United States Army in World War II: The War Department
Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Operations
by Mark Skinner Watson
. . . For Those Who Served
Contents
The Influence of Two Decades—The Large Influence of President Roosevelt—The Chief of Staff and Congress—Controlling Decisions on War Policy—Training of the Individual and the Team
Chapter 2: Prewar Sentiment and Its Effect on the Army
Deterioration of the Army Between Wars—A More Realistic Planning Basis—Scant Funds Allowed for New Weapons—The Accepted Policy of Arming Solely for Defense—The Psychological Effect of Repression—The Quest for New Types of Weapons—The 1936 Paradox—a Halt in Research Expenditures—The Air Corps Breaks Through Earlier Restrictions—Protests Against Methods of Fiscal Control—The Chief of Staff and the Research Effort
Chapter 3: The General Staff: Its Origins and Powers
The General Staff’s Changing Pattern—Changes After World War I—The Chief of Staff’s Powers—The Deputies’ Powers—The Secretary of the General Staff—Duties of the Five Assistant Chiefs of Staff—All-Inclusiveness of the Chief of Staff’s Responsibility—How Staff Divisions Functioned—The “Joint Board” of Army and Navy—Was the Prewar Staff Effective?
Chapter 4: Foreign Policy and the Armed Forces
Army Planners’ Advance from Principles of Passive Defense—Secretary Hull Provides the Initiative—A Start at Combined Planning with Britain—Hemisphere Defense a Factor in Rearming—The Role of the Joint Army and Navy board—The Growing Strategic Importance of the Airplane—Revised Interest in Ground Force Development
Chapter 5: Rearming Begins: A Confusion of Aims
The October 1938 Impulse to American Rearming—The Army Begins Revising Its Ordnance Planning—The Momentous White House Meeting of 14 November 1938—The Army Plans a Balanced Development—The Effort to Accomplish Too Many Objectives—The Obstacles to Thorough Planning
Chapter 6: Rearming Gets Under Way
April 1939 Anticipation of War—War Planning in August 1939—The September 1939 Troop Increase: Only 17,000 Men—Restraint in Requests for Funds—Isolation Sentiment Still Strong in Early 1940—Congressional Sentiment Begins a Marked Shift—General Marshall Warns of Further Needs—Plans for a Rapidly Increasing Army—and a Draft—Advance Planning for 4,000,000 Men—Discouraging Discovery of Production barriers
Chapter 7: Troop-Training Problems of 1940
Draft or Volunteers for Prewar Recruitment?—The Regular Army’s Role in Training—Civilian Leadership in Draft Legislation—Urgent New Reasons for Early Draft Legislation—Costliness of the Delay in 1940 Draft Legislation—The Question of How Best to Use Trained Units—Mid-1940 Aids to Matériel Production—Difficulties in Planning Amid Uncertainties—Training Entrusted to GHQ—The Obstacles to Training—Summer Maneuvers of 1940—General Marshall’s Attention to Training Program—The Timing of Troop Inductions—Extension of Service Term Is Considered—Marshall Asks for Retention of Guard, Reserves, and Draft Troops—The Fierce Fight on Draft Extension—General Marshall’s Role in the Legislative Battle—Attention to Soldier Morale—Last and Largest Maneuvers of the Prewar Period
Chapter 8: Officer Selection, Promotion, and Rejection
Precautions Against Discriminatory Treatment of Reserve Components—Expediting Promotion of the Specially Deserving—A New Bill for Selective Promotion—Policy Determining Selection and Promotion—Efforts to Stimulate Promotion of National Guard Officers—A Halt in Promotions to Attain Uniformity—Attention to Complaints from Within the Service—Declaration of War Brings a New Promotion Policy—Controlling the Inflow of Young Officers—Special Attention to Important Personnel Assignments
Chapter 9: The Movement Toward Air Autonomy
Attitude of the New Chief of Staff in 1939—The Slow Progress Toward Air Autonomy—General Arnold Advises Against Haste—An Unsuccessful Compromise in October 1940—General Marshall’s Move of March 1941 Toward Solution—The First Step: Consolidating the Air Elements—Command Responsibility Requires a New Arrangement—No Autonomy, But Great Progress Toward It
Chapter 10: Aid to Britain versus Rearming of America
Sharing “Secret” Weapons with Other Nations—The Army Declines to Endorse Further Exports—Foreign Shipments Provoke a Departmental Crisis—German Victories of May 1940 Accentuate Disagreements—European Pressure for Other Weapons—Search for Legal Authority for Sale of “Surplus” Arms—The Critical Shortage in Small-Arms Ammunition—Need for Allocations and Accurate Scheduling—Britain’s Fruitful Proposals for Coordination of Effort—A Restatement of the Plan for Army Expansion—Lend-Lease Fails to Solve the Problem of Satisfactory Allocations—The Long-range Influence of Lend-Lease—A Basis Reached for Coordinated Supplies—Early Differences with the Soviet Union
Chapter 11: The Victory Program
Other Influences Calling for a Firm Statement of Objectives—WPD Suggests Action by Chief of Staff—President Roosevelt Orders a Survey—A Large Task Is Undertaken—The Method of Calculation Employed—The President Enlarges the Objective—Last-Minute Discussions with the Navy—A Restatement of National Policy—WPD Again Records Its Difference with the Navy—Isolationist Inquiry into the Administration’s Intentions—Matériel and Personnel Programs Again in Conflict—Suggestions for Reducing the Army with Minimum Injury—Tentative Plan to Send Certain National Guard Units Home
Chapter 12: Coordination With Britain
Establishing the American Position Prior to the British Parley—The American-British Conversations of January 1941—The Agreements Reached at ABC—American Interpretations of the Agreement—Rapid Developments in the Atlantic War—The Start of Formal Military Cooperation of Britain and America—American Involvement Causes Anxiety—Proposals for Cooperation in the Pacific—American Objections to Helping Reinforce Singapore—Stark and Marshall Reject the Singapore Proposals—The Atlantic Conference, August 1941—U.S. Staff Criticisms of the British Suggestions—Effort to Harmonize Views on a Bombing Policy
Chapter 13: Darkening Clouds in the Far East
Limitations of Planning for the Philippines—General Grunert’s Pressure for Reinforcement—Evidence of a Changed Attitude in 1940—December 1940 Brings New Action—General MacArthur’s Large Plan for Defense—General MacArthur Given a New Command—Factors in the 1941 Change of Attitude—Items in the 1941 Rearming of the Philippines—A Hopeful View of Philippine Defenses—Swift Developments of November 1941
Chapter 14: The Nation’s Outlying Defenses in 1941
The Situation in Alaska—The Panama Situation—United Command Becomes an Issue—The Situation in Hawaii—The June 1940 Alert in Hawaii—Change in the Hawaii Command—The Defense Establishment in Hawaii on 7 December 1941—The Air Commanders’ Remarkable Prevision—The New Defensive Screen of Atlantic Bases—Priority for Newfoundland—Early Anxiety over Bermuda Security—The Dwindling Importance of Trinidad—Early Jamaica Plan Soon Abandoned—Minor Bases Planned for the Bahamas, Antigua, St. Lucia, and Guiana—Delay in Utilizing Greenland—The Situation in Iceland—In the Dutch Islands, Aruba and Curaçao—The Fixed Defense in Both Oceans
Chapter 15: The War Reaches America
Factors Contributing to the 7 December Surprise—Evidence of Japan’s Southeast Asia Objectives—The Warnings of Late November—Attention Is Again Diverted—On the Eve of Pearl Harbor—A Fateful Series of Mischances—The End of Prewar Planning
Tables
1. Strength of the United States Army: 1919–1941
2. Percentage Distribution of U.S. Army Strength by Component: 1940–1941
3. U.S. Army Personnel in Philippine Islands: 30 November 1941
4. Modern Combat Aircraft on Hand in the Philippines: 8 and 9 December 1941
5. Number of U.S. Army Aircraft on Hand in the Hawaiian Air Force Before and After the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor: 7 and 20 December 1941
Charts
1. Chief of Staff’s Responsibilities: 1 December 1941
2. Chief of Staff’s Command of the Field Forces as Exercised through GHQ: 1 December 1941
3. Exercise of the Chief of Staff’s Command of the Army Air Forces: 1 December 1941
4. Exercise of the Chief of Staff’s Command of Overseas Establishments, Including Department, Defense Commands, and Bases: 1 December 1941
Illustrations
General of the Army George Catlett Marshall—Civilian Authority Late in the Prewar Period: Henry L. Stimson, Robert P. Patterson, Harry H. Woodring, Louis Johnson—Chiefs of Staff, 1918–30: John J. Pershing, Peyton C. March, John L. Hines, Charles P. Summervall—General of the Army Douglas MacArthur—General Malin Craig—The Chief of Staff in World War II and His Successors—Four Deputy Chiefs in the Late Prewar Period: Stanley D. Embrick, Richard C. Moore, William Bryden, H.H. Arnold—Secretaries of the General Staff in the Late Prewar Period: Robert L. Eichelberger, Harold R. Bull, Orlando Ward, Walter B. Smith—A Warning from the Chief of Staff—A Revision by the Chief of Staff—Clarifying the Instructions
All pictures in this volume are from U.S. Army photos.