Chapter 3: Crystallizing the Wartime Mission
When the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 the Chemical Warfare Service, in spite of signs of improvement in its position, was still suffering from uncertainty as to its wartime mission. The fact that the course of international policy and events after World War I had seriously hindered CWS preparations for the possibility of gas warfare, together with the Presidential pronouncements against using toxic agents, and even against the permanent retention of a chemical warfare service in the Army, tended to lessen the vigor with which a gas warfare preparedness program could be pushed. Once the nation actually became involved in a fighting war in which toxics might be used against U.S. troops, this attitude of the executive department and particularly the War Department became much more realistic. The first year of the war was to witness a marked change in interpretation of the mission of the CWS.
A natural reaction to the events of 7 December was a War Department decision to authorize a sizable increase in CWS personnel. How these men would be utilized, into what units they would be formed, for what purposes the units would be used: these questions were as yet unanswered.
The Study of January 1942
The Secretary of State was among the first to raise a question as to the U.S. attitude toward gas warfare in World War II. In January 1942, Secretary of State Cordell Hull queried Secretary of War Stimson on the advisability of a unilateral declaration by the United States of its intention to observe the tern-is of the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol prohibiting the use in war of poisonous gases.1
As the basis for a reply to the Secretary of State, Mr. Stimson had access to a January 1942 study on toxic gases prepared by the War Plans Division of the General Staff. WPD had undertaken this study to determine existing capabilities of the United States in the event of gas warfare. In the course of preparing Mr. Stimson’s reply, WPD had also consulted the Chief, CWS, and his views were subsequently expressed by the War Department.2
Mr. Stimson advised the Department of State against making any public statement which might indicate willingness by the United States to observe on a reciprocal basis the terms of the Geneva protocol. The Secretary pointed out that such a statement might, through the introduction of domestic controversy over the political and moral issues involved, impede preparation, reduce potential combat effectiveness, and be considered by the enemy an indication of national weakness. Regardless of treaty obligations, the War Department considered the only effective deterrent to gas warfare to be enemy fear of American retaliation, the capability for which should be maintained through active preparation and constant readiness. On the original correspondence Mr. Stimson succinctly penned: “I strongly believe that our most effective weapon on this subject at the present time is to keep our mouths tight shut.”3
The WPD analysis of the state of gas warfare preparations sought to determine whether actual capabilities were reasonably adequate. The study brought to light some serious shortcomings and thereby paved the way for important corrective action. Immediate questions raised by the study involved the mission, mobilization, training, and disposition of chemical troops —all matters which, in prewar planning, had unfortunately been left for future decision. The study recommended that a decision be made on whether the Chemical Warfare Service was an arm or a service. It pointed out that the Munitions Program called for 18 regiments of CWS troops whereas the troop basis permitted but 2 combat battalions for an army of 56 divisions. The,WPD study therefore proposed that six full-strength chemical battalions be activated at once and one battalion each be provided for the important U.S. bastions of Hawaii and Panama. Since tactical considerations plus availability of equipment indicated that the Air Corps would be the
first arm to use gas, the study asserted that first priority on chemical troops should be accorded to the Army Air Forces, and that Air Force A of the Munitions Program, comprising 147 officers and 5,777 enlisted men, should be activated and trained immediately. Other proposals included the provision of defensive chemical units (impregnating and decontaminating) for key U.S. outposts and for Australia, Iceland, and Northern Ireland; stockage of chemical munitions in every overseas theater, possession, and base with priority to areas proximate to the Japanese; activation of six regiments of chemical troops as soon as equipment was available; and training for all branches in smoke and gas operations.4
On 13 February 1942 General Marshall personally directed WPD to insure the activation of 4 chemical combat battalions and directed the Budget and Legislative Planning Branch of the War Department to procure funds for the equipment of 18 chemical regiments (later reduced to 24 battalions).5 General Marshall ordered Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair to activate the four battalions along with nineteen chemical service companies before July 1942. Following the 9 March 1942 reorganization of the Army into the Headquarters, Army Air Forces (AAF), Army Ground Forces (AGF), and Army Service Forces (ASF),6 the AGF, heir to many GHQ functions, informed the Operations Division (OPD), War Department General Staff, that a directive was in preparation which would set up a program for training troops to operate under conditions of gas and smoke. By 23 March 1942 the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, had activated nearly three fourths of the authorized air chemical troops. About this time The Quartermaster General was instructed to ship impregnated clothing and decontamination matériel to the Pacific bases and the Western Defense Command.7
These operational decisions provided answers that the CWS had anxiously sought and supplied objectives toward which administrative and
CWS Equipment Army Exhibit, San Antonio, Texas, March 1942. The masks, from left to right, are: diaphragm, service, optical diaphragm (for use with field glasses), and civilian.
logistical action could be directed. By March 1942 the Chemical Warfare Service was thus embarked on a definite if modest mobilization project that was intended to assure the U.S. Army of at least a limited degree of readiness for gas warfare. In sum, this was an earnest of the active preparations and constant readiness to which the War Department had alluded in its reply to the Department of State.
The Concern of Mr. McCloy
While the WPD study was still in progress, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy brought up another aspect of chemical warfare preparedness which, up to that time, had not been especially considered except by the CWS. McCloy asked the Chief of Staff whether the United States was prepared to assist the United Nations in the employment of toxic gases.8 General Marshall referred the McCloy memorandum to the Chief, Chemical
Warfare Service, for comment and recommendation. Porter’s reply concurred in the views and apprehensions expressed by Mr. McCloy and summarized certain specific steps considered necessary by way of preparation for gas warfare by the United Nations. Some of these measures were already under study by WPD. Porter now advanced a proposal that the chemical warfare needs of all the United Nations be surveyed to determine what assistance the United States should and could provide. “In most of our military preparations,” he said, “we shall, for some time to come, be forced to follow a pacemaker. With the vast chemical industry of the United States and the highly trained scientific and technical men connected with it, we should be able to be ready for all-out gas warfare, if required, in a relatively short time, and in this particular do the pacemaking ourselves.”9
As a result of the McCloy memorandum and General Porter’s recommendations, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD, were directed to determine the requirements in chemical weapons and ammunition adequate to meet the needs of the United Nations in the event of gas warfare.10 In addition, the Under Secretary of War, Mr. Robert P. Patterson, was requested to investigate current British and American production plans to learn what increase should be provided to meet the possible needs of the United Nations.11
This militant attitude reflected the increasing concern on the part of the War Department over the gas warfare situation in the late winter and early spring of 1942. The General Staff was at last beginning to regard realistically the several dimensions of the gas warfare problem: the capability of the United States to produce and use toxic agents; the ability of the United States and the rest of the United Nations to defend themselves against gas attack; the preparation—offensive and defensive—for gas warfare as a means of dissuading the enemy from using gas; and, behind all these considerations, the question whether the United States could indefinitely afford to surrender the initiative to the Axis in this important area. Thus the early months of 1942, a time of utmost difficulty for military planners generally, was also a period of serious concern over gas warfare. Would the enemy beat the United States to the punch and introduce gas before its nascent preparations materialized? Could the United States fulfill
its role in a coalition war of global proportions that was further complicated by the employment of toxic agents? Such questions the General Staff was now obliged to face.
During the prewar years, particularly 1940 and 1941, the Chemical Warfare Service had not always concealed its impatience with what appeared to be a lack of realism in the War Department’s approach to the subject of gas warfare. By 1942 wishful thinking had ceased. It became the official view that the enemy might sooner or later resort to gas and that, if he did, the United States should beat him at his own game.12
The Porter Proposals
In addition to news of the steady succession of defeats suffered by the United Nations in the winter of 1941 and early spring of 1942, intelligence reports and rumors reaching the War Department hinted ever more strongly at the possibility of gas warfare. With the fall of Bataan the whole situation seemed to demand still closer study. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, Maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, called for the views of the Chemical Warfare Service in a memorandum that began with the ominous statement: “Present intelligence reports indicate the possibility of the outbreak of chemical warfare in the near future.”13 General Eisenhower specifically requested an estimate of the capability and probability of the Axis’ waging gas warfare, an estimate of the power of the United States to retaliate, a report (coordinated with The Quartermaster General) on the distribution of protective equipment, another report (coordinated with the Army Air Forces) of the means for retaliation presently available overseas, and finally—for the CWS the most important—a report of such recommendations as the Chief, CWS, deemed advisable.14 It was a red-letter day for the Chemical Warfare Service.
General Porter and his staff warmly welcomed the opportunity to present their case, and the CWS reply furnished the blueprint for the wartime
mission and program of the Chemical Warfare Service. The CWS stated that the probability of gas warfare was stronger than at any time since the beginning of the war and that the Axis had greater capabilities for waging gas warfare than did the United Nations. Whereas Great Britain could retaliate immediately in Europe, the long-established policy by which the United States left the initiative in gas warfare to the enemy had so hampered American preparations that retaliation, at the best, would be on a limited scale. The offensive and defensive training of the Army in chemical warfare was deficient. In the few hours of training allotted to chemical warfare the American soldier had learned little more than how to adjust his gas mask. Nor did inspection reports reveal a much better condition of training on the part of company grade officers. The CWS regarded the distribution and supply of protective clothing and equipment as entirely inadequate. Only a limited amount of chemical warfare offensive matériel was overseas for the use of the Army Air Forces, although it would initially be in the best position to retaliate.
General Porter therefore made a number of important recommendations aimed at placing the United States in the proper posture for offensive and defensive gas warfare. The very first of these was that definite objectives should be set up for the entire chemical warfare supply program. These would include filling the requirements of the United States and other United Nations for full-scale chemical warfare. Since preparations on such a scale naturally called for additional arsenal facilities, the Chief, CWS, pointed out that the present and projected chemical warfare production capacity of the United States was based solely upon the current Army Supply Program, which did not visualize the extent to which chemical warfare might develop. He therefore recommended that American production capacity for toxic agents be increased well beyond probable enemy capacities. On the defensive side the Chief, CWS, proposed that full protection be provided for all military and naval personnel stationed outside the continental United States, and he earnestly suggested that adequate gas and smoke training be injected into normal training routine and maneuvers.
The Chief, CWS, felt that chemical mortar battalions would provide the most effective means for large-scale retaliation on the ground and that such battalions should be activated on the general basis of one per division. Although the Army Supply Program had provided for a total of 28 battalions by 1944, by May 1942 only 4 chemical battalions and 3 separate chemical mortar companies—one each in Panama, Hawaii, and the United
States—had been activated, a fourth company having been lost in the Philippines. The CWS considered the 4.2-inch chemical mortar to be an ideal weapon for delivering gas, smoke, or high explosive shell in high concentrations in support of ground operations.
General Porter proposed the following basis for troop units for service support in the field:
| Type | Basis |
| Maintenance Company | One per army |
| Decontaminating Company | One per army corps |
| Impregnating Company | One per army corps |
| Depot Company | One per army |
| Field Laboratory Company | One per theater of operations |
He also believed that priority should be given to the chemical warfare requirements of the Army Air Forces and accordingly proposed the activation of the following troop units:
| Type | Basis |
| Maintenance Company | One per air force |
| Impregnating Company | One per air force |
| Field Laboratory Company | One per air force |
These service elements would be assigned to each air force in addition to the CWS units already authorized.15
For the Air Forces, General Porter further proposed that an overall distribution scheme be prepared covering incendiary bombs, airplane spray tanks, and chemical bombs, based on the present location and anticipated future allocation of planes capable of employing those weapons in various theaters of operations.
General Porter not only recommended that the GHQ Umpire Manual be revised to include chemical warfare training for all parts of the Army but he also made other proposals to increase the efficiency and capability of CWS training. He requested that the Chemical Warfare Service receive control of the entire area of Gunpowder Neck, on which Edgewood Arsenal was situated, instead of having to share it with the Ordnance Department. This need arose out of the ever-increasing demand for additional space
and range facilities in connection with both research and training which were carried on simultaneously at Edgewood. From this same problem arose General Porter’s recommendation that, in any case, the Chemical Warfare Replacement Training Center (RTC) be relocated from Edge-wood to a 35,000-acre tract outside the town of Gadsden, Alabama. The Chief, CWS, proposed that the student capacity of the Chemical Warfare School be increased from 200 student officers and 50 student enlisted men to at least 400 student officers and 150 student enlisted men. General Porter also recommended that the capacity of the CWS Officer Candidate School (OCS) be increased from 160 to at least 700 officer candidates. Finally, he suggested that a school for senior officers be provided at Edgewood Arsenal with an initial attendance by general officers of the Army.16
A few months earlier such proposals would have received scant attention at the General Staff level; now they were seriously studied and action on them was begun immediately. Within a week OPD sought their approval by the General Staff, with the exception of the ratio proposed by General Porter of one mortar battalion per armored or infantry division.17 OPD recommended instead that twenty-eight chemical battalions be activated by 1944 with a maximum of fourteen by the end of 1942 and the General Staff concurred in the recommendations.18
All through the summer of 1942 the War Department was engaged in the implementation of General Porter’s proposals. The War Department issued directives to insure adequate chemical warfare training and to provide for the immediate supply of impregnated clothing and other essential equipment to overseas forces. A priority list for the distribution of chemical warfare matériel was established with first priority given to the Far East. G-3 and ASF took measures to establish OCS and RTC facilities of sufficient size and to provide equipment for the program. By August the General Staff was ready to recommend the following additional steps to General Marshall: (1) that G-3 establish ratios for the constitution and activation of chemical warfare service troops (Table 4) and constitute and activate chemical mortar battalions on the basis of approved special projects rather
Table 4: 1942 Proposed Modification in CWS Troop Basis
| Type* | As of 25 May | Increase | Proposed 13 August |
| Ground Force Type Units | |||
| Chemical Co (Maintenance) | 12 | 0 | 12 |
| Chemical Co (Depot) | 9 | 2 | 11 |
| Chemical Co (Decontamination) | 26 | 0 | 26 |
| Chemical Co (Impregnation) | 30 | 0 | 30 |
| Chemical Co (Field Laboratory) | 5 | 0 | 5 |
| Chemical Co (Smoke Generator) | 21 | 0 | 21 |
| Chemical Co (Composite) | 2 | 7 | 9 |
| Chemical Co (Mortar) | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| Chemical Bn (Mortar) | 6 | 0 | 6 |
| Air Force Type Units | |||
| Chemical Co (Air Operations) | |||
| (N)† | 37 | 0 | 37 |
| (M) | 17 | 0 | 17 |
| (L) | 3 | 0 | 3 |
| (D) | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| (C) | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| Chemical Co (Maintenance) | 12 | 0 | 12 |
| Chemical Co (Depot) | 12 | 0 | 12 |
| Chemical Co (Storage) | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| Chemical Co (Service Aviation) | 11 | 0 | 11 |
* In addition to chemical sections in headquarters of units as authorized by approved Table of Organization.
† A decrease in Air Force personnel led to the reorganization of the chemical company (air bombardment) and chemical company (air operations) into the chemical company (air operations) which had the same organization for all bombardment groups.
Source: Tab E to Memo, ACofS OPD for CofS USA, 13 Aug 42, sub: Revision in the Cml Warfare Program. OPD 385 CWP Sec HA.
than assign one per division, and (2) that the Chief of Staff sign a letter requesting the Combined Chiefs of Staffs (CCS) to give early consideration to an over-all directive which could be used as a basis for production and allocation of chemical warfare material and troops available to the United Nations.19 The new troop basis increased the size of the CWS to 4,970 officers and 47,192 enlisted men. (Table 5)
Several problems yet remained, such as formal confirmation of combat functions for the CWS, clarification of training responsibilities for CWS units, the adjustment of the Army Supply Program to handle prospective United Nations’ requirements, and clarification of Air Force requirements together with improvement in coordination of the manufacture of chemical
Table 5—CWS Troop Basis, as of 13 August 1942
| Type | Officer | Enlisted Men |
| Total | 4,970 | 47,192 |
| Air Force Type Units | 828 | 14,609 |
| Ground and Service Force Type Units | 964 | 29,743 |
| War Department Overhead (Arsenals, Schools, Procurement) | 3,178 | 2,840 |
Source: Tab E to Memo, ACofS OPD for CofS USA, 13 Aug 42, sub: Revision in the Chemical Warfare Program. OPD 385 CWP Sec IIA.
warfare equipment and aircraft.20 In September 1942 OPD informed the ASF that the Chief of Staff had approved most of General Porter’s major recommendations on gas warfare and that action had been taken to implement them.21
When cables reached the War Department in the latter part of November 1942 strongly suggesting that the enemy might soon resort to gas warfare, the Chief of Staff ordered the CWS to report on the status of overseas shipments of CWS supplies and on the extent of implementation of the protective equipment policy established the preceding June.22 General Marshall apparently did not wish a gas warfare Pearl Harbor.
The Gas Mission Defined
General Marshall conveyed his concern over the potentialities of the gas warfare situation to Secretary Stimson in mid-December 1942 when the Chief of Staff expressed his conviction that the Germans would soon launch gas attacks on the United Nations.23 Apparently both the director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, Dr. Vannevar Bush, and the chairman of the National Defense Research Committee, Dr. James Conant, were present in the office of the Secretary of War when General
Marshall made his remarks, for a week later both these distinguished scientists posed several incisive questions to Secretary Stimson relative to the fears expressed by the Chief of Staff. Bush and Conant asked whether the War Department had taken adequate steps to prepare American soldiers for defense against new German toxic agents.24 Second, they inquired whether the United States was fully prepared to retaliate and, if so, whether a public announcement to that effect should be made.25
These pointed questions, raised by the two civilians who were principally responsible for marshaling the scientific skills of the nation for World War II, deserved serious study. Probably the questions were asked without full knowledge of the numerous measures taken by the War Department during 1942 to improve the capacity of the Army for waging gas warfare. But they served as the occasion for a hasty War Department survey of what had been accomplished under the Porter proposals. Harvey Bundy, special assistant to Secretary Stimson, incorporated the inquiries in a memorandum to Mr. Stimson on 21 December. Three days later it was in General Porter’s hands for comment and recommendation.26
The Chief, CWS, indicated in rather broad terms what had been done and what remained to be accomplished. He assured the General Staff that the service gas mask was the best in the world and that it provided adequate protection against the German toxic agents to which Bush and Conant had referred. On the less favorable side, he pointed out that maneuver reports and inspections at ports of embarkation indicated that U.S. troops had received inadequate defensive training in the use of protective items other than the gas mask.27 As for the ability of the United States to retaliate, General Porter stated that preparations included large stocks of mustard gas on hand and a large and steadily increasing capacity for its production. The Chief, CWS, reiterated his feeling that an overt threat of retaliation would serve no useful purpose and might be taken by the enemy as a sign of weakness.28
1-ton chemical containers awaiting shipment at a CWS storage yard, 1943.
OPD promptly assembled representatives of the CWS, ASF G-3, G-4, AGF, and AAF to study the deficiencies noted by Porter. Upon examination of the vital training problem, the conferees concluded that the Army was not fully prepared to defend itself against gas attack because certain items of individual protective equipment had only recently been standardized and made available for training. They were of the opinion that the current training policy was satisfactory but that until production of the new equipment caught up with requirements the training program would be incomplete. In the meantime, one proposed solution was to re-emphasize priority for the chemical warfare training program of the Army, especially in field maneuvers. More important, it was decided that the Chief, CWS, as technical adviser to the Chief of Staff, ought to conduct any troop inspections necessary to determine the technical status of chemical warfare training. On the question of retaliation, the consensus was that the Army Air Forces could do little with the small stocks of gas munitions then overseas. The
AAF and the CWS agreed that the immediate answer was a higher shipping priority.29
On the basis of General Porter’s letter and the meetings held by representatives of the War Department General Staff, General Marshall informed the Secretary of War: (1) that the Army would be provided with new protective equipment by June 1943 (barring manufacturing priority difficulties); (2) that steps had been taken to expedite the training of the Army in the use of protective equipment; and (3) that American forces overseas were currently unprepared to retaliate but, granted the necessary shipping priorities, available equipment and munitions could be distributed by May 1943. The Chief of Staff concurred with General Porter that no public threats of retaliation should be made.30 A more complete report on CWS and War Department accomplishments since May 1942 was submitted at the end of December in answer to General Marshall’s inquiry of 4 December. This report thoroughly reviewed the chemical warfare status of the United States and listed steps taken toward readiness. The CWS recommended that higher priorities be given for critical materials needed in the completion of impregnating plants, that additional impregnating (later known as processing) companies be authorized, and that special directives governing the issue of impregnated clothing be published for all theaters where gas warfare was likely.31
The gas mission of the Chemical Warfare Service had thus crystallized by the close of 1942 as the result of almost a year of staff studies, discussion, alarms, and War Department directives. A number of factors had combined to bring about a more realistic attitude toward gas warfare than had been present at any time since 1918. Of these, the most impelling was the fear that the enemy might initiate gas warfare. Under the leadership of Secretary Stimson, Assistant Secretary McCloy, General Marshall, and General Porter, the War Department began active preparations to meet such a contingency in a manner that would insure American supremacy in this field.