Chapter 12: Rear Area Support on the Continent: Administration
Logistical Implications of the Allied Invasion
Allied plans for logistical support on the Continent were strongly influenced by World War I experience, and the first objective of Operation OVERLORD—securing Cherbourg and the Brittany ports—might be defined as restoring part of the familiar transportation network of the AEF. The Germans were very conscious of this objective, and set themselves resolutely to oppose it. Moreover, they attained a large measure of success; none of the major ports were captured on schedule. That the Allies were nevertheless able to bring large forces to the Continent across open beaches and support them from those beaches as far as the German frontier was a surprising technological development that upset the calculations of Germans and Allies alike. Of nearly equal import was the technique developed by the Germans for demolishing and mining major ports so that they could not be used at maximum capacity for months even after being captured. Another thing that upset calculations was the effect of Allied bombing on railroads and bridges before D-day in the effort to isolate the battlefield. While this attempt was essential for tactical reasons it was almost too successful, and Engineer requirements for supplies to repair the damage distorted transportation priorities for months thereafter.
Despite all these difficulties, the Allies were able to reach the German frontier in three months, instead of a year as originally estimated. Tactically, this was a resounding victory. Logistically, it was something of a mixed blessing. It meant that future battles would have to be fought at the end of a long and war-scarred line of communications, on terrain of the enemy’s choosing. These unexpected developments had both direct and indirect bearing on quartermaster operations. They deeply influenced the nature of the warfare, thus modifying requirements for quartermaster support, and sharply restricted the types of land and water transportation that might be used to move supplies. Above all, for six months they imposed severe limitations upon transportation capacity, and thus transformed an important part of the OVERLORD logistical plan into a disorderly contest for tonnage allocations. Ships, trains, trucks, and aircraft all came to be rigidly controlled, with G-4,
COMZ, acting as arbiter for the U.S. forces. Each army and each technical service, the Air Forces, the Navy, base sections, the civil affairs organization, AES, and even the Red Cross, had to bid for its share of the available tonnage and be ready to justify its bids in detail.1
The original OVERLORD plan had provided that Headquarters, COMZ, move to the Continent early in September 1944 (about D plus 90). Military leaders assumed that by then the lodgment area would extend from the Seine to the Loire and that three base sections—Normandy, Brittany, and Loire—would be operative. They expected that Brest and Quiberon Bay, and possibly other Brittany ports, would be in full operation and that a depot complex in the Rennes-Laval area, designed to give all necessary support to U.S. combat forces on the Continent, would be nearly completed. Meanwhile ADSEC, about a hundred miles farther east, was to support the combat organizations as they crossed the Seine.
By mid-July it was painfully clear that this plan would not be realized. U.S. troops, barely twenty miles inland from the beaches, were receiving a costly lesson in the tactical importance of hedgerows, and measuring their daily gains in yards. Cherbourg harbor, in American hands since 26 June, was still blocked by mines and sunken ships, and all supplies were still coming ashore over the beaches.2
Paradoxically, lack of tactical success had helped the supply situation. Despite delays caused by the great storm of 19–22 June, the 14-day reserve of Class I and III supplies scheduled for D plus 41 (17 July) was actually on hand. But room had to be found for these supplies in a lodgment area only one-tenth the planned size. Local soil conditions were such that secondary and improvised roads were quickly worn out by heavy military traffic. Consequently, vehicles moved almost exclusively on the main Valognes-Bayeux highway, which was the only good paved road on the beachhead until mid-July. Traffic became seriously congested, the more so since the main depots were also strung along this highway, in the same locations where the assault troops had established their first inland dumps. All these depots were twenty miles or less from the front lines, and supplies controlled by ADSEC, by First Army, and by the combat divisions were crowded into the same small area. Sorting and inventory of supplies in these depots was far from satisfactory, a fact which COMZ attributed to uncontrolled and undocumented withdrawals by First Army units. First Army rejected this explanation and was very reluctant to implement the plan for drawing a rear boundary and releasing these depots to COMZ control. That plan had anticipated a geographical expansion which had not yet taken place, and the organization of new army depots on territory which was still in enemy hands. Since the depots administered by ADSEC were the only ones in existence on the Continent, First Army contended that it should continue to control them. Moreover, ADSEC had not yet demonstrated that it could
administer depots efficiently, and provide reliable support for combat units.3
Since First Army refused to surrender control of ADSEC and the tactical situation indicated that plans to organize a base section in Brittany would have to be postponed, the Forward Echelon, Communications Zone, was left without a function. Personnel of that headquarters began to reach Valognes, south of Cherbourg, as early as 18 June, and Brig. Gen. Harry B. Vaughan, Jr., the FECZ commander, was a somewhat tactless participant in the debate over First Army’s rear boundary. Apparently COMZ decided that it had been a mistake to allow a forward echelon to develop into an independent headquarters, for by 12 July General Vaughan had departed for a new assignment.4 Two days later, SHAEF rendered a somewhat complicated compromise decision on the role of ADSEC—it was to be administratively under COMZ, but General Bradley personally was to pass on all its major policy decisions. This arrangement reflected plans to activate the 12th Army Group and appoint Bradley to this command with control over First Army (Lt. Gen. Courtney H. Hodges) and Third Army (General Patton); 12th Army Group and Third Army became operational on 1 August 1944. All these headquarters had been displeased when FECZ attempted to insert itself into the chain of command. The solution adopted was for COMZ to move to the Continent immediately and absorb FECZ; this was done during the first week in August 1944.5
Lee’s decision to move COMZ to the Continent ahead of schedule was also influenced by Bradley’s tactical plans. Hopes were that Operation COBRA, launched on 25 July, would provide room for tactical maneuver as well as for a base section organization similar to the one originally planned. But plans made for an orderly expansion would undoubtedly need modifying to fit a sudden breakout, and COMZ naturally wanted to be closer to the scene of action and thus better qualified to prepare new plans. Tents and huts were quickly erected to supplement several chateaux taken over by FECZ in the Valognes area, and signal communications, including direct teletype with the United States, were hastily installed.
Office of the Chief Quartermaster
The FECZ Quartermaster Section had operated as an advance party of OCQM rather than as part of a separate headquarters, so that the move to the Continent was an orderly transition for the Quartermaster Service. Littlejohn had paid repeated short visits to France in June and July, and considered Valognes to be his forward command post.6 Since the OCQM did not recognize its
forward echelon as a separate entity it is difficult to assign an exact date for its arrival on the Continent, but the bulk of its military personnel, about 425 officers and men, had reached Valognes by 15 August. By that time all Brittany except the coastal ports and most of Normandy had been cleared of the enemy. The First Army and the British were converging on German forces at Argentan, and the Third Army was approaching the Seine both north and south of Paris. Supply to the armies was still barely adequate, and growing more difficult each day. Normandy and Brittany Base Sections were formally activated on 16 August, but except for Cherbourg their depots did not contain enough supplies for even their own service troops. ADSEC also lacked reserves, and moreover its depots were so far behind the front that they served only air forces and service units. Supply of the combat troops was still a hand-to-mouth affair based directly on OMAHA and UTAH Beaches, and on Cherbourg which had begun very limited operations on 16 July.7
Headquarters Staff
On 19 September, three weeks after the liberation of Paris, the OCQM moved from the tent city at Valognes to more commodious quarters in the Hotel Astoria on the Champs Elysees. With a staff of 209 officers, 553 enlisted personnel, men and women, and 82 British civilians, it was nearly up to authorized strength. In addition to professional officers with lengthy military service, Littlejohn’s key assistants included a large percentage of able young business executives, most of them with mercantile or manufacturing experience. This background had enabled them to absorb the intensive specialized training courses given to a maximum number of QMC officers in the United Kingdom. The purpose of these courses was selection as well as training; those who passed formed a competent group of subordinates, but events during the next three months demonstrated that there were not enough of them.8
To cope with the perennial personnel shortages within the OCQM, as a non-T/0 organization and to provide overhead to administer its enlisted personnel, several T/O units were attached to the office. The Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 67th Quartermaster Base Depot, activated in the ETO early in 1944 to serve as the Quartermaster component of FECZ during the early days on the Continent, remained with the OCQM throughout the continental campaign. The 537th, 549th, and 551st Quartermaster Groups were also valuable reinforcements of the OCQM with such specific assignments as the operation of a Quartermaster Subsistence Laboratory, schools for Quartermaster officers, and the formation of technical intelligence teams which traveled with combat units, observing and reporting on the serviceability of captured and U.S. quartermaster items. These units were quartered outside Paris at the Isle St. Germain, which came to be an important center of QMC activities.9
The ever-lengthening lines of communications demanded a continuous program of setting up new QM installations. Fortunately, the units to man them were available, but the training and experience of these units did not equal the demands of the situation, which required that each new installation immediately begin to operate at full capacity. As already noted, SOS ETO-USA had been forced to accept untrained service units for duty in Great Britain.10 Some of these units had received limited on-the-job training in the United Kingdom, but the majority were activated so late that on arrival in the ETO they were immediately phased through the marshaling areas and sent to the Continent. This undoubtedly contributed to the difficulties of the new installations, most of which were in trouble shortly after they were activated. Littlejohn’s policy of rotating personnel so that experienced officers went to the field to command these units and others newly arrived from the United States received intensive training in the OCQM alleviated these problems without really solving them.11
In retrospect, Great Britain did not turn out to be a completely satisfactory training ground for continental logistical operations. The willing cooperation of the British was, in this particular respect, a disadvantage. Whatever their deficiencies, the roads, railroads, docks, and warehouses placed at the disposal of the Americans were in usable condition, and located in a well-organized country where raw materials, services, and labor were made available through official channels. This was poor preparation for operating in newly liberated territory where a foreign language was spoken, civil authority was in process of reorganization, and all economic initiative and most raw materials had to be supplied by the occupying troops.
In the United Kingdom the OCQM had evolved an orderly supply routine, based on cooperation with British civil authorities and consistent with a static situation. On the Continent, its initial mission was support for a headlong tactical advance by whatever means could be improvised. But simultaneously it had to create a new field organization against the day when a more conventional type of logistical support would be possible. Thus the OCQM continued to be both a planning and an operating agency, but naturally emphasis had shifted very strongly toward the latter function. Although organization had been simplified only slightly when the entire office was assembled under one roof in Paris, Littlejohn felt that practical working efficiency had been greatly improved. (Chart 2)12 This was fortunate, for while the enumerated responsibilities of the OCQM had changed only slightly since the BOLERO period, their scope and complexity had increased enormously. Active combat operations demanded different working methods and a changed subdivision of functions. The following review of these functions and of the handicaps under which they were performed affords an insight into OCQM operating methods on the Continent.
Chart 2: Office of Chief Quartermaster: 1 September 1944
Changes in the Organization of the OCQM
As in Great Britain, the Military Planning Division was the key unit of the OCQM organization. Littlejohn considered it his “general staff” and assigned it his most pressing problems.13 On the far shore, the first of these was keeping track of maritime tonnage, since QMC supplies began to arrive off the coast much faster than they could be unloaded. G-4, COMZ, allocated berthing and unloading priorities at major ports among the technical services, but each service had to solve its own internal priority problems and arrange for ships carrying low-priority cargo to proceed to minor continental ports or to Marseille, to unload in the United Kingdom, or simply to wait. There was almost unlimited discharge capacity at small, shallow-water ports all along the French coast, but the landing craft and coasters from England that could ply such ports were scarce and strictly controlled. The Military Planning Division kept track of inventories in the United Kingdom, procured cross-Channel tonnage allocations for needed items, and saw to it that they were not duplicated in requisitions on the zone of interior.
QMC personnel, units, installations, and responsibilities had all expanded enormously on the Continent, but because the nucleus of able QMC officers was very small, Littlejohn concentrated them in the Military Planning and Field Service Divisions of his office and gave them trouble shooting assignments. Once a crisis was passed, routine functions were consolidated and assigned to other divisions. For example, the acute shortage in port facilities was not overcome until December 1944, when Antwerp became fully operational. In the same month responsibility for marine tonnage was consolidated in the Storage and Distribution Division, which already handled all other transportation matters. Such an abrupt shifting of functions among subordinate offices was typical of OCQM during the continental period. Littlejohn himself considered this an efficient and economical use of personnel, but other staff agencies were inclined to regard OCQM as an unstable organization, with which it was difficult to establish time-saving routines based, upon personal contacts.14
A typical case, about which Littlejohn apologized to Colonel Evans in a personal letter, concerned a requisition for blankets. After sending three increasingly urgent cables to NYPE, the Supply Division of OCQM discovered that a shipload of blankets had been awaiting discharge in European waters for thirty-eight days. Military Planning Division had made unceasing efforts to get the ship unloaded but had neglected to inform the Supply Division that it had arrived.15
However much the frequent shifts in personnel sacrificed continuity and even efficiency in relations with others, they strengthened OCQM internally. At staff conferences Littlejohn repeatedly spoke of “getting on the team” and “moving around to exchange ideas, and insure that we all speak the same language.” The informal phrases should not obscure the important fact that these objectives were achieved. One of the OCQM’s ablest officers, Col. Albert G. Duncan of Military Planning Division, later recorded his regret that, because of his excessively specialized assignment, he had been unable to participate in this very educational interchange.16
Research and Development—a new division organized on the Continent—was headed by Col. Michael H. Zwicker. It evaluated U.S., Allied, and enemy quartermaster equipment under combat conditions. It also reported quantities and locations of captured enemy equipment and supplies to the OCQM, which urgently needed such items for the support of POW labor units, used by all the technical services to conserve military manpower. The Storage and Distribution Division and the Supply Division organized branches to deal with captured items. The Subsistence Division developed a special POW menu, falling back on captured stocks and a few surplus U.S. items to provide the prisoners with an adequate diet. Ultimately, all these POW activities were centralized under Col. Beny Rosaler in the Installations Division. Col. Thomas V. Barber headed the Procurement Division. Since its activities affected the civilian economies of the liberated countries, they were closely controlled by a theater-level procurement organization which is described separately below.
Shortages in land transportation had developed almost immediately after the breakout from Normandy, and early in August the Transportation Branch of the Storage and Distribution Division developed into an information center on such matters as progress in railroad repair, location of tank and reefer cars, and the number of trucks available in COMZ. Such information was essential since G-4, which controlled all transportation, merely allocated gross daily tonnage to each army and major installation, subdivided by technical service and class of supply, without specifying what types of cars or trucks were available, or how far forward rail service had been established. In the confused period of the pursuit, Transportation Branch frequently had the latest and best information available. G-4 and the other technical services often relied upon it, and the OCQM found it especially helpful in preparing the daily bids for tonnage. The many-sided job of getting supplies forward from the docks and beaches to the combat units and intermediate depots demanded that no assets be overlooked. The Transportation Branch occasionally brought to light tonnage capacity unknown to G-4, and therefore not allocated. The OCQM arranged to share this tonnage equitably between the First and Third Armies and to include all classes of QM supplies in the shipments.17 In January
s1945 G-4 began to allocate overland tonnage on a monthly rather than a daily basis and turned over detailed operations to the Transportation Corps. The OCQM found this a much more efficient method of operating and dissolved its Transportation Branch shortly thereafter.
A major function of the Field Service Division was to compensate for poor communications. Signal communications rearward, to the United Kingdom and the zone of interior, were fairly satisfactory, but signal service forward was a constant problem as long as the pursuit lasted. Use of the overloaded lines was severely limited, and the brief daily telegram from the armies was often the only official contact with the combat zone. Littlejohn set up an elaborate courier service by jeep and liaison aircraft to expedite reports from the combat units and from his liaison teams, but the supply situation was confused and the reports themselves were sketchy. For example, during the last fortnight in August, the Third Army quartermaster knew neither his daily requirements nor what he was actually receiving each day.18
Clearly, this was a situation requiring vigorous action by a central authority. At Littlejohn’s insistence a single theater-wide stock record file of quartermaster supplies was set up in the Military Planning Division, and provision was made to maintain it accurately thereafter through a standardized system of documentation for each shipment, periodic reports from all concerned, and continuous supervision by Field Service Division. Littlejohn considered this central stock record his main instrument for staff control of operations on the Continent, and never allowed it to be decentralized even after the logistical situation had become stabilized.19 ADSEC was part of this inventory system, but the armies were not. Consequently, when the armies moved forward and transferred depots to ADSEC, their contents again became theater “assets.” Counting and sorting the vast accumulation of supplies left behind in Normandy by the First Army was a major task.
The Field Service Division acquired other new functions on the Continent. A basic consideration was that all field installations were newly organized and just beginning to operate. They needed active assistance and expert advice rather than inspections and criticism, and at first these aids were provided by all the divisions of OCQM as required. The result was confusion, lack of coordination, and an excessive number of liaison officers absent from OCQM, so that in September 1944 all such activity was centralized under Colonel Rosaler of Field Service. The number of liaison officers was drastically reduced. To correct the weaknesses that had been reported, as many as possible of the less experienced QMC officers were sent in rotation to attend short supply courses, first at UTAH Beach and later at the QM school already mentioned. Inspection reports and Littlejohn’s correspondence with base section and depot
quartermasters during the fall of 1944 indicate that all the mistakes made previously in England were being repeated by the new units fresh from the zone of interior. Perishable supplies were left exposed, and shiploads of balanced rations and sized clothing were scattered and had to be laboriously rebalanced. Inventory and proper documentation of supply actions were neglected. Many units had lost or abandoned the libraries of basic Quartermaster reference data issued to them before D-day and were unable to perform their technical staff functions. Most serious of all, none of the base section commanders, despite their seniority and professional experience, were willing to assert their authority over the port headquarters and insist upon applying the lessons learned at the sorting sheds adjacent to British ports. On the beaches, at first operated by tactical personnel, this reluctance was understandable, but Cherbourg began to operate in July, Dieppe in September, Le Havre and Rouen in October, and Antwerp in November. In no case were effective sorting procedures set up until after the port had become seriously clogged.20
Unfortunately, the cure for some of these ills involved indoctrinating persons and agencies outside the Quartermaster Corps. Littlejohn’s letters to base section commanders and COMZ staff officers frequently presented the whole ETO supply situation from the Quartermaster point of view, as a preliminary to requesting cooperation or concurrence on some specific point. Within the OCQM, indoctrination was a very direct and accelerated process, centering in the QM school on the Isle St. Germain. Supervision of this school and of training courses offered in various base sections at different times was a major responsibility of the Personnel and Training Division, headed by Col. Joseph C. Odell. The transfer of the training function, formerly supervised by the Plans and Training Division, was a significant development. Senior officers of newly arrived QM units, it often turned out, were recently transferred from the combat arms and had to be replaced, at least temporarily, for the units were urgently needed for immediate operations. Many of these officers could be utilized to advantage after brief courses of orientation in ETO practices, but others, less adaptable or of inferior physical stamina, had to be reclassified, used in posts of minor responsibility, or assigned in the United Kingdom, where conditions were less strenuous. Under ETO conditions, training and personnel assignments were closely connected functions.21
The Personnel and Training Division was responsible for assignment of QM units as well as individuals. Littlejohn insisted that the Field Service Division maintain continuous surveillance to insure that QM units were being used efficiently, and he ordered prompt transfers whenever the tempo of activity slackened in any portion of the COMZ.
Moreover, units as well as individuals were given periods of orientation and training in quiet rear areas, and then sent forward nearer to the front. But there were repeated crises and unexpected demands for U.S. units which could be met only partially by surveying the whole theater basis of QM troops and dividing them up as equitably as possible. Every change in tactical plans increased the demand, especially for service companies. Delay in phasing out U.K. supply operations, activation of two extra base sections, and the additional support required for an expanded 6th Army Group were only the most conspicuous of these problems.22 The steady increase in the ETO troop basis and the considerably slower increase in the number of Quartermaster units in the theater are illustrated in Appendix B.
An obvious and yet persistently unpopular solution of this difficulty was the use of foreign personnel. Taking a realistic tack Littlejohn set up a Troop Units and Labor Branch within the Personnel and Training Division shortly after D-day. The OCQM found that the French Government’s regulations on such matters as regional wage differentials and the payment of special family allowances to married employees were extremely complicated and cumbersome. It recommended that prisoners of war be used instead, since they were good workers, easily administered, and could be moved about at will within the communications zone. But installation commanders were extremely reluctant to use any type of nonmilitary labor, and especially POW’s. They exaggerated the security problems involved. This attitude probably originated in June and July, when ADSEC units were subordinate to First Army and the entire beachhead was, technically, a part of the combat zone. Moreover, during the OVERLORD planning period the ETO Judge Advocate (JAG) had favored a very narrow interpretation of the Geneva Convention, which severely limited the use of prisoners. By August 1944 the Judge Advocate had modified his ruling, and COMZ was urging a wider use of prisoners. The OCQM was particularly anxious to substitute prisoners for service units in the rear areas, since military labor was more suitable for use in newly established installations farther forward, and could be used in the combat zone where prisoners were not permitted. The OCQM pursued this program so persistently that at the end of hostilities prisoners comprised 46 percent of Quartermaster personnel in COMZ, or about some 115,000 men. The majority of Quartermaster troops had been transferred to the armies, and Littlejohn only controlled 57,800 men in regular QM units--some 21 percent of his available labor force.23
An even more perplexing problem was the theater troop basis to be used in computing requisitions. Uncertainty and lack of coordination in this field had caused endless difficulties during BOLERO. Beginning in July 1944 a Troop List for Operations and Supply was published by the War Department. This provided invaluable guidance as
Table 11: ETOUSA strength forecast for QM requisitioning, 28 February 1945 and 31 July 1945. a
(In Thousands)
| Category | Continent (Less SOLOC) | SOLOC | United Kingdom | Totals | ||||
| 28 Feb | 31 Jul | 28 Feb | 31 Jul | 28 Feb | 31 Jul | 28 Feb | 31 Jul | |
| U.S. Military: | ||||||||
| Ground Forces | 1161 | 1207 | 369 | 370 | 40 | — | 1507 | 1577 |
| Service Forces | 359 | 378 | 93 | 124 | 101 | 58 | 553 | 560 |
| Air Forces | 175 | 190 | 28 | 32 | 230 | 215 | 433 | 437 |
| Reinforcements | 85 | 90 | 18 | 18 | 20 | 10 | 123 | 118 |
| Others b | 113 | 121 | 30 | 56 | 119 | 117 | 262 | 294 |
| Total | 1893 | 1986 | 538 | 600 | 510 | 400 | 2878 | 2986 |
| Total includes: | ||||||||
| Officers | 140 | 145 | 45 | 50 | 52 | 46 | 237 | 241 |
| Nurses | 9.68 | 11.65 | 2.29 | 2.34 | 7.7 | 6.7 | 19.67 | 20.69 |
| WAC Officers | .27 | .27 | .002 | .002 | .135 | .135 | .406 | .41 |
| Other U.S. and British Personnel: | ||||||||
| U. S. Navy | 9 | 9 | 4 | 4 | 58 | 38 | 71 | 51 |
| Merchant Marine | — | — | — | — | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| UNRRA | 1 | 10 | — | — | — | — | 1 | 10 |
| British & Allied Military | 17 | 17 | — | — | 3 | 3 | 20 | 20 |
| British & Allied Civilian | 11 | 11 | — | — | 4 | 4 | 15 | 15 |
| Others c | 6 | 7 | — | — | 6 | 6 | 12 | 13 |
| 44 | 54 | 4 | 4 | 73 | 53 | 121 | 111 |
| Liberated Manpower: | ||||||||
| Type A—French Combat Forces d | — | — | 273 | 557 | — | — | 273 | 557 |
| Italian Service Units | 3 | 7 | 30 | 31 | 4 | — | 37 | 38 |
| Slav Service Units | — | — | 2 | 5 | — | — | 2 | 5 |
| Type B—Security & Service Units e | 70 | 156 | 105 | 148 | — | — | 175 | 304 |
| Type C—Misc. Security Units f | 51 | 106 | — | — | — | — | 51 | 106 |
| 124 | 269 | 410 | 741 | 4 | 0 | 538 | 1010 |
| Civilian Labor, Mobile g | 29 | 95 | — | — | — | — | 29 | 95 |
| Civilian Labor, Static g | 75 | 79 | 30 | 32 | 22 | 22 | 127 | 133 |
| POW, Labor | 155 | 160 | 115 | 264 | 18 | 18 | 288 | 442 |
| POW, Others | 170 | 850 | — | — | 6 | 8 | 176 | 858 |
| Allied POW | 570 | 1 | 162 | — | — | 1 | 732 | |
| Displaced Persons | — | 3000 | — | — | — | — | — | 3000 |
| Total | 2490 | 7063 | 1098 | 1803 | 633 | 501 | 4158 | 9367 |
a This table is a summary only. The original included monthly estimates.
b Principally hospital patients and theater overhead.
c Includes Red Cross, USO, Technicians, Special Service, Press, guests.
d Includes direct support troops.
e French, Belgian, and Dutch personnel.
f French only—Gendarmerie, FFI, Miscellaneous.
g Mobile civilian labor received clothing and all meals; static civilian labor received a mid-day meal only.
Source: Ltr, CQM to CG ComZ, 16 Feb 45, sub: QM Supply Responsibilities to Agencies other than U.S. Army. LRF XXXIIIA, 123.
far as U.S. troops were concerned, and seemed to solve the problem. But ultimately support of non-U.S. personnel became the larger portion of the QMC mission, and estimates regarding such personnel remained highly uncertain until after V-E Day. Littlejohn believed that such forecasts should be made by the G-4 or G-1 Section of COMZ, but the responsibility was given to G-3, which apparently failed to recognize its importance. Within his own organization, the Personnel and the Military Planning Divisions were made jointly responsible for forecasts to be used in all computations prepared by the OCQM.24 The complexity of the problem was dramatically displayed in February 1945, when the OCQM submitted its own six-month forecast to General Lee, with a request that the estimate be approved or alternate figures provided by his headquarters. Except for the TLOS, all figures had “been obtained through unofficial channels, informally from various agencies.” The estimate was broken down into fifty-five categories of personnel, each to receive different treatment with regard to rations, clothing, or PX privileges, and separate figures were provided for the end of each month, from February through July. The accompanying summary gives only major subtotals for the first and last month-end of the forecast. (Table 11) In February the OCQM was supporting 4,220,000 persons. At the end of July 1945 it expected to be giving direct support to 6,367,000 plus an undetermined amount of indirect support to 3,000,000 displaced persons, who were a responsibility of Civil Affairs. On 5 March, COMZ concurred in the manpower estimate with minor exceptions. It should be noted that this forecast was actually over-conservative in several respects. Peak requirements came in May instead of July, and Littlejohn’s actual direct-support responsibility then totaled a staggering 7,629,000 persons, including 2,885,000 prisoners of war. At the same time some 340,000 long tons of supplies in Quartermaster depots were earmarked for Civil Affairs.25
Relations with NYPE
During the early part of the OVERLORD operation, the War Department shaped all supply policy and controlled certain critical items, releasing them for shipment by specific authorization. But by the end of 1944 recommendations from the Overseas Supply Division of NYPE were the controlling factors in such authorizations.26 By that time OSD had become a clearing house for information on the progress of the procurement program, the stock levels of all the services in the zone of interior depots, and rail traffic and maritime tonnage availabilities, as well as the requirements of the European and Mediterranean theaters. Apart from high-level policy decisions on such matters as levels of supply, OSD decided what would
actually be shipped to those theaters, and in what priority.27
It will be recalled that shortly before D-day OCQM submitted detailed requisitions covering the first ninety days of OVERLORD.28 Support for the invasion was not, therefore, strictly speaking, by automatic supply, but the distinction was largely academic. A headquarters directing an assault had no time to recompute its requirements from day to day; whether the staff computed its own requirements in advance (preplanned supply) or delegated that function to another headquarters nearer the source of support (automatic supply), the initial flow of supplies had to follow a prescribed plan until combat experience indicated what adjustments should be made. Supply to the individual combat units was, or course, completely automatic, apart from emergency requirements. The OVERLORD plan had provided a reserve in Great Britain to cover such requirements, and airlift to deliver them to the requesting units.
During the first weeks after D-day, the Military Planning Division of OCQM kept its eyes on the reserve levels and attempted to translate day-to-day fluctuations into intelligent trends. Inevitably, combat brings logistical as well as tactical surprises, and some of them are so far-reaching that they cannot be compensated for by the over-all margin of safety provided in the supply level. The first readjustment requiring action by NYPE was a direct result of the hedgerow fighting in Normandy. In the heavily compartmented terrain, each enclosed field was a separate strongpoint to be attacked, captured, and abandoned in rapid succession. During the first six weeks, requirements for clothing and such Class II items as blankets, mess gear, and shelter halves were at about two and a half times the expected rate.29
Then, during the pursuit in August and September 1944, there was little time to cook field rations, and operational rations, especially the 10-in-1, were consumed at about twice the projected rate.30 As further by-products of the pursuit and the early liberation of Paris, French civilians became dependent upon Civil Affairs supplies in unexpected numbers, and German prisoners of war, including deserters and whole units surrendered by their commanders, totaled 400,000 by late September, exceeding estimates by about 100 percent. These huge requirements produced a real emergency, necessitating not merely a drastic upward revision of procurement programs but also a change in priorities and expedited shipments from the zone of interior.
When Quartermaster requisitions reached the OSD, they were sent to the Quartermaster Section of the Operations Branch. Here, a staff of more than 300, working under Lt. Col. Terrence R. J. Hickey, edited these requests on the basis of authorized levels, theater strength figures, maintenance factors, and current and projected availability
of materials. This review was by no means routine, since OSD was in reality the executive agency implementing ASF supply policy. It had the authority to make substitutions when necessary as well. as on-the-spot changes in authorization. Particularly knotty problems could be resolved by direct teletype conference between the theater and the port.31
Aside from these formal means of communication, the Chief Quartermaster profited from his friendly personal relationship with Colonel Evans, Chief of the Planning and Control Branch in OSD. Evans, himself a regular Quartermaster officer of wide experience, who had won high respect on both sides of the Atlantic, was in an excellent position to keep Littlejohn up to date on shifts in logistical policy in the zone of interior and, in turn, to transmit the Chief Quartermaster’s viewpoint to the ASF and The Quartermaster General. Littlejohn discovered that Evans could predict fairly accurately how Gregory’s and Somervell’s staffs would react to any proposals from overseas, and moreover was willing to give prompt answers to informal inquiries about the probable fate of official requests. Littlejohn found Evans’ letters so useful that by early September 1944 he requested that they be sent regularly each week. Obliging the Chief Quartermaster as best he could, particularly during the period when the logistical pipeline was under unprecedented strain, Evans communicated with Littlejohn on such subjects as maintenance factors, winter clothing, tentage, clothing for prisoners of war, and reefer tonnages. Each of these was a pressing ETO problem awaiting official action in the zone of interior.32
At the end of September 1944, Littlejohn called upon Evans to perform a task that bordered upon the impossible. During the preceding two weeks, as the pursuit across France came to a halt and the quartermasters of combat units surveyed their clothing shortages, unseasonably cold weather set in. Thus unexpectedly early demands for initial issue of winter clothing were piled upon the accumulated demands for replacement of regular clothing, and the theater’s official forecast of Class II and IV requirements abruptly increased by nearly 250 percent. Simultaneously, the congestion of shipping in European waters made it necessary to cut ten ships from each transatlantic convoy. Littlejohn’s share of this cut in September was 77,000 measurement tons, or about 13 percent, and the prospect was that this deficit would be doubled in October. Having reviewed every outstanding requisition and weighed its relative importance, on 26 September Littlejohn asked Evans’ advice and assistance in completely rescheduling his October shipments from NYPE. The changes necessary were so drastic that Littlejohn suggested canceling all outstanding requisitions and starting afresh. Evans advised against such a procedure, since “it would take thirty to sixty days to get you back on a sound supply basis. There are unquestionably items which, regardless of tonnage allocations or shipping situation, are
absolutely essential for you to have in order for you to support the minimum of operational requirements.”33 Instead, he proposed that Littlejohn cable immediately a list of specific requisitions to be canceled, and later the new priorities for those to be retained. He personally undertook to cancel shipments at the depots, en route to the port and in the port itself, although he explained apologetically that ships more than 50 percent loaded when the cancellation order arrived could not be unloaded. Even beyond this far-reaching compliance with Littlejohn’s wishes, Evans successfully presented the ETO point of view while awaiting specific cabled instructions. He managed to resist pressure from ASF to cancel whole categories of QM requisitions, offering instead to delete specific items that he believed the ETO could readily get along without. Littlejohn found these decisions to be entirely sound, and on 9 October wrote: “As usual, you have been very helpful in assisting me to solve my problems. Many Thanks.”34
Despite this cordial and efficient personal relationship with Evans, Littlejohn was convinced that in certain respects NYPE had been accorded too much authority, with unfortunate results. This applied particularly to longterm requirements, which after editing were forwarded direct from NYPE to ASF and incorporated into the Army Supply Program. Only then was the OQMG informed and directed to deliver the supplies. Littlejohn contended that the OQMG, which had to arrange procurement, needed information on such requirements earlier than NYPE, which merely called the supplies forward from the depots for loading. When ASF called all the ETO service chiefs home to Washington in March 1944 for a last preinvasion review of the supply situation, Littlejohn went straight to Somervell about the matter. The result was an informal agreement that Littlejohn would state his long-term requirements in personal letters to The Quartermaster General, with information copies to the appropriate division of ASF and to NYPE. Short-term and immediate requirements were to be transmitted as formal requisitions to NYPE. The Overseas Supply Division of NYPE was formally directed to forward an edited copy of each QM requisition from the ETO to The Quartermaster General, in order to expedite action on critical items and new items requisitioned. It was unfortunate that the procedure for estimating long-term requirements was not similarly formalized. Most officials in ASF, at NYPE, and even in the OQMG appeared to regard Littlejohn’s letters on the ETO supply situation as informal expressions of opinion, rather than as providing authority to initiate procurement. Moreover, these officials regarded their own estimates of what could be sent as statements of industrial practicability, and not as hard-and-fast commitments to deliver. Conversely, Littlejohn felt that since he had provided ample time for procurement, the “lead time” on formal requisitions to NYPE might
be materially reduced—a view emphatically not concurred in by the New York Port.35
Apparently even Evans failed to understand the full scope of the franchise that Littlejohn conceived himself to have received from General Somervell. Certainly Evans felt that whatever authority Littlejohn might have been given to bypass NYPE it was unwise to do so as a matter of routine, and moreover that the tone adopted in some of these direct-action letters was unfortunate. On 24 November he wrote:
I am certain that you will allow me the liberty of making a couple of observations which I can assure you are made with your best interests in mind. ...
Your technique of bombarding The Quartermaster General, individuals in the OQMG, Headquarters, ASF, and the port with emphatic demands for action in connection with those matters of Quartermaster supply which are not satisfactory to you to date, I believe, has had excellent results. However, there have been informal reverberations from Washington to the effect that a continuation of this technique will probably result in the development of disinclination to be sympathetic with some of your future demands. I have talked this over with General Goodman and we agree that in order to prevent such a procedure from operating to your disadvantage, it would be advisable to, at least temporarily, channel your complaints and special requirements through the port, except for those items of a purely technical nature and perhaps occasionally a vital problem. I am sure you will say that you don’t give a damn what they think or what they say as long as you get what you want. On the other hand a gauge of their tempers indicates that in the final analysis you may not get what you want.36
Littlejohn’s reply, expressing bewilderment at Evans’ admonition, reveals the extent to which he was engrossed in his mission and indifferent to considerations involving personalities. Moreover it reiterates his conviction that, while formal requisitions could best be handled through the port, satisfactory action on broad policy matters—notably maintenance factors—demanded precisely those vigorous methods which Evans decried:
I have gone very carefully over your letter of 24 November. As a matter of fact, I have read it three times as you have sort of caught me off base.
Cotulla raised the question of staying in the groove on requisitions the other day. I do not recall any specific instance except ... my 5,000,000 yards of cloth and the manufacture of the ETO field uniforms. Frankly, I am not proud of the action which I have obtained on either of these ...
I have been very much embarrassed over our inability to secure the ETO uniform. Goodman suggested that I write on this matter to Lutes, which I did ... Some weeks ago it became apparent to me that on clothing and equipage ... I was headed for disaster.37
Clearly, Littlejohn considered his supply position to be precarious, and was ready to ride roughshod over all
opposition to improve it. Evans hastened to agree and gave assurance of his personal support, but again warned that such a policy would probably arouse some hostility:
... Goodman and myself are entirely in sympathy with your outlined position and your stated objectives with respect to your unparalleled mission and that you are assured of our best efforts in your behalf ... we feel that in many cases because of our specific responsibility to your theater we have a more sympathetic understanding and attitude toward your problems than that ... of those in the OQMG. In our dealings with them rightly or wrongly, we ... attempt to secure action for you regardless of other theaters. ... We fully realize that ... our capabilities are limited and that in the final analysis the channels of communication utilized by you are a matter for your decision. Perhaps you will remember that ... I indicated to you that in some instances it might be necessary to effect a cable direct from Eisenhower to Marshall. Normally the boys in the lower echelons do not like to see this type of cable. ... However, to date I know of very few instances when cables like that have come through that the request was not complied with.38
The mechanics of cooperation between NYPE and the ETO improved considerably in the course of time. An agency preoccupied with maritime aspects of supply, NYPE favored decentralization of requisitions among overseas areas served by different ports. COMZ generally agreed with this view, and supplies destined for delivery to Marseille were requisitioned by SOLOC although the requisitions were reviewed by the appropriate technical service within COMZ. In November 1944, reflecting the increasing autonomy of the United Kingdom Base, a similar arrangement was set up for supplies destined for Great Britain. Littlejohn laid down stringent rules governing the Quartermaster aspects of these decentralized procedures. He demanded that requisitions show stocks on hand for each requisitioned item, amounts due in, and projected future requirements over a considerable period. This procedure was not merely a matter of supply discipline but also provided invaluable information to NYPE. After inspecting the ETO in January 1945 General Somervell directed that all the technical services adopt and standardize such procedures. Another result of Somervell’s January tour was of considerable interest to the OCQM; early in April, Evans came to COMZ as Deputy Chief of Staff for Planning and shortly thereafter was promoted to brigadier general.39
The Organization for Procurement on the Continent
To supplement their requisitions on the zone of interior, the U.S. forces made elaborate plans for procurement of continental labor, supplies, and services. During the spring of 1944 SHAEF concluded agreements on reciprocal aid, or reverse lend-lease, with the governments-in-exile of most of the continental nations. An agreement with the French broke down on the thorny issue of recognition for Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s provisional government, but most of the technical details had already been worked out and the Supreme
Commander decided to ignore the diplomatic aspects of the situation for the time being. For Eisenhower’s own troops this made no difference; their orders had already been written and would be obeyed. Initially, there were some fears about the attitude of civilian officials in newly liberated areas. These proved groundless, but an accord with the French Committee of National Liberation before the landing would doubtless have speeded up coordination of effort at the tactical level. Lack of an accord caused various minor complications. For example, it was something of a paradox that each U.S. soldier landing in France, a supposedly friendly country, carried 400 francs ($4.03) in invasion currency secured only by military fiat and angrily repudiated by de Gaulle. Norman farmers and French bankers alike accepted the paper money without protest, but for several weeks the finances of the liberated areas were in a state of confusion that could have been prevented. Littlejohn, visiting the Continent on 22 June, found that his purchasing and contracting officers were buying produce at prices fixed months earlier by the Germans. While the prices seemed slightly high, the lack of an ETO policy on prices was far more serious and Littlejohn asked the general purchasing agent to establish one immediately. The general purchasing agent was well aware of the need for fixed prices to prevent competitive bidding and inflation, but for lack of an over-all agreement his agents had made slow progress in concluding separate and temporary agreements with individual regional officials. On 25 August 1944, when all the military orders to Allied troops regarding civil affairs, local procurement, and similar matters received the sanction of international agreement, the invasion currency was retroactively validated.40
The organization for local procurement employed in the United Kingdom was brought to the Continent intact. General Allen, the general purchasing agent, had become subordinate to the G-4 Section of COMZ in January 1944, but without change in duties. Colonel Barber continued as chief of the OCQM Procurement Division after it moved to France, but it should be noted that many important functions of his office remained behind in London. The program of purchasing British products, especially wool clothing and vegetables, was expanded to include exports to U.S. troops on the Continent.
Reflecting earlier experiences in the Mediterranean theater and the wishes of the governments-in-exile, an ETO directive of April 1944 provided guidance on policy and operating procedures for the procurement of supplies and services. Aware that four years of German occupation had stripped the economies of the liberated countries, the general purchasing agent sought to prevent any local procurement that would result in compensating imports to support the civilian population. He specifically prohibited local requisition of medical supplies and soap, POI„ and all foods except fresh fruits and vegetables. Allied
personnel were expressly forbidden to buy food in restaurants, though night clubs were excepted. No fuel could be purchased except firewood released by local forestry officials. This provision, included at the insistence of the French, later had to be modified. Although coal was in short supply, it was required by the combat forces and requisitioned as a matter of military necessity. The directive further provided that, before the reestablishment of recognized central governments in the liberated countries, U.S. forces could either requisition through the local regional officials, with ultimate settlement to be left to the national authorities, or make direct cash purchases. Once the central governments became operative, procedures were to be revised, and the bulk of procurement was to be handled through a central agency—in France, the Service D’Aide Aux Forces Alliées (SAFA). For practical purposes, a distinction was also made between day-to-day operational needs, which could be met by “field procurement” of surplus civilian supplies and “headquarters procurement” covering long-term or recurrent requirements for supplies not immediately accessible and involving the initiation of manufacturing or other productive processes.41
Notwithstanding that the area to be liberated was one of the highly industrialized regions of the world, it was doubtful from the start how much local support the Allies might draw from it. Industry and transport had been exploited by the Germans and bombed by the Allies. Inadequate transportation aggravated a severe food shortage in the whole area. Labor was plentiful, although rendered inefficient by malnutrition. Any major continental procurement program would need food for the workers, parts or materials to renovate transportation and industrial plants, and raw materials to be manufactured for delivery to the Allies. This implied a complicated long-term program requiring multilateral agreements. Thus in headquarters procurement the OCQM Procurement Division had little freedom of individual action. Littlejohn was an enthusiastic proponent of the continental program, but he wisely refused to cancel any requisition on NYPE until deliveries from continental sources had actually begun.42
Within a month after the liberation of Paris, representatives of SAFA, the French Ministries of Finance and Labor, SHAEF, and the general purchasing agent agreed upon the procedures for American procurement of supplies and civilian labor. Henceforth American procurement officials were in daily contact with SAFA, and whenever a sizable order was placed—for jerricans, cotton duck, or fuel wood, to mention several typical Quartermaster projects—representatives of the interested technical service and of the general purchasing agent conferred with both SAFA
and the French ministry having jurisdiction over the particular supplies under consideration.43 Similarly, as soon as the enemy was cleared from Belgium and Luxembourg, the governments of these countries established offices comparable to SAFA, and the general purchasing agent sent deputies to the various capital cities, to determine what facilities could be readily put into operation that would be of either direct or indirect benefit to the military forces. Rivalry with the British for the use of continental facilities added to the complications of procurement. After creation of the British-American Mission for Procurement on the Continent in September 1944, General Allen and Sir Cecil Weir, the senior British member, easily reached an amicable settlement of most problems of that nature.44
Except for temporary and emergency requirements, services and supplies received by the American forces were paid for by the individual European governments in accordance with lend-lease and reciprocal aid agreements concluded at the diplomatic levels. While superficially this arrangement seemed simple, procurement activities were barely beyond the blueprint stage before delays were caused by conflicting interpretations of reciprocal aid agreements, by the refusal of suppliers to participate in the program until they were sure payment would be promptly forthcoming from the French authorities, and by the inability of French manufacturers to obtain needed raw materials through their accustomed channels.45
Among Quartermaster field installations, the responsibility for short-term procurement was separated from the various supply sections and given to a purchasing and contracting officer in the administrative or executive division. To assure a reasonable orderliness in procurement procedures, the OCQM issued explicit instructions that only duly designated purchasing and contracting officers would engage in such activities. But field procurement was not exclusively concerned with supplies which were unavailable from military sources; regulations provided that local procurement could be employed “when the time element and exigencies of the service did not permit acquisition through regular channels.”46 Monetary limitations, originally $1,000 and later $2,000, were put on the amounts that base section purchasing and contracting officers could spend without going through the OCQM, while in the combat zone officers were obliged to obtain army-level approval for all purchases above $100. The First Army controlled
procurement through its G-5 Section, while Third Army used the Fiscal Branch of its G-4 Section for this purpose. Once the reciprocal aid procedures were improved by experience, direct expenditures of cash dropped perceptibly. At the 62nd Quartermaster Base Depot in Verdun, for example, less than one-fourth of one percent of total procurements before V-E Day were cash transactions.47
As the forward liaison office of the OCQM Procurement Division, the ADSEC quartermaster was the most active field procurement agency. The Procurement Branch at this echelon supervised and coordinated purchasing and contracting activities of all ADSEC Quartermaster depots, and participated with regional deputies of SAFA and liaison officers from the Low Countries in surveys and contract negotiations of procurable facilities. No less than in the areas farther to the rear, these tasks had their trying moments. It was necessary to arbitrate conflicts between military and civilian priorities, educate Europeans in American business methods, outline efficient work plans for the suppliers, and settle the claims of civilians and members of former resistance movements against needed stocks. So that future procurement would not suffer, such friction as occurred between the American military and Allied nationals in the course of these negotiations had to be eliminated by tact and diplomacy. Even when relations were at their best, local procurement was complicated by inadequate transportation, inexperienced civilian labor, and an absence of weighing and packaging equipment. If the Americans had not been able to provide Army transport to the suppliers, or at least gasoline, tires, and oil for their vehicles, as well as sacks, cartons, and crates, the procurement program would have been even further handicapped.48
The Ordnance Service arranged the first large importation of U.S. raw materials on the Continent for military purposes—rubber required for retreading tires after the pursuit across France. Brig. Gen. Hugh O. Minton, chief of the Production Division, ASF, came to Europe in October 1944 to get the program under way. With this exception, Ordnance procurement activities, mainly repair of vehicles and modification of equipment, required skilled labor rather than raw materials. Engineer procurement, largely concerned with construction, used locally available materials. The OCQM initiated most of the procurement that required importation of raw materials from the United States. Late in December 1944 Colonel Barber and General Allen went to Washington to arrange for an allocation of about 100,000 tons of materials, largely sheet steel, cotton, wood pulp, and wool. They traveled on the same aircraft with General Minton, who gave them considerable support during a conference with General Somervell on 3 January 1945.49
On 28 February a Production Branch was set up within the OCQM Procurement Division to assist the general purchasing agent in the many-sided production program. This branch expedited raw materials from the ports to its own warehouse within Depot Q-177 at Paris, allocated them to manufacturers, checked on the manufacturing process, and inspected items before acceptance. It maintained careful stock control and consumption records which contributed to improved accuracy in computing raw materials requirements. The branch also controlled captured German raw materials and raw materials requisitioned from private German sources, insofar as these were in Quartermaster categories. On 29 April 1945 the Production Control Agency, ETOUSA, was established, and thereafter the activity of this branch within Germany was controlled by that agency. Since the U.S. zone of Germany was to be administered by military districts under the armies, and no base sections were to be organized, this implied a new channel of command, but the channel of technical supervision was not materially modified. Subject to coordination by G-4 and G-5, the Quartermaster Service was assigned responsibility for the German industries producing most of those items procured by the QMC in the zone of interior. POL was not included, but the OCQM found itself concerned with both basic and final processing in textiles, food, leather, office equipment and supplies, containers and household goods, and ceramics. To handle these tremendous responsibilities the Quartermaster Production Control Division, staffed by 762 officers and enlisted men and headed by Brig. Gen. John B. Franks, was set up at Frankfurt. This unit provided most of the personnel for the Office of the Quartermaster, Occupation Forces, Germany, which was established at the same site and under the same commander on 20 June 1945.50
In terms of actual deliveries to the U.S. forces before V-E Day, the production program on the Continent was disappointing. Scheduled deliveries of QM supplies for the entire year 1945 from Allied countries on the Continent and neutrals had a total value of $210,000,000. Supplies actually received through 30 June were worth only $14,510,377. None of the major programs based on processing of imported raw materials had produced any large volume of deliveries before V-E Day. Littlejohn and Somervell were aware that delays were inevitable, and that these projects had more humanitarian significance for the rehabilitation of the continental economy than strictly military importance. Some of them were undertaken at the specific insistence of War Production Board representatives.51
Shipping shortages and congestion in continental ports delayed the arrival of raw materials, but the major difficulties stemmed from the disorganized economies of the Allied countries. Government administration, production, distribution, and currencies were all
recovering slowly from a complete collapse. Under strict military controls such as were imposed initially in Italy, it might have been possible to shore up specific enterprises by stopgap measures and compel them to produce. In free countries where the needs of the civilian population came first, the U.S. technical services had to be content with their allocated share of the slowly reviving industrial potential. To an American procurement officer, the machinery of reciprocal aid appeared to be primarily a means of curbing U.S. procurement activity, and only secondarily a method of recompense for lend-lease supplies. Moreover, he often found himself in competition with the French national rearmament program, which received favorable priorities from local officials because it enhanced the military prestige of France. But probably the most important cause of failure to complete the large industrial procurement projects was lack of coal. It had been estimated that the 100,000 tons of American raw materials already mentioned would require a direct supplement of 180,000 tons of European coal to complete the QM procurement program. That estimate had ignored the needs of an urban population for light, heat, and transportation, which were also dependent upon coal.52
The end of hostilities on 8 May came just as seasonal requirements of coal for civilian uses were declining. During late May and early June most of the large industrial projects were canceled, and the rest were materially reduced in size. Large shipments of U.S. raw materials had arrived and were reported as surplus at the end of June. General indications are that the industrial procurement program was just beginning to show results when it was cut off.53
The Supply and Relief Operations of G-5
Some mention has already been made of the ETO Civil Affairs organization in connection with local procurement. Very briefly stated, Civil Affairs was the established channel for all communication between military commanders in liberated territory and the civilian population. In conquered enemy territory, a very similar function called Military Government was performed by the same organization. A special staff section, commonly called Civil Affairs—Military Government was attached to every major tactical and logistical headquarters in the theater. Its aims were to prevent disease and unrest among the civilian population that might impede military operations and also to make available manpower and resources for military objectives. In the Mediterranean theater these functions had been rather narrowly interpreted, and a separate Civil Affairs—Military Government chain of command had been set up to implement them. Moreover, requisitioning, storage, and distribution of relief supplies were a separate Civil Affairs responsibility in which the technical services did not participate. In the European
theater, COSSAC planners had envisioned a Civil Affairs-Military Government organization more closely tied to the tactical chain of command at each level, culminating in a close control over liberated and occupied areas alike by SHAEF. These views, codified as a proposed Civil Affairs-Military Government handbook for civil affairs units in the field, provoked an acrimonious debate between Mediterranean and north European theorists which transcended nationality. General Morgan later admitted that COSSAC set off entirely on the wrong foot in regard to its civil affairs planning, and one of his harassed subordinates observed that “there were plenty of affairs, but the difficulty was to keep them civil.”54
President Roosevelt widened the area of debate when he directed Secretary Stimson to plan for initial relief and rehabilitation operations by the Army in all areas evacuated by the Germans, whether those areas were of military importance or not. That directive insured that the Civil Affairs-Military Government function would be very broadly interpreted in the ETO, and involved the new organization in a wide range of logistical, economic, fiscal, and diplomatic activities. The plan finally settled upon was a compromise. Military Government (in Germany) would conform to the original close control concept; in the combat zone within liberated areas, close control would also be exercised by tactical commanders, but in close coordination with liaison officers of the Allied nation concerned. In the communications zone and in other rear areas control would be turned over to restored Allied governments as rapidly as possible, and such relief activities as were still necessary would be assumed by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). As long as any Civil Affairs functions in rear areas remained in military hands, they would be administered through command channels—primarily by Civil Affairs-Military Government officers in each base section.
Any possibility of a separate Civil Affairs-Military Government chain of command in the ETO was definitely eliminated in February 1944, when the Civil Affairs Division of SHAEF was upgraded to a general staff division, and redesignated G-5. Lt. Gen. Arthur E. Grassett, a Canadian, was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, with Brig. Gen. Julius C. Holmes as his American deputy. These officers brought about a basic revision of the controversial handbook, and later exercised technical supervision over the Civil Affairs-Military Government units deployed in the field. By virtue of their position in the command structure, the two officers could call on the COMZ technical services for support in fulfilling their mission.55
Quartermaster Support for G-5
The procedure followed in obtaining and delivering relief supplies involved close cooperation. Requirements were
computed by G-5, and SHAEF divided procurement responsibility for specific items between Great Britain and the United States. The OCQM forwarded to NYPE such requisitions as were referred to it for that purpose. Editing requisitions and designating shipping priorities were G-5 responsibilities. Once they arrived in the theater, all supplies of a quartermaster nature were stored in Quartermaster depots. Furthermore, the OCQM assumed full responsibility for distribution from ports to depots, and between depots, but G-5 designated the locations of supplies and arranged intratheater shipping priorities. Issue was made in bulk to Civil Affairs units or officers at depots or truck-heads. G-5 edited the requisitions of its own subordinate units. Civil Affairs supplies were segregated from other supplies, but were stored at the same depots that handled Quartermaster supplies of the same category. By military standards, the packing of Civil Affairs supplies was inferior, so that they deteriorated rapidly when stored in the open. This applied especially to food and clothing, which were by far the largest categories of relief supplies. From modest beginnings. Civil Affairs tonnages in Quartermaster Class I, II, and IV depots rose to nearly 350,000 tons—some 15 percent of all such supplies—in April 1945.56
At first glance, computing relief requirements may seem a technical matter suitable for transfer to the various technical services, but Civil Affairs—Military Government requirements differed from all others in one important respect: relief issues were supplementary and not intended to supply all the needs of a nation, or even of an individual except on a temporary basis. Requirements were therefore based on anticipated deficits in local sources of supply. Such computations were made from specialized economic intelligence data and included such imponderables as the amount of “scorching” the Germans might perform before they evacuated various areas. Civil Affairs supplies fell into four general categories:57
Items necessary for immediate relief, consisting of food, clothing, medical, and sanitary supplies.
Items necessary for distribution of relief, consisting of emergency feeding equipment, fuel, and initial repairs to public utility, communication, and transport systems.
Items required to re-establish production of natural resources, such as coal, oil, etc., for military purposes.
Items which will have the effect of reducing the relief burden at the earliest possible date, consisting of agricultural implements and seeds and raw materials for rehabilitation of the textile industry.
The President’s decision to provide this type of support through military channels involved the Quartermaster Corps in many new and unfamiliar responsibilities. For example, before D-day the OCQM requisitioned some 73,000 items of agricultural equipment and over five million pounds of seeds for delivery by D plus 180. Beginning
in November 1944 a French Civil Import Program, presented to ASF by Jean Monnet and coordinated by the general purchasing agent, gradually relieved the OCQM of its responsibility for long-term rehabilitation in France.58
The OCQM was engaged in providing identical items of food, clothing, and sanitary supplies to two general categories of personnel through two different supply channels. Needy local civilians and refugees received Quartermaster supplies from the Civil Affairs organization, either from CA field units or through local governmental agencies. The OCQM supplied the same articles directly to people for whom the U.S. Army was exclusively responsible—prisoners of war, recovered Allied prisoners (including Russians), Italians and Slays in service units, and civilian laborers. The Civil Affairs ration, since it was supplementary, was rather meager. The OCQM ration for prisoners of war was considerably larger, and that for recovered Allied prisoners was still more generous. Displaced persons were a particular source of confusion. Many had fought on both sides in the war, and could describe themselves as POW’s, Allies, or civilian refugees, according to the exigencies of the moment. Three months after the end of hostilities Littlejohn estimated that the Army was still feeding some 1,500,000 displaced persons from military stocks, partly because of confusion regarding their status, and partly because G-5 stocks had been exhausted. The Chief Quartermaster recommended that, in any future conflict, policy on support for all non-U.S. personnel, including careful statistical controls, be the subject of earlier and more centralized planning, and that the actual computation of requirements should be an exclusive QMC function.59 (See Table 17.)
The OCQM normally computed requirements for storage of Civil Affairs supplies as part of its successive over-all storage plans. In December 1944, space was allocated for 20,000 long tons each at Liège, Charleroi, and Verdun, 17,000 tons at Paris, and 10,000 tons at Cherbourg. By February 1945 these allocations had been materially exceeded, but no new locations had been designated. On 13 March, G-4 requested Civil Affairs storage space for 260,000 long tons at new sites nearer to the Rhine, capable of issuing more than 9,000 tons daily. Four days later the OCQM submitted the following plan:
| Depot | Storage capacity | Daily issues |
| Verdun-Esch subdepot | 90,000 | 3,400 |
| Liège-Lutterade subdepot | 75,000 | 2,800 |
| Charleroi depot | 45,000 | 1,400 |
| CONAD depots | 35,000 | 1,350 |
| Total | 245,000 | 8,950 |
At the end of April all these allocations except CONAD’s had been exceeded, and over 300,000 long tons were on hand east of Paris. By June 1945 Quartermaster responsibility for Civil Affairs storage was restricted to Germany, where space for 100,000 tons each was required in the Eastern and Western Military Districts, 5,000 tons in Berlin, and 35,000 tons in Bremen.60
ETO Requisitioning Procedures
As long as the supply situation remained critical, the OCQM was forced to maintain careful supervision over base sections, depots, and other field installations. Littlejohn and his staff realized that centralized control of supply in the OCQM was a cumbersome, slow, and unwieldy method of meeting demands from the combat troops. Gradually, the depots were given greater autonomy in editing and filling requisitions, and part of the task of monitoring these activities was delegated to base section quartermasters. But progress along these lines had to go hand in hand with improvement in the training of Quartermaster troops, which was a responsibility of the Field Service Division. Irregular and unreliable transportation presented another obstacle to the OCQM objective of delegating authority over supply, since the Storage and Distribution Division had to intervene frequently. Moreover, as long as port discharge was confined to Cherbourg and the beaches, there was a natural tendency to maintain centralized control over centralized operations.61
The daily allocation of transportation tonnage by G-4, COMZ, to the armies remained the controlling factor in all supply operations until early January 1945. Requisitions flowed from the armies through the regulating stations to the G-4 Section, COMZ, which was interested only in tonnage and directed that only unitemized gross tonnages of each class of supply should be requested. As long as the armies were in motion they were able to justify demands for most of the available tonnage, and received it in the form of a specific number of railroad trains for each class of supply. The base sections received barely enough to supply the air forces and their own personnel, and nothing at all to build up stocks in the depots.
A characteristic episode of this period concerned winter clothing. Littlejohn warned the army quartermasters that such clothing was available at the ports, but if they wanted it they would have to make their desires known by way of the army G-4’s to 12th Army Group and G-4, COMZ, for the OCQM had no control over transportation. Moreover, in view of slow and uncertain deliveries he recommended that they request air transportation.62 Under prevailing conditions, such action meant that clothing went straight from the beaches to the armies, but none was added to the meager stocks in the depots.
Since specific items, not tonnages, were needed to supply the troops, OCQM maintained close contact with the army quartermasters to learn their actual needs. On 16 September 1944, an OCQM circular letter directed that army and base section quartermasters submit periodic estimates of their future needs—for rations every ten days, and for clothing every fifteen days.63 These estimates were in detail, with separate tonnage listed for each item, and indicated the desired priority. They were used in making up loads for the daily trains allocated by G-4. As an aid to
estimating Class II requirements, OCQM prepared and circulated a basic maintenance set, listing probable requirements of various items and sizes of clothing. (See Appendix A.) But the estimates and the more detailed telegram were merely for the convenience of the OCQM. Despite Littlejohn’s objections, G-4, COMZ, continued to receive the official daily telegram and to make rigid allocations of tonnage to each army for each class of supply. Significantly, the OCQM’s circular letter prescribed an elaborate courier system to insure prompt delivery of the estimates.64
Although rapid pursuit came to an end during September 1944, the armies held obstinately to their optimistic estimate of the situation. With the same obstinacy, G-4 as their agent retained exclusive control over tonnage allocations. Each day it seemed that one more division committed to combat or one more day of hard driving would crack the stubborn German resistance and end the war. Littlejohn believed that the time had come to establish intermediate depots nearer the combat zone. Even in victory the troops would have to be fed and clothed; Quartermaster responsibilities might even be increased. A resupply of the armies had just been completed, but this merely replaced clothing and equipment lost or worn out during the pursuit. It provided few heavy winter items and no reserve at all for cold weather. On 7 October Littlejohn urged the G-4, COMZ, to establish a Class II and IV depot at Reims, perishable Class I and PX supplies at Paris, and all classes of supply at Nancy and Liège-Namur. He pointed out that the line of communications was now over 400 miles long. UTAH and OMAHA beaches would soon have to shut down because of winter storms, and Cherbourg could hardly be expanded to make good the deficit. The system of hand-to-mouth supply over long distances was completely unsuited to proper distribution of sized items of clothing—an absolute necessity as winter set in. Pilferage was growing, encouraged by the disorderly current procedures. Littlejohn understood that Oise Intermediate Section would be activated in the very near future and recommended that ADSEC’s two base depot companies be sent forward immediately to establish depots at Liège and Nancy. His recommendation was ignored. During the next few days the G-4’s of the armies and Brig. Gen. Raymond P. Moses, G-4 of the 12th Army Group, all refused to allocate Class II tonnage to the Chief Quartermaster. A personal appeal to General Bradley brought a similar refusal. The 12th Army Group commander felt that other supplies were more urgently needed. Possibly he misunderstood the inadequacy of the recent clothing issue. He said that “The men are tough and can take it.”65
In late October a shortage developed of the ration accessory convenience kits distributed to combat troops with operational rations. These kits swere considered an integral part of the operational
ration and enjoyed the latter’s high priority for transportation. The most important item in the kit, from the viewpoint of the combat soldier, was a package of cigarettes. It would have been simple to requisition bulk cigarettes from PX stocks in Great Britain, reclassify them as emergency Class I supplements to operational rations, and bring them to the Continent under high transportation priorities. Littlejohn refused to do this; he directed that the few cigarettes remaining on the Continent be reserved for combat troops, but otherwise he took no action whatever for nearly a month. On 27 November there were no cigarettes in the rear areas, and only a three-day reserve with the armies. The shortage received considerable publicity in the press, both at home and in the ETO, and a Congressional delegation when in Europe demanded an explanation. Now assured of a wide audience, the Chief Quartermaster submitted a report showing that there were nearly 150 million packages of cigarettes en route, in the United Kingdom, or awaiting discharge off continental ports. He stated that he did not feel justified in requesting special priorities for cigarettes as long as there were shortages in operational rations and winter clothing. As a specific example, he called attention to a ship loaded with 1,200,000 blankets. This ship had been berthed at Le Havre seven times, but each time had been removed without unloading to make way for other cargo with higher priorities. General Lee conceded the validity of the argument, and personally guaranteed the QMC a special allocation of tonnage to move Class II supplies. But Littlejohn failed to achieve his real objective—a permanent allocation of five extra unloading berths for the Quartermaster service at Rouen.66 (See Table 19.)
This episode presents only one facet of a many-sided struggle over tonnage allocations. Inevitably, the SHAEF G-4 Section became involved and began assigning allocations to all subordinate headquarters on 5 November. Meanwhile the supply situation had eased considerably and a build-up of reserves had become possible. But the armies, blaming COMZ for the recent shortages, were determined to have the reserves built up in their own dumps rather than in COMZ depots. Therefore they favored continuing the allocation system as long as SHAEF administered it to their advantage. They were only partly aware of the inherent clumsiness and inflexibility of the daily allocations that often provided them with supplies they had not requisitioned and could not use, and were inclined to blame COMZ for these misdirected supplies. COMZ contended that it should receive a much higher proportion of the tonnage to build up reserves in its own intermediate and advanced depots, which could then provide better supply service to the armies. But COMZ was consistently overoptimistic over its own movement capabilities, and the resulting deficits in deliveries weakened its arguments in opposition to SHAEF and the armies. To a large extent, those deficits cut into the overinflated requisitions of the
armies rather than their actual needs. The build-up of supplies in the army areas continued despite paper “deficits.”67 SHAEF discontinued allocations in December, but COMZ retained this practice until January 1945.68
By December the tactical situation was less critical, the OCQM had assembled considerable information on the size and location of its supply assets, and current requirements were fairly steady and predictable. Moreover, the armies and base sections were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the whole concept of daily telegrams and daily allocations. The main reason for this, was the delay in filling requisitions. Unfilled requisitions were placed in a “back-order” file in the port depots, but frequently the armies were not informed. The armies then assumed that the original requisition had not arrived and placed another one. This made for overlapping of requisitions—multiple back orders for the same items—and much confusion. With the consent of G-4, COMZ, the OCQM published a new procedure on 5 December 1944, whereby Class II, sales store, PX supplies, and solid fuel were to be omitted from the daily telegram. Using these estimates, the OCQM established credits for the various major commands at intermediate depots, and the depots could honor all requisitions without reference to OCQM as long as the credits were not exceeded. The only exceptions were solid fuels, spare parts, and certain scarce items of clothing officially designated “controlled items.” The OCQM controlled the whole process through distribution directives issued to base and intermediate depots, and designed to maintain the levels needed in the advance depots to meet established credits.
In January 1945 COMZ finally abandoned the daily allocation of trains, and the whole transportation procedure was put on what Littlejohn regarded as a “concrete, business-like basis.”69 Thereafter, G-4 allocated available transportation to the technical services on a monthly basis, and left all operating details to the theater chief of transportation.70 Under Transportation Corps control, supply movements were coordinated all the way from shipside to the army dumps. Volume of freight was regulated to fit the unloading capacities of the depots, and the urgent daily needs of the combat forces could be met by rail, truck, or air transport, whatever means were most convenient. The OCQM likewise relaxed its control—ADSEC now designated the advance depots to supply the individual armies.
On 9 February, the OCQM issued Circular Letter 14, which prescribed new procedures for operating base, intermediate, and advanced depots. Decentralization of supply was developed to the maximum by putting the burden of editing requisitions on the depots
designated to receive the requisitions. Review of requisitions for controlled items was delegated to base section quartermasters. Intermediate depots were to carry the bulk of balanced stocks of all Quartermaster items for the entire theater; limited model stocks for local issue and the unbalanced reserve of all classes of supply would be held in the base depots. Advance depots would carry only limited quantities of carefully selected fast-moving items. Their stocks were also to be exactly balanced so that the supply units could close out depots rapidly and move forward. The requisition period for Class II, IV, and PX supplies was lengthened to twenty days to decrease still further the probability of overlapping requisitions. The regulating stations that received the requisitions from the armies and the depots that filled them were made jointly responsible for informing the armies promptly of action taken on requisitions and when the supplies would arrive.71
This plan was received by combat zone quartermasters with a certain amount of trepidation. Col. James W. Younger, the 12th Army Group quartermaster, feared that editing of requisitions at the level of the intermediate depot would be interpreted too literally and would jeopardize the liberal screening policy practiced by the OCQM. “There must be no headquarters or agencies interposed between the echelon needing the supplies and the echelons furnishing the supplies,” wrote Younger. Direct contact had to be maintained between the army quartermaster and the supplying depots. He wanted to be reasonably sure that the new procedure would not delay the front-line receipt of supplies and reiterated the obvious advantages of being over rather than under supplied. Littlejohn answered that the new procedure was designed to speed up the receipt of supplies by reducing the number of agencies that reviewed requisitions. He suggested that until all concerned were familiar with the new procedures an officer hand-carry each major requisition to the depot and remain until it had been approved.72
Regulating Stations
Regulating stations were vital links in the supply chain since they both forwarded requisitions and monitored the delivery of supplies.73 A heritage of World War I, regulating stations were described in the 1943 edition of Field Service Regulations as traffic control agencies of the theater commander on the line of communications, through which supply and personnel movements were directed. Situated near the boundary between the communications zone and the combat zone, preferably at the junction of several rail lines, the regulating stations were expected to determine priorities of traffic moving into army areas. It was assumed that one regulating station would be assigned to
each army and that the principal means of transportation would be rail.74
Whether there was actually a need for regulating stations under World War II conditions, and if so what ought to be their areas of jurisdiction, were subjects of considerable debate. In the ETO, G-4, COMZ, as already noted, had assumed the responsibility of determining priorities and allocating transportation, depriving the regulating stations of their most important function. Under that procedure there was little reason for the regulating officer to be a personal representative of the theater commander, as prescribed in Field Service Regulations. Responsibility for establishment and management of regulating stations was delegated successively from SHAEF to COMZ, to ADSEC, and finally to the Transportation Section, ADSEC. Regulating stations—one for First Army and another for Third Army —became operational in August, after the drawing of an army rear boundary. ADSEC immediately appointed a representative to each army headquarters to act as regulating officer, advise the army on general supply policies, and suggest the location of service areas.75 From the viewpoint of army commanders and their staffs, the chief function of the regulating station was to provide information on how soon requisitioned supplies would arrive.
In September, all ADSEC railheads and truckheads serving the armies were put under the control of these regulating stations. To each was attached a railhead team of Quartermaster service companies, a depot supply platoon, railhead platoon, and a complement of approximately five hundred POW’s. The job of this team was to operate the transfer point and to move supplies from train to truck or from COMZ truck to army truck. It should be noted that this was an operating function and according to current doctrine should not have been performed by a staff section. Col. Samuel W. Smithers, the ADSEC quartermaster, was dissatisfied with the initial operations of the regulating stations, claiming that they did not make available to the armies enough information about shipments en route. This sentiment was echoed by both Colonel McNamara of the First Army and Colonel Busch of the Third Army. These army level quartermasters had very satisfactory relationships with G-4, COMZ, and felt that the regulating stations should be primarily information centers and documentation offices. They held that routing requisitions through the regulating station was time-consuming and unnecessary. They also noted and strongly disapproved a tendency of the regulating stations, as agencies of ADSEC, to take over railheads and transfer points in the army service areas.76
Littlejohn also, for different reasons, considered the early performance of the regulating stations so unsatisfactory that he was willing to see them dissolved. He felt that the Quartermaster
representative in the regulating station should edit army requisitions critically, rather than merely give a “rubber-stamp approval” and forward them. Specifically, he felt that in a stringent supply situation combat units should receive only what they actually needed to fight with, rather than everything they were entitled to according to Tables of Equipment. Moreover, regulating stations were in an ideal position to know the actual strength of the units they served. They should never tolerate the common practice of submitting inflated strength reports for rations. To underline his conviction that regulating officers should have an intimate knowledge of the units they regulated, Littlejohn requested that ten jeeps be assigned to each regulating station, to be used for regular inspections and courier service to the rear.77
With the improvement in transportation and the development of a reliable communications system, regulating stations also began to operate more effectively. Late in November, daily ration and POL telegrams went to the appropriate station, which, in turn, sent them to the supplying base depot. The shipments forward were made by ADSEC. In February, this system was broadened to include the twenty-day requisition for clothing and equipage, which previously had been sent through ADSEC to the Class II and IV depot at Reims. The regulating officers and the quartermasters of the armies and of ADSEC met periodically to exchange information on their supply problems and to work out supply procedures. By the end of the year Colonel Smithers reported that the requisitioning procedures were working smoothly. The combat elements, confident that the supply organization behind them was operating efficiently, were preparing to renew the offensive against Germany.78