Chapter 4: The Problem of Requirements
To persons not intimately acquainted with procurement of military supplies the critical importance of exact and timely requirements figures is often not fully apparent. But a moment’s reflection suggests that the mass production of weapons and ammunition cannot get under way in an orderly manner until procurement officials know exactly what types are to be produced, what quantities are required, and what delivery schedules are to be met. Only with such detailed information, along with countless technical specifications and blueprints, can production engineers determine what plants and equipment will be needed, how much labor will be required, and what materials will be necessary. Without computation of requirements for each of the thousands of items of equipment needed by the armed forces of the United States and its allies in World War II, scheduling of balanced production would have been impossible and the whole productive effort would have run the risk of being plunged into chaos.1 “It is literally true,” wrote a War Production Board official, “that half the production battle is won when we have decided what we want to produce, how much ... we want to produce, and when we want it.”2
A story that dramatically illustrates the importance of exact figures for military supply requirements was told by men who were close to William S. Knudsen when he came to Washington in the spring of 1940 to help mobilize American industry for war production. In conference with Army procurement officials, one of Knudsen’s first questions was stated bluntly and simply: “What do you want?” When advised of the Army’s mobilization plan with its provision for arming an initial protective force of four hundred thousand men within three months of M-Day, and an additional eight hundred thousand men after one year, Knudsen shook his head. “That’s not what I want,” he declared.
“I want to know what kind of equipment you need for these men—and how many pieces of each kind. Please tell me how many pieces.”3
For the Ordnance Department, knowing well in advance “how many pieces” was of utmost importance because mass production of munitions could not be improvised on the spur of the moment as could the production of many civilian-type articles. In World War I, U.S. troops were ready for combat within a year after the declaration of war, but they had to be equipped in large measure with munitions obtained from the Allies. As the preceding chapters have emphasized, it takes months, or even years, for civilian industry to get ready to produce intricate weapons of war such as tanks, artillery, and fire control instruments. From 1940 to 1942 hard-to-manufacture munitions were generally known as “critical” items as distinguished from “essential” items which posed less serious production problems. For both classes, but particularly for those in the critical category, it was most desirable that requirements be established as accurately as possible, and long in advance of expected need.4 The fact that the objective was never wholly achieved constituted one of the most serious difficulties faced by Ordnance during World War II. On this point all Ordnance officers charged with broad procurement responsibility were agreed. How this came about and how the shape and nature of the requirements problem were determined by a variety of factors can be understood, at least in part, by looking into the process of forming policy and making the computations.
Elements of Requirements Computation
The Ordnance Department did not participate directly in making top-level policy decisions that determined over-all requirements for military supplies. It had the technical service function of making detailed computations on the basis of policies determined by higher authority. The size of the Army, manner of its organization, nature of its equipment, and schedules for its deployment overseas—all these matters were decided by the nation’s highest military and political authorities.5 Once made, these decisions were passed on to Ordnance and other supply branches by the General Staff in the form of numerous lists and tables on which procurement computations were based. To describe each of these documents and to outline the various steps in the procedure of requirements calculation would lead into bypaths of interest to no one but the requirements specialist. The following account, therefore, touches only broad principles and problems.6
Tables and Their Multiplication
The most important document for requirements computation by the supply services was the Troop Basis, which specified the strength of the Army and listed all units actually in existence or to be formed in the near future.7 It was supplemented by tables prescribing the strength of each type of Army unit and listing the quantities of supplies authorized for each type. As there were some five thousand different kinds of units there were thousands of these tables, variously known as tables of organization, tables of allowances, tables of basic allowances, and tables of equipment. In addition, for units on special missions there were separate lists of equipment that applied either to individually numbered units or to all units in a given geographic area.8
The first step Ordnance took in computing requirements was to multiply the quantity of each item of equipment authorized for each type of unit by the number of such units in the Troop Basis. The number of rifles authorized for a rifle company, for example, was multiplied by the number of rifle companies, the trucks per infantry regiment by the number of infantry regiments, and so on until all items were accounted for. The computations were all made by hand before the installation of tabulating machines in the fall of 1940.9 The figures thus determined represented initial allowances for units in the Troop Basis. The next step was to project these calculations into the future and provide additional equipment for replacement of losses, for filling supply pipelines, for supplying certain items to the Navy and Marine Corps, and for foreign aid. The quantity added for replacement was calculated on the basis of a replacement factor (or maintenance factor, as it was sometimes called) established for each major item of equipment by the General Staff after study of recommendations submitted by the arms and services. Expressed as a percentage of the initial issue, it represented an estimate of the quantity of matériel that would be needed during a given period of time to replace equipment lost, worn out, stolen, or destroyed by enemy action.10 Finally, to arrive at net requirement figures, the quantity of each item already on hand, whether in storage, in transit, or in possession of troops, was subtracted from the total of gross
requirements. The whole process was, in the words of a G-4 memo, “a very demanding, exacting and tedious task.”11
Days of Supply and Replacement Factors
The computation of ammunition requirements was altogether different from the computation of requirements for weapons, vehicles, and other general supplies, for ammunition was expendable. As food for guns it” ranked in importance with the supply of food for troops, and posed far more difficult requirements problems because its rate of consumption was irregular and unpredictable. There were no tables showing the number of rounds to be issued to any tactical unit, but there was a figure known as the “day of supply” on which ammunition requirements for individual weapons were based. The ammunition day of supply was an estimate of the average number of rounds that would be expended by each type of weapon per day in the course of planned operations.12 The rate for each weapon included a breakdown showing the estimate for each type of shell—high explosive, armor piercing, incendiary, and so on—and for each type of fuse when more than one type could be used on a shell. (Table 3) To compute ammunition requirements for a tactical unit the Ordnance planners multiplied the appropriate day of supply for each type of weapon by the number of such weapons authorized for the unit, and then multiplied the total by the number of days for which supplies were to be provided. Like the replacement factor for general supplies, the ammunition day of supply was established by the General Staff on recommendations of the arms and services. For training in the United States specified quantities per man were authorized.13
After the 1918 armistice most of the statistical data and technical knowledge of requirements gained during the war were lost through disuse and through failure to study the records before marking them for destruction. Like many other elements of the War Department, Ordnance failed to provide Civil Service grades and salaries high enough to attract and keep technically qualified research employees. There were only five persons on the requirements staff during the interwar years, and the highest paid received an annual salary of about $2,300. It is doubtful that much progress could have been made under any circumstances in peacetime, but the lack of an adequate nucleus of competent requirements specialists insured failure.14
At the beginning of World War II, and for nearly two years thereafter, replacement factors for weapons and days of supply for ammunition were based largely on guesswork. No one knew how long the Army’s equipment, much of it far different from that used in 1917-18, would stand up under rigorous combat conditions, nor did anyone have an accurate notion of how much ammunition an infantry regiment or field artillery battalion would need in an active theater of operations. Virtually the only source of information on the
Table 3: Examples of Ground Ammunition day of Supply for Theater of Operations, 23 December 1941
| Item | Rounds per weapon per day | Proportion of types |
| Machine gun, .30-cal., M1917A1 | 150 | 80% AP, 20% Tracer * |
| Rifle, .30-cal., M1 | 5 | 80% AP, 20% Tracer * |
| Carbine, .30-cal., M1 | 2 | 100% Ball |
| Gun, submachine, .45-cal. | 20 | 80% Ball, 20% Tracer |
| Gun, 37-mm. AT | 10 | 90% AP, 10% HE |
| Gun, 40-mm. AA | 10 | 90% HE, 10% AP |
| Gun, 75-mm. Tank | 10 | 50% AP, 50% HE (Normal) |
| Howitzer, 105-mm. field, SP mount | 30 | 80% HE, 10% WP, 10% HS |
| Howitzer, 240-mm. field | 5 | 100% HE |
* This proportion of types was approved in principle, but the old figures (65% Ball, 20% AP, and 15% Tracer) continued until production could be rescheduled.
Source: Day of Supply of Ammunition other than Aircraft for Theater of Operations, 23 December 1941, copy in OHF.
subject at the beginning of World War II was the Partridge Board Report made in 1938 by a board of Ordnance officers headed by Lt. Col. Clarence E. Partridge.15 Based in part on fragmentary records of World War I experience and in part on “educated guesses,” it was concerned more with general principles than with exact statistical data. As late as March 1943 the Chief of Ordnance reported that “factors now in use are based largely on inadequate and obsolete data obtained from the last war, supplemented by opinion as to present needs. No current battle experience data are available.”16
The day of supply figures used in 1940 and 1941 had two principal defects: they were too high, and they did not allow for differences among theaters, Although Ordnance was convinced that the figures were too high, and recommended their reduction, there was no combat experience during the defense period to support the Ordnance view. No change occurred until December 1941 when the day of supply for .30-caliber machine guns was cut nearly in half—from 250 to 150—and others were reduced in varying degrees.17
The second difficulty with the original figures, as just noted, was that a single set of rates was applied equally to all theaters of operation. In June 1943, after several theaters had been activated and some combat experience accumulated, Army Service Forces directed the supply services to begin systematic collection of data on which to base revisions of maintenance factors and days of supply.18 During the North African campaign no provision had been made for systematic reporting of loss and expenditure rates. In July 1943 Ordnance sent teams of officers schooled in requirements work to headquarters in England, Algeria, Egypt, India, New Caledonia, and Australia. The teams met with varying degrees of success, but in general their work was hampered by a lack of appreciation in the theaters of the far-reaching importance of accurate replacement factors. The theater Ordnance officers, under constant pressure to provide adequate supplies at all times, were far more interested in maintaining an ample supply of everything than in providing data for refined statistical computations by planners back in Washington. This gave rise to one of the most persistent supply problems of the war, the tendency of each echelon to hoard supplies and build up its own reserve. The requirements teams also found that theater records did not provide adequate data on quantities of equipment in the hands of troops, and contained practically nothing on quantities lost. Theater officers insisted that data for determining replacement factors were more readily obtainable at ports of embarkation than overseas. “Officers in this theater,” wrote a member of the team sent to North Africa, “are of the firm belief that our mission is a wild goose chase and utterly futile. ...”19
In spite of these difficulties, the teams made some progress. Their reports showed that different rates were required for the various theaters because weapons and types of ammunition varied in importance from theater to theater. Beginning in February 1944 the War Department required each theater to submit detailed information in a regular monthly report of matériel consumed, and in June it established separate days of supply for the ZI and for
three major overseas areas—Europe, North Africa, and the Pacific.20 Differences among theaters were substantial. In the South Pacific, for example, the replacement rates for bayonets, trench knives, and carbines were from ten to thirty times as great as in North Africa. In the summer of 1944 the number of items covered by replacement factors was sharply reduced, and a new set of replacement factors submitted to ASF headquarters was approved with minor changes.21 But replacement factors were seldom constant for long periods of time in any active theater, since they varied with the intensity of the fighting, the nature of enemy tactics, the method of reporting losses, and even with changes in the weather.
In addition to replacement factors and days of supply the Partridge Board Report had pointed out in 1938 that two other elements entered into the distribution of supplies. First was the time required to ship matériel from the point of origin to the point of use, and second was the quantity of supplies absorbed within the system itself, chiefly in the form of depot stocks. The Partridge Board recommended that the first of these elements be covered by advancing delivery dates by the number of days required for the shipment of supplies to any given troop units. It recommended that distribution stocks be provided by increasing the total requirements by a certain percentage to be known as the distribution factor. Exactly what percentage should be allotted for distribution was, of course, a question the Partridge Board could not answer because of the paucity of experience data.22
Aviation Ordnance
Guns and ammunition for war planes formed another distinct phase of the requirements picture. In 1940 the method used for calculating aviation ordnance requirements was the same as that used for ground ordnance, but in 1941 a new system was worked out by the Ordnance Requirements Division. The new method made no attempt to multiply tables of equipment or allowances by the number of units to be supplied, but based requirements on airplane production schedules compiled by the Office of Production Management and later by WPB. The number of guns per plane, taken from armament charts prepared by the Air Technical Service Command, was multiplied by the number of planes to be produced. To this total was added what the Air Force felt was a sufficient quantity to provide replacements for these weapons.23 Although considered at the time to be a radical departure from traditional requirements practice, the new system proved successful and continued in effect without change until the summer of 1944 when it was modified to provide ammunition and bombs only for planes in active theaters. The Army Air Forces had meanwhile collected sufficient experience data from its units overseas to provide a statistical basis for more refined techniques of requirements determination and supply control. Mission rates for each theater were developed for each type of squadron in much
the same manner as were days of supply for ground ammunition. In the European theater seasonal rates were used because of lessened air activity during winter months.24
The early requirements for bombs and aircraft ammunition called for production of a 5-month supply for each bomber, based on aircraft production schedules, the estimated number of sorties a month for each plane, and the number of bombs dropped and rounds fired per sortie. The bomb supply for 4-engine bombers, for example, was based on an estimated eight missions per month over a period of five months. These computations soon resulted in overproduction of bombs and aircraft ammunition, largely because all planes did not go immediately from factory to overseas theater, nor did they all engage in bombing raids exactly as planned. “We now have in storage in the United Kingdom,” reported the McCoy Board in August 1943, “a greater tonnage of bombs than has been dropped over Europe by the RAF since the beginning of the war.”25 Deep cuts in bomb requirements came in 1943, cuts that soon proved to be too deep. As the air war mounted in intensity during 1944 many of the cuts had to be restored.26
Fluctuating Requirements
It is no exaggeration to say that the worst problem facing Ordnance production planners during World. War II stemmed from the fact that requirements were always changing. As soon as one set of figures came out of the machines it was necessary to incorporate changes in one or more of the basic lists and make the computations all over again.27 The figures in the over-all Troop Basis rose and fell every few months as the strategic situation worsened or improved, and as the War Department planners estimated and re-estimated military needs in terms of the capacity of the nation to support forces of varying sizes.28
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Ordnance Requirements Division always had to work with two different versions of the Troop Basis, one coming from G-3 and the other from G-4. Ordnance normally prepared its allowance figures on the basis of the former and its requirements on the latter. The two versions of the Troop Basis were not identical and were often not even reconcilable, at times being as much as half a million men apart on specific dates. As late as the spring of 1944 Ordnance complained, “The essence of the problem is that the troop basis furnished is not synchronized with the factual situation as to activation and deployment of troops. ...”29 Another difficulty arose in correctly identifying the units included in the Troop Basis. When units appeared without adequate identifying information it was impossible
to know which equipment table applied to them.30
Of nearly equal importance with fluctuations in the Troop Basis were the constant revisions of tables of equipment. During the latter part of 1940, in addition to changes resulting from expansion of the air arm, creation of an armored force, and the transition from square to triangular infantry divisions, there were innumerable changes in allowances of equipment for both individuals and units.31 In the early stages of the war when planners were considering the possibility of air raids on the United States and on American bases and troop units overseas, large numbers of antiaircraft units were scheduled for activation, and requirements for antiaircraft guns and accessories were high. The open type of warfare encountered in North Africa late in 1942 demanded that tanks and antitank guns be given first priority, and later still the demands for heavy artillery topped the list when American troops came up against heavily fortified positions in Italy and France. Each change, however small, demanded a revision of total requirements figures, and every major change in requirements meant a revision of production schedules.
The nature of the equipment changes that occurred between 1940 and 1945 may be illustrated by the single example of the infantry regiment. In 1940 an infantry regiment numbered 3,449 men, but in 1942 it had only 3,088, and in 1943, 3,257. It was authorized 1,181 pistols in 1940, 213 in 1941, 233 in 1942, 275 in 1943, and 293 in 1944. It had no ¼-ton trucks in 1940 but was authorized 103 in 1941, 68 in 1942, 146 in 1943, and 149 in 1944. Of the basic weapon, the M1 rifle, it had 2,099 in 1940, 1,600 in 1941, 1,678 in 1942, and 1,882 in 1943, 1944, and 1945. These were by no means all the changes in the equipment of the infantry regiment during World War II, but they serve to illustrate the frequency and extent of the revisions of equipment tables. In terms of individual units the changes were often small, but, when multiplied many times over and added to those of other organizations, the cumulative effect on total requirements figures was anything but small. Yet it should not be suggested that nothing was static. The number of .30-caliber machine guns (M1917) in an infantry regiment remained at 24 year after year. Throughout the war there were always twenty-seven 60-mm. mortars and eighteen 81-mm. mortars per regiment of infantry. The number of BAR’s dropped from 189 to 81 between 1941 and 1942 but thereafter held steady.32
Changes in plans for armored divisions had greater impact on Ordnance than did changes in infantry divisions, for equipment of armored units required far more industrial effort than did equipment of infantry units of the same size. A measure of the gradual decline in Ordnance requirements is found in the number of armored divisions scheduled for activation. In early 1942, estimates went as high as 46; the
Troop Basis of November 1942 called for only 20; the following summer the figure was down to 16, the number actually formed.33 Tank requirements, set at 169,000 in early 1942, were scaled down to half that number before the war ended.
Ordnance officers fully realized the need for timely revision of the Troop Basis and reorganization of tactical units. They recognized that sudden shifts in the worldwide strategic situation sometimes necessitated drastic revision of supply requirements. They knew that losses through ship sinkings had to be taken into account, that plans for sending troops and supplies overseas had to be geared to available shipping space, and that combat experience frequently demanded changes in types or quantities of equipment. But they nevertheless felt that General Staff planners, not fully aware of the consequences of changes in supply requirements, sometimes ordered such changes without full consideration of their effects. They felt, rightly or wrongly, that ASF and staff planners did not realize that every modification in the tables of equipment meant elaborate recomputations of requirements and also, much more important, far-reaching revisions of production and distribution schedules. They became convinced that staff planners did not realize the need for supplying data well in advance to allow a long lead time for Ordnance production.34
Over and above all this was an intangible but nonetheless real psychological factor that caused requirements planners to adopt a bullish attitude when the war news was good and to turn bearish when it was bad. Requirements were not always determined in the light of pure reason. Sometimes, Ordnance requirements specialists testified, an entire computation would be thrown out and a new one demanded because the results “were not in accord with the ‘feeling’ of those who had initially established the method for the first computation.”35 There was also the practical matter of how much could be produced. Theoretically, requirements were always fully stated regardless of the potentialities of supply but in fact there were ways and means of reducing requirements that seemed unattainable.36
The truth of the matter seems to be that the General Staff and ASF planners were well aware of the need for firm long-range requirements even though they were not always fully aware of the details of Ordnance operations. They tried hard to keep requirements on an even keel, and it was not ignorance of procurement but the exigencies of war that forced them to revise the Army Supply Program.37 “The conclusion is inescapable,” wrote Brig. Gen. Walter A. Wood, Jr., in 1943, “that such a program cannot be static ... it re-requires constant review ... continuing study, and never-ending adjustment.38
Requirements in the Defense Period, 1940-41
Multiplication of a given Troop Basis by the proper equipment tables, and subtraction of stocks on hand, yielded a theoretical statement of Army requirements, but for procurement purposes, particularly in 1940-41, everything depended upon the availability of money. In the uncertain period before Pearl Harbor, and immediately after, requirements were computed for scores of different theoretical situations, but the only results that counted for Ordnance were those covered by appropriations and embodied in an Expenditure Program approved by G-4. Enactment of an appropriation bill, it should be noted, did not automatically give the supply services a green light for procurement. Only after an item of equipment appeared on an Expenditure Program did the supply services have authority to proceed with its procurement.39
All told, ten Expenditure Programs were issued between July 1940 and July 1942, each based on an appropriation measure. The Ordnance share of the funds in each varied from $38 million to more than $12 billion. When added together the 10 programs allotted to Ordnance approximated $31 billion, or three-fourths of all funds appropriated for Ordnance during the 1940-45 period.40 (Table 4)
Before issuance of the first Expenditure Program, Ordnance made a series of computations leading up to the regular appropriation for the fiscal year 1941. Work on this subject began with a request from the War Department Budget Officer in September 1939, after the invasion of Poland, that Ordnance list the items it would include in a $250 million program to eliminate shortages of critical items for the PMP.41 Ordnance quickly complied with this request and with others that came during succeeding months, including such questions as the following: What additional ordnance would be required for a 17,000-man increase in the Regular Army and a 500-plane increase in the Air Corps? What items would be short if a 600,000-man Army, plus PMP augmentation, were to be equipped? What would be needed at each stage during the Regular Army’s expansion in enlisted strength from 173,000 to 242,000, to 280,000, to 375,000? All these calculations, combined with those from other supply services, were used in drawing up the Army appropriation for fiscal year 1941 and the first supplemental, totaling approximately $500 million for Ordnance. This program was widely known as the first Expenditure Program until it was officially decided that the 12 August 1940 statement of requirements for the Munitions Program of 30 June 1940 would be considered the first such program.42
Even before it was passed, the regular 1941 appropriation was known to be inadequate to meet the Army’s needs in view of the swift German victories in Europe during May and June 1940, and the transfer to the hard-pressed British of
Table 4: Summary Tabulation of Ordnance Share of Expenditure Programs
| Expenditure Program | Date | Expended for Ordnance |
| 1st | 12 Aug 40 | $2 billion |
| 2nd | 8 Oct 40 | $38 million |
| 3rd | 8 Apr 41 | $725 million |
| 4th | 9 Jun 41 | $220 million |
| 5th | 25 Aug 41 | $2.7 billion |
| 6th | 12 Dec 41 | $3.7 billion |
| 7th | 31 Dec 41 | $1.5 billion |
| 8th | 21 Feb 42 | $12.4 billion |
| 9th | 16 Apr 42 | $409 million |
| 10th | 30 Jun 42 | $7.4 billion |
Source: PSP 55, pp. 65-88.
615,000 Enfield rifles, 25,000 BAR’s, and other supplies after Dunkerque.43 At the direction of the President the Army hastily drew up in June 1940 a new statement of broad military requirements.44 The bulk of this program, known as the Munitions Program of 30 June 1940, was financed by the second supplemental appropriation, which allotted $1,442,000,000 for Ordnance. As noted in the preceding chapter, the first Expenditure Program issued by G-4 on 12 August 1940 gave Ordnance authority to proceed with procurement under this and the two preceding appropriations.45 The authority came at a dark hour for the western democracies. With France conquered, the British army driven from the continent after losing all its heavy equipment, and the German air force opening its assault on England itself, there were some who felt that further resistance by the British was useless. For the United States the need to strengthen its defenses was clear, but there was still doubt as to how that need should be met.
The second Expenditure Program was a relatively minor one, totaling only $38 million. Drawn up in September—while plans were being made to inaugurate peacetime conscription—it provided essential items for an additional 200,000 men to bring the PMP force up to 1,400,000. The
third Expenditure Program appeared in April 1941, just after enactment of lend-lease, and provided $725 million for Ordnance, mostly for artillery ammunition. The fourth covered Air Force and Field Artillery requirements financed by the regular fiscal 1942 appropriation. By far the largest of the pre-Pearl Harbor programs was the fifth, dated 25 August 1941; it placed major emphasis on ammunition and combat vehicles and was based on an Army strength of 1,820,000 to be raised eventually to 3,200,000.46
By the time the fifth Expenditure Program appeared, Ordnance had been allotted over $6 billion and its procurement program was well under way. But meanwhile the whole defense effort came in for a good deal of criticism, some bearing directly on the problem of Ordnance requirements. Early in September 1941, for example, Ordnance was criticized because the bulk of its production was not scheduled for completion before 30 June 1943 and some items such as antiaircraft guns and armor-piercing ammunition would run well into fiscal year 1944. There was complaint that Ordnance was giving new orders to the few firms already holding contracts and was thus not broadening the base for procurement but was “extending a relatively narrow stream of production farther and farther into the future.” The report making this charge stated further that, in spite of multibillion-dollar appropriations, existing production schedules for many items would fall far short of meeting either British or United States requirements by June 1942. “The lag of production behind requirements is general,” the report concluded, “and is not the result of specific items being produced at the expense of other items. Increased total output in all areas is essential.”47
In commenting on this report General Harris, acting Chief of Ordnance, pointed to many discrepancies in it, particularly as they concerned plans and appropriations. He declared that the report took contemplated programs not yet submitted to Congress—much less enacted into law—and added them to approved requirements in order to make production schedules, which were based only on approved requirements, appear inadequate. Defending the award of new contracts to established producers, General Harris argued that the creation of new production capacity was a long and costly process that was not encouraged by the receipt of requirements “in small successive increments.” The source of most of the difficulties encountered in scheduling Ordnance production, the general declared, was the problem of requirements, and on this subject he clearly stated the Ordnance position in words that bear quotation at some length.
There has not been since the beginning of the Defense Program a comprehensive long-range Schedule of Ordnance Requirements which would permit planning for adequate production capacity. On the contrary, the program has been changed at least seven times in the last fifteen months for most items. ... It is impracticable to create production capacity without definite orders, especially if extensive subcontracting is to be used in accordance with existing instructions of the War Department. Defense Aid orders have been even more varied, repetitive, unpredictable, and apparently unstudied than the United States orders, and action in filling the orders has been correspondingly difficult and unsatisfactory.
The Ordnance Department believes strongly that a carefully studied, long-range
program of munitions requirements for the democracies should be determined as soon as possible and thereafter adhered to with a minimum of change. ... It will then, and not until then, be possible for the Ordnance Department, as well as the other supply arms and services of the War Department, to proceed with assurance that planned production will satisfactorily meet requirements.48
While General Harris was thus appealing for a sound and comprehensive statement of requirements, others in the War Department recognized that a new approach to the problem was needed.49 It was obvious that the Expenditure Programs were not altogether satisfactory documents for stating procurement objectives. Because they were primarily fiscal rather than supply documents they did not list supplies needed by the armed forces for long-range planning but only supplies to be bought with money appropriated for a given fiscal year. Being short-range projections, they kept procurement on something of a hand-to-mouth basis. Further, they omitted important categories such as Army-type matériel procured for the Navy, and they did not establish any definite time periods for delivery of new matériel, though the separate documents known as Time Objectives were issued, to fill this latter gap. All things considered, the Expenditure Programs were inadequate as bases for accurate production scheduling and for determining the need for raw materials and industrial facilities. “During 1941 ...” wrote the chief of the Ordnance Branch of WPB, “procurement officers, and others, requested and failed to get any answers to the three basic questions of—What? How many? When?”50 After Pearl Harbor, when the critical factor in military planning was no longer money but time, the Army Supply Program (ASP) was developed to replace the Expenditure Pro- gram as the basic document for stating requirements and procurement objectives. The transition was not made immediately but extended over the first half of 1942. More than any other individual, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, as G-4 and later as head of Services of Supply, was responsible for its introduction.51
Many civilian critics of the War Department have declared that in the pre-Pearl Harbor years the Army, conservative by nature and suffering from two decades of penny-pinching, could not change overnight to meet the challenge of a new day.52 Military planners set their sights too low, according to the War Production Board history, and it was left to the more realistic and aggressive members of the civilian agencies to push for adequate defense production. These charges are not fully borne out by the official record. There
undoubtedly was some timidity and hesitation in the War Department in 1938-39, but not in later years. The Munitions Program of 30 June 1940, for example, developed by the Army under the leadership of Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson, was both big and bold. Its original totals were scaled down, not by shortsighted generals but by President Roosevelt, who feared Congress would not accept such huge expenditures for military purposes. Earlier proposals by G-4 and General Marshall had called for speedy and substantial increases in national defense expenditures, but they too had failed to win full approval. The only qualifying element in the picture is the delay inherent in drafting requirements and forwarding them through the proper channels to Congress, with the result that expansion plans drawn up in mid-1939 before the European war broke out were obsolete when they reached Congress a year later. But that the Army set its sights too low and had to be prodded into preparedness by the civilian agencies hastily organized in 1940 is a myth.53
Strongest pressure for raising requirements sights came from the British, especially from Lord Beaverbrook and Prime Minister Churchill, who came to Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor. Depending upon American aid for Britain’s survival, they urged astronomical figures that soon proved to be entirely unrealistic. Their pleas were directed just as much toward civilian production men such as Donald Nelson as to military leaders.54 The net effect of British urging was the adoption of altogether unrealistic goals.
The Army Supply Program, 1942-44
As early as July 1941, shortly after Germany invaded Russia, President Roosevelt had directed the armed services to draw up a long-range statement of requirements such as General Harris had in mind. “I wish you would explore the munitions and mechanical equipment of all types which in your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our enemies.”55 The evolution of the resulting Victory Program during 1941 and early 1942 has been described elsewhere and need not be repeated in detail here, but a brief sketch of some of the steps in its development will help to provide essential background for the Ordnance phase of the Army Supply Program.56
Assuming that victory over all potential enemies might require the maximum number of troops the nation could provide, the War Plans Division of the General Staff drafted a troop basis in August 1941 calling for mobilization within two years of nearly 9 million men, organized into 215 divisions, of which 61 were to be armored. This was more than double the maximum force of 4 million men that had been a factor in earlier plans, and, in terms of divisions, was more than twice the number actually organized during World War II. In terms of manpower this troop basis proved a remarkably accurate forecast, but in terms of divisions equipped and put into the field, it was very wide of the mark.57
While computation of matériel
requirements for a force of this size was in progress the President requested that additional calculations be made of munitions to be supplied Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and other countries at war with the Axis. The completed estimates for all these purposes were quickly assembled and given limited distribution in September, but no steps were taken to implement the program as it was to be held in reserve for an emergency. On 7 December 1941 the emergency arrived.
For Army planners the weeks following the attack on Pearl Harbor may fairly be described as hectic. The sixth Expenditure Program, published on 12 December 1941, was larger than any of its predecessors. Computed on a Troop Basis of 2 million men, with proposed augmentation to 3.7 million, it provided more than $3 billion for Ordnance matériel. But it was obviously inadequate in view of the entrance of the United States into the war against Japan, Germany, and Italy, and attention was quickly turned to implementing the Victory Program.58 While the War Department planning agencies were working feverishly on the details of the program, and adjusting their calculations to the actuality of war with specific enemies, President Roosevelt dropped a bombshell in their midst on 3 January 1942. In a letter to the Secretary of War he wrote:
The victory over our enemies will be achieved in the last analysis not only by the bravery, skill, and determination of our men, but by our overwhelming mastery in the munitions of war.
The concept of our industrial capacity must be completely overhauled under the impulse of the peril to our nation.
Our associates amongst the united nations are already extended to the utmost in the manufacture of munitions, and their factories fall far short of the needs of their own armies. We must not only provide munitions for our own fighting forces but vast quantities to be used against the enemy in every appropriate theater of war, wherever that may be.
The President then proceeded to name five types of equipment—four of them Ordnance responsibilities—and to list specific quantities to be procured during the two calendar years ahead. (Table 5) For ammunition the President stated that he wanted production to be based on the assumption that these weapons were to be used in combat.59
The President’s letter to the Secretary of War, and his address to Congress three days later, constituted a striking example of lack of coordination between the White House and the Army staff. The President apparently drew up his plans in consultation with a few close advisers and with the British delegation that had come to Washington soon after Pearl Harbor, but without consulting his own generals. Reaction in Ordnance to these goals was not favorable, for they were regarded as unbalanced and in some cases unattainable. But there could be no outspoken criticism of the decision of the Commander in Chief.
The War Department issued its hurried calculation of requirements for the Victory Program on 11 February 1942 as the Overall Requirements for the War Munitions Program.60 This new statement provided
Table 5: Presidential Objectives: Ordnance Items, 3 January 1942
| Items | 1942 | 1943 |
| Totals | 45,000 | 75,000 |
| Tanks | ||
| Heavy | 500 | 5,000 |
| Medium | 25,000 | 50,000 |
| Light | 19,500 | 20,000 |
| Totals | 20,000 | 35,000 |
| AA Guns | ||
| 37-mm. | 1,600 | |
| 40-mm. | 13,000 | 25,000 |
| 90-mm. | 5,400 | 10,000 |
| Totals | 14,900 | 4,000 |
| AT Guns | ||
| 37-mm. | 13,700 | |
| 3-inch | 1,200 | 4,000 |
| Totals | 500,000 | 500,000 |
| Machine Guns (Ground, tank, AA) | ||
| .30-cal. | 330,000 | 330,000 |
| .50-cal. | 170,000 | 170,000 |
for three stages of Army expansion: 3.6 million troops to be fully equipped by the end of 1942; double that number by the end of 1943; and an “ultimate” force of over 1 o million equipped by the end of 1944. The Army staff estimated the cost of the 1942 and 1943 programs combined at about $63 billion, far above the $45 billion maximum the production experts had earlier set for 1942.61
Despite the term “over-all” in the title, the new program was far from all-inclusive. It made no provision for construction needs, miscellaneous supplies, Navy items procured by the Army, or allowances to fill distribution pipelines, nor did it show quantities of matériel on hand. To remedy these inadequacies, and to keep requirements within estimated production capacity, the program was completely restudied during the weeks that followed and was replaced early in April by the Army Supply Program issued by the newly created Services of Supply (later redesignated Army Service Forces, or ASF).62 The first
ASP, sometimes called the Balanced Program, consisted of several sections that projected Army needs for three calendar years, 1942,1943, and 1944, and provided what General Somervell once called “a spelled-out all-out program of complete Army requirements.”63 Since the War Department reorganization gave the air arm a status independent of the Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply, the ASP did not include requirements for airplanes but did include Ordnance-supplied aircraft guns, ammunition, and bombs. Where requirements for tanks, antitank guns, antiaircraft guns, and machine guns, computed in the orthodox fashion, did not equal the figures set by the President in January they were arbitrarily increased to match the Presidential objectives. Total required production for 1942-43 was about $48 billion, but the ASP, unlike Expenditure Programs, did not at first show the dollar value of requirements and made no reference to appropriations.64
Upon receipt of the ASP or other statements of requirements, Ordnance drew up a production planning book for each category of equipment. Using separate sheets for each item of matériel, these books showed total requirements, facilities in production or scheduled for future production, and estimated delivery rates for each month during 1942 and 1943, and sometimes early 1944. Each book included a statement of production accomplishments and difficulties to date, availability of machine tools and materials, and actions recommended by Ordnance to speed production. When discussed by the appropriate division chief at production conferences attended by representatives of the War Production Board, the Under Secretary’s office, and other high-level agencies, these books played an important role in helping to formulate requirements policies during the first six to eight months after Pearl Harbor.
All during this period officials of the Office of Production Management and the War Production Board contended that requirements were being set at unrealistic levels. In the so-called feasibility dispute they took the position that the Army’s goals were too high to be achieved in the time allotted. Although not familiar with the strategic justification for all the guns, ammunition, and tanks included in the various programs, they nevertheless doubted the need for such huge quantities of equipment; and, knowing the hard facts of munitions production, they questioned the feasibility of the objectives. In this matter they were joined by Ordnance officers who felt that the President and the General Staff were allowing their judgment to be unduly influenced by urgent British requests for aid and by the public clamor for prompt action that followed
the outbreak of war.65 Describing the goals as wholly impossible, the War Production Board planning committee in March 1942 called for reduction of the Army Ordnance portion of the total program from $15.6 billion in 1942 to $9.2 billion.66 Ordnance officers concentrated their fire on foreign aid requirements, which loomed rather large in the over-all picture, arguing that they were far too high and were not based on precise calculation of needs. There was virtually no argument on this score within the Army. The prevailing view was expressed by Maj. Gen. Richard C. Moore, former Deputy Chief of Staff, who remarked at a production conference in June 1942: “I’ll tell you one thing about Defense Aid—they just guessed the requirements. They never had a true basis. They didn’t have any foundation. They just reached up in the air and got what they thought the United States would give them.” General Somervell agreed. “That’s entirely correct.”67
In spite of the President’s reiteration on 1 May of his desire to see the January goals attained, the Army Supply Program underwent constant revision during 1942 and, to the relief of Ordnance leaders, was steadily scaled down.68 (Table 6) The authors of the program had hoped that it would require full recomputation only once each year, but the need for revision became apparent almost as soon as the first ASP was distributed. Reductions in production goals were dictated in part by the rubber shortage that followed the loss of Malaya and in part by lack of enough production capacity for Army trucks. Lend-lease requirements were cut and less mechanized equipment was provided for the U.S. forces. A few weeks later, in mid-July 1942, ASF informed the technical services that the ground equipment section would have to be revised again because of “changes in the Troop Basis, modifications in the Tables of Organization, Tables of Basic Allowances, and Tables of Allowances, and the adoption of new maintenance and distribution factors.”69 In this edition, major reductions resulted from earmarking certain units in the Troop Basis as training units that would remain in the United States during 1942 and would therefore require only half the authorized allowance of certain items. Requirements for small arms ammunition were sharply reduced in the summer of 1942, bringing them closer to Ordnance recommendations, and causing cancellation of 43 production lines.
During the second half of 1942 the Ordnance load was both increased and de-
Table 6: Decline in Tank Requirements during 1942
[in round numbers]
| Type | 11 February 1942 Over-all Requirements for War Munitions Program | 6 April 1942 Army Supply Program | 1 September 1942 Army Supply Program | 12 November 1942 Army Supply Program |
| Totals | 169,000 | 136,115 | 121,230 | 99,230 |
| Light | 61,000 | 41,000 | 41,000 | 37,000 |
| Medium | 105,000 | 95,000 | 80,000 | 62,000 |
| Heavy | 3,000 | 115 | 230 | 230 |
creased. The increase came in September with transfer from the Quartermaster Corps to Ordnance of all responsibility for trucks and other noncombat vehicles. The decrease came two months later when, after the President’s decision to boost output of ships and planes during 1943 and cut back requirements for armored forces, a new computation of the ASP was issued under date of 12 November 1942.70 It reduced requirements for medium tanks and allied vehicles by some 21,000 units and marked the end of the “all out” effort to build tanks. As the danger of air attacks faded, some 11,000 AA guns were eliminated from 1943 requirements. At the same time—less than one year after Pearl Harbor—small arms ammunition requirements were cut back further and construction work on new ammunition plants was canceled. All together, work was stopped on more than 75 Ordnance projects.71 The new ASP called for production of only about $22 billion in 1943 instead of over $31 billion required for 1943 by the first edition.72 By the end of 1942 the troop basis listed only one hundred divisions, instead of the two hundred earlier planned, and the number of armored divisions had dropped from over sixty to only twenty.
Introduction of Supply Control, 1944-45
The cutbacks in 1942 did not prevent production in 1943 from reaching peak levels. Plants newly built or converted to munitions production during the first year of war poured forth a flood of military supplies in the second year. The accompanying list . of Ordnance items selected
Table 7: Selected Ordnance Items, 1942–1943
| Item | 1943 | 1942 |
| 2½-ton trucks | 132,000 | 168,000 |
| Medium tanks | 14,000 | 21,000 |
| 75-mm. howitzer | 1,200 | 2,600 |
| 40-mm. AA guns_ | 9,000 | 13,000 |
| Bazookas | 67,000 | 98,000 |
| Aircraft machine guns | 353,000 | 501,000 |
| .30-cal. rifle M1 | 758,000 | 1,220,000 |
| .50-cal. cartridges | 1,632,145,000 | 4,405,554,000 |
more or less at random illustrates the contrast between 1942 and 1943. (Table 7)
By the end of the first year after Pearl Harbor the immense task of equipping the rapidly expanding Army was well under way. Sufficient supplies were on hand for the North Africa landings in November 1942, for the supply of other overseas forces, and for aid to allies. By the summer of 1943 the first phase of the supply process was virtually complete, and reserve stocks of many items were beginning to accumulate. In July and August 1943 the War Department Procurement Review Board headed by Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, and including among its members a former Chief of Ordnance, General Williams, surveyed the whole situation and reached the conclusion that the time had come for closer screening of requirements and tighter control of inventories.73 As noted above, a move in this direction had been taken by Ordnance and other technical services earlier in the year with the dispatch overseas of teams trained to survey actual consumption data.74
The conclusions of the McCoy Board were received with some misgivings at ASF headquarters. Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, ASF Director of Matériel, had labored hard throughout 1942 to boost production and overcome equipment shortages. His goal had been to supply combat troops with all the fighting tools they needed, and to that end he had constantly urged industrial leaders and workers in the shops to put forth every effort to meet their production quotas. Now the. McCoy report gave the impression that production had caught up with demand and that relaxation of effort was in order. “They came out with a report telling the world that we had too much of everything,” complained General Clay in the spring of 1944, “and the emphasis went over on economy instead of man-you-don’t-be-short.”75 In General Clay’s opinion it was “the worst thing that ever happened around here,” for it resulted in a slackening of effort on the home front during 1944. Cutbacks in some production schedules were certainly called for by the latter half of 1943, but there were major exceptions, such as artillery ammunition,
which should have been pushed ahead instead of being held back.76
As a follow-up to the McCoy Board report a special committee headed by Brig. Gen. George J. Richards studied reserve stocks in both the Z I and overseas. It recommended some cuts and urged improvement in methods for computing requirements and controlling reserve supplies, but did not take exception to the supplies of ammunition that had accumulated during the period of limited fighting. In view of the rise in total Army storage inventories to more than $5 billion the committee urged that for some types of equipment reliance be placed in the future on reserve production capacity rather than on reserve stocks. As sea lanes to all theaters were open the committee urged reduction in the huge reserve stocks in overseas depots. The so-called McNarney Directive of 1 January 1944 put these recommendations into effect and was soon followed by the introduction of new techniques that came to be known as Supply Control.77 In essence, the new system was nothing more than a close integration of all supply data with known requirements. For each principal item of equipment, it brought together on one sheet of paper all data affecting supply and demand status, including past issue experience, estimated future issues to ports, and the schedule of future production. Monthly supply reports from overseas commands were used to keep procurement plans in line with the actual supply situation in the theaters of war. From the production standpoint an important feature of the Supply Control system was the fact that, unlike the ASP, it stated requirements on a monthly as well as an annual basis with a view toward keeping closer control of procurement and supply.78
Requirements leveled off in the 1944-45 period as compared to the earlier years. Production was mostly for replacement of equipment worn out or lost in action, and settled down to a fairly stable level month after month. But for Ordnance there were several major exceptions to this rule. Adoption of new types of weapons and ammunition, or suddenly increased demands for old types, caused sharp fluctuations in requirements.79 A notable example was the emergence of rockets as major Ordnance items, resulting in a steadily rising curve of requirements for rockets and launchers during the latter half of the war. In other areas the trend was toward big-ness—heavy artillery to batter down fixed defenses, blockbuster bombs to blast military targets, huge tanks to counter the German heavyweights, and large trucks to provide fast overland transport in the European theater. Whatever the nature of the change in requirements, they spelled trouble for Ordnance. In large measure
the chapters that follow are devoted to the maneuvers necessary to keep production in line with stated requirements.
As early as 1943 the War Department took steps to estimate the effect on requirements of the end of the war in Europe. To guard against adverse psychological effects Df announcing that the Army was already planning for the end of the war, the fact that demobilization studies were being conducted was not made public, and within the Army they were discreetly referred to as “special planning” studies. They began in the fall of 1943 with a requirements computation based on a reduced troop basis for Period I—after defeat of Germany but before defeat of Japan—and from that time forward special planning computations played a more and more important role as the end of the war came closer. After the defeat of Germany in early May 1945, the Ordnance Matériel Control Division (the former Requirements Division) continued its calculations for the redeployment of matériel from Europe to the Far East. The task involved determining what quantities should be kept in Europe and what surplus matériel was serviceable enough, or could be properly repaired, for shipment to the Pacific. In the war against Japan the Army planned to use more heavy infantry weapons, more amphibious equipment, more self-propelled artillery, and fewer heavy tanks. While these calculations were in process the Japanese surrender was announced and the war was over.