Chapter 12: Replacement Training
While most other elements of the armed forces had made substantial progress in activating and training troops during the early months of partial mobilization, the operations of the Chemical Warfare Service along these lines remained almost at a standstill until the second half of 1941. Even so at the end of December 1941, CWS personnel represented only four-tenths of one percent of the U.S. Army. This ratio was to more than double within the next two years, CWS strength increasing at twice the rate of the entire Army. From 14 chemical units on 7 December 1941, the total rose to 289 on 30 June 1943. (Table 9) From 6,269 officers and enlisted men as of 31 December 1941 the service grew to a peak of 69,791 on 30 June 1943. The accelerated expansion represented by the peak figures did not actually get under way until some months after the Pearl Harbor attack.1
On 7 December 1941, the existing CWS RTC was quite inadequate. The Chemical Warfare School lacked accommodations for enlisted students, although construction nearing completion would eventually enable it to handle up to two hundred officer students. The branch had no officer candidate school and no unit training facilities. Of even more concern to the CWS was the fact that these deficiencies in its training establishment were indicative of the lack of a suitable chemical troop basis. Although this situation was soon to be improved by a renewed concern in the Army over the probability of gas warfare, this development was by no means foreseeable at the end of 1941.2
Soon after the declaration of war the General Staff questioned whether the technical branches were making adequate provision for service units under the augmented protective mobilization plan for 1942. In response to an inquiry on this point, the Chief, CWS, reported that insufficient chemical
Table 9: Chemical Warfare Service Units active during world war II* (as of dates indicated)
| Units | 31 Dec 41† | 30 Jun 42 | 31 Dec 42 | 30 Jun 43 | 31 Dec 43 | 30 Jun 44 | 31 Dec 44 | 30 Jun 45 | 15 Aug 45 (V-J Day) | 2 Sep 45‡ |
| Total | 14 | 98 | 197 | 289 | 264 | 263 | 269 | 283 | 294 | 298 |
| Chemical Mortar Battalions | 2 | 6 | 6 | 10 | 11 | 21 | 25 | 25 | 32 | 32 |
| Chemical Mortar Companies | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 7 | 11 |
| Chemical Smoke Generator Battalions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 5 |
| Chemical Smoke Generator Companies | 0 | 11 | 28 | 40 | 40 | 33 | 25 | 24 | 22 | 22 |
| Chemical Companies Air Operations | 0 | 45 | 66 | 99 | 57 | 47 | 49 | 50 | 50 | 50 |
| Chemical Depot Companies (Aviation) | 0 | 7 | 12 | 14 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Chemical Maintenance Companies (Aviation) | 0 | 0 | 12 | 14 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Chemical Depot Companies | 2 | 5 | 8 | 16 | 25 | 23 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Chemical Base Depot Companies | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 11 | 11 |
| Chemical Maintenance Companies | 2 | 5 | 9 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 18 | 18 |
| Chemical Decontamination Companies | 2 | 7 | 19 | 26 | 29 | 17 | 13 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Chemical Processing Companies | 1 | 4 | 22 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 39 | 36 | 36 | 36 |
| Chemical Service Battalions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Chemical Composite Service and General Service Companies | 0 | 2 | 6 | 10 | 16 | 15 | 19 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Chemical Composite Service Platoons and Detachments | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 14 | 27 | 29 | 29 |
| Chemical Laboratory Companies | 2 | 3 | 6 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 8 |
| Chemical Composite Battalions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
* Data on individual units may be round in Appendix H.
† All units shown in this column activated prior to 7 December 1941.
‡ Japanese signed surrender terms.
Source: Historical Data Cards, AGO.
units were authorized for ground forces and recommended a ratio of seven chemical service companies per field army.3 Arrangements then projected for constituting air chemical service units under the current 84-group AAF program were considered satisfactory.
On the combat side the picture was gloomy. Only two chemical mortar battalions had been authorized—and they were a considerable distance from activation. Yet it was clear that if an adequate complement of service troops was needed in connection with defense against enemy gas attack, weapons troops in substantial numbers were just as necessary for retaliation. The two went hand in hand in any balanced gas warfare program.
In comparison to most other arms and services, as already noted, CWS mobilization at the beginning of 1942 was definitely retarded. This situation had been chronic throughout the period of limited emergency. But, with the development of a full and in fact desperate emergency, the War Department began to view more gravely the manifest shortcomings in the chemical troop program. From January 1942 the military strength of the CWS was to follow a rapidly ascending curve. Yet the handicap of a late start upon an eventually ambitious training program was never entirely overcome.
The strength of the CWS at the end of April 1942 was 1,832 officers and 1 2 ,o68 enlisted men. Four chemical mortar battalions were in training and by the end of June two more were to be mobilized. The air and ground chemical troop basis as of 25 May 1942 called for 4,970 officers and 47,192 enlisted men. It contemplated the mobilization of log ground service units and log air chemical units. The Army Supply Program called for the activation of twenty-two more chemical mortar battalions in 1943 and 1944.4 The sharp increases necessitated an immediate step-up of training activities.
The policy on chemical mortar battalions as worked out in the spring of 1942 made Army Ground Forces responsible for the activation and unit training of these organizations; the officers, unit cadres, and filler and loss replacements were to be trained and supplied by the CWS. Officer requirements for these battalions and for the chemical units in prospect for ground and air forces necessitated immediate enlargement of the modest CWS Officer Candidate School that began operations in January 1942. Troop requirements for nearly thirty-five thousand filler and loss replacements during the remainder of the calendar year forced radical changes in the approach to both individual and unit training. A new and vitalized chemical training program for the Army at large coupled with War Department insistence on more realistic chemical situations in ground force maneuvers combined to give the CWS greatly enlarged training responsibilities.
The Upswing in RTC Requirements
Entry of the United States into World War II as an active belligerent presented an immediate challenge to the system of prewar replacement training. If the preparatory training of all individual soldiers under the training center system were to be continued, considerable increase in the number of centers would be necessary. After careful study, the War Department
rejected this solution as impractical and instead directed such expansion of existing RTC facilities as was feasible.5 This decision meant in effect that the Army was falling back in considerable measure to the prewar arrangement of basic training of ground force inductees within units.
One way to stretch existing RTC facilities in meeting the new sharply accelerated load of wartime training was to cut down the training cycle. In December 1941 the War Department, as a temporary measure, directed reduction of RTC training programs from thirteen to eight weeks.6 An effort was made to meet the cutback in time without disrupting the essential training pattern that had been developed during 1941. Cuts were made in hours allotted to subjects rather than in the subjects themselves with elimination, where necessary, of advanced phases of technical work which bordered upon unit training.
The curtailment of the basic training course by five weeks, while it speeded up the output of the Edgewood Arsenal center, came far short of solving the serious training problem which the CWS was then facing. The steady increase in the RTC load is indicated by the following tabulation of trainees:7
| Month | Number in Training |
| December 1941 | 1,100 |
| January 1942 | 1,210 |
| February 1942 | 1,555 |
| March 1942 | 2,340 |
| April 1942 | 2,595 |
To provide for the increasing number of trainees being shipped to Edge-wood Arsenal, the training organization of the RTC was progressively expanded. A second training battalion was activated in February 1942 and a third battalion was partially organized a month later. Each battalion consisted of a headquarters and headquarters detachment and four lettered companies. Each company had an authorized cadre of 6 officers and 27 enlisted men and 213 trainees.8
Integrated instruction within companies was followed while the RTC remained at Edgewood Arsenal, one lieutenant-instructor teaching nearly all
Table 10—Shipment of RTC trainees, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland
| Quarter | To Z of I units | To overseas units | Shipped as cadres |
| Total | *4,887 | 1,491 | 892 |
| 1941–2nd | 648 | 0 | 0 |
| 3rd | 652 | 0 | 0 |
| 4th | 447 | 0 | 0 |
| 1942–1st | 846 | 430 | 0 |
| 2nd | 1,613 | 741 | 832 |
| 3rd | 681 | 320 | 60 |
* 57 of these went to OCS.
Source: Special orders issued by Hq, Edgewood Arsenal, Md.
of the subjects to the men of his platoon. Progress of training was tested by company commanders or, in the case of specialist schools, by the officer in charge. The center commander instituted an individual proficiency chart which was kept for each trainee and forwarded with his service record when he was shipped out. This chart showed at a glance subjects studied, the hours devoted to each, and the instructor’s rating of the student. By crossing off each hour of instruction as it was completed, the school readily noted absences which had to be made up by special instruction.
During 1941 and 1942 over 66 percent of the 7,270 trainees who passed through the Edgewood Arsenal RTC were sent to fill chemical units in the zone of interior. (Table 10) The RTC also supplied cadres to thirty-nine
newly mobilized chemical companies during the same period, fillers for these organizations being furnished directly from reception centers.
In expanding the Edgewood Arsenal RTC from an initial capacity of 1,000 in the spring of 1941 to 2,500 a year later, it became necessary to house a large portion of the trainees in a tent camp area previously used by the Civilian Military Training Corps. Although this imposed little hardship on the troops, training suffered because of lack of areas and other facilities to accommodate ten companies of over 200 men each.
While the first class of inductees was being processed at Edgewood Arsenal in 1941, the replacement center commander prepared a sketch of what he considered a layout requisite for an RTC capable of handling 1,000 men.9 The plan provided for the use of an area approximately three miles
square, with suitable ranges and instructional and exercise areas. The creation of such an installation on the Edgewood Arsenal reservation was not practicable at the beginning of 1941; by the end of the year there was much less chance of adequately accommodating the training load that had developed.
The replacement center was only one of several training activities that burgeoned at Edgewood Arsenal after war was declared. Officer candidate training was soon demanding space. Advanced and specialized courses at the Chemical Warfare School called for greater utilization of ranges. Training activities had pyramided to such size that they required direction by a senior officer who could integrate all of them, consolidate requirements insofar as possible, and see that minimum needs were satisfied. To this task was assigned Brig. Gen. Haig Shekerjian, who became chief of the Troops and Training Division at Edgewood Arsenal on 11 February 1942. For the next three years General Shekerjian was to be intimately concerned with the replacement training program.
In estimating requirements for replacement training during 1942, the CWS in February assumed that it would have to train 14,384 men.10 Allowing for possible additional activations not yet authorized, the CWS foresaw immediate need for a replacement center having a capacity for 5,000 trainees, which, under a thirteen-week training cycle, would provide 20,000 replacements per year.11 This figure was so far beyond the capabilities of Edgewood Arsenal that the only possible solution was to look elsewhere for a sizable training area. Construction of new RTC installations in 1942 was contrary to War Department policy. But because of the critical plight of the Chemical Warfare Service at this time, with its urgent need to meet the enlarged requirements for chemical troops which the staff was then formulating, an exception had to be made in the case of the chemical training center. The recommendation of the Chief, CWS, that an adequate RTC facility be provided was accordingly approved. A site near Gadsden, Alabama, was selected in March 1942, and work was begun on the new installation, Camp Sibert, several months later.12
Once the decision was taken to develop a new RTC in the south, further improvement of the Edgewood Arsenal installation ceased. Despite the fact that the new facilities were not scheduled for completion before the
following December, the Chemical Warfare Service decided to begin occupancy even before the government formally acquired title to the Alabama reservation. What the Edgewood RTC lacked and so desperately wanted at this time was space. And there was space at the new location.
On 3 June a temporary camp area was selected by an advanced detail from Edgewood Arsenal.13 This section of the reservation soon took the name Tent City. Here shacks were demolished, ground cleared and leveled, and lines of company tents established by the pioneer group so that the temporary camp was habitable by 23 June 1942 when the permanent cadres of Companies E and F, 2nd Training Battalion, arrived from Edgewood Arsenal to form the first RTC training units at the new station. On 8 July, 425 inductees arrived for assignment to these two companies. Thereafter no more men were shipped from reception centers to the Edgewood facility; as successive companies completed their training, the cadres moved to Alabama and there prepared to receive fresh trainees. The last RTC elements cleared Edgewood Arsenal on 6 September.
During the remainder of 1942 two projects were going forward simultaneously in different parts of the big reservation—expansion and development of the temporary camp, and construction of the barracks and other facilities for the permanent installation. Work in the Tent City area was done largely with troop labor, assisted by such civilian labor as could be found for the purpose. New troops were now moving in steadily so that by mid-July more than one thousand were present for duty. In order to accommodate them, it became necessary to arrange the training schedule so as to employ trainees on Wednesday afternoons, and even on Sundays, on the improvement and upkeep of the temporary camp and its facilities. On arrival, the recruits “were made aware of the job in front of them by being given a spade, a shovel, and a short pep talk almost before they had officially reported to their company officers.”14 The contribution of trainees to the early development of Camp Sibert was large indeed. Throughout the summer and fall there were endless drainage ditches to be dug, n-iore company streets to be laid out, new areas to be cleared. This work was undertaken cheerfully enough by men who had recently given up civilian life to become soldiers,
though many of them must have questioned the lack of planning which necessitated their employment for such tasks.
During the latter half of 1942, meanwhile, construction proceeded under contracts let by the Corps of Engineers for barracks and other facilities necessary for the permanent housing of five thousand RTC trainees. Unusually heavy rains which began in December and continued until April hampered the work and increased its cost. The rains not only delayed construction—they very seriously interfered with training. The winter of 19421943 was one of the worst on record. When the Coosa River overflowed its banks in December, great areas of the main camp were flooded and made unusable for training—a situation very different from the “suitability for year-round training” that had been anticipated.
The completion date for the installation, originally set at December 1942, was not met. In fact, on 3 February 1943 the job was no more than 81 percent complete.15 Although the first contingent of RTC trainees began moving from tents into their new barracks on 15 November 1942, all construction work was not finished until well into the following spring.
Camp Sibert proved large enough to afford adequate space for all the varied types of training which the CWS undertook at this location. The reservation was fourteen miles long and over five miles wide at its broadest point. Its terrain included open fields, rolling uplands, and well wooded areas. By the summer of 1943 the new RTC was part of a complete and self-sufficient training installation which included 1,500 buildings and 41 miles of roadway. On the large parade ground, twenty battalions could pass in review. There was a 1,000-bed hospital, bakery, laundry, 9 chapels, 3 libraries, 3 service clubs, 5 theaters, and eventually an airport with 2 runways each a mile long. The entire cost of constructing the camp was $17,662,125.16
Camp Sibert was built for one purpose only: to facilitate the training of chemical troops. Gradually the ranges, exercise areas, and maneuver fields needed to attain this end were developed, although the training phase of the Army’s mobilization had passed its peak before all of them were in use. After the activation of the CWS Unit Training Center at Camp Sibert in
Chemical warfare troops undergoing training on infiltration course, Camp Sibert, Alabama.
October 1942, many of these training facilities were shared by RTC and UTC.
For basic military training, the normal obstacle and infiltration courses, rifle ranges, and exercise areas were provided. For technical training, some novel facilities were developed. For example, a toxic gas maneuver area of some six square miles was set up in an uninhabited section of the reservation, the first area of this kind ever available to U.S. troops. Another important training adjunct was the decontamination area, where the recruit learned how to reopen terrain contaminated with gas. Here rough ground, covered with underbrush and threaded with trails, was alternately gassed and decontaminated. A range where 4.2-inch chemical mortars could be fired practically at will without conflicting with other range requirements filled a long-felt need. Never in its history had CWS been provided with such a good setup for instruction in the tactics and techniques of chemical warfare. There was elbow room at Camp Sibert. As soon as conditions permitted, the RTC began to use it.
RTC Curriculum
In an introduction to a wartime account of training activities at Camp Sibert, the commanding general (Shekerjian) wrote:
Many trainees who came to Camp Sibert held degrees in science and the arts; but they were considered prospective soldiers rather than specialists. The first duty of the camp was to make soldiers out of them. They had to be made physically hard, receptive to discipline, mentally alert, cooperative and thoroughly versed in the fundamentals of soldiering. Once the men had shed their civilian habits and became coordinated into a military unit, they were far more capable of learning and applying the special chemical warfare techniques covered in the later portion of their Camp Sibert training. The instructors primarily aimed at conditioning the men for war. Having achieved this, they taught them the technical aspects of their military duties.17
The issue of military versus technical training was only one of several that had to be settled in connection with the progressive development of the curriculum for RTC training. Other problems were: the amount of time to allow for replacement training; the degree of functional specialization to be aimed at in technical training; and the differing requirements for domestic and overseas replacements. Some of these issues finally had to be decided by higher authority in accord with considerations affecting the Army at large, although in most instances CWS training needs were influential factors. Solutions to these problems were Dever definitive. They had to be worked out in the light of experience to meet the exigencies of constantly shifting military situations, so that the answers developed in the latter stages of the war would not necessarily have served at the beginning.
The preoccupation of technical branches with their own specialties was reflected in the inadequate provisions that were made for basic military training under the early mobilization training programs. Soon after the Army reorganization of March 1942, the Army Service Forces undertook to correct existing disparities and to insure uniformity in basic military training at all replacement training centers under its control. The concept of RTC’s for service troops was new. The Military Training Division, ASF, from the start held the view that the technical soldier should receive the same rigorous basic training as the combatant soldier. The first fruit of this policy was the promulgation in August 1942 of a basic military training program for all replacement (and unit) training centers.18 Thereafter all inductees assigned
to any branch of the Army Service Forces received identical and generally adequate instruction in the fundamentals of soldiering.
This uniformity of programing was extended to cover specialist training that was common to all branches. The early specialist schools conducted while the RTC was located at Edgewood Arsenal had trained truck drivers, motor mechanics, clerks, and cooks. These students were designated “administrative specialists” in contrast to “technical specialists” such as toxic gas handlers whose training in specialist schools qualified them primarily for duty with the Chemical Warfare Service. The “21-series” of mobilization training programs drawn up by the Army Service Forces provided for unified training of all administrative specialists, leaving the training of technical specialists in the hands of the technical branches.
This same principle was observed throughout the war. For training that was basic or common to all technical branches, programs were prepared by the Military Training Division, ASF; for strictly technical instruction, programs were prepared by the training division of the technical branch concerned. For example, the “3-series” of chemical warfare MTP’s followed at Camp Sibert were modified from time to time to conform to the “21-series” of basic programs promulgated by the Army Service Forces.
The question of how much time should be allowed for the replacement center training of newly inducted soldiers was frequently reviewed as the war progressed. The insufficiency of the eight-week program has been noted. The thirteen-week program in effect at the outset of war had to be dropped back to eight weeks during the first three months of 1942, for reasons which were pressing at the time. The thirteen-week schedule was resumed in March and continued to serve reasonably well until that stage of the war when the need for combat loss replacements became of paramount importance.
As a result of his observations in North Africa, General Marshall stated (at a conference on 10 June 1943) that RTC training should be revised to afford better preparation for active combat in overseas theaters.19 This pronouncement marked a turning point in RTC training. In the course of two years, the centers had come to rely on having their graduates received into units where their military education could be rounded out and any defects in individual training corrected. With most of the thirteen-week trainees this procedure was possible, even where replacement center graduates were sent to units overseas. But once conflict was fully joined, as it was in 1943, organizations in combat zones wanted replacements who were ready for
battle. To provide them, the War Department had to assign more time for basic training, and in. August 1943 the replacement training cycle was increased to provide seventeen weeks of training time.20
Under ideal conditions, the most desirable over-all arrangement might have been to allow a total of six months for preparing a civilian to become an effective member of a small-unit military team, with three months devoted to individual and three months to unit training. Such an orderly approach to mobilization has seldom been possible within the vagaries of American military policy. The seventeen-week replacement training cycle represented a satisfactory if not perfect solution to the problem of individual training during the latter stages of the war. It was based, however, on two assumptions which were subject to some question:
a. That individual training for all technical services required identical time.
b. That all technical soldiers (except medical) needed the same basic military training.
The trend of ASF training policy was toward the development of a basic individual soldier who could wear equally well the insignia of any technical service. There was noticeable resistance on the part of the services to the sacrifice of individual service identification implied by this policy. This again is a question which must be considered in relation to progressive stages of mobilization. To have applied the concept of composite training of the individual soldier at the start of the war may well have given validity to objections of the technical services. Later, after the peak of mobilization had been passed, advantages of composite training became evident. Units by that time had assumed a definite mold and were able more easily to assimilate nondescript newcomers without risk of sacrifice to tradition and esprit.
Among matters of technical training initially left to the discretion of the CWS was the question whether a soldier should be trained for duty in a specific type of chemical unit or for general assignment in any type of unit. This problem was complicated by the varied nature of CWS units. Replacements had to be trained for duty in mortar battalions and in smoke generator companies, for processing companies, and for air chemical companies. As long as there was assurance that men trained for specific types of chemical organizations would be assigned to those units, specialized training in the RTC course was advantageous. Such specialization was the rule at the outset
of the war. Of the five RTC lettered companies to which trainees were being assigned in December 1941, two were designated as weapons companies, two as chemical service (aviation) companies, and one as a decontamination company.21
In practice, it was found that the number of RTC trainees who actually reached the types of units for which they had been specifically trained was small. This was especially true as increasing numbers of RTC graduates began to move directly overseas. It was the uncertainties of the replacement depot system that forced a change from specialized to more general technical training.
This fact is to be noted in comparing the original MTP 3-3 issued in November 1941 with the revision of this MTP dated May 1943. Technical training under the first program was on a functional basis and was intended to prepare replacements for assignment to one of seven specific combat or service type chemical units. Technical training under the 1943 program was aimed primarily at developing a basic chemical soldier. Specialization was here limited to a few individuals who in the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth weeks of training received special instructions as decontamination equipment operators, maintenance repairmen, toxic gas handlers, or as members of communication or mortar squads of chemical weapons companies. The number of replacements currently needed in these particular categories was indicated to RTC headquarters by the OC CWS, according to existing troop requirements. In this way clearly foreseeable (and usually limited) needs for technical specialists were met under a program definitely oriented to the development of the type of replacement principally called for during the latter stages of the war—that is, a basically trained chemical soldier.
The pattern of RTC training in the spring of 1943 was at once simple, flexible, and effective. All men assigned to a training company for the thirteen-week course received the same basic military training during the first four weeks; then, at the beginning of the technical training phase, a few men were usually selected for eight weeks of specialized schooling as cooks, clerks, motor vehicle operators, or automotive maintenance men. The remainder of the company at this point began instruction in the technique of chemical warfare, which was given for the next five weeks. Selected men were then screened out for the three weeks of specialized technical training referred to in the preceding paragraph, while all other trainees completed basic technical training. In the last week of the course the entire company
was brought together again in unit exercises in which the specialists as well as the basic trainees learned to function as a team.
Eighty percent or more of RTC graduates were listed as basic chemical soldiers. Early in the war they were assigned specification serial number (SSN) 521, a general classification which was not in fact indicative of the training they had received. A more descriptive designation was authorized by Technical Manual 12-427, 12 July 1944, which set up the classification “chemical warfare man, general (979).” This manual had the effect of sanctioning the training procedure already instituted, a chemical warfare basic soldier being described as one who had received technical training in the functioning of the 4.2-inch chemical mortar and also in the duties of chemical service units. In April 1945, the description of a chemical warfare basic soldier, SSN 979, was modified to exclude mortar training.22 This change again regularized the training practice that evolved toward the end of the war, under which the AGF assumed responsibility for training replacements for chemical combat units, while the CWS trained replacements for chemical service units.
Although the number of men processed through the specialists schools conducted in conjunction with regular RTC training was relatively small, such instruction represented an important feature of the replacement training program. The demand for administrative specialists—cooks, clerks, and automotive men who attended specialist schools during the entire eight-week period of technical training—was fairly constant. The requirement for chemical technicians who attended specialist schools during the last three weeks of the technical training phase of instruction began to fall off in the latter stage of replacement training; by this time units had learned to develop their own specialists and preferred to receive basically trained rather than specialist trained replacements.
The lengthening of the training cycle to seventeen weeks in August 1943 involved no essential change in technical training, which continued as before to extend over eight weeks of the RTC course. The two additional weeks allowed at the beginning of the course for basic military training were intended to better preparation of the individual soldier for life in the combat zone. The two additional weeks provided for basic team or unit training was in substitution for the rounding out that earlier RTC graduates received after joining their organizations, but which under operational conditions after 1943 could no longer be assured to replacements. The final end product
of RTC training was thus a more rounded soldier than his predecessor, If he was not always exactly tailored to meet an overseas requirement, this circumstance must be attributed at least in part to the widely varying demands of global war.
Training Procedures
After the transfer of RTC activities from Maryland to Alabama, the training load followed an ascending curve until May 1943, when a total of 5,850 replacement trainees were being accommodated. The plan of organization had to be flexible enough to permit both expansion and contraction. A second training regiment was organized in the spring of 1943. The following winter the second regiment was disbanded; six months later it had to be reconstituted.
From the training viewpoint the important units were the platoon and the company. As already indicated, the company normally included 213 trainees, but frequently it was necessary to assign as many as 300 trainees to one company. In such cases training suffered. The battalion had four training companies, or 852 men. Thus the CWS RTC, with two regiments of three battalions each, could handle 5,112 trainees.
The system of integrated instruction at Edgewood, where the lieutenant commanding a training platoon taught his men nearly all the subjects in the MTP, had some obvious advantages. But as training programs were successively lengthened and developed, increasing specialization of instruction became necessary, so that a combination of both integrated and departmentalized instruction was eventually evolved. Under the thirteen- and seventeen-week programs at Camp Sibert, the platoon leader instructed in all (or most) of the basic military subjects, while training in technical subjects was generally departmentalized.
The decision of the War Department to mobilize a substantial number of chemical organizations during 1942 presented the immediate problem of providing suitable cadres around which these new units could be built. The limited number of existing chemical companies excluded the possibility of obtaining the necessary cadres from parent organizations. It therefore became necessary to fill cadre positions with replacement trainees.
A special cadre training company was established at the Edgewood Arsenal RTC in June 1942.23 Since some eight hundred cadremen had already
been shipped out from the RTC, the establishment of a cadre training company at this time can be taken to mean that the system of simply selecting as cadre the more alert men who completed the regular RTC course was not satisfactory and that some specialized training for this type of duty was required. Yet cadres for forty-eight chemical units were furnished from Edge-wood Arsenal between 1940 and 1943, most of these men being specially selected rather than specially trained.
The cadre training company at Edgewood Arsenal followed the general pattern of the RTC specialist schools; at the end of the period of basic military training, selected men were transferred to the cadre company where for the remainder of the RTC course they received specialized instruction according to the needs of organizations requiring cadre complements. This procedure was amplified after transfer of the RTC to Camp Sibert, where only men who had completed the entire course of replacement training were selected for additional instruction as cadremen. Selection was made by a board of three officers and was based on demonstrated qualities of leadership, excellent character rating, and an Army General Classification Test rating of ninety or over. Throughout 1943, when the group of cadre trainees was usually in excess of one hundred this training was accomplished in four weeks of additional instruction.
An important use of cadremen was in connection with the activation of the chemical mortar battalions authorized under the 1942 Troop Basis. Although responsibility for unit training of these battalions was delegated by the War Department to the Army Ground Forces, the Chemical Warfare Service was deeply interested in the training of weapons units and accordingly coordinated the early cadre training program quite closely with the AGF schedule for the activation of chemical battalions.24 The needs of the mortar battalions received careful consideration, both in the selection of cadremen and in the attention given to their training. When these cadres left Camp Sibert, they carried with them charts and other training aids to assist in the work of instructing the newly activated weapons units.
As the need for cadre development by the CWS RTC gradually fell off, an increasing number of chemical units completed their mobilization training and were thus expected under existing War Department policy to provide cadres for new units.25 Yet by 1944 this procedure for developing selected
RTC trainees for positions of leadership was producing such good results that in March the period of instruction was extended to nine weeks and established as a “leadership training course.” When circumstances permitted, men who completed this training were frequently detailed to attend NCO courses at the Chemical Warfare School.
A variation of the standard RTC course to meet Army Air Force requirements for chemical warfare replacements was undertaken in December 1942. Under a procedure developed at that time, sixty-five AAF trainees were shipped to the CWS RTC every two weeks, after completion of four weeks of basic Air Force training.26 Upon arrival, they entered the fifth week of instruction under MTP 3-3 at Camp Sibert, completing the course nine weeks later. They were then given four weeks of specialized instruction in the functions of either a chemical noncommissioned officer (SSN 870), a decontaminating equipment operator (SSN 809), or a toxic gas handler (SSN 786). This program was continued throughout 1943. When terminated on 31 January 1944, it had produced 1,450 enlisted men technically trained for duty with various chemical activities of the AAF.
A weakness of the RTC training organization was the inexperience of the instructors upon whom fell the principal burden of training. The NCO instructors of 1943 were often soldiers with less than six months of service. The platoon commanders in the training companies were in many cases OCS graduates who themselves were recent products of RTC training. Those in closest contact with the trainees, those whom the trainees were expected to emulate, were almost always individuals with meager military backgrounds. This was a situation that could only be improved by two courses of action: first, by continuous instruction of trainer personnel; and second, by close supervision of training.
The facilities of the Chemical Warfare School at Edgewood Arsenal were never adequately used in the development of commissioned and enlisted instructors for RTC duty. Had the school been located at the training center during 1943, undoubtedly it would have played a more important role in this connection. As it was, the RTC had to depend upon its own resources for fitting its instructional staff to the specific work at hand.
Such preassignment training was accomplished by means of courses of instruction for both officers and enlisted men which were conducted, after the spring of 1943, in conjunction with the system of specialist schools. These courses included intensive study of the important subjects covered in
MTP training as well as of approved instructional procedures. After assignment, instructors continued their training in troop schools held twice weekly under the provisions of MTP 3-3. Another measure to strengthen training procedure was the institution of nightly cadre meetings at which the officer and NCO staff of each training company met to review and plan instruction scheduled for the following day. Instructors also were frequently detached to attend courses at other service schools. By these means the capability of instructors was gradually improved. It was not until late in the war that veterans with combat zone experience became available for training center duty.
Officer Pools
The officer pool was a necessary device for adjusting variations between the supply of and the demand for commissioned officers. Its most important function was to serve as a reservoir for the temporary storage of excess officers until they could be absorbed into the military system. As long as the overproduction of officers was not great, pools presented no serious administrative problems. But when as was the case by midsummer of 1943, one out of every four CWS officers was being carried in a pool, the requirements for accommodating and training so many individuals became unduly heavy. The evils of officer pools were an inevitable consequence of large officer surpluses, which in turn came about as an incidental result of the unevenness of military mobilization. The War Department undertook to keep officer production in line with military needs, particularly by regulating the output of officer candidate schools. Where early forecasts of requirements erred, mistakes were in the direction of too many rather than too few. While the situation of the Chemical Warfare Service in this respect was somewhat aggravated by uncertainties as to gas warfare as well as by delays in the mobilization of chemical troop units, the upswing from a paucity to an overproduction of officers, which became evident after two years of war, was reflected in the make-up of all technical services.
Late in 1941, when commissioned officers were in short supply, pools were sponsored by the War Department, especially in order to insure availability of filler and loss replacements as needed. The pools at first were therefore associated with replacement centers and were in fact designated as replacement pools. The CWS was initially authorized a pool strength of 150 officers.27 This quota thus became included in officer procurement -
objectives. Once the Officer Candidate School began to produce more graduates than could immediately be absorbed, this authorized strength was disregarded
and the pool became a means by which unneeded officers could mark time until their services were finally required. This situation extended over a period of many months.
The first CWS officer pool was established at Edgewood Arsenal, where before long it began to impinge upon the already complicated activities of that post. As soon as conditions permitted, a second pool was established at Camp Sibert. By the end of 1942, CWS officer pools had also been set up at other arsenals and in procurement district headquarters. At the latter stations, officers in pools were given on-the-job training in manufacturing, procurement, and supply operations. They were rotated occasionally in types of activity other than their specialty.28 At both Edgewood and Sibert pool, officers were organized into self-commanded provisional units which followed successive training courses extending to eight weeks. At the height of the pool load in the spring of 1943 the numbers of CWS officers carried in pools totaled 2,005, distributed as follows:29
| Camp Sibert | 686 |
| Chemical Warfare Center | 742 |
| Arsenals | 152 |
| Procurement districts | 376 |
| Other stations | 49 |
The administration of CWS officer pools was complicated by the fact that the excessively populated pools were located in fifteen different places in the zone of interior. The maintenance of a centralized and uniform control of these groups presented serious difficulties which never were fully resolved. At Camp Sibert the operation of the local pool became a responsibility of the Unit Training Center.30 Some effort was made to centralize the administration of all pools from Sibert, although this scheme was later dropped and the coordination of pool activities was resumed by the office of the Chief, CWS. In these matters, both Personnel and Training Divisions were concerned. The responsibility of each organization was clear-cut;
Personnel Division shifted individuals from pools into appropriate jobs as soon as these became open, while the Training Division undertook to see that pool officers were profitably engaged without burdening the installations where they were assigned. The fact that the CWS never appeared able or willing to assign qualified and experienced officers to the tasks of devising really satisfactory solutions to the troublesome pool problems was probably
due to the optimistic hope that in time the pools would empty themselves. Toward the end of hostilities this situation did ease in considerable measure, although by then the usefulness of many emergency officers had been impaired by periods of stagnation in zone of interior pools as well as in overseas theaters.
Supervisory Control
Although the CWS Replacement Training Center eventually attained high standards of training efficiency, these were reached only after the lapse of considerable time and while a suitable organization was being forged at both operating and supervisory levels. It was the immediate responsibility of Training Division, OC CWS, to direct and control the activities of the replacement training center—first, under the general authority of the War Department General Staff, G-3; and, after March 1942, as supervised by the Military Training Division, ASF.
In March 1942, four agencies were involved in the direction of RTC training. These were: War Department General Staff, G-3, which remained the ultimate authority on matters of training doctrine and policy, but whose functions after 1942 were usually limited to coordination among the AGF, the AAF, and the ASF; the Director, Military Personnel Division, ASF, who controlled the flow of trainees into and out of the centers;31 The Director of Military Training, ASF, who prepared the military training program and established instructional standards for all centers; and the Chief of the Technical Service, whose training staff prepared the program for technical training, arranged for provision of training facilities (including personnel), established quotas for specialist training, and conducted inspections to insure compliance with standard directives. This division of operating responsibility was clear-cut, logical, and satisfactory. The injection of the service command into this picture in 1943 came too late to affect the bulk of CWS training.
Before the 1942 reorganization, while training centers were under the
direct control of the War Department General Staff, considerable latitude had been allowed the technical branches in conducting replacement and other training. The primary concern of G-3 was the training of combat units; and the prewar staff was never adequate to handle this all-important function. In assuming responsibility for control of all supply services training, Brig. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, ASF Director of Military Training, soon made his influence felt, first in stimulating the strictly military phase of the training program, and eventually in improving the quality as well as increasing the scope of training activities in general.
The Training Division, OC CWS, therefore found strong support from above for its replacement training program. Yet the center itself, as it approached the peak of its activities at the beginning of 1943, was suffering from severe growing pains. As long as the camp was still under construction, while barracks and ranges were still unavailable, and while Camp Sibert lay under a flood of unusual winter rains, shortcomings in training did not always show up distinctly. An inspecting officer then commented: “In spite of most severe handicaps a very creditable showing is being made at this center.”32
Yet a comprehensive inspection of the CWS RTC by the executive officer of the Training Division, OC CWS, in January 1943 indicated that, as the “severe handicaps” of 1942 were eliminated, commensurate improvement of training performance did not result. At the time of this inspection the replacement trainee load was 5,300. There were also fifty-eight chemical units in training or being activated for training at Camp Sibert. The operational distinction between RTC and UTC was not recognized to the extent that a separate command organization was provided for each—a fault of OC CWS which was soon corrected. The increase in the training load had not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in instructor personnel; the RTC staff was understrength, due especially to a dearth of qualified officers. Supervisory control of training by RTC headquarters was inadequate. Period outlines for guidance of instructors were not being used so that teaching methods varied and the use of training aids was ineffectual. Units went through the motions of complying with instructions from higher authority but without sparking their work with energy and imagination. Poor preparation, hesitancy, and indecision on the part of company officers were noticeable. Supervision by field grade officers of the tactical work of units left
much to be desired.33 These findings were confirmed by an ASF inspection conducted 2 6-2 9 January 1943.34
In a visit to Camp Sibert late in January 1943, General Porter reviewed the training situation and determined what assistance could be given the undermanned training organization. He then took steps which resulted in marked improvement of RTC training during and after the spring of 1943. Orders were issued 14 February designating separate commanders for RTC and UTC. Experienced Regular Army colonels were assigned to command the two RTC regiments. The officer complement of the center was increased from 152 to 196.35 An effective control section was established for continuous inspection of training and improvement of training methods and training aids. General tightening of supervision brought about more effective compliance with the training precepts found in Field Manual 21-5, with the consequent production of consistently better trained replacements.
The centralized control of training aids was a definite improvement which could profitably have been instituted earlier. Many training tools were continually in short supply; for example, the center never had on hand more than one hundred compasses or approximately four hundred sets of intrench-ing tools. It was thus necessary to spread the use of limited matériel as well as to produce effective visual aids to training. Under arrangements eventually adopted, companies upon arrival at designated areas for scheduled instruction found a truck loaded with the necessary instructional materials. Development, procurement, and distribution of training aids were all controlled by the RTC directors of training and supply.
Unquestionably, the morale of both trainees and instructor staff at the CWS RTC began to improve with the completion of permanent barracks and, with the use of the splendid training facilities, the center eventually obtained. Better housing and better training combined, after the spring of 1943, to raise the CWS RTC to the level of an almost model installation. This improvement is reflected in the report of an inspection made a year later which gives an objective picture of a fully integrated training center whose growing pains were well behind it.36
By this time (1944) the center was organized into two training regiments; one regiment conducted general basic military training, and the other CWS replacement training. In commenting on the latter, the inspectors reported:
In technical training this center has developed a number of ingenious and excellent training devices whereby such subjects as toxic gas handling, impregnation procedure, depot operations, and decontamination operations are taught effectively. In some cases exceedingly clever yet practical training has resulted where there may be a lack of technical training doctrine. It is believed that this is one of the functions in which a replacement training center can lend much to the established doctrine.37
After Camp Sibert had been designated as a Class I activity of the Fourth Service Command in May 1943, CWS activities at the camp were limited to the promulgation of training doctrine, the establishment of student quotas, and the preparation of training programs. While this system was workable, it appears likely that had gas warfare materialized CWS control of the installation would have become necessary.
Movement of Trainees
Under the operating procedure prior to 1942, the training center commander reported to The Adjutant General every ten days the number of inductees he could accommodate within the RTC capacity set by the War Department. On the basis of these reports, the AGO directed reception centers to send to each replacement center enough selectees to keep the center operating at full capacity.
At the beginning of RTC operations at Edgewood Arsenal, when capacity was rated at eight hundred white and two hundred Negro trainees, The Adjutant General found that the most convenient procedure was to fill the camp to capacity and then ship no more trainees until after the camp was emptied at the end of the training cycle. This procedure was followed for the first two groups of trainees while the eight-week MTP was in effect. Beginning with the first thirteen-week cycle in September 1941 The Adjutant General began the practice of moving troops in and out at weekly (or biweekly) intervals, thus maintaining a steady flow of men through the center.
The 1941 procedures were elaborated somewhat to meet the pressure of
wartime operations. In 1942 The Adjutant General began to issue early each month a tabulated schedule indicating proposed movement of inductees from reception centers to fill RTC’s for the month following. For example, Camp Sibert was informed by mid-June 1943 that a total of 1,675 trainees would be received during July.38
Weekly reports submitted by the replacement training centers advised TAG of enlisted men who would complete the training course one month later.39 For example, the report from Camp Sibert on 29 June 1943 advised that during the week of July 26-31 following, there would be available for shipment 401 graduates with qualifications as indicated:40
| Classification | SSN | Trainees Available |
| Truck drivers, light | 345 | 41 |
| Automobile mechanics | 014 | 7 |
| Toxic gas handlers | 786 | 5 |
| Decontamination equipment operators | 809 | 4 |
| Clerk-typists | 405 | 4 |
| Cooks | 060 | 11 |
| Nonspecialists | 521 | 329 |
Appropriate orders were issued in due course by The Adjutant General according to the priority of requisitions for replacements then on hand. First consideration was given to calls for loss replacements for overseas units. Next, requisitions were filled from units preparing for overseas movement. Remaining RTC graduates were supplied as cadres or, finally, as fillers for other zone of interior units.
Procedure for intake of personnel was modified after the peak of training activities had been passed, when TAG began the practice of informing training centers of the total number of trainees they could expect during specific four-week periods. This number was set for the Camp Sibert RTC as 276 white trainees for the four weeks beginning 30 January 1944, a figure which was changed from time to time as circumstances necessitated.41
Curtailment of the Program
Even before the RTC installation at Camp Sibert was fully completed, it became apparent that its capacity would soon be in excess of foreseeable chemical warfare requirements. The job of individual training, which had loomed so large in the spring of 1942, was about to shrink to a replacement-attrition basis. A splendid training facility, urgently needed at the beginning of the war and finally built at heavy expense, came too late to serve adequately the purpose for which it was originally intended. By the middle of 1943 ASF planners, appreciating this situation, were beginning to seek other uses for this plant.
Reduction of capacity of the CWS RTC from 5,000 to 1,500 ASF trainees was announced in August 1943 in a blanket action which affected all ASF training centers. Within this limit, the monthly reception rate of the Camp Sibert center was established at 300 white and no Negro trainees.42 This figure was computed to provide replacements for estimated normal attrition and battle losses, without distinction between combat and service chemical units.43 It proved somewhat low in view of the increased requirements for replacements which developed in early 1944 as a result of the Italian campaign. In March 1944 the ASF raised the CWS RTC capacity to 2,750 trainees with a monthly input of 500.44
Nevertheless, after the midsummer of 1943 the peak of technical RTC training at Camp Sibert had been passed. The distinctive character of the center as a chemical warfare training facility began to change as it was increasingly utilized for more general training activities. The CWS was anxious that the good instructional organization and facility that had been developed should be maintained against the continuing possibility of gas warfare, and for this reason opportunities for undertaking other training missions were welcomed. One of these came with the establishment of the Fourth Service Command Basic Training Center at Camp Sibert on 24 December 1943. After this date, all service command personnel lacking basic military training received this instruction in conjunction with chemical troops. Beginning in January 1944, the same six-week course of basic
training was also given to all Special Service enlisted men.45 Finally, in April 1944, the ASF announced the plan of redesignating as “Army Service Forces Training Centers” the existing training installations which had originally served the technical branches as replacement and unit training centers.46 This move permitted a pooling of ASF training facilities which was necessitated by critical manpower shortages then existing; it was at the same time a tacit recognition of the fact that the major portion of the job of specialized technical training of inductees had been completed.
Certainly by the summer of 1944 chemical warfare technical training at Camp Sibert was shrinking fast. Unit training of chemical organizations was by that time virtually completed. Responsibility for training of loss replacements for chemical battalions had been transferred from the Chemical Warfare Service to the Army Ground Forces. Requirements for loss replacements for chemical service units had diminished with the stabilization of these organizations. Despite the fact that additional general basic training was being undertaken at Camp Sibert, the total training load was still less than the minimum considered by the staff as justifying retention of a training center installation.
In addition to the normal tendency of any government agency to continue under the momentum it has developed long after the initial impetus has ceased, another consideration influenced the reluctance of the CWS to see this center abandoned. Camp Sibert was the only training center where toxic chemicals could be used freely in tactical exercises; if combat employment of gas should be undertaken, this installation would be urgently needed. In an effort to avert the closing of the center, the Chemical Warfare Service made several proposals:
a. That the Army Ground Forces send chemical battalions to Camp Sibert for advanced training in the firing of toxic gas before being committed for overseas movement.
b. That the AGF utilize the facilities available at Camp Sibert for training of replacements for chemical combat units.
c. That the CWS officer candidate school be transferred from Edgewood Arsenal to Camp Sibert.47
Although these proposals did not materialize, final action on the discontinuance of Camp Sibert was deferred until 1945; this along with four other ASF training centers was closed in April of that year.48
Subsequent replacement training was conducted under a plan by which inductees designated for duty with chemical units received basic military training at the ASF training center at Camp Lee, Va., after which they were sent to Edgewood Arsenal on detached service for the technical training called for by current MTP’s.49 This plan was one of the most promising of several that had been tried in connection with replacement training between 1941 and 1945. It appeared to satisfy ASF insistence upon interchangeability of trainees, since after completion of the course at the ASF training center the soldier could be sent to any one of several technical training centers for the remainder of his replacement instruction. It made and held the technical training center responsible only for technical training, thus bringing to an end the long and sometimes futile attempt to make the technical branch trainer an expert in general combat. It gave the CWS absolute control of training at the place where this control was most needed, that is, in connection with the technical aspects of chemical warfare.
This arrangement did not undergo an exhaustive test since, in the closing phase of the war, CWS replacement training diminished almost to the vanishing point. During July 1944, trainees were being received at Camp Sibert at the rate of 550 every four weeks. Thereafter incoming shipments declined steadily. In June 1945, replacements were being received for technical training at Edgewood Arsenal at the rate of only thirty-two every four weeks.50
Development of the CWS replacement training program was retarded substantially by the transfer of the RTC from Edgewood Arsenal to Camp Sibert during the summer of 1942. A year later a quite satisfactory level of training operation had been attained, but the fact remains that men who passed through the RTC during the last half of 1942, when the need for well-trained replacements was most urgent, were not able to obtain the quality of training to which they were entitled. This was not necessarily a fault of those conducting or supervising CWS training. The difficulty was implicit in circumstances affecting the entire CWS program.
The CWS RTC operated within a rigidly prescribed orbit. Within this orbit it had some leeway, principally in the matter of technical training. Yet the time-bounds of instruction, both technical and military, were set by the ASF. As regards military training, there was never occasion for the Chemical Warfare Service to question directives which constantly emphasized the need for developing combat effectiveness in the technical soldier; reports from theater chemical officers invariably placed more stress on military than on technical proficiency. The training standards set by the ASF were high; if operating agencies were sometimes left breathless in pursuing them, they always recognized that the raising of training sights resulted in a superior RTC output. As difficulties and handicaps, both operational and instructional, were successively overcome the CWS replacement trainee finally began to emerge with the regularity of a production-line item. However, the question arose whether the rigidity of the process did not at times work against the flexibility of the product.
Actually the output of replacement (or individual) training centers needed to be shaped into four distinct patterns. The outlines of these distinctive products were not foreseen with clarity when the centers were projected in 1935. In the afterlight of war experience they stand out as: Replacements for zone of interior units; fillers for zone of interior units; cadres for new organizations; and replacements for theater of operation units.
Replacement of administrative losses in military organizations that still were training in the United States was the requirement easiest to fill. Once the soldier had received a modicum of basic training, it was not too difficult for him to swing into step with an outfit that was still some distance short of readiness for combat and to complete his more advanced training with comrades with whom he expected to share campaign experiences. If replacement training was to be shortened anywhere, it was at this point that curtailment could best be afforded.
Fillers for newly constituted units that were starting out, with no more than cadres, on the long road to military proficiency, should have been well-trained RTC products. When they were, development of the unit was relatively rapid. Unfortunately neither the ASF nor the AGF replacement centers were large enough to satisfy this need for fillers, so that all too often it was necessary to shunt recruits directly from reception centers to field units.
The cadreman was the most important single product of replacement training—not numerically, but with regard to his influence in the shaping of new and unparented organizations. The CWS RTC had been operating
more than a year before a clear-cut solution to the cadre training problem was devised. Meanwhile the thin line of early chemical units was depleted by constant calls for cadres. The need for cadres was urgent only during the early stages of mobilization; thereafter this need was negligible. As was true with many aspects of training, by the time an ideal solution to the problem had been devised, it was found that the problem no longer existed.
Both fillers and loss replacements for zone of interior units were individually trained soldiers who were expected to receive final team training with the units they joined. This was all that was expected of replacement training and all actually that was needed. Before proceeding to a theater of operations, the unit still had time to accommodate newcomers. But once the unit was overseas, this situation changed radically. There was no opportunity during combat to devote much attention to incoming replacements. The new arrivals had to be tailored to fit; they needed team training as well as individual training before assignment; and all together they were, or should have been, quite finished RTC products. By the time demands for replacements for the theaters became insistant, requirements for domestic units had slackened appreciably. And with the Chemical Warfare Service, calls for overseas loss replacements were less than had been anticipated. The one un-correctible failure of the replacement center system as a whole was its inability to supply fillers for all new units that had to be manned during 1942 and 1943. This and other inadequacies of the replacement centers may possibly be traced to the fact that in early planning the replacement function was unduly emphasized. In the CWS it appears that adequate provision for training of fillers for chemical units was not made, although this proved to be numerically the most important aspect of individual training of enlisted personnel.
While there were differences in types of RTC trainees, the underlying requirement for the newly inducted soldier was recruit training. Confusion would have been avoided and better training provided if the replacement installations from the start had been designed and designated as basic training centers.