Chapter 6: Theater Supply: Pacific
Foundation of Chemical Supply in Australia Forming a Theater Stock
Chemical warfare supplies available to the United States Army Forces in Australia in December 1941 consisted of 14,000 empty 100-pound bomb casings, a small amount of protective equipment in the hands of troops, and the maintenance allowances brought in by the 3rd Chemical Laboratory Company. This company was equipped with the training gas mask, a light, snout-type mask with canister directly attached to the facepiece,1 some 1½-quart decontaminating apparatus, and a little antigas protective ointment. The unit possessed no noncorrosive decontaminating agent for use in the apparatus, no bleach (chloride of lime) for area decontamination, and no antigas shoe impregnite. Units and individuals subsequently arriving in Australia did have personal protective items and decontaminating materials. Units also arrived with small maintenance stocks.2
USAFIA chemical officers collected the maintenance stocks from incoming organizations and units and these constituted the first theater chemical warfare supply. Even Task Force 6814, soon to be the Americal Division, added to this stock when it stopped over in Melbourne on the way to New Caledonia.3 The 32nd and 41st Infantry Divisions, on arriving in Australia in the spring of 1942, also contributed. The chemical stockpile further increased as the War
Department diverted to Australia supplies which could not be landed in the Philippines and as theater chemical supply officers bought what they could in the local market. The USAFIA CWS carefully hoarded all equipment for the use of forces which at any moment might move out to fight the enemy. Issues were kept to a minimum in the rear areas, and some issues of Australian gas masks were made. By 30 June 1942 the CWS inventory stood at 2,098 short tons.4
War Department Policy for the Southwest Pacific Area
The CWS in SWPA was not yet aware, at the end of June, of the War Department supply policy; they had heard nothing at all from the United States in the first four months after the establishment of the USAFIA and were to have no word from the Office of the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, until July.5 The basic War Department plan was dated 22 January 1942, and the specific plan for the forces in Australia was dated 2 February 1942. The specific War Department plan called for 90 days’ supply of all classes other than ammunition, computed on the standard tables of basic allowances (TBA); 90 days’ supply of ground ammunition, computed on the basis of a special ammunition day of supply for weapons in the theater; and five months’ supply of aerial bombs, ammunition, and pyrotechnics, computed according to a special allowance per aircraft in Australia and the Netherlands East Indies. The Adjutant General instructed the technical services in the United States to compute allowances and set up shipments to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, which was charged with shipment to the theater. The chiefs of the technical services were also charged with allotting funds to the theater for the operation of their services in the theater and for the local procurement of matériel.6
OCCWS immediately began to set up shipments against the War Department plan in accordance with strength figures furnished. It
calculated requirements for toxics according to the allowances for ammunition and aerial bombs. Only mustard gas was available for immediate supply. CWS supply authorities questioned the shipment of mustard gas without the specific authority which had always been necessary for toxic shipments. They also questioned the quantity to be shipped because they lacked aircraft strength figures on which aerial toxic requirements computations were based. General Brett, USAFIA commander, who was probably unaware of these questions within the War Department, nevertheless answered them by cabling a request for 1,000 tons of mustard. The Chief of Staff queried General MacArthur as to his desires and, receiving a confirmation of Brett’s request, in April directed the shipment. The Services of Supply reduced the quantity to 870 tons because of shipping space shortage. OCCWS effected shipment on 15 April 1942.7
At the time the mustard was being shipped, the theater forces were compiling a matériel status report which reached the United States at the end of May. According to OCCWS figures, most items were in excess of allowances and only one item, the chemical land mine, was in short supply. OCCWS attributed excesses to the shipments diverted from the Philippines and to cabled special requirements, such as the one for mustard and another for incendiary bombs which the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, had ordered shipped.8 In fact, OCCWS apologies for excesses were misleading. Theater chemical officers still considered the supply short because, although they had no exact knowledge of strength in the theater or supplies in the hands of troops, they rightly anticipated a considerable build-up in theater strength.9 Later War Department plans for other theaters provided for substantial build-up on the basis of anticipated strength far in excess of current strength, but not until the end of the war in Europe was in sight did a build-up concept apply to the Pacific. To illustrate, OCCWS computed the July 1942 report of chemical materials in Australia according to the theater strength and estimated that the
chemical stock had reached 98 percent of the authorized level. There were, at that time, 95,021 service gas masks for the United States forces in Australia, and this quantity was estimated to be 9,000 more than the allowance. Yet, also in July 1942, the Army Service Forces asked the chiefs of the technical services if they were prepared to support 1,000,000 men in the Pacific!10 On the assumption that at least half of this strength would be assigned to SWPA, this would mean approximately one mask for every five men as opposed to the European theater planning ratio of one mask in stock for each individual who would already have an initial issue mask!11 Even though masks and shipping space were not available at the time, some method of supply planning that would have anticipated SWPA needs in advance of an increase in strength would have caused less confusion.
Theater Retaliatory Preparedness for Gas Warfare
There was little that Colonel Copthorne, Chief Chemical Officer, USAFIA, and in July USASOS, could do to order enough supplies to meet an increase in SWPA strength except to ask that supplies be sent in quantities greater than the SWPA allowance. Under War Department supply procedures he could make requests to exceed allowances only by explaining at length that unusual circumstances would result in the use of extra supplies or that service operations would require supplies not listed in the War Department plan for SWPA. The supplies which prepared SWPA for retaliation in case gas warfare should start were mostly obtained, like the first shipment of mustard gas, by such requests to exceed the allowances. The CWS SWPA needed toxic-filling plants, which were not on the allowance list, to handle this first shipment. Copthorne accordingly cabled an order for plants. The plants arrived in Australia in July but drawings and assembly instructions, which were not available in Australia, did not accompany them. The mustard shipment reached Australia in August. In order to store the gas in newly established toxic gas yards at Darra, Queensland, and Geelong, Victoria, CWS officers assembled the filling plants
by guesswork. The 14,000 100-pound bomb casings were available for filling only because USAFIA had been unable to ship them to their original destination, the Philippines. While most of the mustard was used in filling these bombs, some of it was set aside for filling toxic land mines which had been procured in Australia. MN) aircraft spray tanks, which came from War Department allowance to SWPA, arrived without accessories and mounting instructions. The War Department also shipped some toxic-filled artillery shell from allowances.12
In March of 1943, when the first gas warfare plan was produced, toxics had been further dispersed to six toxic storage yards. One, near Charters Towers, Queensland, contained 115 tons of bulk agents, 5,900 filled 100-pound bombs, about 1,000 empty spray tanks, and boo empty bombs. Another, at Kangaroo, north of Townsville, contained 5,500 mustard-filled 100-pound bombs and more than 20,000 artillery shells. The enlarged Darra yard held nearly 435 tons of bulk agents, nearly 90,000 artillery rounds, a small supply of toxic smoke candles, and empty bombs, spray tanks, and land mines. A new Columboola yard 200 miles west of Brisbane held t 1,000 mustard-filled 100-pound bombs, and a new yard at Kingswood near Sydney stored only artillery shell (approximately 53,000 rounds). The original yard at Geelong stored 400 tons of bulk mustard and 3,160 toxic smoke candles. The CWS SWPA estimated that in the event of gas warfare the stock at Charters Towers would be sufficient for an immediate retaliatory strike. Then, within seven hours, spray tanks could be filled and delivered for a i 6-plane spray mission. The spray mission could thereafter be sustained from other stocks for 63 plane missions. More missions could be flown only if some spray tanks were returned after the flights and this was not expected because spray tanks were normally jettisoned. The artillery shell could not be used prior to movement to forward areas, and no time estimate was given for that movement, presumably because the time could not be calculated in the face of uncertainty as to the available forms of transport. There was at the time no assurance that forward artillery would be on hand to fire the shell since only one American artillery piece had gone forward for the recently ended Papua Campaign.13
Theater Defense Preparedness for Gas Warfare
On the defensive side, as noted above, every individual in the theater was allotted a gas mask, and there was a small reserve, adequate on the TBA basis, of service masks.14 In the opinion of the chemical officers, one undoubtedly shared by the troops, the 5-pound service mask was of very limited utility in the tropics. It could not be worn for any length of time in a hot climate with even an acceptable degree of discomfort, and it was too heavy and bulky to be carried by troops, who could function efficiently only under a minimum burden. The SWPA Chemical Section accordingly requisitioned 228,000 training masks or lightweight substitutes for the equipment of, at least, all assault echelons, and the 2,000 training masks in the theater were earmarked for this purpose.15 OCCWS shipped 139,000 training masks which represented the available supply since training masks were also in demand elsewhere. The masks arrived, as requested, waterproofed; that is, both ends of the canister were sealed. The difficulty with the waterproofing job done in the United States was that the seals were paper and had to be torn off to put the mask in ready condition. The seals could not be restored by the individual user of the mask even if the materials had been provided. SWPA chemical officers thereupon set out to design restorable seals. Capt. Stephen Penler, commander of the 412th (later 62nd) Chemical Depot Company, suggested a “milk bottle cap” for the valve (outer) end of the canister.16 A Sydney paper manufacturer succeeded, after several attempts, in producing the bottle cap seal. These seals were packed in small cans and the can inserted into a pocket sewn into the mask carrier. The open (mask end) of the canister was sealed with a rubber plug, and Capt. John Senter designed a quick acting clamp for securing the canister to the facepiece. Both plug and clamp were also locally procured. The 10th Chemical Maintenance Company set up a production line and performed the not inconsiderable task of modifying masks and carriers.17 More than a year later the CWS in the United States provided a reusable rubber cap which could be attached to the valve end of the canister.
Furnishing protective clothing was an even greater problem than supplying the mask. In SWPA, as elsewhere in the world, protective clothing storage and issue was a quartermaster responsibility, but impregnating the clothing with antigas chemicals was a CWS responsibility.18 Also in SWPA, as elsewhere, the CWS and the Quartermaster Corps worked in close cooperation. The first supply of protective clothing came from the United States in July 1942. Because fighting would be in the tropics, it was unfortunate that much of the clothing, including underwear, was woolen. Just as the supply arrived instructions were received that all garments must be modified by the insertion of gussets and double flies to afford increased protection at trousers and shirt openings.19 Quartermaster employees made the gussets and flies and inserted them; the CWS rented a dry-cleaning establishment in Melbourne for the dual purpose of impregnating the gussets and flies and of testing an improvised impregnating process. Copthorne secured the formula for the American impregnite from the Australians who got it from the chemical warfare experimental station in England. The direct channels of communication with the United States had again failed.20
The experience in the rented dry-cleaning plant proved the improvised impregnating process acceptable. The CWS acquired two English-made Maja trichlorethylene dry-cleaning plants and three commercial laundry dryers, and by the middle of October had this equipment in operation in a factory in Sydney. There the CWS impregnated such clothing as the quartermaster had in stock.21
Copthorne, writing to Brig. Gen. Alexander Wilson in OCCWS, questioned the sense of providing prescribed double-layer (long underwear, outer garments, gloves, sox, leggings, and hood) protection in a climate where that much clothing could certainly not be worn.22 Wilson replied that the War Department was working on worldwide protective policy and that, for the time being, the SWPA CWS could
only furnish the prescribed level under the assumption that the area commander would weigh the risk of gas warfare against the efficiency of the soldier and instruct subordinate commanders as to his policy on wearing protective clothing. The question of policy was never settled to theater satisfaction. The March 1943 SWPA gas warfare plans provided only that outer garments and leggings would be stocked in forward areas while underwear was held in rear reserve.23 The worldwide policy adopted over a year later, in April 1944, provided that only 15 percent of SWPA soldiers would have double-layer protection available.24 Other forward area combat and service troops, or 35 percent of the area command, were given one and a half layer (outer garments, gloves, leggings, and hood, plus cotton drawers) protection, and the rear area troops, estimated at 50 percent of the command, were not provided with any protective clothing.25 Copthorne believed that mid-thigh length knit cotton shorts would afford nearly as good protection as the cotton drawers and would be bearable in the tropics.26 The 1944 plan permitted the use of knit shorts, when available, for one and a half layer protection.
Other items of protection against gas warfare were the decontaminants and the equipment to disperse them. The decontaminants included personal protective ointment, noncorrosive decontaminant for vehicles and equipment, and bleach, the area decontaminant. Since the M1 protective ointment was in short supply and regarded by SWPA officers as of doubtful effectiveness, the CWS SWPA improvised an individual protective kit consisting of swabs, kerosene (a solvent for vesicant gases) , an alkaline soft soap produced locally, and a half measure of M1 ointment.27 General Porter advised Copthorne that the M1 ointment had been reappraised and redesignated M4 and that new techniques for its use had been evolved. OCCWS at the time considered the M4 ointment effective without a solvent or soap to accompany it.28 The solvent and soap in the SWPA kit served as a substitute for ointment until a sufficient quantity of M4 ointment was received late in
1942. The War Department at the same time sent enough noncorrosive decontaminating agent and its disperser, the 1½-quart apparatus. Bleach supplies were growing, but the theater was still short of full allowance. Chemical officers believed that bleach would deteriorate in the tropics. Although the first tests proved that American bleach was standing up well, SWPA officers found after a few months that both the bleach and its containers deteriorated. To fill shortages, the CWS bought bleach from the Australians. The supply men discovered a double benefit in this procurement. Not only was the bleach more readily obtained, but also it was more stable in the tropics and the containers could better withstand the inevitable rough handling. The supply was unfortunately limited by the small production of chlorine in Australia. As for the dispersing equipment—the 3-gallon hand decontaminating apparatus and the 400-gallon power-driven apparatus—the hand apparatus was available in considerable quantity, more than a thousand in excess of allowance in February 1943, and the stock of powered apparatus, 115 in February, was sufficient for critical needs even though 18 short of allowance. It is very doubtful that much area decontamination would have been possible in the jungle in any case. Gas detection devices and gas alarms were not available although the latter could be improvised.29
The one protective item of which there was a definite overage was the gasproof curtain. The curtain was designed for World War I trench warfare and was still issued on a World War I basis of two curtains for 20 men. The SWPA CWS asked the San Francisco port to stop shipping curtains and suggested to area forces that those on hand might be used for foxhole covers in event of vesicant gas attack, since the individual protective cover was not yet available to serve that purpose. OCCWS soon changed the basis of issue to two per 200 men and designated the curtains for use at command posts, communications centers, and medical installations.30
Theater Chemical Supply Status—End of the Preparatory Phase
In sum, the CWS SWPA had by the end of 1942 reached the status of gas warfare supply, both offensive and defensive, reflected in the area gas warfare plans reported to the War Department on March 1943. That is, except for gas detection, SWPA could defend against any gas warfare emergency involving troops likely to be in direct contact with the enemy. Offensively, the air forces could make an immediate retaliatory strike and although they could sustain retaliation for only a brief period, this might have been sufficient considering the distances which isolated individual enemy forces in the theater. The big problem was service in the event of gas warfare. The only available facility for clothing impregnation was the improvised Sydney plant. The CWS estimated that in the event of gas warfare, it would need several chemical impregnating companies, three additional air service units, and one chemical composite company per forward area division. The ability of services other than the CWS to handle gas warfare was also dependent upon increasing service capability. For example, Australian hospitals would have to bear the load of gas casualty treatment because the American hospitals did not then have enough manpower and facilities. Forward area medical service would have been sadly deficient for the same reasons although the chief chemical officer and the SWPA surgeon had cooperated in improvising a field gas treatment kit which would have afforded assistance to medical officers in the field.31
While the SWPA supply of most gas warfare items could be considered adequate, the supply of nongas warfare chemical items was clearly inadequate. There were few hand grenades and little smoke equipment. In fact, smoke munitions were so scarce that Colonel Copthorne ordered the improvisation and testing of a smoke apparatus using FS mixture procured in Australia. There were some flame throwers of the kind that had proved unemployable in the Papua Campaign, but there were no mortars and only 1,000 rounds of mortar shell. The general chemical inventory, which from July to December 1942 had grown from 2,098 short tons to 5,093 short tons, was therefore mostly gas warfare items. The greatest gain, from 299 to 1,641 tons, had been in Class V, ammunition, the class into which the toxics
fell. During the last six months of 1942, the CWS had received 4,983 short tons of matériel. The bulk of this total, 4,645 short tons, came from imports, mostly from the United States, but 139 tons, the greater portion of which was laboratory equipment and production supplies, had come from distress cargoes (cargoes landed in Australia because they could not reach destinations in the combat zone) , and 199 tons came from local procurement. Although the latter figure was small, its size is not the measure of its importance since most of the items so procured were critical.32
The Tyranny of Climate and Distance
Establishment of a New Guinea base in August 1942 and the events of the Papua Campaign brought sharply into focus the problems dealing with the condition of both gas warfare and nongas warfare chemical matériel. SWPA chemical officers had been aware from the first that much of the equipment received was rushed production not of the highest quality, but conditions of storage and issue in New Guinea demonstrated that every weakness in design, manufacture, inspection, packaging, and shipment was magnified many times when items were subjected to the extremes of heat, humidity, and rough handling unavoidable in the tropics and semi-tropics. Sometimes these problems could be resolved or reduced to manageable proportions in SWPA; sometimes they could be met by improvements in the United States; sometimes area forces simply had to adjust to living with the problems. Often a combination of these solutions applied, as in the case of the flame throwers, for example.
Bleach
The deterioration of bleach, mentioned above, was another problem which called forth a joint effort but which was never solved with complete satisfaction. SWPA received and stored bleach in light-gauge, painted and unpainted steel drums of 70-, 100-, 140-, and 500-pound capacity. Handling the larger drums was a problem, but it became apparent, late in 1942, that the handling difficulty was insignificant compared to the problem arising from corrosion of the containers and
deterioration of the bleach. Copthorne in December 1942 ordered a survey of bleach in semitropical and tropical storage to determine how great the loss might be. Base section chemical officers found that all the 100-pound non-painted drums surveyed had corroded and that the bleach had deteriorated below the standard acceptable for decontamination. Corrosion of larger unpainted drums, for some unexplained reason, was negligible while 77.2 percent of 100-pound drums painted brown had corroded. Orange-painted drums in both 70- and 100-pound sizes had stood up well. In all, the CWS turned over 25 tons of deteriorated bleach to the engineers for water purification use. A few weeks later the New Guinea base reported corroding drums and deteriorating bleach. Copthorne could only advise that, since there was probably no solution other than the impractical one of lacquering the drums inside and out, deteriorated bleach should be turned over to other services and replacement requisitioned. A part of the replacement could come from Australian sources, but the bulk would have to come from the United States.33
OCCWS was at work on the problem when Copthorne informed it of his experience. The War Department CWS finally succeeded in obtaining a more stable bleach and in improving the container,34 but the tropical climate continued to take its toll in every storage place from Australia to the Philippines. Fortunately, the deteriorated bleach was still adequate for the hygienic uses to which the Quartermaster Corps and the Corps of Engineers could put it. Because of this secondary use, the demands on critically short transportation were no greater than they would have been had each service obtained its own supply. The CWS SWPA was forced to adjust to the demands of continuous survey of stocks and handling transfers.35
Noncorrosive Decontaminating Agent
Another decontaminant problem concerned the noncorrosive decontaminating agent (DANC) . The agent was a mixture of solvent, acetylene tetrachloride, and a dry chemical known as RH 195. The
two components were shipped and stored unmixed in a 2-compartment 6-gallon drum with the RH 195 packed in the compartment above the acetylene tetrachloride. The dry chemical apparently corroded the seal between the two compartments allowing the contents to mix; the resulting mixture had a life of about three months. Drums dented in shipment almost inevitably corroded because the lacquer on interior surfaces scaled off around the dent. After the first discovery of this packaging deficiency in October 1942, base section chemical depot troops opened dented drums and transferred serviceable RH 19 5 to bottles. If the chemical had combined with the solvent, the mixture was stored for its serviceable life, and when manpower and equipment were available the solvent was reclaimed at the end of that life. The area CWS obtained a crimping machine to reseal drums containing new and reclaimed solvent. The War Department CWS strengthened the RH 195 compartment, made it of a metal more receptive to preservative lacquer, provided a corrosion-proof plastic gasket between compartments, and, eventually, designed a new dual container. But still the CWS in the Pacific had trouble—the old container continued to come through the supply system. One base section received 14,000 old containers in the four months ending in September 1943. The noncorrosive decontaminating agent problem was one that the CWS SWPA learned to live with.36
The one and a half quart decontaminating apparatus for dispersing the noncorrosive decontaminant and the 3-gallon apparatus were poorly crated. The crate consisted of a wooden frame with a cardboard liner; both cardboard and wood frequently failed with almost disastrous results when the crates were used as a base in warehouse stocks.37 Another minor but annoying packaging defect was in the pack for shoe impregnite. The War Department CWS shipped the preparation in small cans packed in cardboard boxes. The boxes were too heavy for one man to handle, and the cardboard simply disintegrated after brief exposure to the weather. The CWS solved this problem by switching to small wooden boxes.38
The Gas Mask
A considerably more serious problem arose from the effect of the jungle climate on gas masks and carriers. Fungi attacked the glass lens of the Australian gas masks which American troops were using. Molds and mildew covered and rotted gas mask carriers and the harness of the mask itself. Rust and corrosion ate away canisters, buckles, and rivets. In the 41st Infantry Division the chemical officer, Colonel Arthur, prescribed a daily brushing of the carrier, but this only retarded the growth of mold and mildew. Furthermore, brushing was possible only for masks kept by individuals, who usually had them only for short periods. Assault troops carried masks in landing and dropped them as soon as the risk of initiation of gas warfare was determined to be slight. These masks were uncared for until chemical officers could assemble details or obtain service troops to collect, inspect, and store them. In early operations losses were large, as much as 45 percent in one assault, and the number of recovered masks rendered unserviceable was also large. Better recovery techniques, especially those evolved when service detachments landed with assault troops, reduced losses to 5 percent and greatly increased the number of serviceable masks recovered.39
OCCWS believed that the SWPA mask problems might be solved by the introduction of the lightweight service mask in 1943. The lightweight mask and its carrier were more rugged than the training mask then in use in SWPA, and the carrier was water resistant and therefore was more resistant to mold and mildew. Also, the CWS provided an adhesive tape waterproofing for the canister. Colonel Arthur set up a wearing test of the mask in the 41st Division. The facepiece was plainly superior to that of the training mask, but the canister rusted as badly, and the adhesive tape waterproofing tended to remove the paint, thus accelerating rusting. With waterproofing clamp in place the rubber hose from canister to facepiece softened and distorted in twelve days, and the adhesive tape waterproofing proved of doubtful value under tropical conditions. Also, the carrier, although apparently more resistant to deterioration, proved somewhat bulky to
wear and, as in Normandy, offered a target for sharpshooters. Arthur recommended that the SWPA-devised training mask and waterproofing be retained but that the lightweight facepiece be substituted for the training facepiece. The War Department approved Arthur’s suggested modification of the training mask, and supplies were furnished to make theater modifications. The CWS tried again with an assault mask with cheek-mounted canister, but no significant number of these masks became available in the theater before the end of the war. In sum, this was again a problem that the SWPA CWS tried to overcome with various expedients but without a real solution, for it was unable to find a means of preventing mold, mildew, and corrosion.40
Protective Clothing
As noted above, storage and issue of antigas protective clothing was a quartermaster responsibility, but the CWS was vitally involved in providing impregnation services and in prescribing the use and care of protective clothing. The SWPA chief quartermaster issued instructions, in the name of the Commanding General, USASOS, on protective clothing in December 1942, in January 1943, and in March 1943. The last of these instructions repeated the then current War Department policy of providing as yet undesignated “double layer” protection based on the cotton herringbone twill “fatigue” uniform as “minimum” and with an additional impregnated woolen or cotton khaki uniform as “complete” protection.41
Patently, complete protection was beyond the SWPA capacity, and the instructions provided that only one set of outer garments plus accessories per individual should be issued or should be held in forward depots for issue to combat troops. Forward depots were also authorized to hold normal replacement quantities to be called forward when needed by operational organizations. The instructions also prescribed storage and maintenance procedures including provision for CWS inspection of clothing in storage.42
USASOS elaborated the storage, requisition, and issue procedures for protective clothing in May 1943. At the end of the month, the commanding officer of the subbase at Oro Bay, which had officially opened late in April, informed the Commanding General, 41st Infantry Division, that 70 percent of the base protective clothing stock, most of which was held for the division, was unserviceable.43 The unserviceable clothing had rotted or the fabric had lost its tensile strength. Much of the unserviceable clothing was that dyed jungle green on which chemical service units in Australia had expended so much effort. Since CWS officers had made the serviceability tests, the CWS SWPA was aware of the problem. In a little more than a week after the first notification, Copthorne asked Sixth Army to determine the extent of damage. Sixth Army replied that almost all clothing in loose storage or in the hands of individuals had deteriorated. Clothing received from the United States and stored in its original waterproof bales and packages off the ground and under cover had not deteriorated. Similarly, those sets of clothing in the hands of individual soldiers which had been stored, as prescribed, in the bottoms of barracks bags hung so that air would circulate under the bag had not deteriorated. Since all troops did not have the opportunity to hang barracks bags in positions where air would circulate, Sixth Army ordered protective clothing withdrawn from individuals for storage in unit supply, but storage conditions in unit supply were far from ideal. The best that unit storage could accomplish was slightly to prolong garment life and, perhaps more importantly, to make garments available for regular serviceability inspection.44
CWS officers soon learned that the effective life of protective clothing was likely to be six months and that the best which could be expected was a year.45 Colonel Smith, then chief of the USASOS Chemical Section and later Copthorne’s deputy, undertook the direct supervision of protective clothing distribution plans and liaison with quartermaster
on the subject. In the circumstance, Smith had no choice but to provide protective clothing for forward area troops and to plan replacing it every six months. Replacement was provided either from the United States or from stocks impregnated in SWPA. In order to carry on impregnation in the area, processing units were required. The 105th Chemical Processing Company arrived in SWPA in June 1943 just as the extent of the clothing problem was becoming known. Since the unit did not receive its own plants for another six months, it worked at processing in the improvised theater plant to rebuild the theater reserve. Copthorne and Smith sought to move the 105th and the eighteen companies received in 1944 into forward areas so that impregnating facilities, both for building up clothing reserves and for re-impregnation in the event of gas warfare, could be close to the organizations with the greatest need, but obtaining USAFFE or GHQ authority and transportation for these forward moves was extremely difficult.46
The SWPA protective clothing reserve problem diminished during late 1944 and early 1945 as stocks were continuously reconstituted by shipments from the United States. Anticipated reserve demands were also reduced by the War Department directive of April 1944 which assigned protective clothing only to 50 percent of the area force. Clothing still deteriorated although better packaging and the use of the M2 water emulsion impregnating process somewhat lengthened the serviceability period. The CWS still sought to move processing units forward as re-impregnation insurance against a gas warfare emergency, and the units, even in forward areas, were diverted to secondary missions which would permit readiness to operate in such emergency.47
In the last year of the war, most of the area protective clothing reserve was stored in the Hollandia, New Guinea, base while organizational allowances were carried in unit supply when commanders would permit, or in forward bases when they would not. The forward bases also stored organizational maintenance stocks. As the fighting progressed farther and farther from Hollandia transportation for resupply became more difficult to obtain, and, in event of gas warfare, the transportation situation might have been desperate. Chemical officers were confident, however, that had gas warfare been initiated there would have been sufficient air transportation available in the interim before the
processing companies could move forward and commence operation. Certainly SWPA was adequately supplied with processing units. Because of the SWPA storage problems and the estimated threat of gas warfare in forward areas, SWPA had more units than any other theater.48
Defective Equipment and Spare Parts
Some SWPA chemical supply problems were common to all theaters. For example, the power-driven decontaminating apparatus was widely used for water carrying and giving showers, but the parts supply, as elsewhere, was critical. No spare parts of any description arrived in the theater before Colonel Morgan returned to the United States after the middle of 1943. Even when parts did begin to arrive, there were few for the large apparatus. Some vehicles were cannibalized to keep others in operation, but even this expedient failed because many parts were not interchangeable among the four different makes of apparatus and because the same type of parts wore out on all apparatus. CWS officers arranged with their Ordnance colleagues, late in the war, to replace worn-out decontamination motors with jeep motors, and this local adaptation permitted some apparatus to be returned to service.49 Other munitions also failed because of faulty manufacturing, faulty inspection, or poor packaging in the United States. Examples are the early shipments of the M33 smoke tank, which air chemical units rebuilt, and of MT 4 and M8 chemical hand grenades of which such a large percentage malfunctioned that Colonel Grothaus, the OCCWS observer, recommended the destruction of entire lots.50 Another major problem which was at least aggravated by SWPA storage conditions was that concerning the 100-pound toxic bomb.
Toxic Munitions
As noted above, bombs were early stored in three toxic gas yards in Australia. Leakers were soon discovered among the thin-cased bombs, and sizable detachments from two service units were required to segregate the leakers, decontaminate the storage areas, and vent and paint non-leaking bombs. After a time it became evident that the
mustard filling of some bombs was itself deteriorating. Copthorne asked for replacement by distilled mustard, which was not so much subject to deterioration, but OCCWS replied that the production authorities in the United States could not afford the time and effort to distill mustard when the undistilled product proved satisfactory elsewhere. Concentrated SWPA CWS effort kept most of the bombs in serviceable condition. Copthorne was anxious, as the war progressed, to move the bombs closer to the scene of fighting. Finally, in 1944, transportation was secured to establish a considerable stock in New Guinea. When Copthorne’s own section moved to Leyte, he again attempted to move the bombs forward, but transportation could not be obtained. Toward the end of hostilities, after a toxic gas yard had been established in the Philippines, another effort was made to move the stock forward, but a detailed inspection revealed that few bombs were then serviceable, and the Chemical Section, Western Pacific, arranged for the disposal of bombs remaining in Australia and New Guinea.51
The deterioration of stocks did not mean that SWPA was without supplies for gas warfare retaliation. General MacArthur requested that stockage be maintained on the west coast pending the availability of shipping. Shipping would have been allotted at once in case of emergency. Also, bombs and other toxic munitions declared unserviceable were replaced so that minimum area reserves were maintained until near the end of the war. The area reserves, equal to four or five days’ retaliation, were in any case inadequate since the plans made late in the war were based on the west coast stock.52
Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Southwest Pacific Area
Tactical Supply Policy
just as many problems in chemical supply in SWPA arose from the difficulties imposed by climate, terrain, and distances, so was the
organization for supply dictated by these conditions. Other factors, such as War Department priority, perpetual shortage of manpower, and the nature of the SWPA organization also played a part. In theory SWPA supply operated just as it did in other theaters. SWPA was first concerned with insuring TBA and tables of organization and equipment allowances for all its organizations and units. It was secondly interested in establishing regular maintenance quotas, usually 30 days’ supply, which moved forward with combat units, or were held in rear area depots or unit supply for rear area units. A third task was establishing theater reserves set at 60, 90, 150, or 180 days’ supply by the War Department (OPD) , as calculated against the War Department approved troop basis. All this was the normal business of supply which was handled and computed in just about the same way by SWPA personnel, by the office of the chief of the War Department technical service, and by the responsible port of embarkation.
In the CWS SWPA, as mentioned above, once the initial problems of determining area strength and authorizations and initial supply status of units and organizations had been solved, “normal” supply became a matter of forwarding requisitions for shortages in initial equipment, maintenance, and area reserves. The complication here became one of knowing what to ask for since poor communication frequently left SWPA chemical officers in the dark as to what was available, or what changes had been made in equipment and allowances, or what new items had been added to the system. Part of this burden was removed by the port of embarkation which automatically filled shortages disclosed by the theater’s matériel status reports, but this and other automatic supply created problems in unwanted equipment such as gasproof curtains, and 20,000 horse gas masks in a virtually horseless area.53 Matériel status report supply also frequently arrived in the theater so many months after the report went forward that the conditions cited and basis for stockage no longer existed.54 But these “normal” supply problems existed in every theater and were only more difficult in degree in SWPA because of serious shortages and failures of communications. Much more difficult were the special requisitions problems.
Again in the special requisitions area, the theaters operated on the same basis. All theater chemical officers submitted special requisitions
to build up gas warfare preparedness, and in all theaters special requisitions or special projects originating with combat organizations were the very basis of tactical supply. In the North African—Mediterranean theater special requisitions sometimes brought wanted tactical requirements, but when special requisitions failed, organization chemical officers like Colonel Barker, with the help of service chemical officers like Colonel Coblentz, improvised their own requirements and handled them through their own channels. In the European theater special requisitions seldom brought the items the theater wanted from the United States, but General Rowan and his staff controlled chemical supply through an individual system that had matured for two years before it was put to the test of combat. Rowan and his staff could call upon the comparatively abundant resources of the European build-up and of the British allies. The chemical special operational projects in Europe were evolved in close coordination between combat and service elements, and the bulk of supply came from theater stocks managed in the theater by the service elements. For example, base section chemical officers could come in for weekly conferences with their theater chief, and, on the Continent, service elements, such as Colonel Stubbs’s ADSEC Chemical Section, were in daily contact with the combat organizations. Transportation and communication in Europe were overburdened, but the distances were shorter and the road and other facilities vastly superior to those of the Pacific. The differences in degree in SWPA were so great as to be almost differences in kind.
When Sixth Army became the major SWPA American ground element, on a level coordinate with USASOS, in February 1943, it assumed responsibility for tactical supply. Colonel C. L. Marriott, Sixth Army chemical officer, arrived in Australia with the second echelon of the army in April but remained only a short time before moving forward to Milne Bay with ALAMO Force, a task force created in June 1943 from Sixth Army troops, and in fact a forward echelon of the army. Marriott’s office was thus separated by 1,200 air miles from Copthorne’s. Marriott’s assistant, Major McKinney, remained in the Sixth Army headquarters. The only expeditious means of communication was by radio, but with such heavy demands on the radio net, normal communication was by letter or informal memo.55
Responsibility for CWS operational supply projects rested with Marriott. Since he had very little assistance and since, after the move to ALAMO Force at Milne Bay, even his own section was divided, most of the supply policy load fell directly upon his own shoulders. But even this was not difficulty enough in the difficult Pacific area. He lacked the logistic information and means of transportation, and his ability to improvise locally was practically nil, since there was no available civilian source of transportation and no substitute line of communication to Allied forces such as many field chemical officers had. New Guinea had no motor roads, no industry, and only a little unskilled manpower. Air transportation carried very high priority and water transportation was at a premium. Until is November 1943, he could deal with the Chemical Officer, Advance Section, USASOS, at Port Moresby. From 5 November until 31 March 1944 he dealt with chemical officers of Advance Section at Lae and Intermediate Section at Port Moresby. But miles of water or air lay between the USASOS sections and his office in ALAMO Force headquarters, which was at Milne Bay until October, at Goodenough Island until December, and near Finschhafen until May 1944.56
Requirements and Transportation
Marriott spent much of his time in 1943 simply in determining how SWPA interpreted chemical supply, what channels existed, how much subordinate elements wanted, and where to store the immediate supply demands of organizations. In June 1943 USASOS provided that requisitions for TBA equipment should be submitted to base section chemical officers who could fill them without further reference. Requisitions for supplies in excess of TBA had to be approved by Marriott and forwarded to USASOS. The availability of non-TBA items in USASOS depended upon the ability of the USASOS Chemical Section supply officers to predict unusual issues and to persuade the United States authorities to ship them. Transportation could be obtained either by theater allotment of space, which was controlled in GHQ, or by San Francisco Port of Embarkation allotment. USASOS sometimes issued credits for controlled (non-TBA or scarce) items to Sixth Army for Marriott’s suballotment, but each issue against credit had to be approved
by USASOS through the issuing base.57 Unusual issues of TBA, such as for the 1st Marine Division which arrived from South Pacific area fighting minus much of its equipment, were approved through USAFFE, Sixth Army’s administrative (not operational) command channel, to USASOS.58
Sixth Army forwarded operational projects to GHQ SWPA and in the course of preparing such a project in June, Marriott, bypassing technical channels, pointed out to the supreme command that confusion existed as to the meaning of the term CWS supplies.59 He indicated that the prohibition against the use of toxics led some staff officers to believe that smoke and incendiary shells and grenades, chemical ammunition then issued by Ordnance, were also prohibited. The belief also existed that protective equipment and chemical ammunition were restricted to a 30 days’ supply, and problems arose because some protective equipment (such as protective clothing and covers) were issued by Quartermaster on a 90 days’ supply basis while other equipment (gas mask, protective ointment, and shoe impregnite) were issued by CWS, apparently on a 30 days’ basis. USAFFE, where Copthorne’s office was then located, replied without reference to GHQ that the Ordnance-issued items were to be used since they were not toxics. The theater administrative headquarters also indicated that tactical planning should encompass TBA plus 30 days’ maintenance and 30 days’ reserve for Classes II and IV. For ammunition supply USAFFE prescribed basic units of fire for initial issue and provided that maintenance and reserves be calculated in days of supply.60 Reserves were parceled out among intermediate bases by the combat organizations. The headquarters regretted confusion resulting from the issue of protective equipment by two services and indicated that action had been initiated to make all protective equipment the responsibility of one service.61
With the possible exception of information on specific day of
supply and unit of fire allowances, Marriott certainly learned nothing he did not already know. His letter was undoubtedly prompted by a desire to “get something on paper” which would establish an operational planning base and at the same time set headquarters thinking about the assignment of responsibilities. The responsibility for protective items, despite the USAFFE assurance, remained divided between CWS and Quartermaster, but the SWPA responsibility for storage and issue of chemical grenades was transferred from Ordnance to CWS in September. Chemical and incendiary bombs remained an Ordnance responsibility, but the CWS was newly charged with inspection and servicing of the munitions.62 If Marriott had indeed sought a transfer of responsibility for all chemical items to CWS supply authority, he learned, as the following events demonstrated, to regret it, because he found that the CWS had acquired so much responsibility as to make handling the forward supply job a huge burden.
Supply Procedures and Their Application
just two days before the transfer of responsibility from Ordnance to CWS, ALAMO Force prescribed supply procedures for combat troops. Each special staff section was assigned to prepare requirements and to oversee and record distribution of the items in its province. The USASOS requisition procedure was followed in that units would requisition directly on base commanders while approval channels were through the army staff section.63 Marriott was launched into a hectic period of dealing with loading and unloading, storage, maintenance, and combat replacement of the small quantities of the comparatively few chemical items which were so easily misplaced, misappropriated, and misspent among the vast quantities of material moving over the vast distances of the Pacific.
Probably as much at Marriott’s behest as for his own use, Copthorne attempted, also in September 1943, to obtain the latest logistics tables, TBAs, and TOEs from the CCWS.64 This information was not
immediately forthcoming, but McKinney did get USAFFE unit of fire data which he sent to Marriott and subordinate chemical officers on 4 October, and Marriott promptly issued an ALAMO Force version.65 But he still lacked information on grenades. A month later he wrote to McKinney that it was embarrassing not to know the particulars on these items for which he was responsible. Declaring that someone must have the information, he briefly ordered, “Shell out.”66
Preparations for the forthcoming Arawe-Cape Gloucester-Saidor offensive were more important than obtaining a set of logistical data. Organizations were about to move out from Australia. McKinney, at a conference in Copthorne’s office (Copthorne had now returned from USAFFE to USASOS) apparently charged that not enough was being done for the combat forces. He particularly urged that division chemical officers be given advance information on their supply status.67 Copthorne’s men, who were older hands at fighting the battle of Pacific transportation, must have appeared un-cooperative since there was little they could do that had not already been done. USASOS elements had only limited ability to provide transportation and no official power to assess tactical supply preparations. Movement and allotment priorities must come from Sixth Army, and, since supply was strictly interpreted as a command function in SWPA, only Sixth Army could furnish supply status data to combat organizations. Furthermore, USASOS chemical officers never knew when matériel would move. It was their legitimate practice to ship maintenance with outgoing units so that it might be withdrawn to stock forward bases. There it would be available to supply the same units or others in critical need. The point was that conditions of movement and storage in SWPA were so poor that the area command could not afford to permit combat organizations to attempt to carry along all their supplies into an assault. The only result would be wastage, and wastage as high as 90 percent of protective items had already been experienced in assaults.68
Sixth Army was not long in seeing the point. On 12 October 1943, Marriott notified the Chemical Officer, Advanced Echelon, USASOS,
of his intended distribution of Sixth Army ammunition supplies among the New Guinea subbases, and he indicated the initial issues that would be required from each base.69 McKinney’s principal task then became getting the transportation that USASOS could not get. Base section chemical officers had become adept at locating and using any nook or cranny not spoken for in any kind of shipping headed for New Guinea, but supply of the scope required by Sixth Army called for more space than they could find. McKinney appealed to the Regulating Officer, GHQ, who was in charge of all SWPA transportation allotments, and also appealed to Sixth Army general staff members to assist in obtaining priorities for chemical items.70
Procedures Questioned
Marriott was naturally concerned about having McKinney do a transportation job which he felt should be done automatically in connection with operational planning. He further objected to being separated from his own section by 1,200 miles and to doing business with the USASOS main echelon from the same distance. Copthorne made a tour of New Guinea bases at this time and talked these points over with Marriott. Copthorne agreed that Marriott should deal with the chemical element of Intermediate Section at once and with that of Advanced Section as soon as that section was set up to handle his requests. Copthorne emphasized, both while in New Guinea and in a letter upon his return, that under the circumstances planning must come from Marriott and that only Marriott was in a position to clear information to the combat elements on the one hand and to the USASOS base elements on the other. He forcefully pointed out that the base elements could be prepared to meet demands upon them only if they knew the complete supply plan—how much material had been issued, how much was to be issued and maintained, and who was authorized to receive supplies. During his trip Copthorne discovered that one base chemical officer had reissued ammunition TBA to a division since he did not know that the division had already received it. Another division refused to relinquish an overage of flame thrower fuel
because it feared future unavailability. At least part of this fear was justified, but if every organization was not supplied on the same basis, the supply system would soon fail. Copthorne had neither the authority nor the channels to correct these situations. Marriott chided Copthorne for ordering base chemical officers to suspend issue in some cases, but Copthorne could do no less in trying to prevent misapportionment of resources.71
Except for the instances of maladjustment in issue and lack of knowledge by the base chemical officers of specific resupply requirements for ammunition, the base supply status met minimum requirements (30 days’ for Sixth Army’s 180,000 strength) at the time of Copthorne’s visit. The only items deficient were the 1½-quart decontaminating apparatus (19.9 days) and the MIS white phosphorus grenade, of which there were none.72 The WP grenade deficiency was not a local failure; there were no stocks in any theater. When WP grenades did become available SWPA got them first, and a supply of these was in the forward bases by 15 December.73 The Oro Bay base was below 30 days’ Class II supply in October and just above 30 days in November, but, presumably at Marriott’s direction, the Port Moresby base compensated with 67 days in October and 76 days in November.74 The only supply complaint noted in the period was one from the 24th Infantry Division pointing out a shortage of SWPA-modified training masks, but again this was not a local failure. The 10th Chemical Maintenance Company was awaiting the arrival of new canisters from the United States in order to begin waterproofing.75 During the combat operations a shortage of hydrogen cylinders for flame throwers developed, but this too was a problem which was not solved locally for some time since there was no regular channel of supply for commercial gases.76
Tactical Procedures Set
By the end of the first week in December there was little more that Marriott and McKinney could do. Fighting in the Pacific was savage and intense but usually brief, so that once forces were committed in a campaign there was practically no hope of getting even resupply from distant bases or from the United States unless it was already on the way. Sixth Army Chemical Section planning turned to supplying training munitions for the next break in combat, and support of the combat forces consisted of juggling supplies at the forward bases to permit maximum availability.77
Marriott took the occasion to write to chemical officers at subordinate echelons asking that statements of requirements for future operations come early and in full detail. The only way to avoid the last-minute hustle which had just been experienced was to plan far enough ahead so that CWS claims on shipping and storage could be entered months in advance. Marriott realized that the supply element of Copthorne’s office should not be placed in the position of having to outguess the combat elements in order to place requisitions on the United States in time to receive any material.78
As new campaigns began in early 1944, it became obvious that it was no longer possible to start from scratch. In order to keep supplies moving, the Sixth Army Chemical Section had to know what had been expended and what was on hand. Marriott and McKinney experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining expenditure and status reports from task forces in widely scattered locations. This failure was particularly frustrating since, at the expense of much effort, they had secured service detachments or at least junior officers to accompany those task forces without chemical sections. The primary duty of these detachments was flame thrower service, but the officers were also charged
with handling supply. It was finally necessary to secure a command letter to get some of the reports.79
By the end of February 1944 Marriott was thoroughly disgusted with the detailed supply operation which had been the lot of the Sixth Army Chemical Section. He wrote to Copthorne that he had come to the conclusion that “we were sweeping water up hill.”80 Considering the small quantity of chemical supply, he believed that Ordnance would feel no additional strain on handling chemical ammunition, and he felt that Ordnance would not need a separate system as did the CWS. He wanted more time to devote to tactical policy and gas warfare protection and he felt he could get the time only by disposing of a part of his supply burden.81
There was some justice in Marriott’s comments. The quantity of chemical supply was very small, but perhaps precisely for that reason, chemical materials tended to be lost when handled by another service. But Marriott was not to be relieved of his supply burden; if anything, it increased. USASOS did offer some help. The Distribution Division, USASOS, had been created in January specifically to handle Sixth Army’s most vexing problems—transportation and distribution policy. The veteran CWS supply manager, Maj. Arthur H. Williams, Jr., moved into the position of Chemical Officer, Distribution Division. The Distribution Division operated as a field element of USASOS and it moved forward ahead of the main echelons.82 The USASOS commander, Maj. Gen. John L. Frink, also redefined the duties of USASOS Advance and Intermediate Sections. Effective I March 1944, Advance Section became a transportation and handling agency and Intermediate Section took over the command of all forward bases and the supervision of supply policy.83 Since the Distribution Division soon moved into Intermediate Section, the Sixth Army Chemical Section at last had
USASOS officers with considerable resources close at hand. Still, the Sixth Army Chemical Section devoted much of its time to supply and service.
Marriott issued a new unit of fire table on I March because he was still responsible for tactical requirements and planning.84 Also, now that some support problems were handled by USASOS, the forward area problems increased. The inexperienced, young junior officers with the task forces lacked the knowledge to handle supply, and Marriott’s office was frequently called upon to give detailed instructions at the regimental combat team level. In many cases Marriott sent out the officers of his own section to inspect or to clear up a field supply problem.85
The introduction of chemical mortar battalions to the Pacific and the increased use of the flame thrower also added to supply duties. Every task force chemical section whether of divisional size or smaller was now more than ever engaged in combat loading and unloading, in collecting supplies on beachheads, and in furnishing support, such as flame thrower fuel mixing, in forward areas. These elements all reported expenditures and special requirements and problems. In each case the Sixth Army Chemical Section had a function of planning, reviewing, or directing operations.86
By the middle of 1944 replacement factors had been increased, supply was more plentiful, and items received were in better shape. The first block-loaded ships were then being prepared in San Francisco, and the Sixth Army Chemical Section took advantage of this means to resupply ammunition. Block-loaded ships were those vessels with loads specially designed to support a task force with a balanced variety of supplies. The matériel was loaded so that discharge could be effected easily and expeditiously, and loads were so marked that accounting and reporting problems were greatly reduced. Each block-loaded ship came into a USASOS base and waited there to be called forward for the support
of an appropriate task force. The block-loaded procedure facilitated supply on Leyte.87
Colonel Marriott was invalided home in July 1944, so that he did not see the effect of the block-loaded ships upon his supply operation. By the time of his departure the pattern of supply was well set, and although there were problems, such as the inability of USASOS to move bases forward fast enough when combat reached the southern Philippines and a critical supply shortage late in 1944, there was no essential change in the chemical tactical supply operation until the end of the war.88
Chemical officers in the Southwest Pacific faced the most difficult supply task experienced by the CWS during World War II. The hardships faced by chemical officers in other theaters—lack of supply information, immensely complicated requirements, requisitioning, and review systems, shortage of critical items, and the early poor condition of equipment—were all compounded by distance, tropical conditions, and lack of channels and facilities in SWPA. As a result SWPA chemical officers developed a series of expedients which were at times unusual and often ingenious. By employing these expedients they did build up area reserves and they did provide the combat forces with both matériel and service. It does seem possible in retrospect that their task, which was never an easy one because of the unpredictable and almost overwhelming difficulties of tropical warfare, might have been somewhat more simply and more expeditiously handled had logistical planning received more emphasis both in the theater and in the War Department.
The Theater Supply System, Central Pacific
Supply in the Emergency Period
The CWS Hawaiian Department in December 1941 stocked more chemical items than any other overseas element of the Army.89 Major
McMillin, Chemical Officer, Hawaiian Chemical Depot, was prepared to issue 60,000 service gas masks when, less than an hour after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began, Colonel Unmacht, department chemical officer, ordered distribution. The departmental CWS also stocked about 90 tons of bleach, 110 tons of chemicals for impregnating permeable protective clothing, and nearly 25,000 gallons of noncorrosive decontaminating agent. Several thousand hand decontaminating apparatus and a completely inadequate supply of personal protective ointment completed the defensive stock.90
The CWS stored some ammunition, smoke agents, and toxic agents, about eleven tons of FS smoke, 3,000 HC smoke pots, and nearly 500 tons of bulk toxics almost evenly divided between persistent and non-persistent gases. The departmental ordnance officers stored some toxic and smoke-filled ammunition. The departmental CWS carefully hoarded 32 4.2-inch chemical mortars, aware that the whole Army had only 44.91
Since Unmacht’s first responsibility was to insure gas warfare protection and a defensive potential for troops, as noted above, he at once directed that impregnating and bleach production operations start, and he also set out to procure cans to be filled as chemical land mines. On 10 December 1941 he cabled the Chief, CWS, for funds to procure materials and to operate and to convert plants. The theater CWS assumed that the War Department would immediately ship TBA equipment for the known troop strength in the Hawaiian Department, but in case such material should not be en route, Unmacht on 17 December cabled for 60,000 suits of protective clothing, 25 tons of impregnite, nearly 200,000 tubes each of shoe impregnite and protective ointment, and training masks, dust respirators, gasproof curtains, and chemical mortar shell. The request was amended on the following day to include more mortar shell, bleach, children’s masks, and respirators for babies.
By the end of December most of the protective equipment on hand, including all but about 5,000 service masks and 5,000 training masks, had been issued to troops, and issues to civilians began. The War Department emergency shipments including training masks for civilians began to arrive in January. Within ten days 15,673 masks had been
issued to civilians, and by 1 March 1942 393,680 of the eventual 425,699 had been distributed. Local workers added nearly 38,000 “bunny” hoods, substitutes for non-available children’s masks, to the total.
Chemical Supply Reserve
The first department report on supply status to the War Department G-4 in October 1942 revealed no serious supply problem except the lack of service personnel. The depot was severely handicapped in the operation of 3 subdepots on Oahu, 3 in outlying islands, and 5 production plants. In Unmacht’s opinion the one chemical depot company activated in the theater in March and the one decontamination company which arrived in June were already overburdened. Theater stock was not up to the prescribed 75-day reserve level, but the San Francisco port was keeping the theater informed on the progress of requisitioned shipments, and automatic supply on less important items was steadily building toward the stockage goal. There is little sense of urgency in the report, probably because the department was enjoying a lull between the emergency period and the combat period.
The March 1943 report does reflect a sense of urgency. Requisitioning responsibility had been transferred from the depot to the departmental chemical office because supply planning for CENPAC combat forces was now in prospect. The failure to maintain authorized stock levels had become serious because large-scale issues of TBA equipment contemplated would deplete area reserves. The departmental CWS had run into the problem of requisitions edited in the United States, a problem which plagued all theater chemical officers. The port had supplied in the requested quantity only two items of a 19-item requisition placed in November 1942; fourteen items were disapproved without statement of cause. Even more serious in the view of departmental chemical officers was the fact that training ammunition supplies were running out in a period of intensive training.
The CWS in Hawaii could report no improvement in June, but in September 1943 the theater reported that relief had been received. The War Department authorized for the Central Pacific Area a 60-day operating level in addition to the 75-day reserve level, and the port authorized an additional “pipeline” factor. The “pipeline” factor allowed the Hawaiian Department to requisition additional supplies to
maintain levels during order and shipping time. TBA issues for combat forces, of which the first was then mounting, could then be handled without difficulty.
On 1 July 1944 the Chemical Office, Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC) , assumed the logistics functions except for broad policy and long-range planning which remained the province of Unmacht’s chemical office. This transfer placed stock level and TBA issue problems in CPBC hands. It also gave the Chemical Office, CPBC, supervision of the combat supply and resupply system which had been inaugurated for the earliest theater operation against the enemy in the Gilbert Islands in November 1943.
Toxic Supply
Another reserve problem was that of toxic supply. As the first gas warfare plan indicated, the 5 oo tons of toxic on hand at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack would have been sufficient, taking into account the retaliation then possible. As strength grew and weapons and aircraft became available, the CWS in CENPAC realized that 500 tons represented hardly a token amount for retaliation even under the assumption that retaliation would take place on one of the small Pacific islands. The CWS consequently persuaded Army and Army Air Forces commands to requisition toxics. Some were received and stored by Ordnance with CWS maintaining the responsibility for inspecting munitions in storage. Between July and November of 1944 the peak stock of 498.5 short tons of bulk lewisite was on hand as well as the peak stockage of 1,126.5 tons of toxics that went into bombs. Other peak stockages for bulk mustard, artillery shell, and chemical mortar shell were attained in the first half of 1945.
CWS officers judged the 100-pound mustard-filled bomb as the most important munition for retaliation. The peak stock on this item, attained in July 1944, was 15,244 bombs with 541.2 tons of toxic filling. This supply was token only. If, for example, this entire supply had been used on Iwo Jima, which had an area of seven and one-half square miles, it would only have contaminated a little more than half, or four and one-half square miles.92 Considering the vapor effect of mustard and the fact that the entire island would not have been regarded as a target, the stock would have been sufficient for one contamination. In
the opinion of most chemical officers one contamination would have been enough to end all enemy resistance on the island. The question of resupply for other objectives would then arise. According to Generals Porter and Waitt an actual initiation of gas warfare would have given the CWS sufficient priorities to effect resupply, by air if necessary, from the west coast.93
From the point of view of supply on hand the CWS in CENPAC was only prepared to make an initial gas warfare strike. But, since CENPAC had better lines of communication to the United States than most overseas areas, gas warfare could have been sustained.
Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Central Pacific
Tactical Supply Policy
The essence of the combat supply and resupply lay in the nature of Central Pacific combat. The Joint Chiefs of Staff scheduled area forces to take a number of small and fiercely defended islands and atolls lying across the expanse of the Pacific. Early supply base development in most of these objectives was out of the question—they were too small and too far away from main bases, or even if they were large enough for base development the distance between them was so great that it was impossible to establish a string of forward bases in the SWPA pattern. Each ground and sea combat operation had to be complete in itself. The assigned combat force took the objective as rapidly as possible and withdrew leaving a small or, in the case of Marshalls and Marianas, a large garrison to clean up and prepare the objective for such use as could be made of it. Any resupply was destined for the garrison only. These island garrisons sometimes built large bases but they usually served the air forces rather than ground combat forces.
The U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific formed seven provisional garrison battalions before a single objective was taken. Each supply plan was made on the assumption, which proved correct, that the ordinary requisition or allotment procedures used in other theaters would not work. All supply for the combat forces must be at sea before the forces arrived at their objective, and garrison force supply had to be in the area as soon as garrison forces could receive it. In this
circumstance, supply could hardly be a function of the combat command. Logistic plans for each operation were a joint product of combat, garrison force, and theater planners. Tight logistical control was essential. Consequently, supply plans were originated by the combat staffs working with the technical service staffs. These preliminary plans were approved and coordinated at general staff echelons and forwarded to the Commander in Chief, POA, for the strategic, tactical, and logistical last word. The tight control came from the management of transportation by the Commander in Chief, POA. Every inch of transport space had to be allocated by strict priorities since shipping was short, since all essentials had to be carried, and since an amphibious force operating at such distances from a base had to be of an easily manageable size.
The First Test—The Gilberts Operation
In the Gilberts operation assaulting troops carried full initial allowances plus 30 days’ essential maintenance and five units of fire computed according to War Department replacement factors.94 An additional 30 days’ maintenance accompanied garrison force troops. Then additional shipments were set up to give the garrison forces a 30-day operating level and a 60-day reserve by D-day plus 60 days. The CWS computations were involved because each of these levels had to be computed on the basis of troop strength expected to be at the objective when supplies arrived. Since strength would decline rapidly with the withdrawal of combat forces once the objective was taken, a descending schedule of strength was drawn up.
All CWS supplies for the Gilberts operation were loaded in Hawaii. Shipments totaled 93 measurement tons (40 cubic feet per ton) , most of it for the Marine Corps assault forces. There were no serious CWS supply problems, but there were a number of lessons for the future. Assaulting forces wanted more flame throwers and more smoke in forthcoming operations although the CWS made a special allowance of smoke pots for the Gilberts.
Assault troops on the Gilberts used the power driven and 3-gallon decontaminating apparatus to spray sodium arsenite on the dead since it was impossible to provide mortuary services in the assault. The
chemical aided in control of disease-bearing insects and the arresting of nauseous odors.95 An extra allowance of the apparatus was indicated.
The Gilberts operation also pointed up some handling problems. Combat troops found flame thrower fuel mixing and repair difficult, partly because 55-gallon drums of fuel were too heavy to handle, and partly because repair parts could not be adequately distributed and used during tactical operations. The Navy and the marines requested the installation of racks on landing craft so that smoke pots could be carried in a ready position for immediate firing. The Army’s 27th Division chemical officers indicated that chemical supplies were insufficiently waterproofed.
Supply System Refinement
The USAFICPA CWS took these problems from the Gilberts into account in planning the Marshall Islands invasion for January, February, and March of 1944. Flame fuel was provided in 5-gallon cans. Waterproofing was improved and allowances for smoke and flame munitions and for the decontaminating apparatus were raised. Even the basic supply system underwent refinement. USAFICPA set up block loads to be shipped directly from the United States to the Marshalls. The CWS shared in the theater system revision by computing a block-load on the basis of 20 days’ supply for 1,000 men. Since War Department factors were usually stated on a 30-day basis and were often not computed in a per-man requirement, CWS USAFICPA was forced to convert War Department figures into per-man-per-day requirements according to theater experience in order to determine the more convenient 20-day block. Chemical officers worked up shipment blocks which would provide 90 days’ supply for the garrison forces on D-day plus 90 days in the Marshalls.
In the actual Marshalls operation, the tactical commander held resupply offshore until he could determine that it could be landed without clogging the beaches. The only CWS supply problem arising in the Marshalls was that so many portable flame throwers were provided that not all could be used. The allowance per division for subsequent operations was cut from 192 to 141 weapons. The physical condition and handling of supplies otherwise met demands, demonstrating that the CWS had learned to operate its share of the theater supply
system. For example, the CWS supplied only end-item replacements to the combat echelons since it was apparent that spare parts could not be handled and used until the garrison forces were set up. Waterproofed packaging and palletized loads assembled by the Hawaiian Chemical Depot and the combat troops themselves before the operation proved to answer other equipment and handling needs. Although space could not be provided for chemical service troops to handle supply, the sanitation problem was so great that the excess decontaminating apparatus were provided and manned by troops of the 29th Chemical Decontamination Company under the supervision of a medical officer.
The theater and CWS supply system was substantially complete at the end of the Marshalls operation. In subsequent operations, the only major refinement was a differentiation between assault and garrison resupply. The practice previous to the Marianas operation in June was to provide resupply on a per-man basis without regard to whether the men supplied were in combat or garrison echelons. POA experience made it clear, however, that combat troops would not be in any area long enough to need resupply on some items, such as gas mask repair kits and gasproof curtains, even in the event of gas warfare. The garrison forces who collected and reconditioned equipment would be in greater need of reconditioning supplies and base development supplies. The CWS USAFICPA accordingly determined assault and garrison resupply blocks on the basis of probable need and scheduled shipment of these blocks so that assault forces would handle only essential resupply.
The Final Test—Okinawa
The great test of the Central Pacific supply system came with invasion of Okinawa in April 1941. Tenth Army was organized in Hawaii in preparation for the Ryukyus Campaign of which the Okinawa invasion was a part, and the Tenth Army Chemical Section, then under Col. Thomas A. Doxey and later under Col. John H. Harper, set to work with the theater (now U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas—USAFPOA) and CPBC Chemical Sections. CWS supply troubles both in providing basic equipment and in resupply were intensified because units and organizations scheduled for the operation were mounting in places varying from the west coast of the United States to the recently captured Palaus and some were still committed
in other operations. The CWS planners prepared supply plans which could be rapidly adjusted to new situations. They provided this flexibility by planning for “type” units and organizations rather than for specific named units and organizations, according to earlier practice. The theater command arranged that requisitions for “type” unit supplies could be placed on the San Francisco port. The port then forwarded supplies to holding and reconsignment points to await theater designation of receiving organizations. The theater further directed the assemblage of an emergency reserve stock in the Marianas to be used in event the “type” supplies fell short of filling basic requirements for the designated specific unit. The CWS logisticians, on the basis of their own experience, estimated shortages for organizations which were known but which could not be consulted because they were still committed to combat. The logisticians computed resupply blocks according to the theater system as usual.
The chemical service manpower requirement was greater than the theater had ever experienced. There were not enough service units available in the theater, and repeated pleas to the United States resulted in the scheduling of two chemical service units on redeployment from the European theater and one unit from the United States. But these units could not arrive before the operation was well under way, so Unmacht activated two service companies and a provisional chemical detachment in Hawaii. He also secured the assignment of a quartermaster service company to chemical work pending the arrival of other units in the target area.96
Assault on Okinawa’s Hagushi beaches began on Easter Sunday morning, I April 1945. Contrary to expectations, no significant resistance was encountered, and a much larger area was taken than had been originally planned in the first three days. As far as the CWS was concerned, the easy advance immediately posed the problem of collecting chemical equipment dropped on the beachhead by incoming troops. Initially, division personnel established beach dumps. On L-day plus three, XXIV Corps took over the operation of the dumps, and the 4342nd Quartermaster Service Company which had been assigned to the CWS arrived with the 1st Provisional POA Chemical Detachment (later the 411th) . Elements of the service company and the
detachment were attached to division chemical sections to assist in dump operation. On 1- o April 1945 Island Command, the garrison force for Okinawa, whose chemical officer was Lt. Col. Emory A. Lewis, took over the supervision of the dumps and service personnel.97 Island Command Chemical Section and its service units had the mission of receiving, storing, and issuing CWS matériel to service echelons and to Tenth Army ASPs and dumps.
The most serious problem of the CWS which developed during the Okinawa operation was the shortage of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition. The 4.2-inch chemical mortar was increasingly acknowledged by commanders and troops alike as a valuable weapon. Because of extensive use, especially in such operations as the Battle of the Bulge; 4.2 ammunition was in short supply in the zone of interior and in all theaters of operations when the Okinawa operation was being formulated. The USAFPOA CWS had planned on having ammunition resupply for Okinawa arrive in the block-loaded ships from the west coast, but because of the shortage, ammunition had to be collected in the Hawaiian Islands and the Marianas and then forwarded to Okinawa. In all, approximately 50,000 rounds of heavy M4 shell were forwarded and another 20,000 rounds of M3 shell were acquired from the Navy at the target. The M4 shell weighed 35 pounds as opposed to 25 pounds for the M3 HE and WP shell. The heavier shell decreased mortar range by 1,000 yards and caused greater strain and wear upon the guns. Breakdowns occurred and a greater replacement of parts than had been anticipated was required. It was a case, however, of using the M4 shell or having none. Fortunately, the end-item and spare parts replacement allowances were sufficient to cover necessary repairs, but this was not the end of the shell problem.98
The mortar units in combat soon discovered that fuzes had corroded in many of the shells, causing premature bursts. Tenth Army called for replacement fuzes. The USAFPOA responded to eleven emergency requests by air, shipping 46,502 pounds of fuzes from the United States and from Hawaii.
Neither ammunition nor fuze problems could be attributed to the USAFPOA chemical supply system, for shells and fuzes were not available in the United States according to plan. It is possible that the requirements stated for ammunition resupply were low, but since there was a shell shortage this point could not be proved. On the whole, the system worked well for the Okinawa operation.
The administration of all CWS activities in the Central Pacific proved to be more effectively and economically handled than in other theaters because circumstances in the area permitted greater centralization of procedures and more command support of the CWS. The CWS supply system in the area also reflected this administrative efficiency. In supply the CWS did not have the independence in the Central Pacific that it had in other theaters—the service had to work through the well-oiled Army-Navy machine. But under Central Pacific conditions this lack of independence was not a significant drawback, for it brought the benefits of working as a part of, rather than in spite of, the theater organization. Independence in other theaters, on the other hand, brought the frustrating problems of trying to operate a very small supply service in a company of giants. In final analysis the CWS supply job was accomplished both through the independent CWS supply systems evolved in other theaters and through the centralized system of the Central Pacific and neither type of system proved to be perfect. But the Central Pacific system which provided logistical control from the top, although it was less responsive to the desires of field commanders, offered the CWS the best and most consistent employment of theater resources and talents.