Chapter 5: Sicily and Italy
Following the liberation of North Africa, the Allied forces launched their next major assault against the island of Sicily, the nearest and most practicable objective for furthering the war in the Mediterranean. From Sicily it was only a step to attack the hard core of enemy resistance on the Italian mainland. Within this theater the primary purpose of Allied operations was to force the withdrawal of Fascist Italy from the European Axis and in doing so to hasten the collapse of Nazi Germany.
The Organization of Transportation in the Mediterranean
Allied activity in Sicily and Italy was undertaken within the same framework of command, supply, and transportation developed during the North African campaign. General Eisenhower continued as supreme commander, AFHQ, until 8 January 1944, by which time his forces had completed the conquest of Sicily and penetrated the Italian peninsula. Eisenhower also headed the U.S. theater (NATOUSA),1 and his deputy commanded the Communications Zone, NATOUSA, including the base sections. Charged with directing U.S. Army supply activities, but without command authority, the Services of Supply, NATOUSA, functioned under General Larkin.
During this period transportation in the Mediterranean area was supervised or administered through many agencies and echelons. At AFHQ, coordination and general policy direction of Allied transportation activities were provided by the G-4 Movements and Transportation Section, in which General Stewart headed the American side.2 Stewart was also chief of transportation for the North African theater, and in that capacity he was responsible to the communications zone commander for U.S. transportation activities. SOS, NATOUSA, had its own transportation officer (Col. John R. Noyes), as did also each of the base sections. As the operations progressed, there were added to the three base sections in North Africa (Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Eastern) the Island Base Section (Headquarters, Palermo, Sicily), the Peninsular Base Section (Headquarters, Naples, Italy), and the Northern Base Section (Headquarters, Ajaccio, Corsica).3
The movement of men and materiel into the theater was effected chiefly by water, and the staff supervision of this
activity, including the utilization of U.S. Army ships and ports, was a major function of the theater chief of transportation. Railways and highways provided vital means of transport, but neither played as prominent a part in Stewart’s organization as water transportation. The Military Railway Service, AFHQ, except for the necessary liaison and coordination with the office of the chief of transportation, enjoyed virtual autonomy, and highway activities were primarily the concern of the base sections. The principal function of Stewart’s office in air traffic was to screen all demands for transportation by air of personnel and freight of American ground forces, arranging for movement on a priority basis. The theater chief of transportation also had a branch for operational planning, which assisted in mounting task forces within the theater.
When the Sicilian invasion began, Stewart’s AFHQ-NATOUSA Transportation Section staff was small. As of 1 July 1943, he had twenty-two officers, one warrant officer and twenty enlisted men. His deputy chief was Colonel Fuller, and his executive officer, Colonel Sharp. Most of the personnel served in the Water, Operational Planning, and Administrative and Statistical Branches. The other branches—Rail, Air, and Highway—were small. Headquarters was then in Algiers.
In the months that followed, Stewart’s organization participated in the planning for each projected assault and coordinated U.S. transportation activities in support of the Allied advance into Sicily and Italy. At the same time the transportation office kept in as close contact as possible with all forward elements in the theater. When the AFHQ Advance Administrative Echelon (FLAMBO) was established at Naples in October 1943, it contained a U.S. Transportation Section under Colonel Fuller, who also continued to serve as Deputy Chief of Transportation, AFHQ. Initially composed of five officers and twelve enlisted men, Fuller’s staff functioned as an advanced echelon of the Transportation Section, AFHQ-NATOUSA, to coordinate American transportation matters in Italy.4
Meanwhile, the SOS Transportation Section, located at Oran, had grown in size and activity. To the Water, Rail, Highway, and Air Sections, all established before the end of hostilities, were added a Planning and Prestowage Section (May 1943) and Supply and Troop Branches (June 1943). Principal activities supervised by the SOS transportation officer during the latter half of 1943 were the movements of SOS passengers and cargo, Transportation Corps supply, prestowage and operational movements, and the allocation and training of transportation troops.5
The prevailing pattern of transportation organization was modified as the result of the reorganization of NATOUSA in February 1944. At that time the duties and responsibilities of the Commanding General, Communications Zone, including the command of the base sections and activities therein, were turned over to the SOS
commander, General Larkin.6 The consolidation of command and operational functions pertaining to the communications zone made necessary a restatement of the respective responsibilities of the U.S. theater chief of transportation and the SOS transportation officer, and by agreement between Larkin and Stewart such a division of functions was worked out. Because of the Allied nature of operations and the need for daily contacts with the Navy, the War Shipping Administration, and other agencies, the over-all coordination of transportation activities continued to be the responsibility of Stewart, as Chief of Transportation (U.S.), AFHQ Serving as adviser to the Allied and American ,theater commanders on U.S. transportation matters, he would participate in AFHQ planning; allocate shipping, air, and rail lift to various bidders under priorities determined by AFHQ; secure vessel allocations and arrange for the water movement of U.S. personnel and cargo within the theater; and supervise the movement of units and vehicles into, within, and out of the theater. He was also to receive and disseminate shipping information, determine the ability of ports to receive incoming vessels, and conduct diversion meetings for incoming UGS convoys.
The SOS transportation officer, on the other hand, was to serve as adviser to the SOS commander. Colonel Noyes was to exercise staff supervision over all transportation facilities in the communications zone, and would retain his responsibilities relating to SOS troop and supply movements, Transportation Corps supply, pre-stowage, operational movements, and troop training and assignments. He would secure the means for effecting supply movements from the theater chief of transportation, and would request the latter to arrange for troop movements under priorities established by AFHQ.7
Although provision was made for constant liaison between the SOS transportation officer and the theater chief of transportation, the arrangement did not work well. Early in June 1944 Stewart informed Larkin that experience had revealed a number of serious defects. Responsibility and authority were divided, confusion and differences of opinion had arisen, and he believed that the arrangement might well break down under the strain of mounting a large amphibious operation.8 To remedy the situation, the theater issued a directive on 23 June designating Stewart as SOS transportation officer, in addition to his other duties. Colonel Noyes became Stewart’s deputy. The control and supervision of transportation activity on the AFHQ, NATOUSA, and SOS levels were now unified in the person of General Stewart, who was responsible to the SOS commander for transportation matters pertaining solely to U.S. movements and the communications zone, and to the Allied and U.S. theater commanders for matters handled on the AFHQ level.
Actual consolidation of the AFHQ-NATOUSA and SOS Transportation Sections began in July, when AFHQ and
SOS moved their respective headquarters from Algiers and Oran to Caserta, Italy.9 The process of merging the transportation staffs and functions continued for several months, but by mid-August Stewart’s organization had been streamlined into two branches, one administrative and the other operational, each composed of groups with specific assignments. In the following month a new group was added, which operated a clearing agency for lost and unclaimed personal baggage—a perennial problem overseas.10
By October 1944, when the Office of the Chief of Transportation attained its maximum expansion, the Administrative Branch was divided into six groups concerned, respectively, with office administration, personnel, supply, planning, control, and personal baggage. The Operations Branch also contained six groups, of which four were responsible for arranging shipments by water, air, rail, and highway, including the necessary liaison. Of the two remaining groups, the one had technical supervision of the use of floating equipment, with the required planning and liaison—an important function. The other, having by far the largest staff in the Operations Branch as well as in the entire office, arranged, supervised, coordinated, and recorded the movement of U.S. Army cargo and personnel into, within, and from the theater.11 (Chart 2)
In November 1944 General Stewart moved forward to serve as transportation officer for the newly created Southern Line of Communications (SOLOC) in southern France. He was succeeded by Colonel Lastayo, formerly Transportation Officer, Peninsular Base Section. Stewart took with him to France a sizable portion of his staff. The resultant loss of experienced transportation personnel might have proved serious for the Mediterranean theater had not the transportation activity already begun to decline. Colonel Lastayo still had the tremendous task of removing American personnel, supplies, and equipment from North Africa to Italy and to southern France.12 However, as the fighting progressed to the area north of Rome, the lines of communication were shortened and the demands made on the Transportation Corps lessened appreciably.
The organizational pattern remained substantially unchanged through V-E Day. Lastayo was followed as theater chief of transportation on 18 June 1945 by his former executive officer, Colonel McKenzie. Subsequently, during August and September 1945 the transportation office was absorbed by the Peninsular Base Section.13
In his primary role of supporting the American forces in the Mediterranean, the U.S. theater chief of transportation faced several formidable tasks. He had to get things done through many echelons and commands and with many nationalities. Even within the U.S. Army he had to deal with three major echelons of command, a confusing situation that ultimately was resolved by having the chief of
Chart 2: Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation AFHQ, NATOUSA-COMZONE, NATOUSA: October 1944
Source. Hist Rcd, OCT AFHQ MTOUSA, Oct–Dec 44, Exhibit A-I OCT HB North Africa.
transportation wear three hats—one each for AFHQ, NATOUSA, and the SOS, NATOUSA. He had to prepare for each new landing operation, often before the current mission had been completed. In addition, he had to clear the rear lines of personnel, supplies, and equipment as quickly as possible in order to meet urgent needs in the forward areas.
To furnish the proper coordination and supervision, the U.S. theater chief of transportation, as earlier during the North African campaign, was represented at AFHQ meetings where incoming vessels were assigned to ports best situated to receive them, and when the limited water, rail, and airlifts were allocated on a priority basis. Of special significance in Italy were the Shipping Diversion and Port Acceptance meetings, at which decisions were reached as to where all incoming vessels should be discharged; and the Rail Priority of Movements meetings, at which tonnage for rail movements was allotted among the respective bidders.14
Since the Allied personnel and equipment were not sufficient for the job, transportation operations were heavily dependent upon local resources. Wherever possible, civilian labor and prisoners of war were utilized. As the Allied forces moved forward, they frequently faced the necessity of rehabilitating war-torn transportation facilities for military use.
U.S. Army Transportation in Sicily
Within the Mediterranean theater combat was characterized by a series of amphibious landings in Axis-held areas, of which the first was launched in Sicily in the summer of 1943. Sicily provided a convenient steppingstone for the Allied advance from North Africa to the Italian peninsula. The capture of this strategically situated island was highly essential in order to clear the Mediterranean sea route. Moreover, as a military objective it did not require an excessive expenditure of men and materiel. At the Casablanca Conference, in January 1943, the decision was reached to invade Sicily during the favorable period of the moon in the following July, but only after completion of the conquest of Tunisia. The undertaking posed two major problems. First, preparations for the assault had to be made in North Africa, far from the major supply bases in the United Kingdom and the United States. Second, the task force units, together with their equipment and supplies, had to be assembled from several widely scattered areas, and one infantry division, the 45th, had to be brought from the United States. Since ocean shipping fell far short of the amount required and since the rail and highway facilities within the theater were grossly inadequate, HUSKY, as the Sicilian operation was called, placed great strain upon the available transport.
Besides coordinating the activities of the American and British ground, sea, and air forces assigned to the assault, General Eisenhower’s planners had to consider various contingent factors such as the number of ships and landing craft likely to be available, the probable capacity of the ports to be employed for mounting the task forces, and the most suitable time and place to launch the actual invasion. 15
The specific areas for the assault were selected so as to insure protection for the invaders by Allied aircraft based on Malta and in Tunisia. The beaches on the southern coast of Sicily were relatively narrow and led directly into rough, mountainous terrain that favored the defenders and confined the motor transport of the attackers to the comparatively few passable roads. Under these circumstances the primary objective of the Allied commander was to land the maximum in men and materiel as rapidly as possible at the coastal points where air cover could be furnished, and thereafter to provide additional support through captured ports, specifically Palermo in the west and Syracuse and Catania in the east.
After considerable discussion, General Eisenhower later decided to postpone the projected seizure of Palermo and to concentrate the attack in the crucial southeastern area, with a view to the early capture of several important airfields deemed essential to forestall prohibitive shipping losses by enemy action. The final revised plan of 18 May 1943, advocated by the air commander and the naval commander, indicated that, for lack of a major port, the invaders for a time would have to rely heavily on supply and maintenance over the beaches. Fortunately, the landings were facilitated by the use for the first time by Americans in the Atlantic area of certain new types of equipment. Among these were the various ocean-going landing craft that could deliver men and materiel directly to the beach areas, and the 2½-ton amphibian truck, or DUKW, which proved extremely useful for ship-to-shore movements of personnel and cargo.16
The revised plan did not alter the target date of 10 July, which among other reasons had been set to insure moonlight for the airborne troops that were to be dropped in advance of the assault. The invasion was to be accomplished by Task Force 141 (later called the 15th Army Group). It consisted of two separate task forces, which on landing were to constitute the U.S. Seventh Army under Lt. Gen. George S. Patton, Jr., and the British Eighth Army, under General Sir Bernard L. Montgomery. During the planning period, the two armies were known respectively as Force 343 (the Western Task Force) and Force 545 (the Eastern Task Force), the former American and the latter British.
In NATOUSA the responsibility for the transportation aspects of the HUSKY operation centered in the office of the chief of transportation. At the outset General Stewart assigned two officers to assist in the planning and to maintain liaison with the special staff group of the I Armored Corps (Reinforced), which was to lay the groundwork for the American task force. To clarify the duties and responsibilities of the various American agencies involved, a meeting was held at Rabat, French Morocco, on 11 March 1943, at which an agreement was reached on the mounting of the operation.17 Briefly, it made the task force commander responsible for furnishing detailed data to the theater chief of transportation and to SOS, NATOUSA, on the men and materiel to be moved; designating the desired time, place, and order of discharge; providing a transport quartermaster with suitable assistants on each combat-loaded vessel; and supplying
adequate personnel for discharge operations on the far shore. The actual loading was to be done by the base sections under the supervision of SOS, NATOUSA, and in accordance with stowage plans approved by the task force commander. The Navy was to provide, man, and operate the combat-loaded vessels, landing ships, and other craft employed in the assault and was to furnish all ocean transport for the attacking force.
Although these arrangements obviously could not cover all contingencies, they helped eliminate much of the confusion previously encountered in North Africa. Within Stewart’s office, the Operational Planning Branch took the lead in the preparations for HUSKY. In anticipation of greatly increased activity by this branch, then headed by Colonel Murdoch, its staff was augmented by nine Transportation Corps officers from the United States, who arrived shortly before the invasion began.18
Stewart’s organization worked closely with the Transportation Division of the G-4 Section of the U.S. Seventh Army, which was guided by Colonel Tank, who had previously served as port commander at Casablanca. The Transportation Division had a slow growth. Colonel Tank was hard put to find qualified personnel and was further hampered by having to divide his small staff between the forward and the rear echelons of the Headquarters, Force 343, at Mostaganem and Oran. As a special staff group devoted exclusively to transportation matters, Tank’s organization functioned mainly to establish transportation policy and to control and supervise water, rail, and highway transport for the U.S. Army in the Sicilian operation.19
The initial disposition of the Seventh Army contemplated three independent subtask forces landing simultaneously, with a fourth force held in reserve. The assault troops consisted of three reinforced infantry divisions: the 3rd, or Joss Force, under Maj. Gen. Lucian K. Truscott; the 1st, or DIME Force, under Maj. Gen. Terry Allen; and the 45th, or CENT Force, under Maj. Gen. Troy C. Middleton. The 1st and 45th Divisions together formed the II Corps, or SHARK Force, commanded by Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley.20 Since the assault area lacked a single sizable port, provision had to be made for over-the-beach supply, for thirty days if necessary. The basic plan was to give each soldier only the essentials for combat. Each sub-task force was charged with its own maintenance until such time as consolidation could be effected and Force 343 could assume the responsibility for supply. The 1st Engineer Special Brigade was the agency chosen to consolidate and control all supply activities for the task force as they were relinquished by the divisions. In essence the brigade was to function as the SOS for the Seventh Army.21
Preinvasion Preparations
The assembling of the subtask forces began before the completion of the Tunisian campaign. When the dates for release of the assigned units had been settled, the G-3, AFHQ, authorized the G-3, Force
343, to issue the movement orders. Any necessary additional transportation was allocated by G-4, Movements and Transportation, AFHQ_, and furnished by SOS, NATOUSA, through the base sections. The close coordination required to implement the movement and mounting schedule for all headquarters concerned was supplied largely through the G-4, Movements and Transportation Section, AFHQ Transshipment within the theater was a major problem since the troops, supplies, training centers, staging areas, and final ports of embarkation were often hundreds of miles apart. All available types of transportation in the theater were employed—water, rail, highway, air.22
The units taking part in the invasion received special amphibious training, mainly at the Fifth Army Invasion Training Center on the Gulf of Arzew. The 1st Engineer Special Brigade helped train all beach personnel, placing particular emphasis on the utilization of the new landing craft. It also trained all DUKW drivers. Selected units conducted practice exercises under simulated combat conditions, but for lack of time these rehearsals were hurriedly planned and at best were “dry runs” on a reduced scale.23
The assembly, mounting, and supply of the assault forces taxed Allied resources to the limit, especially with respect to sea transport. The British components were drawn from such widely separated areas as the United Kingdom and the Middle East, and the U.S. 45th Division had to be loaded in the United States, with a resultant heavy drain on shipping. Apart from combat-loading one division, the principal contribution of the zone of interior lay in dispatching a greatly increased troop and cargo lift to the North African theater and in procuring the ships, men, and materiel for the task.24
One of the first problems was to provide the assault vessels required for the 45th Division. In order to avoid transshipment after arriving overseas, the theater had urgently requested that this unit with its equipment and vehicles be loaded in the United States in the same ships that were to be used in the invasion. The U.S. Navy helped meet this need by withdrawing combat loaders from the Pacific, and also procured, manned, and operated the landing craft and ships for the American task force. The 45th Division alone had ten LSTs, which carried tanks, bulldozers, and other heavy equipment from the United States.
Even more pressing than the requirements for assault ships were the ever-increasing demands for troop and cargo lift to support the operation. Rather than risk an excessive accumulation of shipping for the build-up in North Africa, more intensive use of the available troop and cargo fleet was sought by increasing the size of the slow (UGS) cargo convoys from 45 to 60 ships, to which the U.S. Navy agreed in February 1943, and by reducing the UGS convoy interval in the following month from 25 to 15 days.25 With regard
to the troop lift, the immediate objective was to deliver approximately 160,000 men to the theater by the end of May 1943. This was achieved by increasing the number carried on the troop convoys, beginning with UGF-6, and by employing large troop transports, such as the West Point, which were fast enough to travel without escort. The troop transports docked at Casablanca.26
Although troop transports could be found, the assembling of additional cargo vessels presented a problem for which there was no ready solution, since shipping was tight throughout the world. Also, the theater and the War Department gave divergent estimates on the number of vessels required. In April 1943, according to Washington, for instance, the four UGS convoys for HUSKY (7, 7A, 8, and 8A) would require only 169 cargo ships. The theater scheduled 181. Although the theater was willing to accept a reduction of not more than 10 cargo ships on UGS 8A—so as to avoid the increased hazard in an unduly large and unwieldy convoy—in the final analysis the theater demands for cargo ships had to be and were met.27
Still another complication arose when certain cargo ships had to be specially equipped in the United States for retention and use in the theater. The theater wanted twenty-four motor transport vessels to deliver vehicles and drivers from North Africa to the beaches in Sicily. Each ship was to be fitted with removable washrooms, mess facilities, and standee bunks for 300 men. An additional eight cargo ships were needed to lift overflow vehicles and other impedimenta of the 45th Division. All thirty-two vessels were Liberty ships. The standee bunks were to be installed overseas so as not to waste cargo space on the transatlantic voyage. Each ship carried three LCM-3’s on deck and had sufficient cargo-handling gear aboard to accomplish all discharge. Shaded cluster lights in all holds facilitated discharge at night, and a control switch permitted instant blackout.28
The cargo requirements of the theater created additional problems. At times the editing of requisitions by the Overseas Supply Division of the New York Port of Embarkation disclosed what appeared to be excessive demands in the light of the shipments already dispatched. When asked to reconsider, the theater often scaled down its requests, notably for gasoline and ammunition, of which sizable stocks were already on hand in North Africa. Last-minute requests were filled by the stated deadlines wherever possible, even though hurried changes in cargo loading in the zone of interior were necessary.29 Despite the strain on transportation, tactical organizations, for fear of being caught short, tended to request supplies substantially in excess of amounts really required.30
Mounting the Attack
The build-up of men and materiel for
HUSKY, coupled with the demands of the Tunisian campaign, taxed severely the limited transportation facilities in North Africa. Since the entire burden of mounting the forces to invade Sicily clearly could not be shouldered by the theater alone, the theater urgently requested that one subtask force be combat-loaded in the zone of interior.
Subtask Force CENT, the reinforced 45th Infantry Division under General Middleton, was to embark from the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation, where valuable experience had already been gleaned from the loading of the Western Task Force for TORCH. Late in 1942 the major responsibility for preparing the 45th Division for overseas shipment was delegated to the Army Ground Forces, but the latter was hampered somewhat because it was not brought into the supply picture until mid-April 1943. At that time plans and preparations for the force were well advanced.31
With a view to avoiding a situation similar to the confusion caused by conflicting instructions for the TORCH loading, a conference was held at the Hampton Roads Port of Embarkation on 19 April 1943 at which all interested agencies—Army, Navy, and Army Air Forces—were represented. Detailed plans and procedures were worked out, and effective control measures were set up for the movement of the CENT subtask force. The force was to remain under the control of the Army Ground Forces until it reached the port staging area, Camp Patrick Henry. The port commander and his staff dealt very closely and directly with General Middleton’s organization, and no serious difficulties were encountered. Nevertheless, some shipping space was not utilized because the task force stowage plan was received at the port too late to permit assembling additional cargo called for in the plan.
As a first step to insure a successful loading of General Middleton’s men, equipment, and supplies, the War Department issued a basic directive establishing in detail the requirements for the movement, outlining the responsibilities of all agencies concerned, and setting up effective control measures.32 For the Army Service Forces, all matters pertaining to this movement were channeled through Col. William E. Carraway in Washington and a single Transportation Corps staff officer at the port, Maj. Maynard C. Nicholl. Insistence upon a minimum of change after the plans were firm was a further factor in forestalling confusion.33
The time schedule permitted practice in combat loading at the port and amphibious training at Solomons Island, Maryland.34 The men of the 45th were first concentrated at Camp Pickett, Virginia. Next they moved to the newly completed staging area, Camp Patrick Henry, thereby coming under the control of the Hampton Roads port. The last step was the actual embarkation.
Supplies and equipment for the 45th were assembled at the port much more efficiently than had those for TORCH, in large measure because a standard procedure had been developed by the Movements Branch, ASF. A few last-minute items had to be delivered by air. Vehicles required the usual protective waterproofing for an amphibious landing. Stowage was planned by a ship transportation officer (formerly called transport quartermaster) assigned to each combat-loaded vessel. Middleton’s force was to carry 21 days’ supply of rations and packaged gasoline, together with 7 units of fire.
Part of the cargo for this assault group was palletized, that is, lashed to wooden pallets so as to form compact bundles capable of being picked up by a fork-lift truck or pulled over a beach by bulldozer or other vehicle.35 Opinion within the War Department was divided as to the feasibility of this innovation, and within the Army Service Forces it was doubted if the necessary pallets could be procured and properly loaded by the deadline date of 10 May 1943 for the arrival of supplies at the port. Palletizing was therefore limited to 10 days’ supply of 5-in-1 rations and 50 percent of the motor oil, gasoline, and water. The last two items, which were transported in 5-gallon “blitz” cans, were stacked in two rows, forming a pallet 43 inches high with a total of 2,512 pounds. Although palletization obviously entailed some loss of shipping space, it was favorably regarded by General Middleton’s G-4.36
Altogether, the movement of men and materiel to the port proceeded without serious hitch. The subtask force with most of its supplies and equipment was loaded aboard 13 attack transports (7 APA’s and 6 XAPs) and 5 cargo attack vessels (AKA’s), in two separate groups.37 Headed by an elaborately equipped communications ship, the USS Ancon, the assault convoy—UGF-9—sailed on 8 June 1943, carrying approximately 22,000 troops and 46,000 measurement tons of cargo.38 All 19 vessels arrived safely at Mers el Kebir on 22 June.
The 1st Embarkation Group, a provisional organization built around the 10th Port and Company G of the 591st Engineer Boat Regiment, was to load the reinforced 3rd Infantry Division (subtask force Joss) at the newly captured port of Bizerte.39 Under the command of Lt. Col. William F. Powers, the embarkation group began taking over its mission from the Eastern Base Section in late May 1943. Meanwhile, the Corps of Engineers had started reconstruction of damaged shore facilities at Bizerte, and American and British naval salvage crews were working to clear the surrounding waters of sunken enemy vessels. The proximity of this port to Sicily made it an ideal jumping-off-
place for the invasion, and the deep landlocked Lake Bizerte provided an excellent site for amphibious training.
The 1st Embarkation Group established its headquarters on 8 June, barely a month before D Day. Lacking any precedent to serve as a guide, the group developed its own procedure. It encountered the usual last-minute changes, and because of security restrictions it was frequently forced to ferret out necessary information by “devious and informal channels.” Apart from the headquarters staff, the 105 officers and 682 enlisted men of the unit were divided into three detachments to supervise operations at the three loading areas on Lake Bizerte. These three sites had been selected with a view to insuring protected waters, an adequate road net, the least possible construction, sufficient suitable space ashore for assembly, and a minimum of interference with normal port and naval activities.
After a preliminary exercise in moving troops and vehicles, the loading of supplies began on 28 June. Difficulty developed at once because cargo failed to arrive in the proper order. To meet this problem dumps were set up at dockside where supplies that could not be loaded immediately were stored. The trucks could thus be released for further use. The supply phase was completed on 5 July. On the same day, the first 6,437 assault troops marched aboard 47 LCIs, which sailed on 6 July. The remainder of the initial force embarked on the following day on 5 LCIs, 87 LCTs, 38 LSTs and 2 LSIs (landing ships, infantry), accompanied by 1 headquarters ship and 1 tug. The assault convoy comprised approximately 26,000 men, 3,732 vehicles, and 6,676 long tons of supplies.
The third American contingent, the DIME subtask force, was built around the reinforced 1st Infantry Division. Because the harbor at Oran was crowded, the assault units were loaded at the British port of Algiers. According to the Naval Commander, Western Task Force, the main difficulty arose from “the absence of an authoritative central agency with a complete knowledge of all loading plans, priorities, etc., and capable of rendering decisions.”40 Various American and British organizations attempted to exercise control but none saw the entire picture. The transport quartermasters were plagued by frequent changes in the loading plans, and the ships were crowded with barracks bags and similar items not essential to the assault.41 Despite these drawbacks, the 19,251 troops of this contingent were finally embarked at Algiers aboard 8 combat loaders, 15 LSTs, 19 LCIs (L) and 2 LSIs (S). Like the assault units for Joss, they carried maintenance for 7 days plus 2½ units of fire.42
With the loading completed, the three U.S. subtask forces sailed for Sicily under strong naval escort. The landings, which began in the early morning hours of 10 July 1943, were preceded by airborne assaults and naval gunfire. At the last moment the weather worsened. A high wind and rough seas hampered the invaders. Fortunately, the elements also threw the defenders off guard. The 45th Division, landing near Scoglitti, was hit the hardest by wind and sea, but its landing was virtually unopposed. Near Gela, the 1st Division met heavy enemy opposition at some beaches but very little at others. Around Licata, the 3rd Division ran into enemy
counterfire at only a few points. Because of Allied air superiority, shipping losses from enemy aircraft were surprisingly light.43
Beach and Port Activities
Once ashore, the American forces faced the difficult task of establishing a satisfactory supply system. Adverse weather at first delayed discharge. The principal task, however, was to prevent confusion and congestion on the beaches, since supplies and equipment soon were being unloaded faster than they could be forwarded to dumps or to troops. The most critical period was from about noon of D Day to the night of D plus 1 when the Americans had begun to advance inland and the enemy air attacks were most determined.
Chaotic conditions continued on all the beaches until D plus 3. Although inexperienced personnel, an absence of effective control measures, a lack of suitable exit areas, and a grave shortage of vehicles contributed to the congestion, the main handicap was a shortage of labor for cargo discharge and beach clearance. Supplies were piled high in hopeless disorder, and enemy strafing attacks caused frequent fires.
Initially, each subtask force set up beach dumps. Each force contained signal, ordnance, medical, and DUKW units, as well as a naval beach battalion, but no port units. In Sicily the shore groups attempted many tasks, including combat duty, for which they had not been trained. As a result, their efforts to fulfill their basic mission were scattered and not very effective. During the assault phase, in fact, the unloading was completed only because of the help of naval working parties from the transports and prisoners of war.44
In time the difficulties of the Engineer shore groups were overcome. Conditions improved most rapidly on the beaches in the Joss area, where the U.S. Navy had stationed three able and effective beachmasters. In the DIME area some beaches had to be closed temporarily because of enemy shelling. The most undesirable beaches were those near Scoglitti, where the CENT force had to contend with a high surf, huge sand dunes, and no suitable exits to the hinterland.45 During the first three days, 10–12 July inclusive, the following results were achieved in the landing of men and materiel over the assault beaches in Sicily:46
The newly devised 2½-ton DUKW was amazingly successful in landing maintenance supplies.47 It could deliver directly from ship to dump thereby eliminating double handling of cargo at the beaches. Because the Seventh Army did not have enough trucks, the DUKW frequently was
| Area | Personnel | Cargo (DWT) | Vehicles |
| Total | 66,285 | 17,766 | 7,396 |
| CENT (Scoglitti) | 22,654 | 7,801 | 2,179 |
| DIME (Gela) | 23,161 | 3,351 | 1,465 |
| Joss (Licata) | 20,470 | 6,614 | 3,752 |
diverted from its proper ship-to-shore orbit and driven far inland, thus restricting its availability for cargo discharge. In several instances DUKWs capsized and sank because of overloading. Despite limited carrying capacity and the constant problem of maintenance, the advantages of the DUKW far outweighed its shortcomings.48
By D plus 4, the initial beachhead of the Seventh Army had been secured. The first few days in Sicily showed that, given good weather, air and naval support, and sufficient small ships, landing craft, and DUKWs, a fairly large force could be maintained over captured beaches. The fear that the beaches would deteriorate rapidly under heavy traffic proved groundless.49 Nevertheless, ports were necessary to provide for continued and growing supply needs. Licata was captured and opened to Allied craft on D Day, and on 16 July Porto Empedocle was taken. At Licata, Companies A and B of the 382nd Port Battalion, supplementing their C rations by raids on local tomato and melon patches, feverishly unloaded subsistence, water, gasoline, and ammunition from LSTs. Since these ports lacked the capacity to support the Seventh Army by themselves, beach maintenance was still necessary.50
By 19 July 1943, the 1st Engineer Special Brigade had relieved the division commanders of responsibility for cargo discharge and over-the-beach maintenance in the American sector. With only modest shore facilities, the small ports and beaches on the southern coast received 104,134 long tons of cargo during the period 10-31 July. Of this total, Licata accounted for 37,766 long tons, Gela for 35,310, Porto Empedocle for 17,305, and Scoglitti for 13,753.51
The capture of Palermo on 22 July 1943 gave the U.S. Seventh Army its first deep- water port capable of accepting cargo ships direct from the United States. In peacetime a thriving commercial center and later an important Italian naval base, Palermo normally afforded ample berthing space for ocean-going vessels. Its protected harbor had four large piers and excellent rail and highway facilities. Repeated air and naval bombardment, however, had wrought terrific destruction, leaving the water front a tangled mass of upturned and blackened hulls, spars, and funnels. The Americans found 44 vessels of various types sunk in the channel and at the piers and the port reduced to about 30 percent of its normal capacity.52
Reconstruction in the port area was begun by Seventh Army engineers on 23 July, chiefly to furnish berths for landing craft and coasters and ramps for DUKWs. Removal of debris, the filling of bomb craters, and preparation of port exits were given primary consideration. One useful expedient, first employed at Palermo, was to build ramps over sunken vessels lying alongside the piers so as to obtain additional berthing space. The
experience gained here later proved valuable in reconstructing other war-torn ports in Italy and France. The first ships to enter Palermo harbor were six coasters. They came on 28 July 1943, carrying essential supplies heretofore trucked overland from the south coast. On 1 August the 10th Port began operating at Palermo, remaining there until the following summer.
After Palermo was opened, several temporary beach supply points were established along the northern coast for the support of the American troops advancing toward Messina. Beginning on 1 August supply points were set up, first at Termini Imerese, then at Torremuzza beach near San Stefano, and finally at Brolo beach and Barcellona beach, to which supplies were moved by rail, truck, and craft. At times water transport was the only way to insure prompt supply for combat units, since the rail line was only partly open and the coastal road at one point had been blown from the face of the cliff. Urgently needed rations, ammunition, and gasoline were delivered to the beach points by landing craft, coasters, and schooners from the south coast, Palermo, and directly from North Africa.53
With the fall of Messina on 17 August 1943, enemy resistance collapsed and the island was completely occupied. The build-up and maintenance continued, and soon the harbor at Palermo became so congested with shipping that cargo discharge lagged. The original supply plan had called for five convoys from the United States (UGS-11 through UGS-15), consisting of 57 ships with 347,237 long tons of cargo, all scheduled for discharge in Sicily between 19 July and 8 September 1943. The discharge schedule was not met. All told, during this period 64,653 tons were discharged at the small ports and beaches on the southern coast, and 187,882 tons were landed at Palermo, leaving a backlog of 94,702 tons.54
Port activity at Palermo was limited until the harbor had been cleared of obstructions. Tons of rubble also had to be removed from the devastated port area. As late as 29 August 1943 this once busy seaport had been restored to only 60 percent of its normal capacity. Apart from the extensive destruction, a major factor in the shipping congestion at Palermo was the Army’s inability to effect the prompt forwarding of discharged cargo because of insufficient service troops, particularly truck drivers, and delay and difficulty in setting up a satisfactory system for delivery to the dumps.
Despite the foregoing factors that prevented optimum cargo discharge, U.S. Army engineer and transportation troops were remarkably successful in restoring order from chaos at Palermo. During the period 28 July to 31 August 1943 this port received 48 vessels, consisting of 5 troop carriers, 32 Liberty ships, and 11 coasters. In the same period a total of 120,706 long tons of cargo was discharged. The average daily discharge was 3,658 long tons, with a peak of 5,718 long tons on 12 August. U.S. Army cargo continued to pour into Palermo long after the Sicilian campaign had ended.55
Supplying the Seventh Army by Rail
In Sicily, as in North Africa, the distribution of men and materiel to the interior was effected principally by railway
and motor transport. Although only part of the Sicilian trackage was taken over by the U.S. Army, it was important in advancing the supply line. A measure of the achievement in rail transportation is found in the statistics covering freight carried during the campaign.56 For the period 12 July to 1 September 1943, inclusive, in the combined southern and central districts, which bore the brunt of the initial assault, the heaviest movement was from Gela to Licata and from Licata northward to Caltanissetta. Within this area a total of 112,406 net tons was moved by rail. In the northern district, where the railway did not become available until late July, the most tonnage was lifted on the coastal line running eastward from Palermo to San Stefano. There, for the period 28 July to 1 September 1943, inclusive, a total of 61,617 net tons was carried by rail.
The task of running the Sicilian railways for the U.S. Seventh Army was assigned to the 727th Railway Operating Battalion, which had gained valuable experience in North Africa. An advance detachment landed at Licata on 12 July, where it made a reconnaissance of the railway facilities, organized native railwaymen, and located equipment. On the following day approximately 400 tons of supplies were sent forward by rail to the 3rd Division. By the end of July the entire battalion had arrived and was busily organizing and directing American railway operations.57
Principal operating difficulties encountered by the 727th stemmed from bombed and sabotaged trackage, tunnels, bridges, yards, stations, and locomotives, and inadequate signal communications. From the start, too, trains were delayed for lack of water, and various expedients were adopted, including delivery by water trucks and cars and in five-gallon blitz cans. Nevertheless, with the cooperation of Italian train crews, the 727th rapidly restored rail service in southern and central Sicily, and soon the battalion was delivering more tonnage to the railheads than could be promptly unloaded. The first train, carrying approximately 400 tons of supplies, moved eastward from Palermo on 29 July. With Italian help the tracks soon were opened along the northern coast as far as Cefalu and, later, to San Stefano.
Throughout the Sicilian campaign the 727th Railway Operating Battalion stationed men at strategic points to organize and utilize native railway workers, open rail lines, effect repairs, and keep supplies moving from ports to railheads. Working day and night in strange surroundings, with strange equipment, and frequently without regard for personal safety, the men of the 727th won warm praise from General Patton. Its island mission accomplished, the unit began the trek into Italy in October.
Highway Operations in Sicily
Planning for highway operations in Sicily began in April 1943.58 A complete study was made of the Sicilian road net, and action was initiated to obtain essential highway equipment and supplies. The procurement of sufficient qualified
personnel proved difficult, especially for manning a proposed traffic control organization. Early in July the creation of the provisional 6623rd Regulating Company of 50 officers and 200 enlisted men, however, solved the problem of a traffic control unit. The 6623rd also furnished part of the staff and all of the operating personnel for a Highway Division under the Transportation Branch of G-4, U.S. Seventh Army.
A small advance party of the Highway Division landed on the beach east of Licata on 14 July. On the following day it began operating from Seventh Army headquarters at Gela, making recommendations on main and alternative supply routes for the American sector. Organic motor transport was utilized to haul supplies from beach and port to dump during the first week of the campaign, but thereafter this task was assigned to the trucks and DUKWs of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. Late in July additional highway troops arrived. Various Quartermaster truck units also debarked, but highway operations were handicapped continually by a shortage of drivers.
After the capture of Palermo, the Highway Division moved to that city, completing its transfer on 26 July. A traffic circulation plan was developed immediately, and the traffic engineer was active in the selection of depot and dump sites and supply routes in the Palermo area. On 28 July motor freight activity was inaugurated at the port with 69 trucks and 19 DUKWs, under the operational control of a detachment of the 6623rd Regulating Company. Lack of familiarity with the city and inadequate route and cargo markings, coupled with the blackout, were among early difficulties. A road patrol of three officers constantly roamed the city, directing drivers to destinations and expediting truck turnaround. By 1 August a total of eleven dumps had been designated, located at distances from .3 miles to 10.3 miles from the main port gate. Within a month the first day’s record of 75 trucks delivering a total of 802.3 tons had soared to 230 trucks carrying a total of 4,641.9 tons. Contributing to greater efficiency was the assignment to the Highway Division of centralized dispatch control of all vehicles of Quartermaster truck units assigned or attached to the Seventh Army. Orders for trucks at shipside were placed through a central dispatching office and filled from the motor pool.
For the movement of supplies from Palermo, the Highway Division organized motor convoys, establishing the procedure, routes, and schedules. With the capture and repair of rail lines along the northern coast, an effort was made to reduce movement by highway. Instead, dispatch was made by truck from forward railheads at Campofelice, Cefalu, and San Stefano, the last being as far eastward as the railway was made operative. From two to five truck companies operated from these railheads, delivering to local dumps or to advanced supply points. The peak of highway activity was reached early in August, declining sharply thereafter.
In general, the main roads of Sicily were in excellent condition. Demolished highway bridges caused no serious difficulty, since they were easily bypassed. Towns and villages, with their sharp curves and narrow streets, were often bottlenecks for vehicular traffic. Within more densely populated areas military transport had to contend with heavy civilian traffic. To prevent the natives’ carts and bicycles from interfering on main supply routes, the Highway Division prepared a
set of regulations for civilian traffic, which was issued by the American Military Government (AMGOT).
Although truck, train, and ship bore the brunt of the load, the Seventh Army also made use of animal transport. Because of the rough terrain of Sicily, approximately 4,000 pack animals—horses, mules, and donkeys—had to be employed. Variously procured within the theater by capture, purchase, and hire, these animals were employed by the troops for both combat and supply missions. The average pack weighed from 250 to 275 pounds and consisted of water, rations, signal equipment, and ammunition. During the campaign about 1,500 animals were lost through enemy action.59
The U.S. Army’s experience in Sicily demonstrated that all types of transportation were necessary in invaded areas, and that no one alone could meet the need. This lesson was repeated in subsequent activity on the Italian mainland.
Transportation in the Italian Campaign
The brief Sicilian campaign of thirty-eight days formed the prelude to the longer and much more exacting campaign in Italy. Several factors—notably the stiff resistance and superb delaying tactics of the enemy, the difficult terrain, adverse weather conditions, and inadequate transportation—accounted for the slow and painful progress of the Allied forces up the Italian boot.
The belief that with the overthrow of Mussolini war-weary Italy could soon be eliminated from the conflict entered into the Allied decision of late July 1943 to launch an amphibious assault against the Italian mainland. At that time the U.S. Fifth Army, under General Clark, was directed to develop plans for the seizure of Naples and the nearby airfields with a view to preparing a firm base for further offensive action. The target date for this operation, known as AVALANCHE, was set for early September. The ground forces initially made available to Fifth Army for AVALANCHE were the American VI Corps and the British 10 Corps. D Day was finally fixed for 9 September 1943, since the moon would set well before H Hour on that date and a sufficient number of serviceable landing craft would be available by then. The site for the landings would be the area skirting the Gulf of Salerno, to the south of Naples, principally because it lay within the range of Allied air support from bases in Sicily.60
Mounting the Assault Forces
Loading the troops, weapons, and supplies for the attack on Salerno was complicated by the critical shipping situation and the congested condition of the North African ports. Of the huge armada assembled for the assault, a total of 90 ships and landing craft had been assigned to lift 38,179 troops and 3,204 vehicles for the U.S. VI Corps.61 The main portion of the American contingent was loaded at Oran, that of the British at Bizerte. Supporting convoys were dispatched from both North Africa and Sicily.
American and British plans were coordinated by the U.S. Chief of Transportation, AFHQ, through his Operational Planning Branch. The Transportation Officer, SOS, NATOUSA, was responsible for preparing prestowage plans. His staff cooperated closely with the base section commanders, whose personnel supervised the loading of the troops and cargo in accordance with priorities set by the task force commanders. Transportation officers were bedeviled by frequent though necessary changes in troop lists, loading priorities, and allocations of ships and craft. Despite the usual last-minute flurry of loading, unloading, and reloading, by 5 September 1943 the bulk of the U.S. VI Corps had sailed from Oran for the rendezvous off the Salerno beaches.62
By midnight of 8-9 September the entire task force had reached the assembly area. The weather was clear. Under cover of darkness the troops clambered down the nets into assault craft. Because of enemy mine fields and reportedly strong coastal defenses, the troopships anchored about twelve miles offshore, thereby slowing the unloading operations and adding to the discomfort of the attackers aboard the pitching and rolling invasion fleet. From the transportation point of view two important immediate objectives were the port of Salerno and, about six miles inland, the rail and highway center of Battipaglia.63
Beach and Port Operations
The Salerno landings were preceded by stepped-up strategic bombing of Italian transportation facilities. Railway bridges, in particular, were singled out for destruction from the air. The resultant damage, together with the subsequent demolition activities of the retreating enemy, were to present the Allies with the difficult task of rehabilitating and operating badly battered ports and railways.64 Although the capture of Naples was set for D plus 12—a target date that later proved overly optimistic—plans were made for over-the-beach supply for an entire month if necessary.
Under heavy enemy fire on 9 September 1943 the American VI Corps, spearheaded by the reinforced 36th Infantry Division, surged ashore at four beaches near the site of the ancient Greek city of Paestum. Discharge of vehicles and supplies began shortly after the troops landed, and before the close of the day about 2,000 tons of supplies had been unloaded. Apart from enemy action, the principal hindrance to prompt cargo discharge and beach clearance was insufficient manpower and a shortage of cargo trucks. Both service troops and vehicles had been limited in number because of limited shipping space. Beach personnel on occasion had to be withdrawn for combat duty, and being given no relief the drivers worked until exhausted.65
The effective employment of various types of landing craft (LSTs, LCTs, LCMs, LSIs, and LCIs) and of the amphibious DUKWs contributed materially to successful discharge. The versatile LSTs transported troops, tanks, and vehicles directly to the shore, spanning the last water gap to the beach by attached ponton landing ramps. Some vessels discharged as much as 80 percent of their cargo into LCTs, which shuttled between ship and shore. As in Sicily, DUKWs proved useful, landing not only personnel and supplies but also light artillery and antitank guns.66
Enemy shellfire on D Day forced temporary abandonment of all activity on Yellow Beach and Blue Beach in the American sector. Congestion then developed on Red and Green Beaches. Working parties had to be sent ashore from the transports to supplement the insufficient labor. The first shore dump, located about a quarter of a mile inland from Red Beach, began functioning on D plus 1. Additional dumps were established by D plus 4, and thereafter beach clearance was satisfactory.67
The small port of Salerno, entered on D Day and taken shortly thereafter, could accommodate only a few coasters and landing craft, and its usefulness was limited by enemy interference. As a result, heavy reliance had to be placed upon beach operations. At first, the beach organization consisted of the reinforced 531st Engineer Shore Regiment and a beach party of the U.S. Navy 4th Beach Battalion. As the need arose, the men of the 531st, veterans of North Africa and Sicily, took time out for combat assignments such as cleaning out a nest of German snipers in the old Tower of Paestum.68
The first port battalion to function in the Salerno area was the 389th, which arrived with the assault convoy. The bulk of its personnel, 18 officers and 853 enlisted men, had been distributed among the combat loaders to assist in cargo discharge. Working around the clock, by the afternoon of 10 September the 389th had unloaded 5,635 tons of general cargo and 1,630 vehicles from 18 vessels of the D-Day convoy. This task completed, the battalion was put ashore, where it was attached to the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment. After establishing a bivouac, the 389th continued to discharge cargo from incoming vessels. Repeated enemy bombing and strafing caused many casualties, and a few men “cracked up” under the strain.69
About a week after D Day it became apparent that the task of over-the-beach supply had grown beyond the capability of the existing organization, and that at least one more port battalion was needed. On 17 September 1943 a detachment of the 6th Port arrived to take charge. The 531st Engineer Shore Regiment, however, continued to assist in beach operations. Newly arrived port personnel, including a Negro unit, the 480th Port Battalion, bivouacked amid the impressive ruins of Paestum. Italian labor was recruited nearby and brought to the beaches by truck and train. With this larger force the
daily cargo discharge soared. As the month drew to a close, rough seas prevented continuous operation. On the night of 28-29 September a sudden gale blew several craft up on the beach, a coaster went aground, and cargo discharge was halted for two days.
Because of delay in the capture of Naples, the Salerno beaches were used longer than originally intended, and discharge of supply was therefore at the mercy of the elements. Naples fell on 1 October, and thereafter over-the-beach discharge became less imperative, ceasing altogether on 13 October 1943.70
Port Activity at Naples
At Naples Allied bombers and Axis demolition teams had achieved a new high in destruction. An advance party of Fifth Army personnel, consisting of fifty officers and enlisted men under the command of General Pence, entered the city on 2 October and prepared to open the port. With the party came its transportation officer, Lt. Col. (later Col.) Robert H. Clarkson, and a detachment of the 6th Port. The original plan called for joint American and British operation under a British port commandant, with Colonel Clarkson as his deputy.
Within the port area of Naples, Clarkson and his men found utter desolation. At the principal pier, where the luxury liner Rex had formerly docked, nothing was operative. Buildings had been blasted, roads were blocked with rubble, and fires, which the Germans had ignited, were still burning in the piles of coal. No part of the port or its equipment had escaped damage.71
Wherever possible, the gantry cranes had been dynamited so that they would fall into the water. Several large Italian naval vessels, including one cruiser, lay on their sides. A capsized hospital ship with Red Cross markings lent a splash of color to the otherwise somber array of masts, booms, funnels, and cranes protruding from the oil-slicked harbor. The approaches to every pier and berth were jammed with partially and totally submerged hulks. A survey of 7 October 1943 disclosed only three deepwater berths for Liberties, three berths for coasters, and fourteen anchorages for ships within the harbor that could be worked with landing craft, lighters, or DUKWs.72
According to the same survey, the only available cranes were the crawlers brought in by the Americans. Barges and lighters were urgently needed. Fortunately, Colonel Clarkson was able to obtain enough cargo nets, pallets, fork-lift trucks, and cranes from Palermo. Since Naples had no electric power, the dynamos of three Italian submarines were used to furnish electricity for port operations. Rail connections had been broken, and most of the locomotives and rolling stock had been either destroyed or damaged. The principal railway tunnel was entirely obstructed by the wreckage of two trains that had been rammed into each other head on.
Rehabilitation of the port facilities was achieved through a tremendous cooperative effort. American and British naval
units, including divers and mine sweepers, cleared the harbor. The 1051st Port Construction and Repair Group, aided by other engineer units, removed rubble and debris to permit the operation of vehicles in the port area, razed tottering structures, and reconstructed berths and quays. The 6th Port operated the port and scheduled the rehabilitation program. The 703rd Railway Grand Division restored rail service, repairing the yards, track, and rolling stock.73
The reconstruction of the port was marked by a high degree of ingenuity. Clearing the most readily operable berths naturally received top priority. Small hulks were cut up, but the removal or salvage of the larger ships blocking the piers would have entailed excessive time and effort. Therefore, superstructures of the capsized vessels were removed and ramps were built over the hulks, in effect improvising new docks at which ships could be moored for discharge. Considerable steel was salvaged on the spot, but nearly all heavy timbers had to be imported, since the Italians had very little wood for construction. Various types of ramps were devised to fit the situation. For example, a long personnel ramp, connected to the shore by a steel span, was attached to the curved hull of the capsized Italian cruiser to provide a complete pier for troop debarkation. In another instance, after a disabled tanker had been sunk on an even keel the entire superstructure was cut down to the level of the main deck, which was then covered with a wooden platform so as to form a full-length berth for a Liberty ship.74
From the beginning, local labor was employed extensively at Naples. As an incentive, native workers were served nourishing food and received extra pay for night work. In the last quarter of 1943, the Italians in the port area earned a half million dollars—no mean stimulant for the stricken local economy. During this period the 6th Port had a daily average employment of 4,200 common laborers, 729 stevedores, 1,368 contract laborers, and 1,200 classified workers, including interpreters, clerks, typists, and stenographers.
The 6th Port began cargo discharge at Naples with the 684th and 687th Port Companies of the 389th Port Battalion. By the close of 1943 it had been joined by five more port battalions. Still other port battalions were obtained from Sicily and North Africa. An initial shortage of manpower was eased by converting former Italian infantry regiments into port units, which worked under American supervision. Discharge from landing craft commenced on 3 October, and the first Liberty, the Elihu Yale, docked on the following day. Among the earliest vessels were those that had been loaded by the 6th Port at Casablanca in mid-August 1943 and held within the theater until the capture of Naples.75
At first, ship’s gear and mobile cranes discharged cargo, either at such berths as were open or from anchorages offshore into barges, landing craft, and DUKWs. In October 1943 offshore discharge (89,358 long tons) actually exceeded discharge at the piers (58,887 long tons). Thereafter, as more berths became available
and winter weather limited operations, the amount discharged offshore declined. As port reconstruction progressed, the total cargo discharge naturally increased. By 1 November 1943, when the port came under the complete control of the Americans, it had twelve Liberty, four coaster, and three ponton berths, plus three hards for landing craft. During the period 4 October to 31 December 1943, the average cargo discharged per day, including general cargo and vehicles, amounted to 13,383.5 long tons.76
Apart from the critical need for more tugs, barges, lighters, and other harbor craft to facilitate offshore discharge and the limited number of berths suitable for direct discharge, the early operations of the 6th Port at Naples were hampered by insufficient labor, inadequate lifting equipment at depots and dumps, enemy air raids, and adverse weather. Starting in mid-September 1943 the rainy season brought muddy roads, and loaded trucks sometimes bogged down. Storms, accompanied by high winds and rough seas, frequently forced complete cessation of offshore discharge because of the low freeboard on loaded craft and DUKWs. In mid-October the weather worsened. In order to assure a supply of warm, protective clothing for troops at the front, General Clark personally directed that ships containing overcoats, raincoats, boots, woolen clothing, and the like be discharged first. Detailed data for unloading these items were furnished on the same afternoon as requested, and the necessary action was promptly taken.77
Overflow tonnage at Naples was absorbed by its satellite ports of Salerno, Castellammare di Stabia, and Torre Annunziata. Like Naples, they were released from British control and were assigned to the 6th Port in November. Their peak daily discharge of 4,930 long tons was attained on 16 December 1943. Since Naples had only limited facilities for troop debarkation, three small personnel ports were opened nearby at Pozzuoli and Baia and on the island of Nisida. Termed craft ports because their shallow waters could only accommodate the landing craft that brought troops from North Africa, they were all situated within a three-mile radius and within easy marching distance of the staging area at Bagnoli near Naples.78
Thanks in no small measure to the Corps of Engineers and the Transportation Corps, within six months devastated Naples was transformed into the busiest Allied port in the theater. Because of extensive damage to rail facilities, port clearance in the early months was effected largely by truck, but as the railways became operative they carried a sizable portion of the load. In the peak period, 27 February to 1 April 1944, cargo discharged totaled 591,597 long tons, of which 226,797 were cleared by rail and 299,216 by truck, leaving a backlog of 65,584 long tons.79 The maximum daily cargo discharge, 33,142 long tons, was attained on 21 April 1944.
Among the difficulties encountered at Naples were strong winds and high seas, enemy air raids, the usual absence of Italian civilians on Sundays, occasional
shortages of railway cars and trucks, and, in March 1944, a dramatic eruption of ashes and cinders from Mt. Vesuvius that interrupted rail and highway traffic. In general, the 6th Port made an impressive showing, though perhaps some of its claims were extravagant.80
Naples remained an important U.S. Army supply port throughout the Italian campaign. Beginning in January 1944 normal port discharge operations were frequently curtailed because of outloading for amphibious assaults, of which the first was for the Anzio landing. This operation featured preloaded supply trucks, which were delivered by LST to Anzio.
An even greater burden fell upon the port of Naples when it helped mount the U.S. Seventh Army for the invasion of southern France (DRAGOON) in mid-August 1944. A special group headquarters, composed of 10th Port personnel, was created to take charge of this undertaking. All task force units were required to furnish complete data, including size and weight, for all equipment and vehicles. The loading was based upon a Seventh Army priority list. The units were assigned to specific concentration areas, from which they were called forward as desired to the embarkation points in and near Naples.81
All this activity cut sharply into the discharge capacity. Port personnel were hard pressed since requirements of the Fifth Army were still heavy, and the Seventh Army had taken many port and truck units that had to be replaced by less efficient Italian personnel. On 1 July 1944 the 8th Port began relieving the 6th Port, which was slated for Marseille.82 With simultaneous cargo discharge and out-loading, the 8th Port faced a busy summer at Naples.
To avert port congestion during the period of outloading for DRAGOON, only essential items were discharged at Naples. As many vessels as possible were diverted to other Italian ports, reductions were made in the scheduled shipping to the theater from the zone of interior, and cargo discharge at Naples and its satellite ports was placed on a priority basis. Some port congestion was accepted as inevitable, for with 22 of the available 29 berths assigned to operational loading, only 7 berths remained for cargo discharge. While praising the performance of the port in loading 379 ships and craft for the assault convoy, the U.S. Chief of Transportation, AFHQ, admitted on 15 August 1944 that the backlog of undischarged vessels in the theater was “embarrassingly large.”83 Maximum cargo discharge was therefore absolutely essential in order to release these ships for employment elsewhere.84
At the close of October 1944 the port situation again was nearly normal, since phased shipments to southern France had been completed and Leghorn opened. Subsequent operations were under no great pressure. When the Italian campaign ended on 2 May 1945, Naples and its satellite ports had discharged 5,711,417
long tons of general cargo, 2,485,921 long tons of bulk petroleum, and 675,098 long tons of coal.85 Other major accomplishments included the outloading of 2,140,271 long tons of cargo, the embarkation of 1,307,919 passengers, and the debarkation of 1,768,249 personnel.
Anzio
The Anzio assault was developed to avoid a continued and painful overland advance by staging an amphibious landing on the west coast of Italy behind the enemy lines.86 Throughout the planning, the principal restriction was the relatively small number of operational LSTs—approximately ninety—in the theater, most of which were scheduled for early withdrawal for use in the forthcoming invasion of Normandy.
The Anzio project (Operation SHINGLE) was pushed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Eager to see Rome in Allied hands, he took direct action to arrange for the provision of sufficient landing craft. Fifth Army was charged with the preparations for launching the assault, with a target date as close as possible to 20 January 1944. The immediate objective was to seize and secure a beachhead in the vicinity of Anzio. Ground forces for the operation were to consist of the Headquarters, U.S. VI Corps, commanded by Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, the veteran U.S. 3rd Division, the British 1st Division from the Eighth Army front, and other supporting units.87
Originally conceived as a subsidiary project, the Anzio assault ultimately developed into a major operation. Since the expedition would have to be supplied by sea for an indefinite length of time, a previous plan to land with maintenance for seven days without resupply was scrapped and provision made for at least thirty-five days. To allow for possible bad weather, the schedule called for supply ships to arrive every three days. Heavy equipment was to be forwarded by Liberty ships from North African ports. To save time in loading and unloading, resupply of ammunition, packaged gasoline, and rations was to be accomplished by loaded trucks delivered by LSTs from Naples. Prime Minister Churchill, Admiral Sir John Cunningham, and Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith all disapproved the latter scheme, but circumstances ultimately forced its adoption.88
The Peninsular Base Section was to maintain the U.S. forces. Initial responsibility for supply and evacuation at the beachhead fell upon the Headquarters, U.S. VI Corps. To it was attached the 540th Engineer Combat Regiment, which with accompanying U.S. Army and Navy personnel constituted a beach party of approximately 4,200 men.89
The target area was the Anzio–Nettuno district, about thirty miles south of Rome. The small port of Anzio had only one jetty, enclosed by a breakwater 600 yards long. The harbor, which accommodated only shallow-draft vessels, was subject to sudden storms and heavy swells. Nettuno, to the east of Anzio, possessed practically no port facilities. Both towns, formerly popular seaside resorts, were tied in by road with the important north-south Highway 7. The nearby beaches, although of gentle slope, were flanked by offshore sand bars, lay exposed to the whims of the weather, and had awkward gradients for the discharge of landing craft. The projected Allied beachhead, roughly an area seven miles deep and fifteen miles wide around Anzio, included a reclaimed portion of the famous Pontine Marshes. Winter weather and poor beaches made the entire enterprise extremely hazardous, but success of the operation really hinged upon whether or not the Germans could organize an effective resistance.90
With the approach of D Day, set for 22 January 1944, Naples and its satellite ports presented a scene of intense activity as men and materiel were loaded. Long lines of waterproofed vehicles rolled down to the embarkation points, and troops filed aboard waiting vessels. As dawn tinted the hills above the Bay of Naples, the first ships slipped their hawsers and the ass Cult convoy sailed. The landing was virtually unopposed, for the enemy had been caught completely off guard. By noon of D Day, VI Corps had attained all its preliminary objectives.
The port of Anzio was taken almost intact. Except for minor damage along the water front, the only obstacles were a few small vessels scuttled in the harbor. By early afternoon of D Day the dock area was ready to receive landing craft, and by 0800 of D plus 2 all the LSTs and LCTs of the assault convoy had been completely unloaded. A maximum of eight LSTs could be berthed at one time. Because of shallow water all Liberty ships had to anchor about two miles offshore, discharging their cargo mainly into LCTs and DUKWs. The average load of each LST (American and British types) was 151 long tons and of the DUKW, 3 long tons. The weather during the first week was more favorable than anticipated. High winds and surf halted beach activity on only two days.
After recovery from the initial shock, the reaction of the Germans was sharp and severe. With artillery skillfully emplaced on high ground and, later, with the 280-mm. railway gun known as Anzio Annie, the enemy bombarded the Anzio beachhead day and night, inevitably causing some supply losses but never really halting the operation. Frequent air raids, although annoying, had no appreciable adverse effect. Antiaircraft guns, barrage balloons, and smoke generators afforded some protection for the port. However, winter storms, particularly during February, led to several temporary shutdowns in beach and port activities.91
Originally, activities on the beaches and in the harbor were carried on independently. On 6 February 1944, in order to obtain centralized control, the 540th Combat Engineers, under Col. George W. Marvin, took over all beach and port operations for Fifth Army, using a detachment of the 10th Port as a port headquarters. At first an entire port battalion, the 488th, was sent to Anzio, where its men
moved from ship to ship discharging cargo. The unit had a harrowing experience because of enemy aircraft, E-boats, and long-range artillery. Under almost constant harassment, the 488th managed to discharge an average of 1,498 long tons per day in 37 working days. Nevertheless, by 18 February 1944, fatigue, casualties, and illness had greatly lowered the battalion’s efficiency. Aboard the ships the men often had no rations. Special gear to discharge heavy items was also lacking.
To remedy this situation sufficient port personnel and rations, plus adequate gear for discharge, were placed aboard each Liberty ship or LST sailing for Anzio. After discharge these men returned on the same vessel to the home port, and a different group made the next trip. The new arrangement took effect early in March 1944. Since completing discharge meant leaving this dangerous area, the port troops sent to Anzio worked doubly hard. The average Liberty ship carried about 150 enlisted men with 2 or 3 officers, and the initial operation was around-the-clock. As a rule each gang consisted of 17 enlisted men, of whom 6 worked in the hold, 8 in the LCT alongside, and 3 on the deck. Under the new system the amount of tonnage unloaded at Anzio from 1 through 31 March (157,274 long tons) was more than twice the amount (73,251 long tons) discharged from 6 to 29 February 1944. At the peak, on 29 March, 7,828 long tons were unloaded.92
Anzio resupply at first involved mainly landing craft, although cargo ships became increasingly important in the spring months.93 The ever-present possibility of death or destruction placed a premium on rapid discharge and a quick turnaround. Beginning in late January 1944 a convoy of six LSTs was dispatched daily from Naples. Each vessel brought fifty loaded 2½-ton trucks, which were backed into the LST to permit a quick discharge at Anzio. Each truck carried about five tons, mostly ammunition but also rations and such important items for defense as barbed wire and sandbags. A Fifth Army G-4 representative at the beachhead made a daily check of the materiel on hand and reported the critical needs, operating much like a grocer ordering for subsequent delivery. After being unloaded at the Anzio dumps, the vehicles were filled with salvage and other items and then parked in a concealed waiting line for the return voyage.
Every week a fleet of fifteen LCTs brought bulk shipments from Naples. LCIs were employed almost exclusively as personnel carriers. At ten-day intervals, Liberty ships arrived with additional materiel. This unfailing seaborne supply line and their own stout resistance enabled the beachhead forces to hold out until the Allied break-through in late May brought relief. Following the occupation of Rome on 4 June 1944, the spotlight shifted from grim and battered Anzio to the forward ports of Civitavecchia and Piombino.94
Civitavecchia and Piombino
Three days after securing Rome, the Allied forces had pushed ahead some fifty miles to capture the small city of
Civitavecchia.95 There, bombing and demolition had played havoc with port and rail facilities. The harbor was filled with sunken craft and the breakwater had been damaged. Speedy rehabilitation was essential to provide an additional port, since the available land transport was inadequate for the rapidly advancing Fifth Army. Through the efforts of the U.S. Navy, the Corps of Engineers, and a daily labor force of 500 to 700 Italians, salvage and reconstruction proceeded so rapidly that within a week cargo was being discharged from five ships, four Liberties and a coaster, that arrived on 13 June. A detachment of the 8th Port supervised operations.96
At Civitavecchia all ships at first had to be discharged from anchorage, but four Liberty berths were eventually developed for alongside use. The maximum discharge was about 6,000 long tons per day. As a supply port Civitavecchia had only fleeting significance. Until late July 1944 as much as 27,000 long tons was discharged per week, but thereafter the volume dwindled. Civitavecchia, like Piombino, took ships diverted from Naples when that port became congested. As activity increased at Piombino, Civitavecchia declined in importance and on 12 September 1944 ceased to function as a military port.
The history of Piombino as an Allied port roughly parallels that of Civitavecchia. Captured by elements of the 39th Engineer Combat Regiment, the battered port facilities at Piombino required considerable rehabilitation. Discharge began on 30 June. In the first two days of operation, 3,437 long tons of general cargo and 93 vehicles were unloaded by landing craft, barges, and DUKWs. The 39th Combat Engineers retained control of the port under Fifth Army but were assisted by a detachment from the 8th Port, which was shortly replaced by personnel from the 6th Port.
Port reconstruction later brought berthing space for two Liberty ships and one coaster, but during the summer of 1944 most cargo ships were discharged offshore into LCTs. A pressing problem was the lack of a rail connection with the main line between Rome and Leghorn, which meant that all cargo had to be cleared by truck. In spite of insufficient craft, cargo discharge at Piombino mounted, reaching a peak of 44,009 long tons for the week ending 5 August, or almost four times the figure recorded for the same period at Civitavecchia. During the following months when Leghorn became available, port activity at Piombino sharply declined, and on 20 September its cargo operations ceased.
Leghorn
The large commercial port of Leghorn fell to the Allies on 19 July 1944, but extensive damage prevented its immediate use. The northern and southern entrances to the harbor were blocked by sunken ships, the harbor and town were heavily mined, and enemy shelling for a time delayed clearance. Quay walls had been
shattered by explosives, alongside berths were inaccessible, and rail facilities were inoperable, However dismal the prospect, reconstruction had to begin immediately because of the urgent need of another large port fairly close to forward elements of Fifth Army.97
With the help of the U.S. Navy and the Corps of Engineers, mines and underwater obstacles were removed, a channel was blasted through the scuttled ships to permit large vessels to enter the south harbor, extensions were added to the blasted quays to facilitate cargo discharge, and, as at Naples, the sunken vessels were made into piers. Preliminary operations commenced on 20 August 1944 when the first Liberty ship, the Theodore Sedgwick, arrived and began offshore discharge of essential engineering and stevedoring equipment. Eight days later two Liberty berths were available. Cargo discharge climbed rapidly to a peak, for the week of 24–30 September, of 45,328 long tons. At the close of the month Leghorn boasted eleven Liberty berths for alongside discharge, six berths for lighterage, and one berth for tankers.98
Port operations were started by an Engineer combat battalion assigned to the Peninsular Base Section, and on 1 September 1944 the 10th Port under the command of Col. John M. Cobb replaced the battalion. At Leghorn the 10th Port faced problems similar to those of the 6th Port at Naples—widespread destruction, inadequate service personnel, insufficient motor transport, limited port and rail facilities, adverse weather conditions, and unskilled native labor. For several months Leghorn was uncomfortably close to the front, as evidenced by the landing of enemy saboteurs. Fortunately, the personnel of the 10th Port and of the Peninsular Base Section had the requisite experience to cope with the situation.99
Both American and British port battalions were assigned to Leghorn. The former, mostly Negro units, worked on American ships, and the latter on British vessels. Considerable use was made of Italian labor, both civilians and service units. Many barges and other harbor craft were required for offshore discharge, and frequent breakdowns among such vessels caused much concern until trained personnel were obtained to make repairs. At the outset only three cranes were in use, one 30-ton floating crane and two mobile shore cranes of 5-ton capacity, but thirty additional cranes were procured before the end of the year.100
Since building damage had been extensive, much of the cargo had to be stored in the open. In the absence of rail lines, trucks at first carried all supplies forwarded northward from the port to the Fifth Army. Restoration on 7 November 1944 of rail service from Leghorn to Pisa on Line 50 lessened the load on motor transport.101 Trucks, however, were always the mainstay in port clearance.
By 24 November 1944, since sufficient
berthing space had been developed, all supply for Fifth Army was concentrated at Leghorn. The port then had twelve berths ready for Liberties and another almost completed, one for coasters and one for colliers, two for tankers, and several hards for landing craft. During the period 20 August 1944 to 31 May 1945, 1,375,205 long tons of general cargo, 471,926 long tons of bulk petroleum, and 21,854 vehicles were unloaded at Leghorn. In the same period the port outloaded 233,185 tons of general cargo.102
Passenger traffic was also significant at Leghorn. Troops were transshipped from Naples, reinforcements arrived for Fifth Army, and patients were evacuated. The first personnel ship, the Colombie, docked on 6 October 1944, bringing elements of the 92nd Division. Thereafter the port handled both inbound and outbound passengers. In the last quarter of 1944 debarkations featured U.S. Army replacements and elements of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, the latter arriving by LCI from Naples. Embarkations consisted of evacuated prisoners of war, miscellaneous troops for France, rotation personnel for the United States, and patients leaving the theater. At the peak, in December 1944, almost 3,000 patients were evacuated from Leghorn aboard seven hospital ships.103
Since the harbor was too shallow to accept large troopships, and adverse weather could impede the offshore discharge of personnel, the Sestriere, a fast but shallow-draft cargo vessel taken from the Italians at Taranto, was converted by the 8th Port into a personnel carrier for shuttle service between Naples and Leghorn. Fitted with standee bunks for about 1,900 passengers, the Sestriere completed her first 21-hour run from Naples to Leghorn on 27 December 1944. By July 1945 she had transported 41,042 passengers.104
Embarkations at Leghorn narrowly exceeded debarkations during the wartime period, the former totaling 145,434, and the latter 139,021. Beginning in February 1945, the number embarked was swollen by the inclusion of 68,906 British and Canadian troops redeployed through this port to Marseille.105 When the German armies surrendered on 2 May 1945, Leghorn and Naples were the principal Allied ports in the theater.
Rail Transport
Movement by sea was the predominant factor in U.S. Army transportation in the Mediterranean. Yet, as in other theaters, all practicable means of transport had to be exploited to meet the transportation needs. Among the available alternatives the Italian railways naturally bulked large, and their prompt utilization became an important objective.
Extensive Allied bombing and widespread Axis destruction had left the Italian railways almost completely inoperable when U.S. and British forces invaded the peninsula. American railway operations were initiated in the Salerno area on 23 September 1943. The Corps of Engineers, assisted by Italian labor, opened the
first steam and electric line, which ran from Agropoli, just below Paestum, to Battipaglia, approximately twenty-four miles. Since the overhead wires had been cut on the electrified portion, at first the only source of power was one reconditioned steam locomotive discovered at Agropoli. Switching service was supplied by four 2½-ton U.S. Army trucks that had been specially equipped with flanged wheels to run on rails. More than a hundred boxcars and open-top cars were found available, together with about 300 tons of coal. During the last week of September 1943, 215 carloads of ammunition, rations, gasoline, oil, and grease were forwarded over this line.106
According to Colonel Burpee, who headed the advance echelon of the 703rd Railway Grand Division in this area, the first railway line was opened to Salerno on 5 October. However, the condition of the tracks at Salerno made it necessary to establish a railhead at Pontecagnano, five miles to the south, whence supplies were forwarded by truck to the dumps at Avellino. Two trains per day were operated to the railhead. Following track and bridge repairs north of Salerno, the line was further extended for a total distance of about 43 miles. Railway service was handicapped by an inadequate water supply, by the temporary diversion of vehicular traffic to the railway bridge across the Sele River, and by the necessity of transporting numerous homebound Italian refugees. Despite these difficulties, the line to Naples was gradually made operable by American and British railway troops and Italian labor.107
On 7 October 1943 General Gray, Director General, Military Railway Service, AFHQ, took command of all U.S. and British railway troops in Italy. This action was followed on 22 October by an AFHQ directive assigning Gray responsibility for the rehabilitation, technical development, and operation of all Italian State Railways and all privately owned railways in Italy except those that might be returned from time to time to civilian control. All American rail troops, the railway portion of the British Transportation Service, and Italian State Railways personnel and materiel were placed at his disposal and were to operate under his direction. Control of the Italian State Railways personnel and Italian military railway units was to be effected through General di Raimondo, Director of the Italian State Railways under the Italian High Command, who would report to Gray to carry out assigned duties.
As in North Africa, the MRS headquarters at Naples was an international organization, staffed by both British and American personnel. Gray exercised command of the British railway units through the senior British transportation service officer in Italy, Colonel Parkes, who also served as Gray’s deputy. Colonel Burpee was appointed Director, Military Railways in Italy, and headed up the American rail activities for Gray.108 Continuing MRS operations in North Africa were handled by Brigadier Gage, the British director of transportation and deputy to the director general, and Col. Alexander W. Campbell
(U.S.), Director, Military Railways of North Africa.109
In Italy, U.S. and British railway units were assigned to separate zones, as far as practicable. In general, the British troops were employed behind the British Eighth Army along the eastern side of the peninsula, working their way northward from the Bari area; the American units were placed in support of the American Fifth Army on the Mediterranean side.110 Italian troops were used in both zones to assist in railway rehabilitation.
American railway troops began arriving at Naples shortly after its capture. An advance echelon of the 703rd Railway Grand Division reached that city on 3 October 1943. Three days later the 713th Railway Operating Battalion debarked and began the tremendous job of restoring rail service in the Naples area by clearing away debris and repairing the damaged tracks, bridges, and equipment. Its maintenance of way group, Company A, repaired the trackage at the port and then moved seven miles to the north, laying 8,500 feet of track in four days despite inadequate equipment, adverse weather, and land mines. During October and November 1943 the unit restored as much as 16,200 feet of track in a single week, and with Company A of the 727th Railway Operating Battalion it reconstructed a 300-foot bridge over the swift and muddy Volturno River north of Capua.
Other units of the 713th were also busy during these months. By 23 October Company B had placed nine locomotives in operation and had four more under repair. For a few days Company C had no tracks on which to operate, but thereafter its services were in great demand. The first test train left Naples on 10 October. The locomotives and railway cars taken from the enemy were found to be superior to similar French equipment in North Africa. However, operation of the engines was hampered by poor coal.111
By mid-October 1943 the trains leaving Naples for the front hauled an average of 700 tons. It is difficult to reconcile the conflicting reports on the total number of cars loaded and the total tonnage carried during October in the Naples area, but in any event the trend was definitely upward as more operating equipment became available and more trackage was opened to Allied traffic.112 According to the 6th Port, the monthly carloadings at Naples increased to approximately 5,500 during November and 7,700 during December 1943. As the year drew to a close, General Gray found the Military Railway Service in far better shape than he had anticipated. A number of important facilities such as the steam locomotive repair shop at Naples had escaped serious damage, and the Italian railway workers soon were busily engaged on Allied orders.113
During their first six months in Italy, the MRS troops were plagued most by damaged or demolished tracks and structures and insufficient coal for the locomotives. As they pushed northward from Naples they discovered that the retreating Germans had been amazingly clever in the art of demolition. Bridges were blasted, tunnels blocked, and rails, ties, and switches rendered useless. Among the more ingenious devices was the so-called big hook, which was carried on a flat car and towed behind a train. While the hook tore up the ties, TNT charges were dropped to damage the rails.114 Luckily, not all the destruction came off according to plan. For example, only part of the eight-mile railway tunnel north of Naples was shattered, and the Americans were able rapidly to open the demolished portion and to begin moving trains through the tunnel. The brunt of railway reconstruction in the area behind the Fifth Army was borne by the A Companies and signal sections of the 713th, 715th, 719th, 727th, and 759th Railway Operating Battalions, assisted by two battalions of Italian construction troops.115
Even when tracks and bridges were ready for service, there was the problem of providing fuel to run the trains since Italy lacked coal. In order to make the maximum use of fuel oil, by late October 1943 General Gray had decided to obtain as many diesel engines as possible and to convert U.S. and Italian coal-burning locomotives into oil burners. At the close of February 1944 a total of forty-nine U.S. diesel engines had been placed in operation in Italy. Of the fourteen U.S. standard 2-8-0 coal-burning locomotives received from North Africa during that month, eleven were made into oil burners. Sizable quantities of both coal and fuel oil had to be imported to keep the trains in operation.116
The MRS had considerable shop work done under its direction. Two American and three British hospital trains were converted from captured equipment and used to transport patients during the winter of 1943–44. The second American fourteen-car hospital train, completed on 11 February 44, was much superior to the first, having both electric lighting and steam heat throughout. Other jobs performed during 1944 included the construction of a nine-car “delousing” train for Fifth Army troops at the front and the manufacture of replacement parts for baking equipment at the Anzio beachhead.117
Highly significant in all this activity was the success of the MRS in repairing electric engines and restoring service on the electrified lines that the Germans had left in a seemingly hopeless state. The first electric-driven military train began running in the Salerno area on 16 January 1944. Subsequently, electric trains were operated between Naples and Bagnoli and later between Benevento and Foggia. Diesel-electric engines were kept rolling by the machinists and electricians of the
760th Railway Diesel Shop Battalion, which began functioning at Bagnoli in late November 1943.118
By January 1944 Allied rail traffic in Italy had begun to boom. Lines totaling approximately 2,400 miles were then under MRS operational control, and because of the temporary slow down in the Allied advance the rehabilitation and operation of the railways had been pushed forward almost within sight of the combat zone.119 During the closing months of 1943 the military demands for movements by rail were coordinated and the allotments of rail tonnage decided by means of weekly rail Priority of Movements meetings attended by representatives of the Peninsular Base Section, the Advance Administrative Echelon, AFHQ, and the Military Railway Service. These meetings functioned on the base section level. However, when the demand for rail transport began to exceed the available capacity, serious backlogs developed. Therefore, in late January 1944 the Advance Administrative Echelon, AFHQ, instituted a POM conference to allocate tonnage movements by rail.
At the first AFHQ POM meeting, held on 27 January 1944, principal bidders for rail space, both American and British, were represented, including all the U.S. supply services, the Army Air Forces, and the Peninsular Base Section. Although rail capacities would not permit accepting all bids received, a total of 18,537 tons was allocated for the east-west movement in the week beginning 31 January. The chairman at these meetings was a British movements officer, and the deputy chairman was an American, Colonel Fuller. American and British bids were submitted separately and then consolidated. After the allocations had been decided the final arrangements for shipment were made by the appropriate U.S. and British agencies, respectively, for their accepted bids.120 Since the POM conference concerned only rail traffic for the Allied armies, other arrangements had to be made for nonmilitary passengers and freight.121
While the MRS struggled to restore rail service and to satisfy both military and civilian demands, its operations were by no means trouble-free. The thick blanket of volcanic ash and cinders left by the violent eruption of Mt. Vesuvius in March 1944 halted railway traffic for nearly two days. Also, enemy aircraft continued to strafe trains and to bomb railway facilities, striking in the Naples area as late as April 1944, but doing relatively little damage. As in North Africa, trains carried antiaircraft guns and gunners.122
With respect to pilferage, Gray drew upon his previous experience. To protect railway shipments in Italy he obtained the 794th Military Police Battalion from North Africa. In January 1944, in order to counter stepped-up pilferage, detachments of the 794th were stationed at Torre Annunziata, Salerno, Potenza, and Battipaglia, to guard equipment and supplies both while awaiting shipment and in
transit. Throughout the Italian campaign the MRS employed military police to protect rail shipments by riding the trains and guarding the freight yards.123
On 30 April 1944 the MRS, under General Gray, had the following U.S. Army military railway units stationed in Italy: two railway grand divisions, four railway operating battalions and Company A of another; one railway shop battalion; a detachment of one railway diesel shop battalion; one provisional base depot company; and a military police battalion and a separate military police company. On the same date the strength of all U.S. units assigned to MRS in the theater, including several still on service in North Africa, totaled 7,418 officers and enlisted men.124 During this period rail activity continued at a high level, especially in the Naples and Bari areas. At the close of April 1944 the MRS had 504 locomotives, of which 296 were available and 208 were under repair. Railway cars in service numbered 18,961.125
In May 1944 a new Allied push northward brought additional responsibilities for Gray’s men. On occasion, the Military Railway Service engaged in activity normally pertaining to the Corps of Engineers. An outstanding example was the reconstruction by military railway troops of a 237-foot bridge over the Garigliano River at Minturno, at that time reportedly the largest single span replaced in the theater. Rebuilt with captured German bridging material, the new structure was opened to traffic early in June.126
Following its capture, Rome quickly developed into the main center for the MRS in Italy. Meanwhile, railway lines to and from the Eternal City were being reconstructed much more rapidly than originally contemplated. By 27 June 1944 rail service had been restored to the newly acquired port of Civitavecchia, and two days later the first train ran from Anzio to Rome. During the same month an advance echelon, commanded by Col. James K. Tully, set up the MRS headquarters in Rome. British railway troops had completed the reconstruction of Line 90 from Cassino to Rome by 2 July. The formal entry came on Independence Day, when the Secretary of War and his official party were brought into Rome aboard a special train.127
During July and August outloading for the invasion of southern France placed a heavy burden upon the railways in the Naples area. Among the first MRS units transferred to southern France were the 703rd Railway Grand Division and the 713th Railway Operating Battalion. On 15 September 1944 General Gray officially opened a new MRS headquarters at Lyon, France. Temporarily, the MRS in Rome was represented by a rear echelon under Colonel Campbell and the 704th Railway Grand Division. However, since both Campbell’s group and the 704th were slated for service in France, a new railway grand division, the 774th, was activated
and placed under the command of Lt. Col. William P. Wilson with headquarters at Rome. In late October 1944 Brigadier R. D. Waghorn, the theater British transportation service chief, was appointed director of the Allied MRS in Italy, and Wilson became his deputy.128
Amid these changes, military railway operations centered increasingly in the Leghorn–Pisa–Florence area of northern Italy. The coastal lines from Rome to Leghorn became available on 22 September 1944. Early in November Line 50 was opened from Leghorn to Pisa, after considerable track repair and the replacement of five bridges by the maintenance of way companies of the 715th and 719th Railway Operating Battalions. Subsequently, reconstruction was begun on the two rail lines from Pisa to Florence. The most strategically located of the two, Line 218, passed through the Serravalle Tunnel via Pistoia and Prato to Florence. However, because the demolition of the tunnel was unexpectedly thorough, repairs were rushed on the alternative route to Florence, Line 219, which ran approximately fifty miles along the valley of the Arno River.129
Originally double-tracked and electrified, Line 219 had been one of Italy’s high-speed lines. Because of German demolition and Allied bombing, rail service had been completely halted. Track, yards, signal communications, and rolling stock had been heavily damaged, and most bridges, culverts, and arches had been completely destroyed. Rehabilitation of the major portion of the line began ahead of the target date of 30 Apri1.130 The job was done by Italian railway troops, the maintenance of way companies of the 715th and 719th Railway Operating Battalions, and several engineer construction companies. The project involved 44 miles of main line track, 1,776 lineal feet of bridging, 5,173 lineal feet of fill, 2,425 lineal feet of pipe culvert, and 23 miles of yard, sidings, and spur track at 17 locations.
As the war in Italy drew to a close, the major emphasis of MRS activity was placed upon the reconstruction and restoration to service of the lines in the north, which were vital to Fifth Army. To the south as the wartime urgency lessened, portions of the rail network were progressively released to the Italian State Railways. Military traffic continued heavy in 1945. In April 377 military freight trains delivered 151,827 net tons from Leghorn to Pisa.
There was also considerable troop travel during the first five months of 1945, especially on the leave trains, which in March carried a record total of 88,683 passengers. Coupled with the movement of repatriates and prisoners of war, all this activity brought a constantly increasing demand for rail equipment, which was met only by tapping all available sources in the United States, Sicily, and North Africa and by instituting a vigorous program of repair and recovery of rolling stock on the Italian mainland.
On 30 April 1945 the American contingent of the MRS in Italy comprised 190 officers, 5 warrant officers, and 3,685 enlisted men. The units involved were the
774th Railway Grand Division, with headquarters at Rome; the 701st Railway Grand Division, with headquarters at Florence; two railway operating battalions, the 715th at Florence and the 719th at Leghorn; the 753rd Railway Shop Battalion at Naples; the 760th Railway Diesel Shop Battalion at Rome; and six military police companies, stationed at various points from Naples to Grosseto, with headquarters at Rome. Almost as numerous as the Americans were the attached Italian railway engineer units, totaling 131 officers and 3,287 enlisted men. When hostilities ended, practically all lines on the mainland were being operated by the Italian State Railways.131
Truck and Highway Operations
Despite the impressive contribution of the Military Railway Service, motor transport was in constant demand throughout the Italian campaign. Since rail facilities were badly damaged, trucks initially had to be relied upon to clear the beaches and ports and to provide inland transportation. As the railways were restored to service they assumed an increasing share of the load, but motor transport remained important in port clearance, base and depot hauling, and deliveries forward from the railheads. Providing close and flexible support to the combat forces, trucks were less susceptible to enemy attack than the fixed rail lines, and they could easily be diverted to meet new or emergency demands. Generally speaking, there were never enough trucks to fill current needs. In Italy, which lacked the modern highway network of the United States, the war brought many problems in motor transportation. However, the U.S. Army was better prepared for its task because of previous experience in the rugged terrain of North Africa and Sicily.
Both the Peninsular Base Section and the Fifth Army had sizable aggregations of trucks, the former for service operations and the latter for combat missions. The main burden fell upon the highway officer of the Peninsular Base Section, Lt. Col. Chester R. Weaver, and upon the Transportation Officer, G-4, Fifth Army, Major Kreml. Weaver and Kreml were experienced highway officers who had learned their jobs the hard way—in North Africa.132
It was fortunate that Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Ralph H. Tate, who became G-4 of Fifth Army in August 1943, was firmly convinced of the need of a separate transportation section to function under his direction. Despite the unwillingness of the Fifth Army quartermaster to relinquish the transportation function, Tate succeeded in setting up a new special staff Transportation Section, which was headed by Major Kreml. Tate considered this action the most important single step he took as G-4, Fifth Army, for it meant that all Fifth Army truck units were put in a pool under the centralized control of the Army G-4 and were not, as before, under the control of the Fifth Army quartermaster, who was himself a user of transportation.133
Motor transport activity in Italy began at the Salerno beachhead. With the assault force came the 1st Battalion of the
468th Quartermaster Truck Regiment and a platoon of the 22nd Quartermaster Car Company. Other trucking units soon fol-lowed.134 Early operations at Salerno were confined to moving supplies from the beaches to nearby dumps. At first, both trucks and drivers were far too few to keep the beaches cleared. As the invaders pushed inland, trucks carried the bulk of the supplies, although the opening of rail service in late September lightened the load on Highway 18.135 Thereafter, available rail and highway facilities generally provided a combination lift, with rail transport being employed as much as and as far forward as possible before turning to trucks.136
Within two weeks after the initial assault, traffic control had to be inaugurated on Highway 18, the main overland supply route. By late September 1943 bumper-to-bumper traffic was common, a condition that could have led to disaster had there not been Allied air superiority. To relieve highway congestion, a centralized motor pool was established for all beaches, traffic control posts were set up, and traffic dispersal areas were selected near the highway into which vehicles were diverted until the jams were broken. Blown bridges, difficult bypasses, and the narrow streets of the towns and villages, combined with the constant flow of Italian civilians, gravely complicated the task of the military police in directing highway traffic.137
Following the capture of Naples the principal trucking operations concerned port clearance and the delivery of cargo to the depots and dumps and from the railheads to Fifth Army. Because of severe damage, the trains lagged behind the trucks in accomplishing port clearance. During the week 13-20 November 1943, an average of 3,000 tons was cleared daily by rail, compared with the 3,447 tons per day removed by truck. At this time, because of excessive rain and mud both the Peninsular Base Section and the Fifth Army had many inoperative vehicles, the daily average of the former being 938 operative as against 235 inoperative vehicles, and of the latter 397 operative as against 166 inoperative vehicles. Throughout the remainder of 1943 the tonnage moved by truck from the docks and the depots steadily increased. In December alone almost 200,000 tons were delivered by truck from Naples to Peninsular Base Section dumps.138
Despite inclement weather, rugged terrain, shortages of spare parts, tires, and batteries, and almost constant operation—all contributing to a high percentage of deadlined vehicles—highway traffic continued heavy as Fifth Army sought to break through the Winter Line.139 Behind the combat zone, the Corps of Engineers repaired and maintained roads while the Transportation Corps labored to keep traffic fluid. Toward the close of 1943 increasingly heavy highway movements
pointed up the need of closer supervision.140 After preliminary discussion, the Advance Administrative Echelon, AFHQ, on 24 December 1943, published a basic policy for traffic control in the areas behind the armies. In order to eliminate unauthorized travel, traffic police were empowered to remove from the road any convoy or casual vehicle not in possession of a road movement order or dispatch slip from the American or British agency authorizing the movement. Detailed regulations were issued for convoy travel, and a convoy commander was made responsible for control and operation of each convoy.141
Highway traffic continued to increase in early 1944. During January the Peninsular Base Section reported a total of 904 motor convoys, composed of 40,686 vehicles carrying 7,717 tons of freight and 84,623 passengers.142 Apart from the usual hauling from beach to dump, large numbers of loaded trucks were delivered by LST for the resupply of the Anzio forces. For this last mission a reserve of approximately 1,500 2½-ton trucks was established under a single command, the 6723rd Truck Group (Provisional).143
At Anzio the first increment of 500 waterproofed trucks, each carrying five tons, arrived aboard 14 LSTs in the assault convoy. Each LST had been “spread loaded” in Naples with Class I, III, and V supplies, rather than with one class alone, so that loss of the entire cargo would not seriously reduce any particular supply category. After completing delivery to the dumps, the trucks were driven to an assembly area for eventual return by sea. The second and third increments were loaded in the same manner and like number as the first, 35 trucks per LST. Each truck had only one class of supply, so that it stopped at only one dump in Naples and one dump in Anzio.
Beginning on 28 January 1944, a program was initiated for the daily dispatch of 300 trucks by LST from Naples to Anzio. This arrangement was designed to furnish a daily lift of 1,500 tons, of which 60 percent was allotted to ammunition, 20 percent to rations, and 20 percent to petroleum products. Adverse weather conditions and the diversion of LSTs to other missions prevented attainment of this goal, but the deficit was not serious.
Within a week after the initial landing, four LSTs were able to discharge simultaneously at the Anzio docks, and trucks no longer needed to be waterproofed. Also, the U.S. Navy allowed each LST to carry 50 rather than 35 trucks. As ultimately developed, the cycle began with loading at Naples, sailing at 1700, and arrival at Anzio at 0600 in the following morning. After completion of discharge, trucks awaiting return were driven aboard head on to save time in departing from this hazardous area. The LSTs then assembled in the harbor and proceeded back to Naples.
Direct delivery of loaded trucks from docks to dumps was of immense advantage at Anzio, enabling the combat troops to obtain their immediate needs on short
notice. This truck-and-LST shuttle system was a vital factor in supporting the beachhead defenders until the breakthrough of late May, which relieved the enemy pressure. On 1 June 1944 the first overland motor convoy arrived at Anzio via historic Highway 7, bringing 150 truckloads of ammunition.
For the advance to Rome, considerable reliance was placed upon Highways 6 and 7 running northward from Naples, of which the former became the main supply route for the British Eighth Army while the latter performed a similar function for the U.S. Fifth Army.144 Fortunately, the acquisition of additional ports and rail facilities to the north of Rome shortened the highway hauls and made possible the movement of larger tonnages by motor transport, since the trucks could operate directly from the forward ports rather than all the way from Naples. Throughout the summer of 1944 highway traffic in Italy remained heavy.
In September 1944 the loss of several truck units to the U.S. Fifth and Seventh Armies forced the Peninsular Base Section to operate its trucks on a twenty-four-hour basis and to employ a civilian motor pool for the Naples area in order to meet all demands. The onset of the rainy season brought several washouts, which damaged roads and bridges and led to temporary suspension or rerouting of highway traffic. Cold weather also pointed up the need for determining which highways would be safe during the winter months, especially in the mountains of northern Italy.145
During the ensuing autumn, apart from occasional personnel shortages, the burden of maintenance, a scarcity of spare parts, the elements, and the enemy effectively hindered highway operations. Continual rains flooded the roads. Adverse weather and German demolition impeded the restoration of rail service and increased the load on motor transport. Early in November 1944 abnormal rainfall caused several breaks in the track on Line 50 near Grosseto. While repairs were being made, a temporary truck line was established that moved approximately 400 net tons per day from the railhead at Alberese to the railway cars at Grosseto. Restoration of normal rail traffic on 25 November released the drivers and the thirty-six trucks of the 3826th Quartermaster Truck Battalion engaged in this shuttle service. Similar truck ferries were often improvised during the Italian campaign in order to keep supplies rolling forward.146
Highway traffic was kept fluid by close control and supervision. As a rule, military police actually directed traffic, the Transportation Corps attended to routing and movement control, and the Corps of Engineers repaired and maintained the roads. Military police had both fixed posts and motorized patrols. Traffic Control Posts (TCPs) were usually located at important road junctions and were intended to control and expedite traffic. Each Traffic Control Post maintained a heavy wrecker to remove disabled trucks and had a convoy park adjacent that would hold at least fifty vehicles. With the approach of winter, snow and ice threatened to cut off the highways in the mountainous area beyond Florence. The Fifth
Army engineer therefore set up a temporary system of “snow posts,” whose personnel were responsible for snow removal, first aid and medical service, assistance to drivers of damaged or stalled vehicles, road information, and emergency food, fuel, and shelter.147
Toward the close of 1944 motor transport in the Peninsular Base Section and the Fifth Army areas was under severe strain because of lengthening lines of communication, inadequate equipment, and insufficient personnel. The theater desperately needed newer and larger motorized equipment to replace its old, war-weary vehicles. Specifically, the chief of transportation had recommended procurement of cargo vehicles of greater capacity than the standard 2½-ton truck. He also wanted to increase the lift capacity of the truck companies by means of truck-tractors, semitrailers, and heavy-duty trucks capable of carrying 8 to 10 tons. To meet his needs the theater requisitioned 576 truck-tractors and 720 semitrailers, of which the first increment, 289 truck-tractors and 240 semitrailers, arrived in December 1944. At the end of March 1945 the Peninsular Base Section had 587 6-ton to 10-ton truck-tractors and semitrailers, 23 4-ton 6x6 trucks, 3,349 2½-ton 6x6 trucks, 381 1½-ton 4x4 trucks, 1,626 1-ton two-wheel trailers, and 116 miscellaneous types of cargo vehicles. Meanwhile, Fifth Army had built up its stock of motorized equipment by a vigorous program of rehabilitation and replacement.148
Actual operation in the theater disclosed various drawbacks of the trucks in use. Although the tractor-trailer combination gave greater capacity, its utility was much restricted by rain, mud, ice, snow, and rugged terrain. The 1-ton two- wheel trailer was found almost useless on the mountainous roads and in the mud-filled dumps of Italy. The standard 2½-ton cargo truck, which carried a maximum of 4 to 5 tons, was considered the most efficient general-purpose vehicle. Its body, however, would not hold long pieces of pipe or lumber. The theater needed a new single-unit 8x8 truck in order to insure better performance on rough and winding roads. The desired vehicle was to have a capacity of 8 to 10 tons, an 18-foot to 20-foot stake body, and a minimum of 600 cubic feet of cargo space. The cab-over-engine type was preferred because of the greater visibility afforded the driver. During the war this proposal never got beyond the paper stage.149
Apart from proper maintenance above the second echelon and an adequate supply of spare parts and tires, both problems of the Ordnance Department, the Transportation Corps had difficulty in obtaining sufficient troops for the trucks under its supervision or control. The Table of Organization of the truck company did not, for instance, include the guards required to curb pilferage. Experience in the North African campaign also demonstrated that at least twenty-four extra drivers had to be added to the standard truck company to permit continuous operation. Such augmentation teams finally were authorized for the theater in 1944.
By January 1945 Fifth Army had twenty-seven augmented truck companies and the Peninsular Base Section
twenty-two, of which the latter were all Negro units. In addition to the civilian truck pool at Naples, the theater made extensive use of Italian service units. Originally, there were thirty Italian military truck companies, but this number was reduced by the necessity for screening out the unsatisfactory personnel, who were later pooled in seven companies and employed chiefly as labor. For various reasons, including the fact that they were equipped largely with 1½-ton trucks, the Italian trucking units had less lift capacity than similar U.S. Army units. As established by a personnel utilization survey in April 1945 of all trucking units attached to the Peninsular Base Section Transportation Section, the performance standard for the augmented Quartermaster truck company manned by U.S. military personnel was set at 680 truck-hours per day under continuous operation, as compared with 520 truck-hours per day for the Italian military truck company.150
When hostilities ceased, highway operations had reached a peak. In the week ending 5 May 1945 the Peninsular Base Section and Fifth Army reported the following results in ton-miles for the two principal categories of cargo vehicles:151
| Type | Peninsular Base Section | Fifth Army |
| Truck-tractors and semitrailers | 237,473 | 170,309 |
| 2½-ton 6x6 trucks | 286,571 | 293,758 |
The extent of trucking operations in Italy in the closing phase of the campaign is reflected in the statistics covering port clearance by truck from Leghorn. From its opening in late August 1944 through May 1945, a total of 1,382,872 long tons of cargo was cleared from Leghorn. Of that amount 1,202,934 long tons were moved by truck. During the same period, 1,924,038 long tons were cleared by truck from Naples, as compared with 1,471,501 cleared by rail.152
Many valuable lessons in highway transportation were learned in the Italian campaign, particularly by Fifth Army, which depended mainly upon motor transport.153 As the result of its wartime experience, the Fifth Army Transportation Section laid great stress upon a system of strict control for all highway movements, military and civilian; the augmentation of truck companies to provide extra drivers and other auxiliary personnel for around-the-clock operations; the procurement of additional heavy-duty equipment such as the 20-ton truck-trailer unit; an adequate communications network; and good marking of the roads.
Other Transport
Although it was dependent upon ships, trains, and trucks to move the bulk of its traffic, the Transportation Corps was interested in all other types of transport that could help lighten its load. In Italy, for instance, the pipelines for the delivery of gasoline were not a Transportation Corps responsibility, but their use lessened the strain on the limited motor and rail
facilities.154 Movement of the vast quantities of 100-octane gasoline required for airplanes and 80-octane gasoline for tanks and vehicles was possible only because of pipelines, since neither tank cars nor tank trucks were available in sufficient numbers.155
Pipelines
Pipeline deliveries were made from Taranto, Bari, and Manfredonia to Allied airfields in the Foggia area, and from Naples northward in support of the Fifth Army ground troops advancing up the west coast. Both 4-inch and 6-inch pipes were laid, the former handling approximately 4,000 barrels of gasoline per day and the latter triple that amount. By 22 December 1943 gasoline was being pumped over two pipelines from Naples to Calvi Risorta, twenty-five miles beyond. The daily capacity of 260,00 gallons filled the requirements of Fifth Army. During January 1944 the utilization of this double pipeline saved an average of 50 railway cars daily, or from 250 to 300 trucks. Subsequent extensions of the system resulted in similar saving in transportation.156
Although subject both to pilferage and sabotage, the pipeline presented such a small target as to be well-nigh immune to enemy air attack and artillery fire. Unlike the average road, the pipeline was unaffected by the weather, and it could be used constantly and without fear of congestion. It is therefore no wonder that the pipelines were pushed steadily northward from Naples to the Po Valley and to all points where gasoline had to be furnished in appreciable amounts for any length of time.157
Air Transport
The theater chief of transportation and his staff performed largely a coordinating function with respect to air transport. The Air Facilities Board, AFHQ, established the priorities. All demands from the ground forces for air space for personnel and freight were first screened by the Air Branch of the AFHQ Movements and Transportation Section, of which the American staff became in effect the Air branch of the office of the U.S. theater chief of transportation.158
Air transport was employed mainly to move personnel, mail, and critical items such as serums, spare parts, mortars, mortar ammunition, and signal equipment. During the early months of the Italian campaign air cargo for Italy proper ran fairly heavy. Most air freight originated within the theater, but some shipments came directly from the United States. In December 1943 a total of 160,188 pounds of SOS freight arrived at airfields on the Italian mainland, principally in the Naples area. Air freight remained important throughout the campaign, although the actual tonnages hauled were not impressive.159
Because the constantly increasing demand threatened to overtax the existing facilities, on 10 December 1943 AFHQ
directed that passenger traffic by air be reduced at once and that transportation by air be authorized only on the basis of importance to the war effort. Thereafter, the number of personnel moved by air was reduced appreciably by closer screening of travel requests and by employing surface transportation except for the most urgent missions. In May 1944 the Air Branch, OCT AFHQ, was also made responsible for receiving and processing all ground forces requests for air travel orders and collecting and distributing air tickets. Effective 14 June 1944, a separate aircraft pool (three Hudson and one Dakota) was formed for VIPs in order to enable general officers and important officials to travel with their own parties on special missions.160
The removal in July 1944 of AFHQ and the Headquarters, SOS, NATOUSA, from Algiers to Caserta eliminated much of the previous shuttling back and forth between North Africa and Italy. However, at the same time air evacuation of patients to the zone of interior was begun on a large scale. The primary purpose was to relieve congestion in the theater hospitals, since evacuation by water was not sufficiently effective. In July 900 patients were evacuated by air from the Mediterranean and Peninsular Base Sections.
The invasion of southern France brought a decided spurt in air travel, with daily flights scheduled to Marseille and Dijon by the Mediterranean and European theaters. From 6 December 1944 on, the integrated American-British Air Group under the Movements and Transportation Section, AFHQ, was made responsible for all matters pertaining to demands of the ground forces for air movement, including policy, planning, and operations. Air traffic continued important throughout the remainder of the Italian campaign, especially for evacuation of sick and wounded personnel to the zone of interior.161
Animal Transport
In sharp contrast to the speed of aircraft was the slow steady pace of the pack horse and the mule. Yet the latter could deliver a load in rugged tracts of land where neither jeep, truck, nor plane—except for airdrop—normally could be counted upon for supply. In the mountains of Italy, the highly mechanized U.S. Army was forced to fall back upon primitive, but nonetheless effective, animal transport. When the Italian campaign began, Fifth Army had only the one pack train that the 3rd Division had used in Sicily. Its performance had impressed General Clark. Looking at the map of Italy in late September 1943, he foresaw the need of more of this type of transportation for the long trek northward. At his request a study was made that showed that 1,300 mules were needed for the Fifth Army. However, few animals could be had and equipment and forage were scarce both in Italy and North Africa.162
As Fifth Army advanced beyond Naples, pack trains had to be employed to insure the supply of units operating in the high mountains. Accordingly, the G-4, Fifth Army, requisitioned several hundred
mules to equip hastily organized Italian pack-train companies. The Peninsular Base Section acquired mules from every possible source within the theater but it was unable to meet all demands. Importation of American mules was deemed inadvisable because they would require large amounts of hay and grain that could not be procured locally, whereas Italian mules were accustomed to getting along on home-grown hay and tibben (chopped straw).163 The forage problem in Italy became so serious that in the fall of 1943 an AFHQ Joint Purchasing Forage Board was established. The necessary shoes, nails, and pack equipment also proved hard to procure. However, by 12 December 1943, Fifth Army had 2,257 pack animals, and the number increased steadily during the winter months.164
Fifth Army operations along the Winter Line were highly dependent upon mules. On the flatlands, jeeps and trucks could plow through the thick Italian mud, but miles of rough trail could be traversed only by mules. Each mule usually carried about 220 pounds of supplies. In the forward areas this type of transport was in constant demand.165
For many American soldiers mules were unique, and at first everything had to be improvised, even to the mule skinners. A provisional pack troop was organized for each division, with personnel drawn mostly from service companies. Except for the 3rd Division, which brought its own mules from Sicily, the first mules used by Fifth Army units were purchased in the rear areas or requisitioned from nearby farmers. Late in 1943 a French veterinary hospital was obtained to help conserve the small supply of animals and regular French and Italian pack-train units were secured from North Africa and Sardinia. The troops of the Italian pack-train companies performed admirably. Poorly clad, they worked long hours without food or rest, trudging along with their mules in all sorts of weather and over the most difficult terrain.166
The Italian units were equally indispensable during the second winter of the war in Italy. The forage problem was magnified when the U.S. 10th Mountain Division reached Italy late in 1944, bringing American mules accustomed to eating American hay and grain. Altogether, this division required the importation of approximately 7,120 mules, plus another 500 mules per month as replacements. In order to transport these animals from the United States to Italy, nine mule ships were withdrawn from the Burma—India run. The first of these vessels, the William J. Palmer, was discharged at Civitavecchia early in March 1945. Other mule ships arrived in April, but thereafter no further shipments were required.167
The Final Phase
Mountains and mules marked the close of combat for the Allied armies in Italy. Although the Germans did not surrender
until 2 May 1945, redeployment of American troops had already begun during the preceding month, when approximately 3,200 Air Forces personnel left for the United States. The two major ports for outloading redeployed personnel were Naples and Leghorn, especially the latter since most U.S. troops were stationed north of Rome. As in other theaters, redeployment struck hard at the Transportation Corps, adding to its work at the very time when its most experienced personnel were being sent home.
Upon the cessation of hostilities and after clearance with Washington, the theater diverted various vessels carrying materiel no longer needed, and stopped the discharge of nonessential cargo from others. In several instances ships already on hand were reloaded with ammunition, pierced-steel planking, vehicles, and heavy weapons, and then rerouted to the Pacific. All told, sixteen vessels arriving in Convoys UGS-84 to 89 were returned to the United States undischarged. During May 1945 the bulk of the redeployed military personnel leaving Italy belonged to the Air Forces.168
The tempo of redeployment began picking up during June. In that month twenty units under Transportation Corps control were redeployed from the theater, including five port companies and six Quartermaster truck companies destined for the Southwest Pacific. Because of the shortage of service troops incident to the redeployment, both the Peninsular Base Section and the Fifth Army made extensive use of surrendered enemy personnel. In June the Peninsular Base Section Transportation Section organized approximately 4,500 German POWs into various service units, including 8 port companies and 10 Quartermaster service companies. In the same month the Transportation Section of Fifth Army had about 2,000 Germans working at the railheads and 1,000 Germans operating trucks. Subsequently, increasing reliance was placed on the use of German POWs, along with Italian service units, to fill the gaps left by departing American transportation troops.169
Redeployment traffic continued on the upswing during July 1945. A total of 54,609 passengers was moved out of the theater by sea transport, and outloading of cargo constituted a major port activity. The bulk of the general cargo and vehicles, 107,478 dead-weight tons, was out-loaded at Naples, as compared with 50,747 tons at Leghorn. In the Peninsular Base Section trucking operations were hard hit by a severe shortage of trained drivers, necessitating the transfer of low-score personnel from Fifth Army units to the trucking companies. Rail movements to port staging areas and redeployment centers increased, and early in the month the MRS completed the rehabilitation of Line 69 running from Bologna through Verona to the Brenner Pass. This project linked northern and southern Italy for the first time since February 1943. Apart from playing a vital role in the redeployment and demobilization of the U.S. Army, the reconstructed line also proved useful in repatriating American and British personnel, evacuating German prisoners of war,
and returning Italian refugees to southern Italy.170
Upon the cessation of hostilities with Japan in August 1945, outloading for the Pacific was abruptly curtailed. Seaborne personnel movements reached a peak in August 1945 of almost 92,000 passengers, of whom the vast majority, about 84,000, were destined for the United States. All available shipping was employed to move U.S. personnel from the theater, including the regular troopships, hospital ships, converted Italian liners, and many fitted Liberty and Victory ships.
Loading beyond the normal passenger capacity was the rule, the Liberty and Victory ships being overloaded as much as 30 percent.171 This was far from luxury travel, but since ships were scarce it was necessary to sacrifice comfort in order to speed the repatriation process. The Wakefield set a theater record by lifting 8,227 passengers from Naples on 13 August. The former Italian passenger liner, Vulcania, made her first voyage as a U.S. troopship, sailing from Naples for New York at noon on 25 September with 4,770 passengers aboard, among whom were the majority of the Wacs in MTOUSA. By late October 1945, when the U.S. Army hospital ship Algonquin lifted more than 450 passengers, the theater had cleared from Italy almost all patients scheduled for transfer to the United States.172
As U.S. Army strength in Italy diminished, American transportation activities were progressively curtailed and consolidated. The transfer of the operation and maintenance of remaining lines to the Italian State Railways had been completed in late June 1945, and thereafter the Allies devoted their efforts primarily to supervisory control. During that summer plans were laid for the removal of ports from military control, and, as troops were withdrawn from the north, motor transport activities were increasingly concentrated in the Naples and Leghorn areas. By September 1945 the bulk of the Fifth Army had left Italy. Early in that month the Fifth Army Transportation Section closed operations upon the transfer of its highway functions to the Peninsular Base Section. Meanwhile, the latter had become the principal legatee of the theater transportation headquarters.173
Port operations continued to be carried on by the 8th Port at Naples and the 10th Port at Leghorn. On 25 November 1945 the 8th Port was inactivated, and thereafter the 10th Port was responsible for operations at both Naples and Leghorn. At the end of the year the Peninsular Base Section Transportation Section and Headquarters, 10th Port, were consolidated under the commanding officer of the latter unit, Colonel Cobb, who was also designated Chief of Transportation, MTOUSA.174
Continuing U.S. rail activities, including the maintenance and disposal of surplus property and equipment and the supervision of Italian rail operations supporting American forces, were handled by
the 774th Railway Grand Division, under the Office of the Deputy Director, MRS, Italy. The 774th, which by mid-1946 had been converted into a small supervisory group, remained active until November 1947.175 The principal reason for prolonged service of the 774th was the use of the Italian railways for the maintenance of American occupation forces in the area around Trieste. In Italy as elsewhere over seas the need of U.S. Army transportation activities persisted long after hostilities ceased.