Chapter 5: The Chief’s Office During World War II
General Porter remained Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service throughout the war and into the period of demobilization, retiring from active duty on 13 November 1945. His personality had a profound influence on the development of the CWS mission, and in a very definite sense the success of that mission was the measure of General Porter’s accomplishment.
Porter was graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1909 and commissioned in the Coast Artillery Corps the following year. In 1921 he transferred as major to the Chemical Warfare Service, where he served until his retirement from the Army. Although he lacked experience as a chemical officer in World War I, his peacetime assignments gave him an excellent background for his duties as Chief. After his graduation with distinction from the Command and General Staff School in 1927, he attended both the Army Industrial College and the Army War College.
Porter was an affable and diplomatic officer who lived on easy terms with most of his subordinates. He had the capacity for quickly sizing up a complicated problem and reaching a satisfactory solution with apparently little effort. He found time to listen to persons who wanted to catch his ear and he encouraged subordinates who were at considerable distances from headquarters to write him informal letters. A kindly reception of an earnest presentation of an idea, however, did not necessarily mean that Porter was convinced of its worth, although the person offering it might have thought so at the time. One of Porter’s chief assets was his ability to conciliate members of his staff whenever they clashed over matters of policy or for other reasons. If, as sometimes happened, the conciliatory approach failed, he did not hesitate to take more drastic action. Another asset was his unusual ability to encourage his subordinates to put forth their best efforts. By not setting up impossible standards of performance, and by offering criticism in a kindly and courteous manner, he spurred on
most of his staff to put forth their best efforts. Occasionally personal predilections led Porter to overlook the shortcomings of some of his associates, a trait not unrelated to his congeniality and his desire to accommodate. But instances of either harshness or favoritism were rare, and generally speaking, Porter’s personality inspired genuine respect and loyalty throughout the service.1
Porter was able to attract to the CWS a number of eminent civilians who, as emergency officers, naturally contributed to the success of his administration, both in Washington and in the field installations.2 He either knew or quickly came to know the senior Reserve and emergency officers on whom he had to rely so largely during the war. His intimate acquaintance with the small group of Regular Army CWS officers aided him in making assignments to key positions.
During the prewar years and on into the first few months of the war the Chief, CWS, was under the direct jurisdiction of the Chief of Staff. There was constant consultation between the General Staff and the CWS staff over matters of policy. In March 1942, under a major War Department reorganization, another echelon of command was placed between the supply arms and services and the General Staff.3 That echelon, commanded by General Somervell, was the Services of Supply, or as it was later called, the Army Service Forces. (Chart 4) From that time until after the close of the war, policy matters were usually formulated after consultation between ASF staff officers and their opposite numbers in the CWS. At times War Department General and Special Staff officers had direct contact with CWS personnel, as in the case of the United States Chemical Warfare Committee, but such contact was the exception rather than the rule.4
General Porter himself had direct and intimate contact on matters of policy affecting chemical warfare with the Combined and Joint Chiefs
Chart 4—Organization of the Army Service Forces, as of 30 June 1943
of Staff, with the General and Special Staffs, and with the commanding generals of the AAF and AGF. Officially he had to channel his communications through ASF headquarters. Seldom did this cause Porter any undue concern, for he had great respect for General Somervell’s leadership in the supply field. Moreover, he realized the good work the ASF was doing on such matters as production controls, manpower utilization, and uniformity of administrative procedures. He felt that the ASF had a proper role in coordinating and directing the efforts of the chiefs of technical services, and he supported every move in that direction.5 On the other hand, General Porter, like the chiefs of other technical services, opposed every effort by the Commanding General, ASF, or his staff to undercut the prerogatives of those statutory branches of the War Department.6
Porter did much of his business through personal contacts, characterized by absence of formality. He held frequent staff conferences with his principal assistants, a procedure which enabled him to keep informed of progress being made in his various fields of responsibility and to initiate action in line with ASF policies. These policies Porter became acquainted with at General Somervell’s monthly staff conferences of technical services chiefs, as well as through communications from ASF headquarters. Unless absent from Washington, Porter always attended the ASF monthly staff conferences, accompanied by either Col. Harry A. Kuhn or Lt. Col. Philip J. Fitzgerald of his staff. After the OC CWS moved to Gravelly Point in January 1943, the Chief had a “situation room” set up, where charts and panels portraying CWS progress or lack of progress were displayed and discussed with members of his staff. In the situation room the shortcomings and deficiencies of the CWS were reviewed and analyzed. Through frequent visits to CWS field installations and overseas theaters, Porter was also enabled to gauge the strength and weaknesses of his service.
Early Wartime Organization
General Somervell felt that the most pressing problems facing the ASF before mid-1943 were those of organization and mobilization.7 Two days
after the ASF came into being Somervell issued an initial directive for the new organization which provided for the inclusion of a Control Division in his headquarters.8 The mission of this division was to keep the commanding general, his staff, and his key assistants constantly advised on the status of the Army supply systems and other aspects of his work. The Control Division was to accomplish its mission through such measures as inspection aimed at determining the causes of delays and deficiencies, through analysis and evaluation of recurring reports and statistics, and through investigations of organizational procedures. On 27 March 1942, Somervell directed that units similar in character to the Control Division in his office be activated in all administrative elements under his command and that they be manned by competent personnel. He gave as the reason for establishing such units the fact that officers responsible for operations were usually so occupied with current assignments that they did not have the opportunity to survey the structure and procedures of their organizations as a whole. Thus, he went on to say, deficiencies were not detected and corrective action initiated at an early date.9 The new control divisions in the technical services were to play a major role in all matters of an organizational and administrative nature.
In compliance with the directive of the Commanding General, ASF, a Control Division was established in the OC CWS on II April 1942.10 Shortly thereafter the Chief, CWS, directed that the new division investigate and report on -the adequacy and correctness” of the organization of the CWS, with special reference to the Office of the Chief.11 The CWS made every effort to carry out General Somervell’s directive to secure competent individuals in staffing the Control Division. Col. Lowell A. Elliott became first chief of the division. Upon his departure for Europe in May 1942, Colonel Kuhn, commanding officer of the New York Chemical Warfare Procurement District, was made chief and served in this capacity for the duration of the war. Colonel Kuhn, who was to remain one of General Porter’s closest advisers throughout the war, had been a CWS officer since World War I and had a broad background in the technical, training, and procurement activities of the service. To assist Kuhn, Porter brought in Reserve and emergency officers with outstanding experience in the business
world, as well as civilian employees with considerable training in business administration. It was particularly important that the Control Division engage only individuals of mature judgment, because of the nature of its functions. It was unfortunate that the name “Control” was applied to the division, for this designation did not stimulate ready acceptance by other elements of the Chemical Warfare Service on whose adequacy the Control Division had to report and with whom it had to work. In spite of its name, the Control Division was purely a staff and not a command unit, and its effectiveness depended chiefly on soundness of objectives and methods as well as on maintaining amicable relationships with the elements of the CWS and higher echelons. The division’s effectiveness, as well as its methods of operation, developed gradually as the war went on.
The directive which provided for the organization of the OC CWS at the outbreak of the war had outlined an over-all organizational structure but left details to be worked out as time went on.12 (See Chart 3.) Early in 1942 attempts were made to define more exactly the respective roles of the three services, Field, Technical, and Industrial, with regard to certain phases of the CWS mission.13 After the activation of the Control Division in the Chief’s office in April 1942, the OC CWS put forth more pronounced efforts to define the functions of each of its administrative elements and to fit each element into its proper niche in the over-all organization.14 Sometimes the functions had been but recently delegated to the CWS, as in the case of the requirement for accumulating and correlating data on biological warfare, which was assigned orally in late 1941, and the price adjustment function, delegated in mid-1942. The administration of activities connected with biological warfare was placed in a Biological Division in the Technical Service, where it remained until mid-1943. Supervision of price adjustment activities was lodged with the Legal Division, because of the close association between price adjustment and legal functions such as drawing up and terminating contracts.
Some of the functions under consideration had been assigned originally to a separate administrative unit, but experience had indicated that such assignment was no longer practicable. This was the situation, for example, with the Incendiary Branch which had been set up when the incendiary program was turned over to the CWS in 1941. This branch coordinated all
matters pertaining to incendiaries including their design and development, procurement, storage, and issue. It maintained contact with the Technical Service of the Chief’s office on design and development, with the Industrial Service on the construction, procurement, and inspection facilities to manufacture the bomb, and with the Field Service on matters pertaining to the storage and issue of incendiaries to troops in the field. By June 1942 the incendiary program had been carried to the point where the functions associated with it could be assumed by the Technical, Industrial, and Field Services, and the branch was therefore eliminated.15
In still another instance, investigation revealed that closely allied or identical functions were being performed by various units of the OC CWS. The administration of legal activities was a case in point. Following the 15 July 1941 reorganization, three separate units of the Office of the Chief performed legal functions, namely, the Purchase and Contracts Division of the Industrial Service, the Patent Division of the Technical Service, and the Legal Division of the Executive Office. By early 1942, the OC CWS reached the conclusion that this setup was not making for the greatest efficiency. Furthermore, in May the ASF sent a directive urging the coordination of legal activities. The chief of the Control Division brought the matter to the attention of General Porter, pointing out that Control Division studies had demonstrated that the dispersion of legal functions among three administrative units was cumbersome and expensive. On 24 June 1942, therefore, all functions of a legal nature were placed under the jurisdiction of the Legal Division, OC CWS.16
Organizational developments, especially in the early period of the war, were affected to some extent by the military personnel situation. A number of Reserve officers in grades from first lieutenant to lieutenant colonel were being called to active duty, and in placing these officers the Army had to give consideration to rank as well as ability. The result was that it was often necessary to create organizational units to accommodate the rank of the officers. Organizational changes for this reason were continuously taking place in the early years of the war, particularly in the lower echelons.17
Decentralization of Operations
A policy which had a marked effect on CWS organizational developments, both in the Chief’s office and in the installations, was the ASF encouragement of decentralization of operations. The theory behind this policy was given expression by the chief of the Statistical Control Service in General Somervell’s office; in discussing the functions of the recently activated control units, he said that one of the prime purposes of control was “to effect maximum decentralization of operation while maintaining centralization for coordination of broad policies and objectives.18
In conformity with this policy the Chemical Warfare Service gave considerable attention during the autumn of 1942 to the possibility of transferring elements of the Office of the Chief out of Washington. General Porter and his staff were reluctant to take this step for they realized it would make for administrative inefficiency. They had little choice in the matter, however. For a time they considered the possibility of moving all elements of the Chief’s office to Edgewood but eventually gave up this idea as impractical.19 General Porter and his assistants finally decided that certain units of the Industrial and Technical Divisions could be decentralized with the least loss of efficiency and in October 1942 made provision to move these to Edgewood. About the same time a newly activated Chemical Section of the Industrial Division, OC CWS, whose mission was to supervise the purchase of all chemicals for the CWS, was located in New York City. In 1943 a suboffice of the Chief was established at Baltimore, Maryland, with the following branches stationed there: Historical Branch of the Executive Office; Purchase Policies Branch of the Administrative Office of the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Matériel; Storage Branch of the Supply Division; and a branch of the Field Requirements Division.20 This decentralization, which lasted throughout the remainder of the war, resulted in a need for additional personnel and in some loss in administrative efficiency.
Organizational Defects
The designation “service,” applied to three major administrative units
of OC CWS in July 1941, did not prove satisfactory. The term “service” implied command rather than staff functions; just as the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service had command over the entire organization, so the chiefs of the smaller “services” under him assumed that they had command responsibility over their respective units. In certain matters the chiefs of the Industrial, the Technical, and the Field Services did have command responsibility. This was especially true with regard to installations, since each service was responsible for the conduct of activities at certain types of installations. The chief of the Industrial Service had jurisdiction over the arsenal and procurement districts, the chief of the Technical Service over the research laboratories and proving grounds, and the chief of the Field Service over the depots and training centers.21 As a result of a suggestion from the Control Division, ASF, the three services of the OC CWS were renamed “divisions” on 28 July 1942.22 The new divisions were intended to be “staff” organizations, although for some time they were allowed to retain a considerable degree of jurisdiction over installations. In order to standardize terms, the OC CWS also directed that organizations below division level be designated branches, sections, and subsections.23 The desire of the Chief of the CWS to confine the activities of the new division chiefs mainly to staff activities was not entirely realized, and this was one of the factors which led to a major reorganization of the Chief’s office in the spring of 1943.
Another and more important factor centered around serious personality differences among a few staff members in the Chiefs office. Because procurement was an extremely important function in the early period of war, the chief of the procurement unit was called upon to take vigorous measures in order to get the job done. This pressure at times led to a tendency on the part of the unit to dominate other elements of OC CWS, with the result that personality clashes occurred among key officers. Perhaps because the Chemical Warfare Service was a relatively small organization where everybody in management knew almost everybody else, personal antagonisms were apt to be more pronounced than elsewhere. At any rate the situation as it existed in early 1943 was intolerable and needed correction. Something more than a shift of certain key officers was required, for there were also shortcomings in the over-all organizational pattern which
demanded attention. These shortcomings in certain instances were not unrelated to the strained personal relationships existing between key individuals.24
For example, there was a lack of cooperation on important operational matters between the Industrial and Technical Divisions. This difficulty dated back at least to 1941 when representatives of those units discussed some of the unsatisfactory conditions at a meeting. It was then disclosed that the Industrial Service had made contract awards in certain cases without first obtaining clearance on drawings and specifications, and that the Technical Service had not informed the Industrial Service when changes in drawings and specifications were contemplated but only after they were completed and approved.25 The root of this whole problem was the unsatisfactory state of drawings and specifications at that time—unsatisfactory, that is, from the point of view of mass production of the item. Contractors working on items could not use the existing specifications and drawings and had to seek modifications through waivers and changes approved by the CWS. A large number of such waivers and changes were issued resulting in complete lack of uniformity in the same part produced by different manufacturers. Efforts were made during 1942 to coordinate the operations of the industrial and technical agencies by assigning to the deputy chief of the Industrial Division and the chief of the Technical Division the determination of policy on such activities as continuance of research on a project, drawing up of preliminary and final drawings and specifications for equipment, and issuance of waivers for changes of such drawings and specifications.26 This innovation did not prove entirely successful, and as late as the spring of 1943 a number of unsatisfactory procedures had still not been corrected. The result was that items of inferior quality were being procured.27 Some action to insure that CWS items would measure up to specifications became vitally important.
General Porter found abundant proof that CWS matériel did not meet the standards required in the field, when he and Brig. Gen. Charles E. Loucks of his staff visited Europe in 1943. In England and North Africa
the two generals saw some of the inferior items which had been sent out from the zone of interior, and the Chief returned to the United States determined to take drastic action with regard to uniformity of specifications and inspection of items. One of the first things he did was to direct the activation of an Inspection Division entirely independent of the Industrial Division. This change became part of a general reorganization of Porter’s office which was made effective in May 1943.
Developments, May 1943–October 1945
Since its inception, the Control Division, OC CWS, had been conducting a survey aimed at improving organization.28 On the basis of its findings the Control Division drew up an organizational chart and presented it to General Porter on his return from abroad in the spring of 1943. Among the objectives which the Control Division listed for the new organization were: reducing the number of persons reporting directly to the Chief; reducing the emphasis placed on the procurement function by striking a balance between that and other CWS functions; and improving the machinery for calculating CWS requirements. Porter studied the chart and submitted it to members of his staff for comment. It was the consensus that the proposed organization would be a definite improvement and General Porter then took the matter up with Maj. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Chief of Staff, ASF, who gave his informal approval.29 Porter thereupon issued a directive on 27 May 1943 which activated the new organization. (Chart 5)30
Under this setup there were to be two assistant chiefs, CWS, one for matériel and one for field operations. The Assistant Chief of CWS for Matériel was to “supervise and coordinate” the functions of development, procurement, inspection, and supply. These functions were to be administered by the following divisions: Technical, Industrial, Inspection, and Supply. The Assistant Chief of CWS for Field Operations was to “supervise and coordinate the preparation of plans for the utilization of chemical warfare matériel and troops.” Under his jurisdiction were three divisions, Field Requirements, Training, and War Plans and Theaters. Other divisions, along with the executive branches, were directly under the supervision of
Chart 5: Office, Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, as of 26 August 1943
Brig. Gen. Rollo C. Ditto, CWS, Assistant Chief of Matériel
Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, CWS, Assistant Chief for Field Operations
the Chief, CWS. Brig. Gen. Rollo C. Ditto was appointed Assistant Chief of Matériel and General Waitt, Assistant Chief for Field Operations. Each continued in his respective post until the close of the war. In August 1943 General Ditto’s tables of distribution called for 110 officers and 286 civilians and General Waitt’s for 54 officers and 62 civilians. The total allotment of officers and civilians in OC CWS at that time was 215 and 585 respectively.31 This large number is in great contrast to the small force that had manned the office in the peacetime years.
The 27 May 1943 reorganization of the Office of the Chief restricted command functions to the Chief himself and in a limited degree to the assistant chiefs. In their relations with General Porter the assistant chiefs were staff officers, but in regard to the divisions and installation under their jurisdictions they exercised command. For that reason their offices were generally referred to informally as “Matériel Command” and “Operations Command,” instead of the Office of the Assistant Chief for Matériel and the Office of the Assistant Chief for Field Operations. Besides, the formal designations were much too long for day-to-day usage.
The new setup did a great deal to improve relationships among the
various elements of OC CWS. Better cooperation was attained between the Industrial and Technical Divisions. The Assistant Chief of CWS for Matériel now had jurisdiction over both divisions and he could act as arbiter in the event of differences over policy. The way was open, moreover, for making additional organizational changes aimed at better interdivision cooperation. The best example of this development was the activation of the Industrial Liaison Branch in the Industrial Division in August 1943,32 This unit acted for the chief of the Industrial Division in all matters requiring concurrence by the chief of the Technical Division, such as the compilation of drawings and specifications and the clearing of requests for changes and waivers. Again, better coordination was attained between the industrial and the supply units in OC CWS because the Assistant Chief for Matériel could act as an arbiter whenever differences over policy or procedure arose between these divisions.
Better coordination of related activities was likewise attained under the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Field Operations. The close association of war plans and training had long been recognized, and for that reason General Waitt was given jurisdiction over both activities. A significant innovation was the incorporation of the intelligence function into Waitt’s organization. Previously this unit had reported directly to the executive officer of OC CWS. The coordination of war plans, training, and intelligence under one jurisdiction in OC CWS was to prove very effective throughout the remainder of the war period.
Functions of the New Medical Division
For a decade and a half following World War I there had been a Medical Division in OC CWS. But in 1932 General Gilchrist had eliminated this division, and thereafter CWS and the Medical Department maintained coordination solely through the medical research group at Edgewood Arsenal. Just prior to World War II, increased emphasis began to be placed on the medical aspects of gas warfare, and a Committee on the Treatment of Gas Casualties was set up within the National Research Council. Later, when the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) was activated, the work was also carried on by its various committees and subcommittees.33 The chemical warfare functions of the National Research
Council and the Office of Scientific Research and Development overlapped, and by the spring of 1943 it was evident that there was need for a staff officer in the CWS who would coordinate all functions having to do with the medical aspects of chemical warfare. After consultation among the Secretary of War, The Surgeon General, and the Chief, CWS, Dr. Cornelius P. Rhoads of the Memorial Hospital, New York City, a renowned medical administrator, was selected for the post.34 Dr. Rhoads was commissioned as a colonel in the Medical Corps and served as chief of the Medical Division until 18 April 1945 when he was succeeded by Col. John R. Wood, Medical Corps, who served until the close of the war.
The Surgeon General and the Chief, CWS, reached an agreement on 30 March 1943 on the responsibilities of the proposed Medical Division under Dr. Rhoads. They decided that the new division would be responsible for the conduct of research connected with the prevention and treatment of chemical warfare casualties; for carrying out toxicological studies required by the Chief, CWS; for investigating hazards to health of CWS employees engaged in producing chemical warfare agents; and for keeping The Surgeon General informed on the results of all investigations and studies.35 The Medical Division was activated on 3 July 1943, and all medical and toxicological research being performed at Edgewood was placed under its supervision.36 Before the close of 1943 new CWS medical laboratories had been set up at Camp Detrick, Maryland; Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; and Camp Sibert, Alabama; and a mobile laboratory unit had been activated at Bushnell, Florida. The Medical Division coordinated the research work performed in these laboratories as well as at various university laboratories and maintained liaison with The Surgeon General’s Office, the NDRC, and the Canadian and British agencies carrying on chemical warfare research.37
Administrators later found that the research work and testing being carried on by the Medical Division overlapped that carried on by the Technical Division of the OC CWS. This overlapping was particularly pronounced in projects being conducted under tropical conditions. The
situation improved greatly as a result of the work of the Advisory Committee on Effectiveness of Gas Warfare in the Tropics and its operating agency, the Project Coordination Staff, which were set up in March 1944 after consultation among American, British, and Canadian representatives on chemical warfare.38
The committee, appointed by General Porter, was made up of two civilians, Dr. Conant and Dr. Roger Adams, and representatives from the U.S. Navy, Army Air Forces, and Army Ground Forces, British Army Staff, British Commonwealth Scientific Office, the Canadian Government, and the Australian Government. To the advisory committee the Project Coordination Staff submitted recommendations concerning such matters as allocation of problems to various field test agencies, coordination and standardization of testing methods, and the interpretation of data and results obtained from field tests. The Chief, CWS, appointed a prominent civilian scientist, Dr. W. A. Noyes, Jr., to head this staff and assigned two officers with the rank of lieutenant colonel as assistants. These three were on a full-time basis. The chairman of the committee, in addition, could receive assistance from representatives of the Medical Division, the Technical Division, and the Office of the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Field Operations. Representatives from the Navy and the British and Canadian chemical warfare agencies were on the staff, which had authority to communicate directly with stations and related projects in Australia, India, England, and the United States on questions of information.39
In order to carry out more effectively research on chemical warfare under tropical conditions, the United States and the Republic of Panama made arrangements early in 1944 to lease San Jose Island to the U.S. Army. This became a CWS installation, commanded during the war by a brigadier general. In September 1944, a San Jose Division was activated in the Chief’s office, and the commanding general of the San Jose Project, Brig. Gen. Egbert F. Bullene, was made chief of this division in addition to his other duties.40
Special Projects Division
The WBC Committee on biological warfare turned in a report to the Secretary of War in June 1942 which served as the basis for Stimson’s recommending to President Roosevelt that a civilian agency be delegated to supervise all aspects of this type warfare.41 Upon Presidential approval, the War Research Service (WRS) headed by Mr. George W. Merck was set up in the Federal Security Agency in the summer of 1942. The WRS was a small coordinating organization which drew on the facilities, personnel, and experience of government and private institutions, including the medical services of the Army and Navy, the Chemical Warfare Service, the U.S. Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, G-2 of the Army, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.42 After the assignment of the biological warfare mission to the CWS in the fall of 1941, it will be recalled, a Biological Division was set up in the Chief’s office.43 Later this division was redesignated the Special Assignments Branch. Its first chief was Lt. Col. James H. Defandorf, who was succeeded in March 1943 by Col. Fraser Moffat. The Special Assignments Branch was subject to the technical supervision of the WRS.
The War Research Service secured the services of outstanding scientists and administrators for full-time duty with the armed forces. Among those whose talents were made available to the CWS was Dr. Ira L. Baldwin of the University of Wisconsin. Late in 1942 Dr. Baldwin was assigned to duty with the CWS with instructions to develop a research program, secure a location for a biological warfare installation, design laboratories, and recruit a staff.44 By this time the WRS had decided that exhaustive investigation of biological warfare agents would require research and development on a scale not heretofore attempted and that the agency best equipped to carry out those activities was the Chemical Warfare Service.
Through cooperation with the WRS, Dr. Baldwin secured the services of a formidable group of scientists and technicians. A site outside Frederick, Maryland, was selected for a biological warfare installation and construction of the future Camp Detrick was begun in the spring of 1943. This
was the first of four biological warfare installations built during World War II. The others were the testing grounds at Horn Island, Pascagoula, Mississippi; the Granite Park installation at Tooele, Utah; and a production plant at Terre Haute, Indiana.
In December 1943 the Office of Strategic Services reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that there was evidence that the German Army was preparing to employ biological warfare.45 This report led Secretary Stimson on 13 January 1944 to transfer responsibility for all biological warfare projects from the War Research Service to the Chemical Warfare Service. At the same time the Secretary directed that the Chief, CWS, cooperate with The Surgeon General on the defensive aspects, all under the direction of the Commanding General, Army Service Forces.46 Later President Roosevelt confirmed this division of responsibility.47 To coordinate biological warfare activities in his office, Stimson appointed Mr. George Merck as special consultant to the Secretary of War on biological warfare. Stimson also set up a United States Biological Warfare Committee (USBWC) to advise Merck on policy matters and to maintain liaison with British and Canadian representatives.48
This action by the Secretary of War led the Chief, CWS, in January 1944 to raise the Special Assignments Branch to the status of a division. The new division, known as the Special Projects Division, was headed successively by Cols. Martin B. Chittick, J. Enrique Zanetti, and H. N. Worthley.49 In carrying out the main responsibility for biological warfare preparations the division supervised the activities of some 3,900 persons, of whom about 2,800 were Army personnel, about 1,000 Navy, and nearly 100 civilians. The majority of these were stationed at Camp Detrick, and the remainder were divided among the headquarters of the Special Projects Division in Washington and the other BW installations. The approved organization chart for 16 September 1944 listed 9 Army officers and 8 civilians and 6 Navy officers and 7 Navy enlisted men in the headquarters
office. Included in the activities of the Special Projects Division were administration and supervision of the work of scientists under contract in the universities, research institutes, and industries. Like the War Research Service before it, the Special Projects Division maintained liaison with various government and nongovernment technical groups.
Other Developments
From early 1944 till the close of the war very few important organizational changes took place in the Office of the Chief. The most significant development had something of a psychological aspect because it concerned the interpretation of the relationship of the Chief, CWS, to the installations. In the past, as has been mentioned, the chief of the Technical Division considered himself responsible for the administration of laboratories and proving grounds, the chief of the Industrial Division for arsenals and procurement districts, and the chief of the Supply Division for the depots. These relationships were portrayed graphically on the over-all organization chart of the OC CWS. (See Chart 5.) During 1944 the chief of the Control Division urged the Chief, CWS, to emphasize more strongly his direct command jurisdiction over the installations, and General Porter did this by signing a new organization chart dated 11 December 1944. For the first time during the war the installations were represented graphically as being directly under the command of the Chief, CWS. To understand fully this relationship, it is necessary to examine the administration of CWS field installations in World War II.