Chapter 13: “Frantic Supply”
The Character of Supply Operations in the Pursuit
A German general is once said to have remarked that blitzkrieg is paradise for the tactician but hell for the quartermaster. Ernie Pyle, the popular wartime newspaper columnist, described the operations of August and early September as “a tactician’s hell and a quartermaster’s purgatory.” Whatever the sentiments of the tactician with regard to pursuit warfare, there can be no doubt of the appropriateness of these observations as applied to supply operations. As the Allied armies crossed the Seine and outran their supply lines toward the end of August logistical support became more and more “frantic” in nature, the needs of the combat forces being met almost wholly on a hand-to-mouth basis. With final victory believed to be almost within grasp in the first days of September, small wonder that the logistic limitations became exasperating.
As of 25 July the development of the rear areas in Normandy had progressed as far as possible except for port reconstruction. Discharge was being developed to maximum capacity at the beaches, the minor ports, and Cherbourg; a double-track railway was in operation from Cherbourg to Lison Junction, and single-track lines connected Barfleur and St. Sauveur-le-Vicomte with the main trunk line. In preparation for the coming offensive the Advance Section had taken over all army installations in its area except POL dumps in the beach maintenance area, and also had begun to take over the army maintenance area in the vicinity of St. LC) and La Haye-du-Puits. Emphasis had been placed on the storage of supplies as far forward as practicable—in the OMAHA Beach–St. Lô) area.1
The supply situation was regarded as good at the beginning of August, although reserves were not evenly distributed in the army area and there were certain shortages in Classes II and V. Neither of the armies had anything like the authorized 7 units of fire, but the Communications Zone had a minimum of 9 days of supply of ammunition (11.1 days of artillery ammunition), and there was no critical shortage in any category. There was no shortage of rations (Class I), and the Communications Zone had approximately 16 days of supply of POL (Class III). Army reserves were badly distributed because a large portion of the supplies were still under the control of First Army, which had stocks of certain supplies in excess of authorized levels. On 6 August First Army had 10.5 days of supply of POL as against Third Army’s 1.3 days. But there were no over-all shortages, and no immediate difficulties were
anticipated.2 Third Army presented the most immediate problem, but while General Patton’s forces by this time had penetrated deep into Brittany the Advance Section commander, General Plank, felt that they could be supplied without embarrassment.3
In the first few weeks in August deliveries to the armies were indeed substantial, the heaviest shipments going to Third Army in an effort to effect a more equitable distribution of reserves. In the ten days between the 7th and 16th the Communications Zone recorded average daily deliveries of 6,144 tons to the First Army and 13,250 tons to the Third Army, more than half of the latter’s receipts consisting of POL.4 By the fourth week in August, however, when it became necessary to maintain American forces at the Seine and at the tip of Brittany, deliveries to combat units fell of rapidly. Forced to carry their loads farther and farther forward, trucking units required more and more time to complete round trips between the Normandy depots and front-line units. In the last few days of August deliveries to the armies dwindled to a few thousand tons, and the logistical support of U.S. forces reached the most precarious state during operations in northwest Europe.
Difficulties in supplying the American forces in the pursuit did not suddenly appear in the final week of August. They had begun almost simultaneously with the breakout at the beginning of the month, for it was impossible from the start to maintain the armies on the run at desired scales. When the 12th Army Group became operational on 1 August it had issued administrative instructions authorizing the armies to establish reserve levels of 7 days of rations and POL and 7 units of fire.5 Even at that time the armies did not have their full allowances, however, and once they began their rapid advance it shortly became difficult to move even daily maintenance supplies forward, to say nothing of establishing authorized reserve levels in the army areas. On 27 August the army group took belated cognizance of this situation and reduced the authorized army levels of Class I and III supplies to 5 days and the Class V level to 3 units of fire. This was a meaningless gesture in view of the difficulties of moving even daily maintenance forward.6
At that time the decision had already been made to continue the advance as far as it could be sustained. The army group fully recognized that supply capabilities had become the governing factor, and that the Communications Zone might not be able to keep up with the rate at which the combat elements were moving forward. Nevertheless it was decided that the armies should continue their advance as far as practicable, using every available means of transportation at their disposal to supplement COMZ deliveries, and that they should pause only when it became necessary to rebuild supply stocks.7
At the end of August First Army estimated its daily average tonnage requirements as 5,500 tons (including 2,200 tons of POL and 1,100 tons of ammunition); Third Army requested daily maintenance of 6,000 tons (1,411 of POL and 2,545 of ammunition), and in addition requested 12,500 tons of ordnance Class II and IV supplies to complete its authorized T/E allowances and 15,000 tons of ammunition to build up a reserve.8 The delivery of these tonnages was out of the question at the moment, not for lack of supplies, but because of the limited transportation facilities. In the drive across northern France the Communications Zone gradually despaired of developing the lines of communications at the speed of the armies’ advance, and emphasis necessarily shifted more and more to moving the barest essentials forward to using units on a day-to-day basis. The armies had quickly exhausted their meager reserves, and it became impossible to establish stocks in advance depots. Sustained operations became entirely dependent on daily replenishment from the rear. By the end of August 90 to 95 percent of all the supplies on the Continent lay in the base depots in the vicinity of the beaches, and there were virtually no stocks between Normandy and the army dumps 300 miles away.9
The precariousness of conducting operations under these conditions was keenly felt at all echelons in both the communications and combat zones, and particularly at the various tactical headquarters. The inability to take advantage of a favorable tactical situation produced an understandable frustration as supply deteriorated in the last days of August, and this helplessness was only heightened by the lack of information as to what actually was being delivered to the forward areas. On 30 August General Bradley and his G-4, General Moses met with General Stratton, the COMZ G-4, to survey the entire situation and to assess prospects for the immediate future. General Stratton estimated that by 2 or 3 September the Communications Zone could deliver 11,400 tons per day to the Chartres area (6,000 tons by truck and 5,400 by rail). After the deduction of minimum requirements for the air forces, the Communications Zone, and civil affairs, the net tonnage available for the armies was expected to be 7,000.10
On the basis of these predicted movement capabilities the army group commander made an allocation of this tonnage to the armies. Third Army was to receive a minimum of 2,000 tons per day; the balance up to 5,000 tons was to go to the First Army; anything in excess of 7,000 tons was to be divided equally between the two until First Army’s total requirements were met, the remainder going to the Third.11 General Moses seriously doubted the Communications Zone’s ability to place 7,000 tons of useful supplies in the forward areas.12 He had become thoroughly vexed with the failure of supply and tended to fix the blame for the current crisis on the Communications Zone.13 Unfortunately his pessimism was at least partly justified, for General Stratton’s
commitments were not immediately within the COMZ capabilities.
The picture of actual accomplishment in these critical weeks is obscure. Poor bookkeeping, lack of standardized reporting, the diversion of supplies, all becloud the record of shipments. Third Army left no record at all of its daily tonnage receipts. In the week of 27 August-2 September, the darkest period of the pursuit, the Advance Section recorded average daily shipments of about 3,700 tons to First Army. The latter indicated deliveries of only 2,225 tons, although it was able to record total daily receipts of about 3,000 tons by employing its own trucks for line-of-communications hauling. On 3 and 4 September, by which time the Communications Zone was committed to the delivery of 5,000 tons per day to the First Army under the army group’s recent allocation, the Advance Section was able to lay down an average of only 3,600 tons in the army area. On 5 September the army recorded receipts in excess of 7,000 tons via ADSEC transportation. On that day 12th Army Group altered its allocation, dividing the available tonnage equally between the two armies (3,500 tons each). First Army thus lost the priority which it had temporarily enjoyed. But the record of actual deliveries in the following week is again contradictory. First Army recorded average daily deliveries of 3,700 tons via ADSEC transportation from 3 to 9 September plus 2,640 tons through use of its own transport. The Advance Section indicated daily deliveries averaging 4,500 tons. In any case the volume of movement met the prescribed tonnage allocations. Deliveries to the Third Army, according to the Advance Section, meanwhile averaged only 2,620 tons in this period despite the equality of status it supposedly enjoyed. Deliveries began to improve in the week of 10–16 September when the Advance Section claimed average movements of 5,700 tons to First Army and 3,700 tons to Third.14
These figures indicate that in the second week of September the armies for the first time received tonnages approximately in accord with the latest allocations. On 14 September 12th Army Group had once more altered the allocation, continuing the equal sharing of the first 7,000 tons, but favoring First Army with a priority for any additional supplies up to 1,500 tons.15 But even these tonnages failed to meet the minimum requirements stated by the armies early in September, First Army having requested a minimum of 6,202 tons, and Third Army a minimum of 6,665.16
The record of actual shipments is further confused by charges and countercharges, the Communications Zone claiming that it was forwarding the tonnages requested within allocations and the armies insisting as early as 2 September that the Advance Section’s shipments were far short of allocated tonnages.17 Still worse, the armies claimed they were receiving useless items which they had not requisitioned and for which they had no need, and which were therefore wasting precious transportation.18 Such contradictions and frictions reflected only too well the exasperations
and tensions attending supply operations which had been reduced to a hand-to-mouth and catch-as-catch-can basis. In its effort to meet the demands of combat forces over the stretching supply routes the Communications Zone almost from the start of the pursuit was forced to abandon all thought of developing the lines of communications as planned. Under the continued pressure to sustain the momentum of the pursuit supply operations were soon characterized by the unorthodox and the expedient. After several weeks of overexertion and overextension, which were attended by many irregularities in procedure shared in by both the Communications Zone and the armies, the logistic organization inevitably developed weaknesses. Most of them are directly traceable to the forced accommodation to the emergency conditions of the period which prevented the proper organization of the Communications Zone. An examination of some of the more prosaic aspects of logistic organization illustrates the effect which these forced departures from orthodox procedures could have on supply operations.
One of the main elements of an adequate logistic structure is a good depot system. The Communications Zone had recognized this need, providing for the establishment of the principal storage area in the Rennes–Laval-Châteaubriant area, where the theater’s main reserve stocks were to be accommodated. Because of limitations in storage space and transportation and because of the need for mobility, the Advance Section was authorized to maintain only a relatively small portion of the total theater reserves in its depots, although balanced as to type and sufficient to meet the daily anticipated needs of the armies. The ADSEC depots were to be replenished either by prearranged shipments or by requisition on the Communications Zone.
The planned depot structure and method of operation were upset from the start. The initial difficulties arose from the lengthy confinement in the restricted Normandy beachhead area, which caused a crowding of installations. These difficulties were unnecessarily compounded by the belated transfer of rear-area installations to the Communications Zone. The First Army persisted in retaining control of the bulk of all supply stocks until the end of July, and even after the breakout claimed possession of dumps no longer in its own area. The Communications Zone consequently had had little time in which to assume control of the base structure, and took over its operations just as it was about to be subjected to the severest stresses and strains. The refusal to turn over the base organization earlier was considered unconscionable by the Communications Zone, and could only be interpreted as a lack of confidence on the part of the field forces, which, as it developed, were themselves the heaviest sufferers from the later logistic difficulties.19
The explosive manner in which the lines of communications were suddenly extended in August voided the planned expansion of the depot system. The establishment of a depot system in depth, consisting of properly stocked forward and intermediate depots, became impossible, for the immediate task of delivering daily maintenance supplies quickly absorbed all transportation resources.
These developments had a recurring impact not only on the development of the
Communications Zone but on the development of the army service areas. The difficulties of the First Army quartermaster service afford a good example. Early in August the army quartermaster turned over the army quartermaster installations in the OMAHA beach maintenance area to the Advance Section and chose a new site for a depot in the planned army service area north of St. Lô. So rapidly did tactical developments change in the succeeding days that the army abandoned all thought of stocking Class I, II, or IV supplies there. It immediately selected the Vire–Villedieu area as the next service area and began to receive supplies there. But the First Army tactical situation changed even more rapidly after mid-August, and the Vire area had to be abandoned almost as soon as it became operational. After briefly considering Alençon as the next service area, the army opened new Class I and III dumps at La Loupe, 100 miles east of Vire, and placed demands on the Advance Section for the movement of 62,000 tons to this area over a ten-day period. This was already beyond the capabilities of COMZ transportation, and the army therefore resorted more and more to using its own truck units in an attempt to make up the deficiency, in addition to carrying out heavy troop movements.
In a matter of days La Loupe was far to the rear. Awaiting the selection of a new service area, the army quartermaster received permission to establish temporary dumps at Arpajon, about sixty miles away. Shipments to this area began in the first days of September, and so urgent was the need for POL that issues from this dump were made on the same day it was opened. But Arpajon, like the other sites, had only a short utility as a service area. Meanwhile the army briefly considered plans for new dumps at Senlis, beyond the Seine, but so rapid was the advance of the VII Corps in the final days of August that a decision was finally made in favor of the La Capelle–Hirson area, 140 miles northeast of Arpajon, and the first installations were opened there on 6 September.
Within a month, therefore, the army service area had leaped approximately 300 miles. By the end of August hope was abandoned of establishing the authorized levels of supply in the service areas, and efforts were concentrated on bringing the daily maintenance needs forward. Once the pursuit. began, the army’s own cupboard quickly became bare, and by early September the army had corralled every available truck by immobilizing engineer dump truck companies, heavy and light ponton companies, and artillery and antiaircraft units to make the long trips back to the base depots and thus supplement the deliveries being made by the Communications Zone.20 The opening of a succession of service installations inevitably placed heavy demands on army service troops, which became widely dispersed in the process. By mid-September, for example, the 471st Quartermaster Group was operating an army dump at La Capelle, the remnants of the dump at Soissons, and a railhead twelve miles north of that city at Coucy.21 As the new dumps were established farther forward, installations in the rear were allowed to exhaust their stocks and then close. In this process the armies frequently left supplies behind which they still considered their own but which were taken over by ADSEC. Some of the discrepancies in the figures of tonnages
forwarded are probably explained by the confusion in accounting for these stocks.
Third Army’s experience was similar. For more than a week after the breakout army and ADSEC trucks picked up supplies near the beaches or in the Cotentin and delivered them directly at forward supply points without laying them down in the army maintenance area. All supplies for the Third Army initially had to be funneled through the narrow and congested Avranches bottleneck, where a single highway had to bear the main burden of supply and troop movements,22 and where gas- and ration-carrying trucks frequently ran a gantlet of fire from the air until the enemy finally abandoned his attempts to choke off Third Army’s lifeline. By the second week the distance from the beaches to Laval (135 miles) and Le Mans (175 miles) had become prohibitive for army transportation, and it was clear that another link was needed in the supply chain. Arrangements were accordingly made with the Advance Section to open a forward transfer point at Laval on 13 August, the intention being that ADSEC transportation would deliver to the transfer point and that army trucks would operate only forward of Laval to the supply points.
A week later the transfer point was moved another 50 miles eastward, to Le Mans, but the new site was already too far to the rear when it opened, since one corps had already crossed the Seine, 100 miles beyond. Third Army meanwhile began negotiations to have the transfer point moved to Fontainebleau, or preferably to the east bank of the Seine. Instead it was established at Ablis, 20 miles east of Chartres, still about 100 miles to the rear of the advancing front. There it remained until 7 September, by which time the army was already operating east of the Moselle, 200 miles away, although the Advance Section had begun to-deliver a portion of Third Army’s gasoline to a supply point in Fontainebleau forest on 31 August. Army vehicles thus had to cover distances of up to 250 miles just to reach the transfer point, and supply points were almost nonexistent.23
The Third Army’s supply lines had also extended westward to the extremities of Brittany. Nourishing the fast-moving armored columns in the fluid operations in that area subjected many a truck convoy, both in bivouac and in column, to attacks by detached enemy groups.24
The experience of the Communications Zone closely paralleled that of the armies. Following First Army, the Advance Section had planned to establish a maintenance area in the Vire–Villedieu area. This area was soon too far to the rear to be of much value, and it was utilized only for small quantities of ammunition and quartermaster supplies. The Advance Section next chose Le Mans as a forward depot area. This area was also out of reach within a short time and was used only temporarily by the ordnance, engineer, and quartermaster services. An attempt was then made to develop a maintenance area in the vicinity of Chartres, where considerable quantities of supplies of all classes were stored in the open, and further attempts were made to establish installations at Soissons, Sommesous, and Reims. But
the constant pressure on transportation precluded the establishment of stocks in the forward areas, and during the worst period of the pursuit the advance depots served primarily as distributing points for the ADSEC, Ninth Air Force, and 12th Army Group units.25
The inability to organize a depot system properly and to establish reserve stocks forward had its repercussions on the entire mechanics of supply. The basic supply procedures for operations on the Continent had been outlined in theater Standing Operating Procedure 7.26 This document had provided that, after an army rear boundary had been established, the Advance Section was initially to receive requests and arrange for the supply of the armies, issuing supplies from designated depots within its own area so far as possible and extracting the unfilled items to the base section designated to support it. Shortly thereafter the Advance Section was to establish regulating stations as the principal links with the armies, and these were to process the armies’ requests and arrange for the flow of supplies.
Up to the time the armies reached the Seine the requisitioning process developed approximately as contemplated. But the sudden extension of the lines of communications in August had made it impossible to move forward all the supplies requisitioned or to establish planned reserves in the Advance Section. The Advance Section met the armies’ requests for Class I and III supplies as far as possible from its own depots. Since the great bulk of all stocks on the Continent was still in the Normandy depots, other items on the requisitions had to be extracted to Headquarters, Communications Zone, and filled from rear depots if available at all. Under these circumstances the procedure prescribed in SOP 7 became impracticable.
In an effort to relieve the critical supply situation in the forward areas, the long-distance, through-highway system known as “Red Ball” was inaugurated late in August with a large number of truck companies organized to move supplies from the Normandy depots to the forward maintenance areas.27 This necessitated certain modifications in the supply procedures of SOP 7. Requisitions continued to be submitted through the regulating stations but usually bypassed the Advance Section when the requested supplies were known to be unavailable there. Instead, they were processed directly to Headquarters, Communications Zone, which in turn ordered the items released from the base depots. In such cases the supplies were forwarded directly from the rear depots through the regulating stations to the armies.28
Under the system of tonnage allocations instituted by 12th Army Group the supply services of each army (and other commands such as the Ninth Air Force) made daily bids for a portion of the available lift, the actual allocation within each command being made by the G-4. The approved requisitions were then submitted to the Advance Section’s regulating stations, which arranged for the shipment of items available in ADSEC depots, and extracted those items not available in the forward areas to the Communications Zone for appropriate
action. Supplies furnished from ADSEC stocks were subtracted from the requisition and the weight of these supplies charged against the day’s tonnage allocation.29
Because of the scarcity of transportation this system required the closest kind of co-ordination, and after it had been in operation for a time refinements were necessary. The army G-4, for example, did not always check the weight of requisitioned items against tonnage allocations, with the result that many items could not be shipped because the total weight of the consolidated requisitions exceeded the allocation for the day. Later in September the army G-4’s were required to accompany their requisitions with a detailed breakdown of the tonnage by service.30
One vital agency of the logistic structure whose functions were affected by the critical developments of August was the regulating station. The regulating station was essentially a traffic control agency, organized for the purpose of insuring orderly and systematic movements into and out of the combat zone. It was not intended to act as a supply depot, to maintain any immobile reserves, or to make any transfer of supplies except for mail and a few small articles. As the nerve center for all traffic into and out of the combat zone, however, it was intended to perform an important function in the supply organization of the theater.
The regulating officer in command of the station was, by Field Service Regulations,31 the direct representative of the theater commander. As such he was expected to control all rail movements forward of advance depots of the Communications Zone; to establish and enforce all traffic priorities; and to designate the location of railheads and truckheads in the combat zone. To do his job he had to be fully advised at all times of changes in the status of supplies, in the location of units and installations, and in military plans, and he had to receive full information on the allocation of credits in COMZ depots, priorities for supply, the status of rail equipment, the availability of rolling stock, and so on. With the aid of a small staff, including a representative of each supply service, the regulating officer consolidated all requests for transportation and finally made the necessary arrangements for shipments of supplies and replacements forward and for evacuation to the rear.32
During the planning of OVERLORD there had been divided opinion, first as to whether to employ regulating stations at all on the Continent, and then as to what headquarters would exercise command over them. The theater had finally decided to use regulating stations, but it made a major departure from Field Service Regulations, which specified that the stations be agencies of the theater commander, by assigning them to the Communications Zone.33 The theater SOP’s on supply procedure on the Continent provided that regulating stations were to be agencies of the Advance Section and that they were to be established at the earliest practicable date.34 Beyond this the organization and function of the regulating stations were to conform in general to Field Service Regulations. They were to be established close to the army rear boundary, and the regulating officers were to
receive and process all requests submitted by the combat forces and to control the movement to and from the combat zone. The ADSEC plan assigned responsibility for the establishment of the stations to the Transportation Corps.35
During June and July, when First Army was the only U.S. army on the Continent and in effect controlled all resources in the lodgment through its control of the Advance Section, there was no need for a regulating station, and none was established. When the Advance Section was finally detached from First Army, and a second army was introduced, two stations were placed in operation by the Advance Section, the 24th Regulating Station in support of the Third Army and the 25th in support of the First. Both organizations followed the policy of operating from the most logical traffic control centers in closest proximity to the army headquarters which they supported. In a deviation from Field Service Regulations, however, the regulating officers were designated as the direct representatives of the Advance Section with the armies and operated from the office of the G-4 section of the respective armies.
The Advance Section of necessity had a much closer working relationship with the armies than any of the other COMZ sections or the COMZ headquarters itself. It not only was the immediate supplier or “jobber” to the armies. It also determined the initial development of the communications zone and performed other tasks incidental to supply such as planning the extension of the railways, pipelines, and signal communications and the location of future service areas. For obvious reasons the Advance Section had to keep itself informed on the armies’ future plans and therefore established an intimate liaison with the combat commands. The regulating officers thus performed an important function in coordinating the logistic activities of the Advance Section and the armies and provided the vitally important link between the combat and communications zones.
Although the 24th and 25th Regulating Stations had been activated several months before, they had received little or no technical training in the United Kingdom until early in July and crossed to the Continent just before the breakout operation was launched. Consequently they received little indoctrination in ADSEC procedures before they became active and had only the vaguest notion as to how they should function.36 Even the “book” concept of their role went out the window when they were faced with the tactical conditions of August. Their mission and method of operation as laid down in Field Service Regulations were based largely on experience in World War I, in which operations were largely static and in which rail transportation was the principal means of shipment to and from the combat zone.37 But rail traffic was virtually nonexistent in the forward areas in August 1944, and the main problem in connection with motor traffic was one of expediting rather than regulating. In the highly fluid situation of late August, when communications were bad and shipments were poorly documented, the armies above all needed information as to what they could expect in
the way of supplies, and turned to the regulating stations to get it. The regulating stations helped meet the emergency needs in a variety of ways. They sent personnel to railheads, truckheads, and air-heads, and established traffic control detachments at strategic points of diversion. These detachments served a useful function by furnishing information on routes to convoy commanders and to drivers of straggler vehicles, and by maintaining information on the location of supply depots. They reconnoitered supply routes, furnished guides for the convoys, and inaugurated a courier system to overcome the inadequacy of signal communications. On administrative orders from ADSEC and frequently on verbal orders from the army G-4’s they also diverted supplies from one point to another. After the inauguration of the Red Ball Express the ADSEC G-4 established a control group at the diversion point—initially Chartres, then Dreux, and later Versailles—where convoys were separated and dispatched to the proper army. In the rapidly stretching lines of communications in this period road discipline was poor and many convoys arrived at the diversion point without destination instructions or proper documentation. At this point the convoys were stopped and destination instructions reviewed, and by the use of check lists the ADSEC control group attempted to maintain the proper allocation of supplies. In this way the regulating stations aided materially in expediting the movement of supplies and attempted to keep the armies at least partially informed as to what they might expect to receive. Despite these efforts, many shipments arrived at their destination so poorly documented that it was almost impossible to connect deliveries with requisitions,38 and the armies frequently received supplies they had neither requested nor needed.
Impatient with the confusions and uncertainties which attended the tumultuous events of these days, the armies frequently took matters into their own hands and “hijacked” convoys far from their destinations, and in many cases “diverted” COMZ truck companies to their own use in the army areas.39 The Third Army was particularly notorious for the latter practice.
By hook or crook, therefore, a flow of the bare essentials, however inadequate and unpredictable, was maintained to the armies. By the end of August, however, the armies were being kept in motion by deliveries of only limited amounts of those essentials, such as fuel, rations, and ammunition. In the first days of September the maintenance of combat elements at scales required to permit a continuation of the aggressive pursuit became impossible. Whether the armies might have maintained the speed of their advance if adequate supplies (particularly gasoline) had been available is another question and will be considered later. In any event, the time was fast approaching when the combat forces would require more normal maintenance and the repair or replacement of their rapidly deteriorating equipment.
Gasoline—“The Red Blood of War”
Until the Allied armies crossed the Seine supply shortages had not become
serious enough to restrict their operations. But the cumulative effect of the various logistic difficulties created by the pursuit eventually began to be felt in the last days of August as the armies attempted to continue their rapid advance beyond the OVERLORD lodgment area. While shortages developed in nearly all categories, the first to reach critical proportions in the sense of threatening the success of tactical operations was the shortage of gasoline, a commodity which now dramatically demonstrated its claim to the role so aptly described by the French as “le sang rouge de guerre.”
Contrary to plan, all POL requirements until the time of the breakout were met either by packaged deliveries or by the bulk system based on Port-en-Bessin and Ste. Honorine-des-Pertes. Construction and rehabilitation of the Cherbourg area were supposed to have progressed sufficiently to permit bulk reception by the Major System by D plus 18, and plans had called for the completion of at least one 6-inch pipeline to La Haye-du-Puits and several tanks at that location by D plus 21. But this schedule, like others, was voided by the delay in the capture of Cherbourg, and the construction of intake and storage facilities at the port had not even begun on D plus 21.
Cherbourg was captured on D plus 21, and ADSEC officers began reconnaissance of the area on the same day to determine the condition of existing facilities. It was known that considerable French commercial and naval facilities existed in the area, but it had been assumed that they would be destroyed, and that any storage captured in a usable condition would be a bonus. The Allies were happily surprised, therefore, to find that existing facilities were far from completely demolished. The survey eventually revealed storage capacity for nearly 500,000 barrels—far above the amount planned for the Cherbourg area—which could easily be rehabilitated and used.40 In a struggle in which victory was determined largely by overwhelming material supremacy the capture of Cherbourg’s storage facilities essentially intact, like the later capture of Antwerp, was a fortune of war which, though less dramatic, might well be ranked with the seizure of the Remagen bridge.
Much of the captured storage consisted of underground tanks grouped in three main tank farms about a mile west of the city of Cherbourg and directly south of the Digue de Querqueville. Many of the tanks had been used for diesel and other types of oils and had to be scoured and flushed before they could be used for gasoline. But this task entailed only a fraction of the work expected to be necessary, and the use of existing facilities therefore meant a tremendous saving in both labor and materials—resources which could be used in port reconstruction. The only storage construction initially contemplated was a single 10,000-barrel balance tank.41
The major construction task involved in the Cherbourg POL installation was the laying of the many connecting lines between the tank farms and the laying of intake lines from the Digue de Querqueville. Most of the supplies and equipment for these projects were brought in via UTAH Beach and the minor Cotentin ports and sent to a special POL supply dump on the western edge of Cherbourg. The supplies were generally ample, except for certain
The First POL Tanker alongside the Digue de Querqueville, Cherbourg, 25 July 1944
fittings, and shortages were met either by improvisation or by special airlift from the United Kingdom. Approximately thirty-eight miles of pipe were laid in the area, and one 12-inch and ten, rather than six, 6-inch unloading lines were laid from the tanker berth to storage.42
The provision of tanker docking facilities proved far more onerous and time consuming than the onshore construction projects, for the outer harbor was heavily mined and the planned berths were obstructed by many sunken vessels. The de-mining of the harbor waters and the removal of obstacles were perilous tasks and accounted for most of the prolonged delay in bringing the Major System into operation. Navy units eventually cleared the area sufficiently to permit the first POL tanker to dock alongside the Digue de Querqueville on 25 July, exactly four weeks after the fall of the port.43
Meanwhile the construction of the pipelines inland had also begun. By mid-July one 6-inch line had been completed to La Haye-du-Puits, twenty-nine miles to the south, and two storage tanks with a capacity of 15,000 barrels had also been constructed there. But on 25 July, the date on which Operation COBRA was launched, the bulk distribution system in operation on the Continent was still limited to the Minor System.44 At that time the import of POL on the Continent consequently
lagged considerably behind planned receipts. By D plus 41 daily receipts were planned to average 7,350 tons (4,663 of which were to consist of MT80 gasoline) and a cumulative total of 216,000 tons of POL was to have been delivered on the far shore, about 180,000 tons of the total consisting of MT80.45 On that date, however, daily receipts were averaging only 4,100 tons owing to the delay in bringing the Major System into operation. More than half the POL tonnage was still arriving in packaged form via the beaches. A fairly large and steady flow of packaged POL had been provided to meet all POL requirements in the first three weeks and later to build up the continental can population. This flow had been maintained approximately as planned. In mid-July an average of 2,600 tons of packaged products was being shipped to the far shore each day, and a cumulative total of 142,702 compared with a planned 147,703 tons had been dispatched to the Continent.46 The Minor System, meanwhile, had by this time almost doubled its planned output, but its performance could not begin to compensate for the large tonnages that had been expected to be imported through Cherbourg.
The Major System was to have begun receiving bulk gasoline on D plus 18 at the rate of about 3,400 tons per day, and by D plus 41 was expected to average about 4,000 tons. By D plus 41 (17 July) the Cherbourg installation was to have received a cumulative total of more than 85,000 tons of MT80 gasoline in bulk and more than 100,000 tons of POL products in all.47 But on that date it had yet to receive its first gallon of bulk POL.
The Major System finally began operating in the last days of July—almost six weeks later than scheduled. Despite the long delay and the loss of thousands of tons of intake capacity during this period the level of POL stocks was actually almost exactly as projected, and the supply of POL consequently was no cause for concern on the eve of the breakout. It had been planned that ten days reserve stock of POL would be built up on the Continent by D plus 41 based on an operational day of fifty miles for all vehicles. On this basis the stocks in mid-July already represented a reserve of eleven days. But daily consumption had actually been equivalent to about thirteen miles per day rather than the maximum fifty-mile planning factor, so that existing stocks represented far more than the eleven days’ supply unless suddenly accelerated operations actually led to a much higher rate of consumption.48 First Army’s consumption of gasoline had been low in June, totaling less than 3,700,000 gallons, and averaging about 148,000 per day, or approximately 55 tons per division slice. In July, with the employment of larger forces, the total consumption rose to 11,500,000 gallons, averaging about 372,000 gallons per day, or 75 tons per division slice.49 But this was still considerably below the consumption factor of 121 tons accepted for planning purposes before D Day.50 Fortunately the low rate of consumption in these early weeks
Table 10: Gasoline Supply of First and Third Armies, 30 July–16 September 1944
(Number of Gallons)
First Army
| Week Ended | Daily Average Receipts | Daily Issues | Daily Consumption | Balance on Hand | Days of Supply |
| 5 August | b | b | 429,039 | b | 10.5 |
| 12 August | b | 274,000 | 292,458 | 4,055,930 | 4.4 |
| 19 August | b | 338,000 | 337,000 | 3,486,600 | 3.9 |
| 26 August | 454,300 | 453,000 | 501,500 | 253,320 | 0.7 |
| 2 September | 546,400 | 436,000 | 485,190 | 206,340 | 0.3 |
| 9 September | 540,000 | 370,000 | 530,218 | d 350,255 | 0.0 |
| 16 September | 475,600 | 498,000 | b | b | 0.0 |
Third Army
| Week Ended | Daily Average Receipts | Daily Issues | Daily Consumption | Balance on Hand | Days of Supply |
| 5 August | 121,500 | 105,000 | b | 515,415 | 1.3 |
| 12 August | 396,800 | 313,000 | b | 846,600 | 1.0 |
| 19 August | 367,900 | 360,000 | b | 193,260 | 0.3 |
| 26 August | 285,700 | b | 350,000 | b | 0.6 |
| 2 September | 200,100 | b | 202,38 | b | e |
| 9 September | 423,300 | 333,173 | b | b | 1.1 |
| 16 September | f 428,600 | 464,800 | b | b | 0.7 |
a At end of period.
b Data not available.
c Based on assumption that 85 percent of total gasoline received was motor vehicle gas and resultant tonnage converted at 368 gallons per ton.
d Stored in First Army depot, but not available for issue because of distance to rear.
e Less than 0.1.
f Figure for 10–16 September based on tonnage received converted to gallons.
Source: FUSA receipts from FUSA AARs. TUSA receipts, through 19 Aug, from TUSA G-4 Periodic Rpts; 20 Aug-2 Sep receipts from TUSA AAR, II, QM, 4–6, and in part estimated; 3–9 Sep receipts from Summaries of Activities, G-4 Periodic Rpts; 10–16 Sep figures based on tonnages received, converted to gallons. FUSA issues from FUSA G-4 Periodic Rpts, 12 A GD 319.1 G-4 Rpts. FUSA consumption figures from FUSA Rpt of Opns, 1 Aug 44–22 Feb 45, IV, 86–87. TUSA figures on daily issues and consumption from TUSA G-4 Periodic Rpts, 12 A Gp 319.1 G-4 Rpts. Balance on hand and days of supply from army G-4 periodic rpts. Army group reports indicate higher levels of Class III in the armies.
tended to cancel out the deficiency in planned receipts at Cherbourg. Stock levels were quite satisfactory and were believed sufficient for whatever contingencies might arise.51 Furthermore, the Major System, with its pipeline to La Haye-du-Puits, was destined to begin operations within a few days.
The supply of gasoline was entirely adequate for a full month after the launching of COBRA on 25 July, and at no time in the next four weeks did the lack of fuel threaten to hamper operations. This is not to say that there were no difficulties in the supply of this vital commodity. Third Army was forced to operate with the most meager reserves from the very start of its commitment on 1 August and was almost wholly dependent on uninterrupted daily deliveries. It had planned to hold 1,500,- 000 gallons of gasoline as a reserve for emergency use. Instead it immediately plunged into a highly mobile type of warfare and quickly exhausted its small reserve.52 On 5 August Third Army had only 515,400 gallons of motor fuel on hand, representing 1.3 days of supply. First Army, although it had at last drawn a rear boundary and relinquished control of the Advance Section, at that time still controlled a reserve of 10.5 days,53 a fact which caused some bitterness. (Table 10)
Despite the hand-to-mouth character of supply, however, the Third Army did not actually suffer any want of fuel for its fast-moving vehicles. For two weeks—from 6 to 19 August—Third Army, operating at greater distances and setting a faster pace than the First Army, got the larger share of the gasoline brought forward, its receipts averaging 382,343 gallons per day as compared with First Army’s 286,337, and its issues (and presumably consumption) 336,500 gallons as against First
Army’s 306,000. In this period the great disparity between the levels of supply in the two armies was partially eliminated. By arrangement with the Advance Section, First Army’s excess stocks were gradually reduced and on 19 August stood at 3.9 days of supply.54 This was undoubtedly a conservative estimate, however, for First Army’s balance on hand on that date still totaled almost 3,500,000 gallons.55 Third Army’s on-hand balance had reached a low of less than 200,000 gallons, and was estimated to equal .28 day of supply.56 But by mid-August the Third Army had become accustomed to operating on a slim margin, and the critical state of its fuel stocks evoked no expression of alarm as long as requirements continued to be met from day to day. Thus far the 12th Army Group G-4 weekly periodic reports had consistently included the reassuring statement: “There are no critical shortages which will affect operations.”
The week of 20–26 August, which for the first time saw most of the elements of both armies simultaneously in pursuit and included the crossings of the Seine, brought the highest daily consumption of motor fuel to date—well over 800,000 gallons per day.57 On 24 August the First Army alone
burned up 782,000 gallons (2,125 tons) of gasoline.58 By comparison, consumption of gasoline by U.S. combat forces in the Meuse–Argonne battle in October 1918 had reached the “enormous figure” of 150,000 gallons per day.59 While the lengthening of the supply routes made deliveries more and more difficult, there was as yet no indication that the supply of gasoline was failing to meet needs. On 27 August General Lee, in discussing the theater’s POL situation at a staff and command conference, could state with understandable pride, “I think it is fair to report that at no time in the fighting on the Far Shore has there been a shortage.”60
This claim, while warranted at the moment, could not have been made twenty-four hours later, at least so far as supply of front-line units was concerned. By 28 August the transportation resources of the Communications Zone were spread so thin and the lines of communications were so extended that daily deliveries could no longer be relied upon with certainty. First Army now reported that the Class III supply situation was critical,61 and Third Army indicated that POL was no longer being received in sufficient quantities to maintain adequate operating stocks in the Class III supply points.62 Both armies had reported less than one day’s supply on hand on 26 August, and in the following week the level fell to .31 day in First Army and .007 in the Third.63 On 28 August the Third Army reported a deficiency of 97,510 gallons against its daily telegram requesting 450,000 gallons. In the succeeding days these deficits grew worse. On the 29th deliveries to the Third Army were short by 141,520 gallons of the 325,000 gallons requisitioned, and in the next critical week deliveries dropped to token size, totaling a mere 31,975, 25,390, and 49,930 gallons on 30 August and 2 and 3 September respectively.64
Meanwhile the Third Army instituted a conservation program and began to ration fuel. On the 30th it notified the XV Corps that there was no gas available for issue, and held out no hopes for the following day.65 The XII Corps alleviated its shortage to some extent by the fortuitous capture of about 115,000 gallons of enemy gasoline in the region of Châlons on 29 and 30 August,66 and the army as a whole utilized a total of nearly 500,000 gallons of captured fuel.67 The Third Army even resorted to commandeering the extra gasoline which Red Ball trucks carried for their return trips to the base areas. As a result of this shortsighted practice some convoys were stranded and available transportation facilities were consequently reduced.68 It is hardly surprising that the Communications Zone, which was already losing entire truck companies through “diversions,” became wary of sending its truck units into the army area.
General Muller, Third Army G-4 (photograph taken in 1946)
In the seven lean days from 29 August to 4 September there was a rising chorus of appeals from combat units, many of them expressing anxiety over the extent to which the fuel famine was hampering operations. In some areas motorized reconnaissance continued only by the expedient of draining the tanks of other vehicles. As the situation worsened in the last days of August army trucks had to make longer and longer trips to the rear, for while it had been the policy to keep supply points as far forward as possible, the Third Army G-4, Col. Walter J. Muller, on 31 August ordered a delay in their displacement in order to give the Communications Zone an opportunity to improve its position.69
In the area of the First Army the experience was similar, the shortages of gasoline eventually influencing the tempo of operations. Reversing the situation west of the Seine, where Third Army had made the wider and longer sweep on the outer edges of a huge envelopment while the First Army advanced on a shorter inside arc, the First now found itself tracking the longer routes in the turning toward the German border. In the first days of September notice after notice reading “no gasoline” went up in the war room tents of tactical headquarters, as unit after unit reported the critical state of its fuel supply. With the freezing of truckheads divisional motor convoys were forced to return as far as La Loupe, 250 miles to the rear, to pick up supplies.70 Early in September the First Army quartermaster instituted reconnaissance flights by cub planes to scout for forward-moving gasoline trains,71 and at least one division, the 5th Armored, admitted resorting to hijacking gasoline, a practice of which other units were also guilty.72
The acute shortage of gasoline in the First Army had developed despite the fact that that organization had consistently held a more advantageous position than Third Army’s with regard to POL supply. In the last ten days of August the First Army managed to get the lion’s share of the available gasoline, partly because it possessed more truck transportation than the Third Army, and partly because it was
Brig. Gen. R. W. Wilson, First Army G-4 (photograph taken in 1945)
accorded a general priority in initial reserves and maintenance for the northeastward drive beyond the Seine,73 an advantage which it continued to enjoy for a short time after tonnage allocations were instituted at the end of the month. From 20 to 26 August the First Army consumed an average of 501,500 gallons of gasoline per day as compared with Third Army’s 350,000.74 Strangely enough, however, Third Army at that time was asking for only 250,000 gallons per day in its daily telegram requests despite a considerably higher consumption rate, indicating that its unfavorable position was in part self-imposed.75
The disparity in consumption between the two armies continued in the more critical period which followed, First Army burning an average of 485,190 gallons per day and Third Army 202,382 gallons.76
While the reliability of all POL statistics for this period is highly suspect, these figures would indicate that the First Army was considerably better off in the matter of Class III supply. But its needs were greater, for it was consistently the larger of the two organizations operating east of the Seine and, contrary to popular impression, possessed, a substantial preponderance over the Third Army in all types of armored units, including armored divisions, separate tank battalions, and mechanized cavalry, in the critical days at the end of August and the beginning of September. In armored divisions alone in this period the First Army’s preponderance was two to one, for it employed four divisions in the pursuit as compared with Third Army’s two.77
The disparity in armored strength between the two armies was even greater than is indicated by this comparison, since two of the First Army’s armored divisions
– the 2nd and 3rd—were organized on the basis of the older T/O&E and contained a substantially larger number of combat vehicles than the more recently activated units.
The shortage of gasoline in front-line units resulted less from any breakdown in supply than from the inability to meet ever-mounting demands. Deliveries to the forward areas actually did not fall off precipitately in the crucial weeks. Whereas the Third Army’s consumption had declined from 397,000 gallons per day in the week of 6–12 August to 200,120 gallons in the week of 27 August-2 September, First Army’s receipts had correspondingly risen from 234,760 to 434,857 gallons per day (or rather 485,200 as indicated by consumption figures). Deliveries had increased steadily each week through most of August, permitting daily consumption to rise from about 605,000 gallons in the second week to 851,500 gallons in the fourth. Deliveries had indeed fallen off somewhat in the crucial week bridging August and September, but they were still large enough to permit the consumption of about 688,000 gallons per day, approximately the daily consumption of mid-August.
The fact was that the momentum of the pursuit could no longer be maintained with the amounts of fuel which the armies had received in mid-August. The reason was not that the daily advances by the combat elements were greater than before, nor that a larger number of divisions were employed. As a matter of fact, only sixteen divisions were operational in the two armies on 12 September as compared with twenty-one in mid-August, the VIII Corps having been detached from the Third Army and placed under the control of the Ninth Army in Brittany. The constantly accelerating demand for gasoline must be explained rather by the round-the-clock hauling operations of not only the regular QM truck units but the many provisional organizations formed with the vehicles of artillery, engineer, and other types of units, and by the tremendous increase in mileage involved in lateral communications behind the greatly expanded army fronts. Not only had the lines of communications been extended several hundred miles, but the armies had fanned out as they advanced beyond the Seine, widening the army group front from less than 100 miles in mid-August to 200 miles in mid-September. The inevitable result was to add to the already heavy burden on transportation.
The armies had developed an insatiable thirst for gasoline and had demanded an ever-rising scale of deliveries. The First Army had raised its demands early, estimating its requirements at 567,000 gallons per day beginning on 15 August.78 After the institution of tonnage allocations its bid for upwards of 2,000 tons per day of Class III supplies constituted more than 60 percent of its total tonnage allocation.79 Third Army’s daily telegram requests remained at 250,000 gallons per day until 26 August, when they were almost doubled.80 These soaring demands were beyond the capabilities of the Communications Zone, and could not be met even by the use of army transport. Nevertheless, sizable quantities of gasoline were moved forward even in the most crucial week. Meanwhile consumption of gasoline in the rear areas had also risen as a consequence
of round-the-clock use of all available transportation. Daily requirements for the refueling of Red Ball trucks alone were estimated at more than 300,000 gallons.81
At no time during the period of the pursuit was the gasoline shortage attributable to inadequate stocks on the Continent. Despite the long delay in bringing the Major System into operation, approximately eleven days of supply of POL based on a fifty-mile day had been built up by mid-July. At the end of the first week in August a stock of 25,851,000 gallons of gasoline was held in Normandy, representing fourteen days’ supply at the current rate of issue of 1,809,000 gallons per day and based on the current troop strength.82 Two weeks later, on 19 August, continental holdings had actually risen to 27,000,000 gallons of MT80, which was now equivalent to between eleven and twelve days of supply.83
That continental reserves of POL finally did shrink in the fourth week of August was not immediately attributed to greatly increased consumption. The Chief Petroleum Officer, Col. Elmer E. Barnes, thought at first that the “apparent” drop in reserves had been caused not by heavy consumption but by heavy withdrawals made to fill newly constructed pipelines, by the transfer of mobile reserves in cans to the armies, and by laying down depot stocks in the combat zone, none of which would be reported as stocks. When the trend continued, however, it was realized that this explanation was not valid, and it became apparent that the abnormally high issues of mid-August represented a rising rate of consumption, one which toward the end of August was greatly exceeding the planned maintenance factors. In addition, gasoline was accounting for a much higher percentage of the total POL tonnages than anticipated—about 90 percent rather than 80.84 These trends eventually led to a revision of the POL maintenance factors. Actually, despite the soaring rate of consumption toward the end of the month the average consumption of POL per division slice for the entire month did not exceed planning factors, and the temporary drop in the continental stock position apparently was not serious at the moment and had no bearing on the shortages currently being experienced in the forward areas. On 3 September, when the gasoline supply situation in the forward areas was at its worst, Colonel Barnes reported that stocks of all types of POL products on the Continent had actually increased despite the high consumption rates.85
It is clear from the foregoing that the gasoline shortage can be explained only by the deficiency of transportation facilities. Inadequate transport was in fact the chief limiting factor in the logistic support of the American forces throughout the period of the pursuit, and when the First Army first reported a critical quartermaster
supply situation on 26 August it recognized that the major difficulty was not so much one of inadequate supply levels as it was a problem of moving supplies forward into the army area.86
POL was carried forward by all of the principal means of transportation—motor, rail, air, and pipeline. Since the last was designed specifically and exclusively to meet the special problem of bulk POL movement it is apropos to describe at this point the extent to which the pipeline system was brought to function in this period. With the launching of the COBRA operation on 25 July ADSEC engineers had immediately resumed the extension of the major pipeline southward from La Haye-du-Puits. Upon reaching Lessay, however, a major alteration was made in the planned route. On the assumption that large forces would be employed in Brittany the original plans had contemplated running the pipelines southward through Avranches to Fougères (whence a branch line was to be extended to Rennes), to Laval (where the Major System would be joined by a line running up from Quiberon Bay), and thence to Le Mans and eastward. (See Map 9.) In accordance with General Bradley’s decision of 3 August, by which relatively small forces were allotted Brittany and the main effort was shifted eastward, the pipeline route was now also shifted to bring it into closer support of the main forces operating to the east. Beginning at Lessay the pipeline was redirected southeastward to St. Lô and then projected south and southeastward to Vire, Domfront, and Alençon, generally paralleling the earlier route but from twenty-five to thirty-five miles farther inland. (Map 16) From Alençon the lines were planned to extend eastward to Chartres and the Seine, crossing that river either above or below Paris and continuing on to the northeast. The new route had the obvious advantage of being considerably shorter and thus involving less labor and fewer materials. The construction of an additional line eastward from Quiberon Bay was no longer contemplated.87
Construction continued to be pushed vigorously after the above decision. In the second week of August the pipeline reached St. Lô, where the Major and Minor Systems were linked. Construction then proceeded simultaneously on various segments of the line. On 8 August work began on all three lines forward from St. Lô, two of the lines, each seventeen miles long, reaching Vire on the 29th. Meanwhile construction of two lines from Vire to Domfront, a distance of twenty-five miles, was undertaken on 19 August and completed on the 23rd. The extension of these lines forward to Alençon, another thirty-nine miles, was begun on 22 August, one of the lines reaching that point by the end of the month. By the end of August, therefore, one MT80 line had been pushed to Alençon, eighty-one miles forward of St. Lô, a second was completed to Domfront, and a third (for Avgas) was also nearly complete to the latter location.88
Up to this time the pipelines were extended at a good pace, with more than 7,200 troops and at least 1,500 prisoners of war employed on the projects.89 But both the construction and operation of the
Map 16: POL Pipelines in Mid-September 1944
pipelines were attended by increasing difficulties forward of Vire, and the progress of the lines was hardly an accurate measure of their usefulness. Partly because of the inexperience of personnel, and partly because of the pressure for speed, the lines were not always properly constructed. Rather than take the time it often would have required to break through hedgerows and remove mines in order to lay the pipe on the far side of drainage ditches, the troops regularly laid the lines on road shoulders and in some cases in ditches. As a result there were numerous breaks and pipeline failures.90 In addition, there was much indiscriminate tapping of the lines by the simple process of punching holes in the pipe, a small part of which was attributed to sabotage. On 29 August, for example, breaks occurred in the lines north of Domfront, making it necessary to draw all gasoline at St. Lô, eighty miles farther to the rear, until repairs could be made. Consequently the turn-round distance which trucking units were forced to cover between the forward areas and the pipeline dispensing points was increased by an additional 160 miles. Such breaks reduced the amount of gasoline which could be forwarded to the armies and aggravated the fuel shortage in the most critical period of the pursuit.91
Lack of an adequate communications system prevented maximum efficiency in the operation of the pipeline. POL planners had appreciated the importance of communication facilities along the pipeline and had recommended a permanent
Welding a section of the POL line as it is extended eastward across France
type of telephone system which would permit conversation between any two installations. Such facilities had not been made available, and the troops therefore relied on the organic equipment of engineer units, which proved quite unsatisfactory. Communication between extremities of the line and even between tank farms was largely impossible, and communication between on-the-line pump stations was only indifferently successful. Pump stations and maintenance crews frequently could not be informed of line breaks except by dispatch riders using jeeps, and gasoline was often lost while word was transmitted by this slow means. Operating crews at one end of the line were normally in ignorance of what was being done at the other end, and as the pipeline was being extended toward Alençon the interruptions in deliveries became frequent. Late in August the decision was finally made to install a semi-permanent telephone network, and Signal Corps troops eventually built such a system.92
Meanwhile the forward extension of the pipeline had itself begun to lag. It had long since become apparent that the pipelines could not keep pace with the fast-moving armies. In mid-August, however, even the normal speed of pipeline construction
was retarded by a lack of construction materials. As was the case with most other supply shortages the deficiency was caused not by a shortage of pipeline equipment, but by the inability to bring the available equipment forward. Paradoxically, pipeline construction, itself designed to provide an added transportation facility, felt the impact of the one limiting factor which was determining the extent of all logistic support—that is, transportation—and found itself in sharp competition with supply movements for the limited rail and motor transport available. Faced with a choice between the certainty of long-term savings through the allotment of a portion of the transport for construction purposes, and the more urgent needs of the moment, the Communications Zone tended to choose the latter and divert truck units to the higher priority forwarding of gasoline, rations, and ammunition. Indeed, so persistent was the demand for gasoline that the use of forward dispensing points on the completed pipeline was frequently delayed by the continued withdrawals from pipeheads farther to the rear, for such withdrawals so exhausted the supply of gasoline that it was impossible even to fill the most recently completed portion of the pipeline.93
On 22 August General Plank, the Advance Section commander, pointed out to the COMZ staff that the pipeline had assumed an overriding importance in the support of the armies and urged that additional rail transportation be allotted for the movement of pipe, tanks, pumps, and fittings so that construction could be accelerated.94 High priority was given to the movement of POL engineer materials at the end of the month, and for a period of about ten days between 500 and 1,500 tons of equipment were hauled by railway to the Alençon–Chartres area each day.95 These measures permitted construction to continue, but they did not help alleviate the fuel crisis which was already upon the armies. By 2 September one 6-inch line had reached Nogent-le-Rotrou, about thirty-eight miles east of Alençon, and within the next week the line was extended another thirty-five miles to Chartres.96 But the dispensing of gasoline did not begin with the arrival of the pipeline at these points. After the shutdown of the lines west of Alençon for repairs on 29 August, First Army did not begin to draw gasoline at Alençon again until 2 September. Third Army at that time was receiving its fuel via motor transport from Domfront.97 At the height of the fuel crisis, therefore, the armies were approximately 250 miles from the operating pipehead.
The fuel situation began to improve on 4 September. The supply of gasoline was by no means ample after this date, however, and current receipts did not allow the build-up of reserves. The G-4’s of both armies continued to complain that quantities coming into the truckheads were issued as fast as they were received and that they did not meet daily maintenance requirements.98 Nevertheless, deliveries in the following week were sufficient to permit a record average daily consumption of more than 863,000 gallons. Third Army twice in this period received amounts well in excess of 700,000 gallons and took advantage
of these receipts to build up a reserve of about 1.1 days on the basis of estimated daily needs of 650,000 gallons.99 In this period deliveries by air substantially enhanced the tonnages moved by rail and motor transport. In the following week—10–16 September—the two armies made daily average issues of more than 1,000,000 gallons of gasoline.
In the meantime the pipeline had been advanced still farther and was dispensing considerably farther forward. By mid-September one line had reached Dourdan, about twenty miles from the Seine, and was dispensing at Chartres. In addition, the Major System at this time comprised a second MT80 line extending beyond Domfront and dispensing at that city, and a third line, for Avgas, completed to Alen-con and dispensing there.100 This progress represented an improvement over the situation two weeks earlier, but it was largely illusory, for the bulk distribution system was far from adequate. The distance between the forward dispensing points and the armies was still as great as before—270 miles in the case of the First Army and 200 in the case of the Third. Furthermore, the pipehead at Chartres was capable of delivering only about one third of the estimated needs east of the Seine—that is, 400,000 of a required 1,215,000 gallons. A minimum of 815,000 gallons had to be obtained farther to the rear, a portion of it at Domfront, the great bulk of it at St. Lô and Etreham, and some of it even as far back as Cherbourg. This was obviously an unsatisfactory arrangement in view of the uneconomical use of truck transportation which it entailed.101
Nevertheless it was decided to suspend temporarily a further extension of the pipelines. The acute shortage of transportation continued to present something of a dilemma. Lack of a pipeline extending far enough forward already meant a costly use of motor transportation to bring gasoline from the base areas; on the other hand, adding to the Major System meant using precious rail tonnage for the movement of construction materials over a distance of about 250 miles from the Normandy ports. Because rail transportation was more urgently needed to move other supplies to the forward areas, the use of it for pipeline construction materials was no longer felt to be justified. A re-evaluation of the POL situation at Headquarters, Communications Zone, led to the conclusion that the Major System should be terminated at approximately the line of the Seine, and planners now considered construction of shorter lines based on the easternmost of the north coast ports, preferably Antwerp.102
The Major System was actually extended to Coubert, about ten miles beyond the Seine, although construction was carried on at a much reduced pace and the first line was not completed to that point until early October. By interesting coincidence, the overriding importance which the supply of gasoline had held for several weeks was already diminishing when the above decision was made, for in the second week of September the pursuit came to an end. Although POL requirements
continued to be large, it became increasingly evident as operations became more static and plodding in nature that the demand for other classes of supply, particularly ammunition, would grow more and more urgent and that they would compete for a larger and larger portion of the available tonnage allocated. Such a shift was portended in the first week in September by the bloody battles which the Third Army fought to win bridgeheads over the Moselle. As early as 8 September Colonel Muller, the army G-4, pointed out to General Stratton and General Plank that changes in the tactical situation might necessitate a sudden shift in demand from POL to certain types of ammunition,103 and two days later the G-4 actually took measures to increase the supply of ammunition at the expense of equal tonnages of POL.104 A similar shift in emphasis was made in the First Army about a week later.105
The total effect of the gasoline shortage is difficult to assess, although its immediate consequences for the conduct of operations are quite apparent. Since each day’s deliveries were consumed and the establishment of reserves was out of the question, tactical operations became wholly contingent on day-to-day deliveries. The crisis came when these could no longer be depended on, and the unpredictability of deliveries acted as a depressant on all planning and cast a pall of uncertainty over all operations, even as much as twenty-four hours in advance. In the closing days of August the mobility of the American forces was noticeably reduced, with the result that they could not take full advantage of their potential striking power and could not maintain the momentum of the pursuit. In the period of the shortage some units were allowed to continue their advance until their tanks ran dry, in spite of all the risks entailed.
Measuring the end effects of the gasoline shortage is a more speculative matter. At the time of the shortages there was strong belief in some quarters, particularly the Third Army, that the pursuit might have continued unabated and might have led to decisive results had there only been sufficient fuel to power the vehicles. Lack of gasoline, however, was not the only factor influencing the speed and extent of the eastward advance. By design, the main effort was still being made in the north, and General Bradley repeatedly placed restrictions on the Third Army’s operations, authorizing only limited advances with the thought that General Patton’s forces should not overextend themselves and possibly jeopardize the accomplishment of the army group’s mission.106
Furthermore, while it was true that the Third Army encountered relatively weak delaying forces as it forced crossings of the Meuse on the last day of August, captured documents later revealed that the enemy had already begun building up substantial forces along the Moselle. Certainly the deceleration of the advance occasioned by the gasoline shortage gave the Germans additional time for these preparations, but the formation of the Moselle defenses had already proceeded farther than was realized by U.S. forces.107 Similar developments had taken place in the area of the
First Army farther north. There the enemy had already begun to man the prepared fortifications of the Siegfried Line while delaying forces, aided by the fuel shortage, slowed the advance of the Americans. Although the gasoline shortage was a decided handicap in pressing the pursuit with full vigor, therefore, it is certain, in the light of developments on the enemy side of the hill, that the American forces would have encountered increasing resistance regardless of the fuel situation.
Class I, II, and IV Supply
While the supply of gasoline assumed overriding importance in the pursuit, shortages developed in every other class of supply, again not primarily because of the lack of stocks in the theater or on the Continent, but because of inadequate transportation. The limited lift available to meet the urgent demand for gasoline and the strong rivalry for transportation among all supplies meant that not even the barest essentials of many items would be moved forward.
Since rations are consumed in fairly uniform amounts regardless of tactical conditions, Class I requirements placed a minimum daily demand on transportation resources. But shortages developed even in this class of supply, and the character of operations had a definite effect on the type of rations issued. In the first month following the landings in France Class I issues consisted almost wholly of operational rations—that is, the packaged C, K, and 10-in-1, with a much higher consumption of the last than anticipated. Beginning in the second week of July a fairly rapid shift was made to the bulk-type B ration, in part to offset the heavy drain on 10-in-1 stocks, and by the end of the month approximately 75 percent of all the troops on the Continent were receiving the B ration with its greater variety and palatability.108
Plans had also been made to add perishable items to the diet and thus gradually to convert the B ration into a type A. Issues were to begin on D plus 30 to approximately 40 percent of the troops and eventually were to extend to all troops on the Continent. By mid-July the Quartermaster Corps indicated its readiness to inaugurate this program. But the sudden change in the tactical situation, plus difficulties over the handling of perishable foods, made it impossible to implement this plan fully. The provision of refrigerated transport and cold storage created a special problem along the entire line of communications. Because of the shortage of coastal reefers (refrigerated vessels), in which perishable foods were to be transshipped to the Continent, and because of the lack of cold storage facilities in France, the chief quartermaster had insisted that refrigerated ships be sent directly to continental waters where they could serve as floating storage until the foods could be accepted ashore.
The War Department refused to permit such a practice, insisting that reefers must be discharged promptly and returned. Furthermore, there were not enough refrigerated rail cars to handle shipments of perishables inland. About thirty American cars were supposed to move to the Continent in July, but they did not arrive until mid-August and constituted only a fraction of the requirements. In the critical days of the pursuit cross-Channel lift could not be spared to move refrigerator
Rations stacked at a Quartermaster Depot near Chartres
cars, nor could precious inland transport be used to move materials for the purpose of constructing cold storage facilities.109
Besides being circumscribed by these limitations the ration plan was upset by the nature of tactical operations. Pursuit operations did not lend themselves to the issuance or preparation of either the A or B ration, and the movement of large quantities of bulk supplies would only have added to the burden on transport. Consequently the breakout was accompanied by a rapid shift back to operational rations. No B rations were drawn by the Third Army after the second week of August, and thereafter its heaviest issues were of the 10-in-1 type.110
In the First Army the shift was more gradual, reflecting the more static character of its operations in the first few weeks of August, and the complete reversion to operational rations—mostly 10-in- 1’swas not effected until the last week of August.111 Thus, as in the first month of operations, U.S. troops subsisted mainly on the C, K, and 10-in-1 rations, and the goal of providing a large percentage of the troops with fresh foods was not realized.
Class I deliveries had the same difficulties as the forward movement of other types of supplies. Rations were regularly requisitioned by the daily telegram which gave the strength of the command, with a normal delivery expectancy of three days. With supply lines being extended many miles every day, the time lag lengthened to as much as ten to seventeen days.112 Third Army had its first warning of Class I difficulties in the second week of August. In a period of three days shipments fell short by 350,000 rations. As a result of the
interruption in the flow of supplies, the army’s reserves and even a portion of the unit reserves were temporarily exhausted. For the remainder of the month the daily deliveries were sufficient for maintenance and for reconstituting unit reserves. The army’s reserves remained precarious, although at no time during August did they drop below 2.7 days.
Shipments were again short in the second week of September, when the average daily receipts totaled only 152,580 rations against a troop strength of about 265,000 men, and when the level of supply temporarily dropped to .59 day. This was actually the only period of the pursuit in which the Third Army judged its ration situation critical. The shortages were partially relieved by the use of captured food, particularly canned and frozen beef. Captured flour was also used by the field bakeries, which continued to bake bread at each of the Class I supply points, aiding considerably in relieving the monotony of the C and K rations.113
Experience in the First Army was similar, although its position was slightly better throughout August. The Class I supply level reached its lowest point in the second week of September, when it dropped to .43 day based on a troop strength of 400,000. On the 11th and 12th deliveries had to be supplemented by 75,000 and 52,000 captured rations.114 Despite the occasional interruption in the flow of rations and the hand-to-mouth nature of supply, and although U.S. troops for short periods were forced to eat captured rations, the most unpopular component of which was a tasteless canned fish which American Army cooks were unprepared to cope with, the supply of food for the most part was adequate and never seriously threatened to affect the conduct of operations.
Rations, POL, and ammunition—Classes I, III, and V respectively—can be referred to as the “staples” of combat maintenance, and for obvious reasons had the highest priorities in the forward movement of supplies. Taken together, these three classes of supply placed a steady and fairly fixed daily demand on transportation facilities. Rations imposed the most unvarying demand on movement capabilities. The changes in the course and nature of tactical operations resulted in fluctuations in the demand for POL and ammunition, but an increase in the requirements for one was normally balanced by a decrease in the demand for the other. A highly mobile type of warfare, made possible by a low scale of enemy resistance, resulted in enormous demands for fuel and relatively small quantities of ammunition; conversely, static operations brought about a higher expenditure of ammunition and an accompanying reduction in the consumption of fuel.
In August and early September the minimal requirements for rations, gasoline, and ammunition could easily have absorbed all available lift, and it is not surprising, therefore, that Class II and IV supplies had to bear the brunt of the sacrifice, as is clearly revealed in both the allocation of the available tonnage and in the actual deliveries to the armies. In the first week of September, after tonnage rationing began, First Army permitted less than one seventh of its 3,500-ton allocation to be devoted to Class II and IV supplies. The record of receipts actually shows that, of the 20,742 tons of supplies delivered to the army by the Communications Zone in the first week of September, only 1,643
General Rowan, Chief Chemical Warfare Officer, ETOUSA
tons constituted Class II and IV.115 In the Third Army Class II and IV supplies received early in September averaged less than 300 tons per day, less than one tenth of the total allocation.116
Of the thousands of items furnished by the six services, Medical and Chemical Warfare Service supplies were certainly the least critical in the period of the pursuit. In fact, they were the only supplies of which fairly consistently adequate levels were maintained in the armies throughout the period. This good record in the case of chemical supplies was due in part to the fact that chemical warfare had not been resorted to, although the Chemical Warfare Service was responsible for the maintenance and supply of the effective and popular 4.2-inch mortar and its ammunition. Since some Chemical Warfare units, such as decontamination companies and chemical processing companies, could not be employed in the special functions for which they were trained, many were utilized in related roles, such as firefighting, laundering of salvaged clothing, and providing showers, depending on the adaptability of their equipment and personnel.117
Medical supplies constituted but a small fraction of the tonnages moved forward, and deficiencies could be alleviated fairly easily by air shipment from the United Kingdom. One of the unique features of medical supply in World War II was the provision of whole blood, an item which performed an incalculable service in saving human life. The distribution of refrigerated whole blood was organized by a theater blood bank, consisting of a base depot and advance blood depots for the Communications Zone and the field armies. In the first three months all blood was flown from the base depot at Salisbury, England. Whole blood was not plentiful in the early stages of continental operations; it became the most critical item of medical supply early in August and had to be allocated to the armies by the army group surgeon. The shortage came to an end in mid-August, when increasing quantities of blood began to arrive from the United States.118
The shortages of various types of signal, quartermaster, and engineer equipment developed primarily as a result of the in-
General Rumbough, Chief Signal Officer, ETOUSA
adequate means of transportation. In Signal Corps equipment the First Army’s position was relatively satisfactory in August, but the Third Army was badly in need of many items, particularly field wire and radio parts. On 10 August representatives from the major commands met with General Rumbough, the theater chief signal officer, and agreed that Third Army’s shortages should be alleviated by transfers from First Army’s stocks.119 Air shipment from the United Kingdom, whose depots held considerable stocks of signal equipment, met some of the most critical needs at the end of August. But forward movements from the base areas were small, and there was extensive use of captured enemy equipment as well as a considerable amount of cannibalization.120
Quartermaster Class II and IV supplies had an even lower priority for movement than most other equipment. In view of the more urgent needs for other supplies there was a tendency, therefore, to postpone the replacement of quartermaster equipment to a later date, with the result that quartermaster supply became increasingly critical toward the end of August. There was virtually no replacement of clothing, for example, in the very period when the replacement factor reached an unexpectedly high rate, and in the Third Army approximately 80 percent of all issues before mid-September were made from renovated salvage.121
The limitations of transport had an acute effect on the movement of engineer supplies because of the bulkiness and weight of major engineer items. In order to carry out their most important engineer functions, therefore, such as bridging, the armies attempted to “travel light” and eliminated as much tonnage as possible from their forward dumps. The Third Army met its transportation problem in part by converting an engineer combat group consisting of four heavy ponton battalions into a provisional transport group and using it throughout August to move heavy equipment and supplies forward from the beaches. Even so, there were critical shortages of treadway bridging, water purification equipment, and other items.122
Ordnance Class II and IV supply, normally accounting for a major portion of tonnage movement, likewise felt the full brunt of the limitations of transport, although
ordnance supply was further aggravated by the unexpectedly high demand for many replacement items. The Normandy hedgerow fighting had taken a heavy toll of such items as 60-mm. mortars, grenade launchers, and automatic rifles (BAR’s), creating shortages which persisted after the breakout. The mobile warfare of August now created additional problems of maintenance and replacement through the heavy wear on both general purpose and combat vehicles.
Part of the difficulty over spare parts and replacements in August stemmed from the inability to provide both armies with full authorized loads before D Day. In the preparation for the OVERLORD operation the First Army, as the force designated to launch the assault and secure the initial beachhead, was given first priority for both its T/E requirements and its reserves of major items and spare parts. These requirements, together with the various special authorizations for the assault so drained theater reserves that it was impossible to meet all the Third Army’s needs for operating reserves or its basic loads of spare parts and tools.123 In July, during the build-up of Third Army units in the Cotentin, efforts were made by direct representation at Cheltenham to expedite the shipment of spare parts and tools, and some of the army’s deficiencies were eventually made up in this way.124
Measures were also taken to eliminate the discrepancy in the supply positions of the two armies. On 1 August at a conference at ADSEC headquarters, the COMZ G-4, General Stratton, decreed the immediate release to Third Army up to its requirements of all stocks in COMZ depots of those items in which First Army reported excesses above its T/E and PROCO needs.125 Two weeks later it was agreed that Third Army was to be given preference until it had built up a reserve equal to that held by First Army.126 This policy led to some improvement in Third Army’s supply position. But both armies were by this time outdistancing the capabilities of the available transport, and it became increasingly difficult to bring forward the items in stock in the rear depots. Consequently many of the shortages of the previous month—of mortars and BAR’s, for example continued throughout the period of the pursuit.
In the meantime the hard driving of August created even more critical shortages in major items such as tanks and general purpose vehicles, and a severe maintenance problem demanding greater quantities of tires, tank motors, and other spare parts.127 The Communications Zone was fully aware of these shortages and many of the items needed in the combat units were available in the rear depots or in ships lying offshore. Because of transportation limitations and unloading difficulties, however, equipment could not be laid down at the point where it was needed.128
Other factors besides transportation and unloading inadequacies were at work as well. The unexpectedly heavy attrition of many items in the first three months of invasion had caused shortages in the theater. At the end of August General Eisenhower
highlighted some of the more outstanding losses for the commanding general of the ASF in response to the latter’s request for forecasts of future matériel needs. He noted that in the first seventy days of operations more than 2,400 BAR’s, 1,750 ¼-ton trucks (jeeps), 1,500 mortars, 2,000 planes, and 900 tanks had been swallowed into the maw of battle, and emphasized the imperative need for more and more “trucks of all kinds and sizes.”129
One of the major items in which an ominous shortage had begun to develop was the medium tank. First Army had sustained large tank losses in the assault and in the subsequent hedgerow fighting in Normandy. In June it reported 187 casualties, or 26.6 percent of its average T/O&E strength of 703, and in July it reported 280 lost, equivalent to 24.4 percent of the average authorized strength of 1,153. These figures indicated that losses were running at a rate at least three times as great as the 7 percent replacement factor authorized by the War Department, with the result that the theater reserve was quickly drained.130
Theater officials had predicted such a development even before the experience of the first months had shown this trend. Insisting that tank casualties in the assault would be higher than normal, they had stated before D Day that the existing reserves did not constitute a safe margin for support in the initial stage of the invasion, and had asked for a 20 percent replacement factor for medium tanks. An analysis of the medium tank position early in June revealed a potentially dangerous stock position by 1 August, and a shortage of almost 600 tanks by 1 September was predicted if current replacement policy was followed. The theater had therefore asked the War Department to expedite the shipment of tanks already released, and to release several hundred additional tanks to meet the anticipated shortage.131
The theater’s fears were not unfounded, as was indicated by the loss experience of the first two months. On 15 August the Communications Zone informed the War Department that its reserves of medium tanks were exhausted. Current War Department policy allowed the theater a reserve of 75 days (based on the 7 percent replacement factor) plus a shipping factor of 60 days (the time required for delivery)—a total of 135 days’ supply. But against the 75-day reserve requirement of 435 tanks there was no reserve in the theater at all at that time, although against the shipping factor requirement of 371 there were currently 336 on manifest and 425 on release.
Theater reserves had thus been eliminated by heavy losses, and shipments from the zone of interior had not kept pace with them. Reserve and shipping factors based on current War Department replacement factors, the theater claimed, were obviously too low to provide an adequate cushion if normal editing procedures in the War Department were relied on to effect resupply. ETO officials felt that the
135-day total would afford an adequate reserve only if the pipeline was kept filled by prompt weekly releases and shipment of losses as reported to the War Department. The theater therefore asked that its loss reports, rather than the inadequate replacement factor, be accepted as a firm basis for immediate release and shipment. Allowing eight weeks from the theater’s cabled loss reports until delivery, the 135 days’ reserve would just about cover the anticipated loss rate of 20 percent per month, and the theater noted that the accuracy of this loss rate was being fully confirmed by experience. Further adjustments would be needed if deliveries could not be made in eight weeks.132
In mid-June the War Department had raised the replacement factor from 7 to 9 percent on the basis of loss figures from the North African Theater, but had refused to grant the theater’s request for a 20 percent factor in view of the lack of experiential data at the time. The War Department had also announced that it was expediting the flow of tanks already released, as requested, but that it could not ship additional tanks without taking them from troop units destined for the theater.133 Meanwhile tank losses continued high. For the month of August they totaled 432, or 25.3 percent of the average T/O&E strength of 1,709 in the two armies, thus more than bearing out the rate predicted by the theater.134 Nevertheless, by one expedient or another, including the diversion of certain tank shipments directly to the Continent and the utilization as replacements of tanks earmarked for units arriving later, it was possible to keep all armored units close to their authorized strength throughout August.135 On 15 September the tank status in the armies stood as reflected in table on page 524.136
By that time not only were reserves almost nonexistent, but it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain armored units at their T/O&E strength. This situation was destined to become even more critical before it began to improve.
In the meantime continuing efforts were also made to overcome the other major handicap under which U.S. armored units operated—the recognized inferiority of U.S. tanks to the German Panthers and Tigers in both armament and protective armor. Early in August the 12th Army Group commander requested theater headquarters to take immediate action to convert M4 tanks by replacing the 75-mm. gun with the British 17-pounder, a weapon of superior penetrative power. It was hoped that sufficient conversions could be accomplished initially to provide one 17-pounder gun tank for each medium tank platoon engaged on the Continent, pending the arrival of the 90-mm. gun tank, then under production in the
| Troop units | Number of tanks | ||||||
| Army and type of tank | Armd Divs | Separate Tk Bns | Cav Gps | Authorized | On Hand | Serviceable | Repairable |
| Total 12th Army Group | 7 | 16 | 8 | 2,279 | 2,147 | 1,965 | 182 |
| First Army, total | 3 | 9 | 3 | 1,079 | 1,055 | 941 | 114 |
| 75- and 76-mm. gun tanks | 1,010 | 995 | 887 | 108 | |||
| 105-mm. howitzer tanks | 69 | 60 | 54 | 6 | |||
| Third Army, total | 3 | 6 | 4 | 1, 077 | 983 | 922 | 61 |
| 75- and 76-mm. gun tanks | 975 | 889 | 829 | 60 | |||
| 105-mm. howitzer tanks | 102 | 94 | 93 | 1 | |||
| Ninth Army, total* | 1 | 1 | 1 | 123 | 109 | 102 | 7 |
| 75- and 76-mm. gun tanks | 111 | 103 | 97 | 6 | |||
| 105-mm. howitzer tanks | 12 | 6 | 5 | 1 |
* Ninth Army became operational in Brittany on 5 September.
United States, or until ammunition with performance at least equal to the 17-pounder became available in quantity.137 Nothing came of the proposal at the time, primarily because its implementation would have required withdrawing tanks from the already meager reserve, a step which could not be risked in view of the current operational requirements.
Additional shipments of the new 105-mm. howitzer tank arrived in August, but even though this weapon had a high-explosive round superior to the 75-mm. gun’s it did not meet the need for a tank fighter. Meanwhile, heartening news had been received that a new type of high-velocity armor-piercing (HVAP) round was being produced for the 76-mm. gun which would provide the penetrative properties so badly needed. The first shipment of the new ammunition arrived in August. Firing tests proved the new ammunition greatly superior to that used in the obsolescent 75-mm. gun, although it was still no match for the front armor plate of even the Panther (Mark V) at ranges over 300 yards. Unfortunately the production of the new round was extremely limited, and the quantities received in Europe restricted its use to purely emergency situations.138 Thus, the requirement for an adequate armor-piercing weapon, as well as the problem of providing adequate tank replacements and reserves
in the ETO remained unsolved as the U.S. armies came to a halt in mid-September.
Ammunition
The problem of Class V supply, like the tank problem, was two sided. Chiefly because insufficient quantities of ammunition were being unloaded on the Continent, limitations on expenditures had been imposed within the first weeks of the invasion, long before it became necessary to superimpose tonnage allocations because of the shortage of inland transportation. Rationing of ammunition had therefore become the rule rather than the exception.
During the pursuit the uncertainty of ammunition deliveries was heightened by lack of exact knowledge as to the adequacy of continental stocks and as to the quantities arriving in the theater. In view of the unpredictable status of ammunition the 12th Army Group, when it became operational on 1 August, therefore continued the policy of rationing which had been initiated by the First Army. This took the form of restrictions on expenditure of the more critical types, published every eight days on the basis of the best information obtainable as to future availability. While this was not as orthodox or desirable as a credit system, it was continued in part because it was already in operation, and because any other procedure was impracticable until sufficient depot stocks were available against which credits could be established.
In making its allocation the 12th Army Group at first hoped to maintain reserves of seven units of fire in the armies. But the unsatisfactory continental stock position made this goal impossible, and in the succeeding allocations the authorized army levels were steadily decreased, as they had been for other classes of supply.139 Later in the month these reductions in the army reserves resulted more from the inability to deliver ammunition than from an actual shortage on the Continent. limitations on expenditure actually came to have little meaning, for not enough ammunition was available to fire at even the restricted rates.140
Because of the great amount of labor involved in handling ammunition, both armies attempted to keep their Class V stocks as mobile as possible. To secure the maximum efficiency in the use of its transportation the First Army centralized the operational control of all truck units assigned to ammunition hauling under the commanding officer of the 71st Ordnance Group. At the end of August this group consisted of two ammunition battalions (six companies each), two quartermaster truck battalions (three companies each), and a provisional field artillery truck battalion (with four companies of thirty-four trucks each), and was supported by a medium automotive maintenance company attached for the sole purpose of servicing this transportation. All trucks were to carry double their rated capacity and be capable of making a daily round trip of 160 miles. In order to meet the needs of the fast-moving VII Corps, which paced the First Army’s advance beyond the Seine, a motorized ammunition supply point (ASP) was organized. This rolling supply point carried approximately 500 tons of ammunition, limited for the most part to a minimum number of fast-moving items in accordance with anticipated expenditures, and was protected by two
Handling supplies in the field. Ammunition being sorted
Handling supplies in the field. Ammunition being stacked in open fields
batteries of self-propelled antiaircraft artillery. While somewhat wasteful of transportation, this supply point on wheels was extremely economical of labor and provided close support for the corps in its drive across northern France.141
Meanwhile, the First Army attempted to establish new ASP’s farther forward. At the end of August its ammunition supply was based on the La Loupe service area, although ASP’s were already established in the vicinity of Paris and Soissons. On 5 September a new ASP was established at Hirson, 230 miles beyond La Loupe. But within a few days even this point was far to the rear. On 11 September an ASP was opened near Liége, and fortunately rail service to this point was available almost immediately. But the task of moving the army’s ammunition stocks forward, first from La Loupe and then from Hirson, required the constant use of nearly a thousand trucks. On one occasion every available ordnance vehicle was employed to move 3,000 tons of ammunition in one lift from a depot on the south bank of the Seine (ASP 117 in the vicinity of Corbeil) to Hirson.142 Despite these efforts First Army’s stocks were reduced from 157,000 to 12,000 tons by the end of August.143
The Third Army also tried to maintain a rolling reserve of ammunition and for a time in September established a mobile ASP for XX Corps, but the Third Army’s meager transportation resources made the use of this expedient less feasible. As in the First Army, ammunition companies were augmented by the formation of provisional truck companies (utilizing the vehicles of ordnance maintenance units, for example), and the army’s ammunition stockage at times remained on wheels for three or four days. The army’s stocks fell to their lowest point in one four-day period at the end of August when transportation was almost immobilized because of the gasoline shortage. This threat was a temporary one, and the army’s inability to keep its reserves mobile was in part compensated for by authorizing combat units to carry ammunition in excess of their basic loads and to the limit of their carrying capacity.144
Fortunately heavy firing was not required in this period, with one or two exceptions. Throughout August the daily expenditure in the First Army averaged only 100 tons per division slice.145 The contrast between operations in July and August is reflected in the record of First Army expenditures tabulated on page 528.146 The comparison given in the table is not wholly accurate, for while the expenditure in rounds per gun per day was in several cases higher in August than in July, it was made by a considerably smaller number of guns, and by artillery units which in several cases were in action only ten or twelve days in the month. The contrast between the two months is more accurately revealed by comparing the total expenditures, which were lower in all categories in August, substantially so in most, although some allowance must be made for the fact that the First Army was somewhat smaller in size that month.
| Type | Total expenditures in rounds | Average guns in action per day | Average rounds per gun per day | |||
| July | August | July | August | July | August | |
| 81-mm. high explosive | 60, 990 | 16, 507 | 774 | 546 | 2. 5 | 1. 3 |
| 4.2” mortar | 74, 412 | 9, 066 | 139 | 35 | 17. 6 | 21. 8 |
| 75-mm. gun | 94, 962 | 29, 290 | 1, 000 | 770 | 3. 35 | 1. 42 |
| 75-mm. howitzer | 47, 034 | 17, 848 | 131 | 144 | 12. 4 | 5. 13 |
| 105-mm. howitzer M2 | 723, 907 | 366, 952 | 590 | 440 | 40. 83 | 27. 38 |
| 105-mm. howitzer M3 | 113, 420 | 42, 630 | 192 | 124 | 19. 3 | 15. 4 |
| 155-mm. gun M12 | 14, 096 | 14, 030 | 37 | 25 | 12. 4 | 17. 8 |
| 155-mm. gun M1 | 65, 484 | 35, 140 | 107 | 57 | 19. 7 | 20. 6 |
| 155-mm. howitzer M1 | 272, 973 | 100, 578 | 310 | 190 | 28. 4 | 18. 0 |
| 4.5” gun | 25, 162 | 19, 689 | 38 | 25 | 20. 7 | 25. 0 |
| 240-mm. howitzer | 2, 624 | 2, 084 | 14 | 23 | 6. 2 | 7. 5 |
| 8” howitzer | 11, 240 | 8, 204 | 39 | 29 | 9. 2 | 12. 2 |
| 8” gun | 1, 264 | 831 | 6 | 6 | 7. 0 | 13. 8 |
No tabulation of expenditures of course serves as a reliable guide to actual ammunition requirements. Ammunition was rationed almost from the beginning, and the armies had not been able to fire at desired rates in June or July, or even at the rationed rates later in August. Restrictions on firing had already hampered the conduct of operations in July, although some commanders had ignored them in what they regarded as “emergency” circumstances.
Despite the generally low scale of resistance in August, in at least two instances relatively heavy expenditures of ammunition were required, and the limited allocations had adverse effects. The first was the counterattack at Mortain, in which the First Army did its only heavy firing of the month. While the effects of the ammunition expenditure restrictions were not of major consequence, the First Army artillery officer reported that important interdiction fire by certain 155-mm. gun battalions designed to prevent reinforcement or withdrawal of the enemy forces east of Mortain had to be canceled on the night of 11–12 August for lack of ammunition.147
Far more serious was the experience of the VIII Corps in Brittany, where a combination of circumstances produced one of the most critical supply shortages to date and one which had a decided bearing on the conduct of operations. Shortages in the Brittany area were not limited to Class V. As the lines of communications extended into the peninsula the VIII Corps, like the units racing eastward, suffered shortages in all classes. Artillery battalions, for example, were reported unable to move out of danger when taken under fire because of the lack of gasoline.148 The siege type of operation which the VIII Corps was soon forced to undertake against such fortified places as St. Malo and Brest, however, quickly made lack of ammunition rather than gasoline the severest limiting factor. The experience
of the VIII Corps in Brittany provides a case study rewarding in its lessons in military supply.
Shortages of artillery ammunition had already begun to hamper the corps on 6 August, when the attacks on St. Malo were initiated. Enemy strength there had been greatly underestimated by the Third Army staff (the citadel held out for ten days),149 and inadequate allocations forced severe curtailment of the fire plans. For several days some of the heavy corps artillery battalions were reduced to expenditures of four rounds per gun per day. With this experience in mind, corps warned army as early as 10 August of the heavy ammunition demands anticipated for the reduction of Brest. A week later, at the invitation of Colonel Muller, the Third Army G-4, the VIII Corps G-4, Col. Gainer B. Jones, and the corps ordnance officer, Col. John S. Walker, drove to the army command post near Le Mans and submitted more formal estimates of the corps ammunition requirements for the Brest operation. They asked that three units of fire be laid down before the attack and that five additional units be set up for delivery for the first three days of the attack. Translated into tonnages, this request called for an initial stockage of 8,700 tons, plus maintenance requirements totaling 11,600 tons for the first three days. These estimates were based on the expenditure experience at St. Malo and on the expected employment of one armored and three infantry divisions and thirteen battalions of corps field artillery.
The Third Army ordnance officer, Col. Thomas H. Nixon, refused to approve the corps request for these amounts on the grounds that they were excessive. He noted, first of all, that the corps had been misinformed as to the number of troops it would have for the operation, since only two divisions and ten corps artillery battalions would be allotted. (Actually, three infantry divisions, a separate task force, and eighteen corps artillery battalions were employed in the attack on Brest.) Second, army stated that corps had overestimated the strength of the enemy garrison at Brest. Despite the experience at St. Malo, army believed that Brest would surrender after a show of force, and set 1 September as the target date for completion of the mission. To the dismay of the corps staff the army allotted only about 5,000 tons of ammunition for the operation, the bulk of which was already laid down in ASP’s in the vicinity of Pontorson and Dinan, near St. Malo.150
The VIII Corps supply position was by this time beginning to suffer the adverse effects of a rapidly changing tactical situation. The bulk of the Third Army was already engaged in the eastward drive, with a portion of the command about to cross the Seine. While General Patton was still vitally concerned with the army’s mission in Brittany, the main attention of the army naturally was concentrated on the pursuit, and it was becoming apparent that the Third Army was not willing to divert a large portion of its meager logistic support to an operation which had definitely become subsidiary to, or at least far removed from, the main effort. Control and support of the Brittany operation, furthermore, were daily becoming more difficult because of the increasing distance between the several commands involved. On 17 August, the day on which the corps
supply officers met with members of the army staff, the army headquarters was already in the vicinity of Le Mans, 100 air-line miles from the corps command post near St. Malo. Within a few days the two headquarters were 270 miles apart, the Third Army having moved eastward to the vicinity of Chartres and VIII Corps to the northwestern tip of Brittany.
At the meeting of 17 August Colonel Muller called attention to the increasing difficulty in handling the supply of the Brittany forces as a result of the great distance between the army and the corps, and informed the corps officers that the Brittany Base Section was being organized with headquarters at Rennes to provide administrative support for the corps. Whatever the army’s intention may have been in this regard, the VIII Corps staff, either from what it was told at this meeting or shortly thereafter, concluded that from then on it was to look to the Brittany Base Section for supply support and that it had been granted authority to deal directly with the new base section on such matters.151 At any rate, on 20 or 21 August, corps submitted a new requisition to the Communications Zone for additional ammunition to meet the requirements of its troop allotment which had been augmented beyond the strength on which army had based its allowances. The requisition was also sent to 12th Army Group headquarters, where it was reviewed by the Artillery, Ordnance, and G-4 Sections. With the approval of the G-3 these sections decided that the corps requirements could be filled from the Third Army allocation and agreed that about 3,500 tons should be released immediately.
Allocation of the ammunition was only part of the problem. Getting it to the VIII Corps was another matter. Since the Communications Zone’s transportation facilities were already committed to the fullest extent it was recognized that delivery could not be made unless a proportionate amount of lift was diverted from the maintenance of the armies. This proposal did not meet with the approval of the Third Army. When informed of it the ordnance officer, Colonel Nixon, asserted, first of all, that the requisition had not been forwarded through command channels; furthermore, it was his opinion that the VIII Corps had ample ammunition available for its task, and that if additional ammunition was required it could be supplied by the Third Army. He therefore requested that the army group take no action on the corps requisition and that the request be forwarded to the army as a matter pertaining to that headquarters. Colonel Muller supported the ordnance officer in his recommendation, and the army group accordingly advised the Communications Zone to take no action on the corps requisition.152
The fate of VIII Corps’ requests thus far had already led some officers to conclude that there had been a misunderstanding concerning the supply responsibility for the Brittany forces. Brig. Gen. John H. Hinds, the 12th Army Group artillery officer, located at the rear headquarters and lacking adequate contact with the forward echelon, was not even certain whether VIII Corps was still operating under Third Army command. He had favored the immediate shipment of at least one half of the VIII Corps’ requisition so that there would be no question about adequate
support of the attack on Brest.153 The army group G-3, Brig. Gen. A. Franklin Kibler, also emphasized the importance of the VIII Corps mission, and on 22 August he discussed the Brittany operation with General Patton, who again gave assurances that there would be sufficient ammunition.154
As a precaution, meanwhile, it had already been decided to send an officer from the army group G-4 Section to the VIII Corps to investigate the ammunition situation, and at about the same time Generals Bradley and Patton themselves flew to the corps command post. In consequence of this visit the army group decided on 23 August to relieve the Third Army of all supply responsibility for the Brittany area, and authorized the VIII Corps to deal directly with the Communications Zone on supply matters. Tactical control remained with the Third Army for the time being.155 Army group then sent a courier to the Communications Zone with instructions to ship approximately 8,000 tons of ammunition immediately. This allocation was believed to be large enough to provide the corps a reserve of three units of fire in addition to maintenance for six days, the time which the Artillery and G-3 Sections estimated would be required for accomplishment of the mission.156
While these actions removed all doubts regarding the responsibility for supply in the Brittany area they by no means constituted a guarantee that the needed ammunition would be delivered. On 25 August, with assurances that adequate resupply was on the way, VIII Corps launched its attack on Brest. Two days later, however, General Hinds, who had gone to the corps to check personally on the supply situation, reported that no ammunition had been received as a result of the allocation of 23 August. There were insufficient quantities to sustain the attack which had already begun. On 28 August, to add to an already frustrating situation, it was discovered that there was a basic misunderstanding between the army group headquarters and the corps as to the latter’s ammunition requirements. On that day two officers from the corps appeared at the 12th Army Group headquarters, reporting that deliveries of ammunition had still not begun and, obviously suspicious that the corps’ needs were being neglected, asserting that they wished to establish “firm requirements” for Class V supply. They were then shown the army group directive to the Communications Zone of 23 August and told that it had been issued on the assumption that the requests made on 21 August to the officer from the army group G-4 Section, a Maj. Joseph Peters, represented the corps’ full requirements. It was then learned from the two corps emissaries that that request actually represented only the minimum requirements which the corps regarded as necessary to have on hand before the launching of the attack.
Since the ammunition allocated earlier had not yet begun to arrive, the misunderstanding was not immediately serious. But it was now necessary for one of the corps officers to draw up new requirements that included both reserves and daily maintenance needs. These were reviewed by the army group G-3 and artillery officer, who scaled down the requests for the more
critical items and increased the allocation of items in less critical supply. The revised allocation provided for a 7,700-ton reserve and 1,400 tons per day for maintenance.157 Based on these computations a new directive was dispatched via an officer courier to the Communications Zone on 29 August with the stipulation that the shipments were to have the highest possible priority for transportation.158
The courier who brought the latest directive to the Communications Zone was informed by General Stratton, the G-4, that the shipment of 8,000 tons of ammunition had already been arranged for as a result of the allocations of 23 August. Approximately 3,000 tons had been dispatched on six trains, and the shipment of another 5,000 tons had been arranged for in eleven LSTs which were to sail between the 26th and 29th.159 These vessels were to deliver their cargoes to a beach which had been opened at St. Michel-en-Grève, about fifteen miles northeast of Morlaix, through which the corps had already been receiving a portion of its supplies for the past two weeks. Unfortunately the ammunition allocated on 23 August had not arrived in the quantities scheduled. Some arrived by both rail and LST on 27 August, but the LSTs were lightly loaded, three of them carrying less than 100 tons each and in the period 27–30 August the corps received only 5,300 tons, which was insufficient to sustain its attacks. Because of the inadequate receipts, and because of the uncertainty of replenishment, expenditures were necessarily reduced after the first two days of the attack. Fires were restricted mainly to counterbattery, support of local operations, and defense against counterattack.160
The delay in providing satisfactory logistic support to the corps had caused increasing anxiety in the final days of August. In a message to General Lee on the 28th General Bradley expressed great concern at the possibility that the Brest operation was being hampered by lack of ammunition.161 Lt. Gen. Troy H. Middleton, VIII Corps commander, made repeated appeals for the means to carry out the VIII Corps mission. On the 29th he re-emphasized ‘the desperate straits of the corps in a radio message to the 12th Army Group commander. Because of the bad state of communications he took the precaution of repeating his message via letter. In it he was unequivocal in his statement of the corps supply position and its effect on tactical operations. “Our ammunition situation is critical,” he noted, “due to failure to meet our initial request. If something is not done immediately I will have to stop offensive action.” Thus far, he said, supply had not kept pace with a unit of fire per day, with the result that the corps in some cases had eaten into its basic loads. Once more he repeated his earlier request for three units of fire maintained in the corps ASP in addition to basic loads.162 At the close of his letter he re-emphasized that the VIII Corps was battering against a strongly fortified area and that progress had been extremely slow. Ammunition was therefore the prime requirement; without it he believed the struggle could drag on indefinitely, for he was convinced that the German commander, General der
Fallschirmjäger Hermann B. Ramcke, would expend all his resources before capitulating.163
By this date (29 August) the exasperation of the VIII Corps commander and his staff was quite evident, and understandable. Repeated assurance from higher headquarters had not been followed by adequate deliveries. Furthermore, in the view of the corps commander the entire problem had become unnecessarily complicated by red tape and excessive channels. The VIII Corps had been authorized to deal directly with Brittany Base Section at Rennes, which in turn dealt with its superior headquarters, Communications Zone. But the Communications Zone would deal with the corps only through the 12th Army Group. General Middleton could only conclude that the corps was being given the runaround.164 In view of the many delays, plus the suspicion that its operation had become something of a sideshow, 450 miles from the principal theater of battle, it is not surprising that the corps should regard its position as little better than that of a stepchild.165
Upon the receipt of the second allocation on 29 August General Stratton had immediately taken steps to arrange the additional shipments by asking 12th Army Group for five LSTs per day for seven days, plus three per day thereafter until the shipments were completed. As an added insurance the G-4 directed that three trains per day for four days be dispatched to the Brest area beginning on 31 August, loaded to capacity with the same types of ammunition. As of 30 August, then, arrangements had been completed for shipment via water of 2,500 tons of ammunition per day for seven days and 1,500 tons per day thereafter,166 and an additional 1,500 tons per day by rail for four days. These shipments were to be in addition to those already authorized in the allocation of 23 August. Of the ammunition requested, stocks were not even on hand in the rear areas to satisfy the requirements of certain types.167
Pending the arrival of the scheduled shipments the VIII Corps commander continued to send urgent requests for items which were most critically needed. On 31 August, for example, the corps made a special request for 90-mm. gun ammunition and for air shipment of one million rounds of caliber .30 ball cartridges (in eight-round clips).168 Both requests were approved, but the supply of the corps continued to be plagued by endless difficulties. The air shipment proved impossible because of bad weather and had to be transferred to trucks. In the meantime Supreme Headquarters also became involved in the problem and sent officers to both the Communications Zone and VIII Corps to check on the supply situation and do what they could to expedite matters. Discussions with both General Stratton and the corps commander on 2 September revealed that the progress in meeting the corps’ requirements was still discouragingly slow. Receipts of ammunition up to that date had either been expended or were included in the stock position which the corps commander on 2 September had indicated amounted to less than one unit
of fire. Stocks of some items were completely exhausted.
One of the troubles, it was revealed, arose from the failure to follow through on shipping orders. In the opinion of Lt. Col. Joe M. Ballentine, the SHAEF officer who had gone to COMZ headquarters, the Communications Zone had assumed that its orders were being executed, while shipments actually were not being accomplished as scheduled. There was no way of knowing, he noted, whether deliveries were being made or not.169
One of the best illustrations of the lack of follow-through was the experience with a special truck convoy which General Stratton had scheduled for the shipment of approximately 2,000 tons of critical items. On 6 September it was revealed that the ten truck companies which a regulating officer had designated to fall out of the Red Ball run had not been dispatched to OMAHA Beach for loading, as scheduled. They had been instructed by the Advance Section not to leave the Red Ball under any circumstances, and they had complied with those orders. Since the situation had gone undiscovered for eighteen hours still another delay had resulted.170
Despite all the efforts to expedite the flow of ammunition the entire problem continued uncertain. A big air effort against the enemy fortifications was made on 3 September, but an all-out attack which was planned for the following day was again deferred because of the ammunition shortage.171 On 6 September both of the officers sent out from SHAEF, Lt. Col. Edwin N. Clark and Colonel Ballentine, were at the VIII Corps headquarters and on the basis of performance thus far were pessimistic about the prospects of building up the quantities which General Middleton insisted he must have before resuming the attack—that is, three units of fire and the assurance that an additional unit would be delivered on each succeeding day. LST arrivals thus far had been sporadic, vessels had arrived without manifests, and the loadings had averaged only 300 tons as against the planned 500. Receipts had therefore barely sufficed to meet daily maintenance needs.172
Most exasperating of all was the lack of information as to what could be expected. On 5 September Colonel Clark had attempted to arrange a radio conference with General Stratton but had received no response to his message to the Communications Zone. Impatient with the latter’s silence he addressed a second message to both General Lord and General Stratton the following morning. Re-emphasizing the urgency of the Brest situation, he noted: “Getting ammunition out here is vital matter which your office does not seem to understand. We must have not only ammunition but also information relative thereto. ... What in the name of Pete is wrong with Com Zone?”173 Under the authority delegated him by Generals Crawford and Smith of the Supreme Commander’s staff, Colonel Clark then requested complete information on all shipments.
The doubts and uncertainties over the supply of the VIII Corps reached their
height on 6 September. On that date still another officer sent to investigate the corps supply difficulties—Lt. Col. Leander H. Harrison from the Ordnance Section of the 12th Army Group—reported his findings. He noted that General Middleton and his staff were of the opinion that so many people and agencies had become involved in the ammunition problem that the whole matter was hopelessly entangled and beyond clarification. They were convinced, Colonel Harrison reported, that no one really knew how much ammunition was actually available or en route or on order.174 On that date, however, General Stratton at last gave specific advance information regarding deliveries to the VIII Corps. His assurances to Supreme Headquarters that the corps supply situation would soon be in a healthier state175 were shortly substantiated. Receipts on 7 September raised the ammunition stocks in the corps ASP to an average level of two units of fire. While this was below the minimum which General Middleton had specified as a prerequisite for the resumption of the attack, he nevertheless ordered the attack on Brest launched on 8 September on the assurance that a steady stream of ammunition was now on the way.176
One of General Crawford’s representatives had promised the VIII Corps commander that ammunition would soon pour into the corps ASP in such quantities that General Middleton would cry “Uncle.” In the succeeding days the ammunition picture did brighten considerably, and on 12 September the corps ASP held more than 13,000 tons, with a minimum of three units of fire in all types. Additional shipments were en route via LST, rail, and truck, guaranteeing sufficient Class V supply to support sustained operations.177 By the date of Brest’s capture nearly 25,000 tons of ammunition lay in the corps ASP, much of which later had to be reshipped.178
The VIII Corps, which on 5 September had come under the operational control of the newly arrived Ninth Army headquarters (Lt. Gen. William H. Simpson commanding), finally captured Brest on the 18th. The port had been completely demolished and was never put to use. To the Supreme Command the capture of Brest had continued to hold high priority in September, a fact which Colonel Clark, one of the SHAEF representatives sent to VIII Corps, suspected was not fully appreciated by General Lee’s staff. A basic divergence of opinion as to the advisability of pressing the attack on Brest had in fact developed between logistical and operational staffs. Believing that the need on which Brest’s capture was originally premised had been invalidated by the capture of Le Havre and Antwerp, COMZ planners regarded the costly siege of Brest as a wasteful and unnecessary campaign carried out in blind obedience to an outdated plan. They had been ready in the first week of September to recommend that it be abandoned except for a small containing force.179
The SHAEF staff was not so ready to write Brittany off in light of the vulnerability of Antwerp to blocking and mining,
and the consequent unpredictability as to when that port could be brought into use. General Bradley of the 12th Army Group, looking at the problem from a more strictly operational point of view, justified the battle for the port on the grounds that the containment of the fanatical Brest garrison would have required an even more prohibitive diversion of badly needed troops.180
The difficulties over ammunition supply in Brittany were a vexing and harrowing experience for everyone concerned. In some respects they simply evidenced the overextension of the entire logistic structure which had accompanied the sudden successes of August. The difficulties in filling the VIII Corps’ requirements centered largely on the by-now chronic lack of transportation. Competition for overland transport was at its height at the time, the ammunition shortage occurring in precisely the same period as the gasoline shortage. Transportation by water was also beset with difficulties, principally bad weather and the problem of loading LSTs at the beaches. Additional complications resulted from the diversion of vessels from Normandy. Loaded in the United Kingdom and intended for discharge at OMAHA or UTAH, these ships had often been bulk loaded with the separate components of heavy artillery ammunition, the shells on one and the propelling charges on another. Sudden diversions to the emergency beach near Morlaix caused confusion and resulted in unbalanced stocks, so that many a heavy caliber shell lay unfired for want of the proper propelling charge.181 Many vessels arrived off the beach at St. Michel-en-Grève with only a partial load and without manifests.
In addition to transportation difficulties, however, there were failures of a more purely command and administrative nature. There was no assurance that shipments had actually been made once orders were issued, and the corps was left in the dark as to the logistic support it could depend on. Plaguing the entire operation, furthermore, was the bad state of communications. General Bradley’s urgent message to General Lee on 28 August regarding the support of the VIII Corps, for example, required two days for delivery, and a message to Brittany Base Section at Rennes required sixty hours.182 For a time Third Army had no telephone connections with either the Advance Section or the Communications Zone.183
Not least important was the initial confusion produced by the ambiguity concerning the supply responsibility for VIII Corps. In view of a statement purporting to come from the 12th Army Group commander assuring the corps an ample supply of ammunition, General Middleton did not consider the so-called rationing of expenditures as applying to him. The Third Army’s denial of the corps’ requests was therefore regarded as an arbitrary one, and in the opinion of the corps chief of staff constituted a confusion of tongues which was never entirely cleared up. Colonel Harrison, one of the last officers sent to the VIII Corps by the army group to investigate the ammunition situation, probably made the fairest assignment of “blame” for the sad experience. He noted that the recent difficulties had been due to the lack of proper planning for the operation
by all agencies, lack of proper supply co-ordination by all agencies, lack of proper follow-through by the Communications Zone, hysterical requisitioning by VIII Corps, overoptimistic promises of impossible deliveries by the Communications Zone, and “too many parties giving instructions and too few parties carrying them out.”184
The experience of the VIII Corps highlighted a problem which was to reach serious proportions in the coming months. While the immediate cause of the difficulties in Brittany and elsewhere was the inadequacy of transportation, behind it lay the potentially more serious matter of the actual shortage of ammunition in the theater. For this reason ammunition continued to be a rationed item throughout the period of the pursuit, and the special allocations which were made two or three times in August were in reality command decisions to commit portions of the theater’s reserves. The extra shipments of heavy caliber ammunition to the VIII Corps at Brest placed a severe drain on army group reserves, and in the case of flinch gun ammunition reduced them almost to the vanishing point.185
The origin of the ammunition problem actually antedated the invasion. Theater ordnance officers had begun planning ammunition requirements in the fall of 1943 on the basis of data provided by COSSAC. In January 1944 ETOUSA submitted estimates of its needs to the War Department. Two months later these estimates underwent a radical upward revision—in most cases doubled—on the basis of recent experiential data from Italy and revised activity factors for artillery weapons.186 In mid-April, however, the War Department informed the theater that there were shortages in all types of artillery ammunition of 105-mm. caliber and larger, and that it contemplated allocating production to the various theaters.187
In anticipation of the shortage the theater immediately instituted a survey of its ammunition position. On 5 May the Communications Zone (or SOS) submitted ammunition availability figures to the 1st Army Group and asked that the combat requirements for critical types of ammunition be reviewed to determine whether the theater’s resources were adequate for OVERLORD.188 The upshot of this request was a complete review of the ammunition situation by representatives of First Army, Forward Echelon Communications Zone, Headquarters, ETO, and the 1st Army Group at the army group’s headquarters on 9–10 May. The meeting produced a rather shocking discovery: the theater and the tactical commands had been calculating ammunition requirements on quite different bases. The theater, for one thing, had been using an obsolete troop basis; furthermore, the two had been employing different measurements for their calculations—the army and the army group calculating daily requirements on the basis of one-third unit of fire, the theater using the day of supply as a measure. One thing was clear. The Communications Zone and the tactical commands had to arrive at mutually acceptable factors and then recalculate the ammunition requirements for the operation.
Ordnance and artillery officers immediately worked out expenditure rates after carefully considering the role of each weapon. These were accepted at the meeting on 10 May, and it was agreed that requirements would be refigured and compared with data on availability, and that steps would then be taken to obtain whatever ammunition was needed to overcome any shortages.189
Representatives from the tactical commands had been especially perturbed by the theater’s request that they review their predicted expenditures in the light of “availability,” and that they offer “justification” for any increases. General Moses who attended the meeting as a representative of 1st Army Group, felt that the estimates of their needs ought to serve as justification enough. General Bradley seconded this reaction, asserting that it was hardly the responsibility of the tactical commands to try to revise their needs to match reports on availability. Such a practice would only be self-deluding.190
The army group nevertheless checked its rates thoroughly to make sure that it had not requested more ammunition than was actually needed. On 20 May it submitted its revised estimates, based on the “agreed rates” of expenditure, and asked that it be informed whether its requirements could be met.191 The recalculation of the theater’s requirements had resulted in increases in many categories, and the Communications Zone accordingly submitted requests for additional ammunition to the War Department. Less than a week before D Day the War Department approved the requests except for certain items in critically short supply.192
On the very eve of the invasion, therefore, the ammunition picture appeared much more hopeful, and General Strat ton, the theater G-4, even assured the armies and the army group that their total requirements “of virtually all types” for the period D Day to D plus 70 could be laid down on the far shore when desired.193
The War Department had made important exceptions to its ability to meet the theater’s needs. There were shortages in several categories, but the most critical were in 60- and 81-mm. mortar ammunition, and in 105-mm. howitzer ammunition. Production in the United States simply could not meet the demand which the theater had made for those types.194 Within the next month the Communications Zone realized that War Department releases were falling short of the theater’s needs and asked for accelerated shipments.195 In July after a month’s combat experience, the theater reported that certain
items, including 105-mm. howitzer, 155-mm. gun, 8-inch, and mortar ammunition, were already in the critical category, and that continental levels were not being built up as planned. Failure by the War Department to ship the quantities requested, it noted, had made it necessary to meet all continental needs from U.K. stocks with the result that the balances in the United Kingdom were insufficient to provide units with their basic loads before crossing the Channel and had dropped so low that training even had to be curtailed.196 There was particular concern over the shortage of 81-mm. mortar ammunition, and the War Department shortly thereafter acceded to the theater’s repeated requests to increase the day of supply rate. The upward revision was meaningless at least for the moment, since the quantities required to meet the new resupply rate could not immediately be made available because of shortfalls in production occasioned by a shortage of propellant powder.197
As an additional argument for expediting ammunition shipments the theater reported that the full continental port and beach capacity for discharging ammunition was not being used, and soon thereafter it again asked for additional shipments in order to take maximum advantage of expected continental handling capacity in September and October.198 In making this request it was certainly being overoptimistic if not actually exaggerating its own capabilities.
At the end of July a tabulation of the First Army’s expenditures revealed the extent to which the rationing of ammunition had kept the expenditure rate from equaling the “agreed rates” of 10 May.199 But the initial restrictions in June and July had been imposed by the failure to dis charge sufficient ammunition on the far shore. At the end of July the theater ordnance section was not particularly worried about supply in the next thirty days except for two items-155-mm. howitzer M1 and 81-mm. light mortar ammunition. The only recourse on these items appeared to be additional requisitions on the War Department,200 and on 6 and 8 August respectively both General Lee and General Eisenhower requested additional shipments of both types.201 General Eisenhower considered it imperative that the tactical commanders’ requirements for the next thirty days be met in full, and he requested General Somervell’s personal assistance in arranging for the quickest possible shipments of the additional quantities as well as the unshipped balances of the July releases. The personal appeal by the theater commander brought immediate assurances from the ASF that additional
ammunition would be released.202
The ASF response promised only temporary relief, however, for it dealt with August shipments. The picture for succeeding months became more and more clouded with uncertainties. Most disturbing from the theater’s viewpoint were the doubts which the War Department expressed regarding the theater’s stated needs. In August and early September the War Department repeatedly questioned the theater’s demands, stating in one instance that the quantities of certain items requested appeared to be out of line with the weapons reported in the hands of troops, and asserting another time that the theater’s required level in most instances exceeded that approved by the War Department. The theater’s requests were accordingly cut, the War Department justifying its “editing” of requisitions on the ground that it was necessary in order to effect proper distribution of available resources among theaters and to prevent the accumulation of excesses in the ETO.203 Such action on its requests was not likely to reassure the theater despite protestations by the War Department that all concerned were keyed to the urgency of the theater’s needs. ETOUSA wanted approval of its demands and releases of ammunition, not merely sympathetic consideration of its requests.
In the meantime the theater had to meet the purely internal problem of how to distribute and apportion its inadequate resources. One problem which persistently vexed tactical commanders in connection with scarce items of supply was the difficulty of getting accurate information on both present and future availability. Such information was essential for long-range planning, and it was information which the Communications Zone was not always able to provide. In an attempt to meet this deficiency the army group in mid-August asked the Communications Zone to send a representative to attend all ammunition allocation meetings for the purpose of furnishing information on stocks in the rear areas and of giving a forecast of quantities becoming available in the succeeding forty-five days.204 But even assuming that the Communications Zone could indicate the total theater resources as of any given date (and this prediction was becoming more and more difficult in view of the uncertainty of War Department releases), it could not necessarily give assurances that ammunition would be in depots on the Continent when required. As one officer pointed out, “You can’t shoot manifests or releases.205
Meanwhile the theater determined its policy on expenditure of the limited resources available. Tactical commanders had naturally chafed under the restrictions on expenditures and protested an economy which to them seemed illogical. In July some commanders had in fact taken advantage of a proviso in the allocations which permitted expenditures in excess of allowances in emergency situations. The 30th Division, for example, expended three times the authorized allowances of medium artillery ammunition and double the ration of light artillery ammunition
General Sayler, Chief of Ordnance, ETO USA
during one week in July. First Army’s inevitable inquiry into these excessive expenditures evoked a vigorous defense by the division’s artillery commander, Brig. Gen. Raymond S. McLain. Sixteen enemy counterattacks against the division in a period of seven days, he noted, had created situations which he had considered emergencies and which fully justified the extra expenditures. He also accepted responsibility for the expenditures by elements of the 3d Armored Division which had fired in excess of allowances chiefly at the 30th Division’s request. General McLain re-emphasized that the casualties had always been considerably lower when the ammunition supply was plentiful and expenditures were unrestricted.206
The army group nevertheless had decided to continue First Army’s rationing policy, having little choice in view of the current availability data. In the first weeks of August it restricted expenditures of some types to rates as much as 50 percent below those agreed to on 10 May.207 Meanwhile the Communications Zone, apparently encouraged by the ASF’s additional releases in the two critical categories, saw no reason for worry and repeatedly assured the field commands that there was plenty of ammunition. General Sayler, Chief Ordnance Officer, actually predicted a “surprise for the people back home,” certain that the theater would soon be able to cable stop orders on ammunition as well as other ordnance supplies.208 The army group, on the basis of its own reading of availability figures, put little faith in the Communications Zone’s estimates. Rather than risk disaster as the result of an unnecessary limitation on expenditures, however, General Hinds, the army group artillery officer, decided to take the Communications Zone at its word, and challenged the necessity for the restrictions which the army group G-4 laid down. Arguing that the tactical situation dictated allocations at least equal to the average agreed rates, General Hinds succeeded in persuading the G-3 and G-4 to authorize expenditures at those rates. Allocations up to this time had been made with a view toward building up twelve
units of fire on the Continent. But this had become clearly impossible, and any at tempt to attain that target was now abandoned.209 It was known even at this time that expenditures at the higher rates would leave many items in the critical category within a period of a month.210 Nevertheless the policy for the remainder of August was to recommend the maximum expenditures possible without completely dissipating reserves.211 This was one way of determining whether there actually was a shortage of field artillery ammunition in the theater.
Despite the risk which this policy involved, the rates were renewed on 30 August when the next army group allocations committee meeting was held to set the expenditure policy for the period 3–11 September.212 Only a few days later the entire ammunition situation assumed an even gloomier aspect as a result of the suddenly increased demands from the armies. On 7 September the Third Army asked for a sizable augmentation of both its transportation and ammunition allocations so that it might cope with both the increasing enemy resistance along the Moselle, where it was already heavily engaged, and the anticipated opposition at the Siegfried Line. One corps (the XX) had requested nearly 10,000 tons of ammunition for stockage in its ASP, and estimated that its expenditures would reach 3,000 tons per day when it arrived at the Siegfried Line. At this time the transportation allocated to the entire Third Army totaled only 3,500 tons per day for all classes of supply, and of this total only 1,280 tons were allocated to ordnance. The desperate shortage of transportation made it obviously out of the question to meet the demands of the XX Corps, much less those of the entire army. In the words of one staff officer who reviewed the demands, Third Army was asking for the moon.213
Although such exorbitant demands could not be met, the 12th Army Group nevertheless continued to make relatively large allocations of ammunition considering the theater’s worsening stock position. When the next allocation meeting was held on 8 September (covering the period from the 11th to the 19th) it was realized that the current expenditure policy was resulting in a gradual but certain depletion of reserves. Both the army group artillery officer and the G-3, General Kibler, nevertheless advocated a continuance of the current expenditure policy on the ground that it would be much easier to penetrate the Siegfried Line at this time than later. The G-4, General Moses, was understandably hesitant to approve such a policy because of the dangerous level to which it would reduce reserves, and he was therefore constrained initially to withhold his concurrence.214
In the end he did not object to the high expenditures, but he made certain that the risks which they involved were fully understood. The entire matter was referred
to the chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen, for decision. Influenced by General Bradley’s known desire for a quick breakthrough of the Siegfried Line, the chief of staff accepted the recommendations of the artillery officer and the G-3 for a continuance of the relatively high expenditure rates with full knowledge of the policy’s implications.215 The decision was admittedly a calculated risk.
The logic of the above decision is better appreciated when viewed in the light of the unbounded optimism which pervaded the American forces at the time. In the area of the First Army the enemy was still in headlong retreat, and while the Third Army was encountering increasing resistance along the Moselle a quick penetration of the enemy’s main defense positions along the German border was still hoped for and expected. Should the desired early break-through fail, it was certain that logistic limitations would force a prolonged waiting period during which depleted stocks would have to be rebuilt.
The gamble had not succeeded by mid-September, and at that time the forecast on ammunition supply was indeed pessimistic. On 16 September the 12th Army Group estimated that all reserves of 81-mm. mortar, 105-mm. howitzer, and heavier-caliber artillery ammunition would be depleted by 10 October, and in a few types before the end of September.216 Nor were the long-range prospects any brighter. The Communications Zone reported at this time that, although large quantities of ammunition were en route to the Continent, much of it would not be available for at least thirty days because of inadequate discharge facilities. In the case of the heavier calibers it revealed that not only was there insufficient ammunition available or en route, but that the War Department had failed to release adequate quantities for the next two months.217 There was little cause for complacency as the armies entered the long period of static warfare in mid-September.