Chapter 1: The Atlantic and Caribbean Bases
The expansion of the U.S. overseas military establishment, which during the war virtually encircled the globe, began rather modestly in 1939 with the reinforcement of Army garrisons in Panama and Puerto Rico. With the end of the “phony war” in Europe in the spring of 1940, the United States was compelled to concentrate upon securing its own frontiers as well as protecting the Panama Canal. The somber prospect in May of a complete collapse of both France and Great Britain spurred the hasty adoption in the following month of a new Joint Army-Navy Plan (RAINBOW 4), aimed at preventing the Germans from acquiring a foothold in the Western Hemisphere. During May the British Prime Minister made his first request for a loan of old American destroyers to bolster the British Navy. Negotiations bore fruit in the destroyers-for-bases agreement of 2 September 1940, whereby Great Britain received fifty overage destroyers, and the United States acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, Antigua, the Bahamas, Bermuda, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana. These newly leased bases in effect formed a new American defensive frontier, extending from Canada to South America.1
The acquisition of the Atlantic and Caribbean bases added materially to the work of the Quartermaster Corps and the Supply Division, G-4, which were then responsible for Army transportation. Since the sites to be leased from the British were not developed, considerable new construction would be necessary, involving sizable shipments of men and materials. The Army Transport Service, the branch of the Quartermaster Corps then operating a small fleet of troop and cargo vessels, embraced barely enough ships to meet the requirements of the prewar offshore bases. After a study of shipping needs, undertaken immediately after news of the destroyers-for-bases transaction broke, The Quartermaster General took steps, in collaboration with the U.S. Maritime Commission, to increase the transport fleet.2
Although original plans for these newly acquired bases were later scaled down, their development, as well as the build-up
of Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal, remained an important defense project throughout 1941. During that year, moreover, the defensive screen was pushed farther eastward to embrace Greenland and Iceland, and arrangements were made for the establishment of a number of air and meteorological stations in northeastern Canada.
A brief survey of the transportation problems involved in establishing and maintaining these bases is a proper prelude to the discussion of the more formidable problems encountered after the United States entered the war. Numerous other bases scattered across the Atlantic, among them Bermuda, the Azores, and Ascension Island, each had its place in the conduct of the war, but did not involve sufficiently distinct transportation problems to warrant further mention here.
The North Atlantic Bases
The island of Newfoundland lies on the great circle route between New York and the British Isles, shielding the mouth of the St. Lawrence and jutting into the North Atlantic. Because of its strategic location, this island outpost was accorded a high priority for development as an American air and naval base.3 Following a survey of the island’s potentialities in September 1940, a board of experts appointed by the President recommended three sites for development. Army installations later established at these locations were Harmon Field, at Stephenville, Fort Pepperrell, near St. John’s, and Fort McAndrew, in the vicinity of Argentia.
Shipment of the first U.S. Army contingent to Newfoundland, originally scheduled for mid-November 1940, was delayed, principally because of the necessity of finding and preparing a ship suitable to transport the troops and quarter them until housing could be provided ashore. After undergoing repair and modification, the Edmund B. Alexander finally sailed from the Brooklyn Army Base on 15 January 1941 with 59 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 921 enlisted men.4 After four days at anchor outside St. John’s harbor waiting for a heavy snowstorm and a strong gale to subside, the vessel finally docked on the 29th at a small leased wharf. Upon arrival, Col. Maurice D. Welty, commander of the troops, also took over as Superintendent, Army Transport Service. The troops were housed on board until May 1941 and then moved ashore. Additional shipments arriving after that date brought U.S. Army strength to almost 2,400 by the close of the year.
These troop movements, coupled with the steady flow of supplies and equipment for the garrison and for base construction, placed a heavy burden on the island’s transportation means. The leased dock and other port facilities at St. John’s were inadequate. Argentia, the other available port, was developed as a naval base, and therefore its use by the Army was restricted. The principal means of clearance from the ports to Army stations and to the main airport at Gander was the government-owned Newfoundland Railway. This narrow-gauge railroad was of small
capacity, its rolling stock was old and in poor condition, and heavy snowstorms from January to April often hampered the operation of trains. The few roads that existed were unimproved and could only be used for local movements.
Under the circumstances the Army had to take measures to improve transportation facilities. The base construction program called for replacing the leased wharf at St. John’s with a permanent concrete dock equipped with two heavy-lift cranes. Work on this project was begun in August 1941. To supply Harmon Field with gasoline and oil a pipeline was extended into Bay St. George for direct discharge from tankers anchored offshore. Considerable American financial assistance and a modest amount of equipment were furnished for the rehabilitation of the railway, some new road construction was undertaken, and a temporary pier was erected at Argentia.
Pending completion of these projects, the volume of inbound traffic inevitably exceeded the capacity of the local transportation system. Port congestion, already evident at St. John’s in September 1941, remained a problem throughout the ensuing fall and winter months. Limited port and rail facilities, together with snow, gales, and fogs, delayed cargo discharge and clearance and compelled many vessels to wait for a berth. Unsatisfactory conditions for cargo discharge contributed to the congestion at the port.5 Vessels with cargo requiring heavy lift equipment initially had to be lightened and moved across the harbor to the large crane at the Newfoundland Railway docks. Action to solve this problem was taken in June 1941, when G-4 requested that wherever possible ships employed on the Newfoundland run be not over 25-foot draft and authorized the purchase of two 500-horsepower tugs for use at St. John’s.6
More persistent were the difficulties with local longshoremen, who did their work in a leisurely fashion and in one instance, upon discovering they were handling explosives, went on strike for higher wages in the midst of discharging a vessel. By late October 1941, refusal of the longshoremen’s union to permit port operations for more than ten hours a day had so delayed cargo discharge as to hinder the local construction program, leading the Secretary of War to request American representation to the British Embassy and the Newfoundland Government regarding the urgent need of full-time operation at the Newfoundland ports.7
The difficulty in unloading and clearing cargo at St. John’s caused The Quartermaster General in January 1942 to question the wisdom of completing the new American dock at the eastern end of the harbor away from the railway yards, and led him to urge the Corps of Engineers to develop a secondary port at Argentia.8 But the crisis was already passing. Although U.S. Army ground and air strength continued to grow, reaching a peak of about 10,500 troops in June 1943, curtailment of the construction program beginning early in 1942 brought a general reduction in shipping requirements.
The problem of port capacity was
definitely eased in February 1943, when operations began at the new U.S. Army dock at St. John’s. Finally completed on 15 March, the 605-foot dock and wooden transit shed proved adequate for the reduced traffic, and two new electrically operated gantry cranes, each with a capacity of thirty tons, added to the efficiency of operations. By this time construction was drawing to a close, and existing port and rail facilities were fully capable of handling the maintenance of a fairly static garrison and the delivery of aviation gasoline and other operating requirements to the airfields. Newfoundland remained an important. U.S. air and naval base, with St. John’s as the principal Army port.
The Crimson and Crystal Bases
U.S. Army transportation activity in northeastern Canada was a direct outgrowth of the development of the air ferry route to the United Kingdom. The British and Canadians in late 1940 had begun to ferry bombers directly across the Atlantic from Gander, Newfoundland, to Prestwick, Scotland, a nonstop flight of about 2,100 miles. Despite impressive results, the route had serious shortcomings. The weather was often hazardous, and the distance from Newfoundland to Scotland was too great for short-range aircraft. The inauguration of the lend-lease program in March 1941 pointed up the need for a more northerly air ferry route that would take advantage of the steppingstones to Britain afforded by Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland.9
At the War Department’s direction, surveys of possible landing fields in Labrador and on Baffin Island were made during June and July 1941. Four sites were selected, but since ice and snow would seal off the area before any major construction could be completed in that year, it was suggested that they be manned and equipped as weather stations. On the basis of this recommendation, arctic weather stations were established at Fort Chimo, (CRYSTAL I), Labrador, at the upper end of Frobisher Bay (CRYSTAL II), and on Padloping Island (CRYSTAL III), off the northeast coast of Baffin Island. The CRYSTAL movement, involving shipment from Boston of a small detachment for each station, arctic housing, technical equipment for communications and weather service, aviation gasoline, and food and fuel reserves, was effected in the fall of 1941 by the USAT Sicilien, five trawlers, and three small Norwegian vessels added to the fleet during a stop at Halifax.
The movement, begun on 21 September 1941, was made over a long and hazardous route and presented a number of unusual problems. Since the CRYSTAL stations were accessible only to comparatively small vessels, it was necessary to transfer the Sicilien’s cargo to the other ships for final delivery. This was partially accomplished at Halifax and was completed at Port Burwell Harbor, the rendezvous near CRYSTAL I from which the final runs were made. Because of ice and snow, tides up to forty-two feet, and unsatisfactory charts and soundings, the utmost caution had to be exercised. At each base the same procedure was followed. Spurred on by extra pay, the seamen turned to and assisted in cargo
discharge. Eskimos helped as pilots and laborers. After cargo was lightered ashore, a small engineer detachment erected prefabricated housing, installed communications equipment and weather-recording apparatus, and laid in supplies and fuel for the radio and weather men assigned to maintain a lonely vigil through the long winter months. By late November the expedition had left the area, having successfully carried out a difficult assignment under discouraging conditions.10
U.S. Army operations in northeastern Canada received fresh impetus when the air ferry program underwent rapid expansion following the entry of the United States into the war. The main route under development, extending from Presque Isle, Maine, via Labrador, Greenland, Iceland, to Prestwick, Scotland, involved a long hop from Goose Bay, Labrador, to Narsarssuak, Greenland. To facilitate the rapid delivery of long-range and short-range aircraft to the British Isles, the United States and Canada in the summer of 1942 joined in a cooperative venture, the CRIMSON Project, designed to set up in central and northeastern Canada a series of airfields, 400 to 500 miles apart, situated along alternate routes to permit a choice of landing fields in the event of bad weather.11
To provide for the movement of the men and materials necessary for construction of the CRIMSON bases in the Hudson Bay area, the War Department established a port operation on the bay at Churchill in Manitoba. Originally developed for the export of Canadian wheat, Churchill was linked with The Pas, the nearest inland settlement of any size, by a standard-gauge single-track rail line, approximately 510 miles long. The port’s water-front facilities included an 1,800-foot wharf and
a large storage shed, both served by rail; equipment for loading and unloading ships and rail cars with grain and general cargo; and a marine repair yard. Ships of 28-foot draft could be berthed at all stages of the tide. The port was accessible to ocean-going vessels from the latter part of July to mid-October; thereafter, high winds, heavy snow, ice, and sub-zero temperatures halted port operations.12
U.S. Army marine activity at Churchill got under way after a hasty survey in mid-June 1942 by Paul C. Grening, a former sea captain then serving as a civilian consultant in the Office of the Chief of Transportation. Early in July port personnel were selected, and by arrangement with Canadian transportation officials all railway facilities and dock equipment at Churchill were placed at the U.S. Army’s disposal, as were all Canadian craft in the Hudson Bay area.13 Preceded by the
389th Port Battalion and a small group of civilians experienced in cargo handling, the recently activated 12th Port, commanded by Lt. Col. (later Col.) Curtis A. Noble, arrived by rail at Churchill on 19 July. With the assistance of the civilian component, the port troops operated at Churchill during the brief open season, receiving shipments by rail from the south and outloading them on vessels for delivery to air bases then under construction in the Hudson Bay area.14
By the end of the shipping season, a total of 626 passengers and 25,310 weight tons had been shipped. The bulk of the cargo was moved to Southampton Island, Fort Chimo, and upper Frobisher Bay, with small tonnages going to various weather stations. Deliveries to these bases were hampered by the hazardous waters and adverse weather of the Hudson Bay area and the necessity of lightering all cargo from ship to shore at destination. Altogether, it was a small and costly operation involving twenty vessels. Colonel Noble and his men returned to the United States in November 1942, leaving behind at Churchill 115 carloads of Engineer and Signal Corps supplies that had arrived too late for shipment.
Despite planning in the Office of the Chief of Transportation at Washington, U.S. Army port operations were never resumed at Churchill. Instead, the installations in the Hudson Bay area were supplied directly by water from Boston.15 The utility of Churchill was severely limited because of the port’s brief open season and the long rail haul from its source of supply. More important, the Hudson Bay routes that it served proved of limited wartime value. This resulted from the fact that increasingly large numbers of assembled aircraft were being delivered to the United Kingdom as deckloads on tankers and Liberty ships, while improved facilities at air bases, advances in aircraft range and dependability, and better weather data made possible increasingly heavy movement of airplanes over the main ferry routes through Labrador and Newfoundland without recourse to additional steppingstones in northeastern Canada.16
Greenland
A huge island lying northeast of Labrador, Greenland formed a vital part of the protective screen shielding the east coast of North America and became an important way station on the North Atlantic air route. A country of ice, snow, and cold, the rugged coast with its deeply indented fjords offered magnificent scenery but almost no port facilities. For much of the year ice blocked the approaches from the sea, and ice floes were a serious hazard for all shipping. The mining town of Ivigtut, the most developed settlement, had the only road in Greenland, stretching about two miles back from a small artificial harbor with a single pier for loading cryolite, a mineral used in the production of aluminum.
While preliminary inspections by the U.S. Army and Navy of several possible
sites for airfields and other military installations were underway, U.S. and Greenland authorities on 9 April 1941 entered into a joint agreement granting the United States the right to locate and construct landing fields and other installations for the defense of Greenland and the North American continent. Because of the short working season, the lack of construction materials, and the dearth of facilities for the discharge of ships, the project was bound to be difficult. All food, supplies, and equipment for American use would have to be imported.17
By late April 1941 Narsarssuak, in the southernmost part of Greenland on the Tunugdliarfik Fjord, had been chosen as the site for first air base. Conveniently located about midway between Goose Bay, Labrador, and Reykjavik, Iceland, Narsarssuak could be reached from either point by a hop of about 775 miles. It naturally became the destination of the first military force shipped to Greenland from the United States.18 Selected to perform initial construction and defense, this force was built around a battalion of aviation engineers and an antiaircraft battery. The Corps of Engineers, which was responsible for the construction program, made the heaviest demands on shipping.
After considerable delay in readying one of the two Army transports assigned to lift the expedition and its equipment, a force of 23 officers and 446 enlisted men, accompanied by 2,565 long tons of cargo, sailed under naval escort from New York on 19 June 1941. The convoy proceeded to Ivigtut, where it picked up several pilots, and on 6 July dropped anchor at Narsarssuak near the site of the projected air base. Cargo discharge, begun on the following day, was a slow and difficult task. Everything had to be lifted by ship’s gear into lighters, of which there were too few; the tidal range of ten to twelve feet hampered the unloading of lighters; floating ice was a frequent hazard; and anchorage was a problem because of poor holding ground and limited space for maneuvering. All troops had to assist in cargo discharge, with a resultant adverse effect on the construction program. It was August before the two vessels completed discharge. Meanwhile, work on the air base had begun.19
At Narsarssuak initial construction by military personnel ended in late September 1941, when the contractor’s force arrived. About the same time another group of civilian construction workers began work on a second air base at Sondre Stromfjord. There also unloading cargo by lighter proved a long and difficult process. As soon as possible a temporary dock was built where lighters could be moored for discharge. Movement ashore was hampered because only five trucks had arrived in the first convoy. A third air installation was established at Ikateq, near Angmagssalik on the east coast.20
Except for a few Navy facilities, military installations on Greenland were designed for the furtherance of the North Atlantic air ferry route. Because of the emphasis on air, an Air Corps officer, Col. Benjamin F. Giles, was designated as the first commanding officer of the Greenland
Base Command, which was established in the fall of 1941.21
Cargo shipments to Greenland were modest in 1941, but with America’s entry into the war there was a fairly heavy movement of materials from the United States, totaling 194,700 measurement tons during 1942. The main categories were construction materials, equipment, and supplies for the Corps of Engineers and its contractors, gasoline and lubricants for the Air Forces, and subsistence and other maintenance supplies for the garrisons.22
Considerable difficulty was experienced during 1941 and 1942 in maintaining a balanced flow of supplies to Greenland. Since no regular American steamship service to Greenland existed in the summer of 1941, the Corps of Engineers chartered several small freighters to meet its shipping needs. The North Atlantic Division of the Corps of Engineers, which was directly responsible for construction in Greenland, established its own base at Claremont Terminal, Jersey City, New Jersey, where supplies and equipment were assembled, stored, and segregated according to priority of shipment.23 The arrangement proved unsatisfactory, for the port commander at Boston found that ships for Greenland arrived from New York so heavily loaded with Engineer items that little or no space remained to lift other cargo accumulated at his installation.
The Greenland Base Command reported that its supply situation was unsatisfactory because insufficient shipping space had been allotted to supplies needed for maintenance and operation, as distinguished from construction. After conferences in June and July 1942, involving representatives of the Greenland Base Command, the Chief of Engineers, and the Chief of Transportation, it was decided to assign all shipping available for the supply of the Greenland bases to the Boston Port of Embarkation and to make that port responsible for allocating shipping space in accordance with priorities set by the Greenland Base Command. Also the Corps of Engineers agreed to transfer its activity from the Claremont Terminal to Boston. By mid-December 1942 the supply difficulties had been overcome.24
While a solution was being worked out for the shipping and supply situation, the Greenland Base Command was grappling with the local transportation problem. During the first year service personnel and means for cargo handling were extremely limited; enforced reliance upon lighterage and the handicaps imposed by the high tides slowed cargo operations; and, because of the limited navigation season, freighters tended to bunch in Greenland waters awaiting discharge and convoy arrangements.
Efforts by the Army to deal with this situation were devoted first to the improvement of port facilities. At Narsarssuak, which became the chief U.S. Army port of the command, the need of a dock was first met by building a temporary structure about 150 feet long. Later, a small sheltered cove was selected as the site of a more permanent dock. Construction, begun in February 1942, featured wooden cribs filled with rocks to form a 448-foot marginal wharf. When this dock was finished as many as three small ships could be discharged simultaneously. Warehouses, oil and water pipelines,
harbor craft, and crash boats also were provided.
Improvements at other ports were more modest. At Ivigtut, aside from the local facilities for loading cryolite, the U.S. Navy had a rock-filled crib dock used principally by Coast Guard vessels and tankers, and the Army had two small crib docks suitable only for barges. At Sondre Stromfjord the Army had a 106-foot oil dock, as well as a 140-foot cargo dock. Both were temporary structures built to accommodate barges, as was also the small crib dock at Ikateq.25
As port construction moved forward, steps were taken to relieve the shortage of port personnel, which had necessitated the employment of inexperienced troop labor and civilian construction workers. In an unusual but costly effort to cope with this situation, the Chief of Transportation recruited thirty-two experienced longshoremen in Baltimore and Philadelphia. This group worked in Greenland from mid-October to late December 1942, and in that short period reduced appreciably the amount of undischarged cargo.26 More permanent relief followed the arrival in 1943 of the 194th Port Company, organized and trained especially for work at the Greenland bases. The men of the 194th were distributed in detachments among the various bases. At Narsarssuak, where the load was greatest, they had to be supplemented with other troops.
By the fall of 1943 transportation difficulties in Greenland were no longer acute. With the completion of major construction, the volume of inbound cargo declined sharply. The new main dock at Narsarssuak, equipped with crawler cranes of 20-ton capacity, proved satisfactory, and transportation personnel stationed there were reported to be capable and efficient. Although Greenland remained important as a link in the air route to the United Kingdom, by the summer of 1944 the transportation tasks had become largely routine.27
In June 1945, the port organizations at Sondre Stromfjord, Ivigtut, and Angmagssalik were closing out, and all transportation activity was being concentrated at Narsarssuak. Personnel were redeployed, except for those left at each base to crate and load the material to be shipped to Narsarssuak. There, excess equipment was either sold to the Danish Government or returned to the United States.28
Iceland
Iceland, like Greenland, attracted the attention of the United States many months before Pearl Harbor. The British occupation of the island in May 1940 had been rather reluctantly accepted by the Icelandic Government. Believing that Iceland could be protected without this physical occupation, the latter made exploratory proposals to the United States concerning Iceland’s inclusion within the orbit of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States at first took no official action on the overtures, but eventually changed its
attitude. By the spring of 1941 the worsening war situation made the British Government anxious to release its occupation troops for use elsewhere. This could be done if the United States immediately took over responsibility for the defense of the island, a commitment the United States had recently agreed to in the event it entered the war. In June, with British encouragement, the Icelandic Government issued an eleventh-hour invitation to the United States. The first American garrison, a provisional Marine brigade, reached Reykjavik early in July 1941.29
The defense of the Americas was strengthened and the antisubmarine campaign aided by developing Iceland as an important base along the North Atlantic air and sea lanes to the United Kingdom. As in the case of Greenland, Iceland was unable to provide construction materials or to support the occupation forces. Supplies and equipment therefore had to be imported, a task involving the assignment of scarce shipping to another extremely hazardous route.
Reykjavik, the capital and principal port of Iceland, lay on the southwest coast. Protected by two breakwaters, its small inner harbor—roughly sixteen feet at low tide—could accommodate only vessels of moderate draft. Of the several quays, the best was a 525-foot marginal wharf known as the Main Quay. The second largest port, Akureyri, on the northern coast, had only a few small docks. On the east coast were the tiny fishing ports of Búdhareyri and Seydisfjordur. The absence of any road traversing the island was a serious handicap to transportation, making coastwise traffic mandatory. Fortunately, the British had chartered a number of “drifters,” which were Icelandic fishing vessels ranging from 75 to 150 feet long.30
Even before the first U.S. contingent arrived in Iceland, it became evident that inadequate port facilities and meager housing would make it necessary to effect American occupation by stages. In order to determine discharge possibilities as well as to prepare the way for an Army garrison, the War Department, late in June 1941, ordered Maj. (later Col.) Richard S. Whitcomb and Lt. Col. Clarence N. Iry to Iceland, the former to look into the transportation aspects and the latter the engineering problems.31 Traveling by air, Whitcomb and Iry arrived at Reykjavik on 4 July. After consultation with British and Icelandic officials, Whitcomb concluded that the basic transportation requirements of the forces to be sent to Iceland would be one port battalion and one truck battalion, a small passenger and freight vessel, three tugs, an oil barge, a water boat, a cabin cruiser, and a floating derrick of 75-ton capacity.32 These requirements were met only in part and very slowly.
Approximately 4,100 strong, the marines, commanded by Brig. Gen. John Marston, reached Iceland on 7 July 1941 aboard four troop transports, accompanied by two cargo ships, a tanker, a tug, and naval escort vessels. Having arrived in advance of the Marine contingent, Whitcomb was able to make helpful preliminary arrangements with the British and the Icelanders. The two freighters were unloaded at the quays, with their own gear. Discharge of the transports,
which drew too much water for the inner harbor, was begun from anchorage in the outer roadstead on 8 July and completed three days later. Aided by long hours of daylight and surprisingly good weather, the marines worked continuously, unloading supplies and equipment into tank lighters, landing boats, and nondescript local craft for delivery to the docks or to a nearby beach, where British trucks waited for the last move to camps and dumps. Although the harbor was crowded and the port facilities poor, the energetic marines were soon ashore and settled in their new island quarters.33
The Americans added to the growing wartime burden on Reykjavik. Iceland depended heavily upon imports, and its needs, together with those of the British and American forces, had to be met almost entirely by ocean traffic through that port. The convoy system frequently crowded several ships into the harbor at one time, and prompt cargo discharge was essential to prevent undue delay in vessel turnaround. Under these circumstances coordination of harbor activities and a program for expanding the port’s facilities proved necessary.
Preliminary negotiations, undertaken early in July between Whitcomb and the local harbormaster, culminated in a formal agreement on 19 August 1941 between U.S. representatives at Reykjavik and the port authority there. In return for a first priority on the use of the Main Quay and contingent priorities covering two other quays, the Americans agreed to effect various repairs and improvements in the inner harbor, including the construction of a new East Quay to join the Main Quay and the Coal Quay so as to add approximately 1,000 feet of marginal wharf for American ships. The agreement also provided for building a new transit shed. The United States was to defray all costs, but the port authority was to carry out the work.34
While the projected harbor improvements were still under discussion, the first U.S. Army contingent reached Iceland. Consisting of 1,226 officers and enlisted men—mainly Air Forces personnel—it arrived on 6 August 1941 aboard three ships. Of these, the Army transport American Legion encountered the greatest difficulty. Because her draft would not permit berthing in the inner harbor, the vessel had to be discharged at anchor into tank lighters and motor launches. Moreover, Company B of the 392nd Port Battalion, which arrived on the vessel, was untrained and inexperienced. This unit and other Army troops assigned to the discharge operation functioned so inexpertly that they had to be replaced by marines.35 The second ship, the Mizar, was unloaded without incident, but the third, the Almaack, lacked proper cargo gear and was loaded in such a way as to make discharge difficult. Because of these handicaps, the fast turnaround U.S. Navy desired for this convoy was not attained.36
Amid atrocious weather, a second U.S. Army contingent, 5,058 personnel, reached Iceland on 16 September 1941 in a heavily escorted convoy of ten vessels. Among the passengers were nine civilians experienced in marine operations and a small amount of port equipment, but no
port troops. Although Whitcomb had arranged for a small freighter and a number of drifters to effect the discharge, the naval officer in command, desiring a quick turnaround, decided instead to use open tank lighters and landing boats to remove the packaged cargo. Exposed to rain and spray during ship-to-shore delivery, the cardboard containers soon fell apart, leaving the contents a ready prey to pilferers. Aside from indicating need for better understanding between the Army and Navy, this incident pointed to a serious deficiency in Army packaging methods—a deficiency that was not corrected until long after Pearl Harbor.
With the second Army contingent came Maj. Gen. Charles H. Bonesteel, who assumed command of all American forces on the island, including the marines. Under General Bonesteel, Major Whitcomb became Assistant Superintendent, Army Transport Service (ATS). To carry out his task Whitcomb had only one port company, a handful of experienced civilians, and a few pieces of floating equipment. At the same time, port activity in general was placed under the quartermaster of the newly created Iceland Base Command. Because of the shortage of port troops, Bonesteel assigned the task of unloading vessels to the 10th Infantry Regiment, the port company to provide technical and supervisory assistance and to operate all cranes, tractors, and tow-motors.37
Although no better solution was at hand, neither the Assistant Superintendent, ATS, nor the 10th Infantry Regiment were happy about this arrangement. The infantrymen had no desire to be longshoremen, and Whitcomb would have preferred additional service troops. At first there were only four cranes (two of 6-ton and two of 4-ton capacity) and eight tractors for dock work. Motor transport was usually in short supply, and the narrow streets of Reykjavik and poor roads leading to depots and camps added to the operational difficulties. As 1941 drew to an end, daylight hours were limited and winter storms often halted cargo operations. Under these conditions, more and more ships awaiting discharge accumulated at Reykjavik.38
The unsatisfactory port and shipping situation persisted well into 1942. The Army, which in January took over from the Navy complete responsibility for the supply of U.S. forces in Iceland, was irked by the growing backlog of its supplies awaiting shipment at New York. Since the Army Transport Service lacked vessels for assignment to this run and was unable to obtain additional ships from the Maritime Commission, the Navy was requested to provide shipping to lift the backlog. The Navy, however, maintained that the assignment of more vessels to the Iceland service could not be justified unless ships’ turnaround time was improved.39
Neither service was pleased with arrangements for cargo discharge at Reykjavik. The combination of winter weather, insufficient port personnel, and inadequate shore facilities were obvious causes of the difficulty. Early in March 1942 the War Department directed the Iceland Base Command to take corrective action regarding the delay of ships at Reykjavik, and in the following month it dispatched
two civilian specialists, Paul C. Grening and Clifford S. White, to Iceland.
By this time improvement was under way, for the arrival in late January of additional port personnel and the adoption in February of the practice of discharging ships on a twenty-four hour basis were already reducing turnaround time. The visit of the two specialists proved beneficial, however, in pointing up the need for additional troops, trucks, floating equipment, and berthing space, and through their efforts the port later received several small harbor boats and a number of heavy cranes.40
The port difficulties at Reykjavik were part of the growing pains of the Iceland Base Command. Troop and cargo traffic was heavy in 1942, for as Army forces arrived, the Marines and the British garrison moved out. The same ships that delivered American replacements picked up the British and their equipment and carried them to the United Kingdom. The expanding U.S. garrison called for sizable shipments of Army cargo, which in April 1942 amounted to 55,991 measurement tons.41
While these changes were taking place, the port organization was growing. Early in March 1942 it was augmented by twenty-nine enlisted men, from a Quartermaster shoe repair company, who with training eventually formed a nucleus for a port headquarters. In August two more port companies arrived. One was assigned to Reykjavik and the other distributed among the outports at Akureyri, Seydisfjordur, and Búdhareyri. Of these out-ports, taken over from the British in August and September 1942, the most important was Akureyri. All three unloaded transatlantic cargo vessels and trans shipped freight and personnel by coastwise steamship and drifter to the numerous Army outposts around the island.
Completion of the new transit shed at Reykjavik in late 1942 gave the port adequate quarters to store and sort cargo and to house and repair port equipment. Improved harbor facilities and the acquisition of additional port equipment, including two much-needed 45-ton cranes and a small fleet of harbor craft, at last put the port organization in position to meet all anticipated demands.42
Meanwhile, in line with the precedent already set in the zone of interior by the creation of a separate Transportation Corps, Army transportation activities were removed from the base quartermaster’s jurisdiction on 1 September 1942. This eliminated from the transportation picture the base quartermaster, who had not always seen eye to eye with the Army Transport Service superintendent on the management of the port. There was still no port headquarters, although a table of organization had been proposed. The proposal had to pass through the Iceland Base Command, European theater headquarters, and the War Department, and at one point it appeared to have been lost in the shuffle. The required approval was finally given, and in May 1943 the 18th Port was activated in Iceland, with an authorized strength of 38 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 455 enlisted men drawn from port personnel already there. Whitcomb, who was soon to be made a full colonel, was
named Port Commander as well as Superintendent, Army Transport Service.43
Ironically, when the port organization finally took shape, the Iceland Base Command was already in the process of reduction. After June 1943 monthly shipments of U.S. Army cargo from the United States to Iceland were modest since the base had reached its maximum development. At the same time, outloadings of men and surplus materiel to the United Kingdom assumed sizable proportions, and by the close of the year more U.S. Army cargo was being removed from Iceland than was being received.
By the late fall of 1943 the reduction of the command had progressed to a point where the port organization could be drastically scaled down. On 30 October Whitcomb ended his tour of duty in Iceland. The four transports that carried Colonel Whitcomb and most of the officers of the 18th Port to the United Kingdom took a total of 515 officers and 8,869 enlisted men from the Iceland Base Command. On 29 December 1943 the 18th Port was disbanded, and the personnel that stayed on formed the Port Section of the Iceland Base Command. Diminishing activity and continuing reductions in transportation personnel in Iceland characterized the remainder of the wartime period there.44
The Caribbean Bases
While developments were taking place in northeastern Canada and the North Atlantic, the strengthening of old bases and the construction of new ones in the Caribbean area were being pressed. Within the Caribbean Defense Command, established during 1941, were located not only the Panama Canal, Puerto Rico, and the West Indian bases acquired in the bases-for-destroyers deal of September 1940, but also such valuable resources as the bauxite mines in Surinam and the oil refineries of Curacao and Aruba.45 Some of the Caribbean bases also provided landing fields for the air ferry route between the United States and West Africa.46
Puerto Rico
Puerto Rico, the oldest American Caribbean outpost, was strengthened beginning in 1939. Transportation problems were few during the first year. By mid-1940 all water transportation activities in the Puerto Rican Department were under the jurisdiction of the department quartermaster.47 At San Juan, the capital and for many years a regular port of call of the Army Transport Service, port operations were supervised by two officers and two enlisted men. All cargo was loaded and discharged on a contract basis at a small, leased pier.
Rail service was provided by a coastal line from San Juan, operated by the American Railroad Company, and a number of others run by local sugar companies. Despite mountainous terrain, the island possessed a good highway network, extending in checkerboard fashion from east to west and north to south.
The situation began to change in the latter half of 1940, when additional troops were sent to Puerto Rico and the new American garrisons in St. Thomas, St. Croix, and Antigua placed under the Puerto Rican Department for administration and supply. The increased traffic soon overburdened the port’s personnel and facilities. By the end of 1941 it had been necessary to add fifty-eight civilians, including a marine superintendent, to the small military staff. Work on a modern terminal for Army use was begun in August 1941 on a site adjacent to the Puerto Rican General Depot at Fort Buchanan, and was completed in September 1942. It included a 600-foot concrete pier, a 500-foot transit shed, fuel and water lines, and rail connections with the Puerto Rican General Depot.
The volume of military cargo delivered at San Juan grew from 88,087 measurement tons in 1941 to 141,135 measurement tons in 1942. Shipments from San Juan to U.S. contingents on neighboring islands, extending as far eastward as Antigua and ultimately including both Jamaica and Cuba, also increased.48 Beginning with one harbor boat, the Puerto Rican Department gradually assembled a sizable local fleet of interisland transports and harbor craft.49
The completion in 1942 of major construction at Borinquen Field and the opening of the new Army terminal eased the transportation task. The burden was further lightened when arrangements were made to coordinate Army, Navy, and Air Forces movements to and from the area. Briefly, the U.S. Navy employed its refrigerated vessels to deliver perishables for all U.S. forces. The Army moved all other supplies to San Juan and was responsible for interisland distribution from that port. Both services used their ships to return military personnel and cargo to the zone of interior. Wherever possible, the Army Air Forces (AAF) and the Navy carried passengers on northbound planes to Miami, Florida.50 The hazard of water communications with Puerto Rico was lessened when the heavy concentration of U-boats in the Atlantic caused a reduction of their activity in the Caribbean in the latter part of the year.51
In March 1943 Transportation Corps observers found operations proceeding smoothly. Transportation activities were being directed by a small staff under Col. William H. Sadler, who had been appointed department transportation officer in late August 1942. Colonel Sadler’s duties included general supervision of all water and rail transport, liaison with the Navy and AAF regarding transportation matters, and technical supervision of all transportation officers in the Puerto Rican Sector. Sadler also headed the port of San
Juan, which had an authorized strength of five officers, two warrant officers, and nine enlisted men.52
Port activity remained significant throughout 1943, and in that year Army cargo landed at San Juan totaled 140,339 measurement tons.53 Following the acquisition of additional cargo-handling equipment and harbor craft at the new Army terminal, all ordinary demands could be met. Cargo discharge was accomplished by contract stevedores and extensive use was made of competent civilians at the various transportation offices and the port of San Juan. The interisland transports and harbor craft were manned by civilian crews. There were occasional labor shortages and work stoppages, but none delayed the working of Army vessels.
On 1 June 1943 the Puerto Rican Department was redesignated the Antilles Department and the latter’s jurisdiction was extended to cover the areas formerly encompassed by the Puerto Rican and Trinidad Sectors. Under this arrangement, the transportation officer at San Juan became the Antilles Department transportation officer, and his authority was extended to include supervision of U.S. Army transportation activities in the expanded area under the jurisdiction of the new department.54 However, the previously independent transportation organization of the Trinidad Sector and Base Command was allowed considerable freedom in its operation because of its distance from departmental headquarters. Aside from Cuba and Jamaica, which were supplied directly from the zone of the interior after transshipment via San Juan proved time consuming and wasteful, the outposts in the Antilles Department continued to be supplied from Puerto Rico and Trinidad.55
Rotation or return of military personnel to the United States was initiated in the Antilles Department in mid-September 1943. The progressive reduction of the command’s strength during the last half of the year was reflected in increased passenger traffic at San Juan. Temporarily, these movements proved burdensome, but in the long run the reduced strength of the command resulted in a lessening transportation activity.
The frequent irregularity and almost prohibitive cost of water transport to the more remote points in the Antilles Department led to considerable dependence on air traffic. Puerto Rico, Trinidad, British Guiana, and Cuba had the advantage of being located on routes served by the Air Transport Command. Regularly scheduled flights were also made by the 330th Transport Squadron to practically every base in the area, and special flights were arranged when emergencies arose. In mid-February 1944 the transportation officer of the Antilles Department gained control of all air space assigned to the command, and received authority to arrange for any air space that could be secured from other sources such as the Air Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service.56
Puerto Rico remained an important base throughout the war. It presented none of the unusual transportation problems that characterized the operations at the North Atlantic bases.
Trinidad
Situated 574 nautical miles southeast of San Juan, Trinidad had valuable oil and asphalt resources and was an important transshipment point for bauxite. Because of its strategic location, the island was also a focal point on the established air and shipping routes between the United States, South America, and West Africa. With the arrival at Port-of-Spain on 5 May 1941 of a U.S. Army force of 60 officers, 995 enlisted men, and 10 civilians, Trinidad became the site of garrison and airfield construction and the supply base for American contingents on outlying islands.57
Although the excellent harbor at Port-of-Spain had to be dredged periodically, it afforded well sheltered, safe anchorage at all seasons. Vessels drawing up to thirty feet could be berthed at King’s Wharf, a facility equipped with lighterage and possessing direct rail connections. Adjacent to King’s Wharf was Docksite, a largely undeveloped, muddy area of about twenty-eight acres extending along the Gulf of Paria for approximately 3,000 feet. Set aside for American use, Docksite was later enlarged to encompass 183 acres, and in time a new Army wharf, a large general depot, warehouses, repair shops, and other facilities were constructed there. In addition to Docksite, the principal installations erected on Trinidad were the Army base at Fort Read and the adjoining Waller Field. A run-down railway connected Fort Read and Port-of-Spain, and ultimately both these points were joined by the Churchill-Roosevelt Highway.58
From the outset the Americans in Trinidad had to furnish considerable local as well as interisland transport. Hundreds of laborers had to be moved daily by boat, truck, and train to and from construction projects. As the supply and transshipment point for all American installations within a radius of approximately 500 nautical miles, Trinidad depended almost exclusively upon water transport to deliver personnel, supplies, and equipment to outlying islands, including St. Lucia, the Dutch islands of Curacao and Aruba, and British and Dutch Guiana.59 In order to accomplish this mission, the Army gradually acquired, operated, and maintained a local fleet of interisland transports, tugs, barges, and other craft.60
Port congestion began to develop as early as June 1941, and by October of the following year it had become so acute that it aroused deep concern in Washington. Vessels in large numbers crowded into the harbor at Port-of-Spain since it was an important convoy control point for the U.S. Navy as well as the headquarters of an expanding U.S. Army base and supply depot, the transshipment center for
bauxite from the Guianas, and the only port of entry for the busy island of Trinidad. Insufficient storage space, inadequate port facilities, inefficient dock labor, and limited rail and highway transport contributed to an unhealthy situation: ships were immobilized awaiting discharge and port clearance lagged. Drastic action was obviously in order.
On 1 November 1942 a Transportation Corps officer, Col. Werner W. Moore, was appointed port controller and clothed with sweeping powers to relieve port congestion. He immediately requisitioned additional equipment from the zone of interior, requesting in particular the expedited delivery of two 60-ton diesel locomotives, a tanker, six 500-ton cargo barges, and 5,000 cargo pallets. Native dock workers were engaged in maximum numbers for cargo discharge and without regard to the expense of overtime pay. With the cooperation of all concerned, including an advisory port committee, and the temporary assignment of several experienced wharf supervisors imported from New York and Montreal, the congestion was gradually reduced. By the end of 1942 Army cargo ships were being berthed at Port-of-Spain without delay and the turnaround time had shown decided improvement.61
Despite this improvement in the Army operation, the general situation at Port-of-Spain remained unsatisfactory. Having seen at least fifty ships in the harbor while flying over it, General Somervell directed that a qualified officer be detailed at once to investigate. Lt. Col. Benjamin C. Allin was selected by the Chief of Transportation and he, with Capt. Paul C. Grening, visited Trinidad from 26 to 30 January 1943.62
Allin and Grening found that of a total of 72 vessels in the harbor on 19 January 1943, more than a third were transients using the port only to obtain coal, water, and stores. This situation stemmed from the fact that the shallow waterways in the Guianas made it necessary for the large ocean-going vessels that carried bauxite to the United States to take on only partial loads at the mines. The vessels then proceeded to the Chaguaramas terminals near Port-of-Spain, where cargo space was topped off from a stockpile of bauxite assembled there by about thirty smaller shuttle craft, mostly coal burners. At this time, the latter spent an average of 11.6 days in the harbor, a delay caused chiefly by the lack of coal-bunkering facilities. But relief was already in sight since the bauxite quota from the Guianas was to be cut by about 50 percent by obtaining ore from other areas, an additional coal barge equipped with a crane was to be procured for bunkering, and wherever possible the War Shipping Administration was to substitute oil-burning vessels for the coal-burning shuttle craft.
Although the problem of harbor congestion was nearing a solution, the problem of overburdened port and rail facilities remained. The Corps of Engineers had begun building a new Army wharf with berthing space for two ships, but by late January 1943, only the first berth and one transit shed were completed. At Allin’s suggestion, temporary rail connections were installed and immediate use was
made of this berth and shed. Despite the need of additional port personnel, neither Allin nor Grening favored the assignment of a port battalion. The colonial governor, they explained, wanted no Negro troop labor for fear of inciting local unrest, and the commander of the U.S. Army base did not favor using a white battalion alongside the native dock workers. In addition the investigators aided in expediting the delivery of the additional port and rail transportation equipment that had been requested.
In the spring of 1943, with the arrival of new cargo-handling gear, Trinidad had enough port equipment. Rail equipment, including three locomotives and 124 railway cars, arrived and was used on the local government-owned railway. The latter acquisitions improved rail service, although the railroad’s operation continued to be hampered by antiquated equipment and the loss of many of its best workers to better paying military projects. The command also was assigned the USAT Monterey, a 404-foot troop and cargo transport, to be used in the supply of bases in Brazil and on Ascension Island. Completion of the new 1,202-foot Army wharf made possible the complete release of King’s wharf in the summer of 1943.63
A number of transportation problems remained to be solved at Trinidad, as was evident to the two Transportation Corps officers who had taken over Colonel Moore’s duties as port controller and chief of the Base Transportation Division upon his transfer to Washington in January 1943. The Base Transportation Division was subordinate to the General Depot—a holdover from the days when The Quartermaster General was responsible for both depot and transportation activities—and requests for transportation were delayed in passing along the chain of command. The district engineer, who was independent of the Trinidad Sector and Base Command, operated harbor craft, engaged ocean transport, and actually employed more equipment and personnel on the local railway than did the Transportation Corps.64
The Base Transportation Division was divorced from the General Depot on 1 July 1943, and later in the month Colonel Allin took over as chief of transportation for the Trinidad Sector and Base Command of the Antilles Department. Allin recovered the transportation functions that had been performed by the district engineer, but by the close of the year the entire command was already in the process of reduction.65 Beginning in 1944 the U.S. Army tended to concentrate its supply and transportation activities at the permanent Puerto Rican base in San Juan. Incident to this shift the transportation organization and function in Trinidad fell off appreciably in size and scope.66
Redeployment brought a final flurry of activity. Waller Field was selected to service and maintain a fleet of about 260 C-47 airplanes engaged in Green Project, an operation involving the airlift of troops from the European and Mediterranean theaters to the zone of interior. The first
service personnel for this activity reached Trinidad on 29 May 1945. By July, Green Project planes were carrying 30,000 men per month on the last leg of the homeward trek, making 31 trips daily from Natal to Miami, using Waller Field as a service and maintenance depot. After the surrender of Japan this program was curtailed almost as suddenly as it had begun, ending officially on 10 September 1945.67
Panama Canal
The Canal Zone was a permanent part of the prewar American defense system. Among the first U.S. outposts to be reinforced after Hitler advanced on Poland, the Canal Zone was the headquarters of the Panama Canal Department and later became the headquarters of the Caribbean Defense Command. Within this area the primary function of the Army was to protect the Panama Canal so that it could be used at all times by the U.S. Navy. Air defense was contemplated from airfields in the Canal Zone, in Puerto Rico, and in the Caribbean bases acquired from the British. For the United States, in war as in peace, the Panama Canal formed a vital link between the Atlantic and the Pacific.68
In peacetime, the governor of the Panama Canal was responsible for the operation and maintenance of the canal itself, as well as the administration, sanitation, and government of the Canal Zone. The governor was also the president of the Panama Railroad, which ran along the eastern side of the waterway to connect the terminal ports of Cristobal and Balboa. The Panama Railroad Company also operated the Panama Line, whose three ships had been specifically designed for its needs. The governor, by custom a retired Engineer officer, reported directly to the Secretary of War. As an emergency measure, on 5 September 1939, the Canal Zone was placed under the jurisdiction of the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department.69 The latter’s authority over operation of the canal and governmental functions, however, continued to be exercised through the governor.
The port facilities were excellent at both Cristobal and Balboa, but beginning in 1940 a flood of defense projects greatly increased the pressure upon these ports and the local railway. The Third Lock Project was undertaken to provide an additional set of locks and new approach channels for the Panama Canal, and there was extensive construction for the air, ground, and naval forces.70 The Trans-Isthmian (Boyd-Roosevelt) Highway and the Rio Hato link of the Inter-American (Pan-American) Highway further increased the traffic to and within the area. Although the Public Roads Administration was responsible for these two projects, the Army was affected because of the drain upon manpower and materiel, and the added transportation load.71
As a result of these abnormal conditions, congestion at Cristobal was frequent throughout 1941, but it affected the commercial lines rather than the Army Transport Service. Army cargo had priority discharge, and no undue delay was reported despite the scarcity and inefficiency of dock workers. A recommendation that port troops be brought in and utilized was disapproved by the Caribbean Defense Command on the ground that the docks were not under exclusive military jurisdiction. Apart from a housing problem, it was considered undesirable to use U.S. soldiers alongside native dock labor. At the close of 1941, although the situation was not serious, Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Harlan L. Mumma, department quartermaster, still complained of the very inefficient labor and the obsolete equipment of the Panama Railroad Company, which controlled all port facilities and did all stevedoring for the Army in the Canal Zone.72
Movements within the Canal Zone, along the line of the canal, were performed chiefly by the Panama Railroad.73 Air transport was limited to emergency shipments. Motor transport, although restricted by the poor roads and rough terrain, had a significant role. In addition to organic vehicles, the Panama Canal Department depended upon a motorized Quartermaster regiment, which by March 1942 operated an Atlantic and a Pacific motor pool, together with a dispatch pool of staff cars. The tractor-trailer combinations used by this regiment proved valuable at the piers and for large shipments to the Quartermaster subdepot at Rio Hato. The Trans-Isthmian Highway, supplementing the railroad and the canal, permitted rapid movement of troops and supplies by motor transport between Cristobal and Balboa.74
When the United States entered World War II, Army transportation in the Canal Zone, as elsewhere overseas, was a responsibility of the Quartermaster Corps. The creation of the new and separate Transportation Corps on 31 July 1942 brought no immediate change.75 To discharge his transportation responsibilities, on 5 February 1942 the department quartermaster set up an Army Transport Division, which dealt with ocean-going shipping and rail transportation, and an Area Transportation Division, which operated and maintained the smaller ships and harbor craft employed locally to forward troops and supplies to outlying stations. The Army Transport Division relied extensively upon the facilities and personnel of the Panama Canal establishment, with its modern piers and warehouses at Cristobal and Balboa and the Panama Railroad. The Area Transportation Division had no such good fortune, for it had to procure, man, operate, and maintain its own local fleet.76
The primary mission of the Area Transportation Division was to serve U.S.
military installations that could be reached most conveniently by water. Although this organization functioned at both ends of the isthmus, serving numerous isolated airfields, air warning stations, and other installations, its activity centered on the Pacific side where American bases extended from Guatemala as far south as the Galapagos Islands and Peru. The division therefore set up its headquarters at Balboa, where it secured pier, marine repair, and storage facilities.
From a small nucleus of boats already in the Canal Zone, the Area Transportation Division ultimately developed an adequate fleet of shallow-draft freighters, tugs, barges, and other small craft. A number of larger vessels, including tankers, were also acquired to supply the more distant outlying bases. Aside from fifty purse seiners, procured by the Chief of Transportation on the U.S. west coast for the Aircraft Warning Service and delivered to Panama in the spring of 1942, most of the newly acquired vessels were forwarded to the Canal Zone from the New Orleans Port of Embarkation. By 1 June 1942 the Panama Canal Department had 197 harbor boats in operation.77
A greater problem—never completely solved—was the procurement of competent crews. Many of the civilians who delivered the craft from the United States were unwilling to remain, since their families could not be brought to Panama and the pay scale was not attractive. Others stayed a while but left as soon as possible. The local activation in July 1942 of the 160th Quartermaster Boat Company, stationed at Corozal on the Pacific side, afforded some relief. Despite a general lack of seafaring experience, these men developed into competent marine officers after a period of training under licensed personnel.
There were other difficulties. Where separate living quarters could be arranged aboard the vessel, a native crew could be employed under white licensed personnel, but if not, racial friction was a possibility. It was usually desirable that the vessel complement be either entirely military or entirely civilian, since the great disparity in pay made the average soldier disgruntled if he worked alongside civilians. The manning problem was eased in 1943, however, as the construction program began to taper off and new men became available who were willing to remain in Panama rather than return to the United States and risk possible induction.78
was heaviest at the Canal Zone in 1942 when the construction work was greatest. A total of 738,839 measurement tons of Army cargo was received at Cristobal and Balboa during the year, the bulk of it arriving on transports, with minor tonnages carried by commercial vessels.79 Intensive submarine operations in the Gulf of Mexico during the spring and early summer caused the cancellation of numerous sailings from New Orleans, and a congestion of cargo developed at that port. As a result, beginning late in June, all shipments for Panama except perishables were moved through the port of Wilmington, California. While this arrangement, which was in effect until the end of the year, avoided the submarine danger, it was expensive in terms of
transportation because of the longer rail and water hauls involved.80
Monthly deliveries of Army cargo to Cristobal and Balboa reached a peak of 85,286 measurement tons in September 1942. The downward trend of shipments that followed was halted temporarily in the first quarter of 1943, when some additional construction work was undertaken. To meet the unexpectedly heavy demands for transshipment of cargo to the outlying bases, the Area Transportation Division had to charter and borrow additional vessels. But this was only a flurry, for construction was nearing an end, and the command was soon in the process of reduction.81
Like Trinidad, the Canal Zone experienced a brief resurgence of activity occasioned by the redeployment program. During the summer months of 1945 large shipments of troops and cargo en route from Europe to the Pacific passed through in an impressive movement known locally as Operation Transit. The project was placed under the direction of the Deputy Commander, Panama Canal Department, and the department chief of transportation was assigned responsibility for the technical phase, which included servicing, repair, and transit of the ships.
The first redeployed troopship to pass through the Panama Canal was the USS Uruguay, which docked at Cristobal on 20 June 1945 with 4,400 men aboard, direct from Leghorn, Italy. The next day the ship was on her way to the Pacific. The ensuing weeks saw a steady succession of ships in transit. Every possible facility, including religious, USO, Red Cross, and post exchange services, was made available to make the short stay in the Canal Zone pleasant and profitable. The last redeployment vessel, the USS Hawaiian Shipper, arrived on 14 August 1945, just in time for its passengers to get news of the Japanese surrender and to find their destination changed to New York. Altogether, 36 ships passed through the Canal Zone carrying approximately 125,000 troops being redeployed from the European and Mediterranean theaters.82
At the war’s end, the maintenance of the small force assigned to guard the Panama Canal constituted only a minor transportation task. Together with the other Caribbean bases and those in the North Atlantic, Panama had long since become part of a secondary front overshadowed by the European and Pacific theaters.