Chapter 11: The 4.2-Inch Mortar in the MTO
On 10 July 1943 American, British, and Canadian forces landed on the southern and eastern coasts of Sicily, and in the ensuing 38-day campaign the 4.2-inch chemical mortar met its first test in combat. This CWS weapon, still untried in battle nineteen months after the entry of the United States into the war, by 1945 was to become an important part of the Army’s arsenal.
The 4.2-inch chemical mortar was a multiple-purpose weapon employed in close support of ground troops. Its versatility was indicated by its ability to fire toxic agents, smoke, and high explosives. In original tactical concept it was a basic ground weapon for offensive gas warfare. No other weapon approached the gas-delivering capacity of the 4.2-inch mortar; eight of them could fire over a ton of toxic agent in a span of two minutes.1 The smoke mission was also a part of the original tactical concept of mortar employment and was one of the reasons for its success in World War II. But the real key to the popularity of the weapon was its ability to fire high explosive shell, a Johnny-come-lately as far as chemical mortar missions were concerned.
The 4.2-inch mortar was the culmination of attempts to improve the 4-inch British Stokes Brandt (SB) mortar. With American-made SB mortars and with shell and propellants purchased from the British after World War I, the CWS sought to obtain increased range, accuracy, and mobility.2 By 1924, experiments under the direction of Capt. Lewis M. McBride (later colonel) produced the rifled 4.2-inch chemical mortar with a range of over 2,000 yards, and by the end of World War II this distance had been doubled.3
The Chemical Warfare Service saw the 4.2-inch mortar as a weapon which possessed mobility and flexibility, which could go in and out of
action quickly, and which was capable of delivering mass fire in an unusually short time. Compilation of firing data was simple, and the communications system was efficient and rapid. Its high angle enabled it to reach targets in defiladed positions, inaccessible to most types of artillery. The short minimum range of the mortar and its mobility enabled it to give support to infantry units. The low silhouette of this easily concealed weapon offered a difficult target to the enemy.4
Despite the potentialities of the 4.2-inch mortar the War Department showed little interest in the weapon and in 1935 suspended its manufacture. For about a year preceding September 1941 the 81-mm. mortar and not the 4.2-inch was the authorized weapon for the chemical battalions. These developments were typical and help reveal the over-all status of the CWS during the 1930s. Later, during the war, a theater chemical officer was to maintain: “It can be readily understood that our service cannot be too greatly criticized, for at no time during the days of peace were we permitted to try out our equipment during field maneuvers, etc., which would have given us a great amount of experience,”5 an opinion concurred in by General Porter, Chief of the CWS.
The Authorization of the High Explosive Mission
If the high explosive mission had not been authorized, activity of chemical mortar units in a nongas war probably would have been confined to screening operations.6 While the CWS saw the chief function of the mortar as firing gas shells, it did not overlook the possibility of using the weapon to fire high explosives. As early as 1934 these shells were fired in experiments.7 After the outbreak of World War II the infantry’s need for a good medium-range close support weapon became evident, and General Porter and his staff took vigorous steps to get the HE shell standardized and to make the firing of such a shell a major mission of the chemical mortar battalions.
The determination, mentioned above, to convert the chemical weapons units to the 81-mm. mortar naturally interrupted negotiations regarding the HE 4.2 mortar shell. A personal conference between General Porter and General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, resolved the issue in favor of the 4.2-inch mortar, a decision followed by steps to equip the mortar battalions with the approved weapon.8 Later came the authorization to produce a high explosive filling for the 4.2-inch mortar shell.9
This was only half the battle. There remained the double problem of securing War Department approval for the necessary doctrinal change and convincing the ground commanders that mortar battalions were worthy inclusions on troop lists that already must have looked pathetically thin. The doctrinal matter involved the revision of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations. Actually, the manual change would merely reflect the tacit approval of the War Department of the new mission for the 4.2-inch mortar. The CWS presented its case at a February 1943 conference with representatives of the Army Ground Forces and the Services of Supply. The latter agreed with the CWS point of view but the Army Ground Forces demurred, advocating a Field Artillery Board test of the mortar. If it passed, the weapon should be given to the Field Artillery to be employed only in those theaters which were without 105-mm. howitzers, just about eliminating any effective employment of the mortar.10
The Training Division, Services of Supply, in a strong statement of non-concurrence, called attention to the substantial increase in firepower which would be enjoyed by a division supported by 4.2-inch mortars. For example, the mortar could place almost four and a half times as much high explosive on a target in a given period of time as could the 105-mm. howitzer, albeit at shorter ranges. The mortar weighed 305 pounds, the howitzer over 2 tons. And mortar units were extremely economical in demands upon manpower. To support its case by actual combat experience, SOS cited the excellent war record of the British chemical mortar with its high explosive mission.11
Opposition to the CWS SOS point of view gradually waned, and on 19 March 1943 the War Department authorized the use of HE by the 4.2-inch mortar and directed that necessary amendments be made in the tactical doctrine.12
There remained the difficulty of selling the mortar battalion to the field commanders. To them the idea of firing high explosives from the chemical mortar was untried and unproven. An accompanying difficulty was the fact that the 4.2-inch mortar was a chemical weapon. The general impression of most ground force officers was that the functions of CWS were confined to “gas and gas masks and ... smelly clothing.13 “These officers were surprised and dubious about including in the troop basis chemical units which would fire WP and HE in close support of the infantry.
Obviously, CWS officers had a job on their hands, particularly those staff officers assigned to commands just entering combat. In North Africa Colonel Barker, chemical officer of the Western Task Force, was effective in convincing ground commanders of the worth of the 4.2-inch mortar. Barker pressed for chemical mortar units for support of the North African operations, calling attention to the tactical demands for such a weapon. “This country (and north) is mostly open except for farmhouses and country villas which are in fact rather strong little forts. Trenches within these rock walls give lots of protection to the inhabitants thereof and [machine guns] in such places command a lot of ground.”14 Barker was not to get his mortar units in time for North African operations, but as Fifth Army chemical officer he got four chemical mortar battalions with which to begin the Italian campaign, fought in terrain even better suited for use of the 4.2-inch weapon.
Activation of Chemical Mortar Units
In mid-1941 there was only a handful of mortar units, consisting of regiments, separate battalions, and companies. The 1st and 2nd Chemical Regiments had only one active company between them; the two separate battalions, also the 1st and 2nd, each had an active company. Completing the roster were two separate chemical companies, one of
which was to be lost on Bataan and the other to be inactivated shortly after the United States entered the war.15 This unimpressive list, with its regiments, battalions, and companies, indicated some indecision about the size of the basic type of weapons unit. Indeed, the brigade also had its supporters. By 1941 it had been pretty well decided that the basic unit of the mortar organization would be the battalion, composed of organic companies. The exception was the several separate mortar companies which saw action in the Pacific fighting.
As of January 1942 there were two chemical mortar battalions, the 2nd and 3rd, on active duty.16 Four more, the 81st, 82nd, 83rd, and 84th were activated by mid-year.17 During the ten-month interval from June 1942 until May 1943 the number of mortar battalions remained at six.
Meanwhile, the series of plans prepared in the United Kingdom for the cross-Channel attack included the possibility of chemical weapon support.18 The 1942 plan, for example, which called for a force of a million men included a recommendation for twenty mortar battalions.19 While there was far less than this number available, the lack of reality between plans for the use of mortar battalions and the number of units on hand was tempered by several factors. At that time the mission of these units was restricted to gas and smoke, and thus far it was a gasless war. Moreover, ground force commanders, operating within the limits of the troop basis, were reluctant to give up units of known potential for a type untested in combat.
By March 1943 the persistent work done by the Chemical Warfare Service in selling its battalions was beginning to prove embarrassing because by this time theater requests for weapons battalions exceeded the 6 on hand. The CWS pointed out that, unless other activations
4.2-inch chemical mortar crew in action during the Italian campaign
were authorized before the existing units were shipped, there would be no battalions in the United States, trained or in training, and no sources of cadres for units activated later. As all of the 6 existing battalions were committed for the months of March and May 1943, the CWS urgently recommended that 19 additional battalions be activated by the end of 1943, 6 of them at once to replace a like number being sent overseas.20 Soon after the final decision to commit four battalions for operations in Sicily, the War Department authorized the activation of four additional battalions—the 86th, 87th, and 88th in May and the 85th in June.21
Sicily
Preparation for Combat
The mortar battalions selected for participation in HUSKY, the invasion of Sicily, were the 2nd, 3rd, 83rd, and 84th.22 The latter three sailed almost immediately, arriving in North Africa early in May. These battalions finished their training in the theater although about half of the available time was spent in acquiring their full complement of organizational equipment and in staging. At this time the 3rd, 83rd, and 84th Battalions were placed in support of the 3rd, 1st, and 9th Infantry Divisions, respectively.23
Unfortunately, the pressure of preinvasion activities and the late date of attachments left little time for the kind of training most urgently needed by the mortar battalions—combined exercises with the infantry units to which they were attached. Most mortar units also lacked amphibious training. Of the early arriving battalions, only two companies of the 3rd, commanded by Lt. Col. Edgar D. Stark, had received this specialized training before leaving the United States, and that was limited to a few weeks at the Amphibious Training Center, Camp Carrabelle, Fla., later known as Camp Gordon Johnston.24 The three battalions received “only sketchy preparation for the problem of amphibious maneuvers” at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center after they arrived in North Africa.25
The fourth mortar unit earmarked for Sicily fared better in its preparations. While undergoing training at Fort Bragg, N.C., the 2nd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert W. Breaks, had been able to arrange locally for joint training with infantry units also located at Fort Bragg. The 2nd Battalion was attached to the 45th Infantry Division in February 1943 during final training preparations for overseas movement, preparations which included work in mountain and amphibious operations. This experience constituted what until then
were probably the only cases of joint 4.2-inch mortar—infantry training in the United States. The 45th and its supporting units sailed for North Africa combat-loaded, arriving near Oran just twelve days before embarkation for Sicily. During this brief stay the 2nd Battalion completed a 15-day training program in less than half the allotted time.26
CWS officers in North Africa exerted every effort to acquaint infantry commanders with the chemical mission, including the 4.2-inch mortar and its proper employment. Even before the arrival of the chemical battalions they conducted demonstrations with 4.2-inch mortar WP shells, colored grenades, and flame throwers. With the arrival of the first three battalions CWS officers were able to hold mortar demonstrations for the chief of staff of Seventh Army and other high ranking officers.27
Despite the limited time to prepare for the invasion the participating infantry divisions gave some thought and effort to use of mortar units during the assault phase. Three platoons of the 3rd Battalion mounted mortars on landing craft and actually accompanied the assault waves of three of the four landing teams of the 3rd Infantry Division. Complete surprise in that sector eliminated any need for the 4.2-inch mortars.28 Plans to use 2nd Battalions mortars in the assault phase were canceled because of the limited number of landing craft. No thought was given to the amphibious employment of the 8 3rd Battalion because of that unit’s lack of specialized training.29 The 84th Battalion was not committed to the fighting in Sicily, but was kept in reserve.
The experience in Sicily prompted some of the participating CWS officers to predict the unlikelihood of mortar employment in subsequent landing operations.30 The Fifth Army chemical officer felt that “when one is making a landing at a distance from his base, shipping space is so precious that I doubt if it will ever be possible to mount the 4.2-inch
on landing craft,”31 a correct prediction for the war against Germany, if not for the operations in the Pacific theaters.
Upon entry in combat each of the mortar battalions was composed of 1,010 men: 36 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 973 enlisted men,32 distributed among a headquarters, a headquarters company, a medical detachment, and four weapons companies. Each company had 2 platoons, each platoon 2 sections, and each section 3 squads. On the basis of one mortar per squad, the battalion complement of mortars was 48. Transportation of the battalion consisted of 88 2½-ton trucks and 36 vehicles of varying smaller sizes. Chemical mortar carts were present in case of rough terrain. Side arms for the battalion included 820 .45-caliber automatics.33
The Initial Test of Battle
H-hour for HUSKY was 0230, 10 July 1943. With one exception the mortar units landed in their assigned sectors without incident. The exception was the 83rd Battalion, commanded by Colonel Cunin, three companies of which supported a Ranger task force which was attached to the 1st Infantry Division and which had as its objective the coastal town of Gela, with its complex of strong defenses.34 The three mortar companies encountered false beaches in front of the true landing area. Although the assault craft carrying Company A managed to push across the sandbar and reach its proper objective, the vessels carrying the other two companies extricated themselves only with difficulty.
During the first days of the battle chemical mortars fired against every type of target that presented itself. Some of the hardest fighting took place at Gela where a series of enemy tank thrusts threatened Ranger units, and, surprisingly enough, where 4.2-inch mortar fire was used with a great deal of success against armor. On D-day mortar fire from Company C, 83rd Battalion, helped throw back a tank-infantry attack, and later a group of Italian light tanks broke into town only to be repulsed by antitank guns, bazookas, and pole charges.
Pulling a 4.2-inch mortar cart over rugged terrain
In this skirmish the bazooka team of Company A disabled one tank which was immediately blown up by a Ranger with a pole charge.35 Next day chemical mortars, firing without aiming stakes or prepared emplacements, were not quite accurate enough to destroy any of a group of nine tanks but were threatening enough to force the tanks to withdraw to positions where they were dispatched by friendly artillery and naval gunfire.36
Actually, the chemical mortars had the necessary accuracy to engage targets as small as a tracked vehicle. Just before dawn on one of the early days of the Sicily campaign, a temporarily disabled German tank began harassing an infantry position with automatic fire as the crew made repairs. Asked for help by the infantry, a 2nd Chemical Battalion company commander called for one sensing round and then for a volley of eight. The tank was silenced. Daylight examination of the tank found all mortar rounds within an area fifteen yards in diameter, with
one of them down the open turret of the vehicle.37 Once the beachheads were consolidated, chemical mortars fired preparations preceding infantry attacks, interdicted enemy lines of communications, and fired on machine guns, mortars, ammunition dumps, and barracks.38
One of the most significant chemical mortar smoke missions in Sicily was a series of screens fired for the 3rd Infantry Division during the period 6-8 August. The Germans held a strong ridge line east of the Furiano River, which flows northward to the sea. The 7th Infantry received the mission of seizing the heights dominated by Hill 715. The 2nd Mortar Battalion supported the attack with smoke and high explosives; Companies A and D fired HE concentrations and Company B carried out the smoke mission.39 From 0530 to approximately 0900 on 6 August B Company maintained a 3,500-yard screen to conceal the advancing infantry. Firing from positions west of the river the mortarmen gradually increased the range of the smoke curtain from 1,000 to 3,200 yards to keep pace with the progress of the attacking troops. The smoke mission terminated upon orders of the commander of the assault infantry battalion. At about 1000, as the mortars were firing on call, enemy artillery began pounding the American positions. Enemy shells hit 4 of the 6 mortar positions (knocking over 3 weapons, but damaging only) , 2 platoon-size ammunition dumps, and generally raised havoc with the wire communications of the battalion. That afternoon D Company fired a smoke mission which helped 2 infantry battalions under heavy counterattacks to withdraw to the west side of the river.
Early next morning the infantry tried again, and one B Company platoon concealed the advance to the attack position with a 4,000-yard screen. The mortars maintained this screen for almost fourteen hours despite difficulties caused by shifting winds.40 Once the screen was established it was kept up by two WP rounds a minute, although for a short period around noon weather conditions made it necessary to raise this number to five. The’ mortar crews lifted the screen several
times during the day to permit friendly dive bomber attacks on the enemy positions. On the third day the infantry succeeded in taking the heights east of the Furiano, again with the help of chemical mortar smoke and high explosives.41
Of the three mortar units committed to HUSKY the 2nd Chemical Battalion saw the most action. In fact, it was said to have been the only combat unit on the island that saw no relief during the entire operation.42 After reaching Palermo the 3rd Battalion was transferred to II Corps, an attachment which terminated its combat activities for the campaign. Thereafter the battalion performed a number of rear area duties, principally those dealing with transportation. It also guarded prisoners of war and ammunition dumps, collected ammunition, and generally participated in assignments which failed to utilize its capabilities as a mortar unit.43 On the other hand, the limited activity of the 83rd Battalion, attached to both the 2nd Armored and 82nd Airborne Divisions after the initial stages of the campaign, resulted primarily from a lack of suitable targets.44
Despite early difficulties faced by the chemical mortar battalions in their first combat action, they made a creditable record during the Sicily Campaign. The absence of established doctrine and, with the exception of the 2nd Battalion, the lack of joint infantry-mortar training, resulted not only in some misuse of the battalions but in the failure to use them “where they could have been employed to exceptional advantage.”45
Nevertheless, reaction of ground commanders who had been supported by the chemical mortars was generally favorable, and most of them advocated chemical mortar support for all divisions committed to action.46 Among their comments were “the equivalent of real artillery,” which the chemical mortar was not, and “the most effective single weapon used in support of infantry,”47 a statement to which it had fair claim.
The Problem of Transportation
General Shadle, Chief Chemical Officer, NATOUSA, put his finger on one of the main shortcomings revealed by this first test of combat when he said there was nothing seriously wrong with the 4.2-inch mortar or the chemical battalion except transportation.48 The principal means of motor transport in the mortar battalion was the 2¼-ton truck, often too big and too conspicuous to operate adequately in positions as near the front as the 4.2-inch mortars were emplaced. The ¼-ton truck and trailer seemed more appropriate, and at times infantry commanders gave up some of their own jeeps in order to insure chemical mortar support.49 Because man-handling the mortar carts was an arduous task, crews sometimes attached them to jeeps, an unsatisfactory practice because of damage to the wheels and handles of the smaller vehicle. Once an infantry battalion commander directed his reserve riflemen to help mortar crews struggling with their carts, an unorthodox move which illustrated as well as anything how highly infantrymen esteemed the mortar.50 Often mortar crews commandeered mules in order to keep up with the infantry advance. These animals not only made up for inadequate basic transportation but reached places inaccessible to vehicles,51 a fact that led General Patton to opine at the end of the campaign that the pack animal still had a role in modern warfare.52
The mortar battalion tables of organization and equipment published shortly after the Sicilian campaign provided for ¼-ton trucks and trailers as the basic means of transportation. But because of delays in acquiring the new vehicles and because of the type of terrain and fighting encountered in Italy, this change did not prove to be the expected panacea.
Efforts To Increase the Range
The other serious difficulty encountered in the first combat employment of the mortar was that of its range. The introduction of the
M5A1 propellant in January 1943 increased the range of the mortar from 2,400 to 3,200 yards.53 The M6 propellant, standardized in March 1943, raised the maximum range to 4,500 yards although the item was not in production in time for use in Sicily. Meanwhile, in July 1943 OCCWS froze the range of the 4.2-inch mortar at 3,200 yards, despite repeated requests from North Africa for increased range. Washington headquarters answered: It has been decided, for practical purposes, and in view of manufacturing and materiel difficulties, the chemical mortar is to be considered as having a maximum range of 3,200 yards. ... It is considered that this is a satisfactory range, and any additional work done is to be confined to further perfecting the performance of this weapon within this range.”54
At the end of hostilities in Sicily a conference of Seventh Army CWS officers agreed that a range of 4,500 was required,55 an opinion which was reflected in the other important reports of the Sicilian campaign.56 These recommendations, combined with an urgent request from theater headquarters for a chemical mortar range of at least 4,500 yards, led the OCCWS to reverse its decision.57 Shortages of certain ingredients for the M6 propellant added to the delay involved in getting the Army Ground Forces blessing for the increased range, so that supplies of the M6 propellant did not reach the theater until the end of the year.
Among the lesser problems arising in Sicily were certain shortcomings of the M2 mortar sight. This piece of equipment was unsatisfactory for night employment because it lacked a means of illumination. Moreover, it could not be employed from deeply defiladed positions. In these positions sighting stakes had to be placed to the rear of the mortar position rather than to the front, because of the small traverse (200 mils) of the M2 sight. This limited traverse also caused excessive re-emplacements. Captured Italian 81-mm. mortar sights with 360° traverse proved much superior to the American model.58
There was little difficulty with mortar maintenance during the operation as the equipment was new and not seriously overtaxed. Ammunition was in good supply in Sicily although inadequate waterproofing initially resulted in numerous corroded fuzes.59 And transportation difficulties resulted in low ammunition reserves at forward positions, even though the over-all supply of mortar shell in Sicily was ample.60
The Salerno Landings
The 2nd, 83rd, and 84th Chemical Mortar Battalions took part in the fighting at Salerno, the first of a series of punishing campaigns fought in the rugged terrain of Italy.61 Companies C and D of the 83rd supported American Rangers and British Commandos of the Do British Corps, Fifth Army’s left unit during its assault at Salerno. Originally, the 84th Chemical Battalion was to have supported the 36th Division, the assault force of the VI U.S. Corps on the army’s right. These plans went awry. According to the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Harrison Markham, Seventh Army orders releasing the 84th to VI Corps were lost, and by the time the confusion cleared no shipping space was available with the 36th Division. Three companies of the battalion did find room with corps reserves and eventually fired for the 45th Division, which also had the support of the 2nd Chemical Battalion.62
Although the enemy reacted vigorously to the Salerno landings, so that a period of sanguinary fighting resulted in which the fate of the beachhead was sometimes uncertain, the attack began auspiciously. Company A, 2nd Chemical Battalion, landed at 0300, Do September, (D plus 1) with the 179th Infantry, 45th Division.63 Next day violent enemy counterattacks pushed the American force back from its advanced position, and in the course of the withdrawal Company A’s 1st Platoon lost eleven men. Company B, in support of elements of
another regiment of the 45th Division near the town of Persano, also ran into trouble. Suddenly faced with direct enemy fire, the mortarmen had no alternative but to pull back. In the confusion that followed some of the mortars were left behind, to be recovered, fortunately, at a later time. Company C supported the 157th Infantry, 45th Division; for some unaccountable reason Company D remained in reserve during the entire Salerno operation.64
The first troops of the 84th Battalion came ashore near Paestum on D-day, but congestion in shipping space forced them to land without equipment. It was not until tz September that these companies received their full complement of men and mortars.65 By this time the situation of the Fifth Army was serious. The German attack which had turned the right flank of the 45th Division also cut off elements of the 36th Division north of the Calore River.66 Orders received by a company commander of the 2nd Mortar Battalion indicated the grave plight of the American forces. If the enemy should come too close for effective mortar fire, the mortar troops were directed to stand fast and defend their positions with rifle fire and, if necessary, bayonets.67
Virtually every available American element was thrown into the line on 14 September when the enemy renewed his heavy infantry and tank attack. One of the companies of the 2nd Chemical Battalion fired 1,152 rounds during the day. Over 500 of these were white phosphorus used to set fire to the dry brush, making those areas untenable to the enemy. Early that afternoon the company helped repulse an enemy tank attack in an action which saw the mortar forward observer direct artillery fire as well as that of his own weapons. The stalwart defense on 14 September blunted the German counterattack and secured the beachhead.
Meanwhile, companies of the 83rd Battalion supported the American Rangers and British Commandos in action in the 10 Corps sector.68 On Sicily this mortar unit had earned the sobriquet Artillery of the Rangers. This expression was equally apt for the unit’s service with the Commandos, who also operated without organic heavy weapons.
The Commandos and Company D landed at Vietri sul Mari at 0400, 9 September, with the task of blocking the northern approaches to Salerno. In addition to performing missions of harassment and interdiction, the 4.2-inch mortars fired on troops, tanks, and emplacements. An impressive action took place on 18 September when D Company fired a preparatory barrage of 1,194 rounds on two strongly defended hills north of Salerno. The hard fighting in the Vietri area continued for about ten days until the Germans began their withdrawal.69
At this juncture, the Commandos, having suffered casualties of almost 75 percent, were pulled from the line. Company D stayed on, reinforcing Company C, which had landed at Mairoi on D-day in support of the three battalions of American Rangers. This small, elite force of 1,500 advanced inland and seized Chiunzi Pass and Mt. St. Angelo, which commanded the German supply route south of Naples. Charged with holding the entire peninsula the Ranger force held out for three weeks against attacks in which the enemy sometimes had a numerical superiority of eight to one. As a consequence, the Rangers were so thinly spread that mortar units not only performed their own mission as artillery of the Rangers but also held front-line positions as regular infantry. Sometimes mortar crews were stripped down to one or two men and the rest sent to repel counterattacks or on patrol. These crews engaged enemy 88-mm. guns and 240-mm. howitzers at distances 2,000 yards or more beyond the authorized range of their mortars. Companies C and D of the 83rd fired over 14,000 rounds in the first two weeks of the campaign, a total, according to Colonel Barker, which equaled that of all the other mortar units.70 One result of this heavy firing at excessive ranges was the rapid breakdown of the weapons. In spite of the combined efforts of both CWS and ordnance maintenance units, at the end of the first three weeks in Italy there were only three mortars in action in one company and six in the other.71
Naples fell to the British 10 Corps on 1 October and the first phase of the Italian fighting was over. The important role of 4.2-inch mortars in the over-all success is indicated by Col. William Darby of the Rangers who reported that his forces were able to hold Chiunzi Pass “largely due to the chemical mortar battalion attached to the unit.”72
From the Volturno to the Winter Line
Crossing the Volturno
By 6 October the Fifth Army had advanced to a line running generally along the south banks of the Volturno and Calore Rivers inland to the town of Benevento. The British 10 Corps held the western part of this front, the U.S. VI Corps the eastern sector. These units crossed the Volturno on the night of 12-13 October. The 84th Chemical Mortar Battalion (less Company A) supported the 3rd Division and Company A, 2nd Battalion, supported the 34th Division.
Of these mortar units, the 84th Battalion probably received the most calls for support. Company D fired both screening and high explosive missions for a regimental crossing and later screened bridge-building activity of the engineers. During the daylight hours of 13 October Company B used 2,805 rounds of white phosphorus to conceal the corps left flank from enemy observation from the heights above the town of Triflisco. The mortarmen carried out this mission by firing the WP directly on these heights using the maximum authorized range of the 4.2-inch mortar-3,200 yards. At first, Company B employed one platoon of four mortars for the screening operation but the required rapid rate of fire made barrels so hot that propellants ignited before the rounds reached the firing pin. The commitment of another platoon reduced the rate of fire and eliminated the trouble.73 In addition to these normal mortar missions, the 84th Battalion furnished a detail of officers and 100 men which expended 400 M1 smoke pots to conceal bridging sites and their exposed approaches.74
Fifth Army carried the assault of the Volturno with swiftness and skill, and for a brief time thereafter chemical mortar activity was characterized by relatively light firing. It was during this period that problems arose which were to confront mortar units throughout most of the Italian campaign. One of these involved communications. Mortar battalions used a tremendous amount of wire to maintain contact among units, the radio playing a secondary role because of the excessive amount of dead space typical in mountainous terrain and because of the danger that its use would reveal exact positions to the enemy. Mortarmen usually laid two lines of wire from the company
command post to the platoon firing positions and at least two lines (by different routes) from each gun position to the observation post. In heavy fighting enemy fire frequently shot up the wire—the communication lines of one mortar platoon were interrupted six times during a single day in the Mount Acero region, permitting it to fire only two missions with a total expenditure of eighteen rounds.75 The wire-cutting capabilities of friendly vehicles, particularly those with tracks, also proved discouraging to good communications. In fast-moving situations there was no alternative to the radio. The SCR-284, used principally between battalion and company command posts, proved reasonably satisfactory but poor performances by SCRs 193 and 194 brought a great many complaints.76
It was also at this time that the need for animal transport began to increase. Poor roads characterized the rocky, mountainous terrain in which the fighting took place, forcing the 84th to use oxen to haul its mortars over the steep slopes near Venafro. Mules were the usual beasts of burden. Upon crossing the Volturno, the 84th Battalion, failing to get these animals from the 3rd Division to which it was attached, captured its own mules and successfully improvised pack saddles. Because the U.S. Army mule pack was too large and heavy for the local animals, the Italian model became the pack usually employed.77
Early Fighting in the Winter Line
After being driven from positions north of the Volturno the enemy fell back to his Winter Line which extended along the Garigliano River and thence into the mountainous region from Mignano to Venafro and on toward Isernia. This series of defensive positions was designed to hold Fifth Army’s advance and allow the Germans to fortify further the more formidable Gustav Line. Allied forces reached the Winter Line during the first week of November, but the rather rapid advance ground to a halt in front of stiffened resistance and in face of the increased difficulties caused by winter weather.78
The initial attack on the Winter Line saw all four chemical mortar battalions committed to action. The 3rd Battalion, which had remained
behind in Sicily, joined the Fifth Army on 30 October. Company A of the 84th and Companies A and B of the 83rd rejoined their parent units for the first time on Italian soil.79 Until then the operations of the Fifth Army had not been marked by extended static situations, and the chemical mortar units were of only limited value in rapidly moving situations. Strong enemy defenses and the approach of winter promised a different sort of campaign, one which would make good use of the capabilities of the 4.2-inch mortar.
The key position in the American sector opposite the Winter Line was a gap in the mountains at Mignano through which ran Highway 6. This presented an avenue to the Liri Valley, called the Gateway to Rome, and the ultimate objective of the operations. To the left of the Mignano gap loomed Mount Camino and to the right, Mount Sammucro. In between were several lesser land masses which effectively served as “stoppers” for the break in the east-west mountain chain.80
The VI Corps had reached the Winter Line in early November and had bloodied its nose in its attempt to break through. In the various engagements in the Mount Difensa—Mount Sammucro—Mount Santa Croce area the 2nd and 83rd Chemical Mortar Battalions saw action in support of the 3rd Division and Ranger and parachute troops. The mortars fired preparatory barrages, sometimes followed by screens for the advancing infantry. On 12 November one platoon of Company C, 2nd Battalion, in conjunction with the artillery and in support of a 3rd Division attack on Mount Difensa, laid down a preliminary barrage on a point just beyond the summit, an area which could not have been reached by the artillery. During the last three minutes of the barrage, the platoon fired forty-nine rounds of WP to conceal the infantry assault. Twenty-four rounds of white phosphorus screened the American withdrawal when the attack failed.81
On 13 November a German counterattack against the 4th Ranger foothold on Mount Sammucro initially rolled back that unit’s right and left flank. Some of the shells of the protective concentrations of Company B, 83rd Battalion, fell within wo yards of friendly positions. The company fired 3,605 rounds of HE and 163 WP so rapidly that one of the mortar firing pins became fused. In the course of this fighting German artillery scored two direct hits on Company B
ammunition dumps, destroying 1,000 rounds of ammunition.82 The Rangers thwarted the attack, and artillery, mortar, and small arms fire prevented the enemy from reorganizing for another assault.83
In mid-November Fifth Army paused to regroup. II Corps moved to the middle of the line, and VI Corps shifted to the right. For two weeks, while army planned for a continuation of the assault on the Winter Line, its troops remained on the defensive. The missions of the 4.2-inch mortars—the prevention of enemy observation and disruption of his troop concentrations and counterattacks—reflected this lull in operations. It was during this period that water-damaged propellants became a serious problem. In the 84th Battalion 80 percent of these items were found to have moisture enough to cause shorts or “poop outs.” An investigation of this condition by the chemical officer of the Fifth Army led to the manufacture and operation of a dryer for propellants by the 12th Chemical Maintenance Company at Capua.84
Fifth Army plans for overcoming the Winter Line defenses consisted of three phases: an attack on Mount Camino on the left of the Mignano gap; an attack on Mount Sammucro on the right of the gap; and, finally, the drive into the Liri Valley. The first phase, appropriately called Operation RAINCOAT, combined assaults by the British to and the American II Corps on Mount Camino and its neighboring peaks, Mounts Difensa and Maggiore. Company A of the 83rd Battalion and Company B of the 2nd supported the 1st Special Service Force85 and the 142nd Infantry, 36th Division, in this operation. The second phase, the attack on the Mount Sammucro complex, began on 8 December. During this difficult fighting Company B, 83rd Chemical Battalion, supported the 3rd Ranger Battalion in an attack against Hill 950, a lesser land mass adjacent to the main objective. Although at first successful, the Rangers were finally swept off the hill by a violent enemy counterattack. Company B mortarmen placed heavy concentrations on the hill in rebuttal, attracting intense enemy artillery and mortar fire in the process. This concentration killed two men, wounded ten, hit the company ammunition dump, and temporarily put one platoon
out of action. Next morning the Rangers again took Hill 950, abetted by heavy artillery and 4.2-inch mortar preparations, but their losses were so heavy that they were replaced by the 504th Parachute Infantry regiment. The 4.2-inch mortar company remained in position and supported the new unit until 23 December, by which time Mount Sammucro was in American hands.
Problems and Improvisations
On 15 December the 36th Division attacked the remaining enemy-held heights of Mount Sammucro and the stronghold of San Pietro, a town located off the southwest slope of the mountain. The four companies of the 2nd Battalion ran into trouble in supporting this attack with smoke and high explosives. Tanks broke the communication wire of two companies, and spongy soil caused the mortars of another to bounce so badly that they had to be re-emplaced every five or six rounds. Mortar breakage was a serious problem; when Company A completed its mission on 16 December only three mortars remained in action, and the elevating screw of each of these was locked.86 Much of the breakage resulted from frequent use of mortars against German heavy mortars and Nebelwerfers, whose ranges exceeded that of the American weapon. Firing at excessive range caused failure of many parts of the mortar—elevating and traversing screws bent, the brass barrel housings split, locking forks bent, base plates broke, and recoil springs lost their resilience.87 The new M6 propellant, promised during the Sicily Campaign, and a strengthened base plate combined to increase the maximum authorized range of the 4.2-inch mortar from 3,200 to 4,400 yards. The battalions in Italy began receiving the new propellants in December 1943, and their successful tests prompted the Fifth Army chemical officer to request that all future shipments of propellants be of this type.88
A feature of the fight for San Pietro was the introduction of a self-propelled 4.2-inch mortar, designed to provide the infantry with a means of more mobile support and armored units with a weapon with a high angle of fire. Developed by Colonel Barker and the 36th Division ordnance officer, at the instigation of the latter’s commander,
this roving gun was simply a 4.2-inch mortar mounted on an M7 half-track. Upon first lumbering into position at San Pietro, its noise brought down a heavy enemy artillery concentration. Moving to a defiladed position the self-propelled mortar fired with good results fifty rounds of WP at a range of 3,000 yards.
The weapon and chassis came through this initial test with moderate success. The mortar mount suffered some damage and the blast effect against the sides of the vehicle proved exceedingly uncomfortable to the gun crew. But it appears that little subsequent use was made of the self-propelled mortar. Its size and silhouette precluded emplacement where close support weapons were needed. And any weapon which attracted too much enemy fire was not popular with the infantry.89
While II Corps was overcoming the stubborn German defenses around Mignano, VI Corps, occupying the right flank of Fifth Army, found the going equally rough in the mountains to the north. Heaviest fighting in the 45th Division sector took place near the village of Lagone. In an engagement on 15 December a forward observer for Company B, 84th Battalion, attached to the 180th Infantry, sighted the enemy forming for a counterattack in the sector of the adjacent regiment. The 209 rounds of high explosive and 454 rounds of white phosphorus shell dumped upon this formation aided in throwing back the enemy assault. One prisoner disclosed that the attack was going well until the German troops suddenly encountered intense mortar fire which killed the prisoner’s officer and a number of his fellow soldiers. “We wanted to surrender ...,” the German continued, and the “mortar fire scattered our troops all over the hill and gave us a chance to get away and give ourselves up.”90
Mount Pantano was the scene of the heaviest action in the sector of the other VI Corps division, the 34th. Fighting seesawed among the four knobs of the mountaintop for days, supported on the American side by the effective fire of a company and a half of the 3rd Chemical Battalion. During a 2-day period at the end of November the mortar crews used so much ammunition, over 1,500 rounds, that fire was temporarily suspended. This was one of the few cases of such curtailment in the Italian campaign.91
Action With the French Expeditionary Corps
The capture of the heights of Mount Sammucro, to the northwest, and of Mount Lungo, to the southeast, made San Pietro untenable for the Germans. The 36th Division occupied the destroyed and deserted village on 17 December. There remained the third phase of the Fifth Army attack on the Winter Line, a II Corps drive to the Rapido, accompanied by a similar move through the mountains to the river by the French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) on the north. The fighting here provided a unique attachment for the 3rd Chemical Mortar Battalion. The FEC, composed of a Moroccan and an Algerian division, replaced the VI U.S. Corps early in January 1944 when the corps withdrew from the right sector of Fifth Army to prepare for the impending Anzio operation. The 3rd Chemical Mortar Battalion joined the FEC in an attachment which, with brief exceptions, lasted until June 1944. Preparatory to this attachment Fifth Army screened the four mortar battalions in Italy for French-speaking personnel, assigning those who qualified to the 3rd Battalion. The mortar unit carried out its assignment well, being only mildly affected by the difficulties of adjusting to the operational procedures of the French.92 Its troubles came from another quarter.
On 12 January the French Expeditionary Corps began a 3-day attack which successfully carried it through the northeastern vestiges of the Winter Line. Initially, Company B supported a regiment of the 2nd Moroccan Division. During the course of the morning’s firing a shell exploded in a mortar barrel, killing one of the crew and wounding three others. As it turned out, this was but a prelude for worse things to come. The command post of Company C, 3rd Battalion, was located in the town of Cerasuolo, a focal point for action in that particular sector. Colonel Stark, the battalion commander, was at this command post to insure the necessary close mortar support and to coordinate the fire of Companies C and D. At 1430 12 January Colonel Stark held an impromptu conference, attended by two company commanders, two acting company commanders, and a company executive officer. Eighteen minutes after these officers assembled enemy aircraft bombed the town. The command post sustained at least one direct hit. All the attending officers and seven enlisted men died instantly. Despite the virtual elimination of the command element of the battalion, prompt
reorganization permitted the unit to continue its mission, in fact, Company C fired 157 rounds within two hours of the bombardment. The next day, however, the battalion reverted to Army control and went to a rest area near Naples.93
The Gustav Line
While defending the Winter Line the enemy had been working furiously on his positions behind the Rapido and Garigliano Rivers. Known as the Gustav Line, these defenses extended from Mount Marrone on the northeast, through the mountains to Belvedere Hill, and south to Cassino. The line then followed the Rapido and Garigliano Rivers across the Liri Valley and continued along a formidable mountain barrier curving back to its terminus, Mount Scouri, on the Tyrrhenian Sea. The mountains on both ends of the Gustav Line, tremendous obstacles in themselves, were supplemented by well-emplaced weapons and mine fields. The center of the line, although lacking natural impediments, was a skilfully organized defense of mine fields and wire, pillboxes, and automatic weapon emplacements, all of which were covered by enemy artillery farther up the valley. The Fifth Army History succinctly summarizes the strength of the position: “The area of the Gustav Line had long provided the Italian General Staff with ideal terrain for field exercises. In these problems forces representing the enemy had never been able to penetrate the defense. The Italians considered the area as an impregnable obstacle to any army attempting to capture Rome from the south. The Germans were determined to prove the validity of that assumption.”94
On 15 January the enemy line before II Corps extended from Belvedere Hill along the right bank of the Rapido and Garigliano Rivers to the junction of the Liri and the Garigliano. Highway 6, the road to Rome, passed through the level terrain in the center of the corps sector, exposed as far back as Mount Lungo to observed artillery fire from enemy positions on the mountain heights in back of Cassino.95 The 2nd Chemical Battalion used smoke pots to conceal this vulnerable area
during the build-up for the II Corps attack across the Rapido, the initial American thrust against the Gustav Line.96
The Fifth Army plan for its drive on Rome consisted of two parts: a 3-corps attack against the Gustav Line followed a few days later by an amphibious maneuver south of Rome and in back of the Gustav Line defenses—the SHINGLE operation at Anzio. Army planners hoped that the pressure on the main German position, combined with the threat to his rear, would force the enemy into a general withdrawal.
The assault on the Gustav Line began on 17 January when the British to Corps attacked across the Rapido. Successful on the left and in the center, the British forces were unable to win their objective on the right. So it was that when II Corps attacked three days later, it did so with an exposed left flank. South of Cassino the Rapido is a narrow, swift-moving stream varying in depth from nine to twelve feet. Sant’Angelo, the objective of the 36th Division, the assault force of II Corps, stands on a 40-foot bluff above the west bank of the river. The 141st Infantry, supported by Company A of the 2nd Chemical Battalion, was ordered to cross the Rapido north of the town and then attack south and west. Companies B and C of the mortar battalion fired for the 143rd Infantry which was to cross the river south of the town and then, after reaching initial objectives, assist the 141st in the seizure of Sant’Angelo. Company D, assigned to a regiment of the 34th Division, was located in a position from which it could support the 141st Infantry.
The night of 20 January was one of pandemonium. Attacking at 2000 without surprise through mine fields and the fire of artillery, mortars and automatic weapons, both regiments encountered terrific resistance. All four mortar companies fired barrages just before or immediately after the time of attack. One half hour before the assault, Company A used 400 rounds of white phosphorus to lay down a smoke screen which, in the total absence of wind, rose to a height of 150 feet. Between 2030 and 2100 Company C placed 119 rounds of WP on enemy positions. Next day Company A laid down smoke screens for the men of the 141st who had been stranded on the far bank of the Rapido while Company C fired 204 rounds of WP to cover the withdrawal of elements of the 143rd Infantry which had been given up for
lost on the previous night. That afternoon, on the resumption of the attack, further 4.2-inch mortar fire supported the infantry units.97
One of Company C’s forward observers participated in this action as a member of the command post party of the 1st Battalion, 143rd Infantry. Meeting with heavy German rocket and automatic weapons fire on the near side of the river, the battalion commander ordered a barrage of 4.2-inch white phosphorus. At midnight the small party crossed the Rapido. The battalion commander was wounded, and the lieutenant who took charge ordered the men to dig in for the night. At dawn he went in search of the missing infantry Companies A and B and upon his return announced that they were the only ones remaining. With the radio out, the small group made its way back across the Rapido under cover of fog. It was a thorough defeat; the regimental commander reported that the combat efficiency of his unit was destroyed.98
The situation was just as bad with the 141st Infantry. Mortar Company A fired smoke missions on 21 and 22 January to screen two infantry battalions on the far side of the river. Next day the company expended 441 rounds of WP on a screen to cover the withdrawal of some forty men of the 141st Infantry. The abortive attack had been costly.99
Unfortunately, the smoke screen mission fired for the men stranded on the far bank of the Rapido seriously interfered with the observation of the corps artillery. With communications out and with infantry positions unknown, effective artillery support was impossible.100 There were also misunderstandings regarding the use of smoke. In a 23 January conference between the 36th Division chemical officer and Capt. James O. Quimby, Jr., commanding Company A, 2nd Chemical Battalion, the former commented on the density of enemy smoke at the site of the bridgehead. Quimby had to explain that this was his smoke, not German, a fact unknown to division as well as corps.101
A 24 January mission of Company C demonstrated that some commanders receiving support continued to be unfamiliar with the
capabilities of the chemical mortar. The infantry battalion commander, for example, called for smoke to screen a patrol which was about to feel out enemy defenses and search for American wounded. Several times during the course of this mission he called for target changes requiring gun re-emplacements and once he wanted it without cessation of fire. The commander also requested an increase in the rate of fire at a time when mortarmen were already firing twenty-one rounds per mortar per minute. When the smoke ascended directly into the air, he called upon the mortar commander to rectify the situation. In the words of the custodian of the company diary: “We are still wondering if he wanted us to come down and blow on it.”102 Reactions to this impromptu mission were mixed. The captain with the infantry patrol, which brought back two wounded American soldiers, praised Company C for the effective screen. On the other hand, II Corps immediately informed the mortar company that no more smoke was to be fired without its approval.103
The Anzio Beachhead
Fifth Army launched the second phase of its winter offensive on 22 January on the beaches near Anzio and Nettuno, seaside resort towns located barely thirty air miles south of Rome. The objective of VI Corps was to cut the historic roadway known as the Appian Way and Highway 7, as well as other German supply routes. With these severed, the enemy in the Gustav Line would be left to choose between extermination and withdrawal. Two mortar battalions saw action at Anzio, the 83rd, initially in support of Colonel Darby’s Ranger forces, and the 84th, which landed late on D-day with the 3rd Infantry Division.
The 83rd had undergone a month of training in preparation for the assault. Companies A and B, loaded in Dukws, went in with the second wave but received no calls for fire until H plus 6 because of the achievement of complete surprise. An enemy 88-mm. gun which had been shelling the beach supplied the mortars with their first target. In firing on this gun at a range of 2,000 yards and forcing it to withdraw, Company B provided an excellent example of its usefulness at times when the artillery had not yet come into position.104 That the mortars
did not need specific targets to be effective was well illustrated at Anzio by the tactics of the Ranger commander. Colonel Darby, who had received mortar support both on Sicily and at Salerno, met the first elements of the 83rd Battalion with orders to set up weapons and start firing in the general direction of the Germans. His logic was: “I want the bastards to know I have something heavy, so they will start digging in. That will give me a chance to maneuver.”105
On the morning of D plus 1 Company B moved into position 2,000 yards north of Anzio to support the advance of the Rangers, while in the afternoon Company A advanced to a position 10,000 yards north of the town on the east side of the Anzio-Rome highway. From 24 to 28 January these companies fired on wooded areas and troop concentrations, on roads and rail junctions, and on houses and haystacks in support of Ranger attacks on Carocetta and Aprillo. Bedevilled by excessive mortar breakage from emplacements in the spongy ground, Lt. Col. William S. Hutchinson, Jr., commanding the 83rd, ruefully concluded that the 4.2-inch mortar was far better suited to mountain fighting than for operations “in the mucky, ill-drained soil of the Anzio beachhead.”106
Although it landed on D-day, the 84th Chemical Battalion did not undertake its first missions until three days later, 25 January, when Company A, with its mortars emplaced on an abandoned railway bed, fired 100 rounds against houses, haystacks, roads, and ditches, all places that were suspected of concealing Germans. Two days later the same unit expended 750 rounds of ammunition, hindered all the while by excessive mortar breakage.107
Meanwhile, on 26 January Companies C and D met with tragedy. While en route from Naples to the beachhead the LST carrying these units struck a mine and caught fire. The explosion of mortar ammunition magnified the danger. Many of the survivors who escaped this small hell were picked up by an LCI (landing craft, infantry) which in turn hit a mine and went down with all on board. The two companies lost a total of 293 officers and enlisted men; the survivors were taken to a rest camp near Naples.108 Augmented, reorganized, and retrained,
these units were to see some combat action with the 88th Division near Minturno before joining the parent battalion at Anzio in mid-April.
One of the objectives of the 30 January drive by VI Corps toward the Alban Hills was cutting Highway 7 at the point where it passes through Cisterna. The 1st and 3rd Ranger Battalions set off toward the town at 0100, an hour before the main effort, which would be made by the 4th Ranger Battalion and elements of the 3rd Infantry Division. Companies A and B, 83rd Chemical Battalion, were in support of the Ranger battalions. Creeping along a ditch which led to Cisterna, the Rangers reached the outskirts of town by dawn. There they fell into an enemy ambush. The units making the main effort failed to advance sufficiently to be of any aid to the embattled Ranger forces. Company B placed mortar fire on the encircling Germans in a vain attempt to cover a withdrawal. Only six Rangers made it back.109
Not only did the VI Corps attack fail but it was soon clear that a German counterattack was imminent. From 1 February until the eventual breakout in May, the corps mission was essentially defensive. Both mortar battalions were called upon for heavy fire against enemy attacks and were subjected to frequent enemy artillery and mortar shelling and air bombardment. Because of excellent German observation of the beachhead and all routes leading to Allied positions, there was a great demand for smoke screens laid by mortars, pots, and generators.110
During the period of containment at Anzio it was usual for three mortar companies to stay in the line, while one remained in reserve near battalion headquarters. Unlike the situation near Venafro and San Pietro on the southern front, rear areas at Anzio were well within the range of enemy artillery. Reports were that some men preferred their emplacements to the battalion areas on the beaches. Nevertheless, rotation did give the men a change of scene and diet and also allowed commanders to inspect equipment and to supervise the integration of replacements.
From the time of the landing until 20 May the 84th Battalion fired 50,166 rounds (8,019 WP) of ammunition; the 83rd from February
until 20 May expended 14,326 rounds (4,716 WP). Casualties for the two battalions in the Anzio beachhead were 30 dead and 87 wounded.111
Cassino
With the failure of the 36th Division attack across the Rapido, General Clark directed II Corps to shift to the north, with the town of Cassino, Monte Cassino, and the eventual drive into the Liri Valley as its objectives. By i February the 34th Division, which was to serve as the main striking force, had established a bridgehead across the Rapido near the town of Cairo, about two miles north of Cassino.
The town of Cassino lies on Highway 6 at the foot of the main mountain barriers to the Allied advance through the Liri Valley. Rising behind Cassino is Castle Hill, an elevation of some 633 feet. Overshadowing both is Monte Cassino upon which stands the historic monastery. Together they offered the enemy excellent observation of the movements of the Allied army in its attempt to break into the Liri Valley. A few miles north of Cassino were the towns of Cairo and Villa, the latter being the site of a group of Italian barracks which at different times in the tug of war which followed were to shelter both German and American forces. Four miles northeast of Monte Cassino massive Mount Cairo towers 5,500 feet above sea level. This small area to the north and west of Cassino was to be the scene of some of the bitterest battles fought during the Italian campaign, for it was here that the German forces battled to protect Monte Cassino and the entrance to the Liri Valley.112
Commanded now by Maj. James R. Chapman, the 2nd Chemical Battalion supported the 34th Division in the February attacks against the Cassino defenses. On 1 February Company D fired ninety-seven rounds of WP before a successful infantry assault on the barracks area at Villa. But next day the lack of communications and the absence of adequate observation precluded mortar support for men of the 135th Infantry as they worked their way southward along a ridge line. This situation repeated itself during the period 4-6 February in the bitter engagement on the headland and plateau north of the abbey. In three days of costly fighting the infantry won Hill 593 (Albaneta Farm)
which dominates the approaches to the abbey but the fluid, even confused, situation dictated that there could be little or no mortar support. In further attacks toward the abbey on 8 February Companies B and D did fire 840 rounds in casualty and screening missions. On the same day Company A used limited amounts of WP to screen the advance of supporting tanks, a mission abruptly halted when the smoke spread over infantry positions on the flats near the river.113 On 11 February, in rain, sleet, and snow, the troops of II Corps made another effort to take Monte Cassino. Companies B, C, and D, hampered by the weather and disrupted communications, supported individual regiments of the 34th and 36th Divisions. Fighting in the craggy terrain before the abbey was at such close quarters that Company C received no calls from the regiment it supported. The other two mortar companies fired less than 100 rounds each.114
Mid-February saw British, New Zealand, and Indian troops committed to the fighting around Monte Cassino. Allied bombers struck the famous abbey on 15 February in an operation conspicuous for its lack of positive results. In fact, Allied troops moved back from the hard-won Hill 593 just before the bombardment, and it was the German forces that reoccupied the position when the air strike was over. It took three days for British and Gurkha troops to retake the hill, during which time the British requested and received support from Company C, 2nd Chemical Battalion. The mortar unit delivered a 20-minute barrage of 246 rounds against a row of trees near the abbey among which the enemy had emplaced a number of machine guns. After completion of this mission the commanding officer of the 141st Infantry, to which the mortar company was attached, telephoned his congratulations and those of the British to the mortarmen of Company C. This gesture, as well as expression of thanks upon the relief of Company C on 27 February, was particularly gratifying for the mortarmen since this same infantry officer had previously announced, when a short mortar round fell within fifty yards of his command post, that he would never again request a mission from a chemical mortar unit.115
During the last days in February all of the weapons companies of
the 2nd Chemical Battalion reverted to the control of the parent unit. One hundred and seventy consecutive days in the line had been culminated by the difficult fighting at Cassino, the roughest time experienced by the battalion to date. The Germans were not the only enemy; the terrain, the weather, the lack of shelter, and the limited supply of suitable clothing combined to make life miserable.116
Small satisfaction was gained at Cassino from the over-all contribution of the mortars. There were times when disrupted communications and the fluid nature of the fighting meant that the chemical companies could offer only limited support.
The Drive on Rome
During March and April 1944 the Allied forces in Italy paused, trained, refitted, and regrouped in preparation for another assault against the Gustav Line defenses. A greatly contracted Fifth Army held a narrow sector from the Tyrrhenian coast to the Liri River; II Corps, composed of the recently arrived 85th and 88th Divisions, was on the left and the French Expeditionary Corps was on the right. The sector of the British Eighth Army now extended from the Liri River to the Adriatic, including the strong German defenses which centered at Monte Cassino.
The 2nd and 3rd Chemical Battalions maintained their attachments to the II Corps and the FEC. After leaving the lines at Cassino in late February, the 2nd Battalion passed into II Corps reserve for a period of rest, training, and repair and replacement of equipment. On 13 March Company D joined the 88th Division in its quiet zone near Minturno for a 2-week attachment that served to familiarize the new unit with the 4.2-inch mortar and its capabilities. During April the entire battalion, again in corps reserve, underwent a vigorous training program. Elements of the 3rd Battalion participated in smoking operations on the upper Garigliano in the FEC sector. Abetted by a detail from the 172nd Smoke Generator Company, successive companies of the mortar battalion maintained an extensive smoke installation in the vicinity of the Tiger Bridge across the Garigliano.117
On the eve of Fifth Army’s 11 May attack on the Gustav Line 3rd Battalion communication equipment was augmented by the issue of
sixteen SCR-300s. The successful use of this radio prompted the battalion commander to regard it as the only set which might tend to reduce the telephone to the rank of a secondary means of communication in battle. The exchange just before the attack of 10 2½-ton trucks for 32 jeeps and 48 ¼-ton trailers increased the mobility of the mortar battalion and its ability to get ammunition forward.
The 3rd Battalion fired 7,000 rounds of ammunition in twelve hours of preparatory fire. Each of the four companies supported a French division, three of them by direct attachment to the infantry and the fourth through the control of division artillery. The latter company did the least firing, primarily because of delays encountered in securing firing data, a circumstance which prompted the battalion commander to recommend strongly that this company also be placed under infantry control.118 The enemy lines broke by the middle of the second day, and mortar support decreased. By 27 May the pursuit became so rapid that the battalion was placed in corps reserve and remained there until relieved from attachment to the FEC on 11 June.
The 2nd Chemical Battalion went into action on the Minturno front on II May in support of II Corps’ 85th and 88th Divisions. After expending more than 10,000 rounds in a 7-hour preparation, the battalion fired missions for the two divisions as the situation required.119 For example, the initial objective of the 339th Infantry, 85th Division, was San Martino Hill which had an importance all out of proportion to its modest height of 200 feet because it dominated an important enemy supply route. Within a 15-minute period late on 11 May the battalion fired 1,267 rounds against this objective.120 The fight for San Martino Hill lasted several days. On 13 May all four mortar companies fired high-explosive and smoke missions in support of the attacking infantry. The hill fell next day, and II Corps placed the 2nd Battalion in support of the 88th Division attacking Santa Maria Infante. In this engagement the mortars made good use of smoke to blind enemy observation from nearby Pulcherini. In fact, WP made up about one-third of the 13,575 rounds fired by the battalion between 11 and 14 May. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, the German commander in Italy, commented on the effectiveness of these American screens.
Because of the extensive use of smoke along the Garigliano, he wrote, German artillery had to fire on American river crossings “without the least observation.”121
The May experiences of Company A may be taken as typical of those of the entire 2nd Chemical Battalion once Allied forces breached the Gustav Line defenses. On the 14th the company moved forward by jeep with a regiment of the 88th Division, firing 191 rounds of white phosphorus in midafternoon. Two days later the company used a pack mule train to move overland with the infantry; even then it took overnight marches to keep up with the assault battalions. During the period 21–22 May Company A fired 165 rounds against enemy troops. There were more marches, more difficult terrain to traverse, more changes in position and attachment. All in all, events and units moved so swiftly that there could be little employment of the 4.2-inch mortars.122
Fifth Army coordinated the VI Corps breakout of the beachhead at Anzio with the southern front’s attack on the Gustav Line. Companies A and B, 83rd Chemical Battalion, supported the 1st Armored Division and Companies C and D, the 45th Infantry Division. All four companies fired mass concentrations in support of the initial attack, those with the 4 5 th Division aiding greatly in the successful resistance to two German counterattacks. Once the breakthrough was achieved the mortar units supporting the armored division found they could keep pace only by frequent displacements. Consequently, corps placed these companies in support of the 36th Division, which had moved to Anzio by sea, for the drive that broke the German line at Velletri, twenty miles southeast of Rome.123
Meanwhile, the 84th Chemical Battalion on 23 May expended 3,081 rounds in support of 3rd Division. After the initial breakthrough the 84th Battalion, as had the 83rd, found it impossible to keep up with the infantry. The battalion commander blamed this on the large and unwieldy 2½-ton trucks and the scarcity of jeeps and trailers. Communications also broke down during the swift movement, for there was no time to lay wire and the SCR-284 proved unreliable. But
these complications mattered little; the rapid retreat of the enemy meant that the mortars found little use. As the 83rd Chemical Battalion commander summarized it: “The pursuit was so fast-moving and resistance so weak that the use of the 4.2-inch mortars was unwarranted.”124
Both mortar battalions participated briefly in the pursuit beyond Rome before reverting to army control on 10 June. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions returned to army control a day later. After about a month’s rest three of the battalions, the 2nd, 3rd, and 83rd, went with VI Corps from the Fifth Army to the Seventh Army and began training for the invasion of southern France.125
The Invasion of Southern France
The three chemical mortar battalions which participated in the assault on the beaches of southern France were veteran units which had taken part in one or more amphibious landings in Sicily and Italy.126 Consequently, preparations for DRAGOON for the most part consisted of perfecting teamwork with the infantry. The exceptions were Company A, 2nd Chemical Battalion, and Company D, 83rd Battalion, which were part of an airborne task force created especially for the operation. Activated in July, this force included American and British parachute and glider units.127 The mortar companies received their assignment to the airborne task force on 11 July and moved to training sites at airfields in the vicinity of Rome. Here they trained in glider operations and prepared loading lists for personnel, equipment, and vehicles.128
Late on the afternoon of D-day, 15 August, the two airborne mortar companies landed in the vicinity of Leluc, France, with the glider units of the provisional airborne task force. None of the gliders was lost through enemy air or antiaircraft action but many were wrecked by the sawed-off utility poles—Göring asparagus—with which the Germans studded some of the most likely landing sites. One glider hit
with such impact that the jeep load in its nose catapulted through the front end of the aircraft, seriously injuring the three men sitting in the vehicle.
Elements of Company A, landing between 1845 and 1900, had assembled at their pre-designated area by 2130 and were prepared to fire on the town of Le Muy. Next morning the company fired 200 rounds of HE on the town and 48 rounds of WP on its southern exits. Le Muy fell by midafternoon. Later that day the airborne troops made contact with reconnaissance elements of the 45th Division. After this junction the mortar companies remained attached to the task force as it pushed to the French-Italian border, being relieved from this attachment on 17 September at Nice, France.129
The gliders of Company D, 8 3rd Chemical Battalion, were released over the drop zone near Le Muy at seven minutes after seven on the morning of D-day. Fourteen mortarmen received light injuries during the landings. The company did not fire on that first day but expended 650 rounds in support of the 517th Infantry on 16 August. The mortar unit remained in support of this unit until the end of the month doing relatively little firing in the drive to the Italian border.130
A mortar company accustomed to normal attachments encountered problems in adapting itself to glider operations. Techniques of loading and securing equipment had to be formulated and mastered. Men and equipment had to be distributed in such a way as to allocate weight equally among the several gliders. Moreover, it was necessary to allocate the material so that the loss of one glider would not destroy all the equipment of the same type. The exigencies of glider operations caused a number of changes in the normal organization and equipment of a mortar company based mostly on the fact that a company, landing by gliders, often had to operate as an independent unit until such time as contact could be made with other elements. Because of this fact medical aidmen joined each mortar platoon and automatic weapons were added to provide means for independent defense. In the table of equipment for an airborne mortar company drawn up after DRAGOON by Capt. Raymond J. Lakey of the 83rd Battalion, the responsibility for unit security accounted for all additions to the complement of weapons. Captain Lakey recommended that 4 light machine guns,
8 BARs, 16 tommy guns, and 18 .45-caliber pistols be added to the arsenal of an airborne company. And whereas the table of equipment of a motorized company called for 5 bazookas, 7 should be carried by a glider-borne company.131
Since the assault operation against the beaches of southern France met only light opposition, the mortar battalions found they had relatively few missions to fire as they accompanied their divisions to the west and north.132 Because fire was not needed in such a rapid advance, some of the units were given jobs involving supply. A company of the 83rd Battalion established and operated a railhead to St. Maximin in order to ease the serious logistical problems of the 45th Division. And at one time companies of the 2nd Battalion hauled supplies for the 36th Division.133 For the 3rd Battalion August was a period of long, fast movements with little fighting. The low rate of ammunition expenditure mitigated the shell supply problem which otherwise would have been acute since army supply dumps were frequently 100 miles to the rear.134
These mortar battalions continued to support the troops of the Seventh Army as they fought to the north and northeast—the Vosges, Belfort, Bitche, Colmar were familiar names to the mortarmen. Some mortar units fired for divisions of the 1st French Army which, with the U.S. Seventh, made up Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers’ 6th Army Group. Offensive action came to a temporary halt in mid-December 1944 when the Germans launched their Ardennes counteroffensive.135
The Fighting Ends in Italy
The departure of the 2nd, 3rd, and 83rd Chemical Mortar Battalion for southern France left only the 84th in support of the divisions of Fifth Army from July until the end of October 1944 This unit found itself scattered along the entire army front.136 In an effort to make up for this lost support the theater in June 1944 converted two antiaircraft
artillery automatic weapons units to the 99th and 100th Chemical Mortar Battalions. After completing a period of intensive training under the direction of Colonel Hutchinson, a former commander of the 83rd, the 99th, commanded by Lt. Col. Gordon A. Dixon, left for France and the 100th, commanded by Lt. Col. Russell E. McMurray, joined Fifth Army in Italy.137
July had seen the 84th reorganize under the long ignored tables of organization and equipment of September 1943, a move which reduced the number of officers and enlisted men of a mortar battalion from 1010 to 622. The new tables also cut the number of 2½-ton trucks and increased the number of ¼-ton trucks (jeeps) assigned to a battalion. The long delay between the publication of the tables and actual reorganization was the result of several factors. For one thing, mortar battalions in Italy had scant time away from the front line to put the required changes into effect. Moreover, for a long while there were not enough jeeps to make the substitution in vehicles. Finally, mortar commanders feared that because of the cut in personnel their units would find it impossible to operate efficiently if reorganization took place.138
While the Italian campaign was in progress the War Department drew up still another TOE based upon the recommendations received from battle-experienced CWS officers.139 The salient feature of this revision was the elimination of one weapons company, a move which placed the battalion on the triangular basis characteristic of the infantry division.140 The new organization became effective in September 1944, and two months later the 84th and 100th Battalions reorganized accordingly.141
After his rapid retreat above Rome, the enemy defended positions north of the Arno River, called the Gothic Line, which were not
breached by Allied forces until late September 1944. During that month the 84th Battalion expended about 6,500 rounds of ammunition, over half of which was white phosphorus. New infantry divisions, unfamiliar with the mortars and particularly their high-explosive mission, seemed to make more frequent calls for smoke. Each of the four companies of the 84th supported a different division of II Corps, which was fighting its way northward through the mountains. Despite transportation difficulties, the 84th gave heavy support during October, firing some 16,000 rounds (5,000 HE) , mainly against enemy counterattacks and emplacements and also as a screen for American positions and supply routes.142 On 31 October the 84th Chemical Battalion passed into Fifth Army reserve to be replaced by the 100th Battalion, companies of which supported, at one time or another, each of the infantry divisions of II Corps.143
In January 1945 Fifth Army received reports of the hardships encountered in other theaters and in the United States with the fuzes for the M3 4.2-inch mortar ammunition which, unfortunately, made up the bulk of 4.2-inch ammunition in the theater. Nonetheless, during February the 84th and 100th Battalions used over 11,000 rounds of the suspected ammunition without particular difficulty. On 9 March a shell burst three feet from the barrel of one mortar, killing one man and wounding four others. Thereafter, mortar crews used lanyards to fire suspected ammunition, a precaution which at first reduced the efficiency of mortar crews.144
From the conclusion of the Gothic Line fighting in the fall of 1944 until the spring of 1945 Fifth Army troops remained in relatively the same positions. April saw an army offensive which cracked German defenses in a matter of a week. The 84th and 100th Battalions supported the IV and II Corps, respectively, in this operation until the infantry advance was too swift for effective support. It was at this time that 4.2-inch mortar operations in the Mediterranean theater came to an end.145
Fighting in Italy was as bitter and the enemy defenses as stubborn as any experienced by American forces in World War II. The mountainous Italian terrain, with its abundance of defiladed positions inaccessible to artillery fire, placed a heavy demand on high trajectory weapons, particularly the 4.2-inch mortar. In addition, 4.2-inch mortar units were indispensable to Ranger and Commando units which lacked organic heavy weapons. Most infantry commanders were at first unaware of the potential of the 4.2-inch mortar, but once they had seen the weapon in action they were usually anxious for mortar support. In Italy the chemical mortar truly came of age.