Chapter 16: Clothing for the ETO Enlisted Man
Clothing and Individual Equipment
Comprising some 50,000 different items, clothing and equipment (Class II and IV) was the most complicated category of Quartermaster supply. The combat troops only needed such supplies intermittently, and in quantities far smaller than their steady requirements for rations and gasoline.1 But when the need for Class II and IV items arose it was usually immediate and urgent, and required complicated procedures for requisitioning, inventory, distribution, and tariff balancing that were not encountered in dealing with other QM supplies. Except for combat losses, clothing and equipment were regarded as nonexpendable, and troops received a complete new combat-type outfit at the beginning of a campaign. Apart from unexpected tactical developments or drastic changes in the weather, it was assumed that this initial issue would be sufficient for a predictable length of time, during which commanders and senior logistical staff officers expected to ignore the minor shortages that might arise and concentrate on their more essential daily requirements. Consequently the transportation priority assigned to clothing and equipment was kept low until shortages became rather serious, and then was raised to overcome them.
Possibly because of the relatively small tonnages involved, there was a tendency at higher staff levels to minimize the importance of clothing and equipment and an urge to handle this category of supply on the same daily tonnage basis that was successfully applied to rations, gasoline, and ammunition. This was a major error. Needs for clothing and equipment were invariably for specific items and sizes, and not for bulk tonnage. Even at army level there was hardly such a thing as an average daily requirement for Class II and IV supply. The tactical units had understood this from the first, and normally drew such supplies direct from an army depot on a weekly or ten-day basis against a requisition submitted in advance.2
Gradually the armies also came to realize that only a large specialized depot, with ample stocks of all Class II and IV supplies to support several armies, could meet these specific
demands. Except for certain standard fast-moving items, an attempt to meet anticipated requirements by building up stocks at army level depots was not successful. After repeated moves by the depots, sizes were no longer properly balanced and inventories were no longer accurate. Stocks tended to become what was surplus to the needs of the particular army being supplied, although the same items might be desperately needed by another army.
The Class II and IV depot at Reims, later designated to serve all the armies in northern France, was formally activated on 23 September 1944 by the 55th QM Base Depot, and played a major role in the initial issue of winter clothing to the troops. Although transportation was very scarce the mechanics of initial issue were simple, and at first Reims operated more as a reconsignment point than as a real depot. Littlejohn had noted the advantages of this site on a major lateral rail line, and it passed to his direct control on 25 October. But another six weeks elapsed before the depot had sufficient balanced stocks to operate efficiently and promptly fill the specific requisitions of the armies. Those stocks were accumulated by mutual agreement of COMZ and 12th Army Group, despite the fact that SHAEF had allocated all tonnages for such supplies directly to the armies.3
The QM Class II Plan for OVERLORD
For reasons of mobility, the assault troops landing on the Normandy beaches brought ashore a minimum of clothing and equipment.4 All troops involved in the initial attack had turned in their winter clothing before leaving the United Kingdom. Moreover, the combat units in the assault also gave up everything not absolutely essential. The only replacement clothing they carried was three pairs of socks per man. Apart from impregnated herringbone twill fatigues, worn primarily as protection against gas warfare but also for warmth and to shed rain, the ETO summer uniform was all wool. For winter, heavier items would be added, but summer items would not be turned in. During the first six weeks of combat, so-called beach maintenance sets were issued to division-sized units every five days. Each set would replace items of the assault outfit lost or destroyed during combat. This system of replacement was most successful, probably because the sets were not intended to augment the meager initial allowances but only to maintain them temporarily. Within those limitations, the sets obviated the usual complicated Class II and IV supply procedures in the forward areas. Replacement was simplified by denying the troops many items normally supplied even during active operations. For tactical units fighting in mild weather the policy was entirely satisfactory.5
Clothing Issues in Mild Weather
For the first month on the Continent, units were supplied direct from the beach dumps. The tarpaulin-covered boxes of the original skidloaded beach
Issuing items from beach maintenance sets at the Normandy beachhead near Longueville, July 1944.
maintenance sets proved useful for open storage of other clothing. Cherbourg, which was destined to become the main depot for the area, absorbing the OMAHA and UTAH dumps, was transferred from First Army to ADSEC control on 16 July. The previous day Littlejohn had assigned the future depot the mission of holding a 60-day level of Class II and IV supply for 385,000 men. By the end of July ADSEC reported that 45,000 long tons of QM Class II and IV supply had arrived on the Continent since D-day, but OCQM observers reported that many useless “filler” items had been included, and that pilferage and careless open storage had diminished the value of the stock.6
Littlejohn’s depot plan was a first step toward a more orderly system of supply, but before the system could be put into full operation the troops had broken out
of the beachhead and the pursuit phase of the campaign had begun. During early August some 600 tons of clothing and equipment were issued to Third Army from a dump at St. Jacques de Nehou, and about 800 tons to First Army from the dump at St. Lô. During the following period of daily tonnage rationing and rigid allocations, gasoline and rations were the important items, and clothing received low priorities. In practice, this meant that when available transportation was less than the allocation, Class II and IV supplies suffered. This applied equally to cross-Channel, rail, and highway tonnage allocations.
By early September the pursuit had ended and army quartermasters had time to take stock of their accumulated shortages, many of them dating back to the period of hedgerow fighting in Normandy. It seemed clear that the troops had lost or abandoned more equipment than had been worn out or used up, but large-scale salvage activities in France were just beginning, and the effectiveness of salvage for replacing inventories was still a matter of conjecture. Prudence demanded that all shortages be covered by requisitions for new items and that the continental depots be permitted to accumulate clothing reserves up to the theater’s authorized sixty-day level. On that basis, continental requirements were enormous—about two and a half times the War Department estimate. However, summer was over, and delivery of winter uniforms and equipment to the troops took precedence over replacement of articles lost or worn out since D-day. On 7 September Busch wrote to Littlejohn, “It is getting cold up here. The troops will need heavy clothing very soon. ...” The fact that “up here” meant somewhere east of Verdun, nearly 400 miles from the only available ports, certainly complicated the problem. In addition, unit quartermasters were somewhat puzzled as to what the winter combat uniform actually would be.7
The Winter Uniform for the European Campaign
Combat operations in winter—a comparatively recent development in war-fare—are only possible if troops are properly clothed. As late as World War I, activity diminished in cold weather, and trench-type warfare gave the troops opportunities for shelter that did not exist in the World War II war of movement. Quartermasters in Great Britain reviewed combat experience with winter clothing in North Africa and Italy in 1942 and 1943 and decided that it was not applicable in all respects to the forthcoming ETO campaign. Meanwhile, American troops stationed in the United Kingdom conducted maneuvers in England’s very different climate. They were leading a garrison life in a friendly country where troop discipline was of great importance to international relations, and their commanders were convinced that a smart appearance was vital to discipline. The service uniform was worn in most headquarters and by all personnel after duty hours. Limited dry cleaning facilities in Great Britain made it difficult to keep the serge service coat presentable, and light shade olive
drab trousers quickly showed the dirt. Soldiers who had obtained passes were sometimes unable to go on leave because they could not pass inspection, which naturally created a morale problem.
The inadequacy of these garments as a combat uniform had already been demonstrated in North Africa. The solution adopted by officers in both theaters—to wear dark green trousers instead of “pinks”—pointed out the need for a similar darker shade for enlisted men. The olive drab field, or Parsons, jacket, issued since 1941 was also unsatisfactory. It required frequent washing, was hard to iron, and scrubbing soon frayed the collar and cuffs. Quartermasters in North Africa and Great Britain and OQMG observers sent to both theaters all agreed that a new and improved uniform was needed—warmer, more durable, and better looking than the 1941 Parsons jacket, but less constricting and requiring less care than the serge service coat and light shade olive drab trousers. If such a uniform could improve the shabby appearance of combat soldiers, who had the greatest need for recreation and the least opportunity, it would solve many difficult combat zone problems involving the often conflicting demands of discipline and morale. But there were wide differences of opinion as to just how these desirable characteristics were to be achieved. Varying emphasis on comfort, warmth, water repellency, and a smart military appearance could and did result in a wide variety of designs and proposals.8
The ETO Concept—The Wool Jacket
Very soon after his arrival in the theater, Littlejohn, whose previous assignment had been as chief of the OQMG Clothing and Equipage Division, became interested in the battle-dress outfit, which constituted the British solution to the twin problems of smart military appearance and combat utility. This consisted of a short bloused jacket, snug-fitting at the waist, and easy-fitting trousers. The trousers were very high-waisted, so that the short jacket provided an adequate overlap but did not constrict body movement. With its belt at the natural waistline the jacket did not “ride up,” even during the most vigorous exercise, and presented a trim military appearance. The outfit called to mind the field uniform worn by U.S. troops during the Mexican War9 and reflected normal British civilian tailoring of trousers and waistcoat, but was contrary to current American civilian styling and military design, which tended toward a tight-fitting, low-cut trouser supported just over the hipbones by a belt. Another typically British feature of the battle dress was the rough, heavy texture of wool fabric, which made it possible to clean the uniform by scrubbing or brushing, and which did not require pressing. The jacket was lined with a heavy shrink-resistant cotton drill,
Field Marshal Montgomery wearing the British battle dress uniform on an official visit. June 1945.
and could be worn with or without undergarments. Such clothing was entirely suitable to the raw but not very cold climate of the British Isles, and could absorb moisture without making the soldier feel damp. Additional advantages were that the battle dress fabric could be impregnated with antigas chemicals for wear in combat, and could be dry cleaned for garrison wear. It could be passed through this cleaning and re-impregnation cycle repeatedly without shrinkage or injury to the cloth. Moreover, the British had available surplus chemicals and impregnating facilities.10
Early in 1942 a few battle dress uniforms were issued U.S. troops to make up for clothing shortages of arriving Americans. They were very popular, and the senior commanders in the theater unanimously approved Littlejohn’s suggestion that a generally similar uniform, made of the same material but cut to a distinctively American design, would be ideal for U.S. troops in garrison in the British Isles, as well as later in combat. It would replace not only the serge service coat and the current type of field jacket but also the protective impregnated wool shirt and trousers which had been very unpopular with garrison troops in the United Kingdom.11 The initial ETO request to purchase 5,000 uniforms was not approved by clothing specialists in the OQMG Research and Development Branch. By mid-1942 special uniforms for the Alaska garrison and for armored, parachute, mountain, and amphibious troops had all been developed. Littlejohn’s ETO project seemed to the R&D men to be just one more “special development” at a time when OQMG efforts had shifted toward devising a more versatile and generally applicable winter combat uniform. But on 5 October 1942 General Somervell of ASF had personally approved a purchase for test purposes and possible future development.12 Later in
ETO jackets as worn by generals Eisenhower and Bradley. General Bradley’s jacket is an early experimental version designed and made in England.
the same month General Lee recommended to the theater commander that 360,000 wool jackets of the new design, enough for all ground and service personnel then in the theater, be purchased locally. On 2 December General Eisenhower authorized a purchase of 300,000, but because of repeated changes in design only 1,000 jackets for test purposes finally became available on to May 1943.13
Five days earlier a theater circular had settled the matter of protective clothing by directing that impregnated herringbone twills—in other words the fatigue clothing already in the hands of the troops—would be worn for that purpose. Far from dampening interest in the new type of uniforms, this policy decision actually increased it. In Britain’s raw climate, fatigues were normally worn over wool clothing, and impregnation would make them more water-repellent. Members of the 29th Division, the only combat division in England not sent to North Africa for TORCH, had suggested such a combination to an OQMG observer in March 1943, and it was McNamara’s final choice for D-day. Scheduled tests of the jacket and matching wool trousers by units of the Eighth Air Force and the 29th Division were completed in July 1943, and both the troops and their commanders were enthusiastic. Even before the tests were completed Littlejohn wrote to Gregory, pointing out the superiority of the ETO wool jacket over the 1941 olive drab field jacket, the mountain and arctic jackets, and even the popular winter combat jacket of the armored forces. He suggested that the ETO jacket be manufactured in substantial quantities. In a separate letter five days later he pointed out the merits of a more loosely fitted wool trouser with larger pockets and a higher waist rise.14
As a result of the field tests, the participating troops suggested extensive changes in the jacket. For example, the slash pockets should be replaced by patch pockets higher on the chest, so that they would be accessible above the straps of the field pack. Since this was no longer to be a protective garment,
the protective flap at the front and the tight closure at the cuff should be eliminated. Littlejohn described the revised jacket in a letter to Gregory dated 21 July 1943, and sent samples. General Lee was also enthusiastic and in September urged that the new uniform be issued to all ETO troops.15
Meanwhile, The Quartermaster General had been requested to develop a similar wool jacket in the United States, first for the Air Transport Command arid later for all AAF personnel. In July the ETO commander, General Devers, decided that local production of jackets in the United Kingdom should be stopped until War Department policy had been clarified, and in November all the jackets on hand were turned over to the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, which were actually in combat and needed them.16 Shortly after Eisenhower returned to the European theater as Supreme Commander in January 1944, Littlejohn reopened the question, recommending that the ETO type of wool jacket be issued to all ETO troops. Issue of this simple, multipurpose garment would effect a very great saving of money, materials, and labor. Only 300,000 jackets could be produced in the British Isles, and the balance required for 1944—3,115,000—would have to be manufactured in the United States.17
On 16 February the OQMG version of the wool jacket was shown to the ETO staff by Capt. William F. Pounder, whose activities as a QM observer in North Africa have already been described. The ETO staff found encouragement in the fact that the OQMG was also interested in developing a wool jacket, but noted wide differences between the OQMG and ETO versions that might lead to complications of supply. Moreover, the current official status of any wool jacket, irrespective of design, in the Army Supply Program was not very encouraging. If approved at all, it would probably replace the pile jacket authorized in December 1943 for wear in cold-temperate climates. Presumably this meant that the wool jacket would not be authorized for the mild-temperate climate of central and western France, where the U.S. forces expected to be fighting during the winter of 1944–45.18 (Map 3)
One month later, on 14 March, Littlejohn suddenly received a personal letter from Maj. Gen. Russell L. Maxwell, the G-4, War Department, which placed the
Map 3: Temperature Zones for Coldest Month
status of wool jackets in general in a different and far more hopeful light:
The Quartermaster General is studying the issue to your theater alone of the ETO field jacket. The only questions seem to be whether cloth is available in the United States, and whether machines are available. ... The QMG has estimated your needs to be 4,000,000 for the first year and your production to be zero. The chances for adoption will be improved if you can put into official channels your UK production prospects and your requirements from the United States.
The next day Littlejohn forwarded the above quotation to Col. James H. Stratton, the ETOUSA G-4, with the notation: “This information is somewhat like a bolt out of the blue. It is at variance with all information so far received on this subject.”19 In the light of this development, which seemed to indicate that some kind of a wool jacket was to be authorized in the ETO very shortly, a meeting with OQMG designers to work out a compromise design was clearly necessary. Since Somervell had summoned the chiefs of ETO technical services to a final preinvasion conference in Washington within the next few days, Littlejohn prepared to take care of the jacket matter personally. In accordance with Maxwell’s suggestion, Generals Eisenhower and Lee cabled the War Department on 17 March, recommending that the ETO type of field jacket be adopted for all ETO troops. Revised requirements were 4,259,000 jackets, of which 300,000 would be produced by the British. Littlejohn departed for the United States two days later.20
In a series of conferences during April 1944, Littlejohn and his clothing specialist, Maj. Robert L. Cohen, met in Washington with Maj. Gen. Lucius D. Clay of ASF, Colonel Doriot of the Military Planning Division, OQMG, Mr. Meyer Kestnbaum (president of Hart, Schaffner, and Marx), currently OQMG clothing adviser, and several others. Littlejohn obtained a firm commitment from Clay on his desired production program, but had to forego several desirable features of the garment as originally conceived. The rough, heavy, cloth used in the ETO version of the jacket was declared to be unobtainable in the United States. This was a major disappointment. As General Bradley had remarked, it was the British wool material that made it possible for one garment to serve as both a battle and a dress uniform.21 Nevertheless, it was agreed that the eighteen-ounce serge currently used for the enlisted man’s service coat would be substituted. It was likewise agreed that the biswing back and half-belt of the ETO model could be eliminated without decreasing its utility. But the elaborate details of the U.S. model, including pleated pockets, fly front closure and fly pocket flaps, and adjustable sleeve cuffs were all retained. During subsequent conferences attended only by technicians, Major Cohen insisted that the jacket be sized large enough to fit over
other garments of a winter uniform, but other details of design were decided by civilian consultants of the OQMG. After ASF had accepted the compromise design, Cohen wrote rather dubiously to Littlejohn that “... this garment will in all probability serve the purpose and is the best substitute we can get out of the Research and Development Branch.” Rather less charitably, the historian of the Philadelphia QM Depot, which had to shoulder the procurement problem, remarked: “In their determination to create a stylish as well as a utilitarian jacket, they brought forth a highly tailored one that proved to be the utter despair of manufacturers.”22
Later developments demonstrated that this decision regarding design did not arise from ignorance of mass production methods. Apparently the intent of the OQMG to create work for men’s dress-clothing manufacturers, a specialized segment of the garment industry that had not received any large government contracts up to this time, was carried out with excessive enthusiasm. Thus a principal reason for emphasis on style was a desire to tap a previously unexploited source of production capacity. Such a policy—if it actually was a deliberate policy—clearly involved increased costs. Its only justification was the possibility of a production bottleneck among the manufacturers already under contract, as hinted at by General Maxwel1.23
Fear of such difficulties was confirmed when General Clay cabled General Lee on zo April that only 2,600,000 wool jackets could be shipped to the ETO by the end of 1944, starting with 500,000 in September. He further stated that the wool jacket was officially replacing the serge service coat, which would not be furnished to the ETO thereafter. This was a logical compromise, involving a minimum disruption of the Army Supply Program, since both items were made from an identical wool cloth and overseas experience had demonstrated that the coat was superfluous. But Clay also made it plain that functionally the wool jacket was replacing the 1941 olive drab field jacket. Since the wool jacket allocation was short of requirements by more than a million and would arrive late in the year, he offered 479,000 old style field jackets as substitutes.
Littlejohn was disappointed by the curtailed allocation, and somewhat worried by the retarded schedule of deliveries. He considered this reduced ASF commitment barely adequate for the winter needs of combat troops and replacements, with nothing left over for service troops or for maintenance. He nevertheless accepted the substitution of 1941 olive drab field jackets and requisitioned all that were available.24
Most of the other clothing items required for winter were familiar garments issued in previous years. They were either on hand in depots, in possession of the troops, or would be brought overseas as individual clothing by additional units arriving in the theater.25
The OQMG Winter Uniform
Clothing specialists within the Office of The Quartermaster General were not really interested in any form of wool jacket. They had very different ideas on a suitable winter uniform for combat troops, and the first combat zone test of those ideas, involving the layering principle, had been made in North Africa in March 1943. A more extensive test of the same uniform was being conducted at Anzio as Littlejohn arrived in the United States.26 He had seen the experimental M1943 assembly in November of the previous year in Washington. Col. Georges F. Doriot of the Military Planning Division, OQMG,27 urged that the M1943 was the ideal winter outfit for combat troops anywhere in the projected area of operations, although at the time these garments were not officially accepted, and current plans were to authorize them only for arctic and cold-temperate climates and as replacements for the special winter combat uniform of tank personnel. Littlejohn disagreed. In his opinion Doriot’s experimental M1943 outfit, comprising successive layers of separate garments to be put on or taken off as the weather changed, would aggravate Class II distribution problems and was hopelessly complicated and inefficient for dismounted combat troops in a war of movement.28
In July 1943, the Quartermaster Board had reported that the M1943 combat outfit was unsatisfactory as an all-purpose universal unit, but recommended that the individual items be considered separately for suitability. In September, ASF approved an experimental procurement of 200,000 sets, to be tested by troops in training in the northern United States. Apparently these tests led to conclusions that the M1943 jacket should replace the old olive drab field jacket, and that the entire M1943 outfit was suitable for cold-temperate climates.
On 15 December 1943, as already described in connection with the outfitting of Mediterranean troops, the War Department issued a new table of clothing
and individual equipment embodying new concepts and listing a considerable number of new items. The M1943 clothing and a variety of garments previously issued only to mountain divisions, or for duty in arctic regions, might now be authorized by a theater commander on a discretionary basis for all personnel located in cold-temperate, alpine, and low-mountain terrain. He might also authorize additional and still more specialized items for specified percentages of his combat personnel in the same areas. Supply officers were warned that many of the new articles were in process of procurement or distribution, and stocks of substitute items would have to be used up first. In the revised table, the geographic basis of these authorizations within the continental United States was very clearly specified. Overseas, there was no such clear definition. Subject to War Department approval, theater commanders were in effect empowered to authorize the new articles for issue anywhere in the temperate zone. NATOUSA adopted a liberal interpretation of this table after the Anzio tests, generating requirements that the War Department approved only after some hesitation. But at the beginning of 1944 that decision had not yet been made, and interest centered on the reaction of the ETO, numerically the largest overseas theater.29
The new table was undoubtedly a disappointment to the OQMG Research and Development Branch since it did not prescribe the M1943 ensemble on a mandatory basis for the entire temperate zone, and plans were made immediately to bring about a change in that direction. A major requisition for the M1943 outfit from the ETO would go far to justify such a modification. It would also require a drastic revision of the Army Supply Program, since procurement up to that time was only for 200,000 men in training in the northern United States.
It was in support of plans to revise the clothing table, sponsored jointly by Colonel Doriot and AGF officials, that Captain Pounder was sent to the ETO in February 1944 with samples of the new items. The timing of this effort in salesmanship was not very propitious. Current plans set D-day in Normandy for 1 May, and preparations for the greatest amphibious assault in history were at fever pitch. Delays in operational planning had forced delays in logistical planning, which was now being completed within ADSEC and COMZ headquarters. Everyone’s mental horizon was limited to the crucial assault phase of the operation, and Pounder observed that “there seem to be no plans being made for another winter of war.”30
This was not quite correct. It would have been more accurate to say that clothing plans for the coming winter had been
completed and set to one side, and that everyone was too preoccupied with immediate problems even to consider revising them at the moment. Those plans were based on the official SHAEF forecast of post-OVERLORD operations, which was, of course, grossly in error. It indicated that the Allied armies would not reach the Ardennes and Vosges Mountains, where special clothing for wet-cold and low-mountain terrain would be required, until May 1945. For winter combat in western and central France, Littlejohn and his staff considered the type of winter clothing on hand entirely adequate. The fact that it was on hand in ample quantities, was extremely important, for as D-day approached the chronic shipping shortages of the ETO mounted to a crisis.31 Because of its preshipment program in 1943, the OCQM was in the most favorable supply position of any technical service, but for that very reason had large reserves of clothing, including limited-standard and substitute items, to use up before it could justify new requisitions. Littlejohn considered some of these “obsolescent” items—notably the armored force winter combat jacket and trousers—actually superior to the new designs. He favored some, but by no means all, of the garments now under consideration, and was determined to resist pressure to approve of new items merely because they were new. He had approved the M1943 issues for parachute units, but feared a chaotic situation if all combat units demanded similar garments. Accordingly, Littlejohn told Pounder that he was not to announce his mission or display his wares to anyone but QM clothing experts and military planners. If his samples were given too wide a display, he might oversell his product and create demands that could not be filled. This order was, of course, diametrically opposed to the views of Colonel Doriot, and largely frustrated the latter’s objective in sending Pounder to the ETO.32
Pounder himself either caught the fever of immediacy, or accepted the frame of reference of the officers, all senior to himself, with whom he was dealing. For example, he suggested to Colonel McNamara that the men in the assault might wear shoepacs. The First Army quartermaster pointed out to him that the wet French spring would soon be over, and then the shoepacs, which wore out quickly and in any case were
unsuitable for marching, would have to be replaced with shoes. This was considered an unwise use of precious cargo space. McNamara was interested in the wool sleeping bag to replace the blanket rolls planned for his assault troops. It would save weight and also make a more secure container for other items of clothing, but he seriously doubted that delivery could be made in time. In general, this was the prevailing reaction to all the samples presented by Captain Pounder. Most of the items he had to offer were currently being produced on a very limited basis. His purpose in coming to the ETO had been to invite requisitions to serve as a basis for future procurement, but his “customers” were interested only in emergency requisitions for stocks actually available. Pounder reported to Doriot that a requisition for ponchos was under consideration, and all available stocks of the new wool field trousers were requested for immediate shipment, but in both cases the quantities involved were small. As he himself expressed it, “plans have been pretty well formulated already and there is a good deal of hesitancy to change them. This is especially true of items of the basic uniform. It is essential that all troops have basically the same uniform. To change would require a huge number of new items to be shipped and cause considerable commotion. ...”33 As these words were written, the revised D-day was exactly twelve weeks away.
One major new item, the M1943 jacket, had already been authorized for all theaters, but Pounder brought the first samples seen in the ETO, and the initial reaction to the garment was also in terms of possible emergency requisition. Pounder apparently ascribed to Littlejohn the enthusiasm that some of his staff displayed for this item, stating, “The combination of Jacket Field M1943 over the ETO Jacket fits into the ETO plans and General Littlejohn is anxious to have it here in sufficient time to dress units uniformly.”34 While Littlejohn favored uniformity to avoid further complication of the already intricate Class II supply plans, there is no confirmation in other evidence that he expressed any desire for the M1943 jacket. Pounder had apparently expressed Littlejohn’s sentiments far more accurately in an earlier letter to Doriot, writing that the CQM and his staff were “convinced that their jacket ETO is superior [to the Jacket M1943] for this particular theater, and they are presently seeking the permission of General Eisenhower for authorization. Until this jacket ETO is definitely approved or rejected, nothing will be done to change present conditions of the supply of Jackets M-1943.”35 The “present conditions” referred to were the directive in T/E 21 that the M1943 jacket was only to be issued after stocks of the 1941 style jacket were exhausted. As already noted, Eisenhower made his formal decision in favor of the ETO jacket on 17 March. Apparently his choice was based upon the relative desirability of the two jackets, without regard for the
possible role of the M1943 as part of an outfit to serve as a substitute for the overcoat. It is likely that the sloppy loose fit of the M1943 had a strong bearing on his final decision. A year earlier, when he wrote to General Marshall regarding the somewhat similar Parsons jacket, he already had positive ideas on what should replace it:
I have no doubt that you have been impressed by the virtual impossibility of appearing neat and snappy in our field uniform. Given a uniform which tends to look a bit tough, and the natural proclivities of the American soldier quickly create a general impression of a disorderly mob. From this standpoint alone, the matter is bad enough; but a worse effect is the inevitable result upon general discipline. This matter of discipline is not only the most important of our internal military problems, it is the most difficult. In support of all other applicable methods for the development of satisfactory discipline, we should have a neater and smarter looking field uniform. I suggest that the Quartermaster begin now serious work to design a better woolen uniform for next winter’s wear. In my opinion the material should be very rough wool. ...”36
Littlejohn’s opinions were similar. He recalls that the first M1943 jackets he ever saw actually being worn by troops clothed a WAC unit he watched debarking early in 1944. The remarks inspired by their appearance were unprintable, but the Wacs’ nickname for these unwieldy garments was sufficiently damning: they called them “maternity jackets.” On 17 March, the same day that Eisenhower formally recommended the ETO jacket for all ETO troops, Littlejohn wrote to General Maxwell:
The ETO field jacket has been through many bloody battles. Definitely all the troops in this theater want it, and personally I think the troops have come to a sound decision regardless of the fact that I am the sponsor of this gem. ... I have no desire to criticize the model 1943 field jacket as quite likely it fits the problem in some other theater. It is my understanding also that the sweater required to go with the jacket in this theater will not be available for some time to come.37
In April 1944, when Littlejohn reached informal agreement with Clay regarding the provision of the ETO wool jacket to the ETO, he also stated that he and his theater commander did not desire the M1943 jacket, except for paratroopers. But the outcome illustrates a fundamental weakness of all special arrangements arrived at outside of channels.38 The ETO wool jacket would be substituted, in the ETO only, for the serge coat on T/E 21, and thus be brought into the framework of the Army Supply Program, but deletion of the M1943 jacket, an item authorized in all temperate zones, was a far more complicated matter. At the 17 April conference, Col. John P. Baum of the Clothing and Equipage Branch, OQMG Storage and
Distribution Division, assured Littlejohn and Clay that sufficient 1941 olive drab field jackets were available and could be issued until ETO wool jackets began to arrive in the theater. Possibly neither Clay nor Littlejohn understood the full implications of the procedure whereby ASF planners had inserted the ETO jacket into the Army Supply Program as a substitute for the service coat, leaving the world-wide status of the M1943 jacket undisturbed; or perhaps there was a failure of coordination within the bureaucratic mazes of ASF. At any rate, the decision not to accept the M1943 jacket in the ETO was not widely known or clearly understood within ASF.39
On 9 May ASF sent a cable to ETOUSA stating that the M1943 field jacket and high-neck wool sweater were intended to replace the olive drab field jacket .and were for issue in all temperate climates. This combination was to be required eventually for all troops in the ETO, and was to be shipped on requisitions from the OCQM. Littlejohn left this message unanswered, apparently assuming that if no requisitions were submitted, no jackets would be shipped. But on 17 May Colonel Baum informed the OCQM that the stock of olive drab field jackets was being depleted faster than expected, and that M1943 jackets were being set up as substitutes for shipment to the ETO on current requisitions for olive drab jackets. The next
day the ETO informed the War Department that it wanted M1943 jackets only for parachutists.40 Colonel Doriot was convinced that this was an unwise decision, and promptly imparted his views to Clay. Impressed by Doriot’s arguments, based on voluminous laboratory experiments and scientific data, Clay cabled two days later:
Tests have indicated that sweater, wool jacket, and field jacket M-1943 give better all weather protection than overcoat, sweater, and short wool jacket, with a 4 pound saving when dry and up to 14 pounds when wet. Jacket M-1943 combination has been approved for issue by War Department and you may have it if you desire. If you still prefer to retain the overcoat and dispense with sweater and M-1943 issue please verify with SHAEF and advise.41
The requested verification, signed Eisenhower, was forthcoming on 1 June:
Overcoats necessary to provide warmth and protect troops in this theater. Model 43 field jacket only required for parachutists. Jacket field wool OD ETO type and sweater combination will be required in cold areas. Minimum shipments of model 43 jackets field desired in this Theater. This program has the approval of SHAEF and in addition the approval of Generals Bradley, Hodges and Corlett [XIX Corps Commander].42
The above message was only sent after a thorough discussion and concurrences
involving not only the officers named but also Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, the Chief of Staff, and Maj. Gen. Robert W. Crawford, the SHAEF G-4. Bradley believed that the M1943 jacket was not only unsightly but defective in design; the combat soldier slept in his overcoat, and a short jacket provided no warmth for the legs; the 12th Army Group did not desire the garment. All were in agreement that the M1943 jacket was a superfluous duplicate item. Littlejohn also questioned the validity of laboratory experiments and noncombat field tests, no matter how carefully simulated. Even the Anzio tests, made during combat but in a climate very different from that of the ETO, did not seem to him to be applicable.43
On 15 June, Littlejohn wrote to General Feldman asking precisely how many old style field jackets were still available, and the same day submitted a requisition to NYPE for 2,250,000 sweaters. This was his first formal large-scale requisition for any of the new items displayed by Captain Pounder. In accordance with standing instructions, he had already inquired of the port regarding the availability of wool sleeping bags, and on 24 May had received a commitment for 2,580,000 through October, but the formal requisition did not follow until 22 July, when shipping allocations were available and could be cited specifically. This was in accordance with War Department directives and was the normal OCQM method of operating, but it was not understood by the OQMG, which later accused Littlejohn of excessive tardiness in submitting requisitions.44
The New Table of Equipment and the Compromise Decision
On 1 June 1944, a new T/E 21 was published. Contrary to all expectations, it provided neither an increase in the basis of issue for M1943 clothing nor any clarification of the previous basis. Combat boots and ponchos were listed for the first time, but there was still no mention of wool jackets, or of hoods for the M1943 jacket. A new procedure was introduced grouping all issues into either mandatory or discretionary allowances, and combat boots, the M1943 jacket, and the cotton field cap were all made mandatory in temperate overseas areas, subject to availability and after exhaustion of stocks of substitute items. But the allowances for arctic, cold-temperate, and mountain areas remained discretionary. Accordingly, on zo June Littlejohn cabled the War Department asking for information on clothing and QM equipment that would be used by troops in a winter climate similar to that of Germany and northwestern France.45 This was really a query regarding production and availability of supplies, subjects on
which Littlejohn was never able to obtain satisfactory information. He rightly suspected that the appearance of a new T/E 21 meant that some policy decision or interpretation had been made regarding issue of the new winter garments. Such a decision had been made by the G-4 Division, War Department, but by an almost incredible oversight the OQMG had not been informed. The chain of events leading to this confused situation had begun the previous January.
On 1 January 1944, at a conference attended by representatives of G-1, G-4, AGF, ASF, and the OQMG Military Planning Division, proposals were made to amend the current version of T/E 21, which had been published just two weeks earlier. Specifically, the idea was to expand the special winter clothing allowances for Zone 1 (cold-temperate) and low-mountain terrain to cover the entire temperate zone. A draft amendment to T/E 21, involving eighteen major items, was prepared by the Research and Development Branch, OQMG, approved by AGF, and submitted by the latter to ASF for concurrence on 22 February. ASF in turn requested the views of the OQMG concerning the impact of such a change upon raw materials, labor, production, the civilian economy, and obsolescence of existing stocks.
Maj. Gen. Herman Feldman, replying for The Quartermaster General on 13 March, concurred in the recommendation in principle, but noted the existence of grave limitations upon the productive capacity required to implement it. He recommended that the program be extended over a two-year period, with a limited increase in the basis of issue for 1944, to combat troops in the European and North African theaters only, and with somewhat more generous allowances in all overseas theaters in 1945. Feldman also recommended that the M1943 jacket, wool jacket, and sweater together should replace the overcoat and old style jacket for combat troops. He disapproved the AGF proposal for issue of shoepacs to all combat troops in winter in the temperate zone, since this would require over five million pairs per year, whereas maximum production from all sources, including the use of mandatory orders, was 880,000 pairs in 1944 and 3,225,000 pairs in 1945. Feld-man’s recommendations, coordinated with a careful appraisal of productive capacity, added up to a disapproval of the proposals of AGF (which had actually originated within the Military Planning Division, OQMG), at least in regard to the calendar year 1944. He also stated that the effectiveness of this modified program was based upon receipt of approval and authorization to begin procurement by 1 April 1944.
ASF ignored the OQMG’s deadline and forwarded the correspondence to G-4, War Department, on 15 April, stating its nonconcurrence with most of the original AGF proposals. The ASF recommendations were approved by G-4 on 11 May and forwarded to the OQMG through AGF and ASF. But the correspondence did not reach the OQMG until 29 July, representing a loss of time in transit of seventy-two days and a delay of four months beyond Feldman’s suggested deadline. This administrative oversight imposed a severe handicap on the OQMG in procurement planning. Apparently it also contributed to the curious staff decision whereby the entire NATOUSA theater was considered to
be an alpine or low-mountain area for clothing issue purposes.46
Littlejohn’s inquiry of zo June therefore found the OQMG in a rather poor position to give an accurate and authoritative reply. Colonel Doriot’s answer four days later was clearly based upon an assumption that the AGF recommendations would be approved; possibly he believed that they had already been approved. If he was aware of General Feldman’s contrary recommendations to ASF, he either misunderstood their tenor or disagreed with the appraisal of U.S. industrial capacity on which they were based.47 He predicted that mobile operations would soon bring some of the troops into the cold-temperate area of eastern France and western Germany, and recommended that selection of winter clothing to be issued to all ETO combat troops should be based upon that premise. He referred specifically to
Captain Pounder’s samples and repeated the arguments and recommendations he had made to General Clay a month before, especially regarding the M1943 jacket. He reiterated that this jacket was essential for adequate protection against rain, although he also recommended issue of the poncho. Doriot closed with a suggestion that requisitions be submitted promptly. But Littlejohn felt that he was again being called upon to submit requisitions that might serve as a basis of future procurement, despite the fact that he did not approve of all the items to be procured and despite the fact that General Feldman seriously doubted that such procurement was practicable.
Apparently because Doriot’s letter referred specifically to his overseas representative, the latter was asked to make independent recommendations. On 30 June Pounder submitted almost identical recommendations to Littlejohn in the form of a letter he wished to forward, through official channels, to Colonel Doriot.48 Pounder also forwarded a list of the winter clothing that, he stated, the ETO planned to issue to its troops. This list had been furnished to him by an officer in the Supply Division, OCQM, and was not complete. He pointed out that the ETO uniform was “sadly lacking in water repellent items.” He also remarked disparagingly that “they are counting on the poncho synthetic for protection against wet.” This was a curious, observation, for both Pounder and Doriot recommended the poncho. Pounder had already reported that the ETO was considering ponchos,
and Littlejohn actually requisitioned 250,000 of them on 2 July. This was an experimental requisition to test the reaction of the troops. A week later, Littlejohn wrote to Feldman that all the new items should be handled in the same way:
... for example, the poncho, which in my opinion is definitely superior to the raincoat. It is not my policy to force these new items down the throat of troops but to let them see the new items and then to get a cold blooded, disinterested dissertation thereon giving the good qualities and the bad. ... I am of the opinion that as soon as we can equip a corps or a substantial number of troops with the poncho, we can begin to figure on the raincoat going out of existence.49
Littlejohn would have preferred the nylon poncho, which was reserved for tropical areas in the Pacific. Pounder’s sample item was a slightly heavier version, made of the same material as the authorized raincoat, and therefore could be produced without difficulty. It was easier to manufacture than a raincoat and could be used as a ground sheet under a sleeping bag or even as a shelter half, but was especially useful for individual protection in cold rainy weather, providing that protection against rain which Pounder had declared to be “sadly lacking.” All ponchos had the advantage that one size would fit everyone, and they could be worn over an overcoat, which could hardly be done with a raincoat.
A formal answer to Pounder’s letter was made by Colonel Brumbaugh, who was chief of the OCQM Supply Division at the time. Brumbaugh commented in detail on each of the items he recommended rejecting.50 He agreed that shoepacs were more waterproof than boots or shoes, but they were unsuitable for marching and the soles were not durable. Ski socks were desirable only with shoepacs; use with shoes would require a larger size shoe. Since the overcoat was essential in the ETO climate, the M1943 field jacket was excess; the same applied to cotton field trousers. The bulkiness of leather glove shells with wool inserts hindered use of the trigger finger and made them unsuitable for infantry. Wool gloves with leather palms were preferable. Littlejohn indorsed these views, and within a few days sent Brumbaugh to the United States to expedite a clothing program along the lines indicated. Nevertheless, Brumbaugh was directed to inquire into the availability of the items recommended by Captain Pounder. Colonel Baum informed him that all standard type military shoepacs had been committed to NATOUSA and the arctic reserve, and only 330,000 pairs of shoepacs, all of obsolete types, and 900,000 pairs of ski socks were available. Baum described the trigger finger mitten with wool insert, a new cold-climate combat item, but was of the opinion that the wool glove with leather palm was “more
presentable and warm enough for most occasions.”51 Brumbaugh had been directed to obtain facts and to seek the advice of General Feldman, but not to make decisions.
Another chore that Brumbaugh was to perform was review and completion of a clothing reserve for a 5,000-man task force to operate in a wet-cold or alpine climate, presumably Norway. Part of the necessary clothing had been forwarded to the ETO from Iceland, and the balance was selected in accordance with Doriot’s ideas. But on all major issues the divergence of opinion between Littlejohn and Doriot was so complete that Brumbaugh dealt as much as possible with General Feldman, the Deputy Quartermaster General for Supply Planning, and with officials of the Storage and Distribution Division, even on matters concerning Colonel Doriot’s Military Planning Division.52
Realizing that an impasse had been reached with Doriot, and that not all of Brumbaugh’s questions had been satisfactorily answered, Feldman went to the ETO during the last week in July, just
as the armies were breaking out of the Normandy beachhead. None of Little-john’s experimental requisitions for test purposes had been filled. He still felt that the specific suitability of the OQMG’s new items for his theater had not been demonstrated, but the sudden shift to mobile warfare indicated that the troops might reach the German border ahead of schedule and that some greater provision for operations in a colder climate was necessary. Since the quartermasters of the armies were definitely not available to advise on their requirements for these untried garments,53 the problem had to be approached from the other end—from a survey of what was known to be available. Here Feldman’s detailed knowledge of current supply levels, procurement possibilities, and previous commitments, was invaluable. Littlejohn and Feldman jointly outlined a requirement based upon the availability of 446,000 pairs of improved military shoepacs, the most critical item.54 Supplies of ski socks, ponchos, mufflers, trigger finger mittens, and cotton field trousers were also limited.
Littlejohn found it logical and convenient to frame his requisition as a
project for equipping a type field army of 353,000 men, with normal maintenance reserves. During the period of headlong pursuit he referred to it optimistically as the Army of Occupation project. The formal requisition, J-48, was submitted by cable on 15 August for delivery by the end of October. The next day Feldman, who had returned to the United States two weeks before, gave assurance that the supplies were available. Formal approval, except that half the shoepacs would be obsolete types and poncho deliveries would be deferred, was given on 3 September 1944.55
On 10 August 1944 this clothing program was submitted to the Preventive Medicine Division, Office of the ETO Chief Surgeon, and received the approval of that office. The OCQM planned to provide one field army with cotton field trousers, ski socks, and “a new type of shoepac, in three widths, with proper orthopedic support.” Seventy-five percent of other troops were to receive overshoes.56 Moreover, every man in the theater would be issued a wool jacket, a sweater, and a sleeping bag. OCQM referred to these items as “on requisition,” and there was no hint that they might not be available at the beginning of cold weather.
It might appear at first glance that General Feldman had succeeded in accomplishing a large part of what Captain Pounder failed to do. Such a view would overemphasize clothing design, while ignoring other aspects of supply. Pounder and Doriot had urged Littlejohn to submit requisitions for enough new type winter clothing to equip all the ground combat troops in the theater, a figure in excess of 1,000,000 men. Although Doriot did not believe that such requisitions were procurable in full he did not concur in the idea that a requisition should be limited to what was known to be obtainable. He believed that the OQMG should be given as its objective the procurement of the absolute maximum quantities of the new items obtainable by the use of mandatory orders and “other extreme procurement methods.”57 The garments so obtained should be distributed on a strict priority basis to those troops in the greatest need of them, a process in which Doriot failed to see any difficulties. But such ill-defined procurement and distribution on a when-as-and-if basis was anathema to Littlejohn, who felt that without firm commitments effective local distribution planning within the theater was virtually impossible. By contrast Feldman, a supply man and not a designer, offered the ETO articles that
appeared to be suitable for the changed tactical situation, in quantities that appeared at the time to be available. As a supply specialist he would not be upset because Littlejohn refused M1943 jackets. By August, the OQMG had ordered over 7,000,000 of them from manufacturers, and presumably any reasonable number could be shipped at short notice if the Chief Quartermaster changed his mind.
To anticipate the final outcome, Littlejohn finally did change his mind and accept the M1943 jacket, but only after it had become clear that nothing else was available. The overcoat worn over the M1943 jacket was a combination that pleased neither Doriot nor Littlejohn, but it was one of the variety of motley outfits still being worn by combat troops in early 1945. Once the ETO had approved the M1943 jacket, the War Department cabled that issues were to be made to all troops as authorized in the current TAE 21, and that olive drab field jackets, winter combat jackets, and similar substitute items were to be withdrawn as soon as possible. This directive merely underlines the lack of effective liaison between the two headquarters, since a shortage of M1943 jackets had already developed, making compliance impossible. Moreover, the troops fortunate enough to have winter combat jackets refused to part with them. The order also did nothing to clarify the status of the overcoat, authorization for which was not withdrawn, either then or later.58
Receipt and Forwarding of Winter Clothing
The First Winterization Program 7 September-13 October 1944
On 7 September, the same day that Colonel Busch wrote “It is getting cold up here,” Littlejohn sent letters and memos to each army quartermaster and each base section quartermaster in the theater, and also to his deputy back in the United Kingdom.59 The burden of each message was the same. Supplying winter clothing to the troops was almost entirely a problem of local transportation, and since the OCQM did not control any trains or trucks, quartermasters at all levels must put pressure on their respective G-4’s and persuade them that the allocation of tonnage for moving Class II items had to be radically increased. Moreover, the pipeline from Cherbourg to the armies was now over 400 miles long, without any intermediate depots or effective Quartermaster control anywhere along the route. If pilferage, distortion of balanced tariffs, and interminable delays were to be avoided, supplies must be sent direct from the United Kingdom by air or by LST to specific small ports. Two days later, armed with rough estimates of requirements from McNamara and Busch, Littlejohn made a formal request to General Stratton, the G-4 COMZ, for increased cross-Channel transportation and revised priorities. He wanted the Quartermaster tonnage allocation for September raised from 62,000 to 88,750 long tons. He pointed out that for the
period June–August 1944, the specific allocation of QM Class II tonnage had been 55,000, but actual receipts had only been 53 percent of that amount. Moreover, reports from the United Kingdom indicated that the 62,000 tons currently allocated for clothing and individual equipment bore such a low priority that they could not be shipped before the end of September. He proposed to reduce his Class I and III tonnages from the United Kingdom by 50 percent, and urgently requested a priority authorization for 50,750 long tons of Class II items, broken down as follows:
| Items | Tons |
| Winter clothing program | 10,000 |
| Winter tentage program | 10,350 |
| Combat maintenance | 29,500 |
| Class B and X clothing for POW’s | 900 |
In addition, his Class IV allocation should include 200 long tons of winter clothing to be sold to officers and nurses.
The clothing for enlisted men was intended primarily for 750,000 troops actually in combat—the First and Third Armies on the German frontier, and one corps under Ninth Army besieging Brest. This was normal winter clothing, not special items. It included both initial issues and necessary replacement articles, and the complete issue amounted to 25 pounds per man. (Table 18) Littlejohn explained that distribution had to be completed by 1 October if the efficiency of the troops was to be maintained, and requested that 6,000 tons of clothing for troops in the forward areas, and also the clothing for sale to officers, be moved by air.60 Clothing for Ninth Army and COMZ troops could easily be transported by ship—preferably by LST to small ports where they could be unloaded and expedited by Quartermaster troops. Littlejohn clearly wished to keep these special shipments away from Cherbourg, where more than one hundred ships were waiting to unload and inventory and forwarding procedures were alarmingly inefficient. But Stratton decided that the current overriding priorities for movement of POL and ammunition by air should not be changed. In spite of a personal appeal by Littlejohn, Bradley supported Stratton. Bradley’s comment afterwards was:
When the rains first came in November with a blast of wintry cold, our troops were ill-prepared for winter-time campaigning. This was traceable in part to the September crisis in supply for, during our race to the Rhine, I had deliberately by-passed shipments of winter clothing in favor of ammunition and gasoline. As a consequence, we now found ourselves caught short, particularly in bad-weather footgear. We had gambled in our choice and now were paying for the bad guess.61
Even in the face of such high level opposition, Littlejohn remained convinced of the necessity of his program and sought alternate means of transportation. At a time when the pursuit was slowing down for want of gasoline this was no simple problem, but the Chief Quartermaster explored every possibility and overcame many obstacles. LSTs and coasters were in short supply, and most of the lower priority items had to go to Cherbourg on Liberty ships. Reims had
Table 18—Summary of First Winter Clothing Program, 7 September 1944
| Item | Basis | Estimated requirements by 1 October | Weight per unit, packed | Total weight, lbs. |
| Overcoats or mackinaws | 1 per man not equipped on arrival | 750,000 | 9.00 | 6,750,000 |
| Gloves, wool (pair) | 1 per man not equipped on arrival | 750,000 | .36 | 270,000 |
| Undershirts, wool | 1 per man to Army troops | 750,000 | 1.06 | 795,000 |
| Drawers, wool | 1 per man to Army troops | 750,000 | .86 | 645,000 |
| Blankets, wool | 1 per man | 1,500,000 | 4.65 | 6,975,000 |
| Cap, wool, knit | 1 per man not equipped on arrival | 750,000 | .18 | 135,000 |
| Socks, wool (pair)* | 2 per man | 2,600,000 | .38 | 988,000 |
| Laces, shoe (pair)* | 1 per 2 men in Armies | 350,000 | .02 | 7,000 |
| Laces, legging (pair)* | 1 per 2 men in Armies | 350,000 | .02 | 7,000 |
| Shoes, service (pair)* | 1 per man in Armies | 750,000 | 4.83 | 3,622,500 |
| Shirts, wool” | 1 per man in Armies | 515,000 | 1.50 | 772,500 |
| Trousers, wool’ | 1 per man in Armies | 515,000 | 2.20 | 1,133,000 |
| Totals—pounds | 25.06 | 22,100,000 | ||
| Totals—long tons | 9,866 |
* Represents estimated necessary replacements to troops now on the Continent. These are not considered as initial issues.
been selected as the inland Class II distributing point, and to obtain trains for clothing he arranged to divert ships carrying 800 tons of rations per day (equal to two trains) from Cherbourg to Morlaix, on the northern coast of Brittany. A considerable part of the smaller but more vital portion of the winterization program, involving airlift to the First and Third Armies, was carried out as planned through the personal intervention of General Spaatz. Since transport aircraft were not available, he provided bombers to carry 41 percent of the required clothing to forward airstrips. Perhaps the fact that Littlejohn had personally arranged for Spaatz and his staff to receive 100 sets of the coveted officer type of ETO uniforms a week earlier made this type of informal staff coordination easier.62
Other expedients outside the tonnage allocations system were employed to move clothing forward. On 16 September three DUKW companies,
optimistically moving up to support a Rhine crossing, were used to bring more than 300,000 sets of winter underwear to First Army.63 Moving 1,000 tons of clothing to the Ninth Army through small Brittany ports was comparatively easy because an LST was available for this shipment. Since Liberty ships could not enter the shallow harbors, these ports were not crowded and service personnel of the army were available to assist in unloading. By contrast, at such deep-water ports as Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Rouen, only 12 Quartermaster ships could be berthed at one time, and at the end of September 61 shiploads of Quartermaster cargo including 12 loaded with clothing and equipment, were waiting to discharge.64
A complicated aspect of the winterization program involved the duffel bags that divisions of Third Army had brought to the Continent. These had been stored in various locations within the original beachhead during July. On 9 September the Third Army quartermaster asked ADSEC to send forward over 1,200 tons of the bags for three divisions, and later another shipment for three more divisions was requested. Most of these bags could be located, and had been trucked to the nearest railroad by 25 September, but the sequel was far from satisfactory. Some had been pilfered and no longer contained either blankets or overcoats. The owners of some of the bags had become casualties. Those bags that reached their rightful owners intact usually duplicated items already issued. Naturally, rail transportation was charged against Third Army’s Class II tonnage allocation. The whole procedure was wasteful and inefficient.65
The procedure recommended by Littlejohn, and prescribed for First Army troops by Colonel McNamara, also ran into difficulties. The duffel bags of winter clothing that FUSA units turned in before leaving the United Kingdom in June should, in theory, have been salvaged and returned to stock. On 8 September Littlejohn noted with concern that the United Kingdom inventory of overcoats was only 500,000, whereas he believed it should be twice as large.66 Sorting and returning to stock the overcoats turned in by the combat troops before their departure should have been simple, but salvage operations had been severely hampered by loss of the more experienced salvage units, which were naturally the first to be sent to the Continent.
Nevertheless, bearing in mind the objectives of this first winterization pro-gram—to equip combat troops only—it was very successful. At the end of September the First Army chief of staff set up priorities for the currently arriving winter clothing, giving first priority to infantry divisions and last to army troops. Early in October a full issue of regular winter clothing to First Army was completed, with the exception of a 50 percent shortage in arctic overshoes,
an item not included in the original list. At the same time 6,000 of the new sleeping bags were issued to each division, enough to give each man either four blankets or a sleeping bag and two blankets. Difficulties with the size tariff led to shortages in the medium sizes of field jackets, wool olive drab clothing, and shoes. A similar shortage of wool socks was overcome in military laundries by shrinking size 12 to smaller sizes required in the army depot.67
Meanwhile, by 30 September all Third Army troops had a third blanket. Overcoats had been distributed to all except army troops, demonstrating that, like General Bradley, TUSA regarded the overcoat as a combat item. Early in October issues to Third Army similar to those in First Army were completed, and by the end of the month the only shortages were overshoes, raincoats, and leggings. Third Army had received about 4,500 tons of Class II and IV supplies during October—including 1,194 tons delivered by air.68
One additional fact might be noted here. Upon his return from the United States in late July, Brumbaugh was appointed Deputy Chief Quartermaster (Rear), replacing Brig. Gen. Allen R. Kimball. There were several reasons for this appointment, despite Brumbaugh’s openly expressed preference for a more active assignment. First, there were tremendous quantities of used clothing in the United Kingdom, although progress in salvage and inventory left much to be desired. Brumbaugh, as a clothing specialist, was an ideal man to thaw this frozen asset. Moreover, his ETO experience fitted him to administer what was becoming essentially a British civilian organization, now that the American units were leaving for the Continent. General Kimball, a senior Quartermaster officer but a recent arrival in the ETO, lacked such specialized experience. An additional problem arose late in August, when the U.K. Base Section was transformed into a semi-autonomous headquarters under the command of Brig. Gen. Harry B. Vaughan, Jr. Littlejohn remembered his rather unsatisfactory relationship with the Forward Echelon, COMZ, when General Vaughan commanded that organization, and decided that the situation demanded an unusually competent and forceful Quartermaster representative in this rearmost echelon of ETO supply. Brumbaugh was therefore given the additional designation of Quartermaster, United Kingdom Base, and remained in London despite the fact that there was no really qualified clothing expert to replace him in the OCQM. Lt. Col. Thomas B. Phillips was confirmed in his temporary position as chief of the Supply Division, and several junior officers of even less experience became branch chiefs.69
The Replacement Factor Controversy
At a staff conference in Paris on the morning of 13 October, Littlejohn was able to give a very satisfactory report on progress in winterizing the combat troops. He displayed an impressive chart which showed that, except for blankets and overshoes, quotas for every item of the winterization program had actually been exceeded. But Littlejohn
referred disparagingly to his achievement as a “so-called winterizing program,” explaining that it had merely met preliminary demands brought on by unexpectedly early cold weather. Now he was faced with the real supply problem resulting from accelerated wear and tear of most items of clothing and equipage, and had recently been forced to place heavy emergency demands upon the zone of interior because “regardless of whether this current replacement factor holds true for the whole year, the supplies must be here to meet the known demands.” It was therefore imperative that the transatlantic tonnage allocation for QM supplies for November be increased by 172,275 measurement tons. Littlejohn did not need to mention that this would be an increase of 52 percent over his October allocation, and if granted would require sharp cutbacks by the other technical services.70
That same afternoon Littlejohn covered much the same ground in an interview with the press, but with somewhat different emphasis. He described the disrupting effects of the unexpected tactical pursuit, which had created local shortages of clothing, and the dramatic airlift, which had overcome them in the forward areas. But AAF and service troops were still seriously short of clothing and blankets. The Chief Quartermaster explained that rates of wear and tear and of loss had been badly underestimated, and that the rate of maintenance shipments from the United States would have to be increased 250 percent to take care of these revised requirements. Consequently, the productive capacity of the United States must continue unimpaired. Doubtless Littlejohn was referring to increased discussion of the imminence of victory in the American press and wide publicity that had been given to recent contract terminations by the Army. He carefully refrained from referring to delays in current production in the United States, a matter that had been publicized by the War Production Board late in September, but at least one correspondent, David Anderson of the New York Times, said that such production was “months behind,” and also stated that “the men fighting on the rim of Germany were ill-equipped for winter.”71 This unfortunate statement was only partly true at the time of the press conference; indeed the ostensible reason for calling in the press had been to explain how local distribution problems on the Continent had been overcome.
The Times article promptly evoked a demand for explanations from Somervell to Eisenhower and Lee. The head of ASF failed to understand the need to rush clothing by aircraft, and stated that prior tot October he had received no reports that War Department replacement factors were inadequate. Littlejohn explained to Lee that he had
“stressed the part that air is playing in the supply of the armies.” He also stated that he had made repeated informal reports on the inadequacy of the War Department’s replacement factors, and that during the last month he had been forced to submit two very large emergency requisitions for additional clothing and equipage.72
The above exchange of cables marks the emergence of replacement factors as the major consideration in computing and justifying specific clothing requirements from the ETO. Requirements specialists in the OQMG felt that this was a misuse of replacement factors, which represented long-term trends and were used primarily in computing war production programs at the national level. They recognized that the first stages of any military operation were often marked by unusually heavy demands for Class II supplies, but from their point of view such demands should be met by special projects, such as the PROCO procedure that had been authorized during the build-up for OVERLORD. Such projects were filled from special reserves and did not disrupt the orderly computation of long-term replacement factors. But Littlejohn had believed even before D-day that the current replacement factors were inadequate, and he had made an unsuccessful attempt to set up a special clothing reserve by the use of PROCO requisitions. When ASF disapproved his special projects as unjustified, he became convinced that PROCO procedures were ineffective and also that basic requirements statistics in the zone of interior were faulty and would have to be revised. Officials in the OQMG did not agree. That ASF had disapproved Littlejohn’s PROCO requisitions was unfortunate, but not germane to their problems. Their current replacement factors should stand until new long-term trends had been confirmed.73 Littlejohn, on the other hand, felt that the primary objective of the Quartermaster Corps was to fill the needs of the combat soldier, no matter how unpredictable they might be. For that purpose he was ready to follow procedure, distort procedure, or overturn it altogether. His own description of what had occurred on the Continent during the initial period of heavy combat vividly explains the new and unexpected trend in replacement factors:
Normandy is covered with a series of hedges. Each small plot of ground on the farms is completely surrounded by these tall hedges which carry thorns. Furthermore, in the advance across Normandy, the local actions in which small units were engaged frequently consisted of a life-and-death race across a 50-yard space. The American soldier skinned down to the clothes he had on, his rifle, his ammunition belt full of ammunition, and one day’s ration. The blankets, the shoulder pack, overshoes, were left in a dugout which he had made for himself. Raincoat and blanket were usually at the bottom. The shelter half was staked down on top of the hole and covered with about two feet of dirt. The items left behind or destroyed by the soldier as indicated above, were scavenged by the natives. Another important thing in the high consumption of
clothing and equipage was the mud. If one dropped his knife, fork, spoon, or mess kit at night it disappeared in the mud and had to be replaced. At the close of the battle of Normandy it was necessary for me to completely re-equip approximately 1,000,000 American soldiers almost as if they were completely naked.74
The real point of contention was whether recent demands from the Continent represented a temporary situation or a new trend. If Littlejohn’s view was correct, prudence demanded that the War Department revise its production program immediately instead of waiting until its reserves had been depleted. It was his contention that for at least three months the requisitions from the armies had not reflected their real requirements. Any report of depot issues to date was meaningless unless the unfilled demands of the armies were included, and the same applied to any computation of replacement factors based upon issues alone. Littlejohn’s only effective method of assembling a reserve to meet the future needs of the armies was to compute his authorized level of Class II and IV supply (sixty days) in terms of observed, rather than administratively imposed, factors. Gregory, on the other hand, contended that clothing and equipment had been lost during the pursuit rather than expended during heavy combat, and that the existence of a valid new trend had not yet been demonstrated.75
The OQMG had sent a factor-computing team to the ETO before the June landings, and it set up reporting procedures and began to collect data in July. Like other theaters, the ETO had been submitting reports of matériel consumed since mid-1943, but under combat conditions this was a far more complicated process, since the unpredictable element of combat losses was now added to the factors of wear and tear. Capt. Harold A. Naisbitt, who had been specially trained in the Requirements Branch, OQMG, reported that current administrative directives of COMZ and the OCQM were adequate, but that in many cases they were not being followed.76 The maintenance factor team’s first report, covering the period from 6 June to 28 July (D+52) was so crude that Littlejohn dismissed it as a generalized statement requiring confirmation. On 8 August he wrote to Colonel Franks, the acting quartermaster of ADSEC:
... I must have definite information upon which to raise the ante for requisitions. Of course, as you know, if the situation is serious we will issue all the stocks we have and tell Pembark to furnish replacement. Where is my team that was sent to the Continent to do the maintenance factor job? When are they going to give me some new maintenance factors? The other day you gave me an over-all statement that maintenance was running at the rate of 2½ times the current factors. Please expedite this information so that we can use it in the review of requisitions.77
Crude and unsatisfactory though they were, the factors submitted on 4 August
constituted the last valid report received in over a month. The pursuit across France had already begun, and during that phase of operations improvement in the mechanics of reporting was meaningless, for the clothing issues reported upon were largely confined to COMZ and AAF units. While the armies were engaged in pursuit they were mainly interested in receiving food and gasoline; their requisitions for clothing and personal equipment averaged about 10 percent of normal requirements and actual receipts less than 3 percent.78
Under the circumstances, the OCQM was forced to use War Department replacement factors in computing its preliminary combat zone requisitions on the zone of interior. These requisitions, covering the last quarter of 1944, were submitted in late July before the difficulties of the shipping tie-up were fully realized. The computations therefore optimistically listed as assets all clothing held in the United Kingdom. Because of the low replacement factors and the large deductions for current assets, the net requirements upon NYPE were very small, and provoked an inquiry from General Feldman. Meanwhile, Littlejohn was becoming increasingly aware of the true picture. On 4 September he wrote Feldman from Paris, giving revised maintenance factors and remarking that the over-all trend previously reported—two and a half times War Department factors—appeared to be confirmed.
The next day, 5 September, an airmail letter from General Feldman dated 21 August reached the temporary COMZ headquarters at Valognes, demanding an explanation of the very scanty requisitions for regular winter clothing for the fourth quarter of 1944. Feldman stated that all Class II and IV requirements were less than anticipated, and pointed out that requisitions on file from the ETO for a list of sample items of regular winter clothing and equipment amounted to “much less than anticipated in current Army Supply Program.” Prominent on the list were overcoats, shirts, socks, and wool trousers, all reported to be on hand in large quantities in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, if these amounts accurately reflected theater requirements, an immediate cutback in production would be necessary. Littlejohn was in the forward areas investigating precisely this point when the chief of the Clothing Branch replied in a telegram that “requisitions are to stand.”79 This officer was relatively new to his assignment, having been appointed during the reorganization of the Supply Division when Brumbaugh left the OCQM. Fortunately, General Gregory decided to postpone action on the telegram, which was not only contrary to the facts but was also in contradiction to Littlejohn’s most recent statements concerning rates of consumption. Clothing specialists in
the OQMG wrongly assumed that Feldman was referring to requirements for special winter clothing. They mentioned this telegram whenever any criticism was directed at their handling of winter clothing requisitions. In retrospect it appears probable that Feldman was alarmed at the excessive optimism prevailing in Washington and the tendency to cut back requirements and relax wartime restrictions. He had already mentioned this in a letter to Littlejohn on 11 August. Feldman’s letter may also have been an attempt to make a matter of record his informal arrangements with Littlejohn before departing for a new assignment in the Pacific.80
Shortages of experienced clothing specialists within the OCQM and repeated changes in the direction of the Supply Division continued to have unfortunate results. The reasons for leaving Colonel Brumbaugh in the United Kingdom have already been explained. His assistance in forwarding clothing from the rear was very valuable, but an experienced Class II expert in the Paris headquarters was sorely lacking. Despite repeated instructions to his entire staff, Littlejohn found it necessary to reprimand the acting chief of his Supply Division for misuse of Class II tonnage. On daily telegrams asking for unspecified Class II tonnage, cots and brooms had been sent to the armies instead of useful clothing and equipage. A month later there was a new chief of the Supply Division, and this admonition had to be repeated.81 In both cases, the failure was in administrative supervision. Since no Class II forward depot had yet been established, the Supply Division of OCQM was itself processing requisitions from the armies and preparing distribution directives. The problem was to indoctrinate some seventy-five officers and enlisted personnel in a general policy, which had to be applied with discretion. Performance was considerably improved after Colonel Florsheim, former chief of the Storage and Distribution Division, was transferred to the Supply Division in November.82 This was too late to be helpful in preparing and justifying winter clothing requisitions on the zone of interior. Such requisitions were prepared largely by the Military Planning Division, headed by Col. Albert G. Duncan, and reviewed by Littlejohn personally.
One major reason that the OCQM had no positive and specific clothing requirements from the combat units to transmit to the zone of interior as requisitions was inherent in the supply procedures imposed upon the theater by the G-4, COMZ. The army G-4’s allocated tonnage rigidly on a daily basis, and the amount of a requisition could not exceed the allocation for a single day. Consequently, ever since the original landings the army quartermasters had been obliged to record their clothing
needs in the daily telegram, a frustrating procedure since daily estimates were not suited to this class of supply. Requirements were spasmodic and unpredictable. Undoubtedly echoing McNamara, the First Army adjutant general observed, “Combat organizations do not come out of the line on some set schedule—or suffer losses on one.”83 Aggravating this technical difficulty was the fact that clothing received very low priorities, so that a Class II requisition might be arbitrarily canceled day after day. With floods of new requisitions arriving daily, few of which could be filled from current stocks on the Continent, it became virtually impossible to keep track of unfilled requisitions. Littlejohn had hoped that the regulating stations would become centers to tabulate and disseminate such information, and ultimately provided them with a jeep courier service in default of adequate telephone communications. But getting such a complicated administrative organization into operation took time, and meanwhile many unit QM’s repeated their requisitions, causing an overlap and increasing the confusion. Early in September Littlejohn asked the armies for rough estimates of their total winter clothing needs, and on the 16th he inaugurated a system of detailed fifteen-day estimates of clothing requirements, to be forwarded by a special courier service. This procedure, while not eliminating the unsatisfactory daily Class II telegrams, supplemented them with a coherent method of programing foreseeable needs. It began to produce results immediately.
An interesting development that was an integral part of the new requisitioning procedures was the basic maintenance set. This representative group of sixty-eight essential items was a further development of the beach maintenance set already described in connection with the build-up for OVERLORD.84 The basic maintenance set was not intended for automatic supply, but to simplify the requisitioning procedures of the armies at a time when communication facilities were extremely scanty. By using the provided code references to each item of the set, it was fairly simple to compose a brief and yet specific telegram.85 It was, however, much easier to establish the needs of the combat troops than it was to fill them. Since stocks had already been depleted by the winterization program, these additional demands could only be met by placing requisitions on the United States.
Requisitions Based on the New Replacement Factors
On 18 September Littlejohn wrote directly to Gregory, requesting that 1,300,000 blankets, 250,000 overcoats, and various items already on requisition for later delivery be shipped immediately. He requested that the entire list arrive on the Continent by 10 October on one or two commodity-loaded ships, which
could be given special unloading priorities. He further said: “I am currently confronted with completely re-equipping a minimum of 1,000,000 men with all items of clothing and substantially all items of equipage. In addition ... large numbers of POW’s and 100,000 French Territorials.”86 Two days later in a teletype conference the requisitions for trousers and arctics were each increased by 500,000 pairs, and on 22 September, having received an authorization for another suit of wool underwear per man, Littlejohn stated that his requirement was 1,482,000 suits. But all these were merely stopgap measures to get the most necessary items onto the next convoys. On 18 September he wrote to Evans: “I already have before me requisitions from the several armies for complete clothing and equipment. The only reason my requisitions are no larger is that I cannot get the shipping.”87
During late August and early September Littlejohn, like everyone else in the ETO and many in the United States, had been caught up in a wave of optimism about an early German surrender. This influenced the administrative details of his plans, but did not decrease their scope. As he remarked in late August: “Whether the Army fights, rests, or sleeps, it must eat and must be supplied with clothing. ... As soon as the fighting is over, my problem becomes more difficult rather than less, unlike certain other Services. ... For the Quartermaster ... the only activity that slows down is burial. ...”88
Nevertheless, the pause in the pursuit in mid-September was far more than a breathing space and a chance to take inventory. It carried with it the chill of disappointment, especially after the British were forced out of Arnhem, the only Allied bridgehead over the Rhine, on September 26th. If the fighting was to continue all winter, as now seemed likely, it would not be enough to make good the current shortages of the armies. It would also be necessary to plan for their support during the coming months on the same tremendous scale, and, moreover, to give them protection against the cold weather that was already beginning. This did not become
evident as quickly in the United States as in Europe. On 27 September Col. Ira K. Evans wrote that Littlejohn’s “request for clothing to re-equip one million men has caused a little confusion here as to the exact purpose or necessity. ... I thought that perhaps it was your intent to re-equip all the combat troops on ‘V’ Day, so that those going into Germany as well as those returning to the States, will be properly and suitably clothed.” Littlejohn replied that “the clothing we are asking for is not for V-Day parades, but to effect supply to the front now.”89
The piecemeal requisitioning of this period has been criticized as evidence of poor planning, but Littlejohn’s correspondence reveals that there was hardly time for any planning at all. Preinvasion plans had to be scrapped when the armies crossed the Seine without stopping, and thereafter every problem had to be met on a day-to-day basis. On 17 September Littlejohn wrote to Evans:
We have been moving around for some days, and it is extremely difficult to get the facts before us. For example, there are no communications between my office and the several depots on the Continent except by cub plane or jeep. The latter never fails but is somewhat slow. Please bear with us if we express our troubles in too vigorous terms but the troops are yelling loudly.
Two days later, on the day his new main office in Paris officially opened, he wrote to Feldman: “I have so many problems today in connection with clothing that it is hard to know just where to start or
stop. ... The lantern problem is quiet as the troops are moving too fast to light one. ...”90 The first order of business was, clearly, to centralize the details of administration previously scattered from Paris via Valognes back to London. He was perturbed to find that “the Divisions have had some junior officer take perfunctory and improper action on matters of considerable importance, the Chiefs of Divisions lacking knowledge thereof.”91 This referred primarily, of course, to the Supply Division and to the famous cable of 5 September to Feldman regarding requisitions.
In addition to the tremendous requirements uncovered in the few previous days, Littlejohn found himself under pressure from another direction—an over-all reduction in the theater’s transatlantic tonnage allocation brought on by the tie-up of shipping. (Table 19) That situation had already caused delays in the discharge of Quartermaster cargo. The reduced allocation would also, inevitably, slow down deliveries from the United Kingdom.
Beginning on 25 September the whole OCQM staff was put to work reappraising all outstanding requisitions, for if Littlejohn hoped to obtain an increased shipping allocation notwithstanding the theater-wide reduction, he would first have to put his own house in order by ruthlessly weeding out every nonessential item. At the same time he gave his clothing specialists careful and detailed
Winter clothing arrives in the front line for a First Army reconnaissance squadron. October 1944.
instructions regarding new requisitions. The United Kingdom supply level (45 days) was unchanged, but continental levels were to rise from 30 days in October to 60 in December, while the continental troop basis was to rise from 1,601,700 on 20 September to 2,673,600 on 31 December. The initial issues already described (See Table 18.) were to be completed for all troops on the Continent and two most important items, sweaters and arctic overshoes, were to be added to the list. One million men were to be completely re-equipped with wool underwear and all outer clothing except sweaters, overcoats, arctics, and combat boots. Inventories in the United Kingdom and cargoes awaiting discharge, insofar as information was available, were to be deducted.92
In every aspect except the controversial one of maintenance factors, these were entirely justifiable requirements. Transmitted to NYPE in two teletype conferences on 1 and 3 October, they comprised over 90,000 measurement tons,
Table 19: Class II and IV tonnages discharged and moved forward from ports, July 1944—February 1945
| Class II and IV Ships in ETO End. of Month | Commodity-loaded QMC Ships (All) | Total Berths Available to QMC | QMC Ships in ETO Not Discharging | Offloading Plus Backlog From Previous Month (Long Tons) | Cleared From Continental Ports (Long Tons) | Backlog at End of the Month (Long Tons) | |
| July | 5 | 54 | 12 | 42 | (a) | (a) | (a) |
| August | 8 | 57 | 12 | 45 | 28,700 | 12,500 | 16,200 |
| September | 12 | 75 | 14 | 61 | 54,200 | 15,400 | 38,800 |
| October | 17 | 80 | 18 | 62 | 75,900 | 19,000 | 56,900 |
| November | 22 | 62 | 17 | 45 | 81,100 | 22,400 | 58,700 |
| December | 24 | 68 | 17 | 51 | 137,800 | 49,200 | 88,600 |
| January | 23 | 52 | 23 | 29 | 169,500 | 98,400 | 71,100 |
| February | 6 | 12 | 23 | 0 | 148,800 | 120,500 | 28,300 |
a Information not available,
Source: Study, Incl to Ltr Littlejohn to Somervell, 3 Mar 45, pt. II.
including 62,400 tons to be delivered before the end of October on an emergency basis. The emergency list included the following major items:93
| Blankets | 1,500,000 |
| Caps, wool, knit | 1,000,000 |
| Drawers, wool | 2,400,000 |
| Gloves, wool, pairs | 1,600,000 |
| Jackets, field, OD | 1,500,000 |
| Overcoats | 600,000 |
| Overshoes, arctic (pairs) | 900,000 |
| Shirts, wool | 2,000,000 |
| Socks, wool (pairs) | 6,000,000 |
| Trousers, wool | 3,000,000 |
| Undershirts, wool | 2,000,000 |
Not requested, but prominently listed as due in on previous requisitions, were 2,110,000 wool sweaters and 2,270,000 sleeping bags, also urgently needed before the end of the month. The great size of this requisition, and the number of older requisitions that would have to be canceled to provide shipping space, threatened to dislocate the convoy schedules from NYPE rather seriously. Nevertheless, crises of this sort were not unknown at the New York port; Littlejohn’s trusted associate, Colonel Evans, was very successful in readjusting the flow of Quartermaster supplies.94
Although Littlejohn’s personal correspondence with Evans and Feldman, and also with Gregory, had anticipated the dimensions of the new requirements, the formal requisition, designated K-94, had a tremendous impact upon the operating levels of the OQMG, the ASF, and NYPE. The chief of the Requirements Branch, OQMG, hastened to
point out to Colonel Doriot that the OQMG had received positive assurances from the ETO that no such requisitions would be forthcoming. This was the first of many references to the erroneous telegram of 5 September. The primary reactions seem to have been surprise and indignation that less than thirty days after assuring the OQMG that supplies were sufficient the ETO was making known such tremendous requirements. There was also concern over criticism if they were not filled. But the Requirements Branch reported that the requisition could nevertheless be met. Zone of interior levels for many items would be depleted, but only in a few instances to a serious extent.95
The Requirements Branch re-echoed various objections regarding overseas techniques of computing replacement factors which had been made a year before. There was considerable justification for objections to the theater’s crude methods of estimating supplies on hand, in default of inventories that had not yet been made. But the suggestion that supplies which appeared to have been consumed had actually disappeared into new supply depots revealed that OQMG operating personnel completely misunderstood the ETO situation. It was precisely because no new Class II depots had been organized, and supply had been hand-to-mouth from the beaches, that the trend in ETO clothing requirements had not been detected earlier. It was especially hard for zone of interior planners to accept the statement that ETO reports of material consumed over a three-month period, which had been submitted as recently as 6 September, did not constitute a valid basis for estimating the theater’s requirements.96 Littlejohn discussed this apparent discrepancy in detail with Maj. Gen. William M. Goodman, deputy commander of NYPE, who was currently visiting the ETO. Apparently Goodman was convinced of the correctness of the revised requirements as stated, but was not persuaded that like conditions would recur. He believed that most of the supplies had been lost during rapid movement rather than worn out. But Goodman reported that Littlejohn “does not feel justified in reducing these factors inasmuch as he feels that he should be prepared to resupply based on consumption factors as shown.”97
Meanwhile Littlejohn had been challenged to justify Requisition K-94, and had done so on 10 October in a lengthy cable to General Somervell. It gave specific experience factors about twice as high as War Department maintenance rates for fifteen items, and duly noted that no factors could be reported for sweaters and sleeping bags, since none had arrived in the theater. Despite this defense Colonel Evans reported on 12 October that for eleven of the most important items, shipments would be exactly 50 percent of the quantities requested. Additional supply action was being suspended by the War
Department “pending further justification.”98 In that context, it seems clear that Little-john’s press conference of 13 October, which has already been described, was part of a deliberate campaign to get his total requirements approved without reservations or delay. A personal letter to Colonel Evans confirms this view:
Some weeks ago it became apparent to me that on clothing and equipage we were walking through the garments like paper and that I was headed for disaster. At that time I started flinging back to Pembark increased requisitions for substantial quantities of practically every item. I personally drew up these requisitions based upon facts and figures obtained from the Armies. Your Headquarters gave me 50% and I believe that you were instrumental in getting me this 50%. You came back at me and asked for a detailed defense, which was immediately forthcoming. ... Along with the above have been any number of visiting firemen officially sent over by the War Department. ... Each Chief of Service has had to prepare a set speech for ... these individuals. On top of this, some weeks ago it became my official duty to conduct a press conference at which time I let the press in on the increased maintenance factors here on the Continent, as it was definitely my intention to see that the soldiers were properly equipped and warm for the winter, and the college professors gotten out of the way. I am very happy to say that—between your office, the A.S.F., and the O.Q.M.G., my new maintenance factors have been approved 90%. The 10% not approved doesn’t mean too much. ...99
Littlejohn’s personal letters were all on this theme in mid-October. On the 15th he wrote to Gregory: “I know you think that we have gone crazy here in the ETO on clothing and equipage. However, the facts can be substantiated by anyone who desires to investigate them.” He added that Goodman and Justice James F. Byrnes had done so during the past week.100
Despite the doubts of General Gregory and the openly expressed opposition of his requirements specialists, the whole amount of Requisition K-94 was approved by the War Department on 16 October.101 This approval was without direct reference to maintenance factors, and incidentally without assurance of prompt delivery—a completely separate and very difficult problem. But the OCQM staff, convinced that their maintenance factors were being accepted at least tentatively, promptly submitted requisitions for clothing for the first three months of 1945. General Owens, the chief of the OQMG Storage and Distribution Division, who had recently visited the ETO and understood Little-john’s problems, wrote:
We have been reviewing your requisitions for January, February, and March, which arrived here just after my return. As you will probably realize, some of the quantities asked for by you sort of set us back on our heels. On most of the items I am sure that we can meet your requirements. Some will necessitate increased production on which we are now busily engaged. ...102
In other words, the latest requisitions would require a major revision of the Army Supply Program, which was precisely what Littlejohn had been attempting to bring about. Having won a battle on principles the Chief Quartermaster was now more willing to compromise on some of the specific and technical aspects of the replacement factor problem. He still insisted that priority given to unfilled requisitions from the armies distorted reports of issue for replacement purposes, but conceded that inventories were inaccurate, and that some supplies, although shipped, had never been received.103
Probably information received from NATOUSA contributed to Littlejohn’s conciliatory attitude. Remembering Sullivan’s informal reports of very high replacement factors in Fifth Army during the previous winter, Littlejohn wrote to Middleswart in October, asking for official NATOUSA data on that subject. Middleswart’s answer, surprisingly, showed that Mediterranean factors were less than those of the War Department in many cases. To a considerable extent, of course, this reflected the difference of opinion between Middleswart and Sullivan, which has already been described. There were additional reasons for the differences between NATOUSA factors as reported by Middleswart and the earlier Fifth Army reports. Foremost was the trend toward a static tactical situation in Italy, which had a direct and very favorable effect upon both losses and wear and tear. In SOLOC, where Seventh Army’s tactical situation could hardly be called static, veteran troops from Italy also reported comparatively low replacement factors. Apparently very generous initial issues contributed to this result. On reviewing the first reports from SOLOC of matériel consumed that passed through his headquarters, Littlejohn decided that neither the basis of computation nor the results could be reconciled with ETO experience, and recommended that SOLOC reports should be submitted separately.104
The technicalities of the factor controversy are well illustrated by the example of wool socks. The authorized ETO allowance was three pairs of cushion-sole and two pairs of light or heavy wool socks per man, and the original War Department factors for them were 11.1 and 25 percent, respectively. But cushion-sole socks, the newer and distinctly more desirable item, were in short supply, and the demands of ETO troops, for both initial issue and replacement, were largely filled with heavy or light wool socks—usually the latter. The fragility of light wool socks and the scarcity of cushion-sole were well illustrated in the August 1944 report of matériel consumed, which showed 55.4 percent replacements of the former, and 5.1 percent of the latter. In October
Littlejohn requested a 50 percent factor for all socks, but the approved figures were adjusted at 25 percent for cushion-sole, and 33 percent for other wool socks. Meanwhile General Eisenhower, to prevent trench foot, had approved a plan of The Surgeon General to provide a daily pair of clean socks to each combat soldier. Littlejohn did not favor increasing initial issues, but estimated that it would require two or three extra pairs of socks per man to create a revolving reserve in the laundries and bath units. He was granted his desired 50 percent factor for the first quarter of 1945 only. Thereafter, the percentage reverted to 33 percent for both types of socks. This sequence of events illustrates how issue of an inferior substitute article can becloud replacement statistics, and incidentally cause confusion in procurement programing.105
In a letter to Gregory dated 1 December, Littlejohn reviewed his own previous recommendations on factors, Colonel Doriot’s counterproposals, and cumulative ETO issue experience through October. The Chief Quartermaster admitted, for example, that previous OCQM computations on wool drawers had erroneously included 600,000 initial issues under maintenance. Correction reduced the cumulative issue experience for this item from 19.0 to 14.5 percent, and the OQMG’s proposed factor of 12.5 was acceptable. On the other hand, the OQMG accepted the ETO figure of 8.4 percent on arctic overshoes, which doubled the original factor on that item. There was agreement on 70 percent of the articles under consideration, but the exceptions were all items of importance for a winter campaign. Littlejohn pointed out that most of the excepted items were still in short supply, and that requisitions for initial issue would have to be filled before issues for replacement could be made. A conspicuous example was the one-burner stove, a new and very desirable piece of equipment for a squad in combat. The demand was so great that practically all stock was expended for initial issue, and Littlejohn’s replacement factor (8.1 percent) was merely an educated guess that rejected experience data entirely, but later proved to be quite accurate.106
There was no direct answer to this letter in over a month. During December the Gregory-Littlejohn correspondence, while remaining active, was largely concerned with specific requirements, especially those arising from the German Ardennes offensive. On 5 January Gregory sent a brochure to General Somervell, who was planning to visit the ETO and wanted information on unresolved problems between the OQMG and the Quartermaster organization in Europe. A large number of these problems concerned the Military Planning Division, and presumably the study was prepared by officers of that agency, since it reflected their point of view. Apparently Gregory was unaware of the controversies involved. He wrote to Littlejohn the same day and inclosed a copy of the brochure prepared for the head of ASF. Littlejohn’s reply noted that
Gregory had cleared up several problems, and thanked The Quartermaster General for “the cooperation which have received during the past ninety days. ... The inclosure referred to in your letter of January 5th is quite a different matter. I seriously question whether some of the statements made would dignify the Halls of Harvard.” In another letter to Gregory dated 14 January Littlejohn again complained that the brochure for General Somervell was “rather loosely written.” It gave a very partisan account of the replacement factor controversy, and since all long-range requisitions were based on such factors, it was also an open attack upon Littlejohn’s whole requisitioning policy. Specifically, it stated that the interim replacement factors supplied by Captain Naisbitt, for use until continental experience data became available, were actually combat factors derived from NATOUSA, and if the OCQM had followed them, the clothing crisis of September would never have occurred. This was contrary to the facts. For lack of comprehensive experience data from the Continent, Littlejohn had used the replacement factors recommended by Naisbitt, and later found them quite inadequate for combat.
This was essentially a repetition of the Middleswart-Sullivan controversy on the same subject a year earlier. Littlejohn had received Fifth Army statistics direct from Sullivan, and referred to them as “NATO factors.” He had no previous knowledge of Middleswart’s very different figures covering the entire Mediterranean theater, and referred to them as “War Department factors.” But whatever their source, he was just as emphatic as Sullivan in denying that they were suitable for a combat situation. Since Littlejohn referred to his own statistics as “Continental experience factors,” and always submitted separate requisitions, based on noncombat factors, for the support of the United Kingdom, there was considerable justification for his view that the ETO should have used Sullivan’s rather than Middleswart’s statistics until dependable data from the Continent became available. His unsuccessful attempt in January 1944 to justify a PROCO requisition based upon Fifth Army factors has already been described. After that failure to obtain supplies for extraordinary contingencies by the method recommended by the OQMG, he was all the more determined to fill his needs by revising replacement factors.107
Littlejohn had basic objections to other statements made in the brochure for General Somervell. In May and June 1944 he had submitted piecemeal requisitions, some of them small and frankly experimental but others of very considerable size, for various items of the new clothing sponsored by the Military Planning Division, OQMG. That agency was either unaware of, or chose to ignore, all such requisitions, and stated that Littlejohn had submitted no such requisitions prior to 15 August. Moreover, the requisition of that date was severely criticized as too small and
too late to serve as a basis for further procurement. The fact that the requisition of 15 August had been coordinated with General Feldman before submission was not mentioned. Also, the OCQM policy of experimental requisitions, to test the reaction of the troops, did not meet the approval of the Military Planning Division. One sentence from a letter Littlejohn had written to Feldman was quoted out of context to convey an impression that the Chief Quartermaster was indiscriminately hostile to all newly developed items.108 Even more annoying to Littlejohn was a misstatement that 200,000 one-burner stoves, which he had requisitioned for the ETO, were for issue to officers. He suspected that some stoves previously issued had been misappropriated by officers, but explained to both Gregory and Somervell that these were actually required for the combat troops, on a basis of one per rifle squad.109
Littlejohn personally discussed this and other such differences between his office and the OQMG with Somervell on 14 and 15 January, and the ASF commander decided a good many matters, including replacement factors, in favor of the ETO Quartermaster. Despite earlier objections from the OQMG, Somervell directed that Littlejohn’s requirements for towels, handkerchiefs, and one-burner stoves were to be met. Far more important, the ASF commander decided on the spot that the very heavy responsibilities for clothing and feeding prisoners of war and repatriates, which SHAEF had imposed on Littlejohn, were legitimate calls for American aid. They would be met mainly by local procurement, for which the OCQM needed high-caliber technical personnel. The Chief Quartermaster had warned the OQMG of early requirements for such personnel, but for lack of a policy decision nothing had been done. In this instance General Somervell’s correction of an oversight by his own ASF organization was very helpful to Quartermasters on both sides of the Atlantic.110
By the end of April 1945, ETO replacement factors, especially for individual clothing items, were coming down to the rates originally set by the OQMG a year before, and Littlejohn now recommended that most of the current ETO factors be reduced. The only conspicuous exception was the M1943 jacket, still noted as being in short supply. With the end of hostilities on 8 May, ETO Quartermaster statisticians began a very ambitious compilation of combat replacement factors, tracing their experience during the entire European campaign, and summarizing trends for each item by ninety-day periods.111
In retrospect it may be said that, from a narrowly technical standpoint, the OQMG’s requirements specialists were
only doing their duty when they opposed Littlejohn’s efforts to increase replacement rates and thereby to influence the Army Supply Program. Their mission was to compute total global requirements over extended periods, so that production could be maintained at a steady rate for maximum efficiency. Such an objective could only be achieved by minimizing extraordinary situations and ignoring short-term trends, which were compensated for by a reserve or safety factor. This was a logical approach to solve major logistical problems at the level of the national war effort, but unfortunately the Requirements Branch was short of personnel, and was forced to use data chosen for ready accessibility rather than for accuracy and timeliness. Requirements specialists were well aware that weeks and sometimes months went by before tactical requirements were reflected in depot issues, but the depot issues were reported at regular intervals in convenient statistical form and the tactical requirements were not. Ironically, these specialists were inclined to blame their inflexible and unsatisfactory statistical procedures upon excessively specific directives from ASF and upon the administrative burden of submitting overly frequent and elaborate reports to that headquarters. Conversely, Littlejohn considered the OQMG to be too much dominated by its own statisticians, and customarily looked to his personal contacts within ASF for policy decisions based upon a broad knowledge of combat operations. The existence of these directly opposing views of the role of ASF in shaping supply policy serve to illustrate the fundamental difference in point of view between the OQMG and the ETO Quartermaster, a difference by no means limited to replacement factors.112
Delays in Receipt of New Items
The difficulties in achieving agreement on design of a wool field jacket have already been indicated. Deliveries presented an even greater problem. In mid-March, before a compromise in design had been settled, the OQMG version of the wool jacket was sent to Philadelphia for a technical analysis. Lt. Col. George Christie, Jr., director of the clothing factory in the Philadelphia QM Depot (PQMD), estimated that a maximum of two million jackets might be produced in the seven months, June—December 1944. Meanwhile the Military Planning Division, OQMG, by taking the monthly production capacity of serge coats (700,000) and arbitrarily adding 40 percent, arrived at a production figure of 6,860,000 jackets for the same period. The estimate that a jacket required 40 percent less labor than a service coat had originally been made regarding the simple ETO version, but as noted above, the OQMG’s jacket design was far more elaborate. When General Clay cabled to Lee in April that 2,600,000 wool jackets could be supplied in 1944, he was clearly influenced by the Philadelphia depot’s estimate. Nevertheless, the procurement directive that was sent to Philadelphia on 17 May called for delivery of 3,800,000 jackets in the calendar year 1944. Colonel Christie decided
that his own factory within the depot, which served as a pilot plant, could produce 30,000 jackets in June.113
During early June, bidding by commercial manufacturers was slow. On 5 June the Department of Labor decided that the wool jacket, despite its name, was actually a coat, and approved a 60-cent hourly wage for those making it rather than the 40-cent rate prevailing for jacket manufacturers. This opened the way for new contracts at higher rates, but at the same time several jacket manufacturers withdrew their bids, since they felt that two wage rates in the same factory would inevitably lead to labor dissension. On 17 June the procurement directive was increased by 835,590 jackets to cover a commitment to NATOUSA, and it now became very probable that mandatory orders, a new departure in the clothing industry, would be necessary to procure the required quantity. Since the ETO had stated definitely that M1943 jackets were not required, some contracts for this item might be terminated in favor of wool jackets, but the wage rate considerations already mentioned limited the number of such conversions. Orders for 330,000 M1943 jackets were canceled on 29 June, and the manufacturers concerned contracted for 565,000 wool jackets instead. But the number of jackets on order was still insufficient, and mandatory orders against six contractors, who were capable of manufacturing the wool jacket but had refused to submit bids, were invoked on 20 July. Mandatory orders quickly solved the problem of insufficient bids, but contributed nothing to the far more serious problem of timely deliveries.114
By 6 July Colonel Christie reported that his plant had only completed 11,890 jackets during June, in contrast to his estimate of 30,000. He recommended to the depot procurement officer a whole series of design simplifications that would speed up production, but the Military Planning Division, OQMG, disapproved all changes. On 7 July the PQMD reported contracts for 4,064,500 jackets for 1944 delivery, but the contracts carried no penalties for late delivery, and it was estimated that only 60 percent would be delivered by the end of the year. This was the very day that Littlejohn requisitioned 479,000 old style olive drab field jackets, having established that this was the total number still available. The original plan to provide olive drab jackets until wool jackets became available was no longer feasible, but the full seriousness of the situation was not yet clearly understood either in the OQMG or in ASF headquarters. On 21 July Littlejohn, determined to place his legitimate needs on record, submitted a formal requisition for 3,650,000 wool jackets, and on 4 August Somervell replied that 2,600,000 jackets would probably be the maximum number available in 1944, but possibly the additional 1,050,000 requested could be supplied in January 1945. By contrast, on 15 August the Director of Procurement, ASF, stated that the latest OQMG estimate of jacket production in 1944 was 5,135,000 based
on imposition of mandatory orders, authorization of overtime payments to workers, and full mobilization of local Manpower Priority Committees to aid the program. But procurement specialists at PQMD were pessimistic regarding both mandatory orders and the labor situation. Three days later they gave the gloomiest forecast yet: although contracts for 4,738,545 jackets had now been awarded, only 2,327,890 would be forthcoming by the end of the year. Apparently Littlejohn’s sources of unofficial information were both speedy and accurate, for on 4 September he wrote to Gregory that he had heard “a series of rumors which have made me somewhat disturbed. These rumors are persistent and consistent. They deal with delayed production on the E.T.O. Uniform.”115 The Chief Quartermaster requested that he be informed weekly regarding deliveries of jackets. The first such report confirmed his worst fears. On 1 September there were 56,400 jackets in QM depots and his share, 47,000, was now being shipped. Deliveries for September were estimated at 300,000, of which he would receive 250,000, or exactly half the number promised to him. Actual production at the year’s end was 3,073,581 jackets, or about 89 percent of commitments to the European and Mediterranean theaters, but quantity production started so late that 1944 receipts in the ETO were only 37 percent of requirements.116
Faced with the shortages announced in the cable of 7 September, Littlejohn promptly inquired about possible substitutes, and without even awaiting an answer included 600,000 serge coats on his 18 September requisition. On Requisition K-94 this was increased to 1,050,000, an amount equal to the reported shortage of wool jackets. The same requisition included a requirement for 1,500,000 olive drab jackets, which was apparently filed to establish a priority demand for all available quantities of this item. On 12 October, Colonel Evans reported that 457,741 arctic field jackets, 245,239 olive drab jackets, and 797,020 serge coats were being shipped against the K-94 requisition.117 But by late October the armies had reported that the serge coat was not acceptable for combat, even as a substitute, and M1943 jackets were requested instead. Competition with the wool jacket in the restricted labor market had reduced production of M1943 jackets, and the latter were 626,000 behind schedule at the end of October. The shortage was serious, because this was now a mandatory item in all temperate areas throughout the world. It was even being issued to troops on movement orders to the tropics for their comfort en route, so that a radical revision of issue directives
was necessary before stocks could be made available to the ETO. The exact number of M1943 jackets sent to the European theater is unknown. Total shipments of this item and various substitutes (not including the wool jacket) were 3,451,000 by 31 December 1944, but only 1,510,000 had actually been received into continental depots.118
Littlejohn’s unwillingness to accept the M1943 jacket, and his preference for the olive drab jacket, the arctic jacket, the winter combat jacket, and the pile jacket have been severely criticized, more especially since he objected to the M1943 as a complicating factor in supply. Littlejohn’s explanation was that these various items were functionally interchangeable—all of them would fit under an overcoat, whereas the M1943 jacket was intended primarily to be an outer garment. It was wind-resistant and fairly water-repellent (though the ETO Quartermaster noted deficiencies in this respect), but of very meager usefulness in adding warmth under an overcoat. And yet, as the situation was developing, the M1943 jacket would have to be worn under an overcoat; the M1943 jacket and sweater combination, without the wool jacket to give extra warmth, was definitely inadequate for the European climate. Unfortunately, many soldiers failed to understand this, and turned in their olive drab field jackets as excess after being issued M1943 jackets.119
Actual receipts of the wool field jacket in the ETO were so slow that the prevailing idea in the theater was that this was an item intended primarily for officers. After Littlejohn returned from his April visit to the United States, hardly a day passed when he did not receive a request from some general officer who wanted the new uniform for himself and his staff. On 8 June (D plus 2) he wrote to Feldman:
... to occupy Paris properly it will be necessary that we have some of the new field jackets to wear. Frankly, since it was approved I am being bombarded from every angle. I would greatly appreciate getting 5,000 according to tariff sizes ... at an early date. If I can get the high commanders and their staffs off my neck I will lock the door to the others.120
“Locking the door” was notably unsuccessful, and on 8 July Littlejohn requisitioned 100,000 wool jackets and 200,000 pairs of matching trousers specifically for officers, although they were to be of the enlisted design. This request was disapproved, the jackets because the 2,600,000 already promised were the maximum that could be manufactured, and the trousers because they were considered by G-4 to be a nonstandard and unauthorized item. Subsequently, on 26 September, the QMC Technical Committee recommended that the color of enlisted men’s trousers be changed from olive drab shade 32 (light) to olive drab shade 33 (dark) after
stocks were exhausted. This committee action opened the way for local manufacture of trousers in Europe from dark-colored serge. Littlejohn had already made plans for such production in both the United Kingdom and France, and expediting deliveries of cloth for manufacture of trousers, nontariff uniforms, and officers’ clothing was one of the chores that Brumbaugh performed while in the United States. The requirement for cloth was increased to four and a half million yards on Requisition K-94.121
The new ETO uniform remained in very short supply all through 1944. At the end of September 12,000 jackets were offshore waiting to be unloaded, but none of American origin had been received at the depots. Littlejohn had found that the locally procured jackets were coveted prestige items. On 14 August he had warned Colonel Duncan, his acting deputy in the United Kingdom, that when these uniforms finally arrived from the United States, they were to be stored under guard at Bristol until required on the Continent. Otherwise, in the current rapidly moving situation “the jackets would get into the distribution channels and we would have a terrible mess on our hands.” Ten days later, having heard rumors of delayed deliveries from the zone of interior, he repeated these instructions and added, “I definitely do not want the new type jackets put into the pipeline of supply until we are ready to equip a substantial portion of the Army with them.”122 By the end of October there were still only 160,000 jackets in stock, though the OCQM was seeking discharge priorities to unload 260,000 more. General Lee directed that the first issues were to be made to the troops in the combat zone. That added another complication, for the wool jacket was a difficult garment to fit correctly, and only a limited number of trained depot personnel was available. Definitely, all combat units could not be fitted out at once, and any system of priorities would lead to invidious comparisons. Littlejohn therefore decided not to issue any jackets to enlisted men until the new year. He estimated that it would be April before he could supply any large number of troops. Early in January 1945 all the army commanders decided to await the end of hostilities before issuing the ETO uniform. By the end, of the month, 1,330,000 jackets had been received in the ETO, but except for equipping enlisted men going to the United States on furlough, and a small number used in tests, no ETO jackets were issued to the troops until after V-E Day.123 Presumably, if the wool jacket had arrived earlier, it would have been adopted as a winter combat item. Warm winter clothing was at a premium, and the
Contrasting Jackets. General Eisenhower, wearing the tailored “Ike Jacket” and high-cut tailored trousers, with Generals Marshall and Bradley wearing the standard ETO jacket and trousers.
variety of garments being worn proves that nothing wearable was rejected by the troops. Whether it would have been as practical and popular as anticipated is another matter. The fact that in the Mediterranean theater this uniform was used only in rest areas and on leave is not conclusive evidence that troops in the ETO would have adopted similar practices. Warfare in Italy was static during the winter of 1944–45, and units had no difficulty in maintaining a reserve of clean clothing to insure that their members could pass inspection and therefore were eligible to visit leave areas. Under conditions of more active combat, such as prevailed in the ETO, a field uniform that could be transformed quickly into a Class A uniform had real advantages. But, unlike the British jacket, the ETO jacket was a compromise and not a completely dual purpose garment. To be a practical combat item it had to be fitted loose and rather long when worn with old style low-cut trousers. On the other hand, to look well it had to be shortened and tightly fitted, but then it ceased to be a combat item. When ETO jackets were issued in Germany after the end of hostilities, teams of specially trained tailors were sent out to fit them as combat garments, but encountered a good deal of resistance from the troops. The notion that a garrison uniform must be a tight fit seems to be deeply ingrained in the U.S. Army.124
Littlejohn’s original concept of how to handle special cold-climate clothing was very similar to his ideas on the ETO field uniform—on arrival it should be held at a depot near a port in the United Kingdom to be called forward when needed. At the end of September it had been agreed that the allocation to the separate armies would be made by the Commanding General, 12th Army Group, on advice from his quartermaster, Colonel Younger. This clothing was originally scheduled to arrive in the ETO in September and October, but War Department approval was not immediately forthcoming despite the assurances of General Feldman, and shipment from the west coast, where the arctic reserve was located, also caused
QM issue point at Mannheim, Germany. Sign tacked to table reads: “Don’t fit your ETO jacket skin tight.” January 1946.
delay. Because the shipping tie-up might cause still further delay within the theater, the OCQM requested on 12 October that all these special items be placed on a single ship so that it would be possible to get them ashore promptly, and control storage and issue. But this was not feasible, since they were already arriving at three different east coast ports. The best that Colonel Evans could offer was shipment on three ships, and even that degree of concentration was not achieved. The OCQM hoped for the best, but inevitably discharge would be slowed up. In directing that stocks were to be accumulated at Reims, a depot that was just beginning to operate, Littlejohn clearly anticipated that deliveries would not be completed for some time. Strict control was very necessary. On 31 October he wrote to Gregory: “Due to advertising in this theater by representatives of the OQMG I am flooded by requisitions from the field for these items. Publicity and good will has sold the idea that stocks in the U.S. are unlimited.”125
On 12 December COMZ headquarters officially informed the 12th Army Group that over 90 percent of the special clothing was in ETO waters awaiting unloading, and could be distributed by the end of the month if suitable discharge and transportation priorities were provided. It was recommended that issues be confined to divisional troops, and specifically to rifle, heavy weapons, combat engineer, and reconnaissance units, since these categories of personnel were most often subjected to prolonged exposure. The total of such personnel in fifty-one divisions (the estimated strength of 12th Army Group on 1 March 1945) was computed as 282,388 men, a number amply provided for by the quantities on requisition.126
In reply, 12th Army Group stated that the above data had been passed on to the armies for their information, but that “It is the policy of this Headquarters to permit Army Commanders to use their own discretion in the matter of equipping troops of their commands in accordance with the tactical situation.”127 This disagreement over the equipment of troops was made irrelevant by the German Ardennes counteroffensive, already under way. Class II and IV supplies were excepted from the embargo placed on outmovements from the ports, but in actual practice Rouen, and especially Antwerp, were soon so clogged that any selective forwarding became almost hopeless. More than a month elapsed before improvement was possible. By 3 January no issues had been made, and the army group had decided that allocations were to be in the proportion of 33 percent to First Army, 35 percent to Third Army, and 18 percent to Ninth Army; the balance was to be held by the army group headquarters for future allocation. It recommended that detailed instructions on the fitting and use of the new items be forwarded to each army direct through technical channels.128
Issues of cold climate clothing actually began on 11 January. Six days later, Littlejohn sent identical letters to Colonel Younger and each army quartermaster, warning that no further supplies of these items would be available for about sixty days. He recognized the responsibility of commanders for distribution of special winter clothing, but submitted again as suggestions, based on the experience of quartermasters in other theaters, the same recommendations regarding priorities that had been forwarded through command channels on 12 December. More important, he transmitted with his letter multiple copies of a mimeographed publication called “Quartermaster Tips #1.” This was nine pages of detailed instructions on the purpose, correct fitting, and best methods of wearing, drying, and caring for the new winter clothing. In particular, “Quartermaster Tips” explained the advantages and disadvantages of the shoepac; while warmer, lighter, and dryer than the combat boot, or even an arctic over a combat boot, it induced sweating and required frequent changes of socks and insoles. To prevent “shoepac foot,” or maceration, proper fitting of socks, insoles, and shoepacs was particularly important, but also very difficult because two types of shoepacs were being issued—those 12 inches high were on a military last, while the 16-inch model was in varying commercial lasts, most of them smaller than the military type for the same numerical size. Shoepacs were available in only one width.129
On 30 January Littlejohn wrote to Colonel Bowden, the distribution specialist whom lie had installed—over considerable opposition from the Transportation Corps—as Port Quartermaster, Antwerp: “I got General Ross to issue
Table 20: Issues of Special Winter Clothing
Issues to the Armies, 7 February 1945
Total Issues and Stock Position, 28 February 1945
| Item | First Army | Third Army | Ninth Army | Fifteenth Army | Total Issues to Armies, 17 Feb 45 | Total Issues to ETO a 1944–28 Feb 45 | In Depots 28 Feb 45 | On Ships Offshore 28 Feb 45 |
| Cap, field, cotton | 125,992 | 94,261 | 60,921 | 5,924 | 287,098 | a 2,500,000 | 3,250,000 | 350,000 |
| Insoles, pair | 165,348 | 151,811 | 93,365 | 17,867 | 428,391 | 485,000 | 50,000 | 550,000 |
| Mitten inserts, pair | 336,650 | 252,363 | 165,052 | 60,934 | 814,999 | 875,000 | 295,000 | 220,000 |
| Mitten shells, pair | 189,013 | 159,200 | 101,308 | 47,795 | 497,316 | 535,000 | 158,000 | 27,000 |
| Muffler, wool | 134,372 | 155,928 | 73,280 | 31,844 | 395,424 | 850,000 | 300,000 | 100,000 |
| Poncho, nylon | 59,107 | b 5,005 | 35,855 | 11,800 | (c) | c 380,000 | 100,000 | 50,000 |
| Poncho, raincoat | 106,915 | b 2,400 | 59,048 | 23,675 | 303,805 | |||
| Shoepacs, high d | 69,077 | 76,008 | 40,124 | 14,757 | (c) | d 422,000 | 75,000 | d 237,000 |
| Shoepacs, low d | 66,177 | 76,649 | 30,047 | 9,911 | 382,750 | |||
| Socks, arctic | 203,163 | 173,994 | 118,129 | 8,549 | (c) | c 970,000 | 200,000 | 780,000 |
| Socks, ski | 165,858 | 169,950 | 99,098 | 13,553 | 952,294 | |||
| Trousers, field, cotton | 132,316 | 117,626 | 80,094 | 13,741 | e 343,777 | 73,000 | 355,000 | 145,000 |
a ETO less SOLOC.
b 200.000 British ground sheets issued as substitutes
c Total for both types..
d Both were nonstandard types; ETO total includes s;,000 standard military 12" shoepacs: reserves also include some of this type
e These totals include substitute items.
Source: Issues to Armies from QM Supply in ETO, III, 167. Total issues and stock position from Garside Rpt, app. K.
orders to the Port to select out the cold climate clothing. ... You have most of my critical items lying on your piers. These must be sorted out and delivered direct to the Armies.”130 By mid-February, initial distribution of special winter clothing to the armies was virtually completed. (Table 20)
To a large extent, the special cold climate clothing and equipment arrived in the ETO too late to be really useful during the coldest winter months. The OQMG contended that the primary reason for this was the lateness of the major ETO requisition—J-48 dated 15 August 1944. Littlejohn did not agree. The distinction which he made between requirements and requisitions, although it had been approved by General Somervell and was readily comprehended by Feldman and Evans, was never clearly understood within the OQMG. The inquiries that Colonel Brumbaugh had made regarding availabilities in early July were not regarded as official, nor as announcing a firm requirement. Nevertheless, the OQMG cabled assurance on 3 September that the whole of this special requisition, excepting ponchos, could be made available to NYPE by the last day of that month. This proved to be overoptimistic, since some articles had to be drawn from depots as far away as Seattle, and others could only be supplied from current production after being released by the War Department. Most of J-48 was actually shipped during the last half of November.131
Littlejohn found that requisitions submitted much earlier were subjected to the same treatment of optimistic assurances and subsequent delay. A notable example was the wool sweater, one of the few articles requisitioned on the advice of Captain Pounder. Although NYPE made a commitment in June to provide 3,25(3,000 sweaters by September, that number only became available at the end of January 1945. Even then only 1,775,000 had been issued to the troops; 700,000 more were in transit from the ports, and another 550,000 were aboard ships awaiting discharge. This deficit was especially serious since without a sweater the M1943 jacket did not provide adequate winter protection even in a mild temperate zone.132
Littlejohn had inquired of NYPE regarding availability of sleeping bags on 24 May, and was assured that 2,580,000, complete with water-repellent case, would be available by October. He therefore canceled an outstanding requisition for 1,370,000 blankets. On 14 September he commented rather bitterly to Feldman:
I have before me a table showing assets and requirements on blankets. I have an immediate deficit of between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 blankets, due to the fact that my Equipage Branch was lulled to sleep by Pounder with a promise that sleeping bags would be available in time to supply this Theater. I have just checked my own files and I find that sleeping bags are now promised for delivery here during November and December. The troops want four blankets now. I must have them. Sleeping bags in November and December can be accepted only on a maintenance basis.
Sleeping gear, new type. The wool sleeping bag and its cotton sateen cover replaced two blankets. November 1944.
This was a most unfair aspersion upon Captain Pounder, a junior officer who had visited the ETO as a specialist in clothing research and who had no responsibility for production. Moreover, the commitment on deliveries had been made by NYPE, and not by Captain Pounder. But personalities aside, Littlejohn’s statement aroused an indignant reaction within the OQMG which reveals how completely that headquarters lacked information on the commitments made by NYPE and on the extent to which they were being met. Actually, only 939,000 sleeping bags had been shipped by the end of September, so that deliveries were 54 percent in arrears. Since one sleeping bag with case was the equivalent of two blankets, Littlejohn’s statement was substantially correct.
This episode confirms a lack of coordination between the OQMG and NYPE that can often be inferred from Littlejohn’s correspondence with the OQMG. In this case, while production of sleeping bags was slightly in arrears, the main bottleneck was in the Port of New York. Littlejohn confirmed this view by forwarding to Colonel Evans at NYPE a copy of his letter to Feldman. He warned Evans to expect an official cabled request for one or more commodity-loaded ships to carry blankets and sleeping bags direct to the Continent. This was actually a forewarning regarding Requisition K-94. But because of congestion in European ports and the low discharge priorities given to blankets and sleeping bags, another bottleneck developed within the ETO. At the end of October there were 515,000 blankets and 1,740,000 sleeping bags on ships offshore, awaiting discharge, and a month later the number had actually increased. Littlejohn managed to solve this problem by focusing attention on the current cigarette shortage, an episode that has already been described.133
While some of the delays in delivery of new items could be ascribed to unexpected production difficulties, the ETO also experienced delays in the arrival of well-established standard items. In such cases, the difficulty was almost entirely a matter of transatlantic shipping shortages, and the main cause was
the tie-up of ships awaiting discharge in the ETO. On 19 October Evans wrote to Littlejohn, with regard to deliveries on Requisition K-94:... “there are only so many ships regardless of your requirements, and it appears that those requirements must be cut to fit the ships. ...” What actually happened with regard to wool undershirts and drawers well illustrates the difficulty:134
| Undershirts | Drawers | |
| ETO requested shipment in October | 4,355,000 | 3,967,000 |
| NYPE projected shipping schedule | 3,342,000 | 2,506,000 |
| Actual shipments (October) | 1,506,000 | 1,410,000 |
| Deficit below planned shipment | 1,836,000 | 1,096,000 |
| Deficit below requested shipment | 2,849,000 | 2,557,000 |
In other words, even after pruning the theater’s requests rather severely, NYPE was unable to meet its own schedule.
Footwear and the Trench Foot Problem
As in the Mediterranean theater, the first reaction to the combat boot was very favorable, since the boot would make it possible for the men to discard their hated leggings. ETO troops were delighted with the samples displayed by Captain Pounder, and Littlejohn promptly requested 1,225,000 pairs. But the cuff, which distinguished this item from other footgear, required extra leather, a material in short supply, and it was July 1944 before enough boots arrived in the theater to issue one pair per man to the field forces. Interim needs were filled by supplying the Type III shoe, which lacked the cuff but was otherwise identical with the combat boot. With their flesh-out leather, soft construction, and rubber soles, both items were considered a great technical advance over previous footgear. Very favorable reports were received after tests were made in North Africa, and although there were occasional references to lack of water-repellent qualities, it was believed that the flesh-out leather would absorb a large amount of dubbing, which would correct this weakness. Even the Anzio test report, while stating that the shoepac was preferable for muddy weather, gave the impression that dubbing would increase the water-repellency of combat boots. Many older officers, including Littlejohn, were also influenced by their recollections of the Pershing boot issued during the First World War, a very satisfactory and comparatively watertight item made of flesh-out leather.135 Plans were therefore made before the Normandy landing to issue one pair of combat boots and one pair of Type III shoes to each combat soldier. Service and AAF troops would continue, for the time being, to receive two pairs of service shoes per man. Before winter set in, all ETO troops were to receive combat boots as their footgear required replacement. Before D-day Colonel McNamara, after consulting with his G-3, had stated that First Army would not operate in climatic areas
where overshoes would be needed during the winter of 1944–45. This confirmed tactical forecasts made by SHAEF regarding the duration of OVERLORD. Based on the assumption that the combat boot would give adequate cold weather protection, supply plans provided that only 1,200,000 pairs of arctic overshoes would be required. It was expected that most of these overshoes would be issued to troops who did not have combat boots.136
The plan to issue overshoes only to those without combat boots was one of the most serious miscalculations of the ETO Quartermaster Service during the continental campaign. As early as 1 October, a QM field observer reported that the Type III shoe and combat boot both absorbed more water than the supposedly obsolescent Type II shoe; dubbing reduced insulation against cold, but did not shed water to any noticeable degree. Two days later, when Littlejohn was making plans to bring over 600,000 pairs of combat boots from the United Kingdom to fill deficiencies in overshoes, Lt. Col. McNally, McNamara’s assistant, commented that First Army definitely would not accept combat boots without overshoes. On 5 October, Colonel Muller, the Third Army G-4, urged that COMZ troops be directed to turn in their overshoes for the use of combat divisions. He stated that every combat soldier needed a pair.137
Unfortunately, the need for overshoes did not become evident in time for them to be included in the first winterization program, which was already under way. Lack of overshoes was generally regarded as a major factor contributing to trench foot, and this was particularly true in the early autumn of 1944 before the other contributing factors were clearly understood. Very few cases of trench foot had occurred at the time, but for the week ending 15 October 320 cases were reported in the theater. Incidence increased each week until 17 November, when 5,386 cases were reported. During this period temperatures varied between 40° and 50° F., violent offensive combat was in progress, and rainfall was unseasonably heavy. This was the largest weekly number of cases during the entire European campaign, but two smaller peaks of incidence, in late December and again in mid-January, both coincided with periods of maximum combat activity. In these last two instances, statistics for frostbite and trench foot were combined, since it was often impossible to distinguish between the two forms of injury. Whether the tissues were injured directly by freezing, or indirectly by stop page of circulation caused by chill above the freezing point, the symptoms were almost identical. In all, 44,728 men
were hospitalized for either trench foot or frostbite by the end of April 1945.138
Trench foot was an injury and not a disease, but it created problems similar to those occurring during a major epidemic, severely taxing medical resources. The feet of the affected soldiers swelled painfully, became discolored, and, if neglected, a considerable proportion became gangrenous and required amputation. Proper treatment required evacuation and prolonged hospitalization, and a large percentage of those stricken were unable to return to combat duty. When it is considered that the overwhelming majority of cases occurred among combat infantrymen, who were also subject to some 83 percent of all combat casualties, the extreme seriousness of cold injuries becomes evident.139
Inadequate footgear was only one of many factors contributing to the incidence of trench foot, but it was one the Quartermaster Service might hope to remedy by prompt corrective action. Returning from a visit to the front on 15 November, Littlejohn informed his staff:
Footwear Tariffs: It definitely appears that the footwear tariffs are out of kilter. The troops are requesting overshoes from 9E on up to about 16EEE. This is apparently due to the fact that the overshoe tariff has not been adjusted to the Type III shoe. ...
Combat Boots and Type III Shoes: Due to the wearing of a number of pairs of socks, there are heavy demands for large sizes in combat boots and type 3 shoes. Here again we run from 9’s up to 18’s generally in the E, EE and EEE sizes. This necessitates an immediate adjustment of requisitions on PEMBARK and securing from the UK of all large size shoes. ...
Defects in the Combat Boot: It was my understanding that combat boots were to be issued in lieu of the overshoe and service shoes. The troops at the front ... demand overshoes and state that the combat boot leaks, even when heavily dubbed.140
Since overshoes had been a last-minute addition to the winterization program for the armies, it had proved impossible to supply all that were needed. On 20 September the OCQM requisitioned 500,000 pairs to meet the additional requirements. But the overshoe, like the combat boot it was now to supplement, had certain faults in addition to the difficulty with sizes already described. Because of rubber shortages, a cloth-top overshoe was the standard military type. It tore easily and leaked readily, and many of the overshoes reissued from salvage after being worn in the United Kingdom had never been repaired. Combat infantrymen often found overshoes too heavy and clumsy for an attack, and discarded them. In some units, this was done at the direction of the officers. Few such overshoes were recovered during the pursuit, and maintenance factors soared. Armored units reported that many overshoes were lost when vehicles, especially personnel carriers, were knocked out in combat. The result was inclusion of 1,300,000 pairs on Requisition K-94 to take care of anticipated losses and wear and tear through the end of the calendar year. Littlejohn was convinced that even this quantity was not enough, and made a determined effort to have additional overshoes issued individually to reinforcements at ports
of embarkation. This proposal was at first turned down as a matter of War Department policy, but Littlejohn appealed to General Maxwell, the War Department G-4, and also enlisted the aid of General Hawley, the theater Chief Surgeon.141
Nothing seemed to come of these efforts, and on 2 December he requisitioned another 500,000 pairs of overshoes, a requisition which was promptly approved by ASF. To meet this and other requirements, the OQMG arranged to acquire 700,000 pairs from Navy stocks and to divert another 367,000 pairs from production for the Navy.142 Also on 2 December, Littlejohn officially recommended that all overshoes be withdrawn from headquarters troops in the Paris area. Four days later, all COMZ section commanders were directed to screen their personnel, and insure that overshoes were retained only by COMZ troops who were doing outdoor work in dumps and depots.143
Readjusting the tariff of footwear sizes was no simple matter, since it depended upon accurate inventories. Interim action, to alter the sizes on requisitions already submitted, began as early as 4 November, and by 1 December completely revised winter tariffs for boots and overshoes were sent to NYPE. The OCQM requested that these tariffs be used in filling all requisitions through 15 April 1945, since it was expected that the troops would wear extra socks and require the larger sized shoes and overshoes until that time. On 6 January the OQMG confirmed the correctness of the revisions made in Europe after conducting independent tests of fitting commercial-type overshoes over combat boots and Type III shoes. In theory, an overshoe would fit over a shoe of the same numerical size, but commercial overshoes would not, particularly when fitted over Type III shoes in the broader widths. Each commercial last was slightly different and required a separate fitting table. Apparently no plans had been made to provide for wearing overshoes over combat boots or Type III shoes, and the need for such a procedure had not previously been evident to the Research and Development Branch. New government lasts were being prepared, and production on the revised tariff would begin in February. The new model would be all rubber, a great improvement. Meanwhile, a small number of boots and shoes in the larger sizes were available, but no overshoes in sizes larger than 11, although ETO requisitions demanded sizes as large as 15 on a normal tariff. This situation
was not completely corrected until March 1945.144
Field observers reported that soldiers with large feet, who could not be fitted properly with overshoes, in desperation took smaller sized overshoes and wore them without shoes, but with two pairs of socks and either improvised cardboard innersoles, or felt slippers such as Hollanders wear inside their wooden shoes, or in some cases several thicknesses of blanket. The incidence of trench foot was reduced in all the units that used these and similar improvisations. Medical authorities believed the reason was that all these combinations of footgear made possible free movement of the toes and feet, which improved circulation.145
This observation inevitably leads to a discussion of basic ETO dissatisfaction with both the Type III shoe and the combat boot. Both items were constructed on a last of limited flexibility, which made it virtually impossible to wear more than one pair of light wool socks without constricting the feet and reducing circulation. Americans as a nation tend to wear tight-fitting shoes, and most service shoes when issued had been fitted snugly over a single pair of socks, usually the cotton socks issued to recruits in the United States. Such shoes became dangerously tight when even one pair of heavy socks was worn in cold weather, a condition that was aggravated if the shoes had become wet, for the soft leather tended to shrink in drying. But even issuing a larger size shoe was virtually useless. The low toecap and tight instep of the U.S. Army last limited the number of socks that could be worn. And yet, all European footwear specialists considered several pairs of socks to be desirable in cold weather, always providing they did not make the shoe too tight. Unfortunately, this was impracticable with the last being used at that time.146
Mr. Lawrence B. Sheppard, a technical adviser to the War Production Board (WPB) on shoes and leather, who visited the theater on Littlejohn’s invitation in March 1945, severely criticized the soft-tanning process which caused the leather to shrink when wet, but did not consider the flesh-out construction of the shoe to be significant. He repudiated the theory that a flesh-out construction absorbed dubbing more readily and was therefore superior. For the following winter he recommended a harder tannage and that the leather be reversed to provide a more attractive footgear for reasons of morale. Other experts did not agree with him completely. They argued that, while polished grain-out leather would only shed water for a slightly longer period than dubbed flesh-out leather, wet mud tended to cling longer to the flesh-out surface and continued to soak into the leather even after the wearer had reached dry
ground. Thus a polished grain-out leather had practical as well as psychological advantages. It was agreed that the welted sole construction of all U.S. footwear was less water resistant than the tap-and-screw construction of the British boot, and incidentally of the Pershing boot worn by U.S. troops in the First World War, but the WPB representative declared that a changeover would mean a complete reorganization of the U.S. shoe industry and was therefore not practicable. Mr. Sheppard’s recommendation was for a grain-out combat boot of tightly tanned leather, with a rubber sole. It should have more toe room but no toecap, and the forequarters were to meet over the tongue when properly fitted over a pair of heavy wool socks. One pair of heavy wool socks was considered sufficient.
In winter, all-rubber overshoes were to be worn over this boot. The overshoe tariff should be carefully adjusted to the shoe tariff, and the numerical sizes of overshoes were to be marked so that they would not wear off. This was important, since the tendency of U.S. troops to discard their overshoes in active situations made efficient salvage procedures very necessary. Sheppard believed that troops could wear cushion-sole socks in summer with the same shoes fitted over heavy wool socks in winter, so that seasonal shoe tariffs would be unnecessary. He recommended eliminating both cotton and light wool socks in the ETO to reduce the fitting problem and simplify supply.
All infantry riflemen and troops fighting under similar conditions should wear shoepacs, preferably fitted over two pairs of ski socks, but this was a strictly seasonal item, and should be replaced immediately by combat boots at the beginning of warm weather. Such troops would not require overshoes. Sheppard favored an all-rubber shoepac; it would be drier and more comfortable than the rubber and leather type, easier to manufacture, and would not induce more perspiration. He believed that the issue of shoepacs should be carefully restricted to those who clearly needed them, since they presented the difficult supply problem of providing dry ski socks and felt insoles to troops at regular intervals. Ski socks were difficult to launder properly, since the processes for controlling shrinkage in regular wool socks had not been successfully applied to them.
Sheppard also doubted that even the improved shoepac, with built-up heel and firm arch support, was suitable for continued long marches. Since the combat boot and overshoe combination was too heavy for this purpose, the problem of acceptable footgear for continuous marching in cold, wet weather had not been solved even at the end of World War II. Sheppard recognized the problem, and recommended a long-range effort in research and development.147
Medical officers agreed with these views, but placed even greater emphasis on the dangers of constriction. They favored the combat hoot because it eliminated the legging, which was often too tightly laced. Without leggings it was also easier for the soldier to remove
his footwear and give proper care to his feet. Medical officers were of the opinion that ability to maintain circulation, preferably by exercise, but alternatively by massage or even by stamping the feet or wiggling the toes inside roomy footgear, was the all-important factor in preventing trench foot. Water-repellency and insulation against cold were of only secondary importance. These views were officially disseminated in the ETO in a War Department circular and a War Department technical bulletin, and repeated in circulars and memorandums of 12th Army Group and of the individual armies in September and October 1944, but apparently the true importance of preventive measures was not made clear. Even a forceful and characteristic letter from General Patton to his unit commanders apparently had little effect. On 25 November General Hawley wrote to the 12th Army Group surgeon:
I am not sure that the Medical Department has been aggressive enough in this situation. We have published long dissertations on the prevention of trench foot which are too long for anyone to read. Furthermore they lay down so many requirements that, unless the soldier can fulfill all of them, he does nothing. Apparently no one has ever told the small unit commander that the very essence of the prevention of trench foot is the prevention of stagnation of circulation for periods greater than 24 hours.
General Hawley went on to give a personal opinion: if the soldier’s shoes were removed once every 24 hours, if the feet were massaged briskly, preferably while they were higher than the hips, and if the water was wrung out of wet socks before they were replaced, cold injury could be prevented in 75 percent of all cases.148
Whatever the merits of General Hawley’s opinions, combat units were inclined to find a solution to the trench foot problem along less heroic lines. Issues of socks were increased, and many units arranged to have them sent forward daily with the rations. In particular, there was a widespread demand for shoepacs, in addition to those already allocated to rifle, combat engineer, and reconnaissance units. As Littlejohn had remarked to Gregory in October, publicity had sold the idea that stocks in the United States were unlimited. Moreover, the 12th Army Group had virtually rejected the recommendation of COMZ that the shoepac be reserved exclusively for dismounted combat troops. A distinction between combat and service troops for equipment purposes was universally recognized in the theater. Priorities for divisional troops over those attached to corps or armies had proved to be necessary in October when short supplies of normal winter clothing were being distributed. But there was reluctance to accept priorities that cut across the organization of a division, or even of a single regiment. Senior commanders therefore approved the requests from combat support units for a wider distribution of shoepacs, and on 8 December Littlejohn initiated an official
cable requesting an additional 500,000 pairs. The reply, citing expert opinion in the OQMG and the Surgeon General’s Office, requested that he reconsider this requisition, since a properly fitting service shoe or combat boot and arctic overshoe was regarded as the most satisfactory combination for the ETO. To fill this requisition would require depletion of all reserves and taking over of the entire U.S. shoe industry. It was further stated that Mediterranean experience indicated soldiers were unwilling to wear shoepacs regularly, since they were awkward and subjected the wearer’s feet to abrasion at the heel. The cable went on:
It is recognized, however, that the shoepac is the best article for unusual wet and cold conditions where the soldier is required to stand in water continuously. 446,000 shoepacs issued to your Theater plus approximately 90,000 issued to units in SOLOC prior to embarkation should provide adequately for any specialized operations for which the shoepac may be deemed suitable. The Surgeon General stated that trench foot cases can be reduced or eliminated only by rigid compliance with the provisions set forth in WD Cir 312, 1944, and Technical Med Bull No. 81, 4 Aug 44. Issue of the shoepac will not alleviate this problem.149
Littlejohn nevertheless repeated his request on 23 December, pointing out that climatic conditions were extraordinary, that all combat troops were operating continuously ankle-deep in mud, and that the shoepac was the only mechanical aid that contributed substantially to the prevention of trench foot. It should be noted that this opinion was based entirely upon reports from other theaters—no shoepacs had been issued to troops supported by COMZ at this time. Moreover, SOLOC, where shoepacs had been issued to the infantry of Seventh Army in mid-November, did not officially become part of COMZ until 12 February 1945, and even thereafter coordination of technical channels developed gradually. Since compliance with the ETO requisition would deplete the arctic reserve, the matter was referred to the Operations Division, War Department General Staff, which decided that the ETO requisition should be filled.150
Although the cable of 23 December had specified that shoepacs should only be sent if they would arrive by 15 February, none had actually been unloaded from ships by that date, and only a very small number from this second requisition was ever issued to ETO troops. Meanwhile on 11 February the G-4, Third Army, had decided to revert back to the overshoe-combat boot combination. The weather had turned rather warm, and men were beginning to suffer from “shoepac foot” due to excessive perspiration. Extra felt soles and ski socks to correct this were in very short supply. Moreover, Third Army complained that shoepacs leaked around the seams where rubber and leather met. Undoubtedly an improvement in the supply of overshoes contributed to this
decision. On 21 January Third Army was short 58,000 pairs, but by 13 February this entire requisition, including the scarce large sizes, had been filled. Apparently demands for shoepacs from the other armies were reduced at the same time, for on 16 February Littlejohn was seriously considering storing the shoepacs still on the water awaiting discharge, instead of issuing them. Meanwhile the repeated demands of Littlejohn and Hawley had finally modified policy at NYPE regarding footwear for replacements. Beginning on 13 January, all troops were issued overshoes before embarking for the ETO.151
These developments took on added significance when Littlejohn and Hawley began to receive supply and medical reports from Seventh Army, after the ETO logistical reorganization of 12 February. It will be recalled that Seventh Army received shoepacs in mid-November, about sixty days earlier than other ETO troops, but the number of trench foot cases reported from that headquarters, which commanded several veteran divisions transferred from Italy, was not significantly different from the average for the whole theater. The Chief Quartermaster and Chief Surgeon became convinced that their earlier official statements on the necessity for shoepacs should be corrected, and cabled to Somervell that “the character of footwear is by no means the most important factor in trenchfoot. In fact, insofar as types of footwear yet developed for the Army is concerned, the evidence thus far is that there is little to choose between them.”152 They recommended basic research on the causes of trench foot, pointing out that climate and terrain, tactical situation, troop rotation, combat experience, equipment, and above all foot discipline, had a bearing upon the problem. It should be noted that the U.S. Forces, European Theater, General Board later confirmed these views. In particular, the board agreed that the most important controllable factor in trench foot was individual care of the feet—what Littlejohn and Hawley called foot discipline.153
This was a lesson that the ETO learned only slowly, and by painful degrees. By early December the trench foot rate was considerably reduced. Higher headquarters had initiated various helpful measures. For example one extra tent with a stove, per company or battery, was authorized to dry clothing and warm men. Some divisions organized regimental showers, and dry socks were made available at most divisional shower points. But then came the German counterattack in the Ardennes, and General Hawley’s doubts about the effectiveness of the measures already taken against trench foot were confirmed. In First Army, hardest hit by the German attack, rates were higher than in November. Replacements, who were needed
in mounting numbers as casualties increased, presented a particular problem. They were pushed through the depots at top speed, sometimes arriving in the divisions without proper equipment, and almost invariably without proper indoctrination on cold injuries. Medical observers with all the armies, meeting at Paris in mid-January, decided that proper preventive measures had been formulated, and were even well known in the higher headquarters. What was now required was to disseminate and enforce them, especially at company, platoon, and squad levels. On their recommendation, a theater directive for that purpose was published on 30 January, setting up trench foot control teams in each army, consisting of one line officer and one quartermaster officer. The efforts of these teams were supplemented by a wide use of pamphlets, posters, newspapers, and the radio. By the time this program became fully operational weather conditions were improving, German resistance was deteriorating, and the trench foot rate was dropping rapidly toward zero. Nevertheless, it was believed that the correct approach had been found.154
The efficiency of such measures, enforced by discipline and made a command responsibility at all levels, was demonstrated by the British experience in both world wars. Having suffered nearly 100,000 casualties from this source in 1914–15, the British armies in France and Flanders instituted a rigorous program of daily foot inspection and exercise or massage, and only 443 cases were hospitalized for trench foot during 1916–18. In World War II the British record in France was even better—only 206 hospitalized cases of trench foot. It should be noted that the British did not report minor cases treated in quarters, but this was merely one in a long list of differences between British and American practices and experiences in the field that make a direct comparison impossible. About the only definite statement to be made is that the lesser incidence of cold injury in the British armies was not due to any special or unusual type of footwear. The British service shoe (called by the British a boot) had a high toecap and long forequarters, so that it could not be laced too tight over the instep, even when worn with several pairs of socks. Its heavy tap-and-screw sole was watertight but stiff and inflexible, and U.S. troops found it fatiguing to march in. Nevertheless, it was an excellent and very versatile item. The British issued no other footgear to individuals; they used neither shoepacs nor overshoes. For very wet conditions, British units maintained a small reserve of rubber boots as organizational clothing.155
Possibly of even greater importance was a consistent British policy of rotating personnel between the front lines and reserve areas, preferably relieving battalions or companies in winter after not more than 48 hours of combat. The
British termed this “man-management,” and taught it to all officers as a matter of basic military doctrine. Naturally, such relief was not always possible, but the First Canadian and Second British Armies both reported increased incidence of trench foot after seventy-two hours or more in the line. No consistent and uniform rotation policy was practiced in the U.S. Army. Lt. Col. Mason Ladd, who investigated the entire trench foot problem for The Surgeon General, commented that the “objective-mindedness” of American commanders was a major cause of the higher American rate for all types of casualties, including trench foot. In this connection, it might be noted that the statement already made, that trench foot casualties tend to be proportionate to the total casualty rate, applies also to the British. During the period of the worst U.S. trench foot casualties, 21 Army Group fought a holding operation in sandy, well-drained terrain on a relatively narrow front, and its total casualty rate was low. The U.S. Ninth Army, engaged in an adjacent area and for a time under British command, had similar low casualty rates.156
By contrast, the First, Third, and Seventh U.S. Armies were making an aggressive attack on a wide front, in areas characterized by open terrain with little shelter, muddy river valleys, much snow on high ground, and a harsher climate than the coastal area. Tactical considerations often made rotation or relief of units impossible for weeks on end. When not actually advancing, the troops were often pinned down by enemy fire in water-filled foxholes. In such fighting, the Germans had a distinct advantage. Enemy statistics are not available but medical observers who examined prisoners were of the opinion that the Germans suffered very little from trench foot in November and early December, when the Americans were advancing, but considerably more during their own Ardennes counteroffensive.157
Meanwhile, strained transportation facilities operating over extended supply lines were taxed to the utmost to provide the advancing armies with gasoline, ammunition, and operational rations. The Transportation Corps did not have an opportunity to bring up the kitchen-prepared rations that contributed to good circulation, or to build up adequate stocks of winter clothing in the forward areas. An exhaustive report prepared by The Surgeon General’s Office, after enumerating the multiplicity of factors contributing to the trench foot crisis, concluded that “under the type of warfare and the conditions experienced
last winter in the ETO by the American Armies, trenchfoot in substantial amount is believed to have been an unavoidable hazard of war.”158
Press and Congressional Reaction
The trench foot problem in the ETO and other allied problems regarding adequate winter clothing and equipment were the subject of intense public interest in the United States. COMZ headquarters and all the technical services gave newsmen working in the theater full cooperation and as much information as military security permitted. With some exceptions the material the reporters sent home was accurate, but usually all the factors involved in even an isolated episode were too complex for inclusion in a news story. Their natural interest in the fate of individuals made them ignore, or even contradict, the presentation of the “big picture” as divulged by higher headquarters. Certainly, the public was not reassured about the supply situation in Europe by a headline that declared: “GI’s Seen Poorly Clad and Freezing; Eisenhower Admits ‘Isolated Cases.’” Similar headlines were rather frequent in the American press in the late winter of 1945. An official inquiry from the War Department to Somervell, who was in Europe at the end of January, brought a reply from Eisenhower with Somervell’s concurrence describing the clothing supply situation in detail. At the time, about 66 percent of the items listed in Table 20 had already been issued, and except for extra-large size overshoes, there were no shortages among line troops. The cable further stated:
Disagreement among individual soldiers as well as Army commanders on relative value of various types of field jackets, socks, and footwear could easily lead to impression that troops are not well clothed. Knit gloves with leather palm are not entirely satisfactory in wet snow, because front line soldiers have no means of drying them. Every effort is being made to substitute wool mittens with removable leather shells. ... Every soldier had been issued a wool overcoat. However a too prevalent tendency exists on the part of some front line soldiers to discard heavy clothing, particularly overcoats and overshoes, during fast moving action, and this loss reached considerable proportions at times. Salvage of discarded equipment is being energetically pursued, and positive efforts to enforce supply discipline. ... It is not intended however, to imply that instances do not occur where individuals or units reach the front without the proper clothing and equipment. A case of this kind occurred just recently ... regarding Engineer Combat Battalions ... immediate action was taken to fill shortages ... place responsibility for such supply failure to prevent recurrence, and disciplinary action taken where indicated.159
Eisenhower also noted that the trench foot situation was not as severe as in November, and that the few cases of colds and pneumonia reported were
among headquarters troops, not at the front. The Secretary of War considered this information so important that he personally gave it to the press the same day it was received.160
Meanwhile Congress was also taking an interest in the situation. Soldiers with various complaints, notably those who lacked large-size overshoes or heavyweight socks, wrote to the editors of Stars and Stripes, to their parents, or to various veterans’ organizations. Such letters found their way to Congress, which very naturally demanded explanations from The Quartermaster General’s Office. The standard reply, that deliveries from the United States had been adequate and that these were theater problems of transportation and distribution, apparently failed to satisfy either the congressmen’s constituents or the press. It should be noted that staff officers in the OQMG and those in the ETO Chief Quartermaster’s office both disagreed with this official version. Each group was well aware that deliveries had not been adequate, but each was inclined to place the blame upon the other party. One newsman, who had obtained a rather inaccurate and extremely partisan version of this controversy from individuals in The Quartermaster General’s Office, wrote a story that appeared in the Washington Post on 18 February, charging General Littlejohn with negligence through failure to requisition winter clothing early enough and in sufficient quantities. The reporter claimed that his information came from “the most qualified sources in Washington.” It should be noted that Generals Gregory and Feldman were on a tour of the Pacific theaters when this article appeared. Capt. Donald Craig, the Technical Information Officer of the OQMG, had recommended against its release for publication, but his advice was ignored.161
The Washington Post article stated in substance that every item originated by the Research and Development Branch, OQMG, was “vastly superior” or even “ideal,” and that sufficient quantities could have been made available to equip a million combat soldiers, if requisitions had not been delayed. Moreover it implied that by February 1945 these articles were available in unlimited quantities and were currently being supplied to every combat soldier and every replacement. In support of this thesis, it gave incorrect requisition dates for several important items, and made no reference whatever to the nonconcurrence of G-4 and Army Service Forces, or to production difficulties, or to the OQMG’s repeated failure to fulfill delivery commitments. These omissions left the impression that the ETO did not requisition sleeping bags or Eisenhower jackets until September 1944 and that the theater, rather than the War Department, determined maintenance factors. Littlejohn was of the opinion that the article, and also the brochure
prepared for Gregory and submitted to General Somervell on 5 January, were part of a malicious campaign to discredit the ETO Communications Zone, and in particular an attack upon himself. Having offered his resignation to General Eisenhower, who emphatically refused to accept it, Littlejohn brought the whole matter officially to the attention of General Somervell on 2 March 1945.162
An Official Evaluation
General Somervell directed Brig. Gen. Albert J. Browning, Assistant Director of Materiel, ASF, to investigate Little-john’s charges, and the actual investigation was conducted by a five-man committee, headed by Col. Charles Garside, General Staff Corps, a New York attorney then on duty with the Purchases Division, ASF. The committee report, submitted on 16 May 1945, dealt solely with the supply of clothing to the ETO. It covered the subject with great thoroughness, but it is unfortunate that a committee invested with sweeping powers to investigate so important a subject did not go further afield and provide constructive criticism of a more useful nature. The report disclosed no evidence of major inadequacies of regular clothing. It exonerated General Littlejohn of any blame regarding tardy requisitions and General Gregory likewise of blame regarding tardy deliveries of winter clothing. It stated that while ETO requirements increased suddenly in the latter part of 1944, and far beyond the anticipation of either the Chief Quartermaster, ETO, or The Quartermaster General, the reasons were primarily tactical and cast no discredit on anyone. Every effort was made to meet these requirements as speedily as possible, and for such delay as attended those efforts the primary reasons were, again, tactical. Nevertheless TQMG and NYPE succeeded in filling most of these requirements substantially as requested. Items of regular clothing, with the exception of overshoes, were supplied to the troops abundantly and on time. The impact upon zone of interior stocks was tremendous, resulting in depletion of stocks, curtailment of zone of interior issues, and necessity for initiation of new procurement.163
The report carefully distinguished between regular clothing and special cold climate clothing. With regard to the latter, it noted differences of opinion with respect to the merits of particular items, but declared such differences to be entirely honest and proper. In support of this statement, it pointed to similar differences of opinion among the using armies. At this point the report itself is open to criticism, since an “honest and proper” but long-standing controversy between two headquarters almost invariably points to a lack of clear policy decisions at the next higher level. That observation can be made even more forcibly regarding another finding of the committee: It stated that a major reason
for nonavailability of cold climate items was a policy “which had precluded broader inclusion of indefinite or potential requirements for these items in the Army Supply Program.” This appears to be a fairly definite indictment of ASF, which was clearly responsible for that program and failed to make a firm decision. In staff planning even a wrong decision is seldom as bad as no decision, and this is particularly true in controversial cases where, almost inevitably, a minority opinion will declare any decision to be the wrong one.164
Apart from the somewhat narrow findings and conclusions already mentioned, the Garside Report included thirty-four detailed studies, each covering an item of regular clothing, cold climate clothing, or sleeping gear, and giving all available data on requisitions, production, shipment to the ETO, depot stocks, and issues to troops for the period January 1944 to February 1945. More important than the Garside Report itself were various subsidiary reports prepared at the direction of the investigating committee, or made available to the committee and used as source material. It might be added that there was at least one voice in disagreement with the findings of the Garside Report. Reviewing the report for General Somervell, Maj. Gen. Clinton F. Robinson, director of the Control Division, ASF, criticized the administrative procedures of the ETO Quartermaster, noting that requisitions were sometimes improperly forwarded, and shipping schedules in some instances improperly prepared. This apparently referred to teletyped requisitions, which were not always confirmed promptly by formal written requisitions, and occasional incorrect citation of tonnage authorizations. Robinson also found that the ETO had not requisitioned sufficiently far in advance to insure prompt supply, but this observation was considerably weakened by an admission in the same paragraph that “stocks were adequate and once releases were obtained shipments moved forward at a rapid rate.”165 It might be inferred that the ASF, which was responsible for such releases, was itself too deeply implicated in what appeared to be a controversy between OQMG and the ETO Quartermaster to render a completely impartial judgment. Certainly if blame for oversights is to be apportioned according to the perfection of staff paperwork, a zone of interior agency will always be able to prove an overseas headquarters at fault. As Colonel Garside observed: “Planning in Washington took on a kind of perfection which could never be attained in the supply of vast armies in the field.”166 But the important facts are that the armies were
indeed vast, and that they were supplied, despite all the difficulties. In the final analysis, the occasional misunderstandings and bad-tempered disputes that were carried on across the Atlantic were of very minor importance when compared to the obstacles presented by production bottlenecks, shipping tie-ups, low priorities, and deficits in discharge and forwarding capacity within the theater. These were the real difficulties in supplying clothing to the troops. That they were usually overcome constituted a commendable performance in which the entire Quartermaster Corps could take legitimate pride.