Chapter 4: The United States Chemical Warfare Committee
The War Department’s emphasis in early 1942 on preparation for retaliation gas warfare made evident the need for an agency to furnish advice on chemical warfare policy, to develop a procurement and supply program, and to coordinate these matters with the United Nations, particularly Great Britain.1 In the late spring of 1942 the policy on gas warfare of the United States and Great Britain was announced in unilateral statements by Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt.2 On 10 May Churchill declared: “I wish to make it plain that we shall treat the unprovoked use of poison gas against our Russian ally exactly as if it were used against ourselves, and if we are satisfied that this new outrage has been committed by Hitler we will use our great and growing air superiority in the west to carry gas warfare on the largest possible scale far and wide upon the towns and cities of Germany.” A month later President Roosevelt stated: “I desire to make it unmistakably clear that if Japan persists in this inhuman form of warfare against China or against any other of the United Nations, such action will be regarded by this government as though taken against the United States and retaliation in kind and in full measure will be meted out.”3
These statements established the general gas warfare policy of the respective nations, but no organization had been established to implement coordination between the parallel policies of the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations, and procedures for coordination of effort in event of enemy gas attack were necessary as well as preparation for a combined procurement and supply program. The British in 1940 had established the Inter-Service Committee on Chemical Warfare (ISCCW), a group representative of all services reporting to the British Chiefs of Staff; and the United States had the Chemical Warfare Service which represented the interests of the Army, the component Army Air Forces, and, by informal arrangement, the Navy. In August 1942 General Marshall brought the question of coordination to the attention of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and offered the services of the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service as adviser to the CCS.4 The Combined Chiefs referred this suggestion to the Combined Staff Planners (CPS) who created an ad hoc chemical warfare subcommittee headed by the Chief, CWS, which was to define the United Nations chemical warfare policy and draw up a directive upon which a coordinated United Nations chemical warfare procurement and supply policy could be based.5 During discussions of initial drafts of a report within the ad hoc subcommittee, the British representative proposed establishment of a permanent subcommittee of the Combined Staff Planners to carry out the combined program.6 This proposal was dropped during the ad hoc subcommittee meeting of 22 October 1942 upon general agreement to use existing agencies.7 A week later the ad hoc subcommittee reported the results of its study to the Combined Staff Planners.8
The chemical warfare subcommittee recommended that gas warfare be
undertaken by both U.S. and British Commonwealth forces on the order of the Combined Chiefs of Staff after approval by appropriate governmental authority, or independently by any such nation, if in retaliation, on the decision of a representative especially designated for that purpose by its highest governmental authority.9 It also recommended that either U.S. or British Commonwealth forces should provide evidence of the enemy’s use of gas in case combined action was requested. When the decision to retaliate was made independently, the acting nation should give immediate, confirmed information to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who would then notify cobelligerents. Lastly, the subcommittee recommended that the CCS issue a directive for a coordinated chemical warfare procurement and supply program and included a suggested directive as a separate annex to the report. This proposed directive placed responsibility for the chemical warfare procurement and supply program in the United States with the Commanding General, Army Services Forces, who was to designate the Chief, CWS, and such other officers as he might deem appropriate as a committee to execute this responsibility. This group, in coordination with the U.S. Navy representative, would then contact the appropriate British agency which would be selected by the British Chiefs of Staff. Both the American and British agencies were to be staff in nature; where command decisions were required these were to be obtained through normal command channels. The proposed directive concluded with a list of specific functions which the two committees were to perform. The Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the report with but minor changes, and on 14 November 1942 it became an official document known as CCS 106/2.
Mission and Functions of the Committee
This document, CCS 106/2, described in some detail the duties of both American and British agencies in coordinating the chemical warfare procurement and supply program. It listed seven separate functions for which these agencies were responsible, six of which dealt exclusively with the production and supply of gas warfare matériel.10 The Combined Chiefs of Staff directed these agencies to establish potential production capacity capable of rapid expansion to meet the needs of gas warfare while keeping
current production on the minimum level compatible with this goal. The agencies were to provide for initial stocks at levels which would permit gas warfare to be carried on pending expansion of production; they were to establish uniform initial stock levels of all types of equipment for combined theaters, and they were to determine and maintain minimum levels of individual and collective protective equipment and to set up logistical factors for antigas equipment, gas weapons, and munitions. A further and very important function was the initiation of a program for standardizing and interchanging all types of chemical warfare equipment used by the United States and Great Britain. The directive concluded with the admonition that, in the execution of these policies, “the extent of the measures adopted would be limited to those compatible with a balanced over-all munitions program.”11
To carry out these provisions the Commanding General, ASF, promptly established a committee headed by General Porter and including representatives chosen by G-2 and OPD of the War Department General Staff, the Requirements and Operations Divisions of the ASF, and the U.S. Navy.12
General Porter asked the chiefs of the Industrial, Technical, Operations, and Training Divisions of his office to appoint qualified officers to represent their divisions in the work required by the CCS directive. As the Chief, CWS, correctly observed, this work involved no small amount of time and travel.13 Members of the Office of the Chief, CWS, eventually performed a great deal of the work of the committee.
The new committee, as yet undesignated, held its first meeting on
1 December 1942 to consider the Allied chemical warfare program.14 Conduct of this meeting and of the subsequent monthly meetings followed the general procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) committees.15 For instance, matters brought up for consideration were, whenever practicable, presented in the form of a paper which the secretary circulated among the members before placing the item on the agenda.
At its second meeting, in January 1943, the committee adopted the name Combined Chemical Warfare Committee (CCWC) because it apparently considered its mission as being advisory to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In March the newly appointed British representative on the CCWC, Lt. Col. Humphrey Paget of the Royal Engineers, took formal issue with this interpretation of the committee’s position.16 The British viewpoint was that the committee was simply an advisory body to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff just as the British Inter-Service Committee on Chemical Warfare advised the British Chiefs of Staff. Paget argued that his role on the CCWC was that of a British liaison officer.17 Colonel Paget’s objections initiated a period of controversy and concern over the designation and role of the committee.
General Porter was visiting London to discuss implementation of CCS 106/2 at the time Colonel Paget’s formal objections were received. The Operations Division of the War Department General Staff became concerned over the possibility of British pressure on General Porter for the establishment of an over-all combined committee to sit in London. The British had taken a renewed interest in chemical warfare, OPD felt, and might try to establish a combined committee in London despite the published British view of combined machinery as consisting of parallel joint agencies. OPD sought and obtained concurrence of the ASF, AAF, and the Navy
Department in the view that a combined committee should be located in Washington because the Combined Chiefs of Staff and most of its subordinate and supporting committees were located there. OPD further argued that since most of the assignments of chemical warfare matériel would be made from U.S. production, it was not logical that the assigning body sit in London. The Chief of Staff expressed his agreement with these views, and a cable was sent to General Porter stating the U.S. position.18
The United States had reversed its view of the committee function since the report of the JSP ad hoc committee when the Americans had argued for the use of existing agencies. It is possible that they regretted that decision. The Combined Chemical Warfare Committee appointed a subcommittee to examine the question of functions and derivation of authority for its group. This subcommittee inconclusively reported that the CCWC was neither combined nor joint. It did note that its functions more nearly approached those of a joint committee. When General Porter returned from London, the subcommittee report was taken up at the 30 April 1943 meeting, but the discussion bogged down because of conflicting views.19
Meanwhile, on 28 April 1943, the CCWC was officially notified that the ISCCW was the agency designated by the British Chiefs of Staff to act on CCS 106/2.20 It became apparent that the British concept of parallel joint committees was the most acceptable solution to the organizational problem. At Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell’s suggestion, the CCWC therefore adopted the title, United States Chemical Warfare Committee (USCWC) at its May meeting.21 The question of organization and functions was settled, and the arrangement worked so well that a subsequent attempt to rewrite CCS 106/2 to provide for a combined committee was abortive.
The two committees achieved close cooperation in carrying out the mission given them by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. As in the case of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which drew strength from the personal friendship of Sir John Dill and General Marshall, the strong bonds between members of the American and British committees made it possible for all
their undertakings to be conducted with strength, forbearance, and mutual understanding.22 As one of the principal members of the USCWC expressed it: “The British constantly pointed to the combined C.W. effort as the best combined effort throughout the war. Many, many times I’ve heard my British friends remark that they wished they could enjoy the same effective, smooth, pleasant cooperation with other U.S. agencies. And this model of cooperative effort was accomplished in spite of wide basic difference of opinion as to effectiveness of gas and use of gas.”23 The U.S. representatives, and particularly those from the Chemical Warfare Service, held the view that gas was a decisive weapon if dispersed in sufficient quantities at the right places and at the right time. The British, on the other hand, regarded gas as a supplementary weapon to be used in conjunction with high explosives and incendiaries.24
The two committees were able to cooperate more effectively not only through a continual exchange of information but also through occasional visits by official representatives. In September 1943, about six months after General Porter’s visit to Great Britain, two other members of the USCWC, Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt and Lt. Col. Jacob K. Javits, visited London to confer with members of the ISCCW. At these meetings, discussion centered on varied subjects such as the allocation of the chemical warfare effort of the two countries, the interchangeability of protective equipment, chemical weapons, and munitions, and the coordination of logistical policies.25 In February 1944 a British delegation headed by the ISCCW chairman, Air Marshal N. H. Bottomly, and including Maj. Gen. G. Brunskill of the British Directorate of Special Weapons and Vehicles, attended a meeting of the USCWC in Washington where the progress of the
Anglo-American chemical warfare program was discussed.26 These visits, and others like them, definitely resulted in closer cooperation between the British and American committees.27
In carrying out its duties the USCWC worked through a subcommittee system. At first these subcommittees were ad hoc in nature, but on 8 November 1943, pressure of an ever-increasing number of War Department requests led to establishment of four permanent subcommittees: Chemical Warfare Operations, Gas and Smoke, Chemical Warfare Protective Equipment, and Incendiaries. Appointment of some ad hoc committees, however, continued, including such groups as the Joint Chemical Spray Project Subcommittee.28 Membership on the subcommittees was not limited to USCWC members but was drawn from U.S. and British experts as needed.
Activities and Accomplishments
The USCWC continued in existence until after the close of World War II. During the war the committee coordinated supply between the U.S. services and with the British, it exchanged information on research; it brought about a broad program of interchangeability and standardization of all types of chemical warfare matériel used by U.S. and British Commonwealth forces; it prepared periodic reports of readiness for chemical warfare; and in conjunction with various committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff it established a logistical basis for gas warfare. Unlike the ISCCW, its British counterpart, the USCWC dealt with incendiary agents and munitions and coordinated this program with the British Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Air Ministry.29
Coordination of Supply
To achieve the most effective use of raw materials, production facilities, manpower, and shipping the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations had to coordinate their procurement and supply programs in
HC M1 smoke pots in use, Rapido River, Italy, January 1944.
World War II. Of these factors shipping was usually the most critical. CCS 106/2 provided that British and American agencies should initiate a program for the standardization and interchangeability of all types of chemical warfare equipment used by the respective nations. By this means the planners hoped that the various fighting fronts could be supplied with many chemical warfare items from the United States or Great Britain, whichever was closer, and valuable shipping space could be saved. Such items as toxic agents, bombs, flame throwers, smoke pots, incendiaries, and protective equipment were among those exchanged for this purpose.30
One of the earliest questions studied by the USCWC was the coordination of Anglo-American requirements for smoke-producing materials. Even before the formation of the USCWC in 1942 the United States and Great Britain had begun talks on this subject. Later, the invasion of French North Africa brought with it a need for smoke pots to screen the ports against German air attack. In the summer of 1943 the U.S. Army did not
yet have a large smoke pot of the type needed for starting and maintaining a good smoke screen. The USCWC, therefore, arranged for the British to supply large numbers of their No. 24 smoke pots until the United States should finish developing what was to become the M5 smoke pot.31 This agreement was expanded to the establishment of a basic policy that, insofar as practicable, all troops in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) would use British smoke pots and all forces in the North African theater would be supplied with smoke pots by the United States. The two committees agreed that since the United States could not yet fulfill its responsibility for supply to the Mediterranean, 75 percent of that theater’s requirements would be filled by the British and 25 percent from the United States. The British agreed to provide 600,000 smoke pots for U.S. forces in the ETO.32 Early in 1944 the USCWC reciprocated by consenting to furnish floating smoke pots to Anglo-American forces in the European theater.33 These plans worked out substantially as scheduled. Large-size U.S. smoke pots came off production lines in the spring of 1944. The United States supplied these pots to United Nations troops in the Mediterranean; the British supplied the forces in the ETO with land smoke pots, while the United States provided them with floating smoke pots.
Other examples of items in which coordination of supply was effected were gas bombs and tropical bleach. Until May 1944 the British supplied the U.S. Eighth Air Force in England with ten thousand phosgene-filled 500-pound bombs.34 In the fall of 1943 USCWC representatives arranged for the procurement of fifteen thousand tons of tropical bleach from Great Britain, a measure which saved much valuable shipping space.35 In the summer of 1944 the committee representatives made plans for the supply
of U.S. gas munitions for American aircraft operated by the Royal Australian Air Force in the Pacific.36
A representative of the U.S. Navy served on the USCWC to achieve close interservice coordination. As early as January 1943 conferences were held under committee auspices in order to improve integration of Army and Navy chemical warfare programs.37 These conferences were followed in March by the establishment of the basis for the Navy’s chemical warfare program.38 This integration of procurement and supply simplified procedures and often led to considerable savings of men, matériel, and all-important shipping space. Many of the savings came in the field of protective equipment and supplies. The USCWC combined Navy, Marine Corps, and Merchant Marine requirements for bleach with those of the Army and reduced the total needs. When the committee discovered that Marine Corps requirements for decontaminating agent, noncorrosive (DANC), a special decontaminant for use on equipment, were greater than was indicated in the light of Army experience, the Marines were persuaded to reduce their estimates.39
Efforts to integrate requirements for impregnite and field impregnation plants began while the USCWC was studying the protective-clothing policy in late 1943.40 As a result of committee efforts the Army agreed to assume the task of initial impregnation of Marine Corps uniforms and thus save supplies of critical acetylene tetrachloride, the solvent used in the impregnation process.41 The United States also saved supplies of other chemicals as well as manpower, plants, and shipping space. Personnel shortages prevented the War Department from agreeing to a Navy proposal for the Army to handle reimpregnation of Navy and Marine Corps protective clothing in the event of gas warfare.42
The further development of such agents as cyanogen chloride made desirable the inclusion, in 1944, of a special type of activated charcoal in gas-mask canisters. Although the Navy was procuring its own gas masks at the time, it applied to the Army for a supply of this charcoal. The Army felt unable to furnish more than 20 percent of the amount requested, since charcoal was in such short supply that any additional allocation to the Navy would have crippled the Army’s own program.43 The USCWC resolved the problem by arranging for a reduction in Navy requirements so that the Army could meet Navy schedules. The committee endeavored to coordinate Army-Navy gas-mask procurement and attained such success that the Navy began using Army masks on a substantial scale, particularly for shore-based personnel.44
The Navy generally used Army air munitions for its chemical munitions program. Special requirements, such as phosgene for filling Navy rockets, were coordinated by the USCWC.45 A need developed for the collection of additional basic information on the effectiveness and proper tactical use of chemical spray as well as for tests to ascertain just how much agent would be required. This research was especially desirable because the Army and the Navy had differing theories on the use of aerial spray.46 The USCWC set up a special subcommittee, the Joint Chemical Spray Project Subcommittee, to handle the coordination of this task.47
This subcommittee studied test reports from U.S. and British installations and visited staff chemical officers of the Third Air Force, the AAF Board, and AAF Proving Ground Command to discover what information was available. The members found that considerable data existed on single-plane spray attacks but little on the use of several planes simultaneously for such attacks. The chairman of the USCWC wrote to the AAF and the
Navy requesting that the AAF set up a high-priority project to study formation spray attacks and that the Navy furnish the planes.48 The AAF referred the question to the AAF Board which set up a first-priority board project. The first Navy test began at Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, on 29 June 1944, and the AAF tests started 10 July. The Navy theory of spraying was that it should be done at medium altitude (650-3,000 feet), while the AAF held that spray attacks should be executed either at tree-top level or above 10,000 feet. After the tests at Dugway the subcommittee agreed with Army Air Forces views that low level attacks were both safer and more effective.49
Interchangeability and Standardization of Matériel
Interchangeability and standardization of matériel offered great opportunities for logistic savings. During World War II the USCWC members learned that these goals were difficult to achieve in wartime without long experience in peacetime. Nonetheless, in World War II the United States and British Commonwealth of Nations made some progress in these fields. As the major portion of the Anglo-American gas effort would be from the air, the USCWC sought to interchange or standardize bombs, clusters, and spray tanks for use on U.S. or British aircraft.50 The USCWC and the ISCCW agreed that in developing new items and in revising existing matériel, interchangeability should be sought if at all practicable. On 12 January 1943 the USCWC began discussions with the British Air Commission in Washington during which existing aircraft and munitions were analyzed and the most practical areas for standardization or interchangeability considered.51 Similar work started in March on smoke agents and munitions.
The triple suspension bomb shackle made air chemical bombs generally interchangeable between British and American aircraft. But efforts to
Laying smoke screen to conceal paratrooper landings near Lae, New Guinea, September 1943. Planes barely visible, extreme right, are Douglas A-20s, equipped with M10 spray tanks.
interchange the British 65-pound mustard-gas bomb for use with U.S. bombers unfortunately were not successful. Rather than seek development of special bomb cases, the CWS attempted to have standard Ordnance bomb cases filled with gas and achieved notable success in the development of 500-pound and 1,000-pound nonpersistent gas bombs using the general purpose (GP) bomb case. Thanks to USCWC efforts, the British made their 500-pound phosgene bomb and their spray tanks suitable for use on American aircraft, thus bringing about a greater degree of readiness in the AAF in Great Britain during the earlier part of the war.52 Tests arranged by the USCWC demonstrated that the U.S. Mro spray tank was satisfactory for British Typhoon aircraft. The American 1 oo-pound bomb case, which could be filled with white phosphorus as well as mustard gas, was also interchangeable.
As the use of colored smoke for different munitions expanded,
standardization of colors became increasingly desirable. In January 1944 the USCWC studied the colors then in use for signaling smokes. The committee not only coordinated Army, Navy, and Marine Corps requirements with those of the British but also obtained acceptance of four standard colors—red, yellow, green, and violet—plus blue for the British. Stocks of other colored smokes such as orange were gradually used up.53
By the time the USCWC and the British ISCCW came to consider the question of standardization of protective equipment, most items had been issued to the troops in the field. The committees decided that it would be more feasible at that late date to obtain interchangeability by training American and British troops to use each other’s protective equipment than to attempt to standardize such items.54 The USCWC, therefore, made arrangements with the British for the supply of training matériel and equipment for demonstrations and inaugurated publications to acquaint U.S. and British chemical officers with each other’s matériel.55 Although both committees considered it desirable to obtain standardization of one assault gas mask for British and American troops, their efforts to achieve these objectives were unsuccessful.
Research and Development
For purposes of general coordination of research and development as well as for standardization and interchangeability the USCWC and ISCCW found it desirable to exchange military characteristics and requirements for new items and revisions of existing items. The two committees also deemed it important to exchange information on the lines of research and development that would be followed.56
Among the outstanding accomplishments of the committees was the coordination of research on the effectiveness of gas warfare in the tropics. When delegations from the ISCCW visited the United States in February 1944 they exchanged papers on this topic with General Porter. Preliminary
studies and research had indicated that gas possessed certain special advantages when used in tropical regions. The two committees eventually agreed that definite answers should be obtained on the behavior and usefulness of gas under such circumstances.57 Representatives of the two committees, as well as of American, British, and Canadian chemical warfare agencies, and of the NDRC, concluded arrangements on 4 March 1944 for coordinated tests at American and British test stations.58 The Advisory Committee on Effectiveness of Gas Warfare in the Tropics was established to coordinate planning and evaluate test results and was provided with a full-time Project Coordination Staff to do the work. The United States not only made use of test facilities on San Jose Island in the Gulf of Panama, but also organized and sent the Far Eastern Technical Unit to Australia to assist the British-Australian test station there and to support the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) in its efforts to prepare for gas warfare.59
The United States and Great Britain learned a great deal from these tropical experiments with gas. For instance, in 1944 it was discovered that clothing impregnated with British antivapor (AV) impregnite was toxic to the wearer when used in tropical areas and that British protective ointment was similarly irritating.60 Coordinated action by the USCWC and ISCCW resulted in a requirement by Great Britain for twelve million tubes of the newly developed U.S. M5 protective ointment, and both British and Australian forces submitted requests for thousands of tons of American impregnite.61 Since the M5 ointment was just getting into production, the USCWC set up priorities governing its issue, including initial issue to British troops in active Asiatic-Pacific tropical regions.62
Preparing the Readiness Reports
At various times after Pearl Harbor the War Department sought reports of the current status of the U.S. chemical warfare effort.63 Several months before the USCWC came into existence the Chief, CWS, had requested that all theater commanders be directed to furnish their latest operational and logistical data on chemical warfare matériel and personnel, as well as such offensive and defensive plans for gas warfare as they might have prepared.64 Although the War Department had approved the request, no action was taken to obtain the information until after the committee raised the issue in December 1942. At the first meeting General Porter submitted a draft letter to theater commanders which the committee approved.65 The War Department dispatched the letter and directed coordination with the Navy.66
As the theaters reported their chemical warfare status and plans to the Chemical Warfare Service, it became more and more apparent that American forces overseas were unprepared for powerful retaliation should the enemy initiate gas warfare. The USCWC used these theater plans to prepare logistical studies of gas warfare readiness and included much of the information in the USCWC semiannual reports of readiness.
Beginning in January 1943 the committee obtained information on the state of readiness of the Navy and the British. The USCWC then worked on the computation of logistical requirements for gas warfare, including the necessary reserves as well as the production capacity for key items. A full analysis was received from the British in April and the committee’s first estimate appeared on 14 July.67 Not until March 1944, however, did the USCWC publish its first full-scale report that covered the gas warfare situation as of 1 January 1944.68
This report dealt with every phase of protection, offense, training, and intelligence. It included an estimate of enemy capabilities, mentioned the degree of protection provided American troops, gave the location of CWS units, and enumerated stockages of offensive and defensive chemical warfare items. Plans and principles for the employment of gas were discussed, and information was furnished on special projects. Thereafter the report appeared semiannually and was distributed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to all headquarters represented on the USCWC. The report then served as a day-to-day handbook on chemical warfare.69
Establishing a Logistical Basis for Gas Warfare
The Combined Chiefs of Staff in CCS 106/2 charged the USCWC with the task of establishing and maintaining initial stocks at levels which would enable gas warfare to be sustained pending expansion of production.70 The USCWC performed much of this work in close conjunction with the Chemical Warfare Service and the War Department. An example of the many questions referred to the committee by the War Department was the important one of protective equipment supply policy. An initial issue of individual protective equipment had been provided for all U.S. troops moving overseas.71 In September 1943 the improvement in the strategic situation led the ASF to suggest that an immediate survey be made of overseas reserve requirements for protective equipment with a view to reducing the amounts needed.72 General Marshall referred the question to the USCWC for study and recommendation.
Earlier War Department policy on reserve stocks of protective clothing had been to divide the various theaters into three classes. In the first class were placed theaters where gas warfare was most likely and where U.S. forces would probably be in ground contact with the enemy when it began. The second class embraced those theaters where gas warfare might develop but where there would probably be no ground contact with the enemy. The third class comprised those theaters where gas warfare was unlikely. The planners assumed that all troops moving overseas would have minimum Beginning with the 1 July 1944 report, these semiannual reports of readiness covered all phases of chemical warfare including flame, smoke, and incendiaries.
individual protective equipment and that these classes would apply only to theater reserves.73 As planned by the Army Service Forces in 1943, those regions remote from ground and air attack, such as the Caribbean and South Atlantic, would have reserve stocks of protective equipment equal to 5 percent of the command strength. The ASF used the figure of 40 percent to calculate reserve requirements for Hawaii and the ETO. Where American soldiers were engaged in ground warfare in 1943—in North Africa, the Southwest Pacific Area, and elsewhere—a protective clothing reserve of ioo percent was authorized.74
The Subcommittee on Operations of the USCWC took what it considered a more realistic and detailed approach to the problem. The subcommittee felt that any regrouping of the theaters for purposes of reserve supply levels should be based on the type of operations that were planned and upon the activities and locations of specific numbers of troops within the theaters.75 Accordingly, the USCWC recommended that the planners divide the troop strength of each theater into one or more classes of supply instead of placing the entire theater in one class. The committee reasoned that in certain theaters, such as SWPA, there were troops far to the rear—as in Australia—where enemy gas attack was improbable, whereas other troops in forward areas such as New Guinea were daily exposed to the possibility of Japanese use of gas. The USCWC suggested reserve levels of 100 percent for troops in forward areas within a theater, 50 percent for men in second class areas further to the rear, and only 5 percent for troops in the most remote areas. These levels applied to all types of protective equipment and supplies which would be used only if gas warfare started.76 This policy the War Department directed the ASF to implement.77
Another question which the War Department referred to the committee dealt with requirements for nonpersistent gases. The CWS had proposed the expansion of production facilities to create stockpiles of nonpersistent gas munitions which the AAF desired in 1944.78 The USCWC suggested instead that sufficient facilities be created to sustain operational gas warfare. The desired stockpiles could be manufactured by these plants and the plants then placed in standby condition pending the outbreak of gas warfare. Such a step would, in effect, provide a broad production base that would make possible a considerable expansion in the event of gas warfare.79 Although the War Department adopted this idea in principle, it authorized only one half of the production increase proposed by the USCWC.80
An important function of the USCWC was the determination of the amount of preparation that should be made for offensive gas warfare. The knotty question confronting the USCWC was the rate of military effort upon which levels of munitions supply in the theaters should be based. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had been careful to specify that any measures adopted in preparation for gas warfare should be “limited to those compatible with a balanced over-all munitions program.”81
The USCWC undertook to make statistical studies of theater stocks of chemical munitions beginning in December 1943. From these studies the committee evolved certain fundamental principles upon which future committee recommendations were based. One principle was that in the event the Axis Powers used gas U.S. retaliation should be immediate and intensive, with airplanes flying 150 percent of their normal number of missions during the first fifteen days of gas warfare. After this initial effort, in which bomb loads would consist of 75-percent gas munitions and 25-percent high explosives, the normal number of aircraft missions would be flown with 50 percent of the bomb load consisting of gas.82 Additional principles were that the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations, where the United Nations were on the strategic offensive, should have
special consideration and that a reserve of gas bombs should be created in the continental United States.83
In November 1943 and again in July 1944 the Army Air Forces raised the question of the adequacy of current theater stocks of chemical munitions. AAF experience in the European theater in 1944 revealed that theater gas-bomb stocks amounted to about 17 percent of one month’s expenditure of the high explosive and incendiary bombs. As such a stock of gas bombs was believed to be inadequate, the AAF requested that the theater levels be reconsidered.84 The commanding general of the Army Air Forces, General Henry H. Arnold, took up the question of theater gas stocks with his fellow members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. He suggested that a study be made of American ability to retaliate and called attention to deficiencies in theater stocks of air chemical munitions.85
Instead of assigning the study to the USCWC, the Joint Chiefs handed it over to the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), who worked in close collaboration with the Joint Logistics Committee (JLC). The JPS and JLC designated members of a joint ad hoc subcommittee on which several members of the USCWC were called upon to serve, and the USCWC was asked to coordinate with the Joint Logistics Plans Committee on the study.86 As prepared by this subcommittee, the study called for the use of gas in overwhelming quantities as a decisive weapon against the Japanese. But the study also pointed out certain deficiencies in the nonpersistent gas program and noted the need for tripling production facilities if bombing were continued over a long period. The subcommittee reduced the amount
of gas to be used in normal bombing missions from 50 to 30 percent of the total bomb load.87
Notwithstanding the subcommittee’s recommendations to triple production facilities, the JLC and JPS recommended that there be no expansion of currently authorized production facilities except for certain loading plants. For planning purposes the committees proposed 1 January 1945 as a target date for readiness for retaliatory gas warfare.88 After one more revision the Joint Chiefs approved the final version as JCS 825/4 on 16 October 1944. This study assumed that gas would be used only against Japan proper, the Ryukyus, and the Bonins and set a normal gas mission rate at 25 percent of the total tonnage.89 Because of the time factor, the readiness date was set for 1 April 1945. In the study the planners indicated that the proposed mission rate would require the use of only about half the existing persistent gas capacity and two thirds of the nonpersistent capacity of the United States.90
In December 1944 the USCWC made recommendations to the General Staff on implementing these proposals. Among others, the committee suggested that theater commanders in the Pacific be notified of the proposed rate of air effort with gas, the levels of supply, and the date of readiness. The USCWC also recommended that gas bombs amounting to sixty days’ supply be moved into continental U.S. reserve.91 Three main problems confronted planners in their efforts to achieve gas warfare readiness in the Pacific. These were: (1) the movement of existing stocks to the Pacific; (2) the provision of storage facilities; and (3) the resumption of production, especially of empty bomb cases, without undue interference with the high explosive and incendiary bomb programs which were proving so successful in defeating the Axis.92
In March 1945 General of the Army George C. Marshall noted that some theater commanders had misinterpreted the provisions of JCS 825/4 as a directive for their readiness for gas warfare as of the planning date, including the forward area stockage of chemical munitions. The Chief of Staff expressed concern and suggested that a study be made, for it seemed that forward area stockage might be impracticable in view of the tight shipping situation.93 The Joint Staff Planners studied the question and came up with their recommendations shortly after the defeat of Germany. They estimated that full readiness for swift and continuing retaliation against Japan would require the shipment of 113,500 tons of gas munitions from Europe and the United States, a possible reduction in the manufacture of incendiary bomb cases, the conversion of certain CWS and Ordnance units to handle gas munitions, and the provision of port capacity, labor, and storage facilities in forward areas of the Pacific. Because the JPS (and the Joint Intelligence Committee) considered the possibility that Japan would resort to gas as remote, they recommended that the United States produce and stockpile sufficient munitions to furnish the minimum amount needed for retaliatory gas warfare as of 1 November 1945, and that theater commanders be allowed to move these minimum levels of supply as far forward as shipping and other priorities would permit.94
As finally revised, the JPS-JLC report to the Joint Chiefs noted shortages of gas munitions in the Pacific. Although President Roosevelt’s promise of swift retaliation required the presence of gas munitions in forward areas, the two committees could not agree on the advisability of forward area shipments and separated the question from that of production. They specified a minimum forward area stockage level in the Pacific of seventy-five days’ supply, with ninety days’ required in the China and India-Burma theaters. The planners also assumed that to end the war successfully with gas would require no more than three months’ strategic bombing and six months of tactical bombing. They gave no directions which would require shipments to build up theater stocks nor was anything said about resuming production of toxic agents and munitions.95 The JCS gave informal approval to the recommendations on 19 June 1945 and did not issue any
directives either authorizing theater commanders to raise stocks in forward areas or approving additional production.96
The Question of Initiating Gas Warfare
After the defeat of Germany, Army authorities in Washington suggested a re-examination of the existing American policy that called for the use of gas in retaliation only.97 Several factors favored the use of gas against the Japanese. Meteorological conditions in Japan favored gas. The United States had predominant responsibility for the war in this area and was more convinced of the decisive value of gas than were the British. Finally, and probably most important, the high casualty rate suffered on Iwo Jima and on Okinawa so alarmed the War Department that it gave great emphasis to the study of every means which would shorten the war and save American lives. General Joseph W. Stilwell, then the commanding general of Army Ground Forces, suggested to the Chief of Staff the use of mobile weapons such as 4.2-inch chemical mortars, pack artillery, recoilless rifles, rockets, and self-propelled artillery, and the increased use of mechanized flame throwers and tank dozers. He also recommended that consideration be given to the use of gas in the planned invasion of Japan.98 The director of the New Developments Division of the War Department General Staff, Brig. Gen. William A. Borden, felt that the best means of meeting the existing and anticipated conditions in the war against Japan would be by increasing effective mobile fire power including flame throwers. He further stated: “Efficient and proper employment of gas would be of great assistance.”99
A week after V-E Day, General Borden called a meeting of representatives of G-2, G-4, OPD, ASF, Ordnance, Engineers, and the CWS. The representatives discussed General Stilwell’s recommendations and the pos-siblP solutions to two major problems: (1) What equipment would be best for overcoming the Japanese in their caves, pillboxes, and bunkers? and (2) How should this equipment be best employed?100 The CWS set up a project under the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Field Operations to supervise and coordinate CWS activities in connection with the over-all Army project known as SPHINX.101 As part of this program, the USCWC and the Chemical Warfare Service made extensive studies of the logistical requirements for gas warfare.102
Before June 1945 gas warfare studies had referred only to the question of retaliatory gas warfare. An OPD study of 4 June took up the question of the United States initiating gas warfare. While the study concluded that gas would be helpful, it pointed out that the United States would have to consider the effect on world opinion of using gas, for President Roosevelt had publicly condemned gas warfare. Furthermore, the study did not rate gas as the decisive weapon envisaged by the USCWC and the CWS.103
Nonetheless, on 14 June General Marshall sent to Admiral Ernest J. King another OPD study which recommended that the JCS immediately order an increased production of gas and that the principle of initiating gas warfare be informally discussed with President Harry S. Truman. If Truman should agree to a reversal of Roosevelt’s policy on the use of gas, OPD suggested that Truman take up the question of altering current agreements with other United Nations members at the forthcoming Potsdam Conference. General Marshall added, that if Admiral King agreed with
the proposed action, “I believe we should discuss the subject informally with General Arnold and Admiral Leahy.”104
A copy of the OPD study reached Admiral William D. Leahy, who promptly expressed his opposition to the initiation of gas warfare. In writing to General Marshall, Admiral Leahy stated his belief that President Roosevelt’s categorical statement to the press of 8 June 43 that “we shall under no circumstances resort to the use of such weapons [poisonous or noxious gases] unless they are first used by our enemies” had settled the question105 .’“ Nevertheless, Leahy added that he had “... no objection to a discussion with the President, by anyone who believes in gas warfare, of the possibility of a reversal of President Roosevelt’s announced policy (8 June 1943).” He went on to express his astonishment that no adequate provision had yet been made for retaliation with gas in the Pacific.106
In all probability Admiral Leahy’s response helped to discourage JCS consideration of the Army’s proposal for initiating gas warfare. When the service chiefs went off to the Potsdam Conference in July they presumably also had in mind the thought of using a newer and more devastating weapon, even then being readied for test in the hot desert of New Mexico. After the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima the Pacific war rapidly came to a dramatic close.
Summary
While the United States Chemical Warfare Committee did not reach as high a position in the coordination of the combined Anglo-American gas warfare effort as perhaps many of its members desired, it nonetheless achieved a great deal, and probably all that was expected of it. After the usual initial controversies over mission, powers, and organization the USCWC settled down and became almost a model of cooperative effort, both with the U.S. services and with the British Inter-Service Committee
on Chemical Warfare. Although the committee lacked executive powers, the presence of representatives of interested organizations paved the way for the smooth passage of many USCWC recommendations through command channels.
Of all the committee’s undertakings the coordination of supply seems to have been the most important and most successful. During World War II the most critical factor affecting both the British and American military effort was ship tonnage. Both the United States and Great Britain were committed to campaigns at the end of supply lines stretching across thousands of miles of ocean. While the decisive battle was to be fought only a scant few miles from England, much of the raw materials for the British war effort and all the finished American matériel had to be brought across the sea and in spite of intense German submarine activity. Every ton saved and every instance of crosshauling eliminated brought the day of ultimate victory that much closer. In the case of gas warfare matériel, an “insurance” item, it was even more important that its supply did not interfere more than absolutely necessary with that of items in everyday use.
Two factors restricted the coordination of supply: one was the fact that there was a limit to the amount of matériel that Great Britain could provide for American troops in Europe and the Mediterranean; the other was the lack of standardization and interchangeability of items of British and American matériel. The USCWC manfully undertook to effect such standardization and interchangeability, but the lesson learned was that once war has started it is too late for any significant success in these fields. A number of items, especially aircraft munitions, were made interchangeable. In the field of protective equipment and clothing, interchangeability was obtained by training because so many of the items had already been standardized by each nation and issued to the troops in the field. But only over a considerable number of peacetime years did it appear possible to achieve any notable degree of standardization of the military items of two or more countries.
One of the steps which the USCWC and the British ISCCW took toward interchangeability and standardization was the interchange of information on the research and development programs of both nations and with Canada. Not only did this eliminate some duplication of effort, but it enabled the scientists to design items so that they could be used equally well by troops of any of these nations. The process of research and development is such a slow one, however, that significant results are hardly obtainable in the space of three or four years.
On a broader scale the USCWC prepared information for the use of U.S. and British agencies in the form of reports of readiness for gas warfare. These reports provided periodic information on intelligence, production, training, research, supply, and many other items of interest.
The USCWC participated in the planning for a logistical basis for chemical warfare, but in this instance the higher planning bodies in the Joint Chiefs of Staff committee system took over so much of the work that the role of the USCWC was pretty much limited to that of providing statistical calculations and recommendations for preparedness.
When the question of initiating gas warfare came under discussion in mid-1945 it is not too surprising that the committee, primarily established for procurement and supply coordination rather than for advice on policy, was not consulted. It is surprising that neither the Army Air Forces, as the principal arm for using gas, nor the Chemical Warfare Service, with the technical know-how was consulted. The reason for this is not clear, but it was possibly due to a desire to keep the circle of people debating the issue as small as possible, so that the pressure of public opinion for or against the use of gas might not be stirred by some incautious hint that the United States was considering its employment.
The operation of the committee does not appear to have differed materially from that of the various JCS committees. Toward the end of the war the lack of a secretariat and the strain on the facilities of the Office of the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service impelled the USCWC to seek additional administrative assistance.
Bonds between the USCWC and the Chemical Warfare Service were very close. On almost all subcommittees there was a plurality of CWS officers. The chairman and his principal assistant were the Chief, CWS, and his Assistant Chief for Field Operations. The various secretaries were CWS officers, and the Office of the Chief, CWS, provided the clerical assistance and most of the statistical and technical information on chemical warfare. It would appear that, although other organizations and nations had representation on the USCWC, the Chemical Warfare Service exerted the greatest amount of influence on decisions arrived at by the committee.