Chapter 7: The Assault on Southern France
Originally scheduled for execution simultaneously with the cross-Channel invasion, the assault on southern France was finally launched on 15 August 1944.1 After making successful landings on beaches in the area between Toulon and Nice, the forces of the Seventh U.S. Army and the French First Army captured Marseille and several smaller ports and then moved rapidly northward. The new invasion route served primarily to bring reinforcements and supplies for the American and French armies that formed the 6th Army Group. By mid-September the Allied forces in southern France had advanced approximately 330 miles and had effected a junction with the U.S. armies to the north.2
Plans and Preparations
As in the case of OVERLORD, the invasion of southern France was preceded by an extended period of careful planning and preparations. The initial ANVIL plan was drawn up by AFHQ_, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, in December 1943. American logistical planning began in January 1944, when Task Force 163, a staff drawn from the Seventh Army, set up headquarters near Algiers and sent a group to Oran to coordinate planning with the North African theater and SOS headquarters. In the weeks that followed, a troop build-up program was developed, supply and equipment requirements were determined, and requisitions were submitted to the zone of interior. Also, arrangements were made for flatting 100 ships in the United States to be employed as motor transport carriers. The cargo used for flatting was to consist mainly of rations and ammunition, which would be floored off and held as a floating reserve for use in emergencies. After being temporarily curtailed by the March decision to delay the assault, planning activities picked up in May, as the probability that the DRAGOON operation would be
undertaken became evident. From the outset, General Stewart—the chief of transportation for AFHQ, NATOUSA, and SOS, NATOUSA—worked closely with Force 163 in arranging for shipping, setting up schedules for the movement of men and materials to and through outloading ports, and dealing with other transportation problems involved in the mounting, out-loading, and support of DRAGOON.3
As finally formulated, logistical plans for DRAGOON called for the movement to southern France of 522,000 U.S. and French troops, 101,000 vehicles, and supporting supplies and equipment during the first sixty days of the invasion. The Seventh Army would determine supply and personnel requirements for this period, designate the order and destinations of arrival, and initially control all logistical activities on the far shore. Responsibility for mounting the DRAGOON forces and effecting their continued supply was assigned to SOS, NATOUSA, which would draw upon sources within the theater and from the United States.
The SOS organization also furnished a base section to provide early and close logistical support to the tactical forces, and after the operation got under way established an advance echelon to set up a communications zone headquarters. Roughly 72,410 troops of the total personnel set up for DRAGOON were in service units earmarked for eventual transfer to the base section. As the combat forces advanced these units would be turned over to the base section, which would progressively take over supply and transportation operations in the rear. Such a base section was organized in North Africa in June 1944 and, in the following month, was formally activated at Naples as the Coastal Base Section.4 Both the advance echelon of SOS, NATOUSA, and the Coastal Base Section had transportation staffs.5
On the operational side, the seaborne assault was to be made by the 3rd, 4th, and 36th U.S. Divisions, each constituted as a subtask force, with attached service troops.6 The three subtask forces were to land on beaches between Cap Cavalaire and Agay. French forces were to land in the early follow up. Beach operations would be handled for each division by an Engineer shore regiment, assisted by DUKW, truck, port, and other specialized troops. The subtask forces were to operate independently until D plus 3, when the Beach Control Group, under the Seventh Army G-4, would assume over-all control. Consisting of representatives of the Army services and the Navy, the group was to supervise and coordinate cargo discharge, troop debarkation, and the setting up of dumps. The arrangement would continue until about ten days after a major port was taken, at which time control would be transferred to the Coastal Base Section.7
The ports were to enter the picture after D plus 20, when it was anticipated Toulon would be taken. Marseille, the major port in the area and the first main objective of the Allied forces, was not expected to fall until D plus 40. Because of enemy demolition, the planners forecast that both ports would require extensive rehabilitation. The job of operating the ports in southern France was assigned to the 6th Port, a veteran organization that had seen service in North Africa and Italy. The 6th Port, commanded by Colonel Clarkson, was relieved of its duties at Naples on 30 June and embarked for France aboard three Liberties on 15 and 16 August. The port personnel were accompanied by the main body of the Coastal Base Section’s Transportation Section, which was scheduled to arrive in southern France at the same time. Other Transportation Section personnel had already been placed on temporary duty with the Seventh Army to assist in ship discharge and cargo-handling activities on the beaches.8
Pending the capture and development of Marseille, it was expected that the advance northward would be slow. Principal reliance for the overland movement of men and supplies was placed on motor transport. A total of sixty-two truck companies was scheduled to arrive by D plus 25, with the first units landing on D plus 4. Some thirty-two of these units were to be employed for the support of U.S. forces, and thirty for the French. Twelve DUKW units were also provided, making possible the movement of cargo from ships at anchor across the shore at both the beaches and the ports.9
Rail transportation was not expected to play an important role in the early phases of the invasion. The limited beachhead area and the anticipated extensive destruction of rail facilities would render rail operations impracticable until after the ports were taken. The mission of operating, maintaining, and rehabilitating the railroads was assigned to the 1st Military Railway Service, under General Gray. This organization had successfully handled similar assignments in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy and had developed a far greater degree of autonomy than its counterpart in northern France. In the Mediterranean, General Gray had reported to the theater commander. He had also been responsible for planning and supervising all railway reconstruction and rehabilitation, and for the procurement of all railway equipment and material, including track and bridges. The command relationship and functions were carried over into southern France.10
The first rail units were to be phased in to coincide with the capture of the ports. Two railway operating battalions would arrive on D plus 20, and a railway grand division on D plus 40. Thereafter, additional units would arrive and important rail operations would be undertaken as the combat forces advanced. In preparation for its mission, the 1st MRS submitted requisitions for locomotives, track materials, bridging, signal communications
equipment, and other required materials.11
Mounting Dragoon
While final plans for operations in southern France were being evolved, the process of mounting and outloading the DRAGOON forces got under way. With the setting of a definite invasion date in mid-June 1944, schedules for the loading of troops and cargo were issued by SOS, NATOUSA, to its base sections, and the necessary tasks of packing, waterproofing, moving troops and cargo into port areas, and preloading were begun. The operation was mounted from bases in Italy, North Africa, and Corsica. The principal port for outloading the assault forces was Naples, which loaded 307 landing craft and 75 merchant vessels and combat loaders. French assault forces destined to land in the immediate follow-up were loaded at Oran, Brindisi, and Taranto. Ajaccio and Porto Vecchio also were used in mounting DRAGOON.
For the most part the invasion was supported from Naples and Oran and directly from the United States. Troops and cargo to follow the assault forces into southern France were loaded at the two ports and dispatched in convoy every five days. The principal carrier, as usual, was the Liberty, although coasters and other craft were also employed. Convoys from the zone of interior were scheduled to arrive at ten-day intervals, and were phased into the other convoys moving to southern France.12
Prescheduled shipments for the DRAGOON build-up ended in mid-October 1944, and normal supply procedures were followed thereafter. By that time (D plus 60), a total of 477,903 troops and 93,585 vehicles had moved out of Naples, Oran, Corsica, and Taranto for southern France.13
Beach Operations
The initial assault forces landed on the beaches in the Cavalaire Bay, St. Tropez, and St. Raphael areas on 15 August, encountering relatively light enemy resistance. During the next two days each sub-task force operated independently while their supporting Engineer regiments and attached service troops cleared and organized the beaches, began unloading operations, and evacuated casualties and prisoners. On D plus 2, a day ahead of schedule, the Beach Control Group assumed over-all direction of beach operations for the Seventh Army. The group was augmented by members of the staff of the Coastal Base Section, which was later to take over control of the beaches.
As at the OMAHA and UTAH beaches, supplies were discharged from ships anchored offshore into DUKWs and Navy ferry craft. After delivering pre-loaded artillery and priority cargo ashore, the DUKWs operated between the vessels and the dumps behind the beaches. In order to provide for the quick turnaround of DUKWs, ships’ anchorages and dumps were kept close to the shore line. Trucks and tractors transported cargo from beached LCTs and other ferry craft to dumps and performed other clearance
activities. Motor cranes, “A” frames mounted on DUKWs, and other devices were used to transfer cargo at the shore and at the dumps.
At the outset, difficulties were encountered that kept tonnage discharge behind schedule. One arose because cargo ships had been top stowed with ammunition. Since the anticipated heavy combat did not materialize and the tactical forces advanced more rapidly than had been expected, the demand for gasoline and rations became more urgent than that for ammunition. As a result, it was necessary to move the ammuntion in order to get at items stowed below. Some relief was provided when coasters were loaded exclusively with POL and rations.
Cargo discharge was also handicapped by a shortage of trucks for hauling from LCTs to dumps. The first truck companies had to work on a round-the-clock basis to keep supplies moving. Additional units arrived, but the lengthening supply line necessitated their assignment to hauls between the beach dumps and forward Army supply points.
Other obstacles tended to slow up the operations. Nets, used to transfer cargo into trucks and DUKWs, were not available in sufficient quantity. Dumps were mired by rain and had to be relocated. In many cases manifests were found to be incorrect. Nevertheless, by D plus 10 enough reserves had been accumulated on the beach to warrant a shift of emphasis from building up stocks in dumps to the inland movement of supplies.
Beach operations continued under the direction of the Beach Control Group until D plus 24 (9 September), when they were turned over to the Coastal Base Section. The Engineer shore regiments were then relieved of duties, and unloading operations were assigned to the 6th Port, under Coastal Base Section supervision. By this time the beach at Cavalaire-sur-Mer (ALPHA) had been closed, and in view of the capture of developed ports the other two beaches were scheduled for closing. A port battalion at each beach handled the remaining activities. The St. Tropez (DELTA) beach was officially closed on 16 September, and activities were concluded at the St. Raphael (CAMEL) beach on 28 September.
During the first six weeks after the assault, approximately 380,000 troops, 306,000 long tons of general cargo, 69,312 vehicles, and 17,848 long tons of bulk gasoline were brought in over the beaches. This constituted the bulk of the traffic into southern France in this period, for although the ports had been captured far earlier than expected, they did not come into operation in an important way until mid-September 1944.14
Opening the Ports
After landing at the beaches, French and American combat forces swept rapidly toward Toulon and Marseille. Both ports were cleared of the enemy on D plus 13 (28 August). Meanwhile, French resistance forces had captured Port-de-Bouc, a satellite port of Marseille. As expected, all three ports were found to be heavily damaged. Early reconnaissance indicated the unsuitability of Toulon for development as a major port, and it was decided to use it primarily for the reception of
Civil Affairs cargo. Rehabilitation efforts, concentrated at Marseille and its satellite, were begun on 1 September by the Corps of Engineers, assisted by U.S. Navy personnel and the French. Port activities were handled by the 6th Port and its assigned or attached units, operating first under the Seventh Army and later under base section control.15
A small detachment of the 6th Port arrived at Port-de-Bouc early in September but found it impossible to begin operations immediately. Sunken craft blocked the harbor, the dock area was filled with debris and rubble, and cranes were wrecked. Within two weeks the cranes were placed in operating order and dockside discharge had commenced. By the end of the month, the port had unloaded 23 ships, discharging 36,837 long tons of supplies and 331,600 barrels of petroleum products. At that time four Liberty berths and one tanker berth were available. Thereafter, Port-de-Bouc was to serve primarily for the discharge of bulk POL, for which it had excellent storage facilities.16
Toulon served briefly as a port for the U.S. Army and was the scene of only limited activity. A small detachment from the 6th Port handled operations there between 20 September and 31 October 1944, when the port was turned over to the French. During that period 27,020 long tons of general cargo and 11,542 vehicles were landed.17
The principal peacetime port of France and the largest in the Mediterranean, Marseille had suffered almost unbelievable destruction. The 6th Port, which functioned at both Marseille and Naples, reported that of the two Marseille was the more completely devastated. At Marseille warehouses were ruined, utilities knocked out, cranes wrecked, railway tracks torn up, and all berths blocked by sunken craft or other obstructions. Moles, jetties, and docks had been blasted, no bridges within the port area could be used, and the adjacent railways and highways were cluttered with rubble and debris. All told, seventy-five vessels had been sunk in the harbor, closing all possible entrances. Both the harbor and the port area were strewn with mines, and the quay walls were pierced with many gaping holes.18
On 8 September 1944 the 6th Port began operating at Marseille with cranes brought from Naples. The first Liberty ship was berthed one week later. At first, however, most cargo was lightered ashore. Troops and vehicles were unloaded from beached landing craft. The port facilities were rapidly rehabilitated, entrance channels were opened, and by the close of September Marseille had complete berthing space for fifteen Liberty ships and five coasters, and had discharged 146,297 long tons of cargo at piers or into lighters. In the last two weeks of September the 6th Port discharged an average of approximately 5,000 tons of general cargo per day at the southern French ports.19 The dependence on the beaches ceased, and Marseille, assisted by Port-de-Bouc, be-
came the funnel through which the line of communications in southern France was supplied.20
Initial Motor Transport Activities
Following the fall of Toulon and Marseille, Allied forces moved rapidly northward. After taking Montelimar and Grenoble, they continued their advance through Lyon, Dijon, and Besancon, and on 12 September made contact with the Third Army at Chatillon-sur-Seine. The junction of southern and northern forces was effected eleven days before the date set for the capture of Marseille. The unexpected speed of the advance resulted in an early shortage of motor transport and made the sustained support of the armies difficult.
Aside from beach and port clearance, the principal U.S. trucking activities involved increasingly long hauls from beach dumps to forward dumps and shuttle runs between breaks in newly captured rail lines. The principal highway route used during this period ran from the coast through Aix to Grenoble, and as Army supply points were pushed farther north it was extended to Voiron, Bourg, Lons-Le-Saunier, Poligny, and forward. Both Seventh Army and communications zone truck units were employed. The Seventh Army G-4 determined priorities and controlled operations and movements.
Provided on the assumption of a slow advance, truck companies were hard pressed to keep supplies flowing along the lengthening line of communications. Some fifteen truck companies arrived during the first four days, but proved insufficient to meet both beach and over-the-road requirements. Efforts to phase in additional units earlier than planned failed to furnish adequate relief. Matters became serious early in September when the Seventh Army shifted most of its truck companies from the beaches to the forward area. In order to provide vehicles for freight movement from the beach dumps to the forces, the Coastal Base Section required units landing on the beaches to reload their organic vehicles with Seventh Army cargo and make one round trip to forward destinations. To ease the load on motor transport further, efforts were made to clear the beach dumps and close the beaches as soon as possible after the opening of the ports.
By mid-September trucks were hauling over a highway network extending from the coast to Haute-Saone province. Major operations included line of communications hauling from the beaches and ports to forward destinations, base and port activities at Marseille and Port-de-Bouc, and a shuttle operation between Sisteron and Manosque, which had been separated by enemy demolition of bridges. Vehicle strength was concentrated at the two ends of the line, with communications zone trucking units centered in the south in the Marseille–St. Raphael area, and the Army’s units in the north. Vehicles loading in the south were generally dispatched in small groups to Army destinations. Movement control, also heaviest at either end of the route, was provided through traffic control points manned by personnel from two traffic regulation units. Little control was required at intermediate points, since favorable weather permitted vehicles to make their overnight halts at almost any point along the road.
Meanwhile, a communications zone
motor transport organization had entered the picture. With the transfer of the first trucking unit from the Seventh Army to the Coastal Base Section on 3 September, the CBS Transportation Section’s Highway Division came into operation at Marseille. Additional transfers and arrivals followed. On the 25th a Movement Control Office was opened at CBS headquarters for the control of both the U.S. and the French military convoy movements. Shortly afterward, U.S. traffic was diverted from the mountainous Grenoble section to the Rhône Valley route, extending from Aix to Vienne and Lancin and rejoining the old route at Bourg. New traffic control points were set up at these four locations, and French liaison representation was provided both at the Marseille office and at the field installations.
By the end of the month, the Highway Division had a total of fourteen truck companies and thirteen DUKW units under its supervision, and steps had been taken to convert two antiaircraft artillery battalions into Quartermaster truck battalions and to organize other trucking units with Italian prisoners of war. Communications zone trucks were used for long hauls for only a brief time thereafter, since the railroads had undergone considerable development and by mid-October were carrying the bulk of the Army’s requirements in southern France.21
Early Military Railway Operations
The restoration of rail service in southern France proceeded more rapidly than in Normandy. The liberation of the area was accomplished so quickly that the retreating Germans had no time to effect their usual thoroughgoing sabotage on the railways. With the exception of the devas tated Marseille port area and the many demolished bridges, the destruction of railway facilities was relatively slight. As a consequence, railroads were brought into operation sooner than anticipated and became increasingly important.
Only a day after the initial assault, General Gray’s representative with the Seventh Army, Lt. Col. Benjamin H. Decker, made a preliminary reconnaissance of the railway facilities. Operations were begun within two days of the assault, when Seventh Army troops opened the narrow-gauge line spanning the fifteen miles between St. Tropez and Cogolin. On the night of 23-24 August a standard-gauge railway began running from Frejus via Carnoules to Ste. Maxime. The first train, running without signals or lights, carried rations, gasoline, and ammunition. Rail operations at Marseille were late in starting because of the destruction within the port area. Fortunately, some railway equipment was found that could be used, and there was enough coal on hand for the first train.22
The first military railway units in southern France, the 703rd Railway Grand Division and the 713th Railway Operating Battalion, arrived in late August and commenced supervisory and operational activities. On 14 September General Gray, Director General, 1st MRS, departed Italy by air with an advance party, and established a new headquarters at Lyon. Other operating units, including the 727th
Railway Operating Battalion and A Company of the 759th Railway Operating Battalion, arrived in southern France before the end of the month.23
During September railway operations expanded considerably. The two main double-track routes from Marseille to the north ran parallel to the Rhône River. A third single-track line extended to Grenoble. Several key bridges were down, which prevented immediate utilization of the tracks along the Rhône River. With the exception of two blown-out bridges at Meyrargues and Sisteron, the Grenoble line, or Alps route, was comparatively undamaged. It was therefore used for initial traffic from the beaches, even though the tracks passed through mountainous terrain where eventually snow and ice could be expected. Trucks filled the gaps in the rail line until the bridges could be restored. Meanwhile, the railway on the east bank of the Rhône River was being quickly rehabilitated by the A Companies of the 713th, 727th, and 759th Railway Operating Battalions, assisted by French railway personnel and Seventh Army engineers. By the 25th of the month, the line was open as far north as Lyon and had a capacity of 3,000 tons per day. With continued development, it became the principal supply route for the 6th Army Group.24
At first the demands for rail transportation exceeded the capability of the lines. In order to allocate the available rail tonnage among the various bidders, the first Priority of Movements meeting was held at Lyon on 26 September 1944. At this meeting the bids accepted amounted to only 4,923 tons per day, slightly more than one half the tonnage offered for movement. However, as the rehabilitation of lines progressed and additional motive power and rolling stock were obtained, the rail capacities increased sharply. By 4 October, bids totaling 8,350 tons per day were being accepted, and shortly thereafter an embargo was placed on the use of communications zone trucks for long hauls. The railroads were now ready to bear the brunt of the overland transport load in southern France and were to carry a steadily increasing amount of traffic through the end of the year.25
The Transition to a Communications Zone
As in the case of OVERLORD, the direction of logistical activities passed successively from army to base section to communications zone headquarters as the combat forces advanced and supply and transportation operations were developed behind them. Personnel of the Coastal Base Section arrived with the invasion forces, and upon the capture of Marseille the section set up its headquarters there. During the first twenty-five days of operation, CBS, attached to Seventh Army, assisted with beach and other activities and prepared to assume responsibility for communications zone activities. After turning over control of the beaches to CBS, the Seventh Army on 10 September
1944 drew a rear boundary along the line Moulin—Macon—Bourg—Geneva. Administration of the territory behind the line was then taken over by CBS, which was now redesignated Continental Base Sec-tion.26
The CBS Transportation officer, Colonel Fuller, arrived in southern France late in August 1944. Several of his staff were already on the ground, helping the Seventh Army discharge ships and organize transportation activities in support of the advance from the beaches. After surveying newly captured port and rail facilities, Colonel Fuller activated water, highway, and rail divisions within his Transportation Section. By D plus 25 (10 September), the section had taken over supervision of beach and port operations and had begun its motor transport and rail movement control activities. An air section also was set up. Operating principally at Salon airport, it assisted passengers and recorded inbound and outbound cargo and personnel traffic.27
With the rapid advance of the combat forces and the resultant extension of the lines of communication, the Continental Base Section was redesignated Continental Advance Section (CONAD), SOS, NATOUSA, on 26 September. Like ADSEC to the north, CONAD became a mobile organization, moving forward behind the armies to provide close continuous support. CONAD headquarters moved to Dijon early in October, and the Marseille area was turned over to the newly activated Delta Base Section.28
By this time, a communications zone headquarters had been phased in. An advance echelon of SOS, NATOUSA (later redesignated Advance COMZONE, MTOUSA), had been organized at Caserta, Italy, and had departed for Lyon on 12 September. This group included the first detachment of a Transportation Section, headed by Lt. Col. Thornton A. Magee. After establishing headquarters at Lyon, Magee moved with the advance echelon to Dijon on 5 October.
COMZONE, MTOUSA, continued responsible for the logistical support of the forces in southern France until 20 November 1944. At that time a Southern Line of Communications was established under General Lee, Commanding General, Communications Zone, ETO. Under the new setup, General Larkin, formerly commander of COMZONE, MTOUSA, was designated SOLOC commander and became Lee’s deputy. Larkin, however, was given wide latitude in directing his operations, and existing arrangements for supplying the area from sources in the Mediterranean and the zone of interior were retained. CONAD and the Delta Base Section continued in operation under SOLOC.
As part of the reorganization, General Stewart was appointed SOLOC Transportation officer. He absorbed the advance echelon’s Transportation Section, and drew other men from his former headquarters in the Mediterranean. Serving on Larkin’s staff, Stewart exercised technical supervision over Transportation Corps activities, installations, and troops, and coordinated transportation operations between sections. Unlike Ross in the ETO, Stewart did not have jurisdiction over rail operations. The director of the 1st Military Railway Service was directly responsible to the SOLOC commander.
Stewart’s principal activities pertaining to rail operations involved the allocation of rail tonnage and the supervision of the use of available rail capacity. The SOLOC transportation office was patterned after the organization developed at Allied Force Headquarters in the Mediterranean theater. Stewart directed his activities through an executive officer and three major branches—Operations, Planning, and Administration. Under the Operations Branch, groups were set up to handle movements and rail, water, highway, and air activities.29
Although SOLOC was placed under the Communications Zone of the European theater, it exercised a large measure of autonomy. The northern lines and southern lines of communications were operated independently, with a separate and distinct transportation organization for each. As will be seen, the direction of transportation activities in the theater was finally consolidated in early 1945, when SOLOC was inactivated and jurisdiction over its transportation organization and the 1st MRS was turned over to General Ross.30
DRAGOON was accomplished swiftly and made a heavy contribution to Allied victory, but it was a secondary action. The main Allied force had been committed in northern France, and a successful action was necessary there before Germany could be defeated.
Until late July 1944 operations in Normandy were confined to a relatively shallow lodgment area. During this period principal reliance for the support of the armies was placed upon the beaches and motor transport. Port development proceeded more slowly than anticipated, and the rail facilities in Allied hands were limited and in need of extensive rehabilitation. The operations on beaches exceeded expectation but the opening of Cherbourg was delayed, and prospects for the early capture of the Brittany ports grew increasingly dim. These developments, together with the likelihood that adverse weather conditions beginning in September would curtail beach operations, led to a decision to expand Cherbourg’s intake capacity far beyond that originally planned and to develop the minor Normandy ports. Interior transport was less of a problem, for although motor transport equipment and troops were not furnished in the quantities planned, they were capable of meeting requirements along the short line of communications.
The situation altered radically with the break-through at St. Lô, and the ensuing lightning-like advance across France. Spearheaded by the Third Army, the combat forces soon carried operations ahead of schedule and consequently ahead of the supply program. The resultant increase in demands lent new urgency to the problem of developing additional port discharge capacity and bore down heavily on the carriers, particularly motor transport, which were engaged in supplying the armies over the rapidly expanding lines of communication. From the transportation standpoint, at least, the months immediately following the break-through were among the most critical of the war.