Chapter 11: Supplies and Equipment in Combat Use
World War II brought in its train insistent demands for the development of new items of supply and equipment and for the betterment of old items. Military planners realized that unless these demands were met, at least in part, troops could not properly cope with the novel and unexpected exigencies of fighting that extended into every quarter of the globe. In an effort to keep Quartermaster items abreast of wartime requirements, the OQMG in Washington vastly enlarged its research and development program. Brig. Gen. Georges F. Doriot, who, as director of the Military Planning Division, headed this program, from the outset relied heavily upon the advice of technically trained observers he sent overseas to obtain firsthand information about the capabilities of Quartermaster items and the needs of field forces.1 From their recommendations and those of overseas quartermasters emanated many desirable changes and improvements. Pacific theater experience and suggestions guided the course of much of the research and development work undertaken in the zone of interior.
Jungle Supplies and Equipment
Fighting had barely broken out on Bataan before it was demonstrated that the white color of clothing and equipment imperiled the lives of the hard-pressed defenders. Men, clad in white garments, made glaring targets for enemy bombers and strafers. Troops bathing in streams might disclose their positions if they did not conceal towels and underwear. Neglect of this essential precaution, Col. Thomas W. Doyle, veteran of Bataan, informed the OQMG on his return to the United States in July 1942, caused the death of one of his supply officers. Soldiers washing underwear and handkerchiefs, he added, would ordinarily throw these telltale articles to the ground or dry them on a rock, but this practice, too, endangered their lives. In daytime anything white “had to be pulled in and covered up.”2 Attempts, not altogether unsuccessful, were made to color white materials with the juice of berries and the tannin of tree bark. Experience on Guadalcanal confirmed the necessity of camouflage, but since coffee was more plentiful there than it had been in the Philippines, it constituted
the main coloring agent.3 In the United States the OQMG, aware of the problems presented by bleached supplies and equipment in an age of air warfare, began to procure olive-drab rather than white underwear, socks, handkerchiefs, and towels. Production bottlenecks for some months retarded the delivery of these new materials, but as 1943 progressed, larger and larger shipments of the colored items arrived in overseas areas.4
Meanwhile in the Southwest Pacific there had arisen the problem of what changes in Quartermaster supplies and equipment, particularly in the soldier’s uniform, might be required by the extraordinary physical conditions found in such places as New Guinea. This problem was complicated by the marked variation in that island’s terrain, which ranged from low-lying, insect-infested coastal areas through mountains and valleys covered with lush jungle growths and rain forests to high peaks with low night temperatures. Most of all, the problem was complicated by the lack of any special jungle clothing and equipment except for the bolo, which had been adapted from the long knife used by Filipinos for cutting their way through tangled undergrowth.
Shortly after the catastrophic collapse of the Allied forces in Malaya, MacArthur’s headquarters began to study the whole question of jungle equipment. The disastrous Malayan campaign had convinced many U.S. Army officers that the smashing tactical success of the Japanese was ascribable mostly to their light, compact, and easily portable equipment and their skillful utilization of camouflage. Japanese troops, it was claimed, moved swiftly and noiselessly through the most tangled vegetation, constantly infiltrating the lines of their overloaded opponents, who were handicapped by unsuitable and inadequately camouflaged garments and encumbered by heavy equipment that could not be moved without disclosing their presence. To determine what new items might be needed by American troops, representatives of GHQ interviewed Dutch and British veterans of the war’s opening campaigns and Americans who had lived for years in Pacific islands. On the basis of the jungle lore of these men a series of recommendations was submitted to OCQM USASOS.5
That agency was advised that the khaki cotton uniform and the papier-mâché helmet would both probably be suitable if they were well camouflaged by mottled patches of light green dye or by solid light-green coloring. Footwear presented the main problem. A boot that would last longer than the U.S. Army leather shoe in wet terrain, afford better protection against the entrance of mud and insects, and give a firmer footing on slippery grass slopes, was the basic requirement. Such a shoe might be “of the basketball type, with a strong canvas top, allowing water to drain out, and a thick corded rubber sole,” and with the sides of the tongue sewed up to the top to prevent the entrance of leeches.6 If a boot of this type could not be furnished, one modeled upon the hobnailed shoe worn by soldiers of the Netherlands Indies was desired. That shoe was canvas-topped and leather-
heeled and soled. Both this shoe and the proposed jungle boot, it was believed, would render leggings unnecessary. Leggings at best were unsatisfactory, for, being laced, they required eyeholes and so permitted the entrance of insects. Tightly rolled puttees, smeared with soap or tobacco juice, were thought to afford better protection.
Finally, GHQ informed the Chief Quartermaster that in tropical jungles soldiers could not carry as much individual equipment as they did in temperate climates and that it would therefore be necessary to lighten the weight of loaded packs. This goal, it was suggested, might be achieved by the issue of thinner blankets and by the elimination of gas masks and shelter halves. Instead of shelter halves troops might carry canvas sheets, each large enough to make a lean-to tent for one squad. Bolos, mosquito bars, matches in waterproof containers, emergency rations, and small cooking kits could not, it was thought, be discarded.
Immediate need for jungle supplies and equipment developed in late July and early August, when the enemy landed in the Buna area of northern Papua and advanced south over the mountains toward Port Moresby, a development that obviously demanded retaliatory action by U.S. and Commonwealth forces in order to protect the approaches to Australia. MacArthur, hoping that the War Department could quickly fill his requirements for special items in the coming offensive, sent urgent requests to Washington for 150,000 jungle kits. Among the Quartermaster items that he especially wanted, aside from those previously recommended to the Chief Quartermaster, were gloves, fitted with long gauntlets to protect the wrists from insects, and man or animal-drawn vehicles especially designed for jungle transportation.7
MacArthur’s messages arrived in Washington at a time when the OQMG was just starting work on experimental jungle items with the help of Capt. Cresson H. Kearny, a former oil geologist, who had worked for years in South American jungles and since the summer of 1941 had been designing and testing jungle equipment in Panama for the Caribbean Defense Area. Kearny had developed many special items of the sort asked for by the Southwest Pacific Area and some others as well, but few had been fully tested and none were being manufactured. Despite the lack of complete testing, the OQMG on receipt of Mac-Arthur’s messages quickly placed production orders and late in August shipped model sets of the equipment by air to the Southwest Pacific Area for field study by tactical units. During the next few months this area submitted additional requisitions and by November had ordered more than 250,000 sets. Shipments could not be started from San Francisco until late November and then only in partial completion of the requisitions. This long delay meant that MacArthur could not obtain the equipment in time for the Buna–Sanananda counteroffensive. That operation was accordingly carried out with items already on hand or items improvised and produced in Australia.8
The QMC in that country for a time considered the adoption of the Japanese,
British, and Australian practice of wearing only shorts and open-necked, short-sleeved shirts. Though Australian officers insisted that this custom kept their men cooler and more comfortable, the idea of adopting it for American use was abandoned when reports were received that 30 percent of the Australian troops in New Guinea were suffering from malaria or from body scratches and infections that could have been prevented had they been better covered. Despite GHQ’s initial preference for the cotton khaki uniform, the OCQM concluded that the herringbone twill Army work suit was the best garment immediately available for jungle warfare. It stood up better than did the cotton khaki uniform under the rough usage of combat areas where soldiers often had to crawl over the ground and force their way through tangled vegetation, and its gray-green color could be more easily camouflaged to blend with green foliage than could the yellowish-brown of khaki apparel. The two-piece work suit was chosen in preference to the one-piece coverall because it afforded more ventilation and did not require soldiers using latrines virtually to undress themselves. Work suits of troops bound for forward areas were camouflaged as a matter of course. In conjunction with the Corps of Engineers, which normally did the camouflaging, the QMC determined what shades and color designs were most appropriate, but the haste that necessarily accompanied the preparations for an early offensive precluded extensive use of pattern designs. Work suits in general were simply dyed a darker color. There was at first uncertainty as to what shade of green was best, but though many suits were at first dyed a darker green, No. 7 olive drab was the shade finally selected. Unfortunately, much of the locally procured dye, the main source of camouflaging material, speedily faded.9
Since enemy snipers had much success in picking off soldiers who wore distinctive clothing and insignia or carried visible weapons, camouflage was applied not only to work suits but also to mosquito nets, tents, and other canvas equipment, and to personal equipment of light color or shiny appearance which might reveal the presence of Americans. Even helmets were covered with camouflaged burlap tucked around the bottom between the liner and the steel shell. Before the 32nd Division moved against the Japanese, it developed a mass-production system for the rapid spraying of materials to be dyed. In accordance with a prearranged schedule units brought both their organizational and individual equipment to the camouflaging plant, which immediately applied the necessary coloring; the units then carried away the wet items and dried them. The 41st Division followed the same general procedure but colored equipment by dipping it into the dye-filled vats of an Australian brewery.10
Neither the work suit nor its camouflaging proved fully satisfactory in the Buna—Sanananda offensive. Unit reports convinced most Southwest Pacific quartermasters that herringbone twill was not sufficiently porous for prolonged wearing in the tropics. It absorbed more moisture and dried out more slowly than did other cotton materials and made the wearer almost unbearably hot within a few hours.11 Even the desirability of
Camouflaged jungle suit. Note the jungle boots worn by the soldier, and the camouflaged helmet.
dyeing the work suit was challenged. According to Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, commander of the I Corps at Buna, the coloring “closed the ‘breathing spaces’ in the cloth.”12 The dye used to impart a darker green to the gray-green shade ran and eventually “got a grayish-green anyway after having been in the mud for some time.”13 In many instances “during the recent action,” Eichelberger asserted, “the undyed uniform was less conspicuous than the dyed.” In other instances “the dyed uniform seemed slightly the better.” The margin of preference, he declared, was “so slight” that the decisive elements in the final conclusion that camouflaging of work suits ought to be abandoned were the delay and the cost of coloring uniforms plus the fact that unfixed dyes faded and ran.14
Besides making a jungle combat uniform out of work suits, the QMC in August had arranged for Australian manufacture of about 2,500 pairs of green sniper shoes, which were inspired by the apparent value of comparable footwear to Japanese troops. These shoes, similar to gymnasium or tennis shoes, were to be used by scouting patrols since they made less noise than did service
shoes.15 Service shoes, converted into hobnailed footwear for the sake of firmer footing on slippery, stony, and mountainous terrain and provided with heel plates and rawhide laces, were a common foot covering. After troops of the 32nd Division had their regular shoes hobnailed, they discovered that the hobs quickly fell out of old leather soles. As far as practicable new shoes were accordingly issued to soldiers about to go into the combat zone. Late in the year small quantities of footwear procured in Australia and hobbed in manufacture became available and gave less trouble than did the converted type, but both varieties disintegrated rapidly in the mud around Buna. Constant soaking, with no opportunity for complete drying, quickly rotted the leather, and some shoes wore out in only ten days. In early 1943 a small quantity of American-made service shoes with composition soles arrived in New Guinea. They proved much more satisfactory than leather-soled footwear and did not disintegrate so swiftly.16
The canvas-topped jungle boot, developed in the United States as part of the special equipment for the Pacific, did not arrive in New Guinea soon enough to be utilized widely in MacArthur’s initial offensive. It had rubber soles and canvas tops that at least in theory furnished better protection against mud and insects than did regular leather service footwear plus leggings, but in field tests it did not meet expectations and proved, in fact, ill-adapted for general use by combat troops. It slipped on roots and wet sloping soil and gave insufficient protection against stones and poor support for ankles and arches. Moreover, the canvas tops shrank. The American Division in ‘the South Pacific and several infantry outfits in MacArthur’s command claimed that the boot afforded so little protection for the feet that severe blisters developed around the toes. The OQMG attempted to solve this problem by means of removable duck insoles and soft cushion-sole socks. Both items absorbed moisture and perspiration and would, it was hoped, prevent the toes from blistering. The Sixth Army reported that in actual use the insole shrank and did “not fulfill the requirements of an insole under field conditions.”17
For more than a year the jungle boot, as well as the service shoe, was regularly issued to troops going to Southwest Pacific Area operational areas, but the service shoe more and more became the shoe actually worn in combat zones. At Humboldt Bay in April 1944, for example, most soldiers wore it. One division, it is true, employed the boot, but an OQMG observer was told that this would not be done in the future owing to the discomfort caused by the lack of proper support for the men’s arches. The boot, moreover, could not be laced tightly. Its canvas tops chafed the lower legs, and its rubber soles made walking tiresome. It was particularly unsatisfactory “for marching over relatively hard surfaces, through jungle
devoid of swamp and similar terrain, or where any sort of load” was “carried in the pack.”18 But since it allowed water to run out as rapidly as it entered and dried quickly, the boot had substantial value under conditions where troops’ feet were nearly always wet. Soldiers discharging landing craft lying in the surf, Engineer troops working in water for hours while they constructed bridges, and men operating in swampy areas usually preferred it. Patrols also like the boot because it was supple and made little noise.19 By the beginning of 1944 its issue to combat organizations had generally ceased; requisitioning from the United States had stopped; and remaining stocks were distributed only to units asking for them. The service shoe had become the generally accepted footwear for jungle warfare as well as for other purposes.
For combat operations in rough country infantry troops preferred the hobnailed variety of service shoe. While rubber-soled footwear was suitable in dry terrain, hobnailed shoes gave a firmer footing and quickened progress in muddy areas, on uplands, and in jungles where wet logs, slippery vegetation, and rocky trails abounded. On coral islands ordinary leather soles wore through in a matter of days. Rubber soles, though more satisfactory, sometimes slipped and did not last long under constant use. At Biak rubber-soled footwear wore out in ten days, and fresh supplies had to be flown in and dropped by parachute in order to keep one outfit shod. In similar circumstances hobnailed shoes stood up better and gave better traction than did either of the other types. They were, however, difficult to obtain, for few were manufactured in the United States and Australian production went mainly to the Commonwealth Forces.20
A tropical combat boot, with rubber-cleated soles and heels, was tentatively developed by the OQMG in 1944 and was well received when tested in the Pacific. Those who wore it had only one major criticism—the extremely narrow spaces between the cleats facilitated the accumulation of mud, especially on the heels, which then became almost as smooth as plain leather or rubber heels. With the correction of this fault the rubber-cleated boot would probably have been better liked than any other kind of footwear. But it was designed specifically as an improved jungle boot, and the war moved out of jungle territory before its development could be completed.21
The original jungle boot, with its high canvas top, was intended to give the wearer’s feet and legs the same protection the standard canvas leggings did and thus make that item unnecessary. But since the boot had increasingly fallen into disuse, and the service shoe was too low, combat forces had little protection against deep mud except for leggings. They were “one of the most disliked items.”22 They chafed the legs, soaked up water, and took too long to put on and to dry out. Troops, the USAFFE Board noted, “either leave them behind, cut them down to smaller size ... or put the trousers inside the stockings.” Discarded leggings, it continued, were found more frequently than any other item in salvage
collections of abandoned web equipment. Once soldiers, in violation of sanitary regulations, had cast them aside, they had no adequate protection against mud, whether they were marching, fighting, or working in wet dumps. To provide a substitute, the OQMG developed a combat shoe whose distinctive feature was a cuff and buckle top that gave it a height of ten inches as compared with the six inches of the service shoe. Though production of this new item began in the United States in January 1944, few shoes were delivered to the Pacific areas. A year later the X Corps reported that everyone “would like to get” some.23
Conspicuous among the pieces of equipment shipped from San Francisco in late 1942 was the jungle hammock, which was expressly designed for soldiers entering a combat area. This hammock was optimistically expected to take the place of tent, shelter half, canvas cot, and mosquito net in regions where these essential items could not be taken either because they were too cumbersome to carry or because of unsuitable terrain. One of the chief virtues ascribed to the hammock was that it permitted men to sleep off the ground and so avoid insects and dampness. Made of a lightweight duck fabric, it had a false bottom that provided a dead air space and prevented mosquitoes from biting the occupant’s back. Attached to and over this bottom was an enclosed zipper-opening mosquito net, which in turn was fastened to a rainproof canopy stretched over sticks placed in the ground. The hammock itself was suspended between neighboring trees.24 This ingenious piece of equipment never fulfilled the high hopes of its originators. Light though it was, it still was too bulky to be carried easily. Most important of all, it proved impractical in operational zones. Front-line soldiers, the Sixth Army reported, did “not like to sleep above ground because of possible aerial bombing” and hostile infiltration, and “soldiers behind the line” wanted “to keep out of the way of shrapnel.” In combat areas, the Sixth Army pointed out, it was “essential that troops sleep in fox-holes, dugouts,” or slit trenches.25
Despite such reports, which flowed in from all parts of the Pacific, the OQMG continued to improve the hammock, simplifying its zipper opening and reducing its weight by increased use of nylon. More than 700,000 hammocks were manufactured in 1944, and 600,000 were scheduled for 1945 procurement. These articles, though not widely utilized by the combat troops for whom they had been developed, nevertheless proved valuable in other ways. Rear areas, recurrently afflicted by severe shortages of tentage and cots, found hammocks satisfactory substitutes. During the wet season, when rain fell incessantly for hours, flooding bivouac areas and preventing tents from being pitched, jungle hammocks kept the troops “high and dry during the sleeping hours.”26 Some men in rear areas, Lt. Col. D. B. Dill, OQMG observer, noted, consistently preferred them for the better protection they gave against crawling and flying insects and slept in them as often as they could. When constantly employed, jungle hammocks had one conspicuous disadvantage—speedy deterioration, which
limited their life, according to Dill, to about forty-five days.27
The poncho, a rectangular, blanket-like cloak made from raincoat material with an opening in its center for the wearer’s head, provided some of the services that the jungle hammock had been developed to supply but seldom did. Normally regarded as a makeshift substitute for a raincoat, it was actually a garment that served many varied purposes. Versatility was indeed its chief recommendation, giving the poncho, rarely a favorite item of issue, a high degree of popularity among combat troops in the Pacific. It served as tarpaulin, as ground sheet for sleeping soldiers, as protection for blankets, as foxhole cover, as rain collector, as pillow, and as blackout against lights from cigarettes and fuel tablets. Two of them, fastened together to form a shelter, served in place of a tent. By thus substituting for half a dozen or so bulky articles the garment markedly lessened the soldier’s load.28
When fighting started on Guadalcanal, the poncho was not a regular item of Army issue, but early operational experience and observation of the high combat utility of the Marine Corps version of the cloak convinced quartermasters that its issue to Army troops was desirable. Accordingly, in the autumn of 1942 the QMC in the United States began to ship Marine-type ponchos to the Pacific areas, but it did not forward them in quantities large enough for issue to all soldiers. In October 1943, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, head of the Army Service Forces, who was then visiting the South Pacific Area and the Southwest Pacific Area, was so deeply impressed with their general value that he ordered his headquarters to procure enough Marine-type ponchos to supply all soldiers in these two areas. His instructions were immediately carried out, and by the close of the year this equipment was being issued in place of raincoats to all troops embarking for the South and the Southwest Pacific Areas.29
Front-line fighters valued the poncho mainly as a tent, ground sheet, and protective cover for equipment of all sorts. Some of them, indeed, valued it so highly that they took it into action with them even though they left their packs behind. But they thought it too hot and too heavy for use as a raincoat, officially considered its principal function. This was not really a loss since in combat operations the raincoat itself was objectionable for the same reasons. The heavy fabric employed in both garments was better suited to temperate than tropical climates; in jungles it increased the flow of sweat and interfered with bodily movement to so great an extent that neither piece of equipment could be worn comfortably in the daytime. On rainy nights some infantrymen in quiet sectors did wear the poncho, but those at the front seldom did. Colonel Dill was nevertheless so favorably impressed by its general serviceability that he declared no need existed in the tropics for either raincoat or shelter half.30
The high opinion of the poncho held by the infantry and such observers as General
Somervell and Colonel Dill was not fully shared by corps troops, division service troops, artillerymen, and base supply troops, all of whom operated in rear areas under comparatively favorable conditions. Unlike infantrymen, they did not live for days in close contact with the enemy and the ground. Their work consisted mainly of driving trucks, working in supply dumps, and handling ammunition at artillery positions. These activities were normally carried on at some distance from the front, and those engaged in them had little reason for employing the poncho as a general utility item. They had, moreover, free access to the equipment for which it served as a substitute. Consequently, they did not overlook its clumsiness as readily as did infantrymen. The poncho, in fact, seriously interfered with the lifting and stacking of supplies and with all other manual operations. A lightweight nylon type was developed toward the close of the war, but the Southwest Pacific Area OCQM recommended in May 1945 that in the future raincoats be issued to all troops in place of ponchos. Combat units, it contended, would have no further need for the latter articles, for they were to be amply supplied with shelter halves in preparation for the invasion of Japan. USAFFE approved the OCQM recommendation, but the Sixth and Eighth Armies requested that ponchos continue to be made available to their tactical elements.31
The prevalence of malaria-bearing mosquitoes early gave birth to a demand for personal equipment that would protect troops from these dangerous insects. Mosquito headnets and gloves were accordingly procured in Australia and included in shipments from the United States. The headnet, designed to guard the wearer’s face and head, was meant for use by troops when sleeping and even when fighting, but, as there was no way of keeping the netting away from the face, few men ever wore it. Soldiers, attempting to sleep in the head-net, felt suffocated and soon took it off. Worst of all, it impeded clear vision, particularly during night fighting when most essential. The glove, made of flannel, was worn even less often than the headnet. It was not only hot and soggy; it also seriously interfered with the handling of weapons and ammunition. The almost unanimous verdict of observers was that neither the glove nor the headnet, even if markedly improved, would ever be generally worn. In any event the availability of mosquito bars in increasing numbers and the development of effective insect repellents rendered other protective measures less necessary.32
The U.S. Army machete, a straight, broad-bladed knife, 18 inches long, replaced the shorter, heavier bolo as the main tool for cutting through tangled vegetation. Modeled on machetes developed in South America and the West Indies for slashing cane and clearing out dense underbrush, it depended upon velocity rather than weight for its effect. It permitted quicker and easier swinging by wrist action than did the bolo type and readily cleared jungles of light, resilient growth that “simply sprang away from the slower blow of a heavier, shorter cutting instrument.”33 It was a particularly useful tool for making paths
through thick vegetation. Not until the Philippines were reached and fighting took place more and more in the open country was it much criticized. Soldiers found little need for the machete under these circumstances and began to discard it, claiming it was so long when suspended from their belts that it hit their legs and caught on brush. Some units in consequence issued only one machete to a squad.34
The flotation bladder was another unusual piece of equipment. Made of rubberized fabric, it was planned as a swimming aid. It was tucked under the uniform over the chest and stomach and inflated, when necessary, by blowing through a small rubber tube. The bladder supplied sufficient buoyancy for the wearer to swim deep streams when he was fully clothed and equipped. Actually, streams were seldom wide or deep enough to warrant use of the bladder in swimming, but it occasionally served as a water carrier or an auxiliary canteen. At Hollandia the soldiers of at least one regiment, fighting in an area where water was scarce, met their individual requirements by once a day filling two bladders. The major service of this piece of equipment, however, was one not contemplated by its originators—that of providing an excellent pillow for soldiers who otherwise would not have enjoyed this luxury.35
With troops in jungle areas forced to carry much of their own equipment, the OQMG developed a jungle pack specially designed to lighten their burden. The pack was a water-resistant pouch large enough to hold a soldier’s hammock, spare clothing, and rations. On top was a small zipper-opening sack for canteen, medical kit, mess gear, and other small articles. As the pack itself was not waterproof, two waterproof bags, which could be fitted inside, were developed. One was a small food bag, cylindrical in shape, five inches in diameter and twelve inches in depth, and weighing only two ounces, which protected rations from dampness. Each combat soldier received six or eight of the bags. They were supposed to be placed in the jungle pack, but were normally carried on troops’ belts and used as utility sacks for spare socks, toilet articles, tobacco, matches, knives, can openers, photofolders, and other personal belongings.36 The second bag, a clothing sack, had a like evolution. It weighed seven ounces and was intended to hold sleeping equipment and extra clothing within the pack. In actuality it was used mostly as a field substitute for the barracks bag, a departure dictated largely by the demand for the lightest possible pack. A soldier participating in an amphibious operation put clothing and other personal articles not required in combat into a clothing bag, marked it with his name, and placed it along with those of several other men in a duffel bag, which, presumably, arrived eventually at the correct company dump. Here he could pick it up during a rest period when he would need its contents.37 The articles carried in the clothing bag generally consisted of a complete change of apparel plus a blanket,
towels, and perhaps a few personal possessions.
The jungle pack itself, contrary to the originators’ broad conception of its employment, was utilized only for the few essential articles needed in a combat zone. In the Southwest Pacific, troops normally carried in their packs only a poncho, one or two pairs of socks, a pair of trousers, handkerchiefs, two waterproof food bags, one flotation bladder, a two-day supply of operational rations, a container of canned heat, a meat can with spoon, and a small towel. When front-line soldiers went into action, they seldom carried packs; they simply left them in organization dumps and put a few rations and personal belongings in a poncho, which they strapped to their cartridge belts or belt suspenders.38
Captain Orr, the ubiquitous OQMG observer in the Southwest Pacific, reported that the troops who had participated in the Hollandia operation considered the jungle pack and the two waterproof bags on the whole fairly satisfactory. There was, however, general criticism of the size of the pack, which, admittedly, was too large for the small amount of gear it carried. Some men also claimed that it rode too low on the back, that the straps chafed the shoulders, and that, when it was drawn up in walking, the intrenching shovel hit them.39 What they wanted was a smaller pack with felt-padded shoulder straps or a pack composed of detachable sections that could be dropped, if not needed, and retrieved later by salvage crews. Meanwhile the OQMG was working on a new pack, which was standardized in April 1945. Known as the cargo-and-combat field pack, it consisted of two parts. The lower part, called the cargo pack, held the equipment normally placed in the waterproof clothing bag. The upper part, called the combat pack, contained the items actually needed by fighting troops. Toward the end of the Okinawa operation the cargo-and-combat pack appeared in scattered quantities, and front-line troops generally praised it.40
Operational Rations for Ground Combat Forces
Since organizations fighting the Japanese could not manage kitchens and prepare hot meals for themselves, a constant effort was made to supply such meals from company kitchens located several miles back of the front. Hot food was highly important, for it gave soldiers’ morale a lift seldom imparted by cold food. Yet to provide it was not an easy task. During an amphibious operation the low landing priorities for A and B rations and for cooking equipment, the unsorted state of supplies on beachheads, and the narrowness of the initial combat zones sometimes precluded the establishment of kitchens for ten days or more. If operations became mobile, kitchens could seldom keep pace with the constantly moving troops, and this circumstance alone might prevent the supply of hot food. In jungle territory, even in static warfare, the absence of roads rendered impossible the normal method of using quarter-ton trucks to take to the front marmite cans filled with hot provisions. The problem was further complicated by the scarcity of substitute equipment and manpower. If native laborers were obtainable and the front was relatively quiet, they might carry hot food by hand three or five miles over steep, slippery
trails to the troops actively engaging the enemy. But if there was much shelling, this could not be done.41
Because of all these difficulties special operational rations that could be carried by combat troops themselves were extensively employed. These rations, individually boxed or canned, contained long-lasting foods that troops would be able, if circumstances dictated, to consume unheated. But most of the constituents were more palatable if eaten warm, and canned heat was therefore provided along with the rations if possible. Before these rations were standardized, they had been scientifically studied by food experts and tried and pronounced acceptable by soldiers in the United States. These tests were ordinarily carried out under good conditions that could seldom be duplicated in operational areas. The rations provided for them, moreover, were fresh rations produced and canned and packaged only a few weeks before. They were unaffected by deterioration, heated whenever this would enhance their palatability, and eaten under comfortable circumstances, often in regular messes. The original conception of combat rations had been that they would be stored in well-protected warehouses overseas and be not more than a year old when consumed. Actually, in the Pacific areas they were often exposed to the worst possible storage conditions, were usually from one to two years old, and frequently were eaten during the nervous excitement of battle, when few men had much appetite.42
Overseas areas judged operational rations on the basis of sustenance, palatability, and portability. A relatively high sustaining value characterized all the rations but varied somewhat from type to type according to differing caloric values and vitamin contents. Palatability was beyond question highly desirable, for food discarded because of bad taste was no better than no food at all. Since rations that could not be carried easily by combat soldiers burdened by military paraphernalia might be thrown away, ready portability, too, was essential. Yet the importance of both palatability and portability was, apparently, not fully appreciated at the time the first wartime rations were developed. Palatability at best was difficult of achievement because the necessity for using nonperishable rations entailed the exclusion of all fresh provisions and the inclusion of products specially prepared to give them lasting qualities—often at the expense of taste appeal. Nor was portability easily attained, for it was hard to combine that quality with substantial bulk and high caloric value.
When the Guadalcanal and Buna offensives started, the C ration was the only operational ration on hand in large quantities in the South Pacific Area and the Southwest Pacific Area. Composed of three meat or M units and three bread or B units, it was seriously lacking in variety. Meat constituted half of each of the three M units, commonly referred to as a meat and beans unit, a meat and vegetable hash unit, and a meat and vegetable stew unit. The meat component of the first two consisted of 40 percent beef and 10 percent pork, that of the third unit was all beef. The vegetable components of these M units were also much the same, beans and tomatoes being found in fairly large proportions in both the beans and
the stew units, and potatoes in both the hash and the stew units. Only two other vegetables were used—carrots for the stew and onions for the hash. There was even less variety in the B units, which all contained the same kind of cracker, hard candy, and soluble coffee in the same quantities. The cracker, called the “C Square Biscuit,” was of a special noncommercial type, reinforced with vitamins and calories at the expense of taste. The OQMG was keenly aware that the C ration would become monotonous if it were the only food available over protracted periods. But at the outset that office regarded this ration simply as an emergency reserve that would be utilized at most for only a few days at a time. It did not foresee that in some instances the ration would actually constitute the backbone of combat food supply in the Pacific for days on end.43
To obtain more variety in the subsistence earmarked for emergency use in the Buna—Sanananda operations, USASOS improvised a “rice” ration, having as its main element C components, supplemented by one D ration and a pound and a half of rice. The D ration, designed primarily “to allay the worst hunger of a single missed meal,” was composed of three four-ounce cakes, commonly called chocolate bars but really not so much confections as highly concentrated and rather unpalatable mixtures of sugar, cocoa fat, skimmed milk powder, oat flour, vanilla, and chocolate.44 When utilized as part of the rice ration, it might constitute a meal in itself or it might be taken in small pieces along with other parts of the ration to give all three meals more variety. As the rice ration was generally employed in the Buna—Sanananda operations, breakfast consisted of C biscuits and skimmed milk, perhaps mixed, if heating equipment was available, with cooked rice; dinner, of the D ration; and supper, of a C meat component, again mixed, if possible, with cooked rice. If the rice ration was in short supply, limited stocks were often stretched by using as a single meal only one-fifth of a C meat or biscuit can, mixed with a little rice. When so employed, the QMC pointed out, the rice ration could sustain a man for five days.45 Since it was actually often utilized in this manner, soldiers not unnaturally found it lacking in appeal.
Even a full C ration offered only a dreary though sustaining diet after the first three or four days. Crackers, stored for a year or more, underwent chemical changes that made them rancid and gave them unpleasant flavors. Colonel Cordiner, visiting New Guinea, reported that “troops simply will not eat them except in the most difficult conditions with the result that there is great wastage.” In some places he found that supply dumps were utilizing badly deteriorated cartons of crackers “as dunnage.”46 Meat and hash and meat and stew were disliked almost as much as the crackers. Through lengthy exposure to high temperatures the fat in these components separated from other elements and formed a reddish conglomeration at the ends of the can, so
distasteful in appearance that soldiers repeatedly threw the whole mass of food away. With age the onions, carrots, and meats acquired new and less acceptable flavors and, according to some consumers, came to look and taste like “dog food.” Most troops found the soluble coffee unpalatable. Had utensils been available for heating the hash and stew, these components would have been vastly improved, but front-line troops seldom had such equipment.47 Yet despite these frequently objectionable features, hungry soldiers thoroughly appreciated the C ration if it was not too badly deteriorated. In the Papuan operations the men of the 162nd Regiment, obliged to live for days on “bully beef” and hard biscuits, hailed the ration as a delicacy when shipments finally reached them.48
For carrying purposes the C ration had the disadvantages of a relatively heavy weight—about five pounds—and of an awkward cylindrical can that occupied an excessive amount of space in soldiers’ packs. These characteristics made the ration unsuitable for units in contact with or pursuing the enemy. Troops obliged to carry the cumbersome burden for long periods of time protested vigorously. The almost universal demand was for a rectangular can, which could be fitted snugly into place, but such a container could not be provided owing to the impracticability of retooling plants for the manufacture of a can little used commercially.49
The C ration had one notable merit in that it supplied a quantity of food approximating that customarily eaten by soldiers. While some other combat rations were comparable to it in caloric value and vitamin content, they did not always furnish sufficient bulk and often left partakers still craving food. The C ration, on the other hand, if entirely consumed, provided troops with a normal amount of sustenance and so allayed the sensation of hunger created by an empty or partly empty stomach. This virtue, at first inadequately appreciated, won increasing recognition as knowledge of the ration accumulated. Another conspicuous virtue of the C ration was its tin packing, which warded off deterioration for a longer time than did the nonmetallic packing of some other operational rations. Owing to the prolonged storage of subsistence under poor conditions, this feature was of particular importance. The superior packing of the C ration and the adequate bulk furnished by its constituents led Southwest Pacific Area and South Pacific Area supply planners to prefer it to any other operational ration available before the 10-in-1 type arrived from the West Coast early in 1944.50 Because of this preference and because substantial quantities could be procured in Australia, this ration was used more extensively in the Pacific in 1942 and 1943 than in other overseas theaters.
The rice element of the improvised rice ration posed much less difficult questions than did the C components. It is true that, if water for cooking was unobtainable, this cereal, so valuable in making the soldier’s fare less monotonous, could not be utilized. But lack of water for such purposes was not common enough to rule out rice. Even when there was no culinary equipment for feeding small groups, soldiers desiring
cooked rice could obtain it by the simple expedient of using canned heat to prepare it in their canteen cups.51
The concentrated richness of D rations, the third major element of the rice ration, temporarily assuaged hunger, often before a whole cake was eaten. Some men, particularly if they ate rapidly, could not consume much of a cake without being nauseated. The chocolate, moreover, made troops thirsty; if drinking water was unavailable, this might be a rather distressing result. Another objectionable feature was the quick melting and deterioration of the bars. Despite the fact that D rations furnished no more than passing satisfaction, they served reasonably well as a substitute for a missed meal and so fulfilled the object for which they had been developed.52
Supply conditions in Papua occasionally required use of the Australian emergency ration, which had as its main constituent a six-ounce meat and vegetable plug, composed of dehydrated mutton, potatoes, carrots, and onions, so scored in pressing as to break easily into three equal parts. It also contained a four-ounce plug of dehydrated fruits and nuts—apricots, raisins, currants, and peanuts—and four tea and two milk tablets.53 To most soldiers this ration had only one attraction—its small size, which made it easy to carry in their pockets. They found it almost inedible when, as was normally necessary, it was eaten cold.54
Marine Corps experience with subsistence on Guadalcanal paralleled that of the Papuan force. B rations were scarce—at times unobtainable—and troops lived largely on C rations. These constituted the only food available during the first ten days after the initial landing. Col. Robert C. Kilmartin, a staff officer of the 1st Marine Division, termed C rations unsatisfactory. He claimed that six round cans were too many to get into a man’s pack, that the meat components were excessively greasy, and that the biscuits were too dry, particularly when there was no drinking water. Marines, another report declared, could not eat more than half a canful of C hash at a time. Because of the delayed arrival of B rations, they sometimes consumed captured Japanese food—mostly rice, canned bean-sprouts, taro, greens, and hardtack—and found it fairly edible.55
Shortly before the termination of the Papuan and Guadalcanal campaigns sizable shipments of the jungle ration, recently developed by Captain Kearny and the OQMG, were received, but they came too late for issue to any but a few units. This ration, consisting mostly of dry foods, was dubbed the “dehydrated ration.” Such subsistence, weighing only about a quarter as much as a nutritionally equivalent amount of ordinary subsistence, which is composed mainly of water, was selected because it helped lighten the load of combat troops and enabled them to carry a larger number of rations. Generous quantities of these components were provided, and the ration in consequence was still rather bulky, weighing, when packed, more than three pounds. Though the soldier’s consumption of water was increased by the quantity needed to
rehydrate the dry components, the developers of the ration, assuming that drinking water would at all times be available for this purpose in ample quantities, anticipated no need to carry any along.56 Each ration furnished about 3,500 calories a day—all that would normally be required—and a more varied selection of food than did the C ration. Besides substantial amounts of seedless raisins and dried peaches and prunes, the jungle ration contained salted peanuts, dry cereal, C biscuits, K ration meat, concentrated hard candy, cigarettes, and cocoa, coffee, and lemon powders. Composed of foods usually served cold, it had the merit of requiring no cooking utensils. Canned heat and a canteen were all that was needed to warm the beverages.
Field tests of the newly arrived jungle ration evoked both favorable and critical comments. An infantry company at Guadalcanal described it as “infinitely superior” in palatability “to any other ration issued during the recent campaign,” but pointed out that it did not provide as substantial fare as did the C ration. This unit also noted that the necessary drinking water often was not available. Most important of all, it pronounced the jungle ration too heavy and bulky for easy use in combat. If the ration was employed as its originators planned, each man would bear in his pack four rations, weighing a total of more than twelve pounds when placed in the waxed carton provided for that purpose. This was much too big a load for troops who had to carry on their persons weapons and equipment indispensable in combat. If heavy rations were added to their load, many soldiers, as all military history demonstrated, would discard them. The War Department suggested that the weight could be lightened to ten pounds by removing the ration components from their packings and putting them in five waterproof food bags. To tactical organizations this method was hardly more acceptable than the original one, for it added still more items to be looked after.57
Even more objectionable than the weight of the jungle ration was the inconvenient packaging of its constituents. Peanuts, raisins, dried peaches and prunes, cereals, and powdered milk were all packaged in four-ration or two-ration units. A sealed can of these products could not be opened to obtain food for the first meal without losing its packaging protection against moisture and insects and without exposing its entire contents to the possibility of premature consumption, which in turn would make a varied menu impossible. The meat and biscuits were the only major components packaged as one-ration units. With its one-, two-, and four-ration packaging the jungle ration did not, then, furnish the small, easily portable breakfast, dinner, and supper units that would have been most serviceable. Nor were there sufficient noncombatant troops to break down the ration into such units, or enough small containers available for that purpose. Had this been feasible, troops starting out on combat missions would have been able to take along as many or as few rations as pending operations demanded. Actually, if the jungle ration was issued, it meant giving troops a four-day supply, even when there existed no foreseeable need for so
generous an issue. The defects of the packaging were plainly manifest during the final phases of the Buna offensive, when isolated troops “in slit trenches” could be fed only “by having rations tossed to them by soldiers who crawled forward to within throwing range.” “A man might end up with a whole can of peanuts for a meal or a can of powdered milk.”58 Such disheartening results were inevitable as long as the components were all packaged separately.
Notwithstanding that the jungle ration, if not deteriorated, was rather palatable, supply officers in both the South and the Southwest Pacific came to consider it more a “picnic lunch” than a really nutritional ration that could be served to troops day after day. This fact, together with its unsatisfactory packaging, limited its value so much that in early 1943 its procurement in the United States was first reduced and then stopped. Of the hundreds of thousands of rations sent to these two theaters, comparatively few were issued to combat units except as the fare of reconnaissance patrols and as part of airdropped cargoes. In rear areas they were occasionally used to diminish the monotony of other rations. Because of the restricted demand, most of the stocks eventually spoiled. When, early in 1944, the recently developed and more varied 10-in-1 ration became available, USASOS directed that the remaining stores be disposed of by forced issues twice a month. About the same time the South Pacific Area started to salvage peanuts, raisins, and other edible components.59
The problem of suitable packing for combat rations was most satisfactorily met by the K ration, which was broken down into breakfast, dinner, and supper units. The packaged components of each of these units were put up in a rectangular carton, about six inches long, four inches wide, and two inches deep. The size, shape, and weight of these cartons made them appreciably easier to carry than the cylindrical C ration and the bulky jungle ration containers. Soldiers could take with them a two-day supply of food, which weighed only about as much as a one-day supply of C rations; if they desired, they might even carry the cartons in their pockets. Lightness was, indeed, perhaps the chief merit of the K ration. But the use of cartons rather than metallic containers had also the disturbing effect of intensifying the danger of deterioration.60
Many supply officers, while approving the lightness of the K ration, considered it to be, like the jungle ration, a picnic lunch. Its early history gave some justification for this belief. It had been developed in 1941 mainly to satisfy the demand of paratroopers for a lightweight ration that would provide sufficient nourishment during the first few days of a landing mission and yet not add unduly to their heavy load of arms, ammunition, and individual fighting equipment. Shortly after the new ration became available, infantry organizations decided it met their need for compact provisions for initial assault troops in amphibious operations, which, like airborne operations, required men to carry a mass of military paraphernalia. Originally, then, the K
ration was looked upon as one that would be utilized only during the first day or two of an offensive. Its composition in 1942 and 1943 also lent a certain justification to the description of picnic lunch. Though it contained more than 3,000 calories in scientifically approved proportions of fats, carbohydrates, and proteins, these constituents were in a highly concentrated form that furnished little bulk. After eating them, most soldiers still felt hungry.
Despite this shortcoming the K ration furnished food in greater variety than did the C ration of that period. Each meal unit contained chewing gum, dextrose tablets, and either bouillon or lemon-juice powders, none of which were originally included in the C ration, plus two sorts of crackers in contrast to the single C cracker. The supper unit provided in addition a small D chocolate bar. All three meals at first included meat, veal being furnished for breakfast, spam for dinner, and dried sausage for supper. For the sake of variety cheese was soon substituted for meat in one of the meals.61
Troops found some K components unappealing. Despite the fact that nutritionally dextrose tablets constituted an ideal source of energy, most men rejected them, thus illustrating the hazard involved in serving unfamiliar foods. In hot weather lemon-juice powders melted into a viscous taffy and lost their flavor and most of their vitamins; even when these powders were fresh, few soldiers would drink the synthetic juice made from them. Long-stored crackers and meats, too, lost their distinctive taste. Some kinds of chewing gum proved objectionable, for their flavors were transferred to un-canned food, which in consequence became inedible. On returning from a lengthy inspection trip to New Guinea, Major Fellers reported that troops tired of the K ration sooner than they did of either the C or the jungle ration.62 The probable reason was that K rations, packed in cartons and mostly packaged with nonmetallic materials, deteriorated faster than did tin-packed C rations. After a year’s storage C rations generally were in better shape than K’s.
The exact proportion in which combat troops used the different rations varied according to availability, the difficulty of the operation, the stocks of individual and group cooking utensils, and the personal preferences of supply planners. Operational orders set up the over-all quantities of subsistence, but within these limitations organization commanders determined how much of each ration would be employed. Feeding policies consequently varied not only among divisions but sometimes even among regiments and battalions of the same division.
As far as possible Southwest and South Pacific Area troops in rear operational areas were supplied with B rations, but these rations often lacked not only fresh provisions but also canned foods, bread, and other baked products. Soldiers shifted from the front to rest camps were if possible issued an extra third or half ration. To these men, particularly those who had just been on a C ration fare for one or two weeks, unbalanced B rations appeared to be simply the old C’s. This false conception arose because many elements ordinarily included in the B’s were missing and because hash and stew, the two components largely responsible for the C ration’s monotony, were often served. Sometimes hash and stew provided the only meat in the B ration. Matters were made
worse by the fact that, normally, the meat in both rations was corned beef. From this unsatisfactory situation sprang most of the numerous complaints that units had been fed nothing but C rations for months on end.63
Criticism of the C ration was aggravated by soldiers’ tendency to confuse it with the unbalanced B’s. In the Southwest Pacific Area troops alleged that Australian-produced C’s, the bulk of those consumed during the first half of the war, were inferior to the American product. This belief, for which there was no clear justification, was widely prevalent, and when, early in 1944, receipts of operational rations from the United States rapidly rose, USASOS canceled its unfilled contract demands on local firms.64
In the spring of 1944 the OQMG, in response to overseas complaints about the C ration, especially in the Pacific, altered that ration drastically. Variety was substantially widened by the use of ten instead of three meat components and by the establishment of six different menus, each containing three components. The meals now included such favorites as meat and spaghetti, frankfurters and beans, pork and beans, ham and eggs, and chicken and vegetables. Palatability was further increased by the elimination of the hash unit, by the substitution of a better beef stew, and by the addition of cocoa powder and several candies to the biscuit units.65 A particularly welcome innovation was the inclusion of accessory kits, each holding twelve cigarettes, matches, chewing gum, toilet paper, can openers, and halazone tablets. These tablets were essential in Pacific operations because there was no other way of quickly purifying unusable water. Combat troops regretted the retention of the cylindrical can, the heavy weight of the ration, and the absence from the accessory kit of salt and atabrine tablets, badly needed because of excessive loss of body salt through sweating and because of the high incidence of malaria.
Even before the OQMG produced the improved C ration, it had developed another ration, eventually called the 10-in-1, for feeding hot meals to small groups of troops during the short interval they were in areas beyond kitchens but not yet in contact with the enemy. Under such circumstances the want of kitchens did not exclude the preparation of hot meals if rudimentary cooking equipment, light in weight and easily portable, was provided. The new ration, furnishing food for ten men for one day—hence its name—was often described as simply a B ration so packed that any required number of rations could be speedily obtained. If, for example, two hundred soldiers needed food for one day, the time- and labor-consuming assembly of B components for that number of men could be obviated merely by taking out of storage twenty cases of the new ration. Actually, the 10-in-1 ration was somewhat less than a B ration; for one thing, it had fewer elements, and, for another, it used the individually packed K dinner unit for the noon meal. Yet it was certainly more like a B ration than any other operational ration. Consisting of five menus, each of which contained slightly different breakfast and supper units, it provided a wide range of cereals and canned and
dehydrated meats and vegetables and avoided the daily repetition of the same fare that had been the curse of the old C’s. Another favorable feature, which the 10-in-1 ration shared with the new C’s, was the inclusion of accessory kits.66
Sixth Army organizations, after they had tested the 10-in-1 ration in forward areas for periods of more than 45 days, pronounced it well suited either for unit messing or as an emergency ration for small groups. But they found it ill-adapted to individual consumption and hence unavailable as a substitute for the C, D, or K ration in combat areas where each man carried his own food. Among its virtues testing organizations particularly noted. its utility in speeding the assembly and distribution of B components.67
For some months the huge supply buildup for the coming campaign in France held up shipments of both the improved C and the new 10-in-1’s. The latter, even in small quantities, became available in the Southwest Pacific only in March 1944, and the modified C ration did not arrive in considerable amounts until the close of that year. The 10-in-1 ration, issued operationally for the first time in the Southwest Pacific during the Hollandia campaign, was warmly received. Though only small quantities were available, it proved so popular that the C type—stocks of which were still of the old variety—was employed less widely than in previous operations. The 10-in-1 ration, Captain Orr informed the OQMG Military Planning Division, “seemed a luxury to those troops who had taken part in the early days of the New Guinea campaign.”68 Supply officers particularly liked the ease with which they could issue it to small groups, not exceeding 290 in number. When however lack of regular rations forced unit kitchens to prepare it for larger groups—a use not contemplated by its developers—the results were less pleasing, for the opening of the numerous small cans required to feed these groups demanded a good deal of time and manpower. Tactical situations occasionally compelled the issue of 10-in-1’s to individual soldiers in direct contact with the enemy. When so employed, the food elements, not being packed for individual consumption, were often wasted. Losses were particularly apt to occur under the stress of battle when men who had lost their appetite for normal quantities of subsistence rifled rations for coffee and sweets and threw everything else away.69 A Quartermaster observer declared that “indiscriminate distribution” of 10-in-1’s during the first few days on Leyte, coupled with the “lack of organization in cooking and messing,” caused so much waste as to demand severe restrictions on future issues.70 Yet until the very end of hostilities the general availability and great popularity of this ration led to its extensive utilization under conditions like those on Leyte.
Excessive waste of the 10-in-1 ration prevailed in very small as well as large groups. Groups of less than ten men, such as were found among linemen, bridge guards, truck drivers, outposts, and patrols, were
especially prodigal,. for they were too small to consume the entire contents of cans, which held enough subsistence for ten men for one day. Since they ordinarily required food for only one or two meals, the percentage of loss was at times very high, particularly if they left partly used containers behind when they moved to a new location—unfortunately, a common practice.
Though the 10-in-1 was the most popular operational ration, some of its constituents were severely criticized. Troops coming to rest camps from the front, where K rations had been served for days, objected to the K noon meal. There was, they claimed, no reason for serving this meal in camps that had all means for preparing hot food. In combat areas where absence of sufficient usable water often made it impossible to prepare them properly, dehydrated vegetables were heartily disliked. Finally, sausage meat and some other components were unappetizing if, because of lack of canned heat, they had to be eaten cold.
In November 1944 the widespread popularity of the 10-in-1’s and the protracted delay in the arrival of improved C’s caused the Southwest Pacific Area to consider suspension of further use of C rations, but this idea was dropped because of the small stocks of 10-in- 1 ‘s and the promise of early delivery of the new C’s.71 On Leyte, Southwest Pacific Area troops still had few of the latter type, but Pacific Ocean Areas units were reasonably well supplied.72 In subsequent operations the new kind was available in substantial quantities to all organizations. It was most often criticized because of the continued presence of the stew component, which troops repeatedly refused even in its modified form. Yet the new C’s were on the whole not unpopular. One regimental S-4 noted that, with them in stock, some troops refused the old type.73
Meanwhile the Office of the Quartermaster, Central Pacific Area, had developed a ration specifically designed for troops in the opening phases of amphibious operations. It took this step after learning that during the landings in the Gilberts troops fighting under intense nervous strain had thrown away most of the K ration except for cigarettes and candy. Working in close cooperation with the Hawaiian Pineapple Company in Honolulu, Lt. Col. Clifford C. Wagner developed the assault ration, popularly known as the “candy ration.” It consisted of twenty-eight pieces of assorted hard candy, one chocolate peanut bar, and one package each of chewing gum, cigarettes, and matches. It did not supplant the other emergency rations, which, dietetically, were far superior, but served as a “fill in” during the first day or two of an offensive, when troops did not desire heavier fare.74 The assault ration, produced only in Hawaii, was distinctively a Central Pacific Area item of supply. First utilized in the Marshal’s offensive of February 1944, it was issued to Pacific Ocean Areas forces in subsequent operations as a substitute for the K ration during initial landings.
In the series of offensives that started with Leyte in October 1944 and ended with Okinawa in June 1945, combat rations were employed in something like the
following sequence: assault rations (used only by Pacific Ocean Areas organizations) , K rations, C rations, 10-in-1 rations, and B rations. Pacific Ocean Areas troops on Leyte had about a 20-day supply of 10-in-1 rations, 7 days of C, 3 days of K, and 2 days each of D and assault rations. By A plus 4, many troops were eating 10-in-1’s, but this proved premature, for they then had practically no cooking equipment and could not prepare the rations properly. B rations in general could not be issued before A plus 20 or 30, for until then sufficient components had not arrived to make balanced meals and unit kitchens were not ready to prepare them. The rather marked variations among units that at times characterized the utilization of rations in combat is illustrated by the supplies carried by three divisions in the initial assault on Luzon. Organizations participating in this attack were directed to take with them a 10-day supply of combat rations in addition to those needed on the voyage. Because of failure to comply with this order some units arrived with only a 3-day supply. Troops of the 6th Division had in their packs a 3-day supply of K rations, those of the 37th Division a 1-day supply each of C, D, and K rations, and those of the 43rd Division a third of a day’s supply of C rations, two-thirds of a day’s supply of K rations, and a single day’s supply of D rations. Since on Luzon Japanese resistance was not as intense as it had been on Leyte and regular supplies and cooking equipment became available sooner, the 43rd Division was eating 10-in-1’s by the second night, and on the fourth day the 37th Division was enjoying B rations.75
Other Special Rations
Combat, long-range, and high-altitude airmen as well as infantrymen required special rations. Before their departure on tactical or strategical missions flying crews were tense, had little appetite, and ate sparingly of the food set before them. For this reason they needed special lunches. Similar lunches were also required by reconnaissance, transport, photographic, and other crews, who often missed their regular noon meals because they were away on protracted flights. The high altitudes at which all these crews flew complicated the preparation of lunches. At a height of 20,000 feet gas in the intestines expanded two and a half times and at 35,000 feet four times. It was accordingly essential to eliminate as many gas-producing foods from fliers’ fare as possible. Because of the frequent occurrence of flight fatigue, which was noticeably relieved by nutritious food, crews were also often served a larger evening meal than were-ground troops.76
Flight surgeons agreed that air crews in general should have a minimum of 3,000 to 4,000 calories daily; that half the calories should consist of protein in the form of fresh red and white meat and fresh eggs; that carbohydrates should not exceed 40 percent of the total caloric intake; and that the worst gas-producers—beans, cabbage, corn, and onions—should be omitted entirely.77 Unfavorable supply conditions did not permit complete fulfillment of these requirements, but the Pacific areas all authorized supplementary food issues to flying crews.
In the Southwest Pacific in November 1942 extra issues included fresh fruit juices or powders, coffee, evaporated or powdered milk, oatmeal or prepared cereal, sugar, and pickles. Fresh eggs and meat, though desirable, were not included because they could be secured only in very limited amounts. As food stocks rose and Air Forces needs were more fully recognized, the list of added issues was expanded to embrace fresh or canned meat, canned tuna fish, dehydrated eggs, cheese, butter, flour, baking powder, yeast, and bread. In the South Pacific supplementary provisions did not furnish quite as much variety as in the Southwest Pacific Area but did contain more perishables. Those in the Central Pacific Area supplied hard candy, canned peaches, pears, and pineapples, canned orange, grapefruit, and pineapple juice, and whole-wheat crackers. In October 1944 this list was broadened to embrace meat, fish, and milk. In preparing special lunches the Pacific areas all gave the largest quantities to crews of heavy bombers, smaller quantities to crews of medium bombers, and still smaller quantities to fighter crews. All crews shared alike in the heavier servings given fliers at dinner.78
Issuance of supplementary provisions to flying personnel created a morale problem because ground crews and service troops felt unfairly treated. The sense of discrimination among them was especially strong when flying crews received better food while eating at the same mess. To prevent a general weakening in morale, flight groups occasionally misused the privilege of obtaining supplementary rations by procuring them not merely for flying crews but for all their men. Food intended for 50 persons might actually be distributed to 600, with the result that the flying crews who most needed the extra provisions secured little benefit. In February 1944 Colonel Rogers pointed out that in the South Pacific this practice caused the use of ships and air transports for unauthorized purposes and unjustifiably discriminated against service troops not assigned to air groups. At a conference of AAF and Army supply officers to consider these questions as they had developed in the South Pacific Area, Colonel Rogers praised those air commanders who had established separate messes for flying and nonflying troops and suggested wider application of this practice as a partial answer to the problem of morale. His recommendation bore some fruit, but practical difficulties in most instances prevented it from being carried out, and the problem was never wholly solved in any Pacific area.79
Besides the special rations for troops actively engaged in air and ground combat operations, other special rations were developed for hospital patients, laborers, prisoners of war, and civilian repatriates. Shortly after the Marshalls campaign the quartermaster and surgeon in the Central Pacific Area jointly developed a hospital assault ration for battle casualties during the first few days of an operation. A ration of this type was badly needed because none of those carried by assault troops were varied or nourishing enough for hospital patients. The new ration, assembled by Central Pacific Area quartermasters and taken
ashore by medical units, provided both fluid and soft foods. It contained bouillon cubes, oatmeal, canned fruits and juices, dehydrated soups and eggs, canned boned chicken, evaporated milk, beverages, sugar, and salt. These components, requiring only water and heating equipment for their preparation, were packed in small cans and assembled in large units, which contained 200 rations weighing altogether about 900 pounds. The hospital assault ration was first used in the Marianas. Southwest Pacific forces also utilized a similar ration from late 1944 on.80 Meanwhile the War Department had developed a supplemental hospital ration pack, which served the same purpose as did the hospital assault ration, but it was not shipped in quantity to the Pacific before the attack on Okinawa, where both types were used. As the new ration contained no canned chicken and no dehydrated soups or eggs, it did not provide quite as wide a range of components as did the older one.81
The question of an appropriate special ration affected hospitals outside as well as inside combat areas. In all three Pacific areas the ordinary field ration formed the basis of issues to hospitals outside combat zones, but it was supplemented whenever practicable by fresh meats, fruits, vegetables, and eggs. In the Southwest Pacific the authorized supplement was half a ration in either kind or cash, as the hospital preferred. If an institution took its extra allowance in kind, it requisitioned rations from Quartermaster stocks; if in cash, it bought the added food in the open market. This system worked unsatisfactorily, for it left little means of supervision over supplementary requisitions, and uncontrolled purchases from commercial sources reduced the amount of perishables available to other Army segments and to the Australian public. In mid-1943 buying in the open market was forbidden, and a special hospital or H ration scale was set up that provided about a dozen items not ordinarily found in the field ration. The most important of these items were canned roast beef, dehydrated soup and vegetables, lentils, powdered malted milk, cookies, syrup, and junket tablets. Dietitians pointed out that the H ration was deficient in milk, butter, potatoes, and vegetables, which were all highly beneficial to underweight patients. A special board, appointed to study this problem, recommended that the daily milk allotment be increased from 1 to 2 pints, that the butter ration of ¾ pound a week be raised by two thirds, that the potato ration be lifted from 3 to 5 pounds, and that the fresh vegetables allowance be increased from 4½ to 6 pounds. None of these foods was obtainable in quantities sufficient to permit the complete adoption of the board’s proposals, but an increase of about 30 percent in the components, if supplies were available, was authorized. Because of recurrent shortages the QMC outside Australia could seldom meet the precise requirements of the H ration and was often obliged to issue the ordinary field ration and supplement it by such foods as might be available.82
Special rations were required not only for American troops but also for natives serving as stevedores and construction and storage workers at bases and with tactical forces. The precise elements composing native rations varied slightly in line with differing dietary habits and availability of foods. In territories controlled politically by an Allied power the U.S. Army utilized the colonial governments as its agents in dealing with native peoples. Australian and Dutch officials in New Guinea, French authorities in New Caledonia, and British administrators in the Solomons and the New Hebrides hired native employees for the U.S. Army and determined the constituents of their rations on the basis of standards long laid down in local laws regulating contract labor. Generally, the colonial officials responsible for the feeding of native laborers submitted their ration requirements to quartermasters who, in turn, called upon U.S. supply bases for the necessary foods.83
The Solomon Islands labor forces were provided a simple ration composed of a mere handful of components. Besides rice, one pound of which was furnished, it contained a quarter pound each of corned beef and salmon plus tea, sugar, C biscuits, and plug tobacco, everywhere a native favorite.84 Laborers’ rations in New Guinea and the Central Pacific were based on a larger number of constituents than in the Solomons. If subsistence stocks in these areas contained sufficient tomato juice, animal fat, wheatmeal, peanut oil, or similar foods, small quantities of these items were added to the Solomons list.85
Rice, as the food most in demand among native laborers, occupied the dominant position in all these rations. It had always constituted the major part of the daily fare of Tonkinese and Javanese workers in New Caledonia and the main element in the delicacies prepared for their fetes.86 In their villages the more backward peoples lived chiefly on yams, taro, breadfruit, bananas, coconuts, fish, wild game, and a few pigs and chickens. But during the previous half century plantation owners in regions inhabited by these peoples had served imported rice to their employees, who came to regard it as a highly desirable luxury. Col. O. C. Noel, British Resident Commissioner in the Solomons, declared that the native regarded rice “as an important part of his compensation for volunteering for work and any decrease of this issue is regarded as a breach of faith.” When he returned home on completion of his contract, Noel continued, “one of his most valued possessions was his bag of rice.”87 A quarter century of experience on plantations in the Solomons proved that any diminution of the daily allowance immediately lowered the morale and productivity of workers. This was strikingly illustrated in 1933, when the substitution of maize on Lever Brothers’ plantations halted practically all operations.
In 1945 the necessity of feeding large numbers of liberated Filipinos put heavy pressure on rice stocks throughout the Pacific and brought about a lowering of the daily issue in the Solomons from one pound to three fourths of a pound. The ensuing discontent speedily forced the restoration of the earlier allowance. No program employing native labor, a board of officers investigating this situation maintained, could succeed without the cereal.88 In New Caledonia similar efforts to reduce issues, though more prolonged, met a like fate.
Native rations, on the whole, were deficient in the vitamins and minerals furnished by the normal foods of primitive peoples. The addition of milk and fresh meat would have been beneficial, but American troops had a prior claim on these scarce supplies. Native laborers, moreover, rejected many common foods, and there was not enough time to accustom them to a better diet. On Guadalcanal, where the ration was particularly wanting in variety, extensive use of polished rice, which was deficient in vitamins, caused an outbreak of beriberi. Since the laborers there were familiar with the unpolished type, it was promptly substituted. In New Guinea unpolished rice had been used from the outset.89
By early 1944 the Army in the Southwest Pacific was employing enough Chinese and other Orientals to call for the development of an Oriental or 0 ration. This ration was somewhat more varied than the native rations, providing 16 ounces of rice, 4 ounces of wheat flour, 14 ounces of fresh vegetables, 5.5 ounces of dried and fresh fruits, 8 ounces of fresh beef, 5 ounces of canned fish, 1.5 ounces of bacon, 1 fresh egg, and small quantities of milk, butter, lard, tea, curry powder, and spices. As many of these components were scarce, substitutions were freely made.90 The Oriental ration, or its rough equivalent, was employed in feeding Japanese prisoners as well as Oriental laborers. Though Nipponese, like other Asians, normally consumed only about 2,000 calories a day in contrast to the 2,500 to 3,500 calories consumed by Americans, the Geneva Convention of 1929 required that their meals be equal in quantity to those served U.S. troops in base installations. The Oriental ration met this stipulation, providing about 2,600 calories.
In the spring of 1945 the War Department advised the Pacific areas that the world-wide shortage of canned and fresh meats, canned fruits and vegetables, and dehydrated potatoes demanded the stringent conservation of all these foods. USASOS thereupon directed that the prisoner of war ration be modified by the substitution of egg powders, macaroni, spaghetti, beans, and stews for these scarce products. In July the OQMG developed a new ration for Japanese prisoners, but USASOS pointed out that though this ration provided as many calories as Japanese ordinarily consumed, it did not supply enough nourishment to comply with the Geneva Convention. USASOS accordingly continued to use its own scale, modeled at that time on the Philippine Army ration .91
This ration had been introduced on the American return to the Philippines to meet the requirements of the Commonwealth Army, which was then reconstituted from the guerrilla units that had carried on harassing operations against the occupying Japanese forces. The new ration had a dual objective. One purpose was the elevation of Filipino morale by the provision of most of the nonperishables found in U.S. field rations, which Commonwealth troops regarded as superior. Another purpose was to supply some Filipino staples through the substitution of canned fish for 20 percent of the American canned meat component and of rice for 80 percent of the starchy components. The Philippine labor ration, developed for the thousands of civilians employed by the American forces, contained larger quantities of rice and fish and smaller quantities of meat, flour, milk, and vegetables than did the Philippine Army ration and so reflected more closely the customary fare of the people.92
The loss of huge quantities of food in Luzon to the ubiquitous black market obliged the zone of interior to provide many of the elements in the Philippine rations. Early in 1945 the growing scarcity of subsistence in the United States brought about disturbing deviations from the prescribed standards, and in March the War Department ordered the labor ration to be cut drastically and kept well below the Commonwealth Army ration.93 The sharp reduction in the rice and other favorite components elicited angry protests from workers whose low wages prohibited them from buying additional food in the black market. The superiority of the Philippine Army ration, now more marked than ever, further weakened civilian morale. In May, Base X in Manila reported that its Filipino laborers were suffering from slight malnutrition and that the consequent unrest among them had culminated in strikes and wholesale resignations. Monetary compensation for the reduction in the rice ration from seven to four ounces did not satisfy the men since “the desire for a good meal” outweighed “the desire for small increases in pay.”94 The chief Quartermaster held the inferior labor ration responsible for the inability of the U.S. Army to hire more than a quarter of the workers needed for a large-scale expansion of its supply activities.95
Inviting though the ration of Commonwealth soldiers appeared to Filipino laborers, it did not always seem so to the Commonwealth soldiers themselves. Guerrilla units, attached to American military organizations, notwithstanding that they usually operated alone in remote fastnesses, felt a sense of discrimination because they received less fresh meat and fewer perishables than did U.S. troops. Their complaints went unheeded chiefly because they were believed to enjoy unusually favorable opportunities for obtaining poultry and perishables from farmers.96 Philippine Scout units, incorporated as military police into the U.S. Army, also felt discriminated against when in early June they were placed on the
Commonwealth Army ration. As a result of their dissatisfaction, they were finally given about half the amount of fresh meat issued to their American comrades.97
The liberation of the Philippines brought with it still another food problem—that of supplying an Occidental ration to several thousand American and European civilians who had been interned when the Japanese occupied the islands. As the advancing U.S. Army released American citizens, it placed its penniless fellow-countrymen, unable to obtain food for themselves, on a liberal ration. Lack of a formal plan for feeding Allied and neutral nationals and uncertainty whether control of such rationing belonged to the Army or the State Department caused a good deal of confusion. According to one report each freed U.S. citizen in April 1945 received twenty-eight pounds of subsistence a week while other nationals obtained only a sixth as much, or four and two-thirds pounds.98 Such a striking difference could not be allowed; a uniform scale for all repatriates was essential. USASOS therefore recommended a ration of about ten and a half pounds. Under this proposal that command would sell rations to the State Department, which in turn would sell them to eligible applicants, many of whom now had sufficient funds to buy food. General MacArthur approved the plan, but the State Department lacked the means of setting up sales agencies. The Army was in consequence obliged to shoulder the task of selling as well as procuring the rations. If repatriates did not have money, food was issued to them on a relief basis.
Better planning might have avoided the confusion that accompanied the feeding of repatriates in the Philippines. Better planning might also have avoided some of the deficiencies found in other supplies and equipment throughout the Pacific. While items furnished by the QMC in general served their purpose well, they would have served even better if a full-fledged program aiming at the development of items fitted to diverse tactical and climatic conditions had begun functioning earlier in the OQMG. But such a program could not be established in the period between the two world wars because inadequate military appropriations had to be expended for more immediately significant projects. When, in mid-1940, more money became available, development activities in the OQMG were divided among two of its branches, which to some extent duplicated each other’s work. Not until July 1942 were these activities centralized in the Military Planning Division.99
Up to that time OQMG research activities covered only a comparatively narrow range of specifically. operational items and aimed chiefly at the development of clothing and equipment for special forces, particularly those operating in cold climates. Aside from Captain Kearny’s experiments in Panama, work on jungle equipment, for example, had been neglected, and when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, American troops, even in the Philippines, had no specialized equipment for jungle warfare. Nor did the QMC then have much information about what equipment was needed in jungle
fighting. Even at the end of July OQMG preparations for experimental production of jungle items were just getting underway. The hastily assembled equipment rushed to the South Pacific and the Southwest Pacific in the following year to help support jungle troops usually represented, not the products of careful testing, but rather of quick development of relatively untried items based on imperfect understanding of the tactical and climatic conditions encountered in the oceanic tropics. For at least another year the development of nearly all items used in the Pacific suffered from similar lack of adequate experimentation.100
Many erroneous judgments behind production of items having only doubtful or even no utility might have been avoided had it been possible in the years between wars to establish a well-staffed developmental program on a permanent basis. Through such a program, a much larger variety of experimental items could have been produced and tested under widely differing conditions of climate, terrain, and combat. Actually, the QMC developmental program started too late, and until 1943 was inadequately organized and manned. It also suffered from the swift movement of events which did not allow time to determine until relatively late in hostilities the characteristics peculiar to Pacific combat that might affect the serviceability of new items. In a few instances the practice of using as many standard items as possible in all overseas theaters posed special difficulties for Pacific combat troops. C rations were a notable example of such difficulties. Problems of this sort might have been eased had items been modified somewhat to fit particular conditions, but this would have been a costly and time-consuming solution likely to retard production of supplies in the needed quantities. The problems simply did not lend themselves to quick and easy solutions in wartime when speed was indispensable. More carefully developed items were the best solution, but such items could be produced only by a permanent peacetime research and development establishment, staffed by skilled technicians and possessing the elaborate equipment necessary to carry out tests under all kinds of unusual conditions. Such an establishment is the best guarantee that in future conflicts the supplies and equipment provided by the QMC will fulfill the expectations of the combat forces for whose support they are developed.