Chapter 13: Training of Chemical Units
Of the 298 chemical units in existence at the cessation of hostilities (2 September 1945), all but 14 were mobilized after the Pearl Harbor attack. (See Table 9.) Taking into account organizations reconstituted and disbanded, a total of 383 chemical units and 31 platoons and detachments were activated while the war was in progress.1 This unparalleled expansion, unexpected and not provided for in prewar planning, gave rise to a number of problems in connection with unit training.
The Building of Military Organizations
The creation of a new military organization involved much more than mobilizing the personnel and matériel called for by tables of organization and equipment. The assembly of the officers, cadre, and fillers at a given time and place was akin to the act of conception. The period of unit training which followed was in reality a period of gestation, the requirements of which had to be fully satisfied before the organization could emerge to a status of functional unity. The mobilization training program was merely a systematic working pattern under which this objective could be accomplished within a given time—eight weeks, thirteen weeks, seventeen weeks —the period of gestation varying as the war progressed.
From the start the unit contained an embryo, the cadre. This included noncommissioned officers and a handful of key enlisted specialists, all having needed know-how. The cadre was presumably trained and competent. During the period of unit training, the cadre’s knowledge and experience was expected to extend throughout the organization until finally the entire company could attain the cadre’s level of competence.
Individual Training by Units
In order to insure uniformly successful unit training it was important that properly prepared components be provided for assembly into a
completed end product. The officers had to have preliminary training in order to insure that they would be able to train the men of their unit and eventually lead them into action. The cadre had to be selected carefully either from the ranks of veteran units or from likely RTC graduates. Basically trained personnel ready to learn the business of military teamwork were needed to fill the organization to authorized strength. During 1942 and 1943 all of these desiderata could seldom be satisfied. In the matter of fillers, for example, new units constantly had to be assigned awkward inductees, a development which necessitated some compromise between replacement training and unit training.
To observe the technical distinction that exists between these two types of training was often impossible. Unit training as such could not be attempted until the individual training of the soldier was at least well advanced. Yet as a matter of general policy the War Department decided early in 1942 that individual training would have to be undertaken to a large extent within units. This decision meant in reality that when untrained fillers were received by a newly activated unit (as was normally the case), they had to be given basic military training by the officers and cadre of the organization before actual unit training could be undertaken. Thus much that went by the name of unit training was actually preunit training conducted by the organization.
A more orderly arrangement would have been completion of individual training at the replacement training center, with the unit training center left free to concentrate on its proper function.2 Where, as at Camp Sibert, unit and replacement training organizations conducted recruit instruction simultaneously, it was not always easily justified. Yet there was at least one advantage to the latter arrangement, which of necessity was so often followed. Officers who accompanied the men of their unit through the individual as well as the teamwork stage of military education came to know and understand them intimately.
Which of these two systems was preferable? Is it more advantageous to train the inductee in the elements of soldiering at the replacement center and limit UTC instruction to the development of military teamwork ? Or should newly activated units develop their own fillers and rely on the RTC for loss replacement only? Although the second scheme worked satisfactorily in the training of chemical units during World War II, it does not necessarily follow that it is the better arrangement. Certainly it was adopted
through necessity rather than by choice. The problem must also be considered in relation to the evolution of chemical warfare training during the war. A significant training development was the shift, already mentioned in connection with replacement training, from the specialized individual training of 1941 to the generalized individual training of 1944. If the chemical soldier of the future is to be developed in basic training as an all-round rather than a specialized individual, he should receive his elementary military training before he joins his unit.
Purposes of Unit Training
The basic military training of inductees, whether conducted in a unit or a replacement training center, was essentially the same. What unit training undertook was to advance the organization from that state of functional ineptitude characteristic of the newly activated company to a plateau of capability where the unit, with all of its members working in unison, could competently perform the specialized military function for which it was created.
Chemical unit training, like individual training, had its nontechnical phase and its technical phase. It comprised military subjects that could be taught by any fairly competent military instructor, and it comprised technical subjects which only specialists in chemical warfare could teach. In unit as in replacement training, there were tendencies to overemphasize the technical aspects of training in certain instances and to depreciate them in other instances.
Before they could be committed to a theater of operations, units had to know how to live in the field as well as how to perform their technical functions in the field. They had to be able to pack and transport their equipment—whether a chemical laboratory or a smoke generator—and to set up and begin operations where needed in the combat zone. And if they hoped to operate very long in World War II, they had to become skillful in withstanding enemy attack. This meant they had to be proficient in camouflage; resolute under aerial bombing; prepared to defend their positions against paratroopers or infiltrators; in short to be wise in all the methods of modern warfare. Military training requirements included camouflage technique as well as collective protection against gas attack, defense tactics as well as the art of living comfortably in bivouac. These things had to be taught to units while they were mastering their technical functions and before they could be passed out of the stage of unit training.
CWS Participation in Unit Training
The development of chemical units was complicated by the varying sources of authority for their initial training, a situation that in turn was an incidental result of the ground-air-service setup under which the Army operated during the World War II. Since this logical pattern of organization had not been considered in mobilization planning, all of its implications were not appreciated in advance. The virtual autonomy of the Army Air Forces had been anticipated, and the role of the Chemical Warfare Service in training chemical personnel for service with the Air Forces had been reduced to an acceptable procedure. But the relationship between the CWS and an independent ground force command produced unforeseen problems.
Unit Training Responsibility
In July 1941, G-3 delegated to the newly established Army Air Forces authority to activate all units, including service, for duty with air—yet retained within the General Staff control of activation of all other units. This arrangement continued until March 1942, when the reorganization of the War Department made possible and even necessitated decentralizing the work of activating and training other-than-air units, specifically, ground combat and service organizations. The reorganization directive indicated that the AGF would train ground force units; that the ASF would train units under its jurisdiction; and that the AAF would train tactical air units.3 This simple division of unit training responsibility proved unsatisfactory to the ground and air commands. New War Department instructions issued in May established the more acceptable policy that the prospective zone of employment would determine the command that should train the unit.4
Under the revised policy, training responsibilities of Army Service Forces extended only to those service units that were organized to operate ASF-type installations and activities, including overseas service or communication zone operations. Ground and air forces became responsible for training both tactical and noncombat units organized for operation within their respective commands.5 Flexibility under this policy was provided by
authorizing the shifting of unit training responsibility by mutual agreement among the AGF, the AAF, and the ASF in order to make better use of existing facilities and to avoid duplication of effort. The CWS thus trained a number of chemical service units at the request of the senior combat commands.
Mortar Battalions
The combat traditions of chemical troops were inherited from World War I, when these troops first appeared as the offspring of combat engineers. The early chemical troops had one mission only—to attack the enemy with chemical weapons. The use of chemical warfare units for such work as impregnating clothing against vesicant fumes and destroying persistent enemy agents developed much later. These service functions of the CWS increased in importance during the peacetime years when CWS combatant functions were being minimized.6 But this trend was neither understood nor fully accepted by the majority of CWS officers, who assumed that once the use of gas began their branch would be in the front line of offensive action. Duty with chemical mortar battalions was therefore eagerly sought by combat-minded officers.
Throughout the entire period of the war there was never any question as to where these battalions belonged. They were mobilized by the Army Ground Forces, and the Army Ground Forces zealously retained responsibility for their unit training. The Chemical Warfare Service was at no time fully reconciled to the latter arrangement and sought to take an active part in at least the technical training of chemical mortar battalions.
The attitude of General McNair’s staff on this point was that the Ordnance Department supplied high explosive shells but did not dictate their tactical employment by the Field Artillery; that by the same token, the CWS should provide the chemical agents and leave to the field forces the task of employing them. This appeared to be sound reasoning. The question the CWS raised was whether these units could be properly trained for effective employment under a command that lacked sympathy with their tactical mission.
The two battalions which the Chief of Staff first authorized for activation in September 1941 were not actually mobilized until January 1942. By that time the activation of four more battalions had been authorized. Two of the additional battalions were mobilized in April and two in June 1942. These
six battalions were created for the primary purpose of providing the U.S. Army with means of retaliating with gas in ground operations. Since they represented an important feature of the War Department’s program for improving readiness for gas warfare, the CWS felt considerable responsibility for their technical competence. The battalions fired smoke, yet this mission alone could not justify their existence. Their employment in firing high explosive shell had been proposed by the CWS but was not at this time (spring of 1942) authorized by the General Staff. The original proposal of General Porter that chemical battalions be activated at the rate of one per infantry division was rejected in favor of the plan for mobilizing units on the basis of “special projects.” This was taken to mean, in effect, that when gas warfare began or appeared to be imminent, additional battalions provided for under the 1942 Troop Basis would be activated.
The battalions activated or expanded in the winter and early spring of 1942 received their initial cadres from existing chemical units. On 1 January, Company C of the 2nd Chemical Regiment at Fort Benning, Ga., was inactivated and its personnel were transferred to the newly activated 3rd Separate Chemical Battalion (Motorized). Two weeks later Headquarters Company and Company A of the 2nd Battalion moved from their station at Edgewood to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, but the 2nd Battalion did not reach full strength until Companies B, C, and D were activated in April.7 Additional personnel for these battalions came from the Infantry, the Coast Artillery, the Medical Department, and the CWS Replacement Training Center. Officers and enlisted men in both battalions were of high caliber and, spurred on by the memory of the recent Pearl Harbor attack, they were anxious to do a particularly good job. Each battalion had some officers who understood infantry tactics, a requirement in the training of the units for infantry support.8
As provided in the mobilization regulations,9 the battalions carried out
basic and unit training concurrently. The health and endurance of the individual soldier were emphasized; he was taught to use his weapons and to care for himself in the field. Stress was placed on duty, honorable conduct, and uncomplaining obedience. These remained the essentials of mobilization training during the war.
The tactical training of the early battalions was handicapped by a shortage of mortars and ammunition, a deficiency that was not overcome until 1943. Although the principal mission of the battalions was the firing of toxics and smoke, the zd also fired some five hundred rounds of high explosives before going overseas.10 Another handicap in the initial period of training was the lack of a specific training program for chemical battalions. This situation was rectified somewhat in May 1942 with the publication of a program for the mobilization training of the battalions, but it was not until January 1944 that the War Department published a Unit Training Program for chemical battalions.11
In July 1942 both the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, having been trained up to company level, were directed to participate in Army maneuvers. The 2nd was ordered to the Carolina maneuver area and the 3rd, which had been transferred from Fort Benning to Fort Bliss, Tex., in April, was ordered to the Louisiana maneuver area. From November 1942 to March 1943, companies of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions were rotated for amphibious training at Camp Gordon Johnston, Florida, under the Chemical Warfare Amphibious Project, the object of which was the training of the companies in the use of smoke in landing operations, a technique which these units never used in combat.12 Before being sent overseas the 2nd Battalion was attached to the 45th Infantry Division for training at Camp Pickett, Va.13 This was one of the
Army Maneuvers, Louisiana, 1942. Infantryman advancing under cover of smoke screen.
very few instances in World War II where a chemical mortar battalion actually went through a period of training in the zone of interior with a division.
Cadres from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, together with some Boo men from the RTC at Edgewood who had been given special mortar training over a period of four to six weeks, were detailed as cadres for the first, 83rd, and 84th Battalions when they were activated in the spring of 1942. The first and 82nd were both activated on 25 April 1942 at Forts D. A. Russell and Bliss, Tex., respectively. The 83rd was activated 19 June 1942 at Camp Gordon, Ga., and the 84th on 5 June at Camp Rucker, Ala. These battalions, like the 2nd and 3rd before them, were handicapped by a shortage of mortars, ammunition, training literature, and training aids.14 Until mortars were received at the beginning of 1943 emphasis was placed on physical conditioning of the men, identification of chemical agents, and small arms training. In March 1943 the 82nd was ordered to the Louisiana maneuver area, and in the following month the 81st was directed to participate in the same maneuvers. This was the last occasion during the war when chemical mortar battalions took part in Army maneuvers, so important for the training of combat units.
Despite the handicaps which the 81st, 82nd, 83rd, and 84th Battalions
faced, their training seems to have been quite satisfactory so far as it went. Raw recruits were trained to be good soldiers through long and tedious hours of work and instruction. Ambitious enlisted men were offered opportunities for promotion or for attendance at OCS. The men in the ranks, if the words of one of them can be taken at face value, were motivated by a genuine pride in their accomplishment. “Here we are today,” wrote a corporal of the 82nd Battalion in his seventh month at Fort Bliss, “products of the military training, better Americans and more interested citizens. We have made new friends and acquaintances. We have learned the ways of the outdoors and of nature, of living together and sharing with our fellow soldier. We have learned to listen and obey and follow for a common cause and for the good and welfare of all.”15
The Army inspectors were likewise impressed with the results of the training, sometimes to an extraordinary degree. To quote from the critique of a Second Army inspector of the 84th Separate Chemical Battalion, “I was amazed to see the same men who were at the train three months ago, raw recruits, now men who put on such a good showing. I find the 84th Chemical Battalion gave a very enviable account of themselves.”16
While the principal mission of the mortar battalions was the dispersion of toxic agents and smoke, the CWS was of the opinion that the battalions could be profitably used to fire high explosives in support of the infantry. Before any such assignment was possible two preliminary steps were necessary. First, the War Department would have to approve a military requirement for a high explosive (HE) shell for the 4.2-inch mortar, and secondly, the Army Ground Forces would have to be convinced that the 4.2-inch mortar could be used to advantage in supplementing the 105-mm. howitzer in close support of the Infantry.
The CWS had little difficulty in securing approval for establishing a military requirement for the 4.2-inch high explosive shell; on 10 April 1942 the Chief, CWS, submitted a request to the commanding general, ASF, which was approved on 26 April 1942.17 Convincing the Army Ground Forces of the potentialities of the mortar for firing HE was a much more
prolonged task. In order to accomplish the latter objective, the CWS had to wage a campaign of persuasion on two fronts; in the North African Theater of Operations and in Washington.
Within a month after U.S. troops had landed in North Africa on 8 November 1942, the chemical officer of the Western Task Force, Col. Maurice E. Barker, called the attention of his commander, Maj. Gen. George S. Patton, to the advantages that might be gained by employing 4.2-inch mortars for firing HE. The less mountainous portions of the North African country side were mostly open except for stone farm houses and country villas, which amounted to small natural forts against which it would be highly profitable to employ the 4.2-inch mortar. In the mountainous regions the mortar could be used to put its shells into gullies and behind steep hills where artillery fire could not reach. In December 1942 General Patton requested that the War Department make available a brigade of chemical troops armed with the latest weapons for firing HE and white phosphorus (WP).18
At the same time, the Chief, CWS, was attempting to impress upon the War Department the benefits of utilizing a chemical mortar battalion for firing HE. General Porter had a two-fold objective in mind: first, to guarantee that a sufficient number of battalions would be sent to the theaters to operate in a situation of gas warfare, and secondly, to insure that those battalions would be used as effectively as possible should gas warfare not materialize. Reports coming into the Chief’s Office in early 1943 to the effect that the British were using their 4.2-inch mortars to fire HE served to stimulate and challenge the CWS. As the Chief of the Field Requirements Branch, OC CWS, remarked, “The British are far ahead. Their CWS is in their Army.”19
In February 1943 the Chief, CWS, arranged for a conference among representatives of the Army Service Forces, the Army Ground Forces, and the Chemical Warfare Service, to discuss the feasibility of having a War Department directive issued authorizing chemical troops to fire high explosives. Suggestions emanating from this meeting led to War Department action on 26 April 1943 authorizing the firing of high explosives by chemical troops.20
The official change in mission to include the firing of high explosive shells had a marked effect on the training of mortar battalions. From the spring of 1943 on, training was concentrated more on that aspect of the mission than on the dispersion of toxics and smoke. From May 1943 till 1945, twenty-two additional chemical battalions were activated by the AGF and trained in various camps throughout the United States.21 Of these twenty-two, the first four, the 85th, 86th, 87th, and 88th, all activated in May and June 1943, drained the entire Regular establishment of available battalion commanders. Thereafter battalion commanders came primarily from the ranks of Reserve officers called to active duty.
Although the chemical mortar battalions were activated by the Army Ground Forces and remained under AGF jurisdiction, the Chemical Warfare Service, as indicated above, retained a considerable interest in them. The CWS supplied most of their officers and cadres, procured their mortars and ammunition, and was responsible for the technical aspects of their training. The chemical mortar battalions were accepted in the theaters as stemming from the CWS, even though their early growth was nurtured by the AGF.
The CWS, moreover, had a considerable role in the writing of the tables of organization and mobilization training programs for the mortar battalions. In carrying out these activities the Training Division, OC CWS, worked closely with the Office of the Ground Chemical Officer in Washington. The Ground Chemical Officer was a CWS officer, with the rank of colonel, assigned to the AGF headquarters where he had AGF staff responsibilities for all aspects of chemical warfare training. Since he normally had only two officers and several enlisted men to assist him, the writing of mobilization training programs and tables of organization largely devolved on the Office of the Chief, CWS.22 Final approval of these rested with the Commanding General, AGE
With the appearance of the mobilization training program for the unit training of chemical battalions in January 1944, the platoon, company, and
battalion phases of training were spelled out much more precisely than heretofore.23 During the platoon and company phases of training, which were to run for five and four weeks respectively, each unit was to be developed into a fighting team capable of operating. with other units in various types of battle missions. In these phases, troops were to be psychologically prepared for the shock of battle by being subjected to overhead fire, fire past their flanks, tank attacks against entrenchments of their own construction, and realistic, simulated attacks from the air. During the battalion phase of training, which was scheduled for three weeks, each unit was to be taught to perform its tactical and technical functions in the battalion through movements, maneuvers, and exercises in simulated combat situations. All three training phases called for additional instruction in basic and general subjects, such as military intelligence, security, and physical and mental conditioning.
The commanding officers of the battalions received the mobilization training programs and other official publications from the Army chemical officers, who had responsibility for supervising the technical aspects of the training of the battalions and who conducted occasional inspections. The Training Division, OC CWS, and the Ground Chemical Officer or his representative also inspected the units, as did the AGF inspector general. Actually there was not a great deal of outside supervision or inspection of any kind and the battalion commanders were largely on their own. For administrative and housekeeping purposes the commanding officers reported to the AGF staff officer at their camps who was responsible for the so-called Spare Parts units—those units not organically a part of a division.
The mobilization training program, the official War Department directive for training the battalions, guided the battalion commanders in the compilation of their individual training schedules. These schedules were not simple elaborations of the training programs, but included, in addition to the requirements of the War Department, certain aspects of training which the commanding officers felt should be stressed. In a way these schedules and the training carried out under them reflected the personalities of the individual battalion commanders. If the commander was gifted with imagination, training would tend to be realistic and consideration would be given in such activities as firing the mortar and marches to actual tactical situations. The military background of the commanding officer also tended to influence
training. If, as sometimes happened, the commanding officer had an artillery background, the firing of the mortar would be approached from the artillery point of view.
The experience gained by battalions which had been in combat was not overlooked in the training of the later battalions. The commanders overseas would send back comments to the Office of the Chief which would be passed on to the commanding officers of the battalions in the United States. One such letter in September 1943, which summarized the reactions of the commanding officers of the 2nd, 3rd, and 83rd Battalions, had this to say about training:
Experience has shown that the soldier well-grounded in the fundamentals of scouting and patrolling, use of camouflage, cover and concealment, and taught to move fast, will individually live to fight many battles. Next to that comes team work, an item particularly important to our mortars. ... Failures in mission will be the result of poor team work. Failures in battle are inexcusable when such failures are a result of poor training.24
The demand for company officers for chemical mortar battalions had the effect of pointing up the whole CWS officer procurement program.25 More junior officers were needed for chemical service units than for chemical combat units; yet the ideal toward which the officer candidate aimed was the platoon leader of a chemical mortar company. If he could measure up to this job, he was assumed to be capable of filling any CWS assignment in the grade of second lieutenant.
OCS students acquired some basic understanding of the employment of war gases in ground combat. This knowledge was augmented by the theory for the offensive employment of gas in courses which some of them later attended at the Chemical Warfare School. But training of officers in the conduct of HE fire could not be undertaken until the high explosive shell was authorized for chemical battalions, so that this type of instruction was not begun at the Chemical Warfare School until the fall of 1942. The training of CWS officers for duty with chemical battalions was, on the whole, never as well integrated as, for example, the preactivation training of artillery officers scheduled for assignment to field artillery battalions.
This same lack of integration is evident in connection with the unit
training of chemical battalions. The AGF did not have available firing areas where toxic agents could be released, and arrangements were never worked out for the battalions to fire gas munitions at CWS proving grounds; the training of these units in gas warfare was therefore theoretical at best. At the same time their training in close support of the infantry with HE was never altogether satisfactory because their mobilization training was entirely unrelated to that of the organizations they eventually supported in battle. When the activation of the initial series of six chemical battalions was begun in 1942, a third of the Army’s wartime divisions already were mobilized; and the division mobilization program was virtually completed by the time activation of chemical battalions was resumed in 1943.26 Most of the battalions thus missed out on the splendid teamwork development of non-divisional units which climaxed AGF training in the United States. In many, if not a majority of cases, the battalions first encountered the units they were to support only after their arrival in the theaters of operation, so that lessons that should have been learned in maneuvers had to be mastered in combat.
Smoke Units
From an operational standpoint, the smoke generator companies were somewhere between combat and service units. When attached to combat echelons in screening military operations from either air or ground attack, they were regarded as combat elements. When they were utilized in the static defense of fixed installations they generally came under communication zone control and were classed as ASF troops. In either case their employment was directly against enemy action, in contrast to the noncombatant work of such purely service units as depot and processing companies. Since the operation of smoke generators was somewhat technical and, at least initially, experimental in nature, the development and training of smoke units was handled by the CWS. Thus administratively, if not operationally, they were classed as CWS service troops.
The earliest smoke generator companies were hastily organized in 1942 specifically for screening the Bremerton (Wash.) Navy Yard, west coast aircraft plants, and the Sault Ste. Marie locks in Michigan against air attack. Formal unit training of these organizations had to be curtailed because of the immediate need for their services in the protection of these sensitive zone
of interior installations. These companies each manned long lines of stationary oil generators, an adaptation of the California orange grove smudge pot. On-the-job training in the operation of these early smoke devices was undertaken as a special CWS project in conjunction with chemical staff personnel of the defense commands involved. In the spring and summer of 1942, the Chief’s Office sent Lt. Col. James N. Hinyard to the west coast and to Sault Ste. Marie to demonstrate the use of MI mechanical smoke generators recently procured by the Chemical Warfare Service.27
It was not until the development of the mechanical smoke generator, MI, that the organization of mobile smoke generator units became feasible. Companies activated independently after the mechanical generator was included in a revised T/O&E (as contrasted with those new companies formed amoeba-like from existing units undergoing reorganization) received all or part of their training at the CWS Unit Training Center. In all, forty smoke generator companies were activated during World War 11.28
Experimental Company, Jungle Warfare
In September 1943 the Chief, CWS, directed that a special company be organized at Camp Sibert to conduct experiments on methods of reducing Japanese-type pill boxes. This company, consisting of 17 officers and 277 enlisted men, was under rigid training from October 1943 until January 1944. It made use of a number of weapons in its experiments, including the 4.2-inch mortar, portable flame throwers, Thompson submachine guns, carbines, pistols, grenades, and Browning automatic rifles. Early in 1944 the company was deactivated by order of the War Department and its personnel used to furnish cadres to chemical mortar battalions about to be activated.29
Ground Service Units
Chemical ground service units were those intended to perform technical or service functions of noncombatant nature with the field forces, under either theater, army, or communications zone control. They included
Flame thrower demonstration, Camp Sibert, Alabama, 1944.
chemical laboratory, maintenance, depot, decontamination, processing, and composite companies.30 With the single exception of the 412th Chemical Depot Company they were altogether new organizations with no background of technical experience or military tradition. A considerable number of service type units were Negro units.31
Unit training of these organizations was in the main handled by the Chemical Warfare Service. This training was facilitated by the fact that activation of the principal block of units, begun in March 1942, was spread evenly over the next twelve months, during which period eighty-nine service companies were mobilized.
The timing of the mobilization of these chemical service companies viewed against the full background of the war was excellent. Their primary mission was to limit the effectiveness of hostile gas attack; such secondary functions as they undertook were quite incidental to this principal purpose. By the time the War Department General Staff activated them, it had
become clear that if gas were used against the Allies it would be in the final phases of the war. Earlier the employment of toxic chemicals in curtain raising air attacks had been regarded seriously by CWS tacticians, but the Japanese at Pearl Harbor proved beyond doubt that other munitions were more than adequate for such operations. This in fact no more than confirmed experience in the initial stages of the war in Europe. At the same time reported enemy activities in the field of gas warfare strongly suggested that the gas weapon might eventually be brought into play. And from the strategical viewpoint it was fairly obvious that this development would come only after the Axis powers were thrown on the defensive. In short, the strong likelihood was that the employment of gas would not take place until more than a year after the activation of gas defense units was begun, an interval that would allow ample time for their training and disposition.
Since training of the bulk of these service units was not seriously undertaken until the fall of 1942, this activity came under the supervisory control of Army Service Forces. The ASF in time delegated the responsibility to the service commands, except for exempted installations where immediate control of training was exercised by branch chiefs.32 This meant that unit training conducted at Camp Sibert was theoretically under the jurisdiction of the commanding general, Fourth Service Command, while that conducted at Edgewood Arsenal was directly controlled by the Chief, CWS. In practice the Training Division, OC CWS, retained substantial control of this training at both stations.
Air Service Units
The prewar scheme for organization of chemical units with the Army Air Corps was geared to a defensive rather than to a positive and global strategy. Under the 1939 plan, the principal air chemical service units were assigned to airdromes. Under the 1942 plan, they were assigned to bomber formations.
The air expansion program of 1940 necessitated a substantial increase in the Air Corps complement of chemical troops. This in turn made possible the gradual development of the organizational pattern demanded in World War II. Initially one chemical company was set up in each air district.33 This
company had platoons located at various bases throughout the district. Under this setup the “company” was merely the holding corporation for a large group of service platoons. These were designated as airdromes, service center, and supply base platoons, 134 of them being activated in the zone of interior. With the unit training of these platoons the CWS served only in a monitoring capacity. Enlisted men were supplied principally from the Edge-wood Arsenal Replacement Training Center, while local training of the platoons was accomplished under the supervision of chemical staff personnel assigned to the several air districts. These early air chemical platoons, although later reorganized, were largely represented in the tactical service units which eventually operated with the AAF during the war.
Three principal types of air chemical service organizations were determined upon in 1942 as necessary to support chemical operations of the Army Air Forces. These were chemical companies, air operations; depot companies, aviation; and maintenance companies, aviation. The air operations company was the principal air chemical service unit. Its function was to handle, under operational and combat conditions, liquid toxic or smoke agents used by the type of bombardment aviation which it served.34 The company included 4 officers and 130 enlisted men.35 It consisted of a distributing point section and four operating platoons, the latter capable of operating independently on the basis of one platoon per squadron. The companies were distinctively designated to indicate the type of air unit that served: (M & H) for medium or heavy bombardment, (L) for light bombardment, and (D) for dive bombardment. The air operations company was not trained to handle arsenal-filled gas bombs or incendiaries.36
The majority of the air operations companies activated in 1942 were organized from air chemical platoons activated and trained earlier. Twenty-eight of the companies were given unit training by the CWS. Of these 6 were eventually sent overseas, 19 remained at Camp Sibert for periods of from 6 to 8 months, and 14 were disbanded in December 1943. Many of their officers and men were sent overseas as casual replacements.
The aviation maintenance company had the job of higher echelon maintenance, repair, and salvage of all chemical warfare equipment used by the Army Air Forces. The aviation depot company handled and stored all bulk chemical ammunition and spray tanks as well as incendiary munitions. Five
aviation depot and three aviation maintenance companies were trained by the CWS.
Unit Training at Camp Sibert
Chemical Warfare units were well represented in each component of the Army, yet less than half of these organizations received their unit training directly under CWS auspices. The chemical mortar battalions, as indicated, were all trained by the AGF. Two-thirds of the 1942-1943 AAF units were made up from chemical platoons that had been unit-trained at air installations. CWS unit training was thus narrowed to those technical service organizations which were trained at Edgewood Arsenal and Camp Sibert. (Table 11)
Table 11: Wartime Training of CWS Service Units
| Type of unit | Trained at Edgewood* | Trained at Camp Sibert | Trained elsewhere | Trained units activated |
| Total | 30 | 163 | 164 | 337 |
| Smoke generator | 8 | 34 | 5 | 40 |
| Air operations | 0 | 28 | 72 | 100 |
| Depot, aviation | 1 | 4 | 15 | 20 |
| Maintenance, aviation | 0 | 3 | 11 | 14 |
| Depot | 2 | 26 | 10 | 37 |
| Maintenance | 1 | 5 | 14 | 20 |
| Decontamination | 2 | 10 | 18 | 30 |
| Processing | 12 | 36 | 2 | 39 |
| Composite-service | 1 | 13 | 15 | 28 |
| Laboratory | 3 | 4 | 2 | 9 |
* Seven smoke generator, 1 depot, 11 processing, and 1 composite-service companies were trained at Camp Sibert and Edgewood and are included in both columns.
Source: App. H.
Although replacement training began at Camp Sibert in July 1942, it was not until August that the CWS formally recommended establishment of its Unit Training Center at that station. By the time the center was officially activated on 5 October 1942, the program for mobilization of chemical service units already was well under way; many of the ground service companies and the majority of the air service companies had been mobilized. Many of the organizations mobilized before October 1942 could not be sent to the new UTC to complete their training, but after 1942 chemical service units
activated in the zone of interior normally trained at Camp Sibert. By January 1943, UTC trainees numbered 9,067 as against 5,300 men receiving replacement training. The rapid growth of unit training is indicated in the following figures:
| Month | Number of Units |
| October 1942 | 4 |
| November 1942 | 13 |
| December 1942 | 38 |
| January 1943 | 54 |
| February 1943 | 68 |
Internal organization of the UTC differed from that of the RTC in that the replacement training unit was an artificial structure provided merely to facilitate the training of individuals, while the UTC training unit was a tactical organization as prescribed by an official T/O. The training cadre of the RTC unit remained at the center to train succeeding groups of replacements; but the cadre of the UTC organization was “organic”; it was the heart of the unit.
Although unit training was essentially self-training, that is, training of the company by the company, the instruction of the unit by its officers and noncommissioned officers was furthered in many ways by facilities available at the center. It was possible for an organization to work out its own salvation in the matter of unit training; in fact most of the chemical units mobilized before the UTC was activated were obliged to do so. This was a painful process even when, as at Edgewood Arsenal, it was accomplished in a climate of experience and under the shadow of veteran organizations. For a rapid, production-line operation of unit building such as that which confronted the CWS in 1943 there was no substitute for the training center, even though the true role of the center was merely to assist the unit in its effort to train itself.
In devising the organization of a Unit Training Center there were at the start no more than three tangibles from which to work. The approximate number of new units to begin training at stated intervals was known. The mission of each type of organization was understood. And a governing mobilization training program was available. The aggregate number of units to be trained dictated the battalion-regimental echelonment which provided eventually for four regimental groups. It was therefore necessary to develop a type of training center organization which would permit the commanding
general to exercise leadership through this command structure so as to insure rapid development of the units in accordance with the standardized training program.
After an experimental period of growth and development, the organizational pattern of UTC headquarters became fairly well stabilized in March 1943. Three principal offices were included: one to handle military administration; one for all supply matters; and one for operations and training. The latter was the largest and most important office of the center command. Its organization was reflected in a corresponding staff section at each regimental headquarters.
The technical training section of the operations and training office supervised each company in the technical phase of mobilization training. It set the technical standards, and it was largely instrumental in seeing that these standards were met.
The composition of the section was an index to the technical specialization involved in chemical warfare operations. The availability at UTC headquarters of groups specializing as experts in each of the fields for which chemical service units were being trained provided a partial solution to the recurrent problem of general versus specialized training of the individual.
A high degree of technical specialization was never a target in the wartime schooling of company grade officers. A captain or lieutenant when assigned, for example, to a smoke generator company ordinarily knew very little about the technique of smoke production. However, before technical training under the mobilization training program was started, the company officers were required to attend a special course on the operation, maintenance, and tactical employment of smoke generators, conducted by the smoke generator group of the technical training section.
This evening instruction, given while basic unit training was in progress, continued until the officers were judged competent to undertake the technical training of the company. Once this was begun the technical group maintained close contact with the unit, observing its progress in field operations and evaluating its training accomplishments. By the time the company had completed its technical training, its officers were themselves specialists in this field.
This general procedure was followed with each type of unit activated at the Unit Training Center. The principal effort in both replacement and unit training as already mentioned, was toward the development of general military effectiveness rather than the creation of a broad base of technical proficiency. It was the important function of the technical training section
to insure that the technical training phase of mobilization training was adequately handled. In addition to the primary mission of aiding in the technical training of units, each group of specialists was employed in developing specialized training programs and in preparing technical manuals and directives.
The functions of the supervisory section of the operations and training office complemented the training supervision conducted by the regiments and battalions. Supervision from training center headquarters emphasized especially the technique of training, while supervision from regimental and battalion headquarters gave more attention to the orderly expediting of training programs.
The supervisory section included specialists in training methods who were required repeatedly to visit units in training, to evaluate training procedures with relation to Army standards set by FM 21-5, and to report their findings by standardized form to the several interested agencies. These reports were designed to help the unit, and they proved most useful in maintaining satisfactory training standards. The supervisory section was also responsible for conducting classes of instruction in teaching methods which all UTC instructors were required to attend.
The schedules section undertook at the beginning of UTC operations to write the weekly training schedules to be followed by each organization in accordance with the general provisions of the mobilization training program. This soon proved to be impracticable; it was in fact undesirable, since it infringed upon the training responsibility of the unit. Although schedule writing was soon delegated to the companies, there remained several important functions to be performed by the schedules section of UTC headquarters. The weekly schedules had to be coordinated to avoid conflict in the use of firing ranges, training areas, and other facilities. For this reason it was necessary to have copies of all training schedules transmitted to the schedules section well before their effective dates. This section thus became a steering organization for all training operations at the center. At the same time the data it accumulated provided the basis for procurement of munitions and other matériel required in training operations. The schedules section prepared lesson plans which outlined the instructional approach to be followed in each training period and initiated recommendations for changes in current mobilization training programs.
The schools section was another busy office of UTC headquarters. It was charged with the conduct of the specialist school which trained administrative specialists and chemical technicians. The section also made arrangements
for the attendance of selected trainees as students at specialized courses conducted by other Army or civilian schools. In short, all training of unit personnel undertaken away from the unit was channelized through the schools section.
Activities of the remaining sections of the operations and training office were indicated by their titles. The training aids section procured or built the training aids needed by the entire command, stored them, and made them available when and where needed by the companies. The weapons and marksmanship section established standard operating procedure for the firing ranges belonging to the Unit Training Center, supervised their use, and initiated arrangements for the employment of outside ranges when needed. The statistics section centralized in one office the preparation of numerous reports required by higher authority on the progress of unit training. These statistics, necessary in connection with the general personnel administration of the Army, also proved to be of considerable value to the center command. Two additional sections appeared somewhat later to meet special requirements. The POM section (preparation for overseas movement) eventually checked all details incident to the complicated administrative procedure involved in the preparation of units for overseas movement. The camouflage school section operated a special training course for instruction in the techniques of camouflage as they applied to the protection of chemical warfare field establishments.
Although the activities of the operations and training office of necessity were definitely compartmentalized, it did not prevent close cooperation between the sections. The preparation of lesson plans by the schedules section and the examination of teaching methods by the supervisory section covered much common ground. While units were firing on ranges, supervision of their instruction was largely taken over by the weapons and marksmanship section. The technical training section worked closely with the schools section in the operation of the specialist schools.
Organization of Units
Organization of the several companies into provisional training battalions and regiments was dictated by the number of units present for training. By February 1943 the formation of ten battalions of white and three battalions of Negro troops was necessary. The First and Second Regiments each included three battalions, and the Third Regiment four battalions of white troops. The Fourth Regiment comprised three battalions of Negro troops.
This basic organization continued until Camp Sibert was converted into an ASF training center in April 1944. (Table 12)
Table 12: Provisional organization, CWS UTC, February 1943
| Regiment | Battalion | Companies |
| 1st | 1st | 5 (processing) |
| 2nd | 5 (processing) | |
| 3rd | 5 (processing), 1 (laboratory) | |
| 2nd | 4th | 3 (smoke generator), 2 (processing) |
| 5th | 1 (decontamination), 1 (maintenance), 3 (composite) | |
| 6th | 3 (composite) | |
| 3rd | 7th | 1 (maintenance), 4 (depot) |
| 8th | 7, (air operations) | |
| 9th | 1 (maintenance), 5 (processing) | |
| 10th | 3 (processing) | |
| 4th | 11th | 10 (smoke generator) |
| 12th | 1 (decontamination), 1 (processing), 4 (smoke generator) | |
| 14th | 1 (maintenance), (aviation), 1 (depot) (aviation) |
Source: CWS UTC, SO 42, 11 Feb 43.
The battalions and regiments were provisional organizations responsible for the military control of the companies and for certain features of their training operations. The number and type of companies assigned to battalions were determined by administrative convenience. Five or six companies usually constituted one battalion. One type of company predominated in each battalion.
Four command levels were active within the Unit Training Center: UTC headquarters, the regiment, the battalion, and the company. Although each had definitely prescribed responsibilities in the scheme of unit training, the first three existed solely for the purpose of furthering the efforts of the company in preparing itself for field operations.
To the regiment, the center command delegated primary responsibility for the training management of the companies. Some of these duties were
performed by the regiment. Others were carried out for the regiment by the battalion, since it was impracticable for the regiment itself to provide the intimate leadership needed in directing the operation of fifteen to twenty companies in various stages of mobilization training. For example, the conduct of troop schools was a responsibility of the regiment.37 In practice the regiment conducted troop schools for all officers under its command, while the battalion conducted troop schools for noncommissioned officers assigned to its companies. Development of proficiency in military administration within the units was a function of the regiment; supply administration was checked by the regimental staff, while maintenance of training records was scrutinized by battalion commanders. The regimental commander had five principal staff officers: an executive, an adjutant, a supply officer, a motor transport officer, and a training officer.
The important functions of the battalion in unit training were to insure, by immediate personal contact with the training companies, that their training needs were met and that their training progress was steady. The battalion commander observed and weighed the capabilities of the company organization and judged the military effectiveness of the company commander. The battalion staff included, besides the major commanding, a captain as executive and one lieutenant as training officer. Aside from the conduct of NCO troop schools, the staff was essentially a supervisory-management agency; it directed the translation of training directives into training accomplishments.
The company was the pivot for all activities at the Unit Training Center. From the moment of activation, the company commander was charged with full exercise of the command of his organization, which included the conduct of all instruction and drills. He usually had an authorized complement of lieutenants and an experienced cadre of enlisted personnel to assist him in company training, yet the responsibility was his.
The company headquarters prepared the weekly training schedule which transformed the generalities of the mobilization training program into a specific timetable of training activity. The company maintained the training progress chart, and recorded deviations from scheduled training that had to be made either individually or by the unit. The company also initiated the
bimonthly training status report which indicated the progress made by the unit toward completion of its mobilization training. These basic training records were indispensable to training management, and as such they were carefully scrutinized by higher echelons of the training command.
Unit Training Facilities
The movement of replacement trainees from their original “tent city” camp into newly completed barracks, which began late in 1942, opened the way for the accommodation of unit training at Camp Sibert. Shortly this bivouac area, which had been developed by the Replacement Training Center, became available for the housing of units. But it could shelter no more than five thousand, and in immediate prospect was the unit training of a much larger body of troops.
Putting the UTC in tents would have been a solution to its housing problems. But this was not feasible because the units in training were being filled almost entirely with raw reception center inductees who under existing War Department policy were entitled to solid shelter while undergoing basic training. The Chemical Warfare Service therefore proposed, and the War Department shortly approved, the construction of necessary wooden barracks to accommodate a maximum of ten thousand white and three thousand Negro troops, together with appropriate administrative and recreational structures. Until these buildings were erected, the original RTC area was occupied by the Unit Training Center.
This situation lasted but a few weeks. The UTC construction was pushed to completion much more rapidly than expected, thanks to the ready availability of labor and materials in the Gadsden area. Competent contractors were available to handle architectural and engineering details, building construction, roads, and utilities. Though construction was of the short-life type, the buildings long survived the purpose they were intended to serve. Weather was the principal impediment. Despite exceptionally heavy rainfall, the new UTC headquarters was ready for occupancy in December 1942, and most of the units moved to the new area during the following month. Eighty percent of the training center construction was completed by February 1943, the military following close on the heels of the civilian contractors, and occupying buildings as soon as they were inspected and found acceptable.
The UTC housing scheme was developed on a pattern of regimental areas, with provision for six regiments. Within these areas, groups of five-company battalions were laid out. Seven or eight 34-man barracks were
allocated to each company, the company group including also mess hall, orderly and day rooms, and lavatory. Counting chapels, libraries, instructional and administrative buildings, in all 822 structures were authorized for UTC occupancy, well over half the total number at Camp Sibert.38
Despite the haste in which the Unit Training Center was laid out and built, it proved to be on the whole an efficient installation. Making the streets wider than originally planned and strict care in the preservation of standing trees, both favorite projects of the camp commander, were measures which added to the pleasant atmosphere of the station. Experience indicated some features of the UTC layout which needed improvement. The training areas were too far from the housing area, so that too much time was wasted in going back and forth. The arrangement of four organizational groups in each battalion area, a practice which was followed in the Replacement Training Center, permitted a more convenient arrangement of barracks, mess halls, and orderly and supply rooms, than was possible under the five-unit group adopted by the Unit Training Center. Particularly regretted was the lack of a swimming pool, a much needed recreational facility.
In addition to barracks and administration buildings, the unit training program called for extensive new instructional facilities to provide for a training load well over twice that of the RTC. With the appearance of the new fields, some built by contract and some by training center personnel, Camp Sibert took on the atmosphere of an efficient instructional institution. Many of the basic ideas employed were derived from other training agencies. In this respect the CWS UTC had an advantage by appearing late in the training picture; it could profit from the mistakes of other centers, reject the unsuccessful and ineffective, and limit its training facilities to those of proven worth. A list of these facilities is therefore more than an indication of the scope of training conducted at the UTC—it is also a record of the instructional aids which experience proved was most valuable for that training.
These facilities included four known-distance ranges and three antiaircraft ranges for the .30-caliber rifle, two ‘,non-inch ranges for the .22-caliber rifle and the .30-caliber machine gun, a sub-machine gun range, and an antitank weapon range. There was an obstacle-infiltration course which featured machine guns firing live ammunition. More advanced facilities were a “jungle” course with unexpected and unusual targets, an assault range to
teach street fighting, and a combat range for training in the tactics of small unit operations.
A field fortification area and sanitation, rigging, and camouflage areas were developed in connection with basic military training. Two regimental obstacle courses and one “cross-country” course were designed and built by the Unit Training Center and were extensively used for physical training. A single large gas chamber was sufficient for the phase of instruction which covered defense against chemical attack. While the use of ranges and training areas was controlled by UTC headquarters, it was generally the unit commander who led his organization through these training exercises.
More unusual were those facilities developed for special use in the technical phases of unit training. These included areas devoted to each of the specialties represented by the seven technical sections of the operations and training division of the center. Technical instruction was first undertaken in these areas, followed later by the application of principles in field operations.
Preliminary training of processing companies took place in buildings which housed impregnating machinery in a semipermanent type of installation; after learning the technique of treating clothing with gas-resistant chemicals, units continued their training with their own equipment under field conditions. The depot area contained a typical field depot installation which illustrated principles of perimeter defense and camouflage protection. The toxic filling area included storage facilities and equipment for handling all types of liquid chemicals. In the decontamination area, toxic vesicant agents were neutralized according to approved methods. The laboratory set-up provided a standard Mr chemical field laboratory for analysis of chemical agents. Air operations classrooms and training areas contained full-scale models of bomb bays and wing sections of different aircraft so that chemical air operations companies could be trained in the installation of incendiary bombs and in the filling and installation of spray tanks. In the maintenance training shop were gathered all types of machinery used in the maintenance and repair of CWS material. Technical instruction of smoke generator units was begun in a special classroom provided with sectionalized models and other training aids relating to smoke production.39
Although on the whole the various physical adjuncts to training that were developed and employed at the Unit Training Center were adequate, the assembly of the necessary matériel and the actual construction of facilities while training was in progress presented many difficulties. The preparation
Unit Training at Camp Sibert. Members of a processing company in field training remove clothing from predryer unit. This is the first stage in the processing of clothing for impregnation. Pipes at lower right carry gas-resistant solution to impregnator unit.
of a table of basic allowances of training equipment for the center followed rather than preceded the procurement of the necessary matériel. The task of procuring what was needed was accomplished only as the result of a great deal of enterprise on the part of UTC personnel. The various training facilities were not substantially complete until after the peak of unit training had passed. Their development was not in all cases foreseen or planned for in advance. Some, such as the sanitation area and the rigging area, were initiated by individual units and later adopted for general use. Others, like the jungle course, owed their existence to the perseverance of individual officers who originated an idea or, having seen it applied elsewhere, insisted that it be utilized at Camp Sibert. An effective diorama illustrating correct and incorrect examples of camouflage was devised by the commanding general of the UTC.
Mobilization Training Programs
The conduct of unit training, like the conduct of replacement training, hinged upon the mobilization training program. The programs for the guidance of unit training underwent constant revision during the war. These revisions were in part a reflection of developing experience gained in training management. They were in part attempts to correct defects which showed up in operational experience. And they were in part the results of changes in departmental organization. Some revisions were based on recommendations made by the training center. Others were initiated by the Military Training Division, ASF, either directly or as a result of War Department General Staff action.
The earlier chemical unit programs, in both their military and technical phases, were unilateral productions of the Chemical Warfare Service. After 1943 the CWS prepared only the technical training features, the strictly military sections being written by the Army Service Forces.40 Thus the later programs of each technical branch called for identical basic military training despite wide variations in the types of technical training.
In all, ten mobilization training programs, formally published by the War Department, were in effect during the war for the direction of chemical unit training, in addition to a number of tentative or ad interim directives. These were known as the “dash-two” series of programs.41 Their evolution may be divided into five stages: programs of eight, thirteen, twenty-six, seventeen, and six weeks.
The original eight-week program was followed in the training of chemical service units activated at Edgewood Arsenal and elsewhere during the early stages of hostilities.42
The thirteen-week program, which was in effect when the CWS UTC was officially established in October 1942, provided a very necessary extension of training time. It included programs to cover the highly specialized technical instruction of CWS ground and air service units and of smoke generator units.43
The twenty-six-week program, unlike the earlier programs which assumed
that units would be filled by replacement center graduates, recognized that recruit training of the individual soldier would have to be accomplished within the scope of unit training. The program provided for an initial thirteen-week period of individual training followed by an additional thirteen weeks devoted to actual unit training.44
The seventeen-week individual training program45 lengthened by four weeks the initial thirteen-week cycle of the twenty-six-week program. In so doing, it allowed more time for basic training of the individual soldier and, in addition, permitted some expansion of technical training.
Originally the technical instruction of the several types of service companies had tended toward rigid specialization along functional lines, whereas the need for greater versatility on the part of these troops had become increasingly evident. The seventeen-week program recognized this fact and made provisions for three stages of technical training: two weeks of elementary technical instruction applicable to all units; six weeks of specialized technical training in the functions of the particular unit; and, finally, three weeks of field or applied training. By this arrangement all organizations were able to acquire some basic knowledge of the functions of all chemical service units as well as competency in their own specialized functions.
The six-week program was instituted in the summer of 1944, by which time the activation of new units had slowed to the point that required fillers could be provided from replacement center trainees.46 It represented another major change in unit training policy. Given individual soldiers thoroughly schooled under the exacting replacement training program of 1943, it became feasible to curtail the period of strictly unit training.
The numerous revisions of training programs made by the War Department considerably complicated the work of training management at Camp Sibert. Much of the time one group of units would be training under one program while subsequently activated units would be following a revised program. The lack of stabilized programing interfered with the systematic scheduling of unit training as well as with the orderly military administration of the training center. Although there were often sound reasons for revising programs, the burden of the resulting changes in operating procedures fell heavily on the training center.
The revisions were never as radical as mere phraseology of the published programs would suggest. Changes were introduced gradually and often were in effect for some time before issuance of the revised program. Under normal procedure a proposed change would be adopted upon tentative approval, after which a mimeograph issue of a revised program was gotten out for limited distribution some months before the printed version appeared. As in the case of many such formal documents, publication of the official program merely sanctioned a practice already being followed.
It was customary and in fact quite necessary to supplement the formal mobilization training programs with two types of instructional guides which became standardized as the subject schedule and the lesson plan. The subject schedule was a mimeographed sheet, listing the several periods to be devoted to a single subject under an appropriate program, the subject representing one “subcourse” of the whole training course. It announced the instructional objective to be aimed at in this series of periods, and it included general training notes and a brief description of each training period. The lesson plan supplemented the subject schedule by providing precise instructions for the conduct of each scheduled period. It set forth the specific instructional directive, the text references, training equipment needed, and the training technique to be followed.
A number of manuals were prepared by the Unit Training Center to supplement instructional directives and official training literature. These normally were produced in mimeograph form and sometimes reached considerable proportions. For example, the CWS Soldiers Guide, compiled by the operations and training office of UTC headquarters and issued to each trainee as his own copy, was a 260-page pamphlet summarizing both military and technical instruction.47 Elaborate company guides, comprising one hundred to two hundred mimeographed pages, were also issued to soldiers assigned to each type of chemical unit. The need for these unofficial publications lessened as the coverage of official training literature became more nearly complete.
The Conduct of Instruction
The impressive manner in which units were activated at Camp Sibert provided the clue to much of the success of later training. The activation ceremony was staged formally as soon as 90 percent of the organization’s
fillers had reached the training center. The exercises were conducted by the commander of the regiment to which the new company was assigned, in a park reserved for that purpose. After an invocation by the chaplain, the activation order was read by the appropriate battalion commander. Then the colonel of the regiment called up each soldier and presented to him individually the rifle which symbolized his new status as a member of the armed forces. This was followed by a brief talk by the commanding general or, in his absence, by a senior officer designated by him. During the ceremony suitable music was played by the training center band. After the benediction, the new unit was marched away to the post theater where its indoctrination was begun.
A principle impressed upon all new soldiers, even before formal training began, was that they were primarily fighting men—whether assigned to service or combat units. This was done in an effort to counteract the natural tendency of the skilled specialist to assume that his technical ability was more important to the Army than his combat effectiveness. An illustration frequently used in this indoctrination was that of the early American who, when he hoed his corn, had a musket conveniently within reach to repel attack by hostile Indians; had he not been a competent rifleman, his skill as a husbandman would have been of little value to him or anyone else. This theme, the instilling of a fighting spirit in both officers and enlisted men, was constantly stressed during the entire period of unit training.
The essential tasks of the Unit Training Center were to see that instruction was scheduled in agreement with official training programs and that it was conducted according to instructional procedures set by the War Department. The center was provided with blueprints to be followed; while these might be changed from time to time for good and sufficient reasons, they delineated the bounds of instruction. The management of training operations was in the hands of the center command and the way this function was discharged determined, finally, the effectiveness with which units prepared themselves for active field service.
The officer complement of the CWS Unit Training Center was set at 115; iox of these were CWS officers and the rest were branch immaterial officers.48 Assignments to administration and supply duties were limited to approximately 35 officers; the remaining 80 were employed primarily on
training work. Of these, 28 provided the headquarters training staff and 52 were assigned to the provisional regiments and battalions.
A formal inspection of the center in February 1943 disclosed a number of difficulties interfering with effective progress in unit training.49 Besides inclement weather, some uncompleted barracks, and many unfinished ranges, it was evident that training was being undertaken in too many instances by inexperienced company officers and that the direction of this training was in the hands of training center personnel who too often were immature and uncertain of their duties. Although the full quota of 115 officers was then available at Camp Sibert, the great majority of these officers were second lieutenants, mostly recent OCS graduates. The original scheme and functional design of the center were good, but the shortage of experienced officers was seriously hindering efficient training operations. The dearth of properly qualified CWS officers in comparison to mounting demands in the training field showed up more strikingly then than at any other time during the war. While the assignment of inexperienced company grade officers to newly activated units was understandable, it was imperative that the center be provided with mature officers who were capable of assisting and directing the training work of the companies. This matter was given careful study by General Porter, who saw to it that a number of additional field grade officers were shortly assigned to the Unit Training Center. The influence of better supervisory control was quickly evident. A formal inspection of the center made in April 1943 showed marked improvement in the conduct of training and elicited personal commendation from the Director of Military Training, ASF.50
The rapid and effective handling of the volume of training undertaken at the CWS Unit Training Center in 1943 required, in addition to competent directors, a large number of younger officers who were skilled in training techniques. But the company officers had to know the subject they were to teach as well as how to teach. Officers with these special qualifications were extremely scarce. To a considerable degree they had to be developed at the training center; the device employed was the troop school.
The troop school differed from the service school in that it was an extra duty project, classes normally being conducted in the evenings. It had the advantage of imparting instruction that applied to work immediately at
hand, in contrast to the service school whose instruction was necessarily more academic. Nevertheless, the troop school system, especially as it had to be employed at Camp Sibert, exacted a great deal from physically tired officers whose days were crowded with strenuous duties.
The UTC troop schools were attended by both unit and headquarters staff officers. They taught what to teach and how to teach. They were conducted principally at the regimental level with classes scheduled five evenings per week. The subject of instructor training, including the use of training aids, was studied by company officers insofar as possible before beginning mobilization training of the unit. A general refresher program covering the subjects of basic military training included in the unit training schedules was then begun, this instruction being pushed to completion in advance of the unit training to which it pertained. Specialized technical training of company officers, already discussed, was undertaken while basic military training of the unit was in progress.
The practice of holding nightly cadre meetings began in August 1943. These were conducted by the unit commander and attended by company officers and noncommissioned officers. The meeting began with a critique of the day’s training operations, followed by a discussion of plans and procedures for the next day’s work. While this arrangement was found to be a necessary and important feature of training management, it involved an excessive amount of overtime duty on the part of trainer personnel.
The Unit Training Center made considerable use of other service schools for the supplementary instruction of officers and in some cases of enlisted personnel. Students were sent in increasing numbers to attend courses at AGF schools as well as the service schools of the several technical branches. Graduates of such courses were generally employed on staff training duties at the center.
One phase of training marked by considerable difficulty in the early stages of unit training at Camp Sibert was getting a suitable proportion of trainees to qualify in rifle marksmanship. This matter was brought directly to the attention of the OC CWS by the Army Service Forces when an analysis of training status reports indicated that as of 1 April 1943 the percentage of soldiers qualifying as rifle marksmen ranged between a low of 16 and a high of only 44 percent.51
Weapons training was seriously hampered during 1942 and well into 1943 by uncompleted range construction and by a critical shortage of rifles.
Until 17 December 1942, when the first UTC rifle range was officially opened, the UTC had to utilize the range facilities of Fort McClellan, thirty miles away, for this instruction. Gradually the supply of rifles and ammunition improved, although at one time there was no more than forty Mr rifles available for unit training purposes.
Training in small arms fire as well as all basic military training was stimulated by the attachment of fifty infantry officers to the CWS Unit Training Center in March 1943. These young Ft. Benning OCS graduates soon proved themselves an invaluable addition to the Camp Sibert training staff. Initially attached for a period of six months, many of them remained for nine months, during which time UTC standards in rifle and allied military training steadily improved. By June 1943 the minimum standard of 80 percent qualification of all men firing the rifle was being consistently exceeded.
Specialist Training
A principle of unit training recognized in the earliest mobilization training programs was the division of trainees into two categories, basics and specialists, the latter to be detached during part of the unit training period for specialized instruction. All units, combat as well as service, placed considerable emphasis on the technical knowledge of the group of specialists upon whose capability the functioning of the organization as a whole so largely depended. This development was in fact a concomitant to the growing complexity of modern warfare. Specialists requirements of the several arms and services were compiled by The Adjutant General from current tables of organization and were published from time to time as Requirement and Replacement Rates, Military Specialists. Following is a summary of the distribution per thousand as it stood during 1943:52
| CWS | Entire Army | |
| Total | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| Military jobs without civilian counterparts | 293 | 464 |
| Jobs paralleling civilian occupations | 409 | 387 |
| Laborers (SSN 590) | 182 | 37 |
| Basic Soldiers (SSN 521) | 116 | 112 |
Specialist training was limited to the first two categories. The first category of jobs required training for duties which had no equivalents in American industry, and the second the adaptation training of men who entered the Army with occupational experience paralleling jobs listed in CWS tables of organization. The first of these requirements was the most exacting, although the number of such jobs in CWS was well below the average for the Army at large. The second requirement, which involved training for military assignment of cooks, clerks, truck drivers, laboratory technicians, and so forth, was slightly above the general Army experience.
In the mobilization training of units it was essential that the initial requirements of the organization for enlisted specialists be fully satisfied, although once the unit had passed to operational status it could be expected to develop many of its own specialist replacements by on-the-job training. For this reason UTC training of specialists was much heavier in volume than was specialist training at the Replacement Training Center. The extent of CWS requirements for specialist training is indicated in Table 13.
Two-thirds of the strength of most chemical service units included men requiring types of training that were beyond the resources of the newly organized company. In many cases the soldier brought with him enough civilian experience to qualify him occupationally under a given specification serial number, the only training required being in the adaption of his trade specialty to military duty. It was the partially qualified or the unqualified, yet likely, trainee who presented the most serious problems to the specialist schooling system.
Specialist training was concentrated in the weeks devoted to technical training and was normally completed in time to permit graduates to participate in their units’ final training phase of field operations. Some of this training occupied eight weeks, specifically, the training of clerks, cooks, and automotive specialists.53 Programs for these courses were prescribed by the ASF and were uniform for all technical branches.
Specialist training of chemical technicians was left to the discretion of the CWS and followed programs prepared by the Training Division, OC
CWS. These latter courses of shorter duration were attended during the final weeks of technical training of the unit. (Table 14) The aim in specialist training of chemical technicians was primarily to teach the soldier the military application of skills which he already possessed. In most cases it
Table 13: Enlisted Specialists in each Chemical Service Type Company, World War II
| Trade Specialty | SSN | Maintenance | Depot | Processing | Laboratory | Decontamination | Smoke Generator | Composite | Air operations | Total for 8 type companies | |||||||||
| Total specialists | 61 | 100 | 99 | 30 | 126 | 65 | 77 | 114 | 672 | ||||||||||
| Total enlisted strength | (90) | (150) | (141) | (50) | (165) | (131) | (210) | (130) | (1067) | ||||||||||
| Ammunition handler | 901 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 42 | |||||||||
| Carpenter | 050 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 7 | |||||||||
| Chemist | 292 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | |||||||||
| Chemical laboratory assistant | 411 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 20 | |||||||||
| Chauffeur, truck driver | 345 | 4 | 10 | 3 | 1 | 16 | 28 | 12 | 15 | 89 | |||||||||
| Clerks | 405 | 4 | 19 | 12 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 9 | 1 | 51 | |||||||||
| Cooks | 060 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 24 | |||||||||
| Decontamination equipment operator | 809 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 88 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 90 | |||||||||
| Electrician | 078 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | |||||||||
| Engineman, stationary steam | 082 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | |||||||||
| Gas mask repairing | 609 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | |||||||||
| Machinist | 114 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 6 | |||||||||
| Mechanic, automobile | 014 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 12 | |||||||||
| Mechanic, general | 164 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 6 | |||||||||
| Munitions worker (handlers) | 505 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 5 | |||||||||
| Operator, smoke generator | 731 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 24 | |||||||||
| Pipefitter | 162 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 5 | |||||||||
| Pumpman | 220 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 14 | |||||||||
| Radio Operator | 767 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 4 | |||||||||
| Sewing machine operator | 200 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 10 | |||||||||
| Technician physical laboratory | 160 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2 | |||||||||
| Toxic gas handler | 786 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 85 | 117 | |||||||||
| Tumblerman | 103 | 0 | 0 | 60 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 60 | |||||||||
| Utility repairman | 121 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 18 | |||||||||
| Warehouseman | 188 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | |||||||||
| Welder, acetylene | 257 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
Source: Tables of Organization, World War II.
was neither possible nor necessary to teach a student a new trade.
In conducting enlisted specialist training, little use was made of the Chemical Warfare School. Two reasons for this may be adduced. One was the distance separating Edgewood Arsenal and Camp Sibert. Another and more compelling reason was the fact that when the Unit Training Center needed such help most, the Chemical Warfare School had little assistance
Table 14: Enlisted Specialist Schooling utilized in CWS unit Training*
| Course | Duration in weeks | Conducted by |
| Acetylene welder | 4 | Unit Training Center |
| Automobile mechanic | 6 | Unit Training Center |
| Camouflage technician | 1 | Unit Training Center |
| Carpentry | 3 | Unit Training Center |
| Chauffeur | 2 | Regiment |
| Clerk | 8 | Replacement Training Center |
| Cooks and bakers | 8 | Post Bakery |
| Decontamination apparatus | 1½ | Unit Training Center |
| Depot operations | 1 | Huntsville Arsenal, Ala. |
| Electricians | 3 | Alabama School of Trades, E. Gadsen, Ala. |
| Engineman | 1 | Unit “braining Center |
| Flame thrower repair | 1 | Unit Training Center |
| Gas mask repair | 2 | CW School, Edgewood Arsenal, Md. |
| Pipefitters | 2 | Gadsen, Ala., High School |
| Radio operator | 4 | Unit Training Center |
| Sewing machine | 1 | Unit Training Center |
| Sheet metal worker | 2 | Unit Training Center |
| Small arms repair | 1 | Post Ordnance Office |
| Toxic gas handler | 1 | Unit Training Center |
* This list includes only specialist training that was directly relevant to unit training and omits longer courses at Ordnance and Signal schools to which students were occasionally sent.
Source: Pt. V, Training of Units (Through 30 June 1944), CWS History of Training, App. D.
to offer. The center was therefore obliged to develop its own specialist school system.
As long as MTP 3-2 provided for eight weeks of unit technical training, the scheme of accommodating specialist training within this period was followed. But a gradual slowing down of activations after 1943 permitted a better solution to the problem, heretofore compromised, of preactivation training. An outline of the procedure eventually adopted was published in May 1944.54 The procedure provided for the forecasting of unit activations well in advance and for the preparing of trained specialists to meet such anticipated needs. As part of this procedure the Chief, CWS, was directed to issue regularly to the Unit Training Center, specialist school quotas based upon predicted activations. Informed as to the number of trainees to attend designated courses at specified dates, the commanding general of the center then had the responsibility of selecting suitable specialist trainees to attend
the schools, and finally of assigning the graduates to appropriate units as they were activated.
Within a month after the ASF inaugurated the new procedure, the Chief, CWS, was directed to revise his unit mobilization program (MTP 3-2) so that the cycle would be accomplished in six rather than eight weeks.55 The reduction in time was made possible, the ASF apparently believed, because of the adoption of the new system of building up groups of specialists in anticipation of unit needs. In November 1944 a further refinement of the system was effected when the War Department indicated that specialist courses would be taken during the last two weeks of basic technical training of the individual soldier under the replacement training program.56 This was a final and satisfactory answer to the problem of specialist training, but it was only put into effect after CWS unit training was substantially completed.
Advanced Training of Units
The CWS UTC was more than a training center—to some extent it was also a depot at which chemical service companies were held until such time as operational need for them arose. In normal UTC practice, organizations were given a standard training course after completion of which they moved out promptly for assignment to senior tactical organizations. But at Camp Sibert units were often held for extended periods after completing their normal unit training schedule—once, in the case of a number of air operations companies, until it was determined that anticipated need for them would not materialize. During 1943 it was not uncommon for units to spend more time at Camp Sibert after completing unit training then they had spent on the unit training cycle. This anomalous situation, brought on largely by uncertainty over the employment of gas warfare, had evidently not been foreseen in mobilization planning.
In order to separate regular and advanced unit training, a provisional advanced training battalion was organized at Camp Sibert in August 1943. Into this command was transferred companies that had satisfactorily completed prescribed unit training and whose field assignments were deferred. A special program for the continued training of these organizations was drawn up in May 1943.57 What the units needed at this particular stage of
their development was field maneuvering with large commands, yet the time for such exercises in the zone of interior had largely passed. The advanced training program was an attempt to fill this need. It included a series of field problems, any one of which could be terminated when necessary to permit the units to prepare for overseas duty.
In addition to training at Camp Sibert, a number of organizations were sent to other stations for practical work while awaiting overseas commitment. The amphibious training of smoke generator companies at Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla., has already been mentioned; other units were sent for temporary duty to CWS installations, particularly Edgewood Arsenal, Md., and Dugway Proving Ground, Utah.
The units benefited from experience gained at stations where technical work was being conducted. Three types of chemical units were sent from Camp Sibert to Dugway Proving Ground for what could be called development of operational experience prior to movement overseas. These were processing, decontamination, and air operations companies. At Dugway there was considerable work to be done in the field of each, work directly applicable to the kind of technical training they had recently completed. The clothing impregnation plant, used for treating clothing worn in connection with vesicant gas shoots, was operated by a processing company when one was available. There was always work to be done relating to decontamination at the proving ground—not only the clearing of areas gassed in testing operations, but also the measurement of gas concentrations remaining at various postattack stages. Air operations companies found a great deal of practical work in connection with the servicing of aircraft which were being used constantly in staging experimental chemical attacks. There was also a variety of general work in which all units could participate—spotting for incendiary bombing, firing of chemical mortars and rockets, the servicing of all types of chemical material. The atmosphere of Dugway was charged with realism. Chemical troops spending a brief period there after completion of unit training gained respect for their missions that was often lacking in other organizations.
Supervision of Training
All levels of command, from the company to ASF headquarters, were involved in the supervision of unit training. Formal control measures, designed to evaluate training and to correct deficiencies, were instituted by UTC headquarters, by the service command, by the OC CWS, and by the
Military Training Division of Army Service Forces. These all were geared to the attainment of a status of readiness for overseas service that would satisfy representatives of The Inspector General of the Army who had final responsibility for determining the adequacy of training.
Reports made by officers assigned to UTC headquarters represented spot checks of specific periods of instruction. Although these frequent checks were useful in training management, they were more concerned with technique than with over-all progress of training. For control of the latter there were involved training tests, training reports, and training inspections. The training test was a device employed by UTC headquarters to check the training progress of units at three specific stages: upon completion of basic military training; upon completion of basic technical training; and finally upon completion of the entire mobilization training program. Tests were conducted by teams designated by UTC or post headquarters. Phases of training found to be unsatisfactory by these inspection teams had to be repeated.
Another management control of considerable importance was the training status report. This report was devised by the ASF primarily to provide data through which to determine the readiness of the unit for overseas service or for functional employment in the zone of interior.58 As eventually developed, the report on each unit was prepared twice monthly and finally upon movement to a staging area. It contained considerable data, including strength, status of training, and efficiency rating.
By the end of 1942 it became apparent that the training status report, while a valuable device, could not be depended upon in Washington for final decision as to a unit’s training readiness for overseas movement. In a directive dated 5 January 1943, the War Department delegated to The Inspector General responsibility for determining, among other things, the state of technical training of organizations alerted for overseas duty.59 This procedure was followed during the remainder of the war. It insured that all units moving to theaters of operation were suitably trained and equipped; at the same time the final IG test provided a concrete objective on which training controls could be focused.
The final formal inspection of unit training activities was a means by which training progress was directly measured and difficulties brought to
light. Policy as to formal inspections was determined by the Army Service Forces. Inspection missions were kept to a reasonable minimum, the service command inspecting military training, the OC CWS inspecting technical features, and the Military Training Division, ASF, periodically sending representatives to Camp Sibert to check training operations in general.
Chemical Service Unit Training in Retrospect
No justification is needed for the staff policy of initiating the chemical service units program in 1942. To have delayed further the activation of chemical troops would have been dangerous in that it could easily have encouraged the Axis powers, especially Germany, to initiate gas warfare. The only postwar question that might be raised is whether there was actual need of so many units.60
Between 1940 and 1944 chemical service unit training passed through a complete cycle. It began with a mobilization training program that called for eight weeks of essentially organizational training. This was steadily extended until, by mid-1943, two successive thirteen-week programs were being followed, the first for individual and the second for organizational training. Finally in 1944 unit training was cut back to a single six-week program from which everything but strictly organizational or group training was eliminated. Although circumstances did not permit the exhaustive testing of this curtailed procedure, available evidence indicates that six weeks scarcely allowed sufficient time to permit the rounded development of chemical service units to a state of readiness for active field service. The employment of an eight-week unit training cycle would probably have been ad-visable—the cycle, in short, which was provided for in the prewar unit training program.
Although it is thus evident that unit training returned in 1944 to approximately the program that was in effect in 1940, it does not follow that the various changes made in the program were inappropriate or ill-advised. It would, in theory, have been preferable to limit unit training exclusively to the molding of military organizations out of duly prepared components and eliminated from the procedure all excursions into the field of individual training. Yet the particular circumstances surrounding the mobilization of chemical troops, together with factors relating to military unpreparedness in
general, combined to force adoption of the procedure that was actually followed. And on the whole there were certain advantages to that procedure. The combining of basic military with unit training provided in fact a good working solution to the problem of developing chemical service organizations for World War II. Even though the companies were mobilized at relatively late dates, there was still ample time to complete both types of training at the Unit Training Center and to do so before their presence in theaters of operation became really important.
There was no opportunity for the CWS to test the scheme in vogue at the end of the war, under which chemical units were to receive all basic military training at an ASP training center before being sent to Edgewood Arsenal for technical training. To have put the plan into effect at the height of mobilization would have been unfortunate; when it came into force, CWS training activities in the zone of interior had almost ceased.
The training of chemical units, though adequate in many phases, had several weak spots. One practice that caused difficulty at the CWS Unit Training Center was the activating of units before their components were adequately prepared. It is impossible for an organization to begin its growth until its cadre, its specialists, and its fillers have all had requisite training. Much is lost under a system that requires cadre personnel to learn the subjects in which the organization is being trained while unit training is actually in progress. That the activation of units was often too precipitate is borne out by the fact that not infrequently new organizations were obliged to wait for long periods before full quotas of fillers were received. This resulted in repeated starts being made on training programs with consequent lost motion and dulling of zest. The activation of new units by the War Department was an exacting and complicated procedure which generally ran smoothly, yet there were occasions when time could actually have been gained by deferring mobilization until preactivation preparations were further advanced.
The operational requirements for greater functional versatility on the part of chemical service troops brought about eventual changes in training programs which in the light of full experience might well have been introduced from the first. Unit training was initially too specialized, so that organizations even came to resent being called upon to perform functions that normally pertained to another type of organization. For example, a processing company might be directed to take over and operate a depot; reluctance to do so was likely to stem from concepts implanted in early unit training. Later training, in addition to providing some knowledge of the
functions of other units, sought to inspire willingness to undertake any type of chemical service operations.
The amount of administrative or nontraining time needed by a unit was not always considered by planning agencies. After an organization completed its training program and was ordered out, a lapse of four weeks was required before another unit could begin training in its place. Not less than two weeks had to be reserved to insure that all men could take advantage of furlough policies—the five days of furlough granted had to be supplemented by five days or more of travel time. After the company was again assembled, one week was spent in final processing by supply, personnel, and inspection teams to comply with POM instructions. Once the unit cleared the post, probably three weeks after finishing its training, its place could be taken by an untrained company. But a full week was required for receiving and organizing the new company—time which, if not allowed for, had to be stolen from training schedules.
The cost of the unit training installation at Camp Sibert was heavy. Only eighteen months elapsed between the completion of the center in October 1943 and its closing in April 1945. Some conception of the cost factors involved in military training may be gained by prorating the cost of the center against the number of chemical companies that trained them. However, there was never serious criticism of the zone of interior training of chemical service companies. This training, although costly, served its purpose.