Chapter 12: The Chemical Mortar in the ETO
Getting chemical mortar battalions for the European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, proved to be a complicated and difficult problem. Colonel Rowan, chief chemical officer in the theater, had recommended a total of 24 battalions for the theater troop list, a figure based upon the formula of 2 battalions per corps (18) and 2 additional battalions per army (6). His commander approved this recommendation, including the figure in the over-all troop list, which was forwarded to Washington early in 1943.1
The War Department took no action on the troop basis recommended by the theater commander. In November 1943 it sent an officer to England to inform the theater commander on War Department troop basis policy—the establishment of an over-all theater personnel ceiling within which the theater commander could set up his own troop basis. The officer produced a list of those units which were immediately available, those which were in training, and those which were scheduled for activation. He stated that the theater commander could take his pick, staying, of course, within his over-all ceiling. Because the list admittedly had no relation to the one submitted by the ETO, a situation which negated a large amount of detailed theater planning, the War Department agreed to activate and train units not on the list, with the understanding that this would take additional time. Unfortunately, there were only seven chemical mortar battalions on the list.
Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commander of the U.S. army group in the theater, received the job of determining the final troop list. Rowan pointed out to General Bradley that the seven chemical mortar battalions bore no logical numerical relation to the number of armies and corps on the list, that they could not be distributed equitably,
and that they were far too few to achieve their full potential. Rowan then asked Bradley for the twenty-four mortar battalions of the original troop list. Bradley replied that he would like to have more mortar units but, because the troop ceiling had just about been reached, adding them would mean giving up other units that were equally valuable. This he was reluctant to do.
At the time of these negotiations the only mortar battalion located in the European theater was the 81st. Attempts to secure one of the four combat-experienced units from the North Africa Theater of Operations were turned down as “impossible and impracticable”; the mortar battalions in Italy already were overworked. Colonel Shadle, chief chemical officer of that theater, stated that the battalions were so highly regarded that “the sticking of my fingers into this question would be practically the same as putting them in a ‘bandsaw’.”2
A change in the table of organization for the mortar battalion promised an unexpected source of men. Under the existing table the authorized strength was 1,010; a revised table of September 1943 reduced this number to 622.3 Colonel Rowan was informed that the battalions in the United States were organized under the older table. Taking into consideration the battalions then existing and those which could be formed from the men excess by reorganization under the new table, Colonel Rowan came up with a total of eleven potentially available battalions. If General Bradley asked for but one battalion in addition to the War Department troop list, there would be enough to equal just half of the original request, or one per corps and army. General Bradley acceded, requesting twelve mortar battalions for the theater troop list.
Although it began auspiciously, the plan for capitalizing on battalion reorganization as a source for new units soon turned sour. The theater received permission in December to activate a mortar battalion in England manned in large part by the men freed in the reorganization of the 81st Battalion.4 But Rowan learned to his dismay that the battalions in the United States earmarked for his theater had already been reorganized under the new table of organization, thus cutting off an important supply of personnel.
With only two battalions in England as late as February 1944 the
shortage of such units became critical. Although the troop basis for the ETO now included 12 battalions, only 7 were listed as available in 1944. What was worse, only 4 of these would be in the theater in time for the Normandy landings—the 81st, the 92nd, activated in England, and the 86th and 87th, both of which arrived in April.5
Preparations for OVERLORD
Of these four battalions the 92nd was least prepared for combat operations in France. The other three units concentrated on amphibious training in the winter and spring of 1944, having undergone basic and unit training in the United States. The 92nd, activated in England in February 1944, had to start from scratch.6
From the beginning the training activities of the battalion were hampered by the type of men it received. Of the first 373 assigned to the unit, 308 were of average intelligence or less. Fifty-six had AWOL records, 22 had been court-martialed for other offenses, and 12 had had VD. About 15 of the group were suffering from some disability or were on limited service; 13 others went immediately to the hospital. Throughout its period of activation the 92nd usually received those men declared surplus by other units.7
The battalion devoted the last two weeks of February to making its camp at least partially fit for human habitation. The first part of March saw the enlisted men screened for a selection of potential NCO material and subjected to a review of all basic subjects. Small arms instruction, mortar drill, and the training of 162 drivers followed. By the end of March companies had been organized, squads knew something about their mortars, and the battalion was able to pack and move with some degree of order. Training intensified in April, with special emphasis on field work and marksmanship. Morale reached its lowest point at this time; few realized that the rigorous conditioning was necessary for their own survival. Work on mortar ranges began on 1 o April and continued into May. The month of
May also saw the battalion undergo a two-and-a-half-week period of intensive training while attached to a field artillery group. There was no time for amphibious training before the invasion, and as a consequence the 92nd did not participate in the initial landings. Nor did the 86th Battalion receive assault training in time for D-day activity.
The 81st Battalion was the chemical unit most adequately prepared for the D-day operation. It had trained at the amphibious center at Camp Gordon Johnston, Fla., before leaving the United States. From December 1943 until the following April it participated in intensive exercises at the Assault Training Center in Devonshire and in other maneuvers along the western and southern coasts of England. The 87th Battalion was also well prepared for the invasion; thoroughly trained in the United States, it took part in two amphibious exercises in England that spring. The latter training had indicated that the increased problems in communications and supply in amphibious operations made greater demands on unit personnel. (Battalion commanders already were finding that the reduced complement of men in the new TOE was inadequate to keep forty-eight mortars in action even in normal operations.) Consequently, each of the two mortar battalions earmarked for the invasion was temporarily fattened by 125-man detachments from two chemical processing companies.
The Normandy Campaign
The 81st and 87th Chemical Mortar Battalions landed in Normandy early on D-day in support of the V and VII Corps, respectively, on OMAHA and UTAH Beaches. Companies A and C of the 81st were attached to battalions of the 16th Infantry, 1st Division, and Companies B and D landed with battalions of the 116th Infantry, 29th Division. As it approached the shore, the landing craft carrying the forward battalion group received heavy shelling which killed a sergeant and seriously wounded the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Thomas H. James. Without benefit of engine or rudder the craft drifted aimlessly until currents providentially beached it at a protected spot along the shore.
Company A, landing at H plus 50, lost some of its equipment in the heavy seas. Even worse, Capt. Thomas P. Moundres, its commander, was mortally wounded before reaching the beach. The senior lieutenant assumed command and succeeded in getting the platoons into firing
Smoke screen during the Omaha Beach landings
positions. First day missions included a smoke screen for advancing infantry and the destruction of an enemy machine gun. Company C did not land until midafternoon because the infantrymen in preceding waves were pinned down on the edge of the beach. The unit finally got ashore at 1500 and made its way to positions about 200 yards inland. It received no requests for supporting fire.
The four LCVPs carrying Company B were unable to find a route through the heavy obstacles in their assigned sector, and two of these vessels were disabled by artillery fire as they headed toward another landing area. Despite a heavy sea and enemy opposition, all troops and equipment aboard the stricken craft were transferred to an empty LCT. Company D landed between H plus 50 and H plus 60, but its commander, Capt. Philip J. Gaffney, was killed when his landing craft struck a mine. Before finding an outlet off the dangerous strip of beach the unit changed its position three times and fired one mission. Night found the mortars dug in at St. Laurent-sur-Mer. Thus, on 6 June
Chemical mortars at Utah Beach
1944 3 officers of the 81st were killed and 2 others, including the battalion commander, were seriously wounded. One company lost its total complement of transportation while each of the other three companies lost two vehicles.
Trouble developed on D plus 1 as enemy snipers allowed leading infantry elements to pass through, firing on units which followed. To meet this threat the battalion formed details to wipe out the sniper nests. The mortarmen learned another trick of combat during these early days in Normandy. The enemy, having retreated from the area in which American mortars were to be set up, had marked on its firing charts all logical positions for these weapons. The men of the 81st soon found it was best to avoid reverse slopes and similar accepted mortar sites in favor of unconventional open terrain.
The 87th Chemical Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. James H. Batte, was attached to VII Corps in the D-day assault of UTAH Beach. Three of the firing companies supported the three battalions of the
8th Infantry, 4th Division, and the fourth company supported a battalion of the 22nd Infantry of the same division. Forward observers of the mortar companies landed with the initial waves of infantry, and the units themselves came in at H plus 50. Shortly after landing, the battalion fired 140 rounds and then followed the infantry in moving off the beach. For almost six hours the 4.2-inch mortars were the only ground weapons capable of delivering heavy fire support.8 Targets during the first twenty-four hours of action were enemy machine gun emplacements, concrete emplacements, and pillboxes.
Quinville Ridge, some ten miles northwest of UTAH Beach and a D-day objective for VII Corps, was not taken until 14 June. The companies of the 87th Battalion supported the 4th Division in the fight for this objective, expending 16,870 rounds and suffering 36 casualties in the process. The mortar units continued in support of the 4th Division as it drove north to Cherbourg. On 23 June Company C fired a spectacular rolling barrage in support of a battalion attack which prompted Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt to telephone his congratulations back to the mortar positions.9
The attack on Cherbourg included several other noteworthy 4.2-inch mortar missions. On 23 June Company A blended its fire so that white phosphorus showered German troops just routed from their positions by high explosives. That evening twenty men from Company D fought as infantry troops while the rest of the unit delivered heavy fire against an enemy counterattack. On 24 June the mortars of Company B successfully dueled with German artillery, assumed to be 88-mm. guns, which had been shelling an American regimental command post. On the same day, Company C aided in repelling a vigorous enemy counterattack by getting off 300 rounds before the division artillery could come into action. Expressing his view that the two mortar companies with his division had materially aided the success of the advance, Col. Kramer Thomas, chief of staff of the 79th Division, emphasized an inherent characteristic of the mortars—that of quick response to a given mission. On several occasions, he stated, the chemical mortars, because of the rapidity with which they went into action and the availability of ammunition at gun positions, were the only artillery-type support available.10
After the fall of the port of Cherbourg half of the battalion supported the 9th Division during the several days required to mop up the Cap de la Hague. By 1 July, when this operation ended, the 87th Battalion had been in continuous combat for twenty-five days. Nineteen man had been killed and 75 had been wounded; battalion ammunition expenditures totaled 19,129 rounds of HE and 11,899 rounds of white phosphorus.
The nature of the fighting in Normandy was determined by the predominant feature of the Norman terrain, the hedgerow. As described by Colonel MacArthur, Chemical Officer, 12th Army Group: “The country is gently rolling grazing land, consisting of rectangular grass fields generally about 100 yards deep in the direction of our advance and 150 to 200 yards wide.” The colonel stated that these hedgerows were actually earth walls about four feet high surmounted with bushes and dotted with small trees. They were natural obstacles which could be put to excellent use in warfare, and the enemy fully exploited their defensive possibilities. Machine gun emplacements were located at the corners of hedgerows, and their lengths bristled with machine pistols, rifles, and antitank weapons. Mines with trip wires sometimes supplemented the already imposing defenses. Naturally, an advance over this ground was as slow as it was dangerous; units measured their progress by hedgerows, not miles. This was a form of position warfare with bocage replacing the traditional role of trenches.11
The terrain was particularly dangerous for mortar forward observers, a fact emphasized by the following notation from the journal of the 87th Battalion for 13 July 1944: “Scarcely a day passes that some one, if not all the forward observer party, are either wounded or killed. Yet, all officers of this battalion operate as forward observers and there are always volunteers among the men.”
The 86th Battalion arrived in Normandy on 29 June. Attached to First Army, the companies of this unit initially supported elements of the 90th Infantry and 82nd Airborne Divisions. Company B was an exception. The ship which was taking this unit across the Channel sank after either striking a mine or being struck by a torpedo. One man was listed as missing and 26 were injured; most of the equipment was lost. Refitted in England, the unit rejoined the 86th on 18 July.
Although created for combat support, chemical mortar battalions found themselves at times in something other than a supporting role. The experience of Company A of the 86th on the night of 6-7 July is a case in point. One of its platoons was firing for a battalion of the 359th Infantry; another was in the immediate vicinity. Wire connected the mortar company with the infantry battalion. The mortar company liaison officer at the forward infantry observation post reported that the situation there was uncertain and appeared to be getting out of control. An urgent mission, requested by an adjacent battalion, prompted the mortar company commander to withdraw his security element and send it for more ammunition. Although three infantry companies were thought to be in front of the mortars, enemy machine gun fire suddenly pierced the air above the mortar crews. The mortar company commander called the infantry battalion but could get no definite word about the situation. The infantry battalion agreed that a mortar barrage would probably help, and the two platoons fired at a range of 700 yards. When the machine gun fire crept closer, the commander again tried to contact the infantry command post. Finding it had moved, he ordered one of his platoons to withdraw, a maneuver accomplished with difficulty because of the heat of the barrels and the firm emplacement of the base plates. Soon the mortar positions were swept by enemy machine gun fire and the other platoon received the march order. As the company withdrew, 5 men fell into enemy hands, escaping when the Germans were driven off by the company’s sole remaining .50-caliber machine gun. The next morning all equipment was recovered with the exception of one destroyed jeep.12
Although not involved in D-day operations, the 92nd Chemical Battalion soon participated in the Normandy fighting. Attached to XIX Corps and supporting the 30th Division, the unit first saw action in the opening days of July along the Vire River. On 8 July the 92nd supported the 29th Division which was spearheading the XIX Corps drive on the centers of German resistance around St. Lô. This and one other attack proved unsuccessful; fourteen days and two attachments later the battalion was poised for the breakthrough operation.
COBRA, the offensive to break out of Normandy, began on 25 July. The VII Corps, with three divisions abreast, led the attack. Companies A and B, 92nd Battalion, were firing preparatory missions in support
of units of the 30th Division when Allied heavy bombers droned in to soften German resistance. To the dismay of the American troops, about 3 5 of the planes dropped their bomb loads within friendly lines.13 Nearly 200 bombs fell in the 92nd Battalion area alone. Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, Army Ground Forces commander, was instantly killed while observing the action from a point just in front of Company A. Battalion losses were 5 dead and 23 wounded. Company A lost 9 mortars, half of its ammunition, and all of its vehicles. Company B fared better, managing to salvage 8 of its 12 mortars. On the following day Company C relieved Company A and the latter unit drew back to reorganize; three days later Company A, in turn, relieved Company B. By 3 August all units returned to the battalion area for rest and refitting.
Operational Problems
Despite the complaints heard throughout the Normandy Campaign about the lack of trained mortar battalion replacements, there was no over-all shortage of CWS officers in the European theater. Colonel St. John, Chemical Adviser, G-3, SHAEF, reported in June 1944 that so many CWS officers were in the theater that they were “sitting in each other’s laps and standing on each other’s feet.”14
The root of the trouble was the existence of two distinct types of CWS officers, technical and combat, whose roles were usually not interchangeable. Misassignment not only resulted in a waste of talent but usually in a substandard performance. An officer whose training and background fitted him for a chemical laboratory assignment probably made a poor mortar platoon leader. Because these facts were understood neither by the Ground Forces Replacement Command in England, nor by the personnel officers of the higher commands, it was not unusual for trained mortar officers to find themselves in depots or in branch immaterial positions, while the mortar battalions had to settle for unqualified replacements.15
This situation was verified by the commander of one of the mortar units which saw action in Normandy. Colonel Batte reported that during the course of one week in the latter part of June he received
two CWS officers and one infantry officer as battalion replacements. Batte stated: “The two CWS officers admitted they had never so much as touched a mortar in their entire army experience; before entering OCS they were in the Medical Corps. The greater part of their service in CWS after finishing OCS had been in pools and at the Military Police Training Center, Ft. Custer, Mich.16 The accuracy of these comments made by graduates of the CWS officer candidate school might be open to question, since the OCS curriculum included fifty hours of 4.2-inch mortar training.17 But whatever the explanation, these men were not psychologically prepared to enter combat.18
They probably lacked technical proficiency, as well, for the Chemical Warfare School came to consider fifty hours as an inadequate period of mortar training, and in the summer of 1943 inaugurated a Battalion Officers Course, with the specific purpose of producing qualified mortar battalion officers. Because the battalions in combat were not receiving these officers as replacements, Colonel Batte had been requesting and usually getting infantrymen.19 Similar problems were encountered with enlisted men. Lt. Col. William B. Hamilton, commanding the 86th Battalion, stated that the replacements received by his unit were not trained CWS mortarmen but were “basics from the infantry or most any other branch.”20
Efforts were made to overcome the lack of suitable mortar battalion replacements. General Rowan established a Chemical Training Battalion in England which began operations in August 1944. Until its termination in October 1944 this unit, which doubled as a replacement organization, trained 125 officers and 700 enlisted men for assignment with mortar battalions. This fine record was in part vitiated by two factors: the heavy demands permitted only a fraction of these troops to receive all of the prescribed three weeks of training, and despite
all precautions these men continued to become lost in the Ground Forces Replacement Command.21
The personnel situation remained critical throughout the winter of 1944–45. December found the mortar battalions in the 12th Army Group understrength by twenty-five officers and the theater replacement center seemingly devoid of qualified chemical mortar officers.22 The 92nd Battalion, earlier unaffected by replacement problems, now reported that “trained officer and enlisted replacements have been unavailable and consequently a continuous training program has been found necessary.”23
An urgent message from the theater to the War Department in February 1945 called attention to the need for chemical mortar officers. Within the theater further steps were taken to rectify the replacement situation. All CWS officers assigned outside the service had been located and a number of them were now serving in their proper capacities. Also, the willingness of the Ground Forces Replacement Command to work with the informal advice of General Rowan’s office lessened greatly the chance of misassignment of officers.24
A personnel problem of a different sort had existed even before the battalions entered combat. The revised table of organization of September 1943, it will be recalled, reduced the battalion strength from i,o 10 to 622. Battalion commanders were of the opinion that this number was below that required to man, supply, and provide communications for the forty-eight mortars within the unit. Although there was disagreement as to the composition of an appropriate table of organization, all of the commanders considered the 6-man squad too small to keep a mortar in action. A popular remedy was to withdraw several mortars and reinforce the remaining squads with the men thus freed. Lt. Col. Ronald LeV. Martin took more drastic measures with the 92nd Battalion. He received permission to eliminate one of the four companies of his unit, thus anticipating the revised
table of organization which was to become effective in the fall of 1944.25
Another difficulty which emerged in Normandy involved the tactical employment of chemical mortar units, or more precisely, the matter of mortar battalion control. The resulting controversy provoked two schools of thought, one holding that mortar units should be directly responsible to the infantry which they supported, the other maintaining that they should operate under artillery control. Influential in this dispute was the background and training of the participants. The commander of the 9zd, for example, had been a field artillery officer until transferring to the CWS; moreover, the last training phase of his unit had been supervised by the artillery officer of the corps to which the battalion was attached. It was not strange that this battalion commander became a leading exponent of the artillery control school.
One of the main benefits of the artillery control system was the efficiency with which the battalion could operate as a unit. In defensive situations mortar fire could be readily massed, and the unit’s fire could be effectively integrated with that of the artillery. In the European theater, however, the limited number of mortar battalions generally precluded the maintenance of battalion integrity.26
Most of those concerned, CWS and otherwise, favored the close infantry support method. This fact was confirmed in a CWS theater of operations letter which stated that although applicable artillery techniques and practices should be used, the normal role of the chemical battalion “should be considered as part of the Infantry team ... furnishing close support with a heavy and powerful mortar.”27
The Drive Toward Germany
The Fall of Aachen
After the breakout at Avranches, the Allied advance to the east sharply accelerated. The tactical value of the 4.2-inch mortar usually decreased in fast-moving situations, and such was the case during most
of the campaign in northern France. Although there were periods of intense action, most of the mortar battalions enjoyed a breathing spell. Some battalions temporarily acted as trucking units to help ease logistical problems which accompany any army in rapid movement. Time was available for rest, rehabilitation, and training, as well as for the opportunity to enjoy the enthusiastic reception of the liberated French people. It was a well-deserved respite coming between two taxing campaigns.
The American forces first came into contact with the Siegfried Line in September 1944. At that time there were still only four chemical battalions assigned to the 12th Army Group, an insignificant number for such a formidable force. And the stiffening enemy bore little resemblance to the German troops who had recently fled across northern France. First Army, lacking the logistical support it had recently enjoyed, began a series of limited probes against the German defenses. The objective of one of these attacks was Aachen.
The 92nd and 87th Chemical Mortar Battalions supported First Army in this difficult operation which took the form of a double envelopment. The 92nd Battalion fired for the 30th Division in the XIX Corps drive to the north, and the 87th supported elements of VII Corps in the southern sector.
The attack on Aachen, set for September, was delayed by the wet, miserable weather until early October. During the ensuing lull the 92nd improved its gun positions, perfected plans for prearranged missions, and fired a number of probing missions. Finally, on 2 October, the 30th Division attacked the Siegfried Line in the direction of Ubach, Germany. In preparation for the assault the 92nd Battalion placed a destructive barrage upon wire barriers of concertinas and double aprons which lay in the route of advance of two infantry regiments. Over 1,200 high-explosive shells fell in these two areas whose combined size measured 1,700 by 300 yards, cutting broad swaths through the obstacles. The mortars then kept a rolling barrage 150 yards ahead of the advancing troops. Subsequent missions included those of interdiction, harassment, general support, and smoke screens on the flanks to hamper enemy observation. Targets of opportunity were numerous. One forward observer used mortar fire to chase a German weapons platoon into a pillbox and then adjusted 8-inch artillery fire to bring about the destruction of the concrete fortification.
The battalion expended 25,000 rounds of ammunition and suffered 30 casualties in the Aachen operation, which ended with the fall of the city on 23 October.28
The 87th Battalion supported the 1st and 9th Divisions in the lower jaw of the pincers attack against Aachen. Frequent re-emplacements of the mortars resulted because of the soft, wet ground, a condition which also contributed to the heavy breakage of parts. Missions of interdiction were frequent; tanks, personnel, machine guns, and mortars were targets of opportunity for the 4.2-inch weapons. White phosphorus effectively screened observation from the formidable enemy positions which protected Aachen. Later, mortar fire was placed upon the enemy’s vigorous counterattacks as he attempted to fight out of the beleaguered city. Against one counterattack on 16 October Company B disabled 2 tanks, knocked out 1 self-propelled gun, and killed between 70 and 80 of the enemy. The captain of the infantry company thus aided declared that the mortar support prevented the enemy from overrunning his unit. Against another counterattack the chemical mortars fired white phosphorus shells behind the supporting enemy tanks, silhouetting them for the benefit of American tank destroyers. One German tank was knocked out, two others were damaged, and the rest withdrew. Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, commanding the 1st Division, praised the chemical mortars for the part they played in stopping these counterattacks.29
The 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion at Metz
While assigned to the First Army, the 81st Battalion crossed northeastern France into Belgium and Luxembourg, and in September got its first taste of fighting among the fortifications of the Siegfried Line. Here it learned that while the prepared concrete and steel positions were impervious to mortar shell, smoke did prove effective in preventing observation from these strongpoints.30
In mid-September the battalion was reassigned to the Third Army, also recently halted by logistical difficulties. Lt. Gen. George S. Patton ordered a series of limited operations which would place his forces in a more favorable position once the drive to the Rhine was resumed. Attached to XX Corps, the 81st Battalion was in the vicinity of Metz, preparing to support the 5th and 90th Divisions in attacks against Fort Driant and Maizières-les-Metz, an industrial town located north of the city.31
The first attempt against Fort Driant was made on 27 September by the 2nd Battalion, rah Infantry, 5th Division. This hurriedly planned attack proved abortive, primarily because the strength of the objective was not fully appreciated. Located on the dominant height in the area south of Metz, Fort Driant was one of the most important elements of the fortifications which encircled the city. It consisted of four casemates and a central fort whose concrete walls were 7 feet thick and whose various components were connected by a labyrinth of underground tunnels. Wire obstacles and a dry moat, 60 feet wide and 30 feet deep, surrounded the over-all complex.
The infantry battalion attacked the fort under a pall of smoke which Company D, 81st Battalion, placed on the installation and on the observation posts behind it. By late afternoon the futility of the attack was fully revealed, and the infantry troops were ordered to withdraw. Plans were immediately made by the division commander for a more systematic attack on the fortification.
Company D was to remain in support of the 11th Infantry, but its attachment was changed from the regiment itself to the supporting 19th Field Artillery Battalion. From positions two miles north of the town of Onville, the mortars began to register on targets in the Fort Driant area in preparation for the coming attack. Occasionally, other missions were fired. Targets of opportunity included mortar and machine gun positions and harassing rounds were placed on the road network. In turn, the mortar positions were subjected to sporadic but effective enemy artillery fire.
On the evening of 2 October Capt. Arthur R. Marshall, the company commander, attended several conferences with artillery officers to settle certain details of the attack. Late that night two 2½-ton trucks
brought an extra 866 rounds of white phosphorus to a forward position where they were met by jeeps and trailers from the company. A platoon from Company C was attached to Company D for the operation.
A great deal more planning went into the 3 October attack on Fort Driant, again made by the 2nd Battalion, 11th Regiment, than was given to the one a week earlier. Tankdozers were called on to fill in portions of the encircling moat, and “snakes”—long pipes filled with explosives—were brought forward to be used against the wire obstacles in front of the fort. Again, fighter bombers attacked the fort and corps and division artillery battered its concrete defenses. More mortar smoke was used than in the earlier attack.
H-hour for the second Fort Driant attack was 1100. Company D and its attached platoon immediately began the smoke screen in order to prevent enemy observation of the assault. An irregular 15-mile-an-hour wind made this an extremely difficult mission. At times four distinct screens had to be maintained in order to achieve the proper placement of smoke. Company D continued the screen for five and one half hours, expending 1,600 rounds of white phosphorus ammunition. Despite these well-laid plans the infantry had but limited success. One company did reach positions within the fort, but the enemy reacted strongly, making reinforcement impossible. Again on 11 October Company D’s mortars maintained a 7-hour, 1,400-yard smoke screen, this time with 1,975 rounds of white phosphorus. Elements of the 11th Infantry fought on and around Fort Driant until the night of 12-13 October, when a decision was reached to withdraw. No other large screens were required in the ensuing days although target of opportunity and harassment missions were frequent.
The high-explosive shell fired by the mortar company proved just as ineffective against the fortifications around Metz as it had against Siegfried Line installation at Aachen. This result was not surprising; 500 and 1,000-pound aerial bombs also bounced harmlessly off the concrete and steel of the fortifications.32
One of the handicaps under which the 81st Battalion operated in front of Fort Driant was the high incidence of mortar breakage. Not only did the weaker parts of the mortar (the recoil slides and elevating screws) give way, but the sturdier components (the base plates and the
standards) as well. During the afternoon of 5 October, for example, the breakage became so severe that only one mortar per platoon was available for firing. On that day 20 base plates, 6 standards, 1 barrel, elevating screw, and 1 collar were damaged. Blame for this equipment failure was attributed to the extreme range at which missions were fired and to the mixed rock and shale in which the base plates were emplaced, resulting in uneven pressures and a consequent shearing effect.33
Meanwhile, Company A of the 81st Battalion supported the 35th Infantry, Both Division, in an attack on Maizières-les-Metz. The mortars laid smoke to screen friendly attacks and to cloud enemy observation while mine fields were being removed. Other missions included those of interdiction and targets of opportunity.
The operation against the town proceeded slowly. At one point the infantry was content to use the situation as a realistic training ground, each day setting up platoon and squad attack problems against a house or two.34 Company A accomplished an extraordinary mission during the house-to-house fighting. When an infantry battalion was held up by a single enemy machine gun, the battalion commander, located in a cellar across the street from the enemy position, called for 4.2-inch mortar fire. Company A adjusted a single mortar on the machine gun; its fourth or fifth round landed directly on the sill of the second story window from which the enemy weapon was firing.35
Maizières-les-Metz fell on 30 October, and the all-out drive on the city of Metz began early in November. As at Aachen, the attack took the form of a double envelopment, each arm of which was supported by companies of the 8 1st Battalion. In this operation Company C found itself attached to Team Cherry of the 10th Armored Division, a most unusual arrangement. During the initial stages of the attachment mine fields and roadblocks kept the advance at a relatively slow pace, and the mortar company was able to assume its normal role. But as the pace quickened, the problems of the supporting unit increased.. In order to insure constant support, the two mortar platoons leapfrogged forward, one of them ready to fire while the other advanced to the next appropriate position. A liaison officer stayed with the team commander to insure prompt response to any calls for fire. This
leapfrogging technique was abandoned when Team Cherry split in two, and a platoon joined each of the new elements.
This employment of a mortar unit in support of an armored team was not altogether satisfactory. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Jack W. Lipphardt, questioned the practice, calling attention to the difficulties of replacing mortar parts and of resupplying ammunition in fast-moving situations and to the relative vulnerability of mortar equipment.36 As the battalion operations officer, who accompanied Company C during this attachment, put it: “The mortar is a close support weapon for the doughboy and is of much more value to the infantry regiment than to a combat command.”37
In support of the entire Metz operation the 81st Chemical Battalion fired 51,118 rounds of ammunition. During part of the time a shortage of artillery shell enhanced the role of the 4.2-inch mortar.38
Mortar Parts and Their Maintenance
Maintenance of the 4.2-inch mortar, which became such a grave problem during the autumn fighting along the Siegfried Line, had bothered battalion commanders since the Normandy landing. In the early days of fighting in France the chemical mortar assumed an important role as a primary means of heavy weapon support. Missions were fired from undesirable positions at ranges far in excess of the 4,500 yards for which the mortar was designed, a circumstance which contributed in a large way to mortar part breakage.
The 87th Chemical Battalion, during its first twenty days in Normandy, for example, expended 114 complete sets of springs and bent too elevating screws beyond repair.39 The failure of the springs was not entirely the result of equipment fatigue and firing at excessive ranges. According to Colonel Batte the difficulties experienced with the mortar springs were “due to faulty and inferior material and workmanship.” New springs were known to stay contracted an inch or so under normal length after only five or six rounds had been fired. This weakness compounded the over-all vulnerability of the mortar,
for other parts—shock absorber slides, elevating screws, and even standards—suffered when springs functioned improperly.40 The situation was greatly alleviated when the CWS devised new and stronger rectangular springs.41
Mortar breakage was not confined to Normandy but continued through the campaigns of northern France and the Rhineland. A number of circumstances accounted for such breakage. For one thing, in the fast-moving fighting across northern France, which was more in the nature of pursuit than combat, mortars were almost always called on to perform at excessive ranges.42 Another factor was the emplacement of weapons in soft ground, a situation which plagued the 86th Battalion, in September and October. In some cases, the mortar crews of the 8 6th, after firing only two or three rounds, had to dig through the mud to the base plate and haul it out with a jeep.43 A similar problem was the presence of hard shale rock in the soft clay which provided uneven support for the base plate and produced a shearing effect. The 81st Battalion particularly experienced this difficulty. But as the damage was much less frequent with the new mortar than with the old, part of the weapon mortality must have resulted from equipment fatigue.44
As mortar parts continued to break, battalion commanders began to criticize the design and construction of the weapon, claiming that it should be able to withstand the rigors of combat without an extraordinary amount of repairs and replacement.45 They were especially critical of the construction of the base plate. The standard base plate weighed 150 pounds, a heavy item when carried by hand. In the European theater where hand-carry was at a minimum (the weapons and ammunition were usually conveyed by jeep trailer) it would have been practicable to have a heavier base plate if the additional weight would have added to its strength.
Upon the recommendation of Colonel Batte of the 87th Battalion steps were taken to devise such a base plate. One model, constructed
in a Belgian steel mill, weighed 275 pounds and was 7 inches longer and broader than the standard item. Several were issued to mortar units of the First Army, where the reaction among the crews was favorable. The use of this base plate resulted in fewer re-emplacements, in better accuracy, and in less damage to other parts of the mortar. Modifications were also made in the tie rod. Instead of welding this part to the standard, it was secured by a loop, nut, and belt arrangement which, by allowing greater flexibility, resulted in less breakage.46
Manufacture of the base plate in Europe resulted from a search for improvement, but other parts were produced there for the specific purpose of relieving shortages.47 Among these items were cup forks, elevating and traversing screws, connector rods, standards, base and tube caps, shock absorber and traversing slides, and spring guides. Unfortunately, no manufacturers could be found for the most critical mortar part, the spring.48 The Seventh Army also made spare parts for CWS equipment, preventing at one time, at least, a crisis in the resupply of certain items. This work took place at Epinal at an army maintenance installation which used the students and facilities of a former vocational school.49
The shortage of mortar spare parts harassed battalion commanders from the early days of the Normandy fighting and remained unsolved throughout most of the European operations. The solution of this problem was a primary mission of a CWS spare parts team which visited the Continent during the winter of 1944–45 In its final report the Spare Parts Team praised the work done by the chemical maintenance companies on the component parts of the mortar. With ingenuity and versatility these companies improvised, cannibalized, and even manufactured sufficient spare parts to permit the continued
Preparing a 4.2-inch mortar shell for firing, Ardennes counteroffensive.
operation of the mortar battalions.50 Despite occasional criticism about the distance between the mortar battalions and the maintenance companies,51 effective liaison was generally maintained between these units. Seventh Army insured prompt maintenance by the unprecedented device of attaching 17-man detachments of the chemical maintenance companies directly to the mortar battalions under army control. The rest of these companies were responsible for the maintenance of other chemical equipment, as well as of mortar carts and ammunition, and for fourth and fifth echelon maintenance on the mortars themselves.52
The German Winter Offensive
Progress of the Allied armies, slow and costly during the fall of 1944, came to a complete halt on 16 December as the Germans launched their surprise winter offensive through the Ardennes. In one of the many readjustments hurriedly made to meet the threat of the Bulge, the 3rd Chemical Battalion was shifted from the 6th to the 12th Army Group.53 There it fought with Third Army’s III Corps to relieve the
encircled forces at Bastogne. Mortar companies initially were attached to 2 infantry divisions, an armored division, and a cavalry squadron. During December units of the battalion operated under 2 armies, corps, 6 infantry divisions, and a cavalry group. They expended 17,499 rounds of ammunition and, surprisingly enough, suffered no casualties.54
Farther to the north the 86th Chemical Battalion supported V Corps in the First Army sector. There it was touch and go. The enemy had broken through a neighboring unit and had then cut into the V Corps sector. German paratroopers landed in the corps rear area intent on the disruption of communications and the seizure of installations. 86th Battalion headquarters organized eight patrols to comb the area for these enemy troops. The patrols found no paratroopers, but they did come across a house with a cache of enemy equipment and weapons.
The rear area of Company D was overrun during the confusion of the breakthrough, and 14 of its men were listed as missing in action. Company C of the 86th lay in the direct path of the German drive. Never had the unit experienced such a critical situation; never had its efficiency, morale, discipline, and resourcefulness been so tested. Units which had protected the mortar company suddenly turned to it for protection. Mortar fire halted enemy advances and covered friendly movements; mortarmen maintained communications for and with isolated and threatened units and stayed at their guns while these units withdrew to safety. One mission fired on 19 December enabled a hard-pressed infantry company to withdraw safely from a position that had become untenable. The mortarmen placed smoke and high-explosive shell in a narrow gap which separated the infantry unit from the enemy and continued to fire while all other units passed to the rear. Then they, themselves, withdrew. At times during this period division artillery, armor, and infantry withdrew under Company C’s protective fire—fire which “was largely responsible for holding up the enemy advance and almost solely responsible for the safe manner in which these withdrawals, were effected.55
During the first week of the Ardennes offensive the 86th Battalion expended 7,380 rounds of ammunition. However, the service given by the battalion could not be measured in rounds. Its value during
those trying days can be appreciated only with the knowledge that the 4.2-inch mortar was an important source of artillery-type fire—fire which enabled the infantry in its sector to gain some order out of the chaos caused by the German attack.
During December the mortar battalions began to reorganize under new tables of organization and equipment. Dated 29 September, the revised TOE triangularized the battalion by eliminating Company D. This change had long been advocated by CWS officers, although there had been a recent move to retain the fourth company as a replacement and training unit.56 The designation of the three companies was changed from “weapons” to “mortar.” Each had 3 platoons of 4 mortars, or a total of 36 for a battalion; the previous organization provided for 4 companies, each with 2 platoons of 6 mortars, or a total of 48.
Battalion commanders had long complained of insufficient men; now, despite the reduction in the number of weapons, battalion strength rose from 622 to 672. What formerly had been the headquarters detachment with 63 men was changed to a headquarters company with 155. The inclusion of nine 1½-ton trucks in the new TOE provided a slight increase in the amount of organic transportation.
All of the chemical mortar battalions (they previously had been designated “chemical battalions, motorized”) did not convert to the new organization immediately but did so throughout the winter of 1944–45 and the following spring, as they enjoyed an infrequent relief from front-line activity. The 2nd and 92nd, for example, converted in December, the 91st in January, and the 87th in May.
Mortar Shell Malfunctions
The period of the Ardennes counteroffensive saw the start of a series of mortar shell malfunctions which were to plague the battalions for most of the winter of 1944–45 These malfunctions were of two types: barrel bursts, in which the round prematurely exploded within the barrel; and muzzle bursts, in which the round exploded after leaving the barrel but still within the vicinity of the mortar emplacement.
In December 1944 ETOUSA impounded several lots of chemical mortar ammunition suspected of containing faulty shells. Periodically thereafter, as muzzle and barrel bursts occurred, other ammunition
was withdrawn from supply channels. By the middle of January 1945 a combined list of restricted ammunition included 90 percent of the available supply. Sometimes the pressure of the tactical situation forced the release of suspected ammunition. In these cases the mortar crews took particular precautions to minimize danger; some chemical mortar battalions fired their weapons with the use of lanyards and others built sandbag emplacements alongside of the mortars.57
A conference of mortar battalion commanders of both the 12th and 6th Army Groups was held in January in the office of General Rowan, with defective 4.2-inch mortar shell as one of the main topics of discussion. Consensus was that most of the blame for malfunctions was attributable to the mortar fuze. One solution initiated by Seventh Army was the substitution of an artillery fuze for the suspected CWS item. Test firing of shells with this alteration proved successful, and 30,000 of these fuzes were obtained for the conversion of an equal number of impounded mortar shells. A difference in threads made the substitution of fuzes no easy job. One big advantage resulted from the new combination; the artillery fuze included a delayed action setting (not found in the CWS M3) which had long been sought by chemical units for use against buildings, pillboxes, and other structures.58
Mortar shell misfires reached a peak in January 1945. In one 10-day period two mortar battalions attached to First Army experienced a total of five barrel or muzzle bursts resulting in serious injury to four men. These accidents happened despite careful checking and the observance of precautionary measures. One serious result of these malfunctions was that mortar crews were beginning to show fear of their weapon.59
Concern for this serious situation in the theater naturally extended to the Office of the Chief, CWS, in Washington. The few zone of interior malfunctions had been thoroughly investigated and were found to have been caused in practically every case by a faulty fuze. The increase of misfires overseas prompted General Porter in January 1945 to send to Europe an investigating mission headed by General Bullene. A definite correlation between extreme cold weather and
malfunctions, particularly barrel bursts, had been established by tests in the zone of interior. The experience in Europe substantiated these findings, as there were no more barrel bursts after 29 January when the cold spell ended. The Bullene mission attributed the muzzle bursts, which were not related to the temperature, to a series of weaknesses and defects in the mortar fuze. Corrective measures were recommended in all cases, some of which had been anticipated by the zone of interior investigations.
Actually, the over-all malfunction record of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition during World War II was not bad. Of the approximately four million rounds expended both in training and in combat a total of 63 exploded prematurely, causing the death of 38 and the injury of 127 American soldiers. This averaged 1.58 premature rounds in every 100,000 fired.60
The Final Drive
By the end of January 1945 the Allies had regained the ground lost during the enemy’s Ardennes offensive. In February the 12th Army Group prepared for attack along the Roer and Sauer Rivers, an attack whose impetus would carry to the Rhine. This latter obstacle, the last great defensive barrier for the enemy, was surmounted in March. After that, victory was but a matter of time.
Much of the fighting of February and March involved river crossings. The Roer, the Erft, the Sauer, the Moselle, the Rhine—these were the larger rivers which blocked the American forces in their drive to the east. The chemical mortar battalions, by both smoke and high explosive missions, provided valuable support in this series of important operations.
One of the most spectacular smoke operations in Europe involving chemical mortar battalions was staged in the Third Army sector during the XII Corps attack across the Sauer and Our Rivers. This attack, which began on 7 February 1945, was supported by the 91st Chemical
Mortar Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Roy W. Muth.61 Companies B and C fired for regiments of the 5th Division; Company D supported the 417th Infantry, 76th Division, attached to the 5th Division for the operation; and the two platoons of Company A supported, respectively, the 905th and 314th Field Artillery Battalions of the 80th Division.
These mortar units moved to positions to the west and south of the Our-Sauer Rivers line several days before the attack was to begin.62 This movement in itself was difficult. The roads, heavy with traffic in support of the impending attack, were subject to enemy fire from the heights east of the rivers. The positions of Company D were in the town of Echternach on the south bank of the Sauer, an area which had not been occupied in strength by American forces because the commanding ground just across the river was studded with pillboxes of the Siegfried Line. This fact was driven home when the mortar officers who reconnoitered Echternach quickly attracted enemy machine gun fire. The company moved into the town, two vehicles at a time, under the cover of darkness and with chains and reflectors removed from the jeeps and trucks.
Company B, in support of the 10th Infantry, had less trouble getting to its attack position despite the traffic-clogged roads leading to the river. Four hours after receiving march orders on the morning of 5 February, the platoons of the unit traveled ten miles and set up their mortars in the town of Berdorf. Company C supported the 11th Infantry also from positions near Berdorf. Anticipating heavy enemy artillery opposition, the unit placed its switchboard and fire direction centers near the mortars to reduce the expected difficulty in keeping wire communications intact.
The XII Corps met strong resistance along the Our and the Sauer. The Germans, ensconced in the strong defenses on the heights on the east, dominated the valley. The swift-moving rivers were additional
obstacles. Given the excellent German observation and the relative impregnability of his positions, it is understandable that smoke missions assumed a great importance in the XII Corps operation.
All four of the companies fired screening missions for the American attack. The 10th Infantry found the going exceedingly rough. On the second day of the attack Company B maintained two major screens to obscure enemy observation, one parallel to the front and one perpendicular to it. In addition, one of the platoons successfully blanketed an enemy observation post and placed fire on several troop concentrations. In all, 2,357 rounds of WP were fired that day. Operations were impeded by abnormal wind conditions which caused the smoke to rise vertically, a phenomenon called “pillaring.” On the following day the company expended 2,232 rounds of white phosphorus on a 9-hour smoke screen. At one point the screen was lifted and the effectiveness of smoke was dramatically demonstrated as enemy artillery and machine guns opened fire on American troops. The screen was resumed at once, and the enemy activity abruptly ceased. During the two days action just described the 1st Platoon alone expended 3,287 rounds of white phosphorus, or roughly 41½ tons.
One platoon of the smoke generator company attached to corps supported the Echternach crossing. After a short period of operation the smoke troops claimed that twelve generators were out of order and their unit commander sent the equipment back to a maintenance company for repair. There the generators were examined by Colonel Cottingham who found all but one to be in perfect operating condition. And the exception was in need of very minor adjustment. Apparently, the lack of training, discipline, and leadership prompted the smoke troops to take this action in an effort to be relieved from front-line duty. At Bollendorf, to the west, smoke generator troops effectively established a curtain between the crossing site and the high ground to the northwest from which the Germans had excellent observation.63
Among the problems confronting the 9 1st Battalion during the Sauer-Our operation was the dirty ammunition with which the battalion was supplied. During the two days of intense firing reported above, all available officers and men, from cook to company commander,
were compelled to assist in cleaning the rounds and preparing them for firing. Communication was likewise a problem. The wire and radio communication of a platoon of A Company, for example, was also used by two engineer units and the medical detachment and heavy mortar platoon of an infantry battalion. Even the matter of feeding the men proved difficult. The road leading into Echternach was a gantlet that had to be run daily by the mess personnel of Company D. Pfc. Richard Stubblefield had two jeep tires shot out from under him by shell fragments during one such mission, but continued to take hot food to the men.
As evidence of the severity of fighting against the obstacles of the Sauer and Our Rivers and the Siegfried Line, the companies of the 91st fired for five days from their initial positions. During this period units of the battalion completed twenty-four smoke missions ranging in duration from thirty minutes to nine hours and requiring almost 10,000 rounds of shell.
In another February operation the 87th Battalion supported VII Corps in the First Army attack across the Roer River in the vicinity of Duren. Early in the month the battalion’s four mortar companies, two attached to the 8th Division and two to the 104th, moved into firing positions on the west side of the river. Here they waited for two weeks. The Germans, before relinquishing control of the area, destroyed the sluice valves of the Roer River dams. The raging waters of the river rose five feet, forcing postponement of the attack until 23 February.
The period of waiting was not idly spent by the mortar companies. Some fired on targets of opportunity and others interdicted road junctions. Company D, during the last days before the attack, set up feint smoke screens in the hope that the enemy would be less apprehensive when screens appeared for the actual crossing. On the night before the attack the company blanketed the eastern bank of the Roer to cover four patrols sent out to clear mines from the far side of the river. Smoke was necessary because of the bright moonlight.
Supporting fire for the First Army attack began early on the morning of 23 February. After the assault began the mortar companies laid smoke screens to cover the infantry in its drive across the river. One company fired four smoke screens which progressively covered an attacking battalion, enabling it to cross the river and an expanse of flat terrain with negligible casualties. Again moonlight made this
Roer river bridge behind a smoke screen
concealment necessary. Company C for over fifteen hours maintained a continuous 1,500-yard screen which blocked enemy observation from the high ground near Düren and allowed ferrying and bridge construction operations to continue without the hazard of observed artillery fire. On this first day alone the 87th Mortar Battalion fired over 4,000 rounds of ammunition.
The VII Corps, spearheading the First Army’s advance to the Rhine, eliminated all enemy resistance in its zone on the west side of the river by 9 March. On the following day the 87th Battalion received word that it was to be sent from the First to the Seventh Army, which on 15 March was to initiate a drive through the important Saar-Palatinate triangle.64 This operation was to involve the penetration of the
Siegfried Line and the drive to and the ultimate crossing of the Rhine. Twice before the 87th had supported divisions which penetrated the Siegfried Line—near Aachen in September 1944 and near Malmédy in February 1945. And, as before, the battalion supported a vanguard corps, this time the XV. By 23 March divisions of the corps had penetrated the Siegfried Line and were ready for the Rhine crossing. All four companies of the 87th Battalion were in support of the 3rd Division which was to cross in the vicinity of Worms. Intense artillery and mortar preparations preceded the assault across the 1,000-foot-wide river.
Companies A and B consolidated their fire in support of the 7th Infantry. Between 0200 and 0315 on 26 March they fired twenty-three concentrations entailing 1,200 rounds of ammunition. Thereafter various targets of opportunity—machine guns, self-propelled guns, mortars—were hit by the 4.2-inch mortars. At dawn the combined companies laid two 10-hour screens (600 and 2,200 yards) which concealed bridge-building operations from direct enemy observation. Companies A and B expended 3,615 rounds of WP and 462 rounds of HE during the first day of the attack.65 The effectiveness of the fire was made a matter of record by the operations officer of the 3rd Division.
The Ninth Army, north of First Army and still under control of 21 Army Group, crossed the Rhine in an area just north of the Ruhr Valley. The army attack was concentrated on the XVI Corps front, with another corps poised to exploit initial successes, and a third lending support by fire and demonstration. In keeping with the decision temporarily to bypass the great Ruhr industrial area, XVI Corps attacked with an exposed right flank. To prevent enemy observation from the many potential observation posts in the Ruhr Valley, Ninth Army called for a 2-mile smoke screen along its exposed right flank.
The XVI Corps attacked with two divisions abreast, the 30th on the left and the 79th on the right. The 89th Chemical Mortar Battalion, Colonel Yanka commanding, supported the 79th Division.66 Colonel Yanka initially divided his battalion into two parts, one for each of the attacking regiments of the 79th. Company A, with the 3rd Platoon of Company B attached, supported the 313th Infantry on the division’s right; Company C, augmented by the other two platoons of Company
Artificial haze obscures vehicles crossing the Rhine
B, fired for the 315th Infantry on the left. These inflated companies reported to their respective regiments on 12 March. As this mortar battalion was without experience in river crossings, forward observer teams, two of which were to cross with the assault elements, joined the infantry for specialized training.
The 79th Division began to cross the Rhine in the Milchplatz–Orsoy area at 0300 on 24 March. Companies A and C of the 89th Chemical Mortar Battalion joined artillery units in pre-H-hour preparations and then, for seventy-five minutes after the attack began, fired prearranged concentrations. Upon completion of the preparatory fire the platoons of B Company reverted to company control. At 0600 Company A, firing from Orsoy, began its 3,500-yard screen along the division’s right flank. Each mortar fired a volley of fifteen rounds to establish the screen and then fired a round every fifteen seconds to maintain it. This rate was found to be excessive and was reduced to an average of one shell per mortar per minute. At times the screen thinned, and additional rounds were fired. The screen was maintained until dark.
One mortar was reserved for any targets of opportunity reported by the forward observers. Late in the day Company C crossed the river as did the first platoon of Company B, now in support of the 314th Infantry. Company A remained in position.67
Several problems arose during the first day. The soil gave way under rapid fire, causing frequent re-emplacement of base plates. The heavy rate of fire also caused considerable damage to mortar parts. Overheated barrels caused premature ignitions; in one instance a barrel became so hot that it bent. Shock absorber mechanisms broke down, base cap pins sheared, and locking forks broke or bent. On the other hand, tie rods and standards held up well.
On the morning of D plus 1 (25 March) heavy enemy fire from the right hastened the resumption of the flanking smoke screen. During that day the length of the screen was reduced by 700 yards because of the high rate of attrition of mortar parts. The next afternoon Capt. Clyde H. Westbrook, commander of Company A, reconnoitered the east bank of the Rhine for new mortar positions. That night the company crossed the river on Alligators and floating bridge sections and continued the smoke screen at dawn the next day. On 27 March the tactical situation was such that the use of smoke on the right flank was no longer required.68
With the Rhine behind them the Allies pushed deeper into German territory, and although there was some bitter resistance left in the enemy, it was to be only sporadic. Chemical mortar battalions accompanied the armies in their advance but much of the time, as in northern France, the rapid movement eliminated the need for their employment. And so, as the European war came to an end, some of these battalions were already serving in nonoperational and occupational capacities. This was as it should have been; they had done their measure of fighting and had acquitted themselves well.