Chapter 17: Other Class II and IV Items
The Winter Clothing Conference and the 1945–46 Winter Uniform
On 29 January 1945, twenty-five of the top ranking quartermasters in the ETO assembled in Littlejohn’s office. They were there at the Chief Quartermaster’s invitation to pool their opinions and, if possible, to reach agreement on a winter combat uniform for the year 1945–46. Despite all of the thought that had gone into the development of a simple winter uniform during the past three years, both in the theater and in the zone of interior, seventy different basic clothing items were still being worn in the spring of 1945. To explore the possible remedies, a conference had been planned for the previous December, but had to be postponed because of the enemy’s counteroffensive in the Ardennes. As Littlejohn stated in his opening remarks, their meeting was to enable each representative
... of a major unit [to] express the official opinion of this unit in order that we may determine what is needed, where it is needed and when it is needed. All this is with a view to giving the best possible service during the current winter and for planning the Procurement and Production program for the winter of 1945–1946.
I will appreciate it also if the several field representatives will indicate the wishes of their Commands as to clothing to be worn upon the cessation of hostilities for both summer and winter.1
In the light of their recent experience in the Vosges Mountains, Seventh Army representatives considered the newly standardized M1943 uniform “basically sound.” They liked the jacket, pile liner, cotton field trousers, shoepac, and sleeping bag. On the other hand, they found the overcoat to be of no real use to the infantryman in the field, but they thought it would be suitable as a dress garment in the posthostilities period. Seventh Army had received M1943 clothing through SOLOC from MTOUSA stocks, and there was even enough for several divisions transferred from northern France.2
Because it had never obtained the complete M1943 uniform in large quantity, the 12th Army Group was unable to take as clear a position on this issue as had the units that had drawn their supplies through southern France. Colonel McNamara, of First Army praised the armored force combat suit, but said he would give serious consideration to any substitute jacket on condition that it had sufficient pocket space to eliminate need for special bags or belts. Third Army’s quartermaster, Colonel Busch, generally concurred with First Army’s position: “... there is almost unanimous opinion ... for the combat trousers and old combat jacket to be given to every soldier, combat or service, as long as he works outside.”3
Shoes and socks, overcoats and ponchos, as well as other items were discussed at this exploratory conference, but it was apparent that no general agreement could be reached until the 12th Army Group had been given the opportunity to compare more carefully the various uniforms currently available in the theater. It was agreed that such experience could be most quickly obtained by controlled field tests. Meetings were planned for February, when those conducting the tests would be briefed, and a more conclusive conference would be held after the results of these tests were collected and analyzed by the combat units.4
At least five hundred sets of uniforms were sent to each of the armies, and Quartermaster technical intelligence personnel brought the equipment to the selected divisions. In Third Army, for example, the 4th Armored and the 26th Infantry Divisions each received three hundred uniforms of each type, along with mimeographed instructions describing the preferred methods for wearing the various clothing assemblies. The purpose of the project was to determine which combination of clothing—the M1943 outer garments over wool field trousers and either a pile jacket or a wool jacket, or the winter combat uniform—would best meet the criteria of simplicity and uniformity. The participating troops were asked to consider such qualities as suitability for combat, water-repellency, wind-resistance, warmth and comfort, adaptability to street wear, adequacy of pockets, and suitability for laundering.5
Although no exact procedure was prescribed for the test, 12th Army Group recommended that the uniforms be distributed to small units, preferably to platoons, and rotated among the men throughout the testing period. Also the men were authorized to improvise alternate assemblies at their own discretion. Because it took time to distribute the test garments and the results of the tests were urgently needed, little more than two weeks were given over to the experiment. In mid-March the Chief Quartermaster again called together the quartermasters of the army
Armored winter combat uniform. Tankers found it warm and comfortable.
groups, armies, and air forces in the ETO. To this meeting he also invited representatives from the theater Chief Surgeon’s office, the Office of The Quartermaster General, and the War Production Board in Washington, as well as experienced observers from the Mediterranean theater and Fifth Army in Italy. For two days the participants sifted the data from the recent tests and questionnaires that had been circulated by 12th Army Group, particularly as they related to the technical characteristics of the various articles of clothing. On the third and final day of the meeting, the participants attempted to reach agreement on a single combination of clothing that would provide the combat soldier with the most suitable winter uniform.6
The conclusions of the meeting represented a statement of preferences rather than a meeting of minds. As reported by Colonel Younger, the chairman of a committee appointed to reconcile the diversity of opinions, “... the conference was not in total accord on any one item except underwear and shirts. The differences of opinion were not difficult to resolve for most items. The most controversial items of the uniform were caps, jackets, trousers and overcoats.”7
Agreement was reached on a combination of clothing items generally similar to those worn by Seventh Army and recommended by the representatives from the Mediterranean theater. (See Appendix D.) While rejecting the arctic and Parsons style field jackets, all the representatives spoke highly of the now obsolete armored force combat jacket. Lacking the latter, however, they indicated their willingness to accept the M1943 jacket, the pile jacket or wool field jacket, and high-necked sweater. They stated that the ETO wool jacket would be primarily useful for dress purposes and that the pile jacket required modified tailoring and a water-repellent outer fabric. There was substantial agreement on cotton field trousers, but the standard 18-ounce wool serge trousers normally worn under them were condemned as inadequate. Even the 20-ounce wool field trousers submitted for testing in February were found too light, and a napped 22-ounce fabric was recommended instead. Knowing that production would fall short of full theater requirements, the committee gave as its second choice winter combat trousers over 18-ounce serge trousers, but observed that the available substitute was cotton field trousers over 18-ounce trousers. A strong preference was expressed for a cotton field overcoat with a liner to replace both the conventional overcoat and the raincoat, but this was not a combat item, and the conferees were willing to accept the wool overcoat in the knowledge that neither time nor materials would be available to produce the desired garment. This decision was undoubtedly affected by adoption of the poncho, which could be worn over an overcoat, while the discarded raincoat could not. The committee also agreed on leather glove shells and wool inserts, on the cotton field cap, and on the hood of the M1943 assembly.8
The sentiments of the field forces with regard to footwear were incorporated in the report of Mr. Lawrence B. Sheppard, already described. As has been related, the feeling against the flesh-out boot ran high and the consensus was that the leather should be reversed to provide a russet-colored shoe that could be cleaned and shined.9 It was agreed that the modified boot would be supplemented in winter by all-rubber overshoes, and that dismounted combat troops were to be issued shoepacs under wet-cold conditions.
In the weeks following the March
Generals and their jackets. Generals Patch and Deters (first and third from left) are wearing the M1943 jacket popular with troops in the Sixth Army Group; General Brooks (second from left) wears the armored forces jacket favored by many field commanders; General Eisenhower wears an AAF flight jacket, and General Bradley is wearing the ETO wool jacket as designed by OQMG. Paris, November 1944.
conference, the Chief Quartermaster and his aides analyzed the data collected and evaluated the production problems inherent in the garments recommended by the field forces. In the main these recommendations were accepted and transmitted to the OQMG in the summary report, but on several key items the OCQM had reservations about the compromises reached at the conference. Feeling that the conferees had lacked sufficient experience with all the items considered—the recent tests had only been of two-week duration—and indeed that the number of items under consideration itself had the effect of complicating a clear-cut decision, Littlejohn also felt compelled to modify the recommendations of the committee in line with the production capabilities presented at the meeting.10
In a somewhat contradictory fashion, the committee had accepted the M1943 jacket, but had predicated acceptance of the pile jacket upon certain modifications, including substitution of a water-repellent outer fabric. Since the pile
jacket had been designed as a liner for the M1943 jacket, this change cast grave doubts on the utility of the latter item. Moreover, it was doubtful whether the pile jacket could be supplied to the entire theater by mid-September 1945. Littlejohn therefore recommended that the widely popular armored force combat jacket be reinstated in the Army Supply Program and issued as a substitute for the M1943 assembly, including the pile jacket. He held that this would be more desirable than converting the pile jacket into an item that would closely resemble the combat jacket. Also, the combat jacket could be made in 4 standard sizes, while the pile jacket and its companion garment, the M1943 jacket, were manufactured in 13 and 18 sizes, respectively. By eliminating 27 sizes, each of which was a different garment for inventory purposes, the supply problem would be markedly simplified. The same reasoning was applied to the supply of trousers when the OCQM recommended that winter combat trousers be issued in lieu of cotton field trousers over wool field trousers, as advocated at the conference. In this instance, 16 sizes would be eliminated. Simplification along these lines had been specifically recommended by the Third and Ninth Army quartermasters. The armies had also expressed an interest in reducing the number of garments worn by the men at any one time, and adoption of the armored force combat clothing would accomplish that end. This was a repudiation of the layering principle, which provided additional garments to be worn in winter but did not require a complete seasonal changeover of outer clothing. In Littlejohn’s view, the issue involved the convenience of the combat troops versus the convenience of their quartermasters, and the QMC tradition of service permitted only one solution.11
These views, it should be noted, were not submitted to The Quartermaster General until the day following V-E Day, and in the weeks during which they were weighed and considered in Washington the ETO quickly sank in importance, becoming an inactive secondary theater. The collapse of the German forces was sudden and complete, and the anticipated Nazi underground resistance movement did not materialize. The occupation of Germany settled into a routine garrison activity which did not keep large forces in the field, and estimates of requirements for combat-type clothing were found to be too high. This proved to be fortunate, since troops located in or ordered to the Far East now received the overriding priorities once accorded to the ETO. Moreover, textile shortages continued and the U.S. economy was strained to equip even troops actively engaged.
Littlejohn’s recommendations for revival of the winter combat uniform were rejected by the OQMG, which found that they did not accurately represent the conclusions of the clothing conference. The recommendations of the winter clothing committee were, on the whole, favorably received, but insofar as they deviated from current policy,
they could not be put into effect for the winter of 1945–46. In practice, the army of occupation during the first winter in Germany was not even authorized the current winter allowances for combat troops in an active theater. The men were issued neither wool field trousers nor cotton ones, and only one pair of combat boots per man. Even overshoes were a discretionary item, which had to be authorized by the army of occupation commander. The prevailing ETO winter uniform was the M1943 jacket over the ETO jacket, and herringbone twill trousers over 18-ounce serge trousers.12
Clothing for Officers
The basic U.S. Army policy of World War II, that officers should purchase all regular uniform items, was extended to the combat zone on the Continent. Mobile sales units served the embarkation areas, and the strict rationing of clothing imposed in Great Britain was relaxed for the departing troops. Also, after D plus 8 improvised sales stores were opened within each Class II and IV dump in Normandy, so that officers might buy enlisted-type field clothing from regular stocks. After D plus 14, a limited number of items for nurses were also available at these stores. On D plus 38 (14 July) the 581st QM Sales Company opened a regular sales store in the town of Isigny, and in the next few days it also began to send mobile units forward to the corps and division service areas. By the end of the month it had sold nearly $107,000 worth of clothing and insignia, or about $6,300 per day. This was not an unusually large volume of sales for a force of some 850,000 men during combat, but it far exceeded the rate imposed by rationing in the United Kingdom.13
Both the large amount of sales and the demand pattern were unexpected. For example, 7,418 cotton drawers were sold, and only 445 woolen drawers, although model stocks planned before D-day provided these items in equal quantities. Confirming the need for field clothing under combat conditions, nurses bought large quantities of herringbone twill shirts and trousers.14 By early 1945 a revised model stock had been computed to support 10,000 officers for 30 days, with additional items for 1,000 nurses and WAC officers, and 1,000 civilian women with officer status for a like period. This stock weighed approximately 24 long tons.15
Officers bought tremendous amounts of clothing in the ETO. In October 1944 Littlejohn estimated that he could sell 500,000 uniforms in a week, whereas he actually had 150 locally made uniforms on hand. Later, in reviewing ETO experience he pointed out that in combat units officers bought a uniform, wore it, slept in it, forded or swam rivers in it, and at the end of two months threw it away. The average consumption for all officers in the theater was some seven uniforms per year, and the Chief Quartermaster observed: “The consumption of clothing by officers, nurses, Wacs and civilians is far beyond the Table of Allowances, or any estimate previously made by me. In the field, the necessity for this increased consumption is evident. In the cities, to me, it is questionable.”16
Static sales stores had a most unfortunate tendency to favor individual officers of local units at the expense of combat units. Cherbourg and OMAHA sales stores were notable for such discrimination, and on 23 September Littlejohn ordered Colonel Florsheim to investigate all the sales stores in Normandy. They had repeatedly failed to report their inventories, which the Chief Quartermaster proposed to transfer to other sales stores further forward. But apparently the supplies in these stores had been exhausted, and there was nothing to transfer. A month later, Littlejohn wrote to the Quartermaster, Normandy Base Section, pointing out that it was necessary to maintain strict control over these stories so that officers, including nurses and Wacs, could purchase what they actually needed and no more. He was especially insistent that the practice of buying officers’ shoes, to be sold or given away to enlisted men or French civilians, be stopped, but no effective solution of this problem was ever found. Army women, both officer and enlisted, had their own problems. Despite regulations, male officers sometimes managed to buy stockings and girdles, and various other items, for their friends. There was also a good deal of indignation when newspaperwomen, congresswomen, and the casts of United Service Organizations traveling shows were allowed to make inroads into the scanty stocks maintained for women in the Army.17
Sales store supplies and sales store units both had very low priorities for cross-Channel transportation. For a short time the 581st Sales Company, already mentioned, was split among the First, Third, and Ninth Armies, each having a single platoon. Because this class of supply was so scarce, pilferage was a serious problem and semiofficial “diversions” by commanders who were determined to provide for their own units were equally troublesome. On 7 September Littlejohn wrote Colonel Busch that his attempts to move such supplies by Red Ball or by ordinary freight had proved disastrous. Thereafter he would move them exclusively
by air, with an officer accompanying each shipment. Later in September he noted that there was a sales company in Paris that could not function for lack of supplies. He urged the Seine Section quartermaster to open a store even if he had nothing to sell but a few pairs of GI socks. Presumably the spectacle of such a meager stock might be used to apply pressure to the theater G-4, who controlled tonnage priorities.18
On 15 October Colonel Brumbaugh finally was able to announce that a substantial shipment of clothing for officers was on the way from Britain. The available vehicles of ten truck companies scheduled for transfer to the Continent had been loaded with sales store items. But meanwhile the largest volume of sales of the entire European campaign was being made to officers in the forward areas. This was part of the winterization program already described. Officers received and paid for items identical with those issued to enlisted men. (Table 18). In Third Army, only $10,072 worth of clothing had been sold to 1,118 officers in September, all sales being at a static store. By contrast, 17,818 Third Army customers bought $270,646.46 worth of clothing, almost $9,000 per day, during October, more than half of it from mobile sales units. Sales at the mobile stores averaged nearly $18 per officer compared to about $13.50 per officer at static stores in the rear area. Since it was axiomatic in the ETO that officers would buy all that was authorized, an effort was clearly being made to favor the combat units. First Army did not report sales on a monthly basis, but sold $527,617.74 to its officers in the period 13 September-15 December 1944. About 48 percent of this clothing was sold by mobile units. Sales for three months averaged nearly $5,700 per day.19
The QM sales company was a very satisfactory and efficient unit, and in the ETO the ideal allocation was considered to be one company per army. Staffed with four officers and 174 enlisted men, and equipped with thirteen 2½-ton trucks and five smaller vehicles, the unit was capable of supplying officers’ clothing for a combat force of 600,000 men, and also handled the wholesale distribution of Army Exchange Service items for the same number. The latter function, it should be noted, did not include gratuitous distribution to combat units, which was handled by Class I depots. Unfortunately, there were never enough sales units in the theater, and the normal allocation was two platoons per army in the 12th Army Group. Seventh Army had to get along with only one platoon until late January 1945. The two platoons normally attached to each army operated as mobile stores, visiting corps and division service areas on a regular schedule. The army Class II and IV officer operated a static store at each clothing depot, and sometimes additional stores at large cities within the army area. Such a series of static establishments required considerable numbers of civilian employees, administered by one officer and fifty-one enlisted men, were
self-contained units, and operated satisfactorily without supervision.20
In the Communications Zone, sales companies operated static sales stores of considerably greater capacity than in the combat zone, but normally had no responsibility for AES supplies. One company could operate three large stores, each of which could make 1,200 sales per day, averaging $10.00 per sale. When augmented by civilian personnel, which was usual in the ETO, the company could administer six such stores. In May 1945 there were fourteen large static stores in the ETO, each located at or near the scene of a significant command, logistical activity, or leave center. In addition, there was a smaller store within the Class II and IV section of each QM base depot. The maximum number of sales units in the theater, six companies plus two platoons, was reached by March 1945. Their distribution was two platoons in each of five armies, three companies in COMZ, and one platoon attached to SHAEF.21
Because of the shortages already mentioned, attempts were made to limit purchases in Paris and at some of the other static stores to members of combat units and to flying personnel. Nevertheless, sales stores on the Continent were seldom open more than two days a week because the demand was many times greater than the supply. Moreover, by December 1944 COMZ officers were complaining of discrimination, which had lasted for months. On 4 December Littlejohn recommended to the theater G-1 that a rationing system should be set up, and in January 1945 an ETOUSA circular directed that thereafter clothing and accessories would only be sold on presentation of a ration card. Colonel Busch of Third Army protested that the plan might be necessary in COMZ, but was not worth the trouble in the combat zone, where the armies were already overburdened with paperwork. If army control were exercised through orders limiting the amount an officer could buy, he thought there would be little chiseling. Littlejohn replied that evidently Busch did not have all the facts. Abuses were worst in the rear areas, but were not unknown at the front. This system would protect combat officers, and could be administered by the sales companies so as not to add to the burden of individuals.22
Rationing was considerably more complicated in the Communications Zone than among the combat troops, since there were many additional categories of personnel to be served, each of whom required a special ration card. The problem was further complicated because the OCQM had consented to act as distributor of clothing for the American Red Cross, for hostess-librarians, and for Allied Expeditionary Forces Club personnel, all of whom wore distinctive garments. Moreover the OCQM had itself procured a specially designed uniform for female British civilian volunteers with the U.S. forces. Each of these groups was permitted to supplement its
own uniform with certain common items of U.S. Army origin.23
One reason for uniform shortages in the ETO was that officers arrived in the theater improperly equipped. This problem had been experienced and corrected in the United Kingdom in 1942, but it reappeared on the Continent two years later. Early in January 1945 General Gregory promised to bring the matter to the attention of ASF, but pointed out that many officers went overseas by air, and it was impossible to increase their baggage allowances. Littlejohn took the matter up with General Somervell personally on 12 January, and the latter cabled General Styer the same day that all commissioned personnel should come to the ETO properly equipped for three months. Just what constituted proper equipment was not defined, but Littlejohn wrote to his old friend Colonel Evans at NYPE and arranged that Colonel Barber, currently in the United States to plead for raw materials, should help in preparing an approved list. The CQM suggested that nurses, WAG officers, and civilians should bring enough clothing for four months.24
Contrary to expectations, the ETO field uniform was reserved for officers almost exclusively until after V-E Day. The only exceptions were a few enlisted men of combat units, who wore the uniform on furloughs to the United Kingdom or the zone of interior. The shortage of ETO jackets already described precluded their issue to enlisted men in 1944, but there were more than enough to be sold to officers. The obstacle was ETO insistence that the jacket only be worn with matching dark trousers. Littlejohn’s unsuccessful requisition for 200,000 pairs of dark olive drab trousers exclusively for officers in July 1944 has already been mentioned. It was turned down officially because no such item was authorized for officers, but apparently the real reason was that the trousers would, in effect, provide officers with a field uniform distinctively different from that of enlisted men. In practice the ETO uniform was very seldom worn in combat, even by high-ranking officers, but Army Ground Forces considered that identical combat uniforms for officers and enlisted men were of basic importance, and did not concur in even a very modest requisition that would violate this principle.25
This War Department decision actually meant that dark shade olive drab trousers would become available from the United States only when there were enough for both officers and enlisted men. Meanwhile they were much in demand, and a limited number could be obtained through local procurement. Both Littlejohn and Lt. Col. Robert L. Cohen, the clothing officer in the Procurement Division, devoted a great deal
of time to this activity. Early in October Littlejohn doled out 25 tailor-made uniforms each to the First, Third, and Ninth Armies, and also to General Brereton’s new First Allied Airborne Army. SHAEF headquarters wanted Boo uniforms, but the CQM could offer only 100. He explained that 9,000 jackets had arrived, and he was having matching trousers made up in France, Britain, and Eire. By the end of the month a few more were available and Brumbaugh, who had been instrumental in obtaining local procurement, was allowed to retain 40 uniforms for the United Kingdom Base. This was an exceptional concession, since General Lee had directed that, for the time being, the uniform be reserved for combat units at the front. Littlejohn controlled all distribution personally until the end of November. Then, with a prospect that some 15,000 uniforms would be available in December, he asked that Bradley himself settle the delicate matter of priorities for the 12th Army Group. The 6th Army Group had an independent source of supply via SOLOC, and received none. Early in 1945, the strict rule regarding matching trousers was relaxed, and by the end of February 385,000 ETO jackets had been transferred to the sales stores for officers.26
The end of the fighting in Europe brought geographical changes in sales store operations, but few changes in procedures or problems. The flow of troops was reversed, and sales activities at all ports were increased to meet the needs of departing officers. Also, on 19 May, Littlejohn directed his deputy for operations to establish a sales store in Frankfurt to replace the one in Paris, which had been by far the most important on the Continent during the months of combat. Littlejohn pointed out that the Paris store had remained fixed, while the locations of the various base section headquarters and other concentration points had shifted continually. Now it seemed that Frankfurt was the only definite point of reference within the emerging U.S. Zone in Germany. It should have as large a stock as possible, especially cloth and findings for made-to-measure uniforms. But in August the Chief Quartermaster made a complaint that sounded very familiar. He said that the movement of sales stocks to the army of occupation had been far too slow. After three months, the supplies on hand in Germany—even in Frankfurt—were negligible, and the situation should be remedied immediately. By the end of the year sales stores were in operation in the Eastern and Western Military Districts, in the Bremen enclave, and in the U.S. Sector of Berlin. By that time the new dark shade olive drab trousers had arrived in sufficient quantities from the United States, and the field uniforms of officers and enlisted men were identical. Being on garrison duty, officers naturally demanded Class A uniforms, but these were still in short supply and available
mainly as made-to-measure garments from German tailors.27
Uniforms for Nurses and Wacs
Early experience with uniforms for Army women in the ETO has already been described. Later developments generally reflected trends in clothing for enlisted men and officers. The service uniforms originally provided were considered as unsatisfactory as those for male personnel, and for much the same reasons. If anything, the female version of the M1943 field uniform encountered even more disapproval and resistance than its male counterpart. Since pile had proved too bulky, the women’s M1943 outfit was provided with heavy wool liners for both jacket and trousers. Prevailing opinion in the ETO was that even with wool liners this uniform was still too bulky for normal field use. When the outer covers were removed, the liners made an unsightly and unnecessarily warm uniform for office wear. For the type of duty required of women in the ETO, where they spent little time out of doors but much in unheated offices and barracks, the feminine version of the ETO uniform, consisting of short jacket, slacks, and skirt, all of matching dark shade 33 olive drab serge, was considered ideal. The theater Chief Nurse and the senior WAC Director were enthusiastic, and the Chief Surgeon agreed with them. But unlike the ETO uniform for men, which was approved in the zone of interior and shipped to the theater in rather limited quantities, that for women was disapproved in toto by the War Department in August 1944. On 7 September Littlejohn wrote to Cohen in the Procurement Division:
Dear Bob,
I just received from Doriot and Feldman about ten pages of baloney which, added up, means that this Theater will not be furnished with a new type field jacket for women.
It is my understanding that you can provide enough of the new type field uniforms for all components of the Army providing cloth is made available to you at an early date.28
The above quotation gives an exaggerated estimate of production capabilities in the ETO, but accurately reflects Littlejohn’s intention—to fabricate all necessary uniforms for women locally, irrespective of approval or disapproval of the ETO design by zone of interior agencies.
In line with this policy the Chief Quartermaster told Cohen to develop a detailed procurement plan, which was submitted on 4 October. The most desirable material, 18-ounce dark olive drab serge, was in short supply and most of it would be required for male officers’ trousers. But enough was on hand to make 1,500 sets (jacket, slacks, and skirt) for nurses and WAC officers, and 300 sets
had already been completed in the United Kingdom. Enough 17-ounce material was available to make 6,000 similar women’s uniforms, and these would be manufactured in Britain and Eire. The least desirable material was 22-ounce British battle dress cloth. There was enough for 12,000 women’s uniforms, to be made up half in Great Britain and half in Eire. Manufacture of women’s garrison caps was to be concentrated in France, where 6,000 17-ounce and 8,000 22-ounce caps were to be made. The program was promptly approved, and toward the end of the month, when Cohen was made Chief of the Sales Store Branch, Supply Division, in addition to his duties in the Procurement Division, two WAC officers, Lt. Eileen Dickson and Lt. Jennings, were assigned as assistants to administer the sales stores.29
Meanwhile, on 7 October Littlejohn had drafted a formal proposal for a change in the uniform of WAC enlisted women in the ETO. He advocated that the ETO uniform already being supplied to women officers become the service uniform for Wacs, and that issue of the M1943 field uniform for women be discontinued. This was neither the first nor the last such proposal, but was of interest since it was a complete staff study, submitted through channels with the concurrence of the theater WAC staff director, Lt. Col. Anna W. Wilson. The following changes in allowances were involved:30
| Proposed | T/E 21 | |
| Jacket, WAC, winter | 1 | 2 |
| Jacket, field, M1943, women’s | 0 | 1 |
| Jacket, pile, women’s | 0 | 1 |
| Jacket, field, wool, women’s | 2 | 0 |
| Skirt, WAC, winter | 1 | 3 |
| Skirt, field, wool, winter | 2 | 0 |
| Trousers, field, wool, winter | 2 | 0 |
| Trousers, outer-cover | o | 2 |
| Trousers, wool liner | 0 | 1 |
| Cap, garrison, wool, WAC | 0 | 2 |
| Cap, garrison, wool, WAC (field) | 2 | 0 |
| Total | 10 | 12 |
The main significance of the above proposal was that it advocated one service uniform for all women in the Army. It was approved and forwarded to the War Department, and Littlejohn wrote several letters to individuals in the OQMG, urging its approval by ASF. But like similar proposals regarding uniforms for women officers, it was turned down mainly because of severe shortages of the required dark shade olive drab serge. In December the War Department stated that a short jacket designed by the OQMG, in a light shade serge to match the WAC winter skirt, would ultimately become available. But meanwhile a few of the battle dress outfits tailored in Eire had been delivered, and Littlejohn directed that they be issued in January from Paris, in accordance with priorities set by the WAC staff director. Enlisted Wacs could be supplied from these sources because they were a minority among Army women in the ETO.31
But local procurement had begun too late to supply either commissioned or enlisted women with a warm winter uniform. Since a majority had arrived overseas with the M1943 jacket, issue of the wool liner was one solution of the problem, though not a popular one. The OCQM requisitioned mow liners for all women personnel in October, but by mid-December none had arrived. Women in the Army Air Forces suffered particularly, since many were assigned to night shifts in unheated buildings and underground operations centers. The situation was declared an emergency, and the issue of men’s winter underwear was authorized until women’s winter underwear and various other authorized winter garments for women, including the wool jacket liners, finally arrived. But the ETO uniform was much preferred to any of these items, and the OCQM managed to issue at least one to each WAC member before the end of the winter.32
The uniform of 22-ounce British cloth, which Colonel Cohen had considered the least desirable of the locally procured garments for women, found favor with the Army Nurse Corps. On 31 October the Chief Surgeon’s Office requested from 5,000 to 8,000 British battle dress uniforms for women on an experimental basis, commenting that “The Medical Corps is not satisfied with the Field uniform presently provided for nurses.”33 Littlejohn promptly approved, stipulating that Wacs also be included in the experiment, that priority be given to individuals serving with combat elements, and that geographical priority be from front to rear. Two days later he wrote to Lt. Col. Ida W. Danielson, director of ETO Nursing Service, that every nurse on field duty would shortly receive a British Auxiliary Territorial Service (ATS) uniform. Since it was experimental, this would be a gratis issue. He also referred to Colonel Daniel-son’s recent letter, which praised the comfort and smartness of the new ETO uniform, and the helpfulness shown by Colonel Cohen and Lieutenant Dickson in distributing it. The WAC officer had personally brought truckloads of uniforms, with tailors, into the First and Third Army areas, and had sold and fitted ETO uniforms to 300 nurses in the most advanced units. Littlejohn replied that he hoped to have an adequate number of the new field uniforms for all nurses and Wacs in the forward areas within the next sixty days. He further observed: “My personal view is that a good-looking woman in a bad-looking uniform results in a bad combination. I feel certain that you and I and the Director of the W.A.C. can do a lot to correct this. ...”34 Apparently there was a good deal of truth in the last sentence, for as nurses and Wacs returning from Europe began to bring ETO uniforms to the United States, it proved impossible to stem the tide of their popularity, and they were formally authorized for optional wear in the zone of interior, but not for issue, on 9 January 1945.35
Quantitatively, women’s clothing was always a minor item in the ETO, and it was normally stored at a single depot. In the United Kingdom this was at Thatcham (G-45) and the first concentration point for women’s items on the Continent was at Cherbourg. Experience in Normandy confirmed the wisdom of a single depot for women’s clothing, for the stocks brought ashore at various points as part of the follow-up maintenance sets were quickly reduced to broken sizes that made stock control very difficult. Moreover, several different items were packed in one container, so every package had to be opened, exposing clothing to weather and to theft. This could only be corrected after all supplies had been brought into guarded storage under cover at Cherbourg. Shortly after this was accomplished, the entire stock was moved to Paris, where the initial prescribed mission was a sixty-day level for 3,500 women. Inadequate as it was, even this level was not quickly achieved. The distribution of women’s items to all units in the theater, including those in the combat zone, was made directly from Depot Q-177 (Paris) by a mobile sales unit. This unit replenished stocks in the static sales store within each army Class II depot, and also sold clothing directly to women in the forward areas. This system was so successful that the CQM proposed a similar procedure to handle male officers’ clothing in each army. The armies would each retain only one sales platoon, to run a static sales store, and COMZ would operate two more in each army area to distribute directly to the combat units and also to move clothing from the ports by organic transportation. But the 12th Army Group rejected the proposal, and only women’s clothing was handled in this manner.36
Local procurement was still the main source of women’s clothing in the spring of 1945. By March, the 6,000 uniforms of 22-ounce cloth ordered in Eire were completed, and since nurses were most in need of a heavy uniform, the entire quantity was turned over to them with the concurrence of the theater WAC staff director. Such agreement was possible because Colonel Cohen’s local procurement program was finally beginning to deliver adequate quantities of uniforms in standard dark serge, and a monthly allocation could be made to both Wacs and nurses. But one result of this increased production had a most unfortunate effect upon the morale of Army women, especially enlisted Wacs. Since ample quantities of the ETO uniform were now in sight, it was decided that it would be made available to U.S. civilian women employees, who were now beginning to arrive in the theater. Although the civilians were to wear the uniform with distinctive insignia, Wacs still felt that this policy accorded to civilians an unearned distinction that should have been reserved for those who had gained it through military service.37
Clothing for Allies and Dependent Groups
The QMC was less responsible to Allies and dependent groups for clothing and equipment than for food. In theory, its Class II and IV obligation to displaced persons was confined to the equipping of assembly centers and the warehousing of civil affairs clothing to be distributed by G-5. In practice, G-5 reserves were far from adequate, and the OCQM had to provide very considerable quantities of military supplies, including Class X and Class B clothing, and even some serge service coats. In crowded refugee camps such uniforms quickly developed an unsightly appearance, which had a most unfortunate effect upon the morale of U.S. troops wearing the same uniform. On 15 April 1945 a theater directive placed such issues under the direct control of General Lee, who was required to approve each issue and maintain accurate records of such sup-plies.38 In the period immediately after V-E Day, the ETO wool jacket was the only distinctive garment issued solely to U.S. troops, a fact that goes far to explain the extraordinary efforts made to distribute it to American units.
Initial issues for French regular military forces were provided by the British Commonwealth—principally by the Canadians. As long as these forces were under U.S. command, subsequent replacement issues were made—or at least attempted—by the Americans. Support for French paramilitary units, which were not officially recognized by SHAEF, was a different and nearly insoluble problem. In October 1944, for example, when everyone on the Western Front was seeking winter clothing, calls were also placed on American supply sources to equip the troops of the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) fighting with the 94th Infantry Division in the south of Brittany. These bands of irregulars were occasionally integrated with American troops on the front line, and were particularly useful for reconnaissance and patrol missions. Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony, commanding the 94th Division, strongly urged the theater commander to approve the issue of winter clothing to these French units lest the cold weather force them back to their homes, leaving gaps in the line that he could not fill effectively. Realizing that American clothing was scarce, and that captured German supplies were not sufficiently available, Malony was even willing to take impregnated protective clothing so long as it was suitable to provide body warmth.39
Clothing and Equipment for Prisoners of War
Plans made before D-day were based on capturing 120,000 prisoners during
the first three months of combat on the Continent. All were to be evacuated to the United Kingdom, and eventually a considerable number to the United States. The maximum responsibility of U.S. forces at any one time was estimated at 30,000 prisoners, a number that could easily be supplied with captured or salvaged items. The first month of combat appeared to confirm these estimates, and, moreover, apart from underwear and toilet articles, the first prisoners captured were adequately equipped. But late in August, SHAEF directed that all POW’s who were physically fit and appeared to be cooperative be retained on the Continent as laborers. At that time there were already 170,000 in POW enclosures on the Continent. Their number was increasing daily, while the expected flow of captured equipment from the combat troops into COMZ depots did not materialize. It was understandable that the armies should retain captured matériel to meet their omn needs, but the necessity of guarding and rationing such supplies was only gradually realized, and, meanwhile, looting and poor controls made for the dissipation of captured stocks. The gradual correction of this situation is narrated in a subsequent chapter.40
With the increasing numbers of captured troops and the early onset of winter, prisoner of war enclosures needed blankets, mess gear, and tentage. Salvage depots in the United Kingdom held ample quantities of such items, but they had not yet been sorted. Moreover, cross-Channel transportation was scarce, and stringently rationed. Since winter clothing for the American troops was also scarce at the time, continental salvage inventories were low because of the soldiers’ reluctance to turn in items that could not be replaced. Loire Section enclosures were able to obtain small quantities of equipment from Seine Section, but never enough to escape the charge of “unsanitary conditions ... on account of the lack of proper equipment.”41
By October, Littlejohn was reluctantly calling on the zone of interior for help. A sudden call from SHAEF to supply 400,000 prisoners and some 200,000 displaced persons had come as “a blow between the eyes,” and he was prepared to procure comforters, underwear, nonstandard mess gear, and overcoats wherever he could find them. By late December the basis of requirements had increased to 1,100,000 persons, and the Chief Quartermaster reported that ETO stocks hardly met 50 percent of his needs, with specific shortages existing in drawers, towels, shoes, socks, and mess gear. The OQMG canvassed depots in the zone of interior for usable salvaged clothing, but only to percent of the amounts requisitioned could be located. The inadequacy of these quantities was
German prisoners at Rheims repairing captured clothing. January 1945.
painfully evident by V-E Day, when U.S. responsibility for German POW’s alone had swelled to a total of 2,835,000.42
In the interests of economy, action was taken to make prisoners somewhat self-sustaining by equipping at least one camp per base section with captured ‘sewing machines, findings, shoe lasts, salvaged rubber, and tent repair kits, all of which would enable them to make their own repairs to clothing, shoes, and tentage. Although the OQMG was unable to provide clothing for prisoners, there was a possibility during February 1945 that cloth surplus to the needs of the Foreign Economic Administration could be made available. Accordingly the OCQM instructed Q-256, the great salvage depot with headquarters at Reims, to open a prisoner of war clothing factory. Personnel of Q-256 and of the POW and Captured Enemy Materiel Branch, Installations Division, OCQM, jointly surveyed possible sites, and decided to locate the factory at Aachen. Plans were made for a very large installation, to be supervised by a composite battalion headquarters, two composite company headquarters, and a service company. More than 5,000 prisoners were to be assigned, including interpreters, foremen, tailors, garment inspectors, cutters, cobblers, and sewing machine mechanics.43 Before the project actually went into production in an old umbrella factory, numerous obstacles arose to plague the participants. Satisfactory rehabilitation of the plant required recruiting of electricians and plumbers, importing of cutting machines and cutting tables from Belgium, reconstruction of the center section of the plant, deactivation of numerous booby traps, and removal of rubble, which
reached second story windows. Unfortunately the promised cloth from the United States was required by UNRRA and could not be made available, but plans were made to use locally procured cloth, and to operate the factory on a reduced scale.44 The clothing factory was in production by 31 March, and early in April a thousand garments were coming off the line daily. During the next two months, almost 100,000 garments were made of a German material known as feldgrau, but with the end of the war and the drawing of occupation zone boundaries, Aachen found itself in the British area, and the factory had to be moved to Bamberg.45
As the only COMZ echelons permitted to follow the armies into Germany, ADSEC and CONAD became the chief custodians of the flood of prisoners collected in enclosures along the Rhine. In April, particularly after the collapse of the Ruhr pocket, First Army alone bagged half a million prisoners, more than 50 percent of its total for the entire continental campaign. Their evacuation to enclosures west of the Rhine put a heavy strain on Quartermaster truck units, and their supply similarly taxed the ingenuity of Quartermaster personnel.46 ADSEC by this time was fully aware that normal requisitioning methods would not promptly bring the required matériel and that captured stocks could not be expected from army sources without special pleading, and then only in token quantities. Therefore, the initiative was taken by diverting three salvage collecting companies from their regular tasks and assigning them to pursue every clue to the whereabouts of captured equipment. A high priority was given to the truck transportation needed to bring these stocks to three central prisoner of war supply points at Rheinerg, Sinzig, and Bingen.
The sudden importance of this responsibility in the spring of 1945 was reflected by the establishment of a prisoner of war division within the office of the ADSEC quartermaster that acted as the agency for the requisitioning and distribution of supplies for captured troops in the area. By V-E Day, ADSEC’s quartermaster was preparing to relinquish these supply points to the British, who were assuming control of the Rhine provinces. The prisoner population in ADSEC alone now approached 800,000, crowded into a dozen enclosures which were little more than densely inhabited open fields guarded by personnel from the 106th Infantry Division and operated by Quartermaster battalions under the supervision of the 56th QM Base Depot. Barely 20 percent of the prisoners were under shelter and there were no hospital tents for the sick. Summarizing his situation to Littlejohn, Colonel Smithers of ADSEC wrote:
Aside from the 750 tons received from Fifteenth Army, no subsistence has been received nor do I expect any. What desirable Class II and IV we have received has been entirely at the sufferance of the Armies, upon personal appeal and has been insignificant in relation to the demands which are being put upon us by the influx of prisoners of
war. We have taken every means at our command to increase these amounts, but with negligible results.47
CONAD’s responsibility, some 230,000 prisoners concentrated in the Heilbronn-Ludwigshafen area, was more modest but also more permanent, since those cities were in the American zone of occupation. The termination of hostilities of course did not spell the solution of this problem, nor did it even cause an immediate drop in the numbers to be cared for. A partial solution lay in the release of prisoners who could be transferred to fill the demands for labor by other governments, or cleared to return to their homes. Such action was accelerated after ADSEC and CONAD were deactivated in July, and the armies had to assume all occupation functions.
Strength Forecasts
The greatest difficulty for the QMC in supplying prisoners of war, displaced persons, and repatriates was caused by uncertainty as to the numbers who would have to be supplied. While no long-range forecast subject to the fortunes of war could be more than an approximation, the OCQM was convinced that this important subject deserved more care and forethought than it was receiving in higher headquarters. As already described, the OCQM submitted its own personnel forecast (See Table 11.), which was finally accepted by COMZ for lack of better information, but meanwhile delays had severely impaired the effectiveness of requisitions. Specific Quartermaster responsibilities for Class II and IV supply to foreign nationals were determined by higher headquarters, and were only indirectly influenced by the number of persons in each category actually present in the ETO. For example, only those French troops actually under U.S. command at any given time were a Quartermaster responsibility. The classification of recovered Russian personnel as Allied prisoners rather than displaced persons, an unexpected result of the Yalta Conference, added considerably to demands for QM supplies. On 15 May 1945, the OCQM was responsible for supplying 7,341,381 persons with Class II and IV items that ranged from clothing and mess gear to soap, toothpaste, and tobacco. The number of persons in each category, and their daily allowances of Class II and IV supplies, were as follows:48
| Category | Strength | Class II and IV (lbs. per day) |
| U.S. military and others in Category 1 | 3,181,588 | 1.69 |
| Hospital patients (all) | 169,277 | .6864 |
| French military including Moslems | 355,551 | 1.7842 |
| Recovered Allied military personnel (including (Russians) | 725,716 | .6157 |
| POW’s (excluding hospital patients) | 2,835,425 | .488 |
| Mobile civilian employees | 31,837 | .2224 |
| Italian and Slav units | 41,987 | 1.0569 |
Tentage
The Quartermaster Class II and IV supply plan for OVERLORD made no
Table 21: ETO Tentage Requirements, Allocations, and Receipts
| Description | 21 May 44 Requirement D Day–D+240 | 14 Jun 44 Requirement 1 Sep 44–31 Dec 44 | 6 Aug 44 Requirement 1 Aug 44–31 Jan 45 | Shipped 1 Jan 44–30 Jun 44 | Allocation 1 Jul 44–31 Dec 44 | Shipped in Convoys Jan 1945 |
| Fly, tent, wall, large | 6,738 | |||||
| Fly, tent, wall, small | bc (114,908) | |||||
| Paulin, large | 20,962 | 37,458 | d 169,412 | 48,228 | 71,811 | 25,388 |
| Paulin, small | 28,350 | c (30,351) | 11,435 | |||
| Screen, latrine a | 16,607 | 3,567 | 20,027 | 9,398 | 3,567 | |
| Tent assembly a | 1,770 | 1,448 | 1,250 | 529 | 0 | |
| Tent, command post a | 6,029 | (2,024) | 8,675 | 2,262 | ||
| Tent, hospital, ward a | 8,694 | 24,042 | 14,857 | 9,520 | 6,965 | |
| Tent, maintenance, shelter a | 788 | 796 | 805 | |||
| Tent, pyramidal a | 123,648 | (e) | 154,557 | (e) | ||
| Tent, squad a | 112,449 | f 271,468 | 34,226 | 73,737 | 28,480 | |
| Tent, storage’ | 27,421 | (e) | 1,726 | (e) | ||
| Tent, surgical-operating, truck. | 86 | |||||
| Tent, wall, large a | 6,692 | (e) | 886 | 20 | ||
| Tent, wall, small a | 5,116 | 9,607 | g (77,545) | 107,393 | 72,720 |
a Complete with poles and pins.
b (...) represent excess items.
c These excesses applied against (d).
d Net requirement after subtracting (c) excesses.
e Squad tents substituted for these items.
f These excesses applied against (g).
g Net requirement after subtracting (f) excesses.
Sources: QM Supply in ETO, V, pp. 67-69, 123-2S; Memo, TQMG to CQM, 12 Oct 44. Hist Br, OQMG; Cbl SPTAA-40412, 3 Jan 45 NYPE to COMZ ETO; Memo Opns Br, Mil Plan Div OQMG to Rqmts Br, 4 Nov 44, sub: Status of CY 1944 Tentage for ETO. OQMG 421.4 ETO.
provision for tentage in excess of T/E allowances prior to D plus 45. By D plus 240, a phased transition of all camps and depots from canvas-covered structures to huts and buildings made of wood and metals was to be completed. An OCQM estimate dated 21 May 1944 stated that by 1 February 1945, tentage would be required for 1,686,000 of the 2,500,000 men expected on the Continent, but assets were thought to be more than sufficient. About 500,000 would be housed in buildings constructed or rehabilitated by the Engineers, tentage for 1,225,000 would be brought over from the United Kingdom as that vast staging area was closed down, while tentage for another 200,000 men was on requisition. Tarpaulins for 14,000,000 square feet of open storage were either on hand or had been requisitioned.49 (Table 21)
Very shortly thereafter information was received that squad tents were becoming available as a standard replacement of pyramidal, storage, hospital ward, and large wall tents. Taking advantage of this very desirable simplification, the OCQM also made minor adjustments in its requirements, and submitted Requisition H-7, for the last four months of 1944, on 14 June. But this requisition was submitted too late to affect deliveries. By the end of June the theater’s current requirements had been very nearly filled in terms of older models of tentage. This proved to be fortunate, since production of the new
squad tents did not materialize according to schedule.50
By late July, when the troops were securely lodged on the Continent, there were strong indications that these earlier estimates had been too optimistic, and that tentage and tarpaulins for both personnel and storage would be needed in much larger quantities. Tentage was being retained in the United Kingdom because storage activities were not phased out on schedule, and because combat troops were held there longer than expected. Moreover, the British found that they were unable to meet their commitments to provide additional permanent housing after D-day because civilians could not return to locations retained as training and embarkation areas. Meanwhile, delays in the rehabilitation of Cherbourg prevented the importation of materials needed by the engineers to construct housing and storage. July was also the month of some of the heaviest Allied aerial bombardments of the war, which concentrated on logistical as well as tactical targets and caused even more damage than the attacks designed to isolate the lodgment area. The purpose of these attacks was to assist a breakout by the field forces, which would lead to mobile warfare and
still greater demands for tentage as permanent billets were left behind. Littlejohn summarized all these facts for The Quartermaster General and warned him that “the QMC must be prepared to house substantial numbers, if not all, of the American troops on the European Continent,” and to supply tarpaulin for more than 61,000,000 square feet of open storage. He promised to submit revised tentage requirements as soon as he had consulted with General Feldman, who was then in the ETO. The formal requisition, J-69, was forwarded on 6 August.51
But Feldman brought rather alarming news. Canvas and cotton duck production was just being resumed after the sharp cutbacks of 1943. He estimated that the whole of U.S. current production was only adequate to produce 47 percent of ETO tentage requirements. Littlejohn wrote to the ETO Chief Engineer on 31 July, hoping that substitute storage space could be provided. Maj. Gen. Cecil R. Moore’s reply four days later brought little comfort: “I am most concerned over the question of tentage and feel that our requirements are a minimum. ... Hutting is in short supply and ... does not afford a satisfactory answer for our mobile armies on the Continent.” Littlejohn forwarded this reply to Feldman, by then returned to Washington, and received back the comment: “I wish to point out that the duck situation is still very serious. Therefore the Engineers must be required to produce.”52
This was clearly wishful thinking in the early stages of a mobile campaign, when Engineer Corps responsibilities and difficulties were even greater than the Quartermaster’s. At Gregory’s suggestion, General Somervell inquired whether the tentage requisition was absolutely essential. Littlejohn’s answer dated 26 August was emphatic: “Only a cessation of hostilities or building of hutments will reduce these requirements,” and two days later, in a personal letter to Feldman, the CQM brought up for the first time the possibility of local procurement of duck on the Continent. This was a momentous proposal, which if adopted would require taking over most of the French cotton textile industry. No doubt it was a response to Feld-man’s discouraging report from the zone of interior. On 11 August the DQMG had written: “No change in the situation as I outlined it. ... Upon my return, a meeting was held with WPB, the producers of duck and webbing yarn, and ASF ... to emphasize that the war was far from over, and that requisitions for tentage would be increased rather than decreased.” Littlejohn wrote to Feldman on 28 August: “Every paulin I have is being yelled for from three or four places,” and on 14 September he warned Brumbaugh in England: “We cannot afford to scrap a blanket or a tent of any kind.”53
No formal answer to Requisition J-69 was received until 13 October, when the OCQM was informed that its allocation would be about 25 percent of the amount required. Littlejohn prepared an official letter to General Somervell requesting substitute nonstandard or salvaged tents, since requirements for housing prisoners of war and repatriated Allied prisoners were running far beyond any original estimate. The armies were still planning to house all combat troops under canvas for the winter, and also to use paulins rather than warehouses in their service areas. In view of the serious shortage of tents, billeting appeared to be the only solution. Billeting of troops in Germany was definitely contrary to current antifraternization policies. Moreover, destruction of German cities appeared to be so great that displaced persons would occupy most of the available housing. The G-5 sections of the armies expected that billeting troops with families in Allied territory might create problems and therefore approached the matter with hesitation. Civil Affairs policy guidelines were generally interpreted as forbidding such a procedure. Third Army, operating entirely on French soil, came to an agreement with the SAFA organization late in October 1944. First Army, with its front line largely in Germany, had an entirely different problem, but nevertheless began to make similar arrangements with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg during November.54 In practice it was
found that Europeans do not share the traditional American repugnance toward billeting, and that whatever civilian housing was needed by the troops would be made available without difficulty.
Partially resigned to the improbability of obtaining tentage in the amounts requisitioned, the CQM in early December called upon G-4 for a revised policy statement on the billeting of troops in Germany. Even with prospects of obtaining knock-down hutments from Switzerland and the zone of interior, he estimated that 90 percent of the troops would require tentage, that available and prospective supplies would at best serve 1,500,000 troops by March, and that 750,000 troops would still lack adequate housing. Shortly after the elimination of the Bulge, shipments of tentage from the zone of interior were resumed, although still in quantities less than even those of the October allocation. Front line troops, at the same time, also used existing buildings and the basements of demolished structures, and found them preferable to living under canvas. Such use of existing facilities became the typical procedure and by V-E Day it was noted that tentage was required for only 50 percent of the continental troops, and that supplies were ample.55
Materials-Handling Equipment
Except for the heavy-duty equipment used at ports, materials-handling equipment in the ETO was a Quartermaster Class IV category of supply. The various technical services computed their own requirements, and after review by G-4 submitted them to the OCQM for requisitioning, either locally or in the United States. This was largely a mechanical function since the OCQM did not edit such requisitions, and materials-handling equipment was not a prominent subject in Quartermaster correspondence. On the other hand, the General Purchasing Agent was actively interested, especially in roller conveyors, since large numbers were purchased both in the United Kingdom and later on the Continent. Small ball or roller bearings were the most critical component of such conveyors, and since the British bearing industry was overloaded with orders for armament, some 54,000,000 bearings to meet combined requirements were imported from the United States in 1943. Nevertheless, conveyors were always in short supply in the ETO. In March 1945 Colonel Smithers reported that his two QM base depots in ADSEC had only 1,714 ten-foot sections. Since they were now operating railheads and transfer points within Germany, where the use of POW’s was forbidden by theater policy, conveyors were especially desired as a labor-saving device. The G-4, COMZ, was unable to fill requisitions. ADSEC could use another 5,000 sections if they were made available from other QM installations.56
The requirements of the ETO Quartermaster Service as a whole for such equipment varied widely from depot to depot, according to the type of supplies in which that particular depot specialized, the general layout of the installation, and the amount of daily traffic. Receipts and issues by barge, by rail, and by truck each demanded somewhat different types of equipment. Nevertheless, a rough average was ascertained by surveying the performance and the requirements of the following five major QM depots: Q-177, Paris; Q-178, Verdun; Q-180, Reims; Q-181, Le Havre; and Q-183, Charleroi. On 30 April 1945 these depots each had an average storage capacity of 180,000 long tons of supplies, about two-thirds being open storage. The average of closed storage was 580,000 square feet, and the average tonnage handled per day, in and out included, was 5,500 long tons. All classes of QM supply and every type of COMZ depot operation were represented. Average requirements for equipment were as follows:
| Item | Per Daily Movement (long tons) |
| 1 section, gravity conveyor, straight | 5 |
| 1 section, curved | 314 |
| 1 crane, mobile, 5-ton or under | 5,000 |
| 1 forklift, truck, 3-ton or under | 353 |
| 1 tractor, warehouse | 184 |
| 1 trailer, warehouse | 24 |
| 1 truck, hand, 4-wheel | 45 |
| 1 truck, hand, 2-wheel | 24 |
In submitting these figures, the Chief Quartermaster emphasized that they were only suitable for the roughest kind of preliminary calculations. There were no standard methods of calculating requirements for such equipment, and the recommended method was to determine the needs of each depot individually, after deciding on its mission and location.57
Local Procurement
Procurement in the United Kingdom
Contrary to expectations, British production in 1944 was almost as high as in previous years, and the local procurement program already described was successfully continued after D-day. Although some commitments, notably for officers’ uniforms and wool socks, had not been completed by the end of the year, the amounts delivered were very large and included winter items badly needed by American troops.58
Detailed information on procurement in 1945 is not available. Class II supplies delivered during the period January–June 1945 were 5,438 long tons compared to 11,127 tons for the whole of 1944. Shortly after V-E Day, procurement in Britain was removed from the control of the OCQM and became an autonomous activity of the United Kingdom Base. As a further result of the end of hostilities, contracts for a total of 1,529
long tons of Class II supplies had been canceled by 30 June 1945.59
Field Procurement on the Continent
From D-day to the end of 1944, most of the supplies actually delivered to the U.S. Army from continental sources resulted from field procurement, either purchased “off the shelf” or manufactured from raw materials locally available. Needless to say, only very limited quantities were available, but under the emergency of combat requirements and the additional handicap of a bottleneck in port capacity, whatever could be obtained from such sources was tremendously valuable. Examples were 17,900 stoves suitable for heating tents, purchased in France in October, and 26,400 knives and 60,000 spoons, located in Belgium a month later.60
A major instance of spot procurement was provided by the emergency need for snow camouflage garments, beginning in November 1944. French stocks of white cloth were meager, but practically all of them were made available on operational priorities, either through high-level agencies such as the general purchasing agent, or by direct purchases of QM procurement officers in the base sections or attached to armies. Some 60,000 square yards were also imported from the United Kingdom, but Belgium was the chief source of white cloth. ADSEC purchased nearly 520,000 square yards, paying the equivalent of $250,000 in Belgian currency. The cloth was transferred direct to the armies.61
First Army concentrated its production in the hands of the 602nd Engineer Camouflage Battalion, which maintained a factory system in Belgium and provided 88,000 white garments of various types. Third Army purchased 800,000 square meters of cloth in Belgium, and made contracts with three French firms to manufacture camouflage clothing. Moreover, two of its subordinate corps made similar contracts, and in addition military units, notably the 13th Chemical Maintenance Company and the 300th QM Salvage Repair Company, made quantities of such garments. In Ninth Army, Military Government personnel mounted public-address systems on trucks, and then drove through German towns in their area, demanding white cloth from civilians. This direct-requisition procedure gathered in 41,500 bed sheets, and Ninth Army also purchased 32,000 linear feet of cotton cloth in Belgium. Five factories, two in the Netherlands and three in Germany, produced 70,000 snow suits for Ninth Army. The 255th QM Battalion obtained 250,000 meters of cloth for Seventh Army at Epinal, but in general such functions were performed for SOLOC by the higher level agencies in the Communications Zone. The total number of snow camouflage garments manufactured was reported by the general purchasing agent as 131,125, but the operations of individual units and agencies enumerated above seem to indicate that this figure was far too low.62
Long-Range Procurement on the Continent
The organization for long-range headquarters procurement, the broad policies involved in such a program, and the raw materials import project have already been described. The armies liberated the industrial regions of northern France and Belgium, where such operations might be undertaken, in August 1944, just as Littlejohn was becoming aware of production difficulties in the United States. During the next month, French and Belgian textile trade associations, working with Colonel Barber, conducted a survey of continental productive capacity, and on 3 October Littlejohn included 3,000,000 yards of olive drab serge on Requisition K-94, his emergency request for winter clothing. This was in addition to 1,500,000 yards already requisitioned. It was primarily needed to manufacture locally 800,000 ETO-type wool jackets and an equal number of wool trousers which, it now appeared, would not be produced on time in the zone of interior.
The cloth requisition was viewed with disapproval by the OQMG for several reasons. Littlejohn realized that it would be many months before any deliveries were realized from newly initiated procurement in recently liberated areas, and accordingly refused to cancel any requisitions on the United States for finished items until locally manufactured goods actually began to appear. But this meant that for many months he would be receiving both cloth and finished garments, which the OQMG considered wasteful and unnecessary. Indeed the whole ETO procurement program was considered unnecessary, and a reflection upon the abilities of the OQMG. The first reaction was that this latest requisition for cloth could not be filled until June 1945, and that deliveries on earlier requests would carry over into the new year. This was one of the problems discussed in General Gregory’s brochure of 5 January 1945 for General Somervell. In general, Somervell overruled Gregory, directing that cloth be provided insofar as available, and that the necessary procurement experts be sent to the ETO.63
After considerable delay, on 6 December 1944 an agreement was reached with the French Government regarding procurement of clothing. The French agreed to manufacture 2,500,000 sets of wool uniforms comprising trousers, jacket, and garrison cap, and 100,000 sets of women’s garments consisting of slacks, skirt, jacket, and cap. This was an agreement in principle only, involving governments and not manufacturers, and subject to deliveries of cloth from the United States. It would have required over nine million yards of cloth, but on 9 December the War Department cabled that 1,525,250 yards had already been either approved or shipped, and that the ETO would not receive any more cloth during 1945. Early in January 1945 The Quartermaster General was able to offer the ETO an additional 250,000 yards per
month beginning in February, but he acknowledged that most of the yardage previously promised was still in depots awaiting shipment, and only a small quantity had left the zone of interior. Meanwhile, French estimates of their ability to manufacture clothing had proved as inflated as American estimates regarding available cloth. Early in June the Procurement Division, OCQM, reported that 505,000 pairs of trousers were actually on requisition, in both France and Belgium, and that deliveries to date had been 131,000. For garrison caps, the figures were 234,000 on requisition and 25,000 delivered. Of 200,000 garments for women on requisition, 11,000 jackets, 50,000 skirts, and 30,000 slacks had been completed. Production was only beginning, and nearly $35 million worth of clothing was scheduled for delivery in 1945 from France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. However, the advisability of cutting back these contracts was already being discussed, and on 13 July War Department orders directed that all longterm production programs in the ETO be terminated by 30 September. The cloth remaining in the theater at that time was transferred to Germany, where it was used to make individually tailored uniforms.64
Since the textile shortage in the United States was a result of insufficient spinning, knitting, and weaving capacity, while stocks of raw materials were ample, General Somervell and various WPB officials encouraged Littlejohn to undertake a complete textile program. Gregory, and Littlejohn himself, were somewhat dubious, but such a program had great possibilities for the economic rehabilitation of Europe, and might possibly relieve pressure on the United States during a protracted war against Japan. A letter from the Chief Quartermaster to General Goodman at NYPE reveals that the difficulties of the project were not underestimated.
Some of the boys from Washington have been over here and have suggested that I go into production on tentage to meet my requirements. Maybe this is the final answer to this problem. However, I had this job in the OQMG from 1940 to 1942, and then—to my chagrin—I found that in the States, where cotton, labor, and machinery were all available, that it took 9/12 months to produce a substantial quantity of tentage. Over here we have the additional problems of no raw materials, no coal, no transportation, and displaced labor. Regardless of all these obstacles I intend to go for production of textiles in a serious way.
Another letter, written to Barber while that officer was in Washington, was equally revealing: “... discuss with General Gregory personally, key personnel for the duck program. Get [Col. Robert T.] Stevens if possible. ... The Procurement Division in OQMG must not become too optimistic because we agree to do the best we can. ...”65
The cotton production program on the Continent fared no better than did
the wool clothing project, primarily because it also depended upon receipts of raw materials from the United States. The Chief Quartermaster had hoped to produce fine cotton items such as handkerchiefs, bath towels, and bedding, as well as tentage. While the receipt of 37,000 bales of raw cotton and patterns for tents was mildly encouraging, the amount fell far short of the 193,000 bales required for the cotton production project through 1945.66
By the end of March, contracts for the partial fulfillment of cotton requirements had been accepted in France and Belgium. Among these were tentative commitments for 1,100,000 pillowcases, 2,300,000 bed sheets, 13,000,000 handkerchiefs, 7,000,000 bath towels, and 23,000,000 yards of cotton duck. The largest part of these deliveries was forecast for the last quarter of 1945. But a shortage of raw cotton, and the absence of cotton findings and finishing compounds, together with urgent civilian needs and coal shortages, made the French unwilling to undertake more than half the fine-cotton projects assigned to them. The Belgians were anxious to cooperate, but awaited the arrival of raw materials, including coal. All these factors, plus the fact that a resurvey of light cotton goods on hand and forthcoming showed that the theater would be able to meet its requirements, led to cancellation of the cotton production program in June 1945.67
Meanwhile a very large knit goods project, involving 7,000,000 sets of wool underwear, 6,000,000 pairs of gloves, and 2,500,000 sweaters, was also under consideration in France. Scoured wool was not available in the United States, and it was estimated that 30,000 tons of greasy wool would be required. But the French Government decided that it could not spare the 31,000 long tons of coal needed to complete this program, and rejected it on 2 June 1945. The Belgian Government accepted a program for roughly 40 percent of the above items for delivery in March 1946, provided the raw materials arrived in September of the current year. But on 8 June 1945 the War Department canceled all shipments of wool for the manufacture of knit goods.68
Insignia were items important to Army morale, and large numbers were locally procured. Contrary to expectation, hand embroidery was not available in large quantities in France, and only 140,000 handmade sets of 810,000 required were produced by June 1945. By September, 2,886,067 machine-embroidered insignia, 2,712,257 metal insignia, and over 82,800 meters of ribbon for decorations had been delivered. This production was very modest compared with estimated requirements, which totaled
nearly 24,000,000 emblems, insignia, and decorations of various kinds.69
A rather large project for procurement of paper was concentrated entirely in Belgium. Some 6,000 tons of wood pulp from the United States were to be combined with 17,000 tons of pulp and waste paper from Germany. The Belgian contribution was 4,000 tons of straw and 40,000 tons of coal, and the desired total was 27,000 tons of finished paper. More than half was to be used as office stationery and blank forms, but the requirement also included kraft cartons, wrapping paper, and toilet paper. By September 1945 deliveries included nearly 8,000,000 sheets of sulphite paper and 18,100 cartons. Moreover, paper was one of the few categories of supply considered essential for the occupation forces and therefore the contracts were not canceled.70
In general, procurement in Belgium was considerably more satisfactory than in France, the chief reason being a fundamental difference in the national economies of the two countries. In time of peace Belgium had been a heavily industrialized nation with a food deficit and large exports, and after liberation unemployment and lack of raw materials were major problems. By contrast French industry was mainly geared to produce for home consumption, and many essential raw materials, especially food, were locally available within the country. The most pressing problem in France after liberation was transporting raw materials to urban centers. Once this was solved local demands saturated French industry, and there was little labor available for Allied procurement programs. An additional complicating factor was France’s ambitious rearmament program, which naturally had prior claims on the nation’s productive capacity. Disagreement over the need for such a program, and over France’s future role as an occupation power in Germany, culminated during the last week in April 1945 when de Gaulle ordered the 1st French Army to remain in Stuttgart in defiance of orders from General Devers. General Eisenhower promptly directed that all issues of equipment to French Metropolitan Program units, then being activated, be suspended. The political issues were soon resolved, and maintenance issues to General de Lattre’s forces were never interrupted, though except for those units destined for the Far East, no French units received initial issues of U.S. equipment thereafter. Needless to say, after this episode French deliveries of equipment similar to that needed for their own forces were extremely meager.71
Viewing U.S. procurement on the Continent in perspective nearly two decades later, it appears that raw material deliveries from the United States were slow and conclusion of agreements for overseas production was still slower. Most of the major contracts were signed in the period April—June 1945, and most
of them had been canceled by the end of August. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems clear that the whole program was too late to be worthwhile, but it should be borne in mind that the atomic bomb was one of the best-kept secrets in history, and without the bomb the military situation had a radically different appearance. Japan was expected to resist invasion even more desperately than Germany. For example, as late as 24 July 1945 the Combined Chiefs of Staff still accepted 15 November 1946 as a “conservative logistical planning date” for the end of Japanese resistance. Viewed in that light, the continental procurement program was merely an effort to make a noncombatant overseas theater self-sufficient, during an expected additional year of hostilities, in those categories of supply that were causing difficulties in the United States.72