice of an officer for the “man-size job” of port commander should be made most carefully. The grave deficiencies in packing and marking called for corrective action in the zone of interior. In particular, cardboard and corrugated paper cartons were strongly condemned as unsatisfactory for amphibious landings. Excessive sizes and weights of such items as landing
mats in 5,000-pound bundles called for heavy lift equipment. Organizational impedimenta often were poorly packed and marked, emphasizing the need of early and better preparation for overseas movements on the part of units, home stations, and service commands. The urgent need for amphibian vehicles in port and beach operations was clearly established, and the serious shortcomings in the characteristics and functioning of the available landing craft were pointed up by their mortality rate in the assault, despite the fact that there was little or no shore opposition.
Port activity naturally centered about the ships that brought men and materiel to the theater. The movements of these vessels were strictly circumscribed by the convoy system, which might mean, as happened at Casablanca, that a given Liberty ship would have to depart, even though not fully discharged, lest she miss the returning convoy. According to the theater chief of transportation, his principal difficulty arose from failure to receive complete, accurate, and direct information on inbound convoys and cargo sufficiently in advance of the actual arrival of the ships.69 Although the ports in the United States endeavored to speed the dispatch of such vital data, annoying delays occurred, especially in the initial phase when communications for North Africa had to be sent via London. The port commander at Oran at first tried to rely on air-mailed manifests, but two convoys arrived ahead of the shipping papers and the result was confusion. To prevent recurrence, special Transportation Corps couriers were employed until the regular U.S. Army courier system proved more dependable.70
Similarly, the distribution of shipping data from the theater chief of transportation to the North African ports and base sections in the beginning was haphazard and unreliable. Procurement of an electric mimeograph machine permitted rapid reproduction of shipping papers,71 but a special Transportation Corps courier system had to be instituted to insure safe and prompt delivery of information within the theater. Akin to the basic difficulty of getting adequate data on incoming convoys and cargo was the daily problem of keeping abreast of the new and ever-changing code names, shipment numbers, and shipping designators, since cargo consistently arrived in the theater with markings that were unfamiliar to the port personnel, who in this instance became the victims of too much security.
As in the United Kingdom, “diversion meetings” were held before the arrival of each convoy in order to determine the number of ships to be received and discharged at each port. Attended by representatives of the U.S. theater chief of transportation and all agencies having an interest in the cargo, the Diversion Committee assigned ships to individual ports, taking into consideration the desires of the
supply services involved and the ability of the ports to receive and discharge the vessels. The theater chief of transportation staff also attended the weekly Priority of Movements (POM) meetings, at which SOS, Air Forces, U.S. Navy, and Allied forces tonnage requirements were bid and allotments of shipping space made.
Coordination of all shipping questions arising in the theater was handled through the North African (later, Mediterranean) Shipping Board, on which the U.S. theater chief of transportation was represented. Composed of representatives of the British Ministry of War Transport, the American War Shipping Administration, and all U.S. and British military agencies concerned with merchant shipping, NASBO provided advice regarding the allocation of shipping in the area; nominated to the naval commander-in-chief vessels for inclusion in convoys originating in the theater; expedited the turnaround of vessels; allocated ships for imports and exports of civilian cargo; coordinated the movement of tankers and colliers; and cared for the welfare of merchant seamen.
A major task within each American-controlled port was the coordination of the activities of the three U.S. operating agencies most vitally concerned with shipping—the Navy, the Army, and the War Shipping Administration. A local port committee representing the interested parties, American and Allied, met daily and ironed out the operating details common to all.72
Despite inexperienced personnel, limited facilities, and the constant haste and pressure of war, the U.S.-operated ports in North Africa rolled up an impressive record. Oran and its subports carried the largest load, but the ports in the other two base sections also were active. The following tabulation shows the long tons of general cargo, bulk POL (petrol, oils, and lubricants), and coal, and the number of vehicles discharged in each base section up to 30 June 1943:73
| Base Section | General Cargo | Bulk POL | Coal | Vehicles |
| ABS | 745,742 | 242,710 | 89,531 | 40,122 |
| MBS | 1,282,532 | 266,665 | 142,443 | 30,217 |
| EBS | 125,275 | 69,729 | 52,640 | 4,967 |
Highway Transport
Efficiency of port operation depended mainly upon the rate of port clearance, which was effected primarily by highway transport.74 Since the rail facilities might be destroyed, the initial Transportation Corps planning in London aimed at port clearance solely by truck. At first only short hauls (port to dump) were contemplated, although long hauls (50 to 250 miles) later were found necessary because of the inadequacy of rail transport. The planning included the development of traffic systems, forms, and SOPs (standing operating procedures). Traffic regulating personnel made available by the 531st Engineer Boat Regiment were trained for
six days at Liverpool, immediately before sailing for North Africa.
Early Operations
No highway division was established by the theater chief of transportation until July 1943 since there was very little intersectional operation of highway transport apart from organic movements and deliveries to the east of new vehicles. While the hostilities continued, except for a few large movements, the control of highway traffic was left mainly to the base section transportation officers. The nature of the control over highway transport varied among the base sections. In the Atlantic and Eastern Base Sections this control tended to be centralized, but in the Mediterranean Base Section it was decentralized between port and highway movements. The Americans at first lacked both trained personnel and an established procedure for effective over-the-road control, but fortunately they received splendid assistance from the British, who had both the men and the system needed.75
The Transportation Corps planners for highway transport, Captains Kreml and Barton, landed at Arzew on 8 November 1942 with Colonel Stewart’s advance party. The first task was to organize sufficient motor transport to support the combat troops once they had exhausted the three days’ supply carried ashore on their backs. The capture of Oran made available approximately 380 charcoal-burning trucks belonging to a wine syndicate, which were promptly requisitioned. Both at Casablanca and at Oran a shortage of U.S. Army trucks hindered port operation. Locally owned vehicles were pressed into service, but considerable difficulty was experienced because of inability to exercise adequate control over the civilian drivers.
Back piling, that is, temporary storage, of cargo in the port areas was necessary, not only because of an insufficient number of trucks for port clearance but also because the vehicles themselves were not suitable for carrying certain items such as cased vehicles. Although highly desirable, back piling by class was not practiced in the early and most critical stage of cargo clearance, in part because port troops were not aware of the importance of properly sorting back-piled cargo, and in part because of having to rely largely on native labor. As a result, the transportation system was less efficient than it might have been had supplies been stacked by class so as to facilitate transfer to dumps and depots when more trucks became available.
Contributing to initial confusion at the ports was the lack of an effective control system by which trucks, storage space, and labor could have been fitted like links in the tight chain of military transportation. The local communication system at best was grossly inadequate for the control of motor transport. In such a large port as Oran, telephones were either lacking or useless, and communication was maintained by runners. An attempt to employ walkie-talkies was stopped by the signal officer on the ground of security violation. Without adequate control, trucks got lost, drivers went off on their own, and tie-ups developed at dumps, thereby depriving the ports of badly needed motor transport.
To his regret, Captain Kreml had failed to bring a goodly supply of road signs. In the absence of such signs, and especially after dark, bewildered American drivers
wasted many hours trying to find the dumps. Luckily, French drivers knew where to go if shown the location on a map, and after a week or ten days of orientation Americans also could be trusted not to get lost. Ultimately, an effective control system was established whereby trucks were dispatched daily as required and were kept under close supervision from port to dump by a central highway office. To avoid impending tie-ups fewer trucks might be dispatched to a congested dump or additional labor obtained for unloading at destination. The object was to keep the trucks moving, preferably around the clock if enough drivers could be obtained.76
The Transportation Corps was embarrassed repeatedly by not being consulted in the initial selection of dumps and depots. The ideal location was high, dry, and firm terrain able to support truck traffic, situated near the port, and adjacent to connecting rail and highway facilities. Actually, when the rains came, some dumps became seas of mud, and at Oran as many as sixty trucks were mired in one night. The cargo capacity at the destination frequently failed to match the incoming volume. For instance, the Class I dump in Oran was a warehouse with an inside loading platform that accommodated only two trucks, thereby forcing other vehicles to wait. At another site the mud was so thick that the dump had to be closed and the supplies moved elsewhere.
Although the roads deteriorated under wartime traffic, they were kept reasonably usable by the Corps of Engineers. In the latter stages of the campaign, however, two important bottlenecks developed in the Eastern Base Section. One was in the mountainous La Calle–Tabarka area, where truck operation was handicapped by poorly surfaced roads, steep grades, and sharp turns; and the other, in the vicinity of the important supply base of Constantine, where rain made the highways dangerously slippery.
During the early, critical stage of port clearance, the trucks carried all they possibly could, subject only to being able to get in and out of the muddy dumps. The standard U.S. Army 2½-ton 6x6 truck could safely carry 4 to 5 tons, but it was virtually useless for moving bulky cargo such as cased vehicles, airplane parts, rails, and telephone poles. Larger trucks would have been useful, and tractors with semitrailers would have proved very helpful, since the trailers could be dropped off for loading and picked up later. One-ton trailers were considered uneconomical for short hauls, but later proved useful for runs from Philippeville to Tebessa and Ouled Rahmoun. Ships were discharged at Philippeville only during daylight hours, and the cargo was stacked. At night inbound trucks left empty one-ton trailers to be filled, then received their own shipments, and finally returned to attach the loaded one-ton trailers for the outbound trip.
Except for cargo clearance from port to dump, the bulk of the motor traffic moved eastward, principally by convoy. Convoys of organic vehicles carrying men and supplies generally were loaded and dispatched from Casablanca and Oran, proceeding eastward under Transportation Corps traffic control to Orleansville, at which point they became subject to British movement control. Replacement vehicles usually were taken forward in convoy by officer and enlisted replacements who
were frequently inexperienced drivers simply drafted for the job.77 U.S. Army freight moved by convoy in accordance with priority lists. In addition to American motor transport, both organic and casual, the North African highways had to carry British and French traffic. Under these circumstances effective control over motor traffic, including convoys, was essential to prevent highway congestion.
Detailed AFHQ instructions for the conduct of motor convoys began appearing early in February 1943, when this type of traffic had become significant in the theater. As a rule, the officers in charge were cautioned to adhere strictly to the prevailing speed limits (usually 25 miles per hour or less in built-up areas) and the prescribed traffic density (15 vehicles to the mile), in order to avoid casualties to the native population arising from careless driving. Small advance parties were to be sent ahead to make arrangements at the next intermediate point. Each convoy was to begin with enough rations for seven days and gasoline for 500 miles. The normal halts were to be observed, and the progress of the movement was to be checked at the traffic control posts en route. A blue flag was to be carried by the leading vehicle and a green flag by the rear vehicle. Guards had to be placed on the cargo trucks for protection against marauding natives and hungry soldiers.
In order to regulate convoy movements a chain of traffic control stations was set up early in 1943, beginning at Casablanca. According to Kreml, this traffic regulation at first did not work well. As the American convoys pushed eastward beyond Orleansville, their movements conflicted with those of the British, who therefore insisted upon regulating all U.S. Army highway movements from the west. Imbued with the traditional American spirit of independence, both service and combat elements objected vigorously to having their movements regulated. As a result, the British complained to AFHQ that they were deluged by approximately 2,900 vehicles passing through Orleansville in a single day, instead of the 1,800 vehicles that had been agreed upon as the normal daily load at that point. This particular difficulty was resolved by an AFHQ directive subjecting all such movements to regulation.
A second difficulty was one of communications. A movement might be cleared from, say, Oran, but the traffic control officers on the road frequently could not be informed of the plan because of broken telephone connections. A call generally had to pass through several switchboards and, as Kreml said, it was a miracle to get through and an even greater one to be heard. Highway traffic regulations, to be effective, depended upon an adequate, centralized communication system hard to achieve under combat conditions.
Long hauls of the convoy type hardly became significant until Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel broke through the American defenses at Kasserine in February 1943. Because of the loss of the limited rail net in this area, it became necessary overnight to activate several new truck battalions for service in the Eastern Base Section, primarily to deliver ammunition, petroleum products, rations, and other supplies for the support of the U.S. II Corps near Tebessa. These trucking units were hastily organized with untrained personnel drawn from various combat units. The 2640th Quartermaster Battalion (Truck), for instance, had many
men who had not even driven automobiles in civilian life. Within a week the battalion had loaded high-priority freight and was on the road heading east from Casablanca. Despite mountainous terrain, the long trip to Ouled Rahmoun was completed successfully on 23 March 1943, less than a month after the battalion had been hurriedly activated at Casablanca. The unit at once began operating on a twenty-four-hour hauling schedule.78
Convoy UGS-5½
The transformation of the campaign from a stalemated operation mired down in mud into a war of movement greatly increased the demands on the limited overland transport facilities in the theater. Fortunately, the need had been anticipated early in 1943. After participating in the Casablanca Conference, General Somervell had taken a direct hand in improving the rail and highway facilities in the theater, which even then fell far short of satisfying the current demands. In late January, after conferring at Algiers with General Eisenhower and his staff, Somervell concluded that motor and rail transport represented the greatest need in North Africa. Accordingly, in a long radio message he startled the War Department by demanding that a special convoy be sent on 15 February with a huge quantity of highway and rail equipment, together with certain other urgent items. No obstacle, declared Somervell, was to be permitted to interfere with this shipment as directed.79 At the same time approximately 4,000 new service troops were requested in addition to an MRS detachment of about 25 officers and enlisted men, under Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, Jr., upon whom Somervell counted for corrective action to increase the capacity of the North African railways.80
The special convoy assembled at Somervell’s behest was an excellent example of effective wartime cooperation.81 Time was short, shipping tight, and materiel scarce. The Navy agreed to furnish the necessary escorts. The War Shipping Administration somehow managed to spot twenty available cargo ships, but their locations were such that loadings had to be done at New York, Baltimore, and Hampton Roads. In Washington, the Assistant Chief of Transportation, General Wylie, personally supervised the assembling of the cargo and its movement to the ports.
The most pressing transportation requirement was motor transport, which had been in short supply from the beginning of the North African operation because the number of vehicles accompanying the initial task forces had been drastically cut for lack of shipping space. In fact, at his first conference with the theater commander, General Somervell had suggested scheduling a special convoy primarily to deliver as many trucks as possible. The original plan called for 5,000 2½-ton cargo trucks, 400 5-ton dump trucks, and 2,000 1-ton, 2-wheel cargo
trailers. Smaller 1½-ton equipment had to be substituted for 5-ton dump trucks, which were unavailable. Since the 5,000 2½-ton trucks were the largest single item requested, General Wylie decided that this portion of the shipment would have to be cut about 10 percent in order to insure space for other must cargo. The trucks were shipped in part on wheels but mostly boxed.82
The principal railway items requested by Somervell for inclusion in the convoy were 5 80-ton locomotives, 5 56-ton war flats, and 25 15-ton and 25 30-ton meter-gauge wagons. The meter-gauge items were to be restricted to specific ships in order to permit diversion to ports in the forward area where such equipment was most needed. The additional locomotives and rolling stock were calculated to inject new life into the ailing North African rail line.
Despite a tight squeeze in assembling the cargo and the snow and rain that slowed the loading, the special convoy sailed from Hampton Roads on 17 February 1943. The result in large measure of unremitting effort by the Transportation Corps, this shipment gave valuable support to the theater. Some items had to be left behind, but the bulk of the transportation equipment was shipped, including 4,536 2½-ton cargo trucks and 1,872 1-ton trailers.83 The convoy, which reached the theater early in March, was hailed as a godsend by General Eisenhower. The trucks greatly increased the mobility of the Allied forces, and the locomotives and other rolling stock helped prevent a breakdown of the North African railways. The theater commander later attributed the success of the Tunisian campaign largely to the support from the special convoy.84
Supporting the Final Offensive
In the theater, meanwhile, highway activities in the Eastern Base Section were being stepped up. In preparation for the impending Allied counteroffensive, supplies were brought in through the port of Philippeville and the railhead at Ouled Rahmoun for forwarding by truck or rail to Tebessa. At the outset, the principal difficulty came from accepting tonnage commitments in excess of the actual capacity to deliver. A potentially dangerous gap between promise and performance was closed by means of a weekly highway transport program, predicated on the available lift on the one hand and the service demands on the other, subject to arbitration and approval by the G-4 of the Eastern Base Section. During the last half of March 1943, 16,722 tons were moved east from Ouled Rahmoun, of which 9,544 tons went by truck and the remaining 7,178 tons by rail.85
Aside from the obvious disadvantage of functioning with hastily organized and largely untrained personnel, the tracking units in this area at first had two major handicaps that impaired their operating efficiency. One was the failure to load the 2½-ton trucks to the maximum capacity.
The other was the lack of a firm trucking schedule that would achieve a steady flow of freight with the best possible turnaround time. Motor transport also suffered from an acute shortage of tools, maintenance equipment, spare parts, and tire-patching material, for which there was only gradual relief.
By mid-March 1943 the volume of highway traffic in the Eastern Base Section had grown so great that Major Kreml was assigned to make a special study of the traffic pattern with a view to possible improvement. He recommended that the highway system, hitherto under British movement control, be organized into “blocks,” much like those used by railways. Roadside traffic control stations were set up at intervals of about thirty miles, all connected by telephone with an area dispatcher, who could then tell at any time the exact whereabouts of any convoy on the road. As a result, much of the slack time inherent in the previous arrangement was eliminated. The British favored the change and indeed helped set up the required telephone system.86
An outstanding achievement of the final phase of the Tunisian campaign was the movement in April 1943 of the entire U.S. II Corps of more than 100,000 men and their equipment from the extreme southern flank in Tunisia to the northern flank, in preparation for a decisive thrust against Bizerte and Tunis. Although the movement began with some confusion, it was completed in orderly fashion. The bulk of the II Corps personnel moved in its organic vehicles, but additional trucks had to be furnished by the Eastern Base Section. In connection with the movement, the 2638th and 2640th Quartermaster Truck Battalions, operating approximately 230 2½-ton trucks and trailers, transported 1,100 tons of ammunition from dumps three miles south of Tebessa to a new site about twenty-five miles east of Tabarka. This mission was accomplished within forty-eight hours, despite driving rain and mountain roads with steep grades and sharp curves. Accidents took the lives of two men, and German aircraft strafed some vehicles, causing minor damage.87
As the fighting intensified in northern Tunisia, the volume of traffic grew too heavy for the narrow, mountainous, scenic highway between La Calle and Tabarka. Since wounded troops were being evacuated over the same road in the opposite direction, the trucks often had to pull over to the side and stop to permit ambulances to pass. In the absence of a rail link between La Calle and Tabarka, efforts were made to ease the strain on the road by using water transportation to bypass it. Landing craft were sent from Bône to Tabarka, where their cargo was forwarded either by rail or truck. This arrangement kept the highway available for essential traffic. In fact, even after hostilities ended in May 1943 and until the port of Bizerte could be operated at sufficient capacity to support the American troops in Tunisia by direct water shipments, the accepted pattern was to combine existing water, rail, and highway facilities to form a single transportation system within the theater.
Beginning with limited resources in equipment and personnel, supplemented by locally owned trucks with native drivers, the Transportation Corps in North Africa managed to meet the ever-changing demands of the U.S. Army for
highway transport. The trucks were kept moving despite enemy aircraft, hazardous mountain roads, heavy rain, thick mud, and the frequent necessity of hauling at night under blackout conditions. As General Ross wrote, “When you tell a driver ‘Get these rations to such-and-such a place—they’ve got only enough for breakfast,’ you know he’ll get it there, come hell, high water, or Nazis.”88
Railway Operations
Although the U.S. Army could not have functioned in North Africa without motor vehicles, the number was insufficient to satisfy all demands for overland transport. In this theater as elsewhere all available railway facilities had to be utilized as promptly and fully as possible. The main railway, a single-track line during most of the war, ran roughly parallel to the northern coast of Africa from Casablanca via Fes, Oujda, Oran, Algiers, and Constantine to Tunis, a total of 1,410 miles. (See Map 3.) The main line was standard gauge, but most of the branch lines, including those in Tunisia, were narrow (meter) gauge. From Casablanca to Fes the main line was electrified, eastward of Fes it depended upon steam. Freight capacity was estimated at 240 tons of military supplies per day per train, yielding a total of 5,760 tons for 12 trains per day each way.
The North African railways operated in three distinct nets, conforming in general to the boundaries of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.89 The Americans found these railways undamaged in most respects and in normal operating condition, but unequal to the wartime traffic. The rolling stock, especially the “dinky” engines and small hand-braked cars, fell far short of American standards. Maintenance had been neglected, trains were slow, and there was a grave shortage of motive power.90
Railroading in North Africa was carried on by a wartime mélange of American, British, and French military personnel, superimposed upon the normal peacetime organization of French and Arab civilians. In the course of the campaign U.S. and British railway troops and equipment were brought in, and Allied railway activities were placed under an American director of military railways. Most of the participating U.S. troops had been railroaders in private life, and the previous affiliations of the officers and enlisted men read like a roll call of American railways. In the forward areas the locomotives were operated by military railway personnel, assisted by French civilian engineers acting as pilots. Elsewhere, native civilians ran the trains. Like other Americans in the theater, the U.S. rail personnel had to contend with language difficulties, equipment shortages, and the hazards of enemy aircraft and mines.
Initial Activities
Preliminary Transportation Corps estimates of late July 1942 called for one railway grand division91 and four railway
operating battalions in the initial North African contingent, and a reserve of two railway operating battalions and one railway shop battalion.92 The first military railway unit to reach the theater was the 761st Railway Transportation Company (less one detachment), which after a short training period in England, was sent to North Africa, debarking at Mers el Kebir on 11 November 1942. Among its first tasks were the operation of the railway yards at Oran; the setting up of RTO’s from Oujda to Algiers; and the assignment of railway men as guards, who could also serve as crews if need be, to U.S. Army supply trains moving east from Oran.93
An advance echelon of twelve officers and enlisted men of the 703rd Railway Grand Division, under the command of Colonel Burpee, landed at Casablanca on 18 November. Members of this group at once began work with the French railway officials to move American troops and their organic equipment from the D-plus-5 convoy. In the effort to furnish all needed transportation, Burpee’s staff had the good fortune to find an American veteran of World War I who was familiar with the local rail situation and could serve as an interpreter.94
Throughout the North African campaign the Americans were to exercise purely supervisory control over French railway operations, and their success was dependent upon winning the support and cooperation of the local railway officials so as to expedite the movement of U.S. Army personnel and freight. The French generally cooperated well until the war ended, after which the restoration of normal railway service became their paramount interest. Apart from the language problem and certain French railway practices that the Americans found time consuming,95 the principal obstacle was a severe shortage of manpower and rolling stock that had to be overcome by the employment of U.S. and British railway troops and equipment.96 At first, British railway operating troops functioned eastward from Orleansville, leaving railway activity west of that city under American control.
At AFHQ during the early months of the campaign, U.S. Army rail activities were under the supervision of an experienced American railroader, the theater deputy chief of transportation, Colonel Fuller. During the early part of the campaign, at nine each night he and his British counterpart held a Priority of Movements meeting,97 at which the current demands for military transportation were
weighed and the priorities established for all types of movement within the theater, including shipments by rail for the U.S. Army. On the following day Fuller or one of his staff officers conferred with representatives of the British Army and the French Army,98 and with key officials of the French railways, in order to regulate and coordinate this traffic and apportion rolling stock to meet the most essential needs of the Americans, the British, and the French. Thrice weekly an Allied Railway Commission, of which Fuller also was a member, met to thrash out the larger problems not solved at these daily meetings.
A rail section was formally organized at the Office of the U.S. Chief of Transportation, AFHQ, in January 1943. Among other things, the section prepared the rail movements schedules for U.S. Army personnel and freight, maintained liaison with the British and French regarding such movements, and furnished information to the American base sections on movement priorities. It worked closely with the Military Railway Service after that organization began functioning in North Africa.99
Fuller and his associates had proved valiant pioneers, by the beginning of 1943 it had become evident that greater coordination and closer supervision of American operations on the French railways in North Africa could be achieved only by setting up a special military railway organization to function on a theater-wide basis. The eastward advance of the Allied forces had greatly lengthened the supply line, increasing the burden laid on the railways. As yet comparatively few U.S. military railway personnel had reached North Africa, and because of the extensive area to be supervised, their efforts were spread thin. Apart from the Advance Echelon, 703rd Railway Grand Division, and the 761st Railway Transportation Company, only two other Transportation Corps railway units reached the theater before the end of 1942. They were the 753rd Railway Shop Battalion, which worked primarily in the French railway shops at Sidi Mabrouk; and the 727th Railway Operating Battalion, which was soon to begin operating the meter-gauge line from Ouled Rahmoun to Tebessa, virtually within the combat zone. No other U.S. railway units became available until late February 1943, when the remainder of the 703rd Railway Grand Division, the 713th Railway Operating Battalion, and Company C of the 753rd Railway Shop Battalion arrived.100
The Establishment of a Military Railway Service
Since as a civilian his forte had been railway traffic rather than operations, Colonel Fuller felt the need of an experienced operating man who could supervise all U.S. Army rail transportation in North Africa and assure the maximum utilization of the French railways. The day after
the Casablanca Conference closed, the matter was taken up by General Somervell with the theater G-4, General Hamblen, the theater chief of transportation, Colonel Ross, and the latter’s deputy, Colonel Fuller. Somervell recommended General Gray, and a request for him was immediately dispatched to Washington. An experienced and aggressive railway executive, Gray was then stationed at St. Paul, Minnesota, serving as general manager of the Military Railway Service, which had been transferred from the Corps of Engineers to the Transportation Corps in mid-November 1942.
General Gray and a small advance party left the United States by air, landing at Algiers on 9 February 1943. Five days later the AFHQ commander formally assigned Gray as director general of Military Railways in North Africa, and placed all U.S. and British military railway personnel at his disposal. Serving in an Allied capacity, he reported directly to the Chief Administrative Officer, AFHQ, and for certain functions he was also responsible to the deputy theater commander,101 but he was virtually independent of the U.S. theater chief of transportation. This arrangement was not in accord with the more orthodox view of General Gross that the theater chief of transportation should control and supervise rail as well as port and highway operations. However unorthodox Gray’s position might appear, the results were good—in large measure because Colonel Stewart recognized the energy and ability of General Gray and was glad to let him run the railways.102
General Gray established his Military Railway Service headquarters at Algiers. There, the British director of transportation, Brigadier R. F. O’Dowd Gage, was appointed as his deputy, a combined staff was set up, and the operation of various routes was assigned to U.S. or British units. The British considered the decision to place Allied railway operations under American command inconvenient, since they believed that it entailed a loss of British responsibility for railway policy on their lines of communication, but they accepted it loyally. Although differences in methods and organization inevitably caused some difficulties, on the whole the arrangement worked well. Liaison was close, many firm friendships developed between U.S. and British officers, and Gray found Brigadier Gage most cooperative.
Although Gray had no direct command authority over the French Military Railway Service, a small organization with only six companies of construction troops, by AFHQ directive his recommendations were to be the basis for negotiations conducted by the Allied chief administrative officer with the French authorities regarding the extent to which railway development and operation would be effected through the medium of the French Military Railway Service, or by U.S. or British military railway personnel. In practice, the French recognized Gray’s responsibility for the direction of all military railway activities, and their military units were placed at his disposal in much
the same manner as the American and British troops.103
Basically, General Gray depended upon French civilians to run the railways, since sufficient Allied trained military personnel were lacking for complete MRS operation. In accordance with AFHQ policy, he sought to assist the French to move the maximum Allied tonnage by supplementing their limited resources in manpower and equipment. Indeed, before Gray reached North Africa, the theater chief of transportation had advised that American personnel and rolling stock must be procured to prevent a breakdown of railways.104 Although the French cooperated fully, civilian operation was not deemed desirable in the combat zone, and in other areas in the interest of efficiency the Americans had to supplement the French train and repair crews. Rolling stock, already in poor condition, was to suffer increasingly from enemy action as the campaign turned eastward.
At the time of Gray’s arrival, American rail units in the theater or en route consisted of the advance echelon of the MRS headquarters, the railway grand division, two railway operating battalions, a railway shop battalion, and a separate transportation company. After conferring with the deputy theater commander and the AFHQ Movements and Transportation Section staff, he requested additional U.S. railway units to meet his anticipated requirements. These units, consisting of the rear echelon of MRS headquarters, two railway grand divisions (the 701st and 704th), and three railway operating battalions (715th, 719th, and 759th) landed in North Africa on 11 May 1943.105
Additional railway equipment had been requisitioned by the Americans and the British before Gray’s arrival. Because damage was less than expected, the original requirement of 250 standard-gauge 2-8-0 locomotives, 175 meter-gauge 2-8-2 Mikado locomotives, and approximately 5,000 cars was later reduced by the Director General, MRS, to 105 2-8-0 and 60 2-8-2 locomotives and to 1,500 cars. American-built rolling stock began arriving early in 1943. Railway cars were erected and 2-8-0 standard-gauge locomotives were unloaded and serviced at Oran by personnel from the 753rd Railway Shop Battalion. Part of the 753rd had already been assigned to the modern French railway shops in Sidi Mabrouk, where the chief task was to erect meter-gauge locomotives urgently needed on the Ouled Rahmoun–Tebessa line. The first two meter-gauge locomotives were unloaded at Oran in mid-March 1943. They were unassembled and each consisted of fourteen packages, which were shipped to Sidi Mabrouk for assembly. Within ten days both locomotives were ready for service.106
Although existing U.S. Army regulations assigned responsibility for
extraordinary repairs and reconstruction of military railways to the Corps of Engineers, the MRS in North Africa engaged in these activities from the outset.107 This came about in part because of the international and theater-wide nature of the MRS command, and in part because of the availability of MRS personnel for construction purposes. The British Transportation Service troops placed at Gray’s disposal included personnel for railway construction, a function assigned to that service in the British Army. Also, the fairly satisfactory maintenance conditions on the North African railroads made it possible to use the A (maintenance of way) companies of the American railway operating battalions for construction and rehabilitation work.
Military construction troops undertook three main types of railroad work in North Africa—depot track work, involving such projects as the construction of depot layouts and the extension of sidings; rehabilitation of captured lines in the combat zone; and, at the end of hostilities, construction of a more permanent nature. Depot track work in the Atlantic and Mediterranean Base Sections was performed by U.S. Engineer troops, while similar construction from Algiers eastward to the combat zone was performed by American and British troops of the MRS.
The delineation of responsibility for repair and rehabilitation of rail lines in the combat zone was at first less clear. After establishing his headquarters at Algiers, Gray set up an advance headquarters at Constantine under Col. E. L. Parkes (British) to handle construction planning, and to maintain liaison with the French Military Railway Service, French civilian railway officials, the group commander in the combat zone, and U.S. base section and British line of communications commanders. Shortly after the enemy breakthrough at Kasserine had been repulsed, confusion arose among the MRS, the U.S. II Corps engineers, and the French Military Railway Service as to which agency should be responsible for the work in the area evacuated by the enemy. The situation was clarified, first by verbal order and then, on 10 April 1943, by AFHQ directive. The Director General, MRS, was specifically assigned responsibility for planning and effecting the construction, maintenance, and repair of military railways in both the communications and combat zones. Provision was made for the director general to call on the tactical commander in the combat zone, and on AFHQ and the SOS commander in the communications zone, for additional assistance when insufficient resources were at his disposal. The same directive gave Gray the responsibility for planning, requisitioning, stocking, and issuing all railway equipment and materials. These responsibilities were to remain part of the MRS mission during subsequent operations in Sicily, Italy, and southern France.108
Rail Operations Under the MRS
When General Gray’s MRS became active, the North African campaign was nearing its crucial stage. In order to expedite the movement of supplies in support of the combat forces, he assigned the
bulk of the available U.S. railway units to operations in the forward area.109 Early in March 1943 the 703rd Railway Grand Division, the main body of which had recently disembarked at Mers el Kebir, moved to Constantine and assumed jurisdiction of the CFA (Chemins de Fer Algeriens) lines extending from Beni Mansour to Souk Ahras, from Philippeville to Le Kroub, from Ouled Rahmoun to Tebessa, and from Oued Kebrit to Tebessa. Assigned to the 703rd were the 727th Railway Operating Battalion, which had already begun operations on the overtaxed Ouled Rahmoun–Tebessa line during the previous month, and the newly arrived 713th Railway Operating Battalion, which was given jurisdiction of the lines from Beni Mansour through Constantine to Philippeville. As already stated the 753rd Railway Shop Battalion (less Company C) was placed on duty at the CFA shops at Sidi Mabrouk.110
Stationed farthest forward, the 727th Railway Operating Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Fred W. Okie, had begun its operations under serious handicaps. The locomotives on the meter-gauge line from Ouled Rahmoun to Tebessa were often junk heaps, and many had no brakes. Tools and materials for repair were in short supply, and the unit at first lacked even a red lantern.
From the outset the 727th operated uncomfortably close to the enemy. On 14 February, when the loss of Gafsa appeared imminent, Colonel Okie, aided by a small detachment of the 727th and three trucks, attempted to evacuate highly essential railway rolling stock and war material. Despite strafing, four of the imperiled locomotives were removed, but the remaining engines and sixteen cars of ammunition were caught behind a blown-out bridge at Sidi Bou Baker on the rail line to Thelepte. The detachment had just succeeded in concealing eight locomotives in a mine tunnel near Moulares and immobilizing them by removing vital parts, when the approach of an enemy tank caused Okie hastily to load his men and engine parts on trucks and leave for Redeyef. En route, the party was fired upon by native troops but avoided further attack by waving a French flag. After picking up twenty-six French civilians and their baggage at Redeyef, the Americans set out across the desert via Tamerza to Bir el Ater, walking and pushing the trucks for several miles through deep sand. The detachment finally reached the road running north into Tebessa, arriving there on 16 February with gas tanks practically empty.111
On 17 February when the Thelepte airfield was abandoned, another detachment of the 727th, under 1st Lt. Victor E. Williams, removed all rail equipment in this vicinity. This movement came under enemy fire, and several cars of equipment were destroyed. Shortly thereafter, when Rommel’s forces broke through the Kasserine pass, the battalion made ready for the possible evacuation of Tebessa itself. However, by the morning of 25 February 1943 the enemy had retreated, leaving
behind numerous deadly mines and several badly damaged bridges. Railway repair and reconstruction progressed rapidly in the recaptured area, and within fifteen days after the German withdrawal the line was open to Kasserine.112
Altogether, these were difficult days for the newly arrived MRS, especially in the war-torn area around Tebessa. There train operations were frequently interrupted, considerable damage was done to railway equipment and facilities, many bridges were demolished, and approximately 16 locomotives were lost to the enemy. On 27 February 1943, when the crisis had passed, 50 of the 70 engines the MRS had at Tebessa were definitely in bad order and only 10 of the remaining 20 were operational. More rolling stock was needed immediately. During March 2-8-2 meter-gauge locomotives began coming off the assembly line at Sidi Mabrouk, thereby helping to relieve the serious shortage of motive power on the Ouled Rahmoun–Tebessa line. The main facilities for servicing incoming 2-8-0 standard-gauge locomotives were located at Oran. The port was also the center for assembling various types of railway cars, shipped knocked-down so as to conserve shipping space.113 By April 1943 MRS personnel at Oran had placed in service 38 standard-gauge locomotives and had assembled 233 railway cars. With this added equipment, Gray was confident of the success of his mission.114
Eastbound rail traffic continued heavy as the North African campaign drew to a close. Constantine, Ouled Rahmoun, and Tebessa were especially busy points. During the seven days ending 21 April 1943, the MRS ran thirty trains between Ouled Rahmoun and Tebessa, and in the following week as many as forty-eight trains were operated daily through Constantine.115
In contrast to the comparatively minor destruction inflicted elsewhere in the theater, the rail lines to the south and east of Tebessa in the Kasserine–Sousse area were heavily damaged by enemy demolition and Allied air bombing. After the Germans had been forced out of the Kasserine area in late February 1943, the 18 Army Group commander ordered the rehabilitation of the Haidra–Kasserine–Sbeitla–Thelepte line. Because of the differences in directives issued by the individual armies concerned, 18 Army Group issued its directive jointly with those of the U.S. II Corps and the MRS advance headquarters. As a consequence, both the II Corps engineers and the MRS began planning for the necessary rehabilitation. At the same time the French Military Railway Service, which believed it had the sole responsibility, also undertook to plan the work. As previously noted, all three services engaged in the project, with resultant confusion and some delay.
To avoid a repetition of this experience, the 18 Army Group staff made verbal
arrangements for the MRS to assume responsibility for the planning, coordination, and performance of railroad repairs in the combat zone. The next job, the repair of the line running eastward from Sbeitla to Sousse, was completed expeditiously under MRS guidance by U.S. and British MRS units, U.S. Engineer troops, French MRS units, and civilians.
Following the formal assignment of the railway construction and rehabilitation functions to the director general on 10 April 1943, no further administrative difficulties were encountered. In the final phase of the campaign, the rapid Allied advance across northern Tunisia offered little opportunity for either friendly or enemy destruction, and it was possible to place rail lines in that area in operation with only light repairs. Basing his plans on priorities established by the 18 Army Group, Gray assigned responsibility for individual lines to advanced U.S. and British MRS units, and to the French MRS. An important exception to this arrangement came when a newly captured segment of the line running from the port of Tabarka to Mateur was used to carry supplies forward to the U.S. II Corps. In order to place the line in service as rapidly as possible, the Eastern Base Section rushed in Engineer troops who repaired the line from Tabarka to Nefza. Mechanics of the 753rd Railway Shop Battalion moved in and repaired the one available but decrepit locomotive at Tabarka, and on 4 May, one day after the Americans entered Mateur, the first train was dispatched from Tabarka with 13 loads, 145 net tons, aboard. The remainder of the line from Nefza to Mateur was later repaired by Allied MRS troops.116
Although damage to rail facilities was generally light, operations in the forward areas were hindered by mines placed along the right of way by the retreating Axis forces. Neither the British nor the American railway troops were at first adequately trained to deal with such hazards. Track mines usually were detected by employing a locomotive to push several cars loaded with rock to take the brunt of any exploding mines.117
As the Allies advanced deeper into Tunisia and the supply line lengthened, prompt turnaround of rolling stock became increasingly necessary. Constant pressure had to be exerted to speed up the discharge of cars and expedite the return of empties from the east. During April 1943 an average of more than 150 carloads of supplies had to be delivered each day to the forward railheads.118 At the peak of activity on the Algerian and Tunisian railways in the period 13 April-12 May 1943, Allied freight traffic, based on a total mileage of 1,905 for all sections, totaled 31,554,660 ton-miles.119
The relations of MRS with the three major railway systems varied considerably. Over the Moroccan railways (CFM) the MRS control was almost entirely supervisory. Excellent cooperation was received from the French railway personnel, but the trains were slow and delays frequent. The only substantial aid given
the CFM by the Transportation Corps was fifteen 2-8-0 standard-gauge steam locomotives, which were needed because of insufficient electric power. The CFM naturally became less significant as the Allies advanced eastward. It served as insurance, however, for had the Strait of Gibraltar been closed by enemy action it would have become a vital line of communications from Casablanca to the Mediterranean.
The Algerian railways (the CFA) carried the largest amount of Allied military tonnage and were given the most assistance by the MRS. Cooperation on the CFA was good until the end of the fighting, when the French railway personnel evidenced a stronger desire to run the lines in their own way. Here as elsewhere on the North African railways, the Director General, MRS, was not satisfied with the French methods of operating trains and of maintaining and repairing equipment. He believed that the MRS, if given full control, could have done a much better job, but he had no authority over the civilian railway personnel. Regardless of the urgency, he had to request, he could not order. Yet he had to bring in MRS troops and equipment that in the aggregate accounted for an estimated 70 percent of the transportation capacity of the CFA.
The Tunisian system (the CFT) received the least supervision from the MRS because it was the longest in enemy hands. Because of wartime destruction, the Tunisian lines required the most reconstruction. Motive power and rolling stock were found in deplorable condition. The CFT management was resourceful, but the system suffered from the same procrastination and delay previously encountered in Morocco and Algeria. As General Gray remarked, it was the irony of fate that the battered Tunisian rail lines were to become all-important for subsequent campaigns in Sicily and Italy.120
Following the surrender of the Axis forces in North Africa in May 1943, all remaining lines in Tunisia not previously placed in service by the Allies were swiftly readied for temporary operation. The first train entered Tunis on 13 May. Plans were made jointly by the MRS, the French Military Railway Service, and civilian railway officials for more permanent repair work on the Tunisian lines. Reconstruction areas were assigned to Americans, the British, and the French, and work was begun with a scheduled completion date of September 1943.121
The end of hostilities in North Africa altered the transportation pattern of heavy movements of men and materials from west to east. Thereafter a two-way flow of traffic developed, as men and materiel were moved both into and out of Tunisia. The inbound traffic was largely in preparation for the projected invasion of Sicily and Italy. Already in progress but much accelerated by the Axis surrender, the outbound movement involved mostly personne1.122
Evacuation of Patients and Enemy Prisoners of War
Aside from the U.S. Army combat and service units moved out of North Africa for the Sicilian and Italian campaigns,123
there were two main groups of outbound personnel. The first group, which had been accruing since the invasion began, was the sick and wounded. The second group comprised the Axis prisoners of war, who ultimately became so numerous and burdensome that mass removal from the theater provided the only solution. Both groups posed special problems for the Transportation Corps.
The Sick and Wounded
Because the landings were relatively unopposed, the initial American casualties were light, and several months elapsed before the removal of patients became a major undertaking. Within the combat area, cross-country ambulances provided the chief means of transportation for casualties, and jeeps were convenient on narrow mountain roads, though not comfortable. Weapons carriers and 2½-ton trucks also were used for ambulatory patients but only in an emergency for litter cases. In a few instances the slow but sturdy mule was used for movements over the rugged terrain of Tunisia. Air evacuation, which was faster and more comfortable, proved increasingly valuable and in fact became indispensable during the final offensive in Tunisia, but the bulk of the removals to hospitals and ports was made on hospital trains. Their movements were controlled by the G-4, AFHQ, which set priorities to meet the needs of the American, British, and French forces.124
No U.S. Army hospital ship was available in North Africa until June 1943, when the Acadia lifted the first load of 778 U.S. Army and Navy patients from Oran to the United States.125 Although British hospital ships were of some assistance, returning troopships provided the principal means of evacuating sick and wounded during the first eight months of the campaign. The number so evacuated was limited. Until liberalized in late February 1943, theater policy restricted this method to patients mentally and physically capable of caring for themselves in the event of disaster at sea. Even after patients of all types were permitted to be removed on transports, the ship’s facilities had to be adequate but generally were far from the best. Most troop carriers were routed to Casablanca, and at that port transportation difficulties and movement restrictions minimized the number of patients that could be evacuated from the Mediterranean and Eastern Base Sections. Until early 1944 the theater consistently suffered from a lack of advance information on the number of patients of each class who could be evacuated aboard incoming vessels. Meanwhile, beginning in May 1943, an easing of the theater movement policy combined with improved rail facilities and an additional medical hospital ship platoon, greatly increased the number of patients that could be evacuated to the zone of interior. As a result, a total of 11,434 patients was evacuated by troopship in the last half of 1943, as compared with the 4,850 evacuated during the first half of that year.126
The evacuation by train and ship of American sick and wounded overseas was handled jointly by the Medical Department and the Transportation Corps, the former furnishing the required medical personnel, supplies, and facilities, and the latter providing the necessary transportation by land and water. To facilitate the work of these agencies, on 16 September 1942 U. S. Army commanders of overseas theaters and bases were directed to submit, through their respective U.S. supply ports, certain essential information: (1) a monthly report indicating the number of patients actually awaiting evacuation from overseas, and the number of additional patients expected within the next thirty days, and (2) a special report on the sailing of any vessel with patients being evacuated to the continental United States.127 In North Africa there was some lag in setting up this system.
At first, casualties from the Center and Eastern Task Forces were to be evacuated to the United Kingdom aboard British carriers, but in the absence of regular U.S. Army hospital ships the patients from the Western Task Force were to be sent to the States on returning troop transports. By late November 1942, a total of 115 casualties from the latter group had been received at Hampton Roads, the very port from which they had only recently embarked.128
Manifestly, from the Transportation Corps point of view, the most difficult problem in the evacuation process was to develop adequate land and water transport. The eleven hospital trains employed within the North African theater were improvised from French railway coaches and boxcars, which had been made as comfortable as possible. The movement of casualties by rail was especially heavy in April 1943 and reached a peak in May, when the fighting ceased.129 As patients awaiting evacuation from the theater began to accumulate, the demand increased for additional hospital ship space. The need had been foreseen by General Eisenhower before the invasion of North Africa, but the world-wide shortage of ships was so acute that only the makeshift accommodations aboard the troop transports were available.130 Only three U.S. Army hospital ships, the Acadia, the Seminole, and the Shamrock, arrived in the theater during 1943. Altogether in that year, a total of 3,593 patients departed for the United States via hospital ship as compared with a total of 16,284 patients evacuated by troop transports.131
The evacuation of patients continued long after the fighting had ended in North Africa, the process in general being complicated by limited rail and water transportation. Except for the registered hospital ships the accommodations at sea were far from perfect, although every effort was exerted to furnish the maximum in comfort and care.
Prisoners of War
The patients to be evacuated were never as numerous as the German and Italian prisoners of war who had to be taken out of the theater. As the campaign developed, the POWs, as the prisoners of war were called, became an increasing burden for the theater to guard and feed. Many prisoners, especially the Italians, were retained in North Africa as workers for the U.S. Army, but many more had to be shipped to the zone of interior, where they could be used to ease the labor shortage. Able-bodied prisoners of war, to be sure, could not expect the same amenities accorded American patients, but by accepted international practice they were entitled to certain basic privileges such as adequate food, clothing, and medical care. The Transportation Corps was responsible for effecting POW movements by land and sea; the Office of the Provost Marshal General had over-all supervision, determined policy and procedure, and furnished the military police to guard the prisoners en route to and aboard ship.132
The number of prisoners in American custody in North Africa did not bulk large until enemy resistance began to collapse in the spring of 1943. In mid-May the theater commander reported that from 225,000 to 250,000 prisoners of war had been captured, most of whom would require feeding by the U.S. Army. Reflecting subsequent large-scale POW evacuation from the theater, the total prisoner strength (German and Italian) in the United States increased progressively until it reached a peak of 172,763 in December 1943. Of this total by far the greater number, 123,440, were Germans, many from Rommel’s Afrika Korps.133
The wholesale removal of POWs following the Axis surrender in North Africa placed a severe strain on the North African railways, already swamped by the movement of casualties and the redistribution of troops and materiel incident to renewed assaults in the Mediterranean. Herded on foot or in trucks to the railheads, the POWs then proceeded westward in boxcars.134 In May alone, a total of 81,804 POWs was evacuated by rail from the Eastern Base Section. Many thousands more were carried by truck in convoys traveling to the west. In accord with the policy of evacuating POWs as fast as possible and by any available means, processing within the theater was kept to a minimum. Within each base section the transportation officer and the provost marshal shared the responsibility for the evacuation of POWs, who were as a rule either loaded directly aboard ship or held temporarily in the port stockade.135
Evacuation by sea of the rapidly growing enemy prisoner population was hampered in the beginning by the U.S. Navy limit of 500 POWs for each unescorted vessel. This policy remained in effect until mid-May 1943, when General Eisenhower requested and received its temporary abrogation.136 Because the regular troop
transports could not carry the huge load, emergency passenger space had to be contrived. At the theater’s suggestion and with War Department approval, cargo vessels of the EC-2 Liberty type, which because of their primary mission became known as POW ships, were hastily converted. Using freighters from convoys UGS-8 through UGS-21, the theater evacuated 75,366 prisoners of war to the United States.137
As was to be expected, the POW vessels were poorly equipped to move personnel. The improvised sanitary facilities, which included overside latrines, were unsatisfactory. The water supply usually was insufficient. The prisoners subsisted on C rations, and at first they slept on blankets spread over the deck. All POW Liberty ships were operated by the War Shipping Administration, which also arranged for their conversion. The WSA furnished portable passenger accommodations (standee berths), and provided the supplies for each ship. Initially, about 300 prisoners were carried on each vessel, but this figure later was raised to 500 or more. Lifesaving equipment was provided, including improvised life rafts made from dunnage and empty oil drums and life preservers filled with native cork. Medical personnel, supplies, and equipment were placed aboard each vessel. Ordinarily, one medical officer and three medical enlisted men were assigned to 300 prisoners. Aboard ship the POWs were kept behind wire barricades and iron doors. Evacuation entailed a serious drain on the theater manpower, since armed guards had to travel on each ship, varying in number in proportion to the group being evacuated. Normally, the No. 2 ‘tween-deck space was equipped to hold 300 to 500 prisoners of war, and the No. 3 ‘tween-deck space was made to accommodate 40 or more escort guards.138
The POW Liberties were obvious makeshifts, and the frequent overloading resulted in cramped, uncomfortable quarters and excessive strain on the ships’ facilities. Being in no position to complain, the prisoners simply endured the passage. Later, when American soldiers had to be transported on the same POW ships, efforts were made to improve such features as messing arrangements, sanitary facilities, and ventilation.139
The Final Phase
The closing months of the campaign had been characterized by a growing emphasis on transportation and supply. Within the theater the basic Transportation Corps problem remained that of coordinating and supplementing all available means of transportation over the long and tenuous supply line in order to support the Allied push eastward into Tunisia. By combined lifts involving water, rail, and highway facilities, sufficient men and materiel were moved forward to support the American effort. The U.S. troops, said General Stewart, “never lacked supplies as the result of failure on the part of transportation.” For this accomplishment he gave due credit to the support of the Chief of Transportation in Washington and the U.S. ports of embarkation.140
The North African campaign gave a helpful preview of the principal supply and transportation problems likely to be encountered in other theaters. Considerable loss resulted from pilferage, despite guards and protective packaging.141 In North Africa, cartons were not wanted because they soon disintegrated when exposed to the elements in the open fields around Casablanca that were used for storage. As late as April, the deputy theater commander requested that balanced stocks be sent and that shipments be properly packed and marked. This demand from the theater led to the pronouncement by General Gross that goods delivered unfit for use or that failed to arrive because of improper packaging or marking constituted a “scandalous waste.”142
Still another problem by no means peculiar to the North Africa theater was the frequent shipment of units without their equipment. This difficulty arose early, since the task force units had been compelled to leave behind 50 percent or more of their organic equipment, predominantly vehicles. Pending the delivery of this equipment to and within the theater, the effectiveness of the units involved was obviously impaired. The problem persisted, affecting the Transportation Corps as well as other units. General Gray, for instance, complained that three railway operating battalions were allowed to sail from the United States without their equipment, thereby materially limiting their usefulness in the theater.143 Largely because of shortages in materiel and shipping, the War Department and the theater were unable to eliminate the time lag between the arrival of troop units overseas and the delivery of their equipment. Nevertheless, the reports of observers made it clear that here, indeed, was a condition calling for corrective action.144
As to the supply picture, by early 1943 the understandable desire of all concerned to avoid any conceivable shortages had culminated in an actual excess of certain items in the theater. This oversupply pertained chiefly to items shipped on an automatic basis, such as subsistence, ammunition, and petroleum products. In an attempt to load all ships to the maximum, the ports in the zone of interior utilized as much filler cargo as possible, and especially rations. Such shipments tended to accumulate and to deteriorate in North Africa, overtaxing the theater storage facilities. The obvious remedy, soon applied, was to place further shipments to the theater on a requisition basis.145
Following the end of hostilities, North Africa was important principally as a supply base and a staging area for U.S. Army operations in Sicily and Italy. Reflecting the emphasis on this new mission was the
organization of a new Supply Branch in the SOS Transportation Section on 1 June 1943. Headed by Maj. Harry D. Kamy, the Supply Branch was concerned with the procurement, storage, and issue of items peculiar to the Transportation Corps, mainly railway, port, and marine equipment and supplies. Subsequently, a Transportation Corps theater depot for marine and port equipment was established at Oran, in addition to the several Transportation Corps subdepots already in operation. During July 1943 the Corps was made responsible for procuring, storing, and issuing life preservers, a necessary item for troops embarking for Sicily and Italy and for enemy prisoners of war being evacuated to the United States.146 In September, two provisional base depots were established to handle railway equipment arriving at Oran and Algiers.147
By the fall of 1943 the major Allied effort in the Mediterranean had shifted from North Africa to Italy. On 24 October the U.S. Army chief of transportation in the theater, General Stewart, established a forward headquarters in Naples. The Director General, Military Railway Service, AFHQ, General Gray, had already moved to that city.148 Both Stewart and Gray had learned much in North Africa. Fortified with knowledge born of wartime experiences, they and their men faced the hard task of providing water, rail, and highway transport for the Italian campaign.