Chapter 8: France, Belgium, and Germany
Breaking out of Normandy, the Allied armies quickly drove south and west into Brittany and surged eastward across northern France. By late August 1944 they had overrun the territory slated in OVERLORD for capture by D plus 90, with the exception of the principal Brittany ports, and in addition they had captured Paris and established bridgeheads across the Seine. Following on the heels of the retreating and disorganized enemy forces, the Allies moved weeks, then months ahead of the tactical timetable. Meanwhile, the DRAGOON forces had invaded southern France and had driven swiftly toward a junction with the armies to the north. At the end of September the Allies had gained possession of practically all of France, Luxembourg, and Belgium, and the southern part of Holland.1
Transportation in Relation to Tactical Developments
The rapid advance across France soon outstripped the means of logistical support, forcing constant readjustment of plans, improvisation, and hand-to-mouth supply operations. From a transportation point of view two problems loomed large in sustaining the onrushing Allied forces: the development of sufficient port facilities to receive and clear the growing volume of men and materials arriving on the Continent; and the distribution of troops and supplies from the beach and port areas over greatly extended lines of communication. Neither of the problems was satisfactorily solved during the two months following the break-through.
Plans for the development of the Brittany ports were upset by stubborn German resistance and extensive enemy and Allied destruction of facilities. The urgent need for additional ports to augment Cherbourg, the invasion beaches, and the minor Normandy ports caused Allied transportation planners to reassess the port situation, and in September finally led to a decision to abandon the idea of a major port development in Brittany and to concentrate on the newly captured ports of Antwerp, Le Havre, and Rouen. In the absence of adequate discharge capacity, port congestion was chronic, and a growing number of ships had to be held offshore to serve, in effect, as floating warehouses.
The problem of providing transportation to the interior was even more pressing. The lengthening lines of communication and the increased requirements of the combat forces did not permit the
establishment of the planned series of base, intermediate, and advance depots, and created a growing gap between the Normandy supply installations and the forward areas. Transportation facilities were too limited to bridge the gap. Rail line rehabilitation and pipeline construction were pushed forward vigorously, but they simply could not keep pace with the advancing armies. The main reliance had to be placed upon motor transport. Aside from performing the essential tasks of port clearance and base hauling, trucks carried the bulk of the troops and supplies that were moved forward during this period. As transportation planners had feared, there were not enough drivers and equipment to meet the needs. Minimum requirements were met only by overworking the men and vehicles, neglecting proper maintenance, and diverting trucks from port clearance and other essential work. Supplementing the overland carriers, air supply played a minor but important role in meeting emergency needs of the tactical forces.2
Overextended supply lines and increased German resistance brought the Allied advance to a virtual halt by the latter part of September. The relatively stable period that followed was marked by an improved transportation situation. The ports of Le Havre and Rouen were placed in operation, taking up some of the slack caused by the failure to open the Brittany ports and making it possible to close the beaches and a number of minor Normandy ports. Cherbourg continued as a major port, although it never attained its planned discharge capacity, and in the south Marseille satisfactorily handled traffic for the 6th Army Group. Considerable progress was made in rehabilitating the railways, which then took over an increasing share of the burden from the hard-pressed motor transport facilities.
The great turning point in the development of transportation operations was the opening of Antwerp on 28 November 1944. The huge port had been captured virtually intact early in September, but it could not be used until the Germans had been cleared from the approaches to the Scheldt Estuary. Possessing sufficient facilities to handle the bulk of the incoming U.S. and British cargo and located far closer to the fighting front than the ports already in operation, Antwerp was a major factor in solving the tight interior transport situation. The opening of Antwerp, to be sure, did not immediately resolve all transportation difficulties. It took some time to dissipate the shipping congestion; port clearance remained a limiting factor; and other ports and lines of communication had to be kept in use. Nevertheless, placing Antwerp in operation made it possible to provide increasingly better transportation service and placed the logistical support of the Allied armies on a far sounder basis.
New difficulties were encountered during the German Ardennes counteroffensive of December 1944—January 1945, when cargo piled up at Antwerp, movements to threatened areas were embargoed, motor transport was diverted to handle emergency shifts of men and materials, and bitter winter weather handicapped all operations. The setback was only temporary, and dislocations in the transportation system were rapidly corrected once the crisis had passed and the tactical situation improved.
The Allied armies resumed the offensive early in February 1945, and in March
they crossed the Rhine. The ensuing eastward drive from the Rhine to the Elbe was in some respects reminiscent of the advance following the St. Lô break-through, but this time there was no comparable transportation crisis. With Antwerp in full operation and Ghent coming into the picture, port capacity was ample. For overland transportation detailed plans had been worked out in late 1944 and early 1945 for the support of the offensive, including provisions for extending rail and highway operations to, across, and beyond the Rhine. Rail lines were pushed forward rapidly, bridges were opened, and beginning in April an increasing proportion of the tonnage moved east of the river was carried by rail. As in the earlier advance, the railroads were outdistanced by the tactical forces. Although air supply was increasingly important in meeting urgent needs in the forward areas, the brunt of the transportation burden fell on motor transport. The required over-the-road hauling was effected through the so-called XYZ project, involving trucking operations over a system of highway routes established behind the onrushing American armies. Carefully planned and well organized, XYZ proved to be the largest and most successful of the long-haul trucking operations of the war.3
With the achievement of victory in Europe, the transportation effort shifted to vital postwar tasks. Redeployment and then repatriation of the bulk of the massive U.S. force built up in the theater were huge and complex undertakings. Special projects, including the movement to the United States of patients, recovered American military personnel, and war brides, also had to be carried through. Over and above these programs, there remained the significant and long-term job of supporting U.S. occupation forces in Europe. Having established itself as an essential service during the wartime years, the Transportation Corps continued important as a permanent part of the peacetime Army.
The Evolution of the Transportation Organization
Until February 1945 two major U.S. Army transportation headquarters existed in France. In the north, General Ross’s Transportation Corps headquarters was transplanted from the United Kingdom to handle planning and staff functions relating to transportation and to supervise marine, rail, highway, and movement control activities in the ETO communications zone. In the south, where the advance echelon of COMZONE, MTOUSA (previously SOS, NATOUSA), was supplanted in November 1944 by the Southern Line of Communications headquarters, technical direction was exercised independently of Ross by the SOLOC Transportation Section, headed by General Stewart.4
Other transportation headquarters were established within the subordinate territorial commands set up under COMZONE and SOLOC. By the end of 1944 five contiguous base sections (Normandy, Brittany, Seine, Channel, and Oise) had been activated behind the mobile Advance Section in COMZONE. In
SOLOC, the Continental Advance Section had moved forward, and the Delta Base Section had taken over the territory behind it. As in the United Kingdom, the base and advance sections directed personnel and operations within their respective jurisdictions. Each had a transportation staff to supervise Transportation Corps activities and control intrasectional movements.5
Upon moving his headquarters to Valognes in August 1944, General Ross set about developing an effective working organization and turned to the formidable transportation tasks involved in supporting the advancing armies. The stay at Valognes was brief. Early in September the Transportation Corps, along with the rest of COMZONE headquarters, moved forward to Paris. From the beginning the Transportation Corps operated under great pressure. Expansion of port, rail, and motor transport capacities was imperative, and with the increase in the number of base sections heavy demands were made on the Transportation Corps for staff and operating personnel.6
In general, this headquarters was organized along the same lines as it had been in the United Kingdom. The principal divisions were Administration, Control and Planning, Supply, Movements, Marine Operations, Motor Transport Service, and the 2nd Military Railway Service. With the exception of an Inland Waterways Division, which was separated from the Marine Operations Division in November, the structure remained basically unchanged at the end of 1944.7
Although General Ross’s organization was marked by stability during 1944, it encountered considerable delay in attaining its full stature. As will be seen, the COMZONE G-4 controlled shipping and exercised important functions with regard to movements control. To the theater chief of transportation these activities appeared to be an unwarranted invasion of his sphere of operations. After prolonged controversy the matter was finally settled in his favor, and late in the year he was given authority to develop a port and supply movement program. Subsequently, the control of shipping also was turned over to him. Another important step in the direction of centralizing the direction of transportation activities was taken after General Somervell visited the theater. On his recommendation, the G-4 Transportation Section was transferred to Ross’s headquarters in February 1945.8
The attainment of a unified theater-wide transportation organization was achieved in February 1945. During that month SOLOC was dissolved, and the Delta Base Section and CONAD were brought directly under COMZONE headquarters. As part of the general reorganization, the functions and key personnel of the SOLOC Transportation
Section were absorbed by Transportation Corps headquarters in Paris. General Stewart became deputy chief of transportation, assuming responsibility for the supervision of movements and the operational services, exclusive of marine operations. Colonel Traub, previously the sole deputy chief of transportation, was assigned responsibility for the planning and administrative services. Since Traub was familiar with the shipping situation, he retained supervision of marine activities. At the same time a General Headquarters was established to coordinate the activities of the 1st and 2nd Military Railway Services, and its director was placed under the chief of transportation. No other significant organizational changes were made during the remainder of the war.9 (Chart 4)
After V-E Day, Transportation Corps headquarters was divided between France and Germany. Ordered by SHAEF to establish an office to direct transportation activities within the U.S. occupied area in Germany and to coordinate movements with other areas, the chief of transportation shifted part of his staff from Paris to Wiesbaden. He appointed an additional deputy, Col. Charles Z. Case, to head the new forward headquarters, which included Planning and Control, Movements, Motor Transport, and Administrative Divisions. The Office of the Chief of Transportation (Forward) continued to operate at Wiesbaden until 21 August 1945, when it was transferred to Frankfurt. Shortly thereafter, General Ross moved to the new location, dividing his time between Frankfurt and Paris. The division into forward (later main) and rear offices continued into the peacetime period.10
The Expansion of Port Capacity
The Allied offensive in the summer and early fall of 1944 accentuated the need for developing additional ports. Concentrating their main effort on the eastward pursuit of the retreating enemy, the tactical forces were unable to take Brest, Quiberon Bay, and Lorient on schedule. Other ports of potential importance in Brittany, including St. Nazaire and Nantes, also were denied to the Allies by the stubborn defense of German garrisons. As a result, the northern armies had to rely on the invasion beaches, Cherbourg, and the minor Normandy ports. The facilities barely sufficed to keep the Allied offensive rolling. The probability that over-the-beach operations would be severely curtailed by adverse weather beginning in September lent additional urgency to the problem of securing other suitable deepwater ports.
As previously indicated, delays in implementing OVERLORD plans for port development had caused transportation planners to cast about in search of additional discharge capacity. By the end of July Cherbourg’s planned discharge targets had been greatly increased, but much rehabilitation was required before they could be attained. The minor Normandy ports were also being developed, and proposals were made to develop Cancale, in Brittany, as a substitute for Quiberon Bay. In August efforts were made to open the small Brittany ports that had been
Chart 4: Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, COMZONE, ETOUSA: 1 April 1945
Source: Rpt, Consolidated Historical Report on Transportation Corps Activities in the European Theater of Operations, May 1942 Through V-E Day, Chart VII, OCT HB ETO.
captured, including St. Malo, Cancale, St. Brieuc, and Morlaix.
Prospects for major port development in Brittany faded in September, as the enemy continued to cling tenaciously to key points and as the Allied forces drove farther eastward. Early in the month General Ross reported that the Quiberon Bay project was “definitely out,” in view of the impracticability of getting tows from the United Kingdom into the Bay of Biscay at that time of year. Brest was captured on 17 September but was so badly damaged that it was not worth rehabilitating. The Lorient–St. Nazaire area remained in enemy hands throughout the war.
During the same month, meanwhile, the advancing forces had uncovered Le Havre, Rouen, and Antwerp. While Le Havre and Rouen had suffered extensive damage, Antwerp was taken virtually intact, a development that even the most optimistic planner could not have foreseen. The prospective availability of these ports placed the entire matter of ship discharge in a new light.11
Until the newly captured ports could be placed in operation, the supply situation remained critical. In a communication to his major commands on 13 September 1944, General Eisenhower expressed his belief that the availability of additional deepwater ports was prerequisite to a final invasion of Germany. The current port situation was such that a week or ten days of bad channel weather might well “paralyze” the Allied effort. In order to support the Allied forces, Eisenhower stated, it would be necessary to secure the approaches to Antwerp or Rotterdam and to capture additional Channel ports.12
Shortly thereafter, in a communication to Eisenhower, General Lee noted that while tactical progress had exceeded expectations, port development was still behind schedule. In Lee’s opinion the development of Brest and the other principal Brittany ports to the tonnage previously planned was impracticable. Since Le Havre was reported seriously damaged and since its location did not materially shorten the lines of communications, he recommended that it be placed in operation as rapidly as possible but with a minimum expenditure for reconstruction. Lee recommended that the major port development be confined to Cherbourg, Le Havre, and Antwerp.13
The port problem underwent continuous study during the month, and on 27 September COMZONE issued a revised port development directive tailored to the current tactical and logistical situation. The main emphasis was now placed on the development of Antwerp, Le Havre, and Rouen.14 Under the new plan, Antwerp was slated to become the major British-American port on the Continent. Le Havre would be immediately developed to receive cargo from Liberty ships
discharging into DUKWs or lighters, and its capacity would be eventually increased to 7,000 tons per day. Rouen was scheduled to discharge 3,000 tons daily from coasters. Until Antwerp became available, Cherbourg would be used at maximum capacity, and although unfavorable weather would reduce their intake the beaches would have to be kept open. Of the minor Normandy ports, Grandcamp-les-Bains was closed; Granville was designated for coal discharge only; and the coaster ports of Barfleur, St. Vaast-la-Hougue, and Isigny were to continue in operation on second priority.
By this time, the Brittany ports had ceased to be an important consideration. With regard to Brest, plans were made only for a survey regarding its possible future use and development. Cancale was abandoned before it was opened, and port reconstruction work at St. Malo had stopped. Only Morlaix and St. Brieuc were scheduled for continued operation.15
With the opening of Le Havre and Rouen in October, the port situation improved somewhat, making possible the elimination of minor or expensive operations. Early in November 1944 General Eisenhower made available to the French St. Brieuc, Barfleur, St. Vaast-la-Hougue, Carentan, Grandcamp-les-Bains, and Isigny—shallow-draft ports that the Allies no longer required. The invasion beaches, where operations had been severely curtailed by bad weather and high seas, were closed later in the month.16
While Le Havre and Rouen furnished some relief, no real solution to the problem of port capacity was possible until Antwerp could be opened. This was delayed until late November because of the difficulty of clearing the Germans from the approaches to the port. During this period the Allies were denied the port facilities and the shortened lines of communication required for the adequate support of the tactical forces.
Once Antwerp came “into production,” port capacity was no longer a serious problem. Thereafter, the emphasis in planning shifted from port discharge to port clearance and inland distribution. The subsequent opening of Ghent increased the port reception capacity on the Continent still further and provided insurance should the enemy interfere with operations at Antwerp. No additional ports were opened until after V-E Day.17
The Problem of Shipping Congestion
The prolonged delay in attaining adequate port capacity, coupled with expanding military requirements and other conditions, resulted in a growing backlog of undischarged cargo vessels in European waters. Early in July 1944 the War Department manifested anxiety over excessive retentions of cargo ships in the European theater. During the following months, in view of the critical shipping situation throughout the world, the commanders of the European and North African theaters were urged to release and return cargo vessels as quickly as possible.
The problem was especially serious in northern France where the bulk of the shipping to support the invasion had been concentrated off the coast of Normandy.18
The War Department advised the European theater on 31 August 1944 that the theater was retaining too many vessels and so was interfering seriously with the availability of ships for other theaters. Accordingly, the currently scheduled sailings were to be cut by sixty vessels at the rate of ten per convoy. The theater protested that it wanted to crowd in the maximum tonnage for August and September before the equinoctial storms, but computations in Washington indicated that the existing program of sailings from the United States exceeded possible discharge on the Continent and the reduction was made.19
By October 1944 the shipping situation in northern France had become worse. Therefore, early in that month, the War Department advised the theater that sailings for the last quarter of the year would be scheduled in accordance with demonstrated ability to discharge, in order to reduce the backlog to about seventy-five vessels. General Gross, in particular, considered the theater’s discharge estimates too high on the basis of past performance and too wasteful of shipping. The theater again protested the cut; it expected the discharge rate to increase rapidly, and it also believed that the employment of ships as floating warehouses could be justified.
The number of idle ships in European waters continued to mount. The anticipated rate of cargo discharge failed to materialize, in part because of storms, rain, and mud, which hampered unloading and clearance. The previously projected opening dates of additional ports, notably Antwerp, were not realized. Although Eisenhower and Lee made personal pleas for more ships, citing the grave status of their ammunition supply, the War Department remained adamant. The situation, said Somervell, did not permit the use of ships for base depot storage.20
Recalling how effectively shipping had been controlled in the United Kingdom, General Gross concluded that in France the influence of the theater chief of transportation had waned. The shipping tie-up in Europe, he asserted, was delaying operations in the Pacific and postponing the end of the war. Accordingly, with the approval of the theater, he detailed his director of water transportation, Brig. Gen. John M. Franklin, to the theater “to suggest means to improve the discharge rate, to discourage the huge assembly of ships for storage purposes, and to give appropriate emphasis to the fundamental need to use shipping efficiently.” Franklin, a former shipping executive with considerable prestige, arrived in Paris on 28 October 1944. To help him in his mission General Ross placed Franklin in charge of the Marine Operations Division. Gross hoped
that with Franklin’s help Ross would be restored to a dominant status in the control of shipping at General Lee’s headquarters. The seriousness of the situation is shown by the fact that of the 243 cargo vessels in the theater on 30 October only about 60 were actually being discharged.21
General Franklin reported that Ross had been sidetracked and that the COM-ZONE G-4, Brig. Gen. James H. Stratton, was exercising complete control over the berthing and discharge of vessels. Shipping from the United States to the theater was scheduled on the basis of requests drawn up by the G-4 Section, “with only nominal coordination” with the theater chief of transportation. Franklin termed the G-4 estimates of cargo discharge “completely erroneous.” In a series of high-level theater conferences, in which General Eisenhower participated, Franklin stressed and secured the acceptance of the principle that the theater’s calculation of shipping requirements must be subject to continuing review and revision. Like Gross, Franklin believed that the basic problem was not a lack of ships but the discharge performance in the theater. With the assistance of two officers of the Water Division in Washington, Franklin therefore undertook a survey of cargo-discharge and port-clearance capacities on the Continent with a view to obtaining a sound basis for realistic estimates.22
During November 1944, despite vigorous efforts to expedite the release and return of ships, no appreciable drop occurred in the number of idle vessels awaiting discharge. In part, this situation reflected the setback from the severe October storms, but basically it stemmed from the inability to develop adequate port discharge and clearance capacity. Antwerp, although consistently and optimistically included in theater estimates of port capacity, did not begin cargo operations until 28 November, and it gained little momentum before mid-December. The theater’s continued failure to meet the target for discharge of cargo stimulated the growth of skepticism in the War Department as to the value of the ETOUSA estimates and led to a renewed determination not to dispatch additional ships to the theater until the existing backlog had been reduced.23
Late in November General Eisenhower sent several senior staff officers including three major generals (Lucius D. Clay, Harold R. Bull, and Royal B. Lord) to Washington to explain in detail his serious ammunition and shipping situation. General Franklin accompanied the party. The ensuing discussion at the War Department brought no significant change in policy. As before, the War Department was willing to give the theater all the ships it needed, provided they could be discharged promptly.24
Upon return of the theater delegation to Paris early in December, a Shipping Control Committee was set up. It was composed of General Lord, Chief of Staff, COMZONE, General Stratton, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, COMZONE, and General Franklin as the representative of the theater chief of transportation. This committee, whose basic task was to effect the requisite coordination between supply and transportation, was designated as the agency through which all shipping matters were to be cleared with the War Department. It was to receive requests for the allocation of shipping, which the G-4 originated on the basis of tonnage requirements, and to scale them down to the estimated capacity for reception. To insure proper allocation of vessels to discharge ports and to reduce turnaround a Diversion Committee was formed. Headed by the Transportation Corps Control and Planning Division chief of the theater, the committee included representatives of the COMZONE G-4, the technical services, and the Transportation Corps Operations and Movements Divisions.25
Meanwhile, the impact of the worldwide shipping shortage had made itself felt at the highest level in Washington. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War Shipping Administrator, whose vessels in large numbers had long been immobilized overseas, presented the matter to the President in November 1944. In accordance with instructions from the President, the Joint Chiefs in December issued a directive designed to improve the utilization of vessels in the overseas commands. Applied to all theaters, it prohibited the use of oceangoing vessels as floating warehouses, banned partial or selective discharge except in emergency, and enjoined a realistic appreciation of port and discharge capacity in arriving at shipping requirements. A system of weekly ship activity reports (short title, ACTREP) also was instituted to provide prompt and uniform information for all interested agencies in Washington.26 The tide had already begun to turn in Europe when this action was taken. After Antwerp became available for cargo discharge, the reserve of commodity loaders began to melt away.
However, more rapid improvement of the shipping situation was hindered by the fact that more cargo could be discharged than could be promptly forwarded by the available inland transport. Even after additional rail facilities had been obtained, the restricted capacity of the forward depots to receive cargo was a serious limiting factor, and this difficulty was intensified by the absence of intermediate depots. Temporary relief was secured by storing cargo in the port area, a practice that was also adopted at Le Havre. By mid-December thirty or more vessels could be worked simultaneously at Antwerp, and each could be turned around in ten or eleven days.
The ensuing German counteroffensive temporarily checked progress in clearing the shipping backlog. At Antwerp for a time vessel discharge was curtailed, additional cargo accumulated on the quays, and with the exception of critical items forward movement of cargo was further restricted. The port congestion was soon relieved, once the enemy threat was turned
back and port clearance operations were expanded. The result was that ships that had idled as floating depots for months at last could be sent home.27
On 19 January 1945 General Franklin reported the accomplishment of the War Department objective of bringing the theater’s cargo shipping and discharge program into substantial balance. Between 30 October 1944 and 7 January 1945 the number of cargo vessels in the theater had been reduced from 243 to 99. He also noted the need of intermediate depots with sufficient capacity to absorb tonnage that the forward dumps could not receive. Such depots, although deemed essential to prevent port congestion and long desired by the theater, had not yet been established.28 On 17 February General Lord, on behalf of General Lee, assured General Somervell that there would be no excessive accumulation of idle ships and that he would see to it that his staff maintained “a vigilant and accurate estimate of the situation at all times.” Both the discharge rate and the forward movements from the ports, he reported, were finally showing signs of consistent improvement. By late March 1945 General Gross was satisfied with the shipping and transportation situation in the European theater.29
U.S. Army Port Operations
Despite the delay in developing the port discharge and depot capacities envisaged in OVERLORD and the consequent shipping congestion, the U.S. Army-operated beaches and ports in France and Belgium handled an enormous volume of traffic originating in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Mediterranean. Between the invasion of Normandy and 8 May 1945, approximately eleven months, they discharged 15,272,412 long tons of Army cargo and handled the debarkation of 3,702,180 personnel. In most cases, port operations were handicapped by extensive destruction of facilities, personnel and equipment shortages, and limited means of transportation to the interior. The workloads carried by the various Army port and beach installations during this period are indicated in the following table:30
| Ports | Cargo Discharged (Long Tons) | Personnel Debarked |
| Southern France | 4,123,794 | 905,512 |
| Cherbourg | 2,697,341 | 95,923 |
| Antwerp | 2,658,000 | 333 |
| OMAHA Beach | 1,264,999 | 801,000 |
| Le Havre | 1,168,171 | 1,014,036 |
| Rouen | 1,164,511 | 82,199 |
| UTAH Beach | 726,014 | 801,005 |
| Ghent | 614,861 | 6 |
| Minor Normandy | 600,884 | 788 |
| Brittany | 253,837 | 1,378 |
Cherbourg
The first major port on the Continent to fall into American hands, Cherbourg, had begun operations on 16 July 1944. Late in the month, the port was given the objective of discharging 20,000 tons per day by mid-September 1944. An expanded program for the rehabilitation of the shattered port facilities was undertaken by the Engineers and plans were made to provide additional unloading equipment and to improve rail and highway facilities.31
During the summer and fall of 1944 every effort was exerted to reach the desired daily discharge of 20,000 tons, but progress was disappointingly slow. Mine sweeping and ship salvage proved more difficult than anticipated, causing delays in port reconstruction. Cargo operations were carried on around the clock, but night work was slowed by poor lighting. Manpower was insufficient, despite the employment of thousands of prisoners of war and hundreds of French civilians. As winter approached, inclement weather often interrupted the port activity, and in September, alone, ten days were lost. Also, much of the incoming cargo consisted of bulky construction and rail rehabilitation materials, items that were difficult to handle expeditiously. Diversion of trucks and rolling stock from Cherbourg to hauls along the lengthening supply lines further handicapped port operations.32
Although General Ross had warned that the goal of 20,000 tons per day might not be achieved if passenger traffic were allowed to interfere with cargo operations, American troops began debarking at Cherbourg as early as July. In anticipation of additional troop movements, suitable space for staging areas was found southeast of the city. Evacuation of casualties was started in mid-August and was an important port activity thereafter. On 7 September 1944 the first troop convoy of four ships arrived direct from the United States, carrying approximately 19,000 military personnel who were unloaded by means of barges and rhinos. During that month a total of 67,022 troops landed at Cherbourg, and 5,059 casualties were evacuated. These passenger movements, while not extraordinarily heavy, had an adverse effect upon cargo discharge since they tied up badly needed floating equipment and port personnel.33
After discharging 12,911 long tons on 30 August, the port hit a new high of 14,426 long tons on 18 September. During the remainder of the month, the tonnage unloaded daily fluctuated between 8,150 and 13,888 long tons. Notwithstanding the difficulties already mentioned, the port commander, Colonel Sibley, believed that the main deterrent to the accomplishment of the port’s mission was the delay in reconstructing sufficient deepwater berths. On 14 September 1944 the port rehabilitation program was reported 75 percent complete, but a large part of this work consisted of lighterage facilities and the uncompleted 25 percent consisted chiefly of berths where cargo could be discharged directly from ship to shore. At that time, only five of twenty-eight planned Liberty
berths were available. The lack of deep-water docks compelled the port to rely heavily on lighterage, a process that required double handling and inevitably slowed cargo discharge. Of the 439,660 long tons of Army cargo discharged at Cherbourg by 13 September, only 38.4 percent was unloaded directly at quayside or at special LST ramps. The remaining tonnage was carried ashore from ships at anchor by DUKWs, barges, and other craft.34
Other problems arose in the realm of administration. As in the United Kingdom, the ports on the Continent were under the jurisdiction of the base sections. The Normandy Base Section commander, with headquarters at Cherbourg, took an active part in the direction of the port activities, and in Colonel Sibley’s opinion prevented the port commander from effectively exercising his authority. Moreover, the presence of base section headquarters, as well as various naval headquarters, served to crowd the port area and added to the congestion.35
Colonel Sibley was relieved on 19 September 1944 and was succeeded late in the month by Col. James A. Crothers.36 During the following month continued progress was made in rehabilitating the port as much additional cargo-handling, marine, motor transport, and rail equipment and personnel became available. Improvement was also reported in the maintenance and repair of port equipment. A growing percentage of the cargo was discharged directly at dockside, and despite worsening weather conditions the average daily discharge rose from 10,481 tons in September to 11,793 long tons in October.37
As cargo discharge operations improved, port clearance became the principal limiting factor. By October it had become apparent that although it was physically possible to unload 20,000 tons of cargo per day, this objective was being blocked by the difficulty of moving cargo forward once it had been placed ashore. There it tended to pile up, awaiting transport. As at any port, when clearance failed to keep up with discharge congestion developed. The continuous fall rains brought thick mud and impassable roads and caused trucks to bog down at the dumps. Motor transport for port use was severely limited by the demands of the rapidly advancing armies. As a result, greater use had to be made of rail facilities.
General Ross had foreseen that rail facilities would have to be greatly expanded and ultimately relied upon for most quay clearance at Cherbourg. Accordingly, an additional ninety miles of track were constructed within the port area. At his insistence, two large marshaling yards were built outside the city. The 4th Port also took over the operation of the Cherbourg Terminal Railway from the Normandy Base Section in order to achieve control and coordination of port and rail activity.38
Until August 1944 port clearance at Cherbourg was effected mostly by motor transport, but thereafter rail traffic increased rapidly. In September almost as much cargo was dispatched by rail as by truck. Beginning in October, movement by rail took the lead as additional trackage became available and more trains were placed in operation. The following are the comparative figures, in long tons, for cargo discharge and port clearance by rail and by truck during the last half of 1944:39
| Cargo Discharged | Cleared by Rail | Cleared by Truck | |
| July | 31,627 | 1,212 | 27,257 |
| August | 266,444 | 94,692 | 152,731 |
| September | 314,431 | 162,021 | 166,118 |
| October | 365,592 | 191,307 | 161,814 |
| November | 433,301 | 242,004 | 150,026 |
| December | 250,112 | 155,797 | 97,202 |
The peak in cargo discharge at Cherbourg was reached during November 1944, and on one day the 20,000-ton target was almost reached. An abrupt drop in December brought the discharged cargo down to about the August level, where it remained during the first quarter of 1945. The decline was due primarily to the opening of other ports—Rouen, Le Havre, and Antwerp—which were closer to the combat zone. Cherbourg remained useful, particularly for the discharge of ammunition, which was not moved through Antwerp because of the buzz bombs.
After November 1944 Cherbourg steadily declined as a major port. In the process of slackening off, much of its cargo-handling equipment was turned over to other installations. After V-E Day Cherbourg was used chiefly for the evacuation of patients. The port was returned to French control on 14 October 1945.40
The Brittany Ports
The supply problem of the U.S. forces was so pressing and the lag in cargo discharge so serious that every effort had to be made to develop auxiliary ports, no matter how small. With the Allied advance following the St. Lô break-through, a number of northern Brittany ports, including St. Malo, Cancale, Morlaix, St. Brieuc, and St. Michel-en-Grève, became available. The job of operating these installations was assigned to the 16th Port under General Hoge, former commander of the Engineer Special Brigade Group at OMAHA Beach.
Early in August 1944 General Hoge flew to France with an advance party, which was followed later in the same month by the main body of the port organization. Preliminary reconnaissance disclosed that the beaches at Cancale and St. Malo were not usable and that the lock gates at St. Brieuc had been severely damaged. On 11 August the 16th Port was ordered to discharge three LSTs that had just arrived at St. Michel-en-Grève with trucks, ammunition, rations, and miscellaneous supplies urgently needed by the VIII Corps of General Patton’s Third Army. The unloading, which began on the following day when the beach had dried out, was completed in sixteen hours. Later, other LSTs were discharged here in similar fashion. Meanwhile, operations also started at Morlaix. In September
1944 the 16th Port was relieved in this area by the 5th Port.41
The 5th Port found the facilities at Morlaix very poor. The retreating Germans had done some damage, but following reconstruction Morlaix and its sub-ports of Carentan, Roscoff, St. Michel-en-Grève, and St. Brieuc were serviceable, and they discharged and forwarded approximately 54,000 long tons of supplies in September 1944. At the tiny port of Roscoff more cargo was discharged and cleared every day than had been handled there in an entire year before the war. A small fleet of Army harbor boats, assisted by Navy landing craft and some local shipping, furnished the required water transportation. Through these minor installations flowed a steady though not heavy stream of ammunition, rations, and petroleum products for the support of the Third Army. The service of the 5th Port in Brittany was terminated in December 1944 when the unit transferred to Antwerp.42
Counted on heavily in OVERLORD planning, the Brittany ports played only a minor role in the support of the armies. Morlaix and its subports proved useful, but none of the larger ports was ever opened. As already indicated, enemy resistance, destruction of port facilities, and the rapid Allied progress eastward led to abandonment of the hope of any significant port development in Brittany. By the latter part of September, the emphasis in planning had shifted to ports recently uncovered by the advancing armies.
Le Havre
The port of Le Havre, at the mouth of the Seine River, had suffered severely from Allied artillery and air attacks and from enemy demolition. As planned in late September 1944, the port development program called for the immediate reception of approximately 1,500 long tons per day by means of DUKWs or lighters and an eventual discharge of about 7,000 long tons per day. This was to be accomplished without major reconstruction.43
The 16th Port, which was assigned to operate Le Havre, had completed its transfer from Brittany by the end of September 1944.44 Meanwhile, Engineer troops had arrived and had begun the job of rehabilitation. This work was scheduled for completion in three phases. In the first phase the Engineers cleared and prepared the beaches for operation, removed mines and booby traps, provided storage space, and built access roads. In the second phase emphasis was placed on the repair of quays and lighterage berths, the improvement of the road network, and the removal of sunken vessels. The latter job was done in close coordination with U.S. Navy salvage crews. The first phase was completed and the second well under way by the end of November. Thereafter work was concentrated on the provision of facilities of a more permanent nature—the third phase.45
Work was sufficiently advanced by 2 October 1944 to begin over-the-beach discharge from LSTs. Despite almost continuous rainfall, rehabilitation progressed and the discharge rate mounted steadily. By the end of the year the port troops, augmented by French civilians, had unloaded 434,920 long tons of cargo from a variety of vessels including Liberties, LSTs, refrigerator ships, and coasters.46 The bulk of the tonnage was discharged from ships at anchor into DUKWs, barges, and landing craft. As at other ports, operations were conducted around the clock.47
During the German counteroffensive of December 1944, Le Havre played an important role in supporting the hard-pressed U.S. forces. In that month the port dispatched ninety-two trainloads of ammunition to the forward area; critically needed rockets were rushed by truck from the port to troops defending a large depot at Liège; and certain types of small arms ammunition were given expedited handling.48
A major feat during this period was the rehanging of the gates of the Lock Rochemont. This project, participated in by Engineer and harbor craft troops, U.S. Navy salvage personnel, and French civilian contractors, opened the inner basins to Liberty ships. Despite adverse weather, underwater obstructions, and limited equipment, the job was finished at the end of November. The first Liberties passed through the lock on 16 December. Other important undertakings, completed early in the following year, involved the rehabilitation of the Tancarville Canal for barge traffic up the Seine from Le Havre, and the rehanging of the gates of the Bassine de-la-Citadelle.49
In January 1945 a peak monthly discharge of 198,768 long tons was achieved. Although quayside operations had assumed increased importance, DUKWs and barges continued to be the chief means of discharge. During the first quarter of the year the seven DUKW companies brought ashore 35.2 percent of the tonnage landed at Le Havre. Quayside discharge accounted for 23.3 percent of the total. Barges and other craft accounted for the remainder. The volume of inbound shipments—largely ammunition—continued heavy, and by 31 May 1945 Le Havre had received a total of 1,254,129 long tons of cargo.
Port clearance at first was effected by motor trucks, which rumbled through the debris to the dumps. Later, rail and canal facilities also were used to remove cargo from the port area, where suitable storage space was scarce. As elsewhere, port clearance activities were at first handicapped by insufficient ship-to-shore discharge facilities and by truck and rail equipment shortages. By early 1945, however, these conditions had been materially improved. The tonnage moved forward then exceeded that discharged, permitting the reduction of cargo previously accumulated in port storage.50
Aside from serving as a cargo port, Le Havre also developed into the principal troop debarkation point in the European theater. Debarkation activities became important in November 1944, and reached a peak during March 1945, when 247,607 personnel debarked. The landing of troops was facilitated by direct ship-to-shore operations at a long steel ponton pier and at a rehabilitated troopship berth at the Quai d’Escale. In mid-January 1945 the 52nd Port, newly arrived from the Bristol Channel, was attached to the 16th Port. Its commander, Col. William J. Deyo, was assigned the job of handling troop movements. During the same month the Red Horse Staging Area was established nearby to stage inbound and outbound personnel.51
With the coming of V-E Day, emphasis shifted from troop debarkation activities to outloading personnel. On 1 June 1945 the Le Havre Port of Embarkation was established and included the port, the depots, and the adjacent staging camps. During the month a total of 207,759 American military personnel embarked from Le Havre. The port was used for outbound American personnel, including war brides, until the end of July 1946, when this activity was assigned to the 17th Port at Bremerhaven, Germany.52
Rouen
U.S. Army activities at the Seine River port of Rouen were begun early in October 1944. A detachment of the 16th Port arrived to direct operations; rehabilitation and salvage activities were undertaken by the French, U.S. Army Engineer troops, and U.S. Navy personnel; and French civilians were hired to assist in the conduct of port activities. The first two ships, coasters carrying POL from the United Kingdom, were berthed on 15 October 1944.
After four days the 16th Port detachment was replaced by the 11th Port, which with its attached units had been transferred from the Normandy minor ports. There were then nine berths available, and rehabilitation was estimated to be 20 percent complete. The 11th Port commenced unloading activities on 20 October, and during the remainder of the month it discharged 23,844 long tons from forty-eight vessels, most of them coasters.53
At first, port operations were retarded by enemy destruction, inadequate railway facilities, a shortage of labor, and insufficient motor transport for cargo clearance. Also, larger cargo vessels, such as Liberties and MTVs, had to be loaded lightly or were lightened in order to negotiate the shallow channel between Le Havre and Rouen. As rehabilitation progressed, the port’s performance improved. During November 1944, the 11th Port discharged 127,569 long tons, and in December it unloaded 132,433 long tons. Meanwhile, troop debarkations had become important. Beginning with the debarkation of troops from an LSI on 10 November, Rouen by the end of the year had received
51,111 personnel and 22,078 vehicles, which arrived aboard LSTs, MTVs, coasters, and landing craft.
The port rehabilitation program was pushed to within 75 percent of completion by the close of 1944, and subsequently a total of fifteen Liberty and twenty-six coaster berths were made available. Activity reached a peak during March 1945, when the port discharged 268,174 long tons of cargo. At that time approximately 9,000 U.S. Army troops, 5,000 French civilians, and 9,000 prisoners of war were engaged in operations at Rouen. Traffic at the port fell off drastically after V-E Day, and on 15 June 1945 the port was returned to French control.54
Marseille
In contrast with the delayed port development in northern France, Marseille was brought into operation earlier than anticipated. When Marseille and its satellite, Port-de-Bouc, were captured late in August 1944, about a month ahead of schedule, operation was assigned to the 6th Port. Despite extensive destruction, rehabilitation proceeded rapidly, and by late September 1944 it was possible to close the beaches in southern France and rely on the ports to receive the men and materials required for the support of the 6th Army Group.55
During October prompt removal of cargo from the port area at Marseille became very difficult because of a shortage of motor transport. Large amounts of cargo were piled on the quays, many berths were idle, and on a single day as many as forty-four ships were awaiting discharge. In this emergency every available vehicle was seized for port clearance. Even horses and wagons were used. But since the backlog continued to mount, a temporary embargo had to be placed on sailings to Marseille from Italian and North African ports. The procurement of additional motor transport and the relatively rapid rehabilitation of rail facilities proved major factors in relieving this port congestion. By 1 November some 1,100 trucks were available for port clearance, the backlog of cargo awaiting removal had been reduced to normal, and the ports of Marseille and Port-de-Bouc were discharging and clearing an average rate of 16,000 long tons per day for five days each week.56
The 6th Port ran into a shortage of experienced labor at Marseille since the best dock hands had been removed by the Germans. Nevertheless, many indigenous workers were hired. In February 1945 an average of 7,339 French civilians worked each day in the dock area. The French served under their own supervisors but received U.S. Army rations to supplement their diet. Because the demand for labor exceeded the available supply, the port requested and received prisoners of war to assist in port operations. During the same month, in addition to French civilians, the daily labor force at Marseille included 1,268 Indochinese, 4,621 prisoners of war, and 5,646 U.S. troops. The large number of foreign workers accentuated the
pilferage problem. Efforts to minimize black market activity originating in the port were only partially successful, chiefly because of an insufficient number of military police to serve as guards.57
During November 1944 Marseille achieved a record of 486,574 long tons of cargo discharged. In the period from November 1944 through March 1945 the port unloaded a total of 2,249,389 long tons. For the same five months troop debarkation figures aggregated 269,579. Port-de-Bouc, in addition, had received large amounts of petroleum products, which in March 1945 alone totaled 162,245 long tons. By April 1945 the Army had sixty-eight berths available at Marseille. In the following month part of the port area was relinquished to French agencies for handling much-needed civilian foodstuffs and supplies.58
When V-E Day came the port of Marseille had discharged more U.S. Army tonnage than any other European port. It had also debarked a large number of American military troops in addition to forwarding prisoners of war to the zone of interior. Following the German surrender, Marseille was the principal port for direct redeployment of personnel, equipment, and supplies to the Pacific. Here were concentrated the “flatted” Liberties that were to transport organizational vehicles for the redeployed units. These were the ships originally requested by the theater to furnish vehicle lift and an emergency floating reserve of ammunition and subsistence for the invasion of southern France.59
After V-J Day the main mission of the 6th Port was to return troops and materiel to the zone of interior. The peak came in November 1945 when 139,785 troops and 41,062 long tons were outloaded. Activities at Port-de-Bouc were ended on 23 March 1946, and on the last day of that month all U.S. port operations ceased at Marseille.60
Antwerp
Situated on the Scheldt River about fifty-five miles from the sea, Antwerp had the important advantage of excellent shipping facilities, good connections with the hinterland, and proximity to the front lines. In peacetime Antwerp had been one of the world’s busiest ports with activity comparable to that of Hamburg and New York. Besides many modern docks equipped with 270 electric cranes, 322 hydraulic cranes, and much heavy lift equipment, the port had considerable shed and storage space, several large dry docks, and more than 400 connected tanks with a capacity of over 120 million gallons for petroleum products.
Since the Germans had left the port and its facilities relatively undamaged, no major reconstruction work was required. The river and harbor had to be swept of mines, and considerable dredging accomplished.61 Some sunken craft had to be cleared from the basins, sand and gravel
removed from the quays, and hard surfacing provided for fork lifts and other materials-handling equipment. The damaged gates of the Kruisschans Lock at the main entrance to the American sector had to be repaired, ripped-out rails replaced, and repairs to sheds, warehouses, and quay walls made. The rehabilitation work was performed by British and American military units, assisted by civilian labor. An early report indicated that the port of Antwerp was capable of meeting the combined requirements of the British and American Armies.62
Preliminary negotiations between the British and Americans had assured the latter a minimum of sixty-two working berths. On 14 October 1944 General Ross designated the chief of his Control and Planning Division, Col. Hugh A. Murrill, as his representative in the over-all planning for the development of the port. Ross, in particular, wanted the maximum freedom of operation accorded the U.S. port commander. Four days later a formal agreement was reached between the British 21 Army Group and the U.S. COMZONE headquarters providing for a division of the inner harbor, or basins, between the British and the Americans, and for the joint use of the outer harbor, that is, the docks along the river. Subject to later amendments, this agreement assigned a large portion of the northern section of the port to the U.S. Army and reserved the southern section, including the city of Antwerp, for the British forces.63
Under the agreement, the British assumed responsibility for the local administration and defense of the Antwerp area, while the Channel Base Section, COMZONE, was given the task of coordinating; controlling, and administering all U.S. forces within the area. Although over-all command of the port was vested in a British naval officer, the British and American sections were each headed by a separate port commander. The coordination of activities, including the determination of requirements for civilian labor and port equipment, was controlled through a Port Executive Committee, which was headed by the British naval officer in charge and included the British and American port commanders.
Provision also was made for the establishment of a joint American-British movements and transportation committee to plan and coordinate movements by highway, rail, and canal. After a Belgian representative had been included, this committee became known as BELMOT (Belgian Movements Organization for Transport). Insofar as possible, American cargo was to be moved from quayside to advanced depots, and any storage in the port area was to be of an in-transit character. It was estimated that the U.S. Army would move approximately 22,500 tons of cargo per day, exclusive of bulk POL, to its depots in the Liège–Namur and Luxembourg areas. The British were expected to move 17,500 tons daily, exclusive of bulk POL, to their forward depots.64
The 13th Port, previously stationed at Plymouth, was assigned initially to Antwerp. Its personnel began arriving in October 1944. Later, the 5th Port also was moved to Antwerp, coming in two detachments during November and December. Technically, the 5th Port was attached to the 13th Port, but the officers and men were placed wherever needed so as to form a single working organization. The headquarters companies of the two ports remained separate. In command of this combined organization was Col. Doswell Gullatt, who formerly headed the 5th Engineer Special Brigade at OMAHA Beach.65
The first American cargo vessel at Antwerp, the James B. Weaver, arrived on 28 November 1944 with men of the 268th Port Company and their organic equipment aboard. By mid-December the port at Antwerp was operating in high gear. The American section was divided into eight areas, each of which functioned as a unit. Cargo handling was greatly helped by the large amount of American equipment, notably harbor craft and cranes, brought in to supplement the Belgian port facilities. As the year closed, the pool of floating equipment was augmented by the arrival of 17 small tugs, 6 floating cranes-2 of 100-ton capacity-20 towboats, and a number of other harbor craft. Military personnel for the most part simply supervised cargo discharge, since the bulk of the unloading was done by Belgian longshoremen. The number of civilians employed by the U.S. Army steadily increased, and at the close of 1944 the average was approximately 9,000 per day. The principal problem was that of transporting the workers to and from their homes, since enemy activity had forced many natives into temporary quarters outside the city. During the winter of 1944–45, despite occasional short-lived strikes, the Belgian civilians on the whole performed excellently and proved both cooperative and industrious.66
Buzz bombs, rockets, and enemy air attacks often interrupted but never entirely halted port operations. Casualties, property damage, and frayed nerves were inevitable concomitants. In late October the persistent enemy bombardment of the Antwerp port area had aroused fear in the Army’s Operations Division at Washington that this might be another case of putting “all the eggs in one basket.67 In reply, the theater commander had stressed the importance of the additional port capacity. The defense of the city, he said, was being strengthened, but at the same time every other available port on the Continent was being developed to the maximum as insurance against disaster at Antwerp.”
Regardless of the grave hazards, port personnel soon succeeded in unloading more cargo than could be moved promptly to the dumps and railheads. Although cargo forwarding lagged behind vessel discharge, the rate of port clearance steadily improved. Rail clearance, initially limited by shortages of rolling stock, was stepped up, and by mid-December 1944 it outstripped other means of transportation from the port. During that month removal by rail accounted for 44 percent of all tonnage cleared, as against 40 percent for
motor transport. The inland waterways accounted for the remainder.
Normal port operations at Antwerp were interrupted by the German counteroffensive of mid-December 1944. Because outlying depots and dumps, particularly those in the Liège area, were threatened, large quantities of supplies again accumulated in the port. Items such as winter clothing, tanks, Bangalore torpedoes, jeeps, mortars, and snowplows were rushed to the front. Port personnel were diverted from their regular assignments to assist in the rescue of V-bomb victims and to guard supply trains moving into the forward areas. The port troops also formed road patrols and did sentry duty at vital dock installations in order to forestall possible attack by saboteurs and enemy paratroopers. Fog, icy roads, and bitter cold added to the operating difficulties.68
constant harassment by long-range V-1 and V-2 weapons and occasional bombing and strafing from aircraft, port activity continued at a steady pace. During December 1944 the impressive total of 427,592 long tons of cargo was taken off U.S. vessels at Antwerp. The nuisance bombing was countered by determined and effective defenders utilizing antiaircraft fire, radar screens, and every other modern protective device. Yet the bombs came through, bringing death and destruction. Despite the incessant noise and the constant terror, longshoremen worked feverishly around the clock. Lights burned all night, controlled by master switches for protection against enemy aircraft. A steady stream of trucks and trains moved the cargo forward to the armies.69
Early in 1945 the halting of the German Ardennes offensive, continued progress in the rehabilitation of port facilities, and the acquisition of additional harbor -craft and port equipment permitted substantial improvement in the amount of cargo moved through Antwerp.70 The following tabulation shows, in long tons, the cargo discharge and clearance at the port during the first half of 1945.71
| Cleared From Port by | |||||
| Month | Cargo Discharged | Rail | Road | Barge | Total |
| Jan | 432,756 | 238,518 | 120,799 | 41,616 | 400,933 |
| Feb | 473,473 | 306,036 | 169,469 | 57,868 | 533,373 |
| Mar | 557,585 | 302,018 | 184,169’ | 74,020 | 560,207 |
| Apr | 628,217 | 209,459 | 86,103 | 142,450 | 438,012 |
| May | 416,825 | 147,797 | 72,885 | 123,758 | 344,440 |
| Jun | 484,667 | 170,511 | 110,627 | 164,822 | 445,960 |
By V-E Day the American section of Antwerp had become the leading cargo port operated by the Transportation Corps in the European theater. After the close of hostilities the port did not lose its significance. In July 1945 ammunition, tanks, vehicles, and personnel were shipped to the Pacific. The capitulation of Japan led to a change in the outloading program, which thereafter was directed to the return of troops and equipment to the zone of interior. As at other ports, the frequent turnover of personnel and the progressive reduction of strength incident to redeployment and demobilization resulted in lowered operating efficiency. Because an adequate military guard could not be
maintained, cargo pilferage increased.72
The 5th Port was inactivated on 18 November 1945. In that month, despite the loss of many key men, 156,743 long tons of cargo were outloaded. The 13th Port remained as the headquarters unit at Antwerp. However, as the year drew to a close, activity was on the decline. On 31 October 1946 the 13th Major Port was inactivated and all U.S. Army port operations ceased.73
Ghent
The Belgian port of Ghent was opened in January 1945 under joint American and British operation to serve as a standby port for Antwerp. Having been used by the Germans only for barge traffic, the harbor had to be dredged and the port facilities rehabilitated. The 17th Port was assigned to Ghent, and on 23 January it began unloading the first cargo ship. A steady increase in American activity during the ensuing months culminated in a peak discharge in April of 277,553 long tons. Late in that month the Americans took complete charge of port facilities, except for a few berths reserved for the British. By 31 May a total of 793,456 long tons of U.S. Army cargo had been unloaded. On 24 June the 13th Port relieved the 17th Port at Ghent. The main body of the latter organization then proceeded to Bremerhaven, which was to be developed as the supply port for the American occupation forces in Germany and Austria.74 U.S. Army port operations ceased altogether in the last week of August 1945.75
Movement Control
Movement control operations on the Continent differed markedly from those in the United Kingdom. France lacked the well-organized military transportation system that existed in the British Isles and there was no established movement control organization upon which the U.S. Army could rely. Movement control on the Continent was further complicated by wartime damage or destruction. At the outset it was almost impossible to determine how much traffic might be handled in a given area. Movements therefore could not be planned, as in the United Kingdom, on the basis of known performance and a relatively predictable logistical situation. On the Continent the estimates of port, rail, and highway capacity were never free from the uncertainty inherent in a changing tactical situation.
The control of movements on the Continent was initially handled on a decentralized basis. As the advance and base sections were established, they set up movement control staffs within their transportation sections and assigned traffic regulating personnel to important rail terminals and truck traffic control points. On the Continent the RTO did much the same work as in the United Kingdom, performing the actual movement control operations in the field. Although under the technical supervision of the theater chief of transportation, the RTO was
directly responsible to the transportation officer of the base section in which he functioned.76
decentralized command structure, coupled with the intervention of the COMZONE G-4 in the realm of operations, delayed the development of centralized direction of supply movements by the theater chief of transportation until the end of 1944. Until that time, the commanders of the various base sections took almost complete responsibility for the control of movements originating in their respective areas. The “technical supervision” of the theater chief of transportation was construed in the narrowest sense, with the result that his personnel in the base sections refused to act without a movement order from the G-4, COMZONE, whose office therefore became an operating agency. The Freight Branch of the chief of transportation’s Movements Division was primarily advisory. There was no strong civilian organization, such as the British Ministry of War Transport that could bring pressure to bear on the supply services.77
The depots and dumps on the Continent generally were set up without consulting the theater chief of transportation and often without regard for limitations that he might have detected. Such practices resulted in many unsatisfactory locations being chosen, and rail and truck congestion followed because freight was scheduled for arrival at a rate beyond the capacity of the installation.78 Since many of the factors affecting the control of freight movement were unknown or variable, and since large reserves ashore were lacking, the supply of the U.S. Army usually was on a hand-to-mouth basis, governed by a system of priorities and daily allocations.
By late 1944 it was clear that the ability of the ports to discharge and forward cargo exceeded the combined receiving capacity of the U.S. Army depots. This situation called for a movements program geared to realistic goals. However, the priority system and movement control exercised by G-4, COMZONE, prevented the theater chief of transportation from effectively restricting and policing freight traffic in accordance with depot capacities. Moreover, the G-4 of each base section was free to use the movement capacity that remained after the priority allocations of G-4, COMZONE, had been met. This often led to the arrival of additional freight at depots that were already overburdened.
The period of extreme decentralization in movement control came to an end on 1 January 1945 with the publication of the first monthly port operations and supply program.79 The new program had its beginning in the daily allocation made for the Red Ball Express in late August 1944. Further impetus was given by the subsequent shipping crisis, in which it was demonstrated that cargo discharge, port clearance and forward movement would have to be planned on a realistic basis. Details of the new system were worked out in
periodic conferences with the chief of transportation, whose position, as has been pointed out, was greatly strengthened at this time.80 During March 1945 General Ross was also instrumental in establishing a workable procedure whereby an immediate embargo could be proclaimed to prevent congestion at a given depot. The monthly personnel and supply movement program, as it was later called, proved extremely useful during 1945.81
In order to effect the orderly movement of supplies and replacements into the combat zone and the prompt evacuation to the rear of casualties, prisoners of war, and salvage, provision was made for the assignment of regulating stations. This type of traffic control agency, a hold-over from World War I, should not be confused with the traffic regulating units, on which the Transportation Corps relied heavily throughout operations on the Continent. As a rule, a separate regulating station was established behind each army, commanded by a regulating officer who theoretically was the direct representative of the theater commander.82
As provided for in OVERLORD planning, the regulating officers serving each of the armies under the 12th Army Group were assigned to ADSEC, which then functioned as the armies’ regulating agency. When the 24th and 25th Regulating Stations reached France in late July 1944, no one clearly understood what was expected of such units since they had not been used previously. By mid-August, however, the 25th Regulating Station had begun to assist ADSEC in controlling the flow of supplies to the U.S. First Army, its mission until the German surrender.
Meanwhile, the 24th Regulating Station began supporting the fast-moving U.S. Third Army. Especially during August and early September 1944, the demand always exceeded the supply and the transportation facilities proved inadequate. Priorities of movement had to be established to prevent highway congestion, and shipments were forwarded on a day-to-day basis. Under these circumstances the unit did more expediting than regulating, a condition that lasted until December 1944. The 24th Regulating Station followed the Third Army into Germany, operating as a control agency in its support until the end of hostilities.83
In view of the extensive employment of motor transport on the Continent, the control of highway traffic became an important staff function of the theater chief of transportation and was assigned to his Movements Division. This work fell into two main phases. The initial phase obtained from D Day until about mid-August 1944. During this period, when the tactical situation was the governing factor, highway traffic was regulated by the U.S. First Army and ADSEC. The second phase began with the establishment of the office of the chief of transportation in France, when the Movements Division became responsible for highway traffic regulation and issued the necessary directives and procedures. For about three months it also issued motor movement instructions and made its own reconnaissance in the field. As soon as the base sections were
fully staffed and trained in the proper procedure, they took over this activity.
For security reasons as well as to facilitate communication, a key-letter system of recording and dispatching information on the movement of convoys and units was inaugurated by the theater chief of transportation. Coordination with civilian traffic agencies was achieved through two liaison officers, one French and the other Belgian, who were attached to the Movements Division. To supplement his small staff, General Ross requested fifteen civilian highway engineers from the United States. They began to arrive in December 1944 and were assigned where needed, but they might have proved more acceptable in the field had they been commissioned officers. The experience of the Movements Division indicated that traffic control on a decentralized basis, through the base sections, was the key to efficient traffic regulation.
At the close of hostilities in Europe the entire continental highway movement plan had to be altered to embrace the use of motor transport for the redeployment and readjustment of military personnel. Late in May 1945 a theater directive was issued that provided a complete standing operating procedure for such movements. To facilitate smooth and rapid transfer of personnel by highway from the army areas to the assembly areas and the port staging areas, a forward Road Traffic Branch was established at Wiesbaden, Germany, on 10 June 1945. It formed a helpful link between the armies and the theater chief of transportation.84
Motor Transport
By late August 1944 three types of truck operations had developed as planned: (1) so-called static operations, which included short hauls around depots and other installations; (2) port clearance; and (3) line of communications hauling, or long hauls. Static operations, though unspectacular, absorbed the bulk of motor equipment. Port clearance, which chiefly concerned cargo but might also involve troop movement, was essential to the smooth flow of supplies and troops into the combat zone and to insure the prompt return of ships to the United Kingdom and the zone of interior. Line of communications hauling had the most dramatic role in bringing lifeblood to rapidly moving armies.85
The main highways on the Continent were generally in good condition, thanks to reconstruction and repair by the Corps of Engineers. In a changing military situation, motor vehicles constituted the most flexible type of transportation, since they allowed hauls to be made to any location at any time and could be adapted readily to loads of varying weights and sizes. To meet the mounting demands of the advancing armies and to link the ports and beaches with the forward army supply areas, several express highway routes were established. But before describing these routes, it may be helpful to trace the principal developments with respect to the supply and operation of motor transport during the campaign on the Continent.86
Factors Affecting Operations
Throughout the summer of 1944 the burden laid on motor transport increased sharply, and the length of the hauls grew
greater as the Transportation Corps vainly tried to keep up with the armies. Had there been more truck units and more heavy-duty vehicles, the situation might never have become so acute, but the theater chief of transportation and his staff had not received the trucking units and heavy-duty cargo-hauling equipment that they had considered necessary for operations on the Continent. The resultant shortage in truck capacity was undoubtedly a factor in slowing the Allied advance, particularly that of the U.S. Third Army, across France in the summer and fall of 1944.87
Other factors also played a part. The Motor Transport Brigade (MTB) experienced considerable difficulty because of inadequate communications, congested highways, and frequent delays in loading and unloading. By late August 1944 the MTB had a daily lift of approximately 10,000 tons and the average haul was somewhat over 100 miles. At that time, General Ross reported that the rapid advance had proven extremely burdensome to the Transportation Corps and that only the trucks had saved the situation. It was, he added, pretty hard to keep pace with armies that covered in less than three months what they were expected to do in ten, especially when only one major port (Cherbourg) and the beaches were in operation.88
Despite the failure to get the motor transport that he wanted before D Day, the theater chief of transportation continued his efforts after the invasion. Then, as earlier, he had to contend with insufficient and inadequate equipment and inexperienced and untrained troops in hastily organized provisional truck companies. During the last half of 1944 General Ross tried to obtain additional trucking units and in particular to re-equip the 2½-ton standard companies with truck-tractors and 10-ton semitrailers that could carry a large pay load. Most of the re-equipping, begun in November, was accomplished by sending truck companies to Marseille where approximately 1,800 semitrailers and 690 truck-tractors had been discharged because of limited port capacity in northern France. After taking a short course in nomenclature and operation, these units brought the new heavy-duty equipment north from Marseille.89
Replacement of vehicles was a frequent necessity. Enemy action caused some damage, but the many accidents and mechanical failures due to inexperienced drivers and inefficient maintenance were the principal contributing factors. Because of constant wear and tear, the supply of tires and tubes for replacement became especially critical in the last quarter of 1944. Preventive measures were taken to ease the strain on such items, and late in the year the chief of transportation succeeded in procuring 16,053 tires and tubes of various types and sizes. Although the major supply problem in motor transport concerned vehicles, tires, and tubes, a host of other requirements developed, ranging from cotter pins to 750-gallon skid tanks. During this period the Motor Transport Service also stressed improved
maintenance procedures in an intensive effort to lessen the number of deadlined vehicles and to root out unsound practices.90
The lack of qualified personnel, notably truck drivers, was especially serious because of the damage done to equipment by inept handling. In light of the havoc they wrought, some provisional truck units were dubbed derisively truck destroyer battalions. Maintenance often was omitted in order to keep the vehicles continuously in service, and they never recovered from such abuse. Nor were the field armies always economical in their use of motor transport. On occasion, when a convoy arrived in the forward area, the trucks were not allowed to unload. Instead, the entire convoy was moved ahead for days as a sort of mobile dump. The Motor Transport Service had to keep liaison officers constantly in the field to effect the return of such convoys. Properly used and supported, truck transportation, said Colonel Ayers, could have done a much better job than it did.91
The provisional Motor Transport Brigade, originally intended to function only forty-four days, was not dissolved until early in November 1944. Its personnel then joined the Motor Transport Service, which took over the operational duties previously performed by the Motor Transport Brigade. On 5 December 1944 Col. Ross B. Warren succeeded Colonel Ayers as commanding officer of the Motor Transport Service. The responsibilities of the MTS and the base sections were considerably clarified by March 1945, at which time the administration of the COM-ZONE truck units was assigned to the base sections, as was also operational control when the haul was entirely intrasectional. If the movement was intersectional the MTS had operational control, together with the technical supervision that it maintained under all circumstances. At the close of 1944 the MTS had 198 truck companies under its technical supervision, including the 84 units that were also under its operational control. Of the 198 units, well over half, or 104 truck companies, were equipped with standard 2½-ton 6x6 trucks.92
A gradual shift in the need for motor transport from the Cherbourg and Normandy areas to the north and the east began in November 1944. Operation on the Normandy beaches ceased during that month. The tonnage landed at Le Havre and Rouen increased, and Antwerp was opened. Simultaneously, plans were prepared for the employment of motor vehicles in support of an extensive advance, in the event of a possible break-through into German territory.
The enemy counteroffensive of December 1944 soon altered the situation, necessitating the diversion of many vehicles to deliver combat troops into the forward areas and to remove aviation gasoline from imperiled dumps at Liège. Apart from the semitrailers used to lift gasoline, the equipment used during this crisis was predominantly 2½-ton standard cargo trucks and 10-ton semitrailers with 4-5-ton truck-tractors. The Transportation Corps moved more than 1,000,000 tons of supplies by motor during the Battle of the Bulge. In the process it lost fifty trucks,
and twenty-eight of its men were reported killed, wounded, or missing.93
Increasingly heavy demands were made on motor transport during the closing months of the war. For the Rhine River crossing a small fleet of landing craft was moved from the seacoast on large M-19 and M-25 tank transporters.94 In the spring of 1945, an acute motor transport equipment shortage arose as tonnage requirements increased, and truck units were pulled out of port clearance and static operations and placed in support of the final offensive east of the Rhine. In mid-March and again in April 1945 General Ross apprised the base section transportation officers of the critical situation and urged them to make the most efficient use of the facilities at their disposal. He listed certain ideal conditions to be achieved, such as two drivers for each vehicle so as to permit round-the-clock operation; forty vehicles per day per company doing task duties and the other eight being serviced; and maximum utilization of trucks with regard to pay loads and turnaround time. He also recommended the policy of pooling vehicles at all installations, a return-loads program, and the utilization wherever possible of additional civilian motor transport, as well as horses and wagons and rail and barge lines.
By V-E Day the situation had improved somewhat, but new requirements served to keep the pressure on. In the summer of 1945 General Ross stressed the difficulty caused by redeployment of motor transport units to the Pacific. Only by the resourceful and economical utilization of the equipment remaining in the theater could the armies be redeployed and the many displaced persons and prisoners of war be relocated. The accomplishment of these missions required a continued maximum effort by all COMZONE transportation officers in the months immediately following the termination of hostilities.95
Express Highway Routes
To meet the ever-growing requirements of the field armies, several express highway routes were established, usually for limited periods, for special missions, and until the railways could carry the load. The express highway routes served their primary purpose in 1944. Although they became less essential, as rail and barge services became operative, late in the year, fast highway transport again became a major factor in logistical support when the armies drove beyond the Rhine in 1945.96
The POL routes were opened on the Continent on 14 June 1944 and were continued throughout the war. Organized first to supply petroleum products during the critical phase of the invasion, the POL truck routes usually ran from pipeheads, although some loading was done directly at the ports, especially at Rouen. Bivouac areas, vehicle maintenance depots, and routes were constantly changing as the pipelines were pushed forward. The drivers hauled both MT 80 (Motor Transport 80 octane) gasoline for vehicles and AV 100 (Aviation 100 octane) gasoline for aircraft. Petroleum products were carried either in bulk or in packaged form, the latter being prepared from bulk lots at the
decanting areas. Packaged POL usually was transported in 5-gallon Jerry cans on 2½-ton 6x6 cargo trucks, and bulk shipments were made in tank trucks.
In mid-November 1944 fourteen tank truck companies comprised the backbone of the POL truck fleet. Five of these companies had 750-gallon tankers and nine had 2,000-gallon tankers with 2,000-gallon trailers. Since additional tonnage was required, standard cargo trucks were added to carry packaged POL or were equipped with skid tanks to haul bulk gasoline. In the closing months of the war, three companies were equipped with ten-ton semitrailers, each fitted with four 750-gallon skid tanks.97 During the period from 14 June through 31 December 1944, a total of 423,434 tons of petroleum products was carried by the Motor Transport Service.98
Express motor routes for the movement of general cargo were established as the need arose. The impetus to the first such route, the Red Ball Express, came in late August 1944 when the G-4, COMZONE, asked if a total of 100,000 tons of various classes of supply could be delivered from Normandy to the U.S. Army dumps in the Chartres–La Loupe–Dreux area by 1 September, in order to support a projected advance. Since the available rail facilities would lift only 25,000 tons, the remaining 75,000 tons would have to be moved by truck. ADSEC accepted the assignment, and the first hauling began almost immediately and with little advance preparation. The Motor Transport Service, under Colonel Ayers, supervised the project, the supply services furnished the cargo, and the Normandy Base Section loaded it, but the Motor Transport Brigade, under Colonel Richmond, actually operated the trucks.99
Realizing that the roads of Normandy were too narrow to support continuous heavy two-way traffic, both Richmond and Ayers demanded and were granted the one-way restricted roads that later became known as the Red Ball Express Route. Provision was made for a loop run, using the northern road for loaded vehicles, and the southern road for the returning empty vehicles. Later, after the operation had been extended, Maj. Gordon K. Gravelle of the Forward Echelon, COMZONE, prepared detailed traffic circulation plans for critical locations and coordinated the project with ADSEC, the COMZONE headquarters, the theater provost marshal, and the U.S. First Army.100
The initial Red Ball route extended from St. Lô, which was the control point for dispatching outbound convoys, to the delivery area in the La Loupe–Dreux–Chartres triangle west of Paris. (Map 4) The route was restricted to Red Ball convoys. The operation began on 25 August 1944 with 67 truck companies, which hauled a total of 4,482 long tons on that
Map 4: Routes of the Red Ball Express
day. Only four days later, when the peak performance was reached for the first phase of Red Ball, 132 truck companies with a strength of 5,958 vehicles were assigned to the project. The average number of truck companies utilized was 83. The largest amount hauled on a single day (29 August 1944) was 12,342 tons.101
Traffic control points were set up in the main centers along the route. There, the convoy movements were checked and recorded, and the trucks were refueled and given emergency repairs while the drivers received instructions and enjoyed a brief rest, hot coffee, and sandwiches. The Red Ball road signs were easy to follow, especially at night when the markers and directional arrows could be readily distinguished. Traffic was carefully regulated to prevent highway congestion. The maximum speed allowed was twenty-five miles per hour. Colonel Ayers, with the support of Colonel Richmond, insisted that the drivers be relieved and replaced
Map merged onto previous page
regularly at bivouac areas located at a midway point, in place of having them cover the route in segments as some ADSEC officers had recommended. The latter method of operation, in Ayers’s judgment, would have resulted in widespread equipment breakdowns through inadequate preventive maintenance, since drivers would not be assigned to any given vehicles, but would take their turns driving whatever trucks arrived at their segment station. Although operational control rested in the Motor Transport Brigade, its jurisdiction was confined to the boundaries of ADSEC, an arrangement not conducive to the best results in intersectional moves. The success of the program was dependent upon assistance from other services, notably military police to control and direct traffic, Ordnance units to make truck repairs, and Engineer troops to maintain the roads. When necessary, French agencies were called upon to deal with civilian traffic.
Up to 1 September the freight moved fell slightly short of the 75,000-ton target.
The project was then extended for four days and the tonnage target was increased because the railways as yet were unable to carry their full share. By 5 September when the first phase ended, approximately 89,000 tons of supplies had been lifted by truck. From then until 16 November 1944, when Red Ball officially closed, shipments were made on the basis of a daily tonnage commitment. As the armies raced across France, the Red Ball route was stretched and stretched. By the time the convoys reached the point where the Army dumps should have been, the latter had usually been moved forward. As a result, the trucks sometimes had to travel another fifty miles or more to discharge their loads. Although the established route was not extended beyond Hirson on the north fork (for the U.S. First Army) and Sommesous on the south fork (for the U.S. Third Army), some truck companies operated as far east as Verdun and even to Metz.102
During the second phase of Red Ball operation, efforts were made to shorten the length of hauls by transferring freight to the railways after reaching the Paris area. The rail net east of the capital city was more extensive than that in the northwest of France and had suffered less damage. Much of the damage, including the wrecking of all permanent rail and road bridges across the Seine and the Loire, had been inflicted by Allied air forces in an effort to seal off the Normandy battlefield. A prominent SHAEF transportation official later raised the question as to whether the immediate advantage gained actually outweighed the disadvantages, in view of the limiting effect the air attacks had on transportation and therefore on the Allied advance. Without arriving at a definite conclusion, he pointed out that the matter of air attacks on communications was one requiring careful study by air staffs in conjunction with movements and transportation officers.103
In order fully to utilize the rail net east of Paris and to ease the strain on the drivers, trucks, and tires, the theater chief of transportation proposed that truck-to-rail transfer points be established near Paris. Exclusive of items too heavy to be manhandled, approximately 4,000 tons daily were to be transferred at these points, of which the first was established at Vincennes-Fontenay-Sous-Bois on 27 September. At the peak four such freight transfer points were operated by American military personnel and French labor, under the direction of the Transportation Officer, Seine Section, COMZONE.104
During the eighty-one days of the Red Ball operation, approximately 412,193 tons were carried, at an average rate of 5,088 tons per day. The accomplishments were impressive and were widely acclaimed, but there were serious deficiencies. As the runs grew longer, sometimes as much as 600 miles forward, more and more trucks were deadlined. With fatigue increasing, the drivers also became less efficient and more likely to have accidents. The desperate gamble made in sacrificing maintenance in an all-out effort to hasten victory took a terrific toll in trucks, tires, and gasoline. Moreover, the centralized control that Ross and Ayers wanted was lacking, and the operation
was often hampered by the base sections. COMZONE failed to give adequate support in military police patrols, in labor for loading and unloading the trucks, and in maintenance and communication facilities. Many of the truck companies were hastily organized units, and the drivers were often inexperienced and untrained. Despite the glamour given Red Ball by press and radio, the work was hard, drab, and monotonous, but it was often preferable to the life in a combat unit, even when the combat troops were just waiting to get into the line. Many men from combat units welcomed a temporary assignment to Red Ball as a change from the muddy tent camps where they had been staged. There was also a sordid side to driving the Red Ball route, however. Dog-tired drivers occasionally sabotaged their equipment or resorted to outright malingering to obtain needed rest, and some were found guilty of selling their loads, especially gasoline, on the lucrative black market.105
The Red Ball fleet did not have sufficient cargo-handling capacity to give adequate support to the advance of the armies beyond eastern France since the Transportation Corps, to repeat, never received all the trucks, including the heavy-duty equipment, that it deemed necessary for the task. Red Ball men did a magnificent job, but at a tremendous expenditure in human effort, trucks, tires, gasoline, and oil. As Colonel Ayers observed, trucks can haul what the railways do, but at a much greater cost in manpower and equipment.
The Red Ball route was terminated as a large-scale operation because additional rail and inland waterway facilities had become available, and because new ports such as Antwerp had been acquired, from which supplies could be moved with shorter inland hauls. To meet the continued need for an expedited movement of a limited amount of supplies from Normandy to Paris, a so-called Little Red Ball route was established on 15 December 1944. For a month it provided fast delivery for high-priority items by means of a single truck company with five-ton truck-tractors and ten-ton semitrailers. The average daily tonnage carried was approximately 100 tons. The route was discontinued on 18 January 1945, by which time the railways were able to furnish express service.106
The White Ball Express Route was established on 6 October 1944 to utilize the shorter line of communications from the ports of Le Havre and Rouen. The operation, resembling that of the Red Ball Express, was much improved because of the experience gained on that route. The largest number of truck companies assigned to White Ball was forty-eight, with a daily average through December 1944 of twenty-nine. The route extended from Le Havre and Rouen to intermediate depots and rail transfer points in the vicinity of Paris, Beauvais, Compiegne, Soissons, and Reims. Most of the freight was loaded at Rouen, where a traffic control regulating point was established. Operations ceased on 10 January 1945. From 6 October through 31 December 1944 approximately 140,486 tons were
transported over the White Ball route, at an average rate of 1,614 tons per day.107 The average forward trip was 113 miles.
The Green Diamond Express Route was inaugurated to move supplies approximately a hundred miles from dumps and depots in Normandy to rail loading points at Avranches and Dol-de-Bretagne. Activity began on 14 October and closed on 1 November 1944. The daily average number of truck companies employed was fifteen. They moved forward approximately 15,590 tons. The operation was controlled entirely by the Normandy Base Section. It was not a success, largely because of confusion as to the responsibility for initiating movements, unsatisfactory command and supervision, and the thick mud at the dumps in which most large tractor-trailer units could not function satisfactorily.108
The Red Lion Express Route was set up to move 500 tons of British gasoline and American supplies daily from Ba-yeaux to the 21 Army Group railhead at Brussels, Belgium, in order to give additional support to airborne operations in Holland. The Red Lion (or B.B., Bayeaux to Brussels) route was used only twenty-seven days, 16 September to 12 October 1944. The U.S. Army furnished the operating personnel, but the British provided camp and control sites and supplied rations, water, and other necessities. A total of 17,556 tons was transported, of which 9,631 tons went to the British. The average haul per day was 650 tons and the average trip forward was 306 miles. Eight U.S. Army truck companies were assigned to this route over much of the period. Red Lion was considered a successful operation.109
The ABC (Antwerp–Brussels–Charleroi) Express Route was established to clear incoming supplies from the port of Antwerp. The initial operation lasted from 30 November 1944 to 26 March 1945 and was based on a surge pool, or marshaling yard, outside the port area. There, motor convoys dropped empty ten-ton semitrailers (the only type of equipment used in this haul) and picked up loaded semitrailers for the forward trip to the depot areas near Liège, Mons, and Charleroi. Other marshaling yards were set up at the points where the convoys dropped loaded semitrailers and picked up empties for the return trip. Truck-tractors placed in each of the marshaling yards facilitated the shuttling of the loaded and empty semitrailers and reduced turnaround time considerably.
During the 117 days of the ABC operation, nearly a quarter of a million tons were moved forward approximately ninety miles to the dump areas from which the U.S. First and Ninth Armies were supplied. An average of fourteen truck companies was assigned to the route. A profitable outcome was the experience gained in the use of truck-tractors and semitrailers in an almost continuous operation. The principal difficulties arose from the mixed loads, which delayed unloading at
destination, and the failure of the depots to operate twenty-four hours a day.
Shortly after the surrender of Germany a second ABC operation was begun in order to clear freight that had accumulated at Antwerp and Ghent. This was a peacetime project, carried out by fourteen well-trained truck companies that had previously served in Iran. For the first time in the European theater, an entire fleet was composed of diesel-powered ten-ton 6x6 cargo trucks. Like its predecessor, this ABC project was very successful, achieving an average lift of 2,670 tons per day. It served to illustrate how, with proper coordination and control, well-trained and supervised personnel, and suitable heavy-duty equipment, motor transport could be integrated into a complete transportation system.110
The last and greatest of the long hauls was over the XYZ Express Route, which was planned and organized to support the American forces in the final stage of the campaign against Germany. (Map 5) Realizing that the rapid advance of U.S. troops and the widespread destruction of railway facilities would place heavy demands upon the trucking units, General Ross had requested the Motor Transport Service to plan for this contingency. A three-phase system was devised to meet possible varying tonnage requirements. Plan X called for 8,000 tons per day, Y for 10,000 tons per day, and Z for 12,000 tons per day, all three based on a two-day turnaround. The four XYZ routes began near the western border of Germany, pushing out from Liège, Duren, Luxembourg, and Nancy to support respectively, the U.S. Ninth, First, Third, and Seventh Armies.111
The XYZ program was put into effect on 25 March and continued through 31 May 1945. To provide for the control of operations in support of each of the four U.S. Armies in the field, the Motor Transport Service organized three provisional highway transport divisions, and assigned an augmented Quartermaster group with similar functions. Within a period of 63 days, approximately 871,895 tons were delivered. The average daily lift was 12,895 tons. At the peak of operations truck units of various types, equivalent in capacity to 244 2½-ton truck companies, were assigned to the XYZ project.112
The 6957th Highway Transport Division (Provisional) supported the U.S. Third Army, which for daily maintenance required approximately 7,500 tons of supplies, including about 2,000 tons of bulk POL. To carry this load forward, 62 truck companies were used, including 34 equipped with 10-ton semitrailers and 14 with bulk tankers. By the end of May 1945 this division had moved forward 354,015 tons of supplies and almost 30 million gallons of bulk POL. In addition it had transported 381,019 personnel. At the peak, somewhat over 10,000 tons of supplies and 1,000,000 gallons of bulk POL were moved in a single day. The chief of the Motor Transport Service
Map 5: XYZ Motor Transport Hauls
credited the 6957th Highway Transport Division with an ideal operation from the standpoint of unified command and complete support.113
In support of the U.S. Ninth Army, the most northerly of the forces, the 6956th Highway Transport Division (Provisional) had a total of 15 truck companies. Of these, 12 were equipped with 10-ton semitrailers and the rest with 2,000-gallon-capacity semitrailers. By V-E Day the drivers of the 6956th had delivered 122,684 tons of supplies. Supporting the U.S. First Army, the 6958th Highway Transportation Division (Provisional), with a peak strength of 31 truck companies, delivered 182,425 tons of supplies between 28 March and 8 May 1945.114
Working closely with the U.S. Seventh Army, which it supported, the 469th Quartermaster Group operated as a highway transport division along the Yellow Diamond route through southern Germany into Austria. At the peak, twenty truck companies were employed, of which all but three had 10-ton semitrailers. The total haul for the period from 31 March to V-E Day was 146,000 tons. Apart from a shortage of tires and replacement parts, the Yellow Diamond trucks were handicapped because of winding, narrow roads and mountainous terrain, but they turned in a creditable performance.115
The XYZ project, rather than the better-known Red Ball Express, was deemed the most successful of the several long hauls undertaken by the Motor Transport Service. The planning and execution were superior, and coordination with the available railways proved excellent. Contributing to these results were the experience gained in organizing previous operations, the assignment of veteran trucking units, and the increased availability of heavy-duty cargo vehicles. Also, the rapid rehabilitation of the railroads behind the armies kept road hauls sufficiently short to give the tactical forces effective support. The same system was continued after the end of hostilities in order to build up supplies for the occupation forces and for troops being redeployed.
Despite the high level of efficiency generally achieved, the XYZ operation disclosed some minor deficiencies such as improper documentation and inadequate communications facilities. It also demonstrated the desirability of using a single agency, such as a highway transport division, to operate behind each army in the field. Experience gained on the express highway routes indicated that motor transport should be used to haul from railheads to army forward dumps in accordance with a well-developed and properly coordinated schedule. Where possible, it was found preferable to restrict the total turnaround distance of the trucks to approximately 350 miles. Adequate supply support from COMZONE sections and close coordination with the armies in troop and supply movements obviously were necessary.116
On V-E Day the Motor Transport Service had a total of 260 truck companies under its control on the European
continent. The largest number of units, 125, were equipped with 4-5-ton truck-tractors and 10-ton semitrailers, while 92 had 2½-ton standard or cab-over-engine trucks. Other companies were operating 10-ton diesel trucks, tankers, miscellaneous types of truck-tractor-semitrailer combinations, and refrigerator trucks.117 As Transportation Corps planners had anticipated, the 10-ton semitrailer companies proved the most valuable for general-purpose cargo hauling, particularly over long distances. Within the limitations of its capacity, the standard 2½-ton 6x6 truck performed well. Other vehicles giving satisfactory service included the 10-ton diesel and the 2,000-gallon semitrailer tanker.118
It would be difficult, indeed, to overestimate the significance of the role played by motor transport in the war against Germany. It served as the principal long-distance hauler on land pending the restoration of railway service, provided close and flexible support to the advancing armies, and performed vital port clearance and base-hauling functions. In appraising its performance, it is necessary to bear in mind that the theater chief of transportation did not receive the personnel or the number and type of vehicles he considered essential for OVERLORD, and that the drivers and equipment that were made available were called upon to support a tactical advance that outstripped the timetable set up for OVERLORD. Improvisation, overwork, inadequate maintenance and communications, and rough operating conditions all attended the effort to keep the armies supplied. Despite the difficulties, U.S. Army truck units engaged in port clearance, static operations, and line of communications hauling moved 22,644,609 long tons and covered 702,925,988 ton-miles in the period from 17 June 1944 through 31 May 1945. When asked in late 1944 to list the outstanding achievements of the Transportation Corps in the European theater, General Ross gave prominence to the operations of the Motor Transport Service. The basic credit for its accomplishment, he said, belonged to the soldiers who drove the trucks day and night, in all kinds of weather, and all too often without adequate rest and food. These men, he added, had done a “wonderful job.”119
Railway Operations
The railways of France totaled some 26,400 miles of single-track and double-track lines operated as a unified national system. All the important main lines had standard-gauge track. Before the war the French passenger schedules were considered very satisfactory, but freight traffic had no scheduled movement. The French railway cars, like the British, were small in comparison with American equipment. Despite wartime handicaps the French railways were in reasonably good
operating condition, although two years of bombing had left much destruction, especially on the lines west of Paris. As the Germans retreated, they did considerable damage, but not to the degree expected by the Allies.120
The Expansion of Rail Activities in Northern France
In northern France, as we have seen, U.S. rail activities were initially slow in developing, but with the St. Lô breakthrough the situation changed radically. To support the swift advance, rail reconstruction was given high priority, and as rapidly as the lines could be opened the 2nd MRS followed in the wake of the U.S. First and Third Armies.
The first heavy rail traffic was handled in mid-August 1944, when the 2nd MRS began to move gasoline, ammunition, rations, and medical supplies over a single-track route from Normandy to a dump at Le Mans, where they were picked up by Third Army trucks. Each train carried an average of 1,000 tons. Since the main line was not yet open, the trains ran over branch lines for a considerable portion of the route. The railway facilities at Le Mans had been bombed repeatedly and had to be restored by the Americans. At the close of August MRS-operated trains were arriving in the French capital.121
Beginning in September, considerable tonnage was forwarded on the rail lines east of Paris. They were relatively undamaged, since the rapid retreat of the enemy had prevented his usual effective destruction.122 Late in the month, because of the swift advance and extended lines of communication, the theater chief of transportation put into effect a new plan for the movement of supplies to the armies, whereby approximately 6,900 tons were to be brought into the Paris area daily by truck and then forwarded by rail. Although the diversion of trucks to other missions restricted the daily haul to about 4,000 tons, this combination of motor and rail transport had good results. As indicated earlier, the railways east of Paris could accommodate much more tonnage than could be shipped on the comparatively few rail lines entering the city from the west. Therefore, the material trucked to Paris to be forwarded by rail increased the total amount delivered to the combat troops. By shortening the truck routes, turnaround time was lessened, and more trucks became available.123
In the autumn of 1944, as the Americans drove deeper into France, the 2nd MRS units were relocated to facilitate the flow of supplies by rail. Railway rehabilitation was accomplished as required, but as a rule only on a stopgap basis. In September 1944 the railway line from the Brittany peninsula, via Rennes, Le Mans, and Chartres to Paris, was turned over to the French for operation, thereby releasing American MRS personnel for more critical assignments elsewhere. Early in that month the 2nd MRS headquarters shifted to Paris, the city that formed the hub of the French railway system. The
MRS units within the various sections of COMZONE were responsible to the commanding officers of their respective sections for administration and discipline, and to the 2nd MRS for technical operation. Their activities were coordinated through the transportation officers of the sections.124
The 2nd MRS found itself handicapped by the lack of experienced railway officers. To fill the need, the European theater made an urgent request to Washington for twenty-five field grade officers to serve as executives, operating experts, and engineer technical specialists. By hurried recruiting in early September a number of experienced American railway officials were commissioned directly from civil life and dispatched at once to France. The desired number was rounded out by taking MRS officers released from less active overseas commands, notably from Iran and Alaska. Placed in key positions these men brought knowledge and experience to their jobs, but, as was to be expected, the appointments led to some dissatisfaction among lower-ranking MRS officers already in the theater, who feared loss of promotion after long service overseas.125
With approximately 4,788 miles of single and double track under 2nd MRS operation by 1 October 1944 (Map 6), the demand for additional locomotives and rolling stock became urgent. Accordingly, locomotives and railway cars in large numbers were drawn from the joint stockpile in the United Kingdom and ferried across the Channel. Meanwhile, as early as June 1944, General Ross had anticipated the demand for additional railway equipment and had sounded out the War Department on the subject. Ross found Gross none too sanguine about the prospects for more American-built locomotives. In fact, the latter reported that the Director of Materiel, ASF, General Clay, was adamant in his stand that the British had to produce their share of locomotives, as they had originally agreed to do.126
Behind the growing clamor for railway equipment lay a significant shift from motor to rail as the principal means of supporting the U.S. armies—the railways, as the prime long-distance carriers, were assuming a larger proportion of the line of communications hauling. In the last quarter of 1944 the Paris area became an extremely busy railway center and an important truck-to-rail transfer point. During October alone, 798 freight trains arrived at the French capital from Normandy and Brittany, and 999 freight trains departed for northern and eastern points with U.S. Army shipments. From November on, more than half of all tonnage forwarded from the rear areas in northern France moved by rail.127
A number of developments made possible the steady growth in the volume of traffic handled by the 2nd MRS. Chief among them were continued progress in the reconstruction of tracks and structures; the opening of the ports of Le Havre, Rouen, and, finally, Antwerp; the arrival on the Continent of more MRS units, locomotives, and rolling stock; the recovery of additional railway equipment in the liberated areas; the superior operating
Map 6: Phase Operations, 2nd MRS
condition of the rail lines east of Paris; and the mounting assistance from French and Belgian railway workers. On 15 December 1944 the 2nd MRS attained a daily peak of 50,000 tons moved by rail, after which came a sharp but temporary downward trend because of resurgent enemy activity.128
An advance echelon of the 2nd MRS was established at Antwerp on 7 November 1944. Headed by Colonel Beeler, it supervised the planning and development of that port for rail traffic. In the first month of activity at the Antwerp Terminal, 268 freight trains were dispatched, moving a total of 150,824 tons. Operations were never seriously affected by the almost constant German bombing of the port. The 708th Railway Grand Division, the first to function in Belgium, was responsible for the rail support of the U.S. First and Ninth Armies.129
By mid-December 1944, railway troops under the jurisdiction of the 708th Railway Grand Division were operating almost within sight of the enemy. The 740th Railway Operating Battalion was operating as far forward as Malmedy, Belgium. The advanced lines in Holland and Germany north of Malmedy, extending as far east as Herzogenrath and Geilenkirchen, were then being operated by Company C of the 734th Railway Operating Battalion. The German counteroffensive soon forced the evacuation of the forward railheads at Malmedy, Eupen, and Herbesthal.
The activity of the 2nd MRS was broadly affected by the Battle of the Bulge. Supply movements declined from 50,000 tons to approximately 30,000 tons per day between 15 and 20 December. Rail shipments were held back pending improvement in the tactical situation, and many rail cars were diverted to remove supplies from endangered areas. Although no units of the 2nd MRS were in direct contact with the Germans, enemy strafing and bombing resulted in considerable damage, especially at Soissons where bombs set fire to cars loaded with ammunition and temporarily halted activity on the main line.130
Although it had been hoped that all railway lines west of Paris could be released to the French as early as 1 December 1944, action had to be postponed, first because of the delay in opening the port of Antwerp, and second because of enemy activity in the Ardennes. At the close of 1944 the 2nd MRS had a total of 757 officers, 26 warrant officers, and 16,763 enlisted men on the Continent. In addition to the headquarters, there were five railway grand divisions, eighteen railway operating battalions and two detachments, four railway shop battalions, five railway workshop (mobile) units, and ten hospital train maintenance platoons and sections.131
Military Rail Activity in Southern France
In southern France, meanwhile, the 1st MRS was vigorously pushing its operations northward. As already indicated, the lack of systematic destruction in that area permitted more rapid restoration of
railway service than in the north. By mid-October 1944 rail transportation had become the principal carrier for long-haul deliveries, and as more lines were repaired and additional motive power and rolling stock were obtained rail capacities increased sharply. Late in the month General Gray reported a rail commitment of 12,000 tons per day for delivery from Marseille to the railheads at Montbeliard, Vesoul, and Epinal, where it was shared on a sixty-forty basis between the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First Army. In the last quarter of the year an average of 644 freight cars was forwarded daily from the Delta Base Section to the Continental Advance Section, and from there an average of 557 was moved forward to the armies. During this period rail lines were extended northward to Metz, Sarrebourg, and the vicinity of Sarreguemines.132
The French civilian railway personnel cooperated wholeheartedly with the U.S. Army, taking over complete operation of the trains much faster than originally contemplated. Since demolition of the right of way was less than expected, requisitions for most track material for this area were canceled. However, the expansion of rail traffic was handicapped for a time by the shortage of motive power and rolling stock. French equipment was employed exclusively until late October 1944, when the first four American 65-ton diesel-electric locomotives arrived. Altogether, ten diesel locomotives and eighty-seven 2-8-0-type steam locomotives had been ordered for southern France, but deliveries of the latter lagged. Considerable railway equipment was obtained by transfer from North Africa and Italy. By the end of 1944 additional shipments from the United States brought definite relief.133
At the close of 1944, with the assistance of Engineer units, the 1st MRS had rebuilt 42 bridges and repaired 800 miles of track. It was operating 4,000 miles of rail lines. Further expansion was temporarily checked by the tactical situation, but railway rehabilitation in the areas to the rear of the forward railheads continued in preparation for the resumption of offensive operations.134
Activation of General Headquarters
After the German counteroffensive of late 1944 had been repulsed, the 2nd MRS made ready to move across the Rhine River. It was then supporting the 12th Army Group, under which were the U.S. First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies, while the 1st MRS supported the 6th Army Group, comprising the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First Army. With the inactivation of SOLOC and its absorption by COMZONE in early 1945, the theater took steps to attain closer coordination of rail activities by bringing them under a single supervisory head. The 1st MRS and 2nd MRS were accordingly assigned to a new General Headquarters, Military Railway Service, which was activated on 10 February 1945 with General Gray as the director general. Col. Arthur E. Stoddard, formerly with the SHAEF G-4 Division, became the new General
Manager, 1st MRS, and General Burpee remained as General Manager, 2nd MRS.
As the result of this merger, all military railway units in the European theater for the first time came under the control of the theater chief of transportation. General Gray, who as head of the 1st MRS had reported directly to the SOLOC commander, now functioned under the technical direction of General Ross. Ross found Gray’s work at the new MRS headquarters helpful, especially in relieving Burpee of the heavy administrative burden at Paris. General Gross, who had never liked having the MRS in a separate camp, was delighted to see it placed under the theater chief of transportation.135
General Gray established his new GHQ at the Gare St. Lazare in Paris. The duties assigned to him as Director General, MRS, included:
... the command of all Military Railway Service units; advance planning, development and operations of all railroads required for U.S. military operations; stocking and issue of all railway stock material for ordinary maintenance; distribution, for operational use, of all U.S. railroad rolling stock, and all other railroad property that may come under the control of the U.S. Army; and authority to order and execute the move of Military Railway Service units, together with personnel and units attached thereto, within the theater.
Gray commanded all MRS troops in the theater and was responsible for the stocking and distribution of all rolling stock and other railway equipment. On the other hand, he did not retain the responsibility for railway reconstruction and rehabilitation that he had undertaken in southern France. In a directive covering procedures for the operation, maintenance, and construction of all railways in the U.S. areas on the Continent, the theater commander prescribed that railroad construction would be a responsibility of the Engineer service, under the technical supervision of the Chief Engineer, COMZONE.136
To be closer to the front, the 2nd MRS moved its headquarters from Paris to Brussels on 25 February 1945. Since Brussels was controlled by the British Army, it had to be consulted on housekeeping matters. By the end of March a new communications system of telephone and teletype circuits was set up whereby the principal 2nd MRS units in the field could be contacted readily. Brussels was centrally located for current operations, and if necessary the headquarters organization could get into direct contact with any unit within six to eight hours by jeep.
With the advance into Germany the problems of the MRS multiplied. The communication system required extensive repairs. Jeep courier service and special radio networks had to be used to maintain contact between headquarters and the field units. Measured by American standards, the railway facilities were often inadequate. Sabotage was considered an ever-present hazard. On the other hand, the German civilian railway workers were well-disciplined and usually cooperated with the MRS in restoring railway service. Meanwhile, additional trackage in the rear was turned over to the French, thereby releasing MRS personnel for duty
in the forward areas. But the last was no unmixed blessing, since the French railway officials frequently failed to deliver locomotives and equipment or to supply train services at the times and places required by the Americans.137
Bridging the Rhine
The plans to support the U.S. combat forces beyond the Rhine called for erection of the first railway bridge across that river at Duisburg, Düsseldorf, or Cologne, with Wesel as the fourth choice. After the capture of the Ludendorff railway bridge at Remagen on 7 March 1945, immediate steps were taken to exploit this windfall by rehabilitating the rail lines leading to the bridge from the west. The collapse of this structure ten days later forced the MRS to return to the original program. The only one of the four locations previously considered that was then safely in Allied hands was Wesel. There, the first railway bridge over the Rhine was completed on 8 April 1945, after approximately ten days and five hours of concentrated effort by Engineer troops, assisted by MRS and other Transportation Corps personnel and a few Seabees. By V-E Day the eastbound freight over the Wesel bridge amounted to 273,141 long tons, consisting principally of POL, rations, and ammunition.138
The Wesel railway bridge involved construction of a 1,752-foot single-track span over the Rhine River, the laying of approximately two miles of connecting track, and the preparation of the required yard facilities at Wesel and Büderich. The 717th Railway Operating Battalion Detachment repaired track at the two yards, assisted the Engineers in constructing the line from the Büderich Yard to the west side of the bridge and in building turnouts at the approaches to the bridge, and laid rail over the bridge. The 729th Railway Operating Battalion transported rail and construction materials and furnished 24-hour switching service with six diesel-electric locomotives. On 9 April 1945 the 720th Railway Operating Battalion moved the first train across the river. Muenster was the destination. Other railway bridges subsequently erected for Army use included the President Roosevelt Bridge at Mainz, completed on 14 April, and the Victory Bridge at Duisburg, which was opened on 8 May and gave access to the vital Ruhr coal fields.139
Because of their limited number and capacity, the railway bridges over the Rhine became centers of serious rail congestion during the spring of 1945. In fact, special committees representing all interested agencies had to be set up to control traffic at the Mainz and Wesel bridges. The backlog of loaded railway cars was especially heavy behind the Mainz bridge, where the situation was complicated by the U.S. Third Army’s tendency to call forward selected items rather than all requisitioned freight. A shortage of cars developed, which was not eased until after V-E Day. During this period there was a
heavy and constant demand for all types of railway equipment. In April 1945, the 2nd MRS alone operated 4,287 freight trains, which carried forward 1,926,947 long tons of supplies and equipment for a total of 329,813,897 ton-miles. The average load for a single car was 13.6 tons. In the same month the 2nd MRS also ran 108 hospital trains, 278 prisoners of war trains, 71 troop trains, 97 leave trains, and 93 refugee trains.140
The accompanying chart (Chart 5), depicting the tonnages moved east of the Seine and north of the Rhône in the period from 30 August 1944 through 8 May 1945, indicates the prime importance of the railways in supporting the U.S. armies in the field. The largest movement of freight by rail occurred in the months from February through April 1945. The actual accomplishment of the MRS, assisted by native railway personnel, was even greater than is here indicated since considerable rail traffic was confined to the area south of the Rhône and west of the Seine.
On 14 May 1945 the MRS organization on the Continent consisted of the following: 1 general headquarters, 2 headquarters and headquarters companies, 7 railway grand divisions, 24 railway operating battalions, 7 railway shop battalions, 8 military police battalions and 2 separate military police companies, 2 base depot companies, 1 railway transportation company, 5 railway workshops (mobile), and 10 hospital train maintenance detachments.141
Freight Expresses
During the war various specialized types of railway service had to be developed to meet specific needs of the U.S. Army on the Continent. Among such innovations was the “Toot Sweet Express.” It was inaugurated early in 1945 to carry high-priority freight on a fast schedule from Cherbourg via Paris to the forward areas. The first train left Cherbourg on 22 January. At Paris it was divided into two 20-car freight trains, one of which ran to Namur (and later to Liège) in Belgium, and the other to Verdun, France. Specially marked railroad equipment was used. The car space was allotted on the basis of bids from the supply services. Total running time from Cherbourg via Paris to either terminal was fixed at thirty-six hours. Shipment of mail on these trains sharply reduced the time in transit and cut pilferage to a minimum. The Toot Sweet Express continued to follow the U.S. armies into Germany, until the close of hostilities made expedited freight service unnecessary. In March 1945 a similar special train, called the “Meat Ball Express,” began hauling perishables—mostly meat—from Namur to the U.S. First and Ninth Armies.142
Hospital Trains
A program for the procurement and adaptation of old British railway equipment for use as American hospital trains had been undertaken in the United Kingdom before D Day. Most of this equipment was eventually ferried across the Channel
5: Tonnage moved east of the Seine and north of the Rhône: 1944–45
Source: Statistics Branch, TC Hq ETO.
and provided the bulk of the hospital train service for the U.S. Army on the Continent. The first of these trains began evacuating wounded Americans from the front on 20 August 1944.143 Earlier in the month an improvised hospital train had been set up at Cherbourg for emergency use. It consisted of twenty French freight cars equipped to accommodate litter cases and three cars for ambulatory patients. In the course of the war other trains were improvised from French rolling stock or were specially built in France. Only one hospital train was obtained from the United States.
At the close of 1944 forty hospital trains were serving the U.S. forces on the Continent, of which twenty-five were of British origin, fourteen were built or improvised of French material, and one was of American construction. From the safety stand point, the French cars with steel bodies were much superior to the wooden British cars. The train procured by the Transportation Corps in the United States was of an experimental design and did not prove satisfactory. The heating equipment in all hospital cars was unsatisfactory. The movement of the trains was subject to many delays en route. Their distinctive markings did not afford complete immunity, for hospital trains at Liège and Paris were damaged by enemy aircraft.144
During 1944 the Transportation Corps moved 194,842 patients by rail on the Confiner.. Although the hospital trains were under the control of the theater’s chief surgeon, their operation as railway equipment was assigned to the theater chief of transportation. He established movement schedules on the basis of requests from the chief surgeon. Patients moved by rail generally were transferred from evacuation or field hospitals in the forward areas to the coast, via Paris, in trains of fourteen or fifteen cars. The maintenance of U.S. Army hospital trains was the responsibility of the 764th Railway Shop Battalion, which had headquarters at Paris.145
During the winter of 1944–45 evacuation by rail was severely handicapped by adverse weather and enemy activity. The rugged operating conditions slowed the turnaround of trains and caused much equipment to be deadlined for major repairs. Also, medical personnel complained of both the lighting and the heating of the hospital trains. The French railways were suffering from the war, the weather, and coal shortages, and the deficiencies of the hospital trains were simply part of the general picture. The situation was improved by March 1945, largely because of the advent of more moderate weather. Meanwhile, at the request of the chief surgeon, the theater chief of transportation had undertaken a program to provide additional hospital trains. The first of these was placed in operation in February 1945 and a number of others were subsequently delivered, but reduced Medical Corps requirements made completion of the program unnecessary. In mid-April 1945 there were on the Continent forty-seven hospital trains, a number sufficient to meet operational needs.146
Leave Trains
Most American soldiers were in Europe for the first time, and when they had leave they naturally wanted to see the sights. Leave travel therefore became a large undertaking. Late in 1944 plans were laid to furnish rail and water transportation so that selected personnel on duty in France could spend seven days of sight-seeing in the United Kingdom. The program got underway early in February 1945 and by March it was in full swing, with a total of 14,922 arrivals and 16,329 departures at Southampton. This phase of the leave program drew considerable criticism, since the men were not properly briefed or inspected before leaving France and frequently carried excess baggage, such as blankets and weapons, which the Southampton port commander had to collect and hold until their return.147
In March 1945, in response to repeated requests by the field commanders, two special leave trains commenced daily operation to and from Paris for the accommodation of personnel of the U.S. First and Ninth Armies. Each train had a capacity of approximately 1,000 passengers. Also, three leave trains per week were scheduled to run to the Cannes–Nice area without entering Paris. During the ensuing months
Paris, Brussels, and especially the golden Riviera, enjoyed great popularity among officers and enlisted men hunting rest and recreation. Apart from arranging for the required rail accommodations, the theater chief of transportation exercised movement control through RTO’s stationed at strategic points.
In the spring and summer of 1945 the pressure for additional leave trains mounted. As quickly as tactical considerations and the prevailing shortages of motive power and rolling stock would permit, the theater chief of transportation placed such trains in operation. Long and difficult negotiations were necessary to get the help of the French, who naturally preferred to restore their own railway services. For morale purposes the leave trains were made as comfortable and attractive as possible, but they obviously did not measure up to peacetime standards and complaints were frequent.148
Train-Cargo Security
Thefts from U.S. Army supply trains and diversion of the loot into the French black market became a serious problem during the closing months of 1944. Every stolen item represented a dual loss, first in critical shipping space, and second to the military personnel for whom delivery was intended. In southern France, where the 1st MRS had enough military police units assigned as train guards, security proved no problem. There, General Gray had followed the common practice of American railways and assigned special police to the task. In northern France the base section commanders were unable to furnish sufficient MPs. In both the Normandy and Channel Base Sections excessive and heavy losses caused by pilferage necessitated the detail of infantrymen and service troops as train guards.149
Both military personnel and native civilians pilfered, encouraged by the enormous black-market profits. Wholesale thefts of such items as cigarettes, rations, shoes, and post exchange supplies on such a scale as to contribute to theater short-ages—notably in cigarettes—led to undercover activity by the Army’s Counterintelligence Division (CID) agents. As a result of their work, the spotlight of publicity was thrown on extensive pilferage by the personnel of a railway operating battalion in the Paris area. Altogether, 8 officers and 190 enlisted men were tried, and of this number only 5 officers and 17 enlisted men were acquitted. The majority of those convicted took advantage of an offer of clemency by the theater commander whereby they were restored to duty in a special combat unit. After this unsavory episode, stricter supervision of the freight trains and railway installations curtailed further malfeasance of this type.150
Pilferage by civilians from military trains and railway yards remained troublesome throughout the war. The Army had to hire many native workers for freight-handling operations, thereby offering opportunities for theft that were bound to appeal to the needy and the unscrupulous. The only effective way to deal
with this problem was to station military police as guards aboard trains and at military installations. Upon the establishment of the General Headquarters, MRS, in February 1945, Lt. Col. Frederick H. Owen was appointed director of security to exercise staff supervision over the train-cargo security program in the 1st and the 2nd MRS.151 At the close of hostilities General Gray recommended that a railway security department be made a permanent feature of the Military Railway Service, and that specially trained military police be provided on the basis of two companies per railway operating battalion.152
After V-E Day
With the end of hostilities, the direction and character of railway traffic changed abruptly. Temporary congestion resulted while the necessary adjustments were made. The forward movement of freight was drastically curtailed, and the great bulk of U.S. Army personnel began moving out of the theater. In addition to the outbound American troops, the railways carried large numbers of German prisoners of war and displaced persons. All this activity placed a heavy strain on the slender supply of railway equipment, even though some relief was provided by equipment received from the United States and by the repair and utilization of much captured German rolling stock.153
A single rail corridor, known as the Eclipse Line, served the American occupation forces in Germany and Austria. This link between the U.S. Army ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and the American zone was opened to traffic as far as Eichenberg in June 1945, but the necessity of rehabilitating several bridges to the south delayed its completion. The last gaps in the Eclipse Line were closed in August.
Berlin, which formerly had excellent rail connections with western Germany, was almost isolated at the end of the war. For the support of the British and American personnel in that city the Soviet authorities made available only a single-track railway with no signal facilities. It ran from Berlin to a truck transfer point at Helmstedt and was operated by German civilians under Soviet supervision. The first U.S. supply train entered Berlin on 27 July 1945. Railway service between Berlin and Helmstedt was unsatisfactory, the slow-moving cargoes were often pilfered, and the Soviet officials proved generally un-cooperative.154
The main task confronting the MRS in the summer and fall of 1945 was the removal of men and materiel from the theater. The job had to be done under unremitting pressure and by units whose effectiveness was progressively impaired because of personnel losses incident to redeployment and demobilization. The staff of the MRS spent the greater part of June 1945 assembling approximately 2,000 passenger cars and the necessary motive power for the movement of redeployed personnel from railheads in Germany to
the Reims assembly area in France and thence to the ports of Marseille, Le Havre, and Antwerp. Because of the inevitable time lag, many officers and men awaiting shipment to the United States or transfer to the Pacific were allowed leave or furlough, which created a competing demand for rail transportation. In July 1945 General Gray reported that an “unbelievable total” of 1,729 cars was being used for leave and redeployment travel.155
All available American, British, French, and German passenger equipment—even boxcars—was pressed into service to accommodate U.S. Army personnel on the move. Such equipment was seldom first class and usually it was in poor condition. In order to provide the maximum lift, the MRS carried 1,000 soldiers or more per train, as compared with about 500 in the United States. Under these circumstances, good service was impossible.156
Following the return of complete operation and control of the French rail lines to their own officials in August 1945, the U.S. Army became simply another customer. Thereafter, it was more difficult to obtain prompt and satisfactory train service for American movements. Uncomfortable and inconvenient though they were, there was no alternative to the French railways in moving troops destined for redeployment and demobilization, and rail traffic therefore remained brisk throughout the summer and autumn months. The peak outloading of personnel from the Continent to the United States came in November 1945, after which the pressure on the railways began to ease.157
With its wartime mission ended and demobilization in full swing, General Headquarters, MRS, was closed on 24 October 1945 and General Gray relinquished his post as director general. In the same month MRS troops were withdrawn from the Belgian railways, and plans were laid to turn over the German railways to civilian control under the American military government. Upon the departure of General Gray, General Burpee assumed command.158
At the close of hostilities and on the basis of his experience overseas, General Gray made recommendations for future MRS operations. He advocated additional personnel, particularly for communications, map reproduction, handling supplies, and cargo security. He contended that the director general should be responsible for both restoration and repair of military railways; that he should plan for, requisition, stock, and issue all railway equipment and material, including track and bridge items; and that he should be charged with insuring the safe transit by rail of military freight. General Gray further recommended that the MRS be set up as an exempted command responsible to the chief of transportation, except that the COMZONE section commanders should have administrative authority over certain functions such as the supply of common items, financial transactions, hospitalization, and evacuation. A subsequent theater General Board study of
Transportation Corps operations and organization supported most of these recommendations but held that the Corps of Engineers should retain its normal responsibility for railway construction and reconstruction, other than maintenance of way.159
Later General Gray took a somewhat different stand and maintained that the Military Railway Service should be a major command—as it had been in North Africa and Italy—and that the director general should report directly to the theater commander. He then expressed his opinion that the MRS could not succeed if operated below the theater level. Neither General Gross nor General Ross shared this view. During the war they believed that the MRS should be under the control of the theater chief of transportation in order to have proper coordination with highway and water transportation. Gray’s concept of the MRS as a separate command was not adopted, and it has remained part of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps.160
Inland Waterways
By the late summer of 1944 it was evident that the inland waterways of France and Belgium would have to be developed to lighten the increasingly heavy load on rail and highway transport. Although the slow-moving barge never would deliver supplies as quickly as train or truck, it could be made a valuable adjunct. Immediate utilization of the inland waterways was impossible because of damaged bridges and locks, sunken craft, and other obstructions that hindered navigation. Usable towboats and barges were scarce, and there was a shortage of skilled operating personnel. Under these circumstances an Inland Waterways Committee, which included representatives of G-4, COMZONE, the chief of engineers, and the chief of transportation, was appointed in September 1944 to survey the facilities and initiate rehabilitation with a view to the resumption of barge traffic.161
Soon after the work of rehabilitation had begun it became obvious that the eventual scope of the program was such as to require a larger staff and a more permanent organization than the Inland Waterways Committee. Accordingly, on 7 November 1944, an Inland Waterways Division was established at Paris under the theater chief of transportation. Its primary mission was to assist the French and Belgian Governments in opening their canal systems. Supervision was to be its main function, and actual operations were to be left to the appropriate local governmental agencies. The Inland Waterways Division was headed by Colonel Ryan, who had previously represented General Ross on the Inland Waterways Committee.162
U.S. Army engineers reconstructed the
waterways system but with considerable assistance from civilian contractors. As more waterways became navigable and barge operations increased, Ryan’s organization expanded. Liaison representatives were stationed at several ports including Le Havre and Antwerp, and operating personnel were assigned to various inland points such as Reims and Liège, where the barges were unloaded. The Inland Waterways Division furnished floating equipment, spare parts, fuel, and even clothing for the native bargemen. By the end of 1944, with the exception of the Rhône River, all waterways in France and Belgium had been rehabilitated sufficiently to permit limited use. Projected operations on the Rhône were later abandoned because of the lack of tugs suitable for its swift and rather shallow waters.163
Barge Operations in France and Belgium
In France the Oise and Seine river and canal systems became the principal waterways employed by the U.S. Army. Because of the urgent need of coal for civilians in Paris, the Inland Waterways Committee gave top priority to the opening of the Oise, which was a vital link in the coal transport system of northern France. The 1057th Engineer Port Construction and Repair Group was assigned to repair the locks, remove the obstructions, and rebuild the damaged bridges. With French assistance this waterway was made navigable by 28 October 1944. High water delayed the opening and later, contrary to expectations, the water froze. Despite these handicaps the barges began moving. By mid-November seven barges carrying approximately 2,000 tons of coal had reached Paris via the Oise river canal system. Early the following month the Seine was opened for limited traffic in military supplies and essential civilian imports from Rouen to Paris. To improve operations on the Oise and Seine Rivers, twenty-five surplus American tugs were transferred to the French on a lend-lease basis.164
Meanwhile, barge operations were begun in Belgium. There, the main artery was the Albert Canal, extending a distance of approximately 60 miles from Antwerp to Liège. Restoration was a military requirement because much U.S. Army tonnage discharged at Antwerp could be dispatched by barge through the Albert Canal to the various depots in the vicinity of Liège. The Americans and British cooperated in the reconstruction, and by 24 December 1944 the canal could be used by barges not exceeding 700 tons in capacity. When the canal froze, sea mules equipped with bulldozer blades were employed as ice breakers. The barge operators were given a daily bonus, called “danger money,” for work in the extra-hazardous Antwerp area. The Belgian Government also insured their craft against damage by enemy action. In Belgium, during the period from December 1944 to July 1945 a total of 1,222,000 tons
of Army cargo was forwarded by barge, as compared with approximately 580,000 tons moved by the same means during the same period in France. The difference is explained by the heavy shipments through Antwerp and the comparatively short haul over the Albert Canal.165
Although the inland waterways were helpful auxiliaries to rail and motor transport, the tonnage forecasts and targets for river and canal traffic were never attained, mainly because the French and Belgian personnel could not be persuaded to make the maximum effort of operating around the clock. Adverse weather conditions also were a handicap. After the ice had melted, floods halted movement from 24 January to 25 February 1945 on most rivers and canals. The Inland Waterways Division gave the bargemen both supplies and floating equipment. A special canal patrol of nine small boats was established in Belgium to prevent pilferage and to keep traffic moving. Colonel Ryan’s policy was to push the French and the Belgians continually so as to improve the turnaround. At best, however, the barges were a slow means of transport, and much depended upon the degree of cooperation received from the individual operator.166
Barge Traffic on the Rhine and the Danube
Toward the end of the war, the theater chief of transportation also made plans to use the waterways of Central Europe, especially of the Rhine and the Danube. Normally, fleets of large barges had operated on these rivers, but much equipment had been sunk or damaged. Apart from obtaining barges and operators, the principal problem was to remove navigational obstructions—almost all bridges across the Rhine and its tributaries were down and many vessels had been scuttled. Before mid-May 1945, rehabilitation was largely a paper project pending delineation of the American sector and determination of the role of the U.S. Army. On the basis of experience gained in France and Belgium it was decided that the Transportation Corps would supervise and police barge traffic and would establish a chain of offices at key points along the inland waterways. Insofar as possible German civilians were to operate the barges, and the U.S. Army was not to requisition such craft on a large scale.167
The Rhine River Branch of the Inland Waterways Division was activated in mid-April 1945, and its four officers and three enlisted men set up their headquarters at Biebrich, Germany. The first assignment was to survey available facilities, inspect damaged craft, and estimate the time required to remove the hindrances to navigation. Clearing the river and restoring barge traffic became a joint effort of the Corps of Engineers and the Transportation Corps. German firms were employed for salvage and reclamation, and the
damaged craft were towed to predesignated shipyards for repair. After the withdrawal in late April 1945 of U.S. Navy personnel, the Transportation Corps’ 329th Harbor Craft Company took over their vessels and spare parts and began operating on the Rhine. Because many sunken craft had to be raised and repaired and many navigational hazards such as demolished bridges had to be removed, the Rhine was not open for large-scale barge traffic until September 1945. At the close of that year the Rhine River Branch had 74 tugs and 288 barges in operation. Coal was the principal commodity transported.168
The Danube River Branch of the Inland Waterways Division was established at Linz, Austria, on 27 May 1945. Two days later the 337th Harbor Craft Company arrived and began functioning. A major responsibility of this branch was to take charge of a captured enemy fleet, the so-called Danube Navy. For the time being it was used mostly for the movement of essential military and civilian supplies. However, two of the captured vessels provided daily pleasure cruises for U.S. Army personnel, and other craft were employed to repatriate displaced persons.169
For the most part, actual operations on the Danube were carried on by civilian agencies. An indication of the initial activity on this river may be gained from the following. During the week of 8-15 June 1945, 6,933 displaced persons were transported between Linz and Melk, Austria; 3,569 American troops were carried on recreational cruises; 1,645 tons of miscellaneous cargo were unloaded; crude oil was discharged from 21 tankers; and considerable repair work was accomplished on engines and hulls. Operations were hampered by a shortage of personnel and occasional low-water levels. Fortunately, the Danube was comparatively unobstructed, enough river boats were available, and all necessary repairs and spare parts could be had at Linz.170
On 1 June 1945 Colonel Schroeder succeeded Colonel Ryan as chief of the Inland Waterways Division. Early in August the division was redesignated the Inland Waterways Transport Service (IWTS), headed by a director general (Colonel Schroeder), but still under the theater chief of transportation. Meanwhile, the activity in France and Belgium had been reduced to liaison with local operators. The Rhine River Branch and the Danube River Branch functioned throughout 1945. The IWTS was inactivated on 1 January 1946, and its operating personnel and equipment in Germany and Austria were transferred to the Office of Military Government, U.S.171
Transportation Corps Supply on the Continent
After D Day the chief of transportation’s Supply Division, under Lt. Col. Maurice
G. Jewett, was chiefly concerned with the transfer to the Continent of transportation items stored in various Transportation Corps depots in the United Kingdom and with the establishment and operation of similar installations in France. In the initial planning, the first Transportation Corps depot was to be set up at Cherbourg. Because of the delay in the capture of the port and the general confusion after the Normandy landings, some Transportation Corps items were lost or misdirected, including organizational equipment belonging to the 11th and 4th Ports. Some of the missing equipment was recovered but only after considerable delay. For example, spare parts for Chrysler marine engines, which were scheduled for discharge at Cherbourg, landed instead at Barfleur and Isigny and were overlooked for a month.172
The transportation items stored and issued on the Continent fell into two main categories: port and marine equipment, and railway equipment.173 The first Transportation Corps supplies to reach Normandy were placed in a large dump behind OMAHA Beach. A similar but smaller dump was set up near UTAH Beach. Later, as Transportation Corps depots were established, those for railway supplies usually were located near the main railway lines, while those for port and marine items were generally adjacent to the principal ports. A rear area depot was maintained in the United Kingdom to store and issue materiel received from American and British sources and to forward supplies and equipment to France as they were needed. The supply problem was complicated by the necessity of handling some 30,000 different items for marine operations and some 20,000 separate items for military railways.174
By D plus 30 a Transportation Corps dump had been established at Bricquebec, which in August 1944 developed into a permanent depot (T-700) for marine and railway equipment. Another Transportation Corps depot (T-701) was established at Rennes during the following month, but it was closed when projected port operations in Brittany did not materialize. Also in September, a depot (T-704) was set up at Cherbourg to receive, store, and issue spare parts for all types of harbor craft, but some time elapsed before it was fully stocked. The growing volume of emergency air shipments from the United States necessitated the setting up of a small depot (T-703) adjacent to the Le Bourget airfield near Paris. Intended chiefly for critical marine and electrical items, it was later expanded to meet special needs at Antwerp, to which reasonably rapid rail service was available. The principal northern depot (T-705) was at Liège. All these installations were manned by base depot companies. A chronic problem of the Transportation Corps depots was to procure personnel with enough technical knowledge to do a satisfactory job.175
After SOLOC was absorbed by the European theater, there were eight Transportation Corps depots in operation on the Continent. The following tabulation gives
their location and other pertinent information as of April 1945:176
| Depot | Location | Type of Supplies | Storage Capacity (Long Tons) | Handling Capacity per Day (Long Tons) |
| T-700 | Bricquebec | General | 16,000 | 225 |
| T-703 | Paris | General | 13,000 | 294 |
| T-704 | Cherbourg | Marine | 1,800 | 100 |
| T-705 | Liège | General | 18,000 | 660 |
| T-706 | Marseille | Marine | 15,000 | 150 |
| T-707 | Marseille | Rail | 6,700 | 225 |
| T-708 | Marseille | Rail | 21,500 | 1,800 |
| T-709 | Chaligny | Rail | 5,100 | 525 |
The organization of the Supply Division on the Continent was essentially the same as that in the United Kingdom. The primary mission was to furnish all marine and rail equipment and all organizational and miscellaneous equipment required by Transportation Corps units, and to maintain adequate stock records and stock control for all Transportation Corps items received and issued on the Continent. Materiel from the United States was obtained by requisition upon the New York Port of Embarkation through G-4, COMZONE. Extensive use was made of local procurement in order to save shipping space. Captured enemy equipment was used whenever possible. Contributions from local sources were difficult to evaluate since they often included services and repairs as well as materiel. The British and the French supplied considerable railway equipment for American use. The Supply Division, in turn, assisted our allies by distributing clothing among railway workers and by supplying railway parts. During the first quarter of 1945 an emergency trucking service was organized to move critically needed items. Among the items so delivered were life preservers for combat troops crossing the Rhine.177
During the closing months of the war, Transportation Corps supplies and equipment from the United States continued to arrive in large quantities: approximately 68,000 tons in April, 56,000 tons in May, and 81,000 tons in June. After V-E Day came the task of scaling down requirements and striking out items no longer needed. Much of this adjustment was accomplished automatically because the New York Port of Embarkation immediately put into effect a prearranged plan, whereby requisitions marked “STO” were not filled and only those marked “SHP” were processed for shipment to the theater.178
After Germany surrendered, the Transportation Corps supply organization had the task of redeploying transportation materiel to the United States and the Pacific, and at the same time of setting up new depots in Germany to support the U.S. occupation forces. Originally four such depots were planned, but only three were found necessary. A depot at Bremerhaven, primarily for marine engine parts, sufficed for the Bremen Port Command. At the request of the U.S. Seventh Army the Supply Division accepted a site in Karlsruhe for a general depot to support transportation activity in the American occupation zone. An experienced base
depot company functioned at each of these installations. A third depot, at Munich, was designated exclusively for diesel-locomotive spare parts. It operated under the supervision of the 762nd Railway Shop Battalion.179
The Transportation Corps supply program on the Continent had two major deficiencies, each traceable to the absence of previous experience in this field. They were a lack of basic information in the form of stock catalogs, drawings, spare-parts lists, interchangeability lists, maintenance factors, and standard nomenclature lists; and a shortage of men familiar with technical equipment and supplies. Both deficiencies were beyond the control of the Transportation Corps Supply Division in the theater. Standardization of equipment data was prevented by production difficulties in the zone of interior, which necessitated frequent substitutions, and sufficient trained personnel could not be had.180
Throughout the war neither the supply of spare parts nor the initial issue proved adequate. Slowness in getting the required parts into production was attributable in part to the comparatively late entry of the Transportation Corps into the field of supply and the specialized nature of its requirements. In its initial procurement program the emphasis necessarily was placed on the production of the basic equipment, with a resultant lag in the output of spare parts. Even after they had been received, the theater had difficulty in identifying parts because of unsatisfactory numbering and listing.
In this connection, Colonel Jewett recommended that spare parts be shipped in bulk rather than in sets and that each item be stamped with its Transportation Corps stock number. In his opinion the ideal arrangement in any future overseas undertaking called for a Transportation Corps Supply Division with clearly defined responsibilities and an adequate staff that would have sole responsibility for the operation of the Transportation Corps depots.181
Outbound Passenger and Cargo Traffic
The inbound flow of troops, supplies, and equipment remained a vital consideration until victory came into view. However, as the war in Europe drew to an end, outbound shipments took on increased importance. The climax, of course, came after the close of hostilities in May 1945 when the redeployment and demobilization programs swung into action. Included within the broad and varied outbound category were returning U.S. Army personnel, enemy prisoners of war, and patients being evacuated to the zone of interior, liberated persons, redeployed and demobilized troops, redeployed and excess supplies and equipment, and military dependents. All these movements threw a heavy load on the available transportation, greatly complicating the task of traffic control.
Returning U.S. Army Personnel
U.S. Army personnel returning to the zone of interior did not bulk large until the summer of 1943 when the troop rotation program got under way. The purpose of the program was to effect an exchange of military personnel between the zone of
interior and the overseas commands in order to give relief to officers and men who had seen unusually long or arduous service overseas. The theater commander prescribed the period that rendered individuals eligible for rotation. Replacements had to reach the theater before the departure of the rotational personnel. While the traffic involved in implementing this program was not heavy, the net result was to impose an additional burden upon the transportation system.182
During 1944, in addition to the rotational category (RO groups), many temporary duty personnel (the so-called TD groups) returned to the United States for rest, recuperation, and rehabilitation. The latter were limited in number only by the availability of shipping and by the needs of the theaters. Small numbers of military personnel also left the theater on emergency leave, on furlough, or as officer candidates. However, the total movement of Americans from the European theater to the zone of interior was on a modest scale, amounting to slightly under 260,000 passengers for the entire year of 1944. Meanwhile, the evacuation of enemy prisoners of war had developed into an operation of considerable magnitude.
Enemy Prisoners of War
The break-through at St. Lô and the subsequent rapid advance eastward brought a host of captured Germans into Allied hands. Many of these prisoners were put to work at once, but the theater had to feed and guard a large number who could not be used readily on the Continent. When this burden became too great, relief was obtained by evacuation, initially to the United Kingdom and later to the United States, where the Germans were needed because of a critical labor shortage. The theater chief of transportation was charged with the supervision of the movement of prisoners of war and provided the necessary land and sea transportation. The provost marshal was responsible for guarding en route.183
The summer and fall of 1944 saw a heavy movement of German prisoners of war to the United States. To provide sufficient shipping space, the Transportation Corps again made use of the hastily converted Liberty ships, which had been employed previously to remove Germans and Italians from the Mediterranean. During the peak month of September 1944 a total of 55,359 Germans arrived in the United States. By that time the influx had reached such alarming proportions as to cause the Army Provost Marshal General in Washington to oppose further shipments by the theater. General Somervell agreed and urged that this view be pressed more firmly upon the War Department General Staff and the European theater.184
Convinced of the seriousness of the problem, the Under Secretary of War in late September requested that as an emergency measure the removal of prisoners of war to the United States be halted. Compliance was not immediate because of pressure from the European theater, which reported a “huge volume of prisoners” on hand and asked to be permitted to load vessels beyond the authorized
passenger capacities. The War Department replied that the decision as to the number of prisoners carried rested with the captain of the ship, and then on 27 October it ordered the theater to suspend the movement of prisoners of war to the zone of interior. A subsequent modification of this directive restricted evacuation to “rabid” Nazis and prisoners of war wanted for interrogation.185
After a temporary lull, the last heavy movement of prisoners of war to the United States came in the spring of 1945 as the result of mass surrender of Germans to the advancing American forces. The traffic was at its height in April and May 1945, with arrivals of 31,559 and 28,260 prisoners, respectively. This exodus brought relief to the theater and helped alleviate the tight manpower situation in the United States. In order to evacuate as many prisoners as possible, the capacity of the POW Liberty ships was raised from the normal 300-500 to 750 and, finally, to 1,000 men, by opening additional hatches and by employing more guards.186
Anticipating an early end of hostilities General Somervell, on 6 April 1945, directed General Gross to take “positive action” to discontinue the shipment of German prisoners to the United States on V-E Day. Appropriate instructions were then issued to the overseas commands. When V-E Day came, the Chief of Transportation at once directed that all POW Liberty ships which were then en route to the United States turn back to the European ports from which they had sailed.187
Liberated Persons
The term “liberated persons” covers both recovered and exchanged Allied personnel. During the war exchanges were made with the Axis powers, through the cooperation of the U.S. War and State Departments, and the British, Canadian, and Swiss Governments. The exchanged persons normally traveled on the Swedish liner Gripsholm. The role of the Transportation Corps, both overseas and in the zone of interior, was confined to embarkation and debarkation arrangements, and the total number involved was small.188
Liberated military personnel, usually called RAMPS (Recovered Allied Military Personnel), formed a much larger group. As a matter of policy the War Department had determined that all U.S. personnel who had been prisoners of war longer than sixty days were to be returned to the United States unless they elected to remain overseas or requested reassignment to their former units. After U.S. armies entered Germany the number of RAMPS rapidly increased. Most American RAMPS embarked from the Le Havre Port of Embarkation after having been fed, clothed, and processed at Camp Lucky Strike—later known as Ramp Camp No. 1. Although the Army under-
took to give these men the best treatment possible, it could not repatriate them as rapidly as was desirable and at the same time carry out the schedule for redeploying troops and evacuating patients. Largely because of this delay, low morale arid poor discipline were reported at Le Havre and also at Southampton, where many RAMPS were staged pending repatriation.189
Patients
The evacuation of sick and wounded U.S. Army personnel was a joint undertaking of the Medical Department and the Transportation Corps, the former providing medical personnel, care, and equipment, and the latter furnishing transportation. The procedure for the return of patients from overseas commands was prescribed by War Department directive. As developed by June 1944, it called for each theater commander to submit a monthly report on the number and class (mental, litter, ambulant, or troop) of U.S. Army patients awaiting evacuation by water at each overseas port under his jurisdiction. In addition, he indicated the number of patients of each class expected to accumulate during the succeeding thirty days for removal by ship to the zone of interior—vital data for plans and operations of both the Transportation Corps and the Medical Department. Evacuation policy was expressed in terms of days. Thus, a 120-day evacuation policy meant that all patients likely to be hospitalized in excess of 120 days would be evacuated. Within the theater the movement of patients was to be accomplished, as the need arose, by litter, motor ambulance, airplane, and/or hospital train.190
Patients evacuated to the zone of interior by water traveled in one of two ways. By far the larger number occupied the hospital spaces of troopships leaving the theater. The other method of evacuation was by hospital ship, but despite early planning the development of a fleet of U.S. Army hospital ships was considerably delayed.191 The first was the Acadia, which began operating as a convention-protected vessel in June 1943. For the information of the overseas commander the patient capacity of each ship employed for evacuation was established by a special survey at the home port. All such vessels carried the medical personnel, equipment, and supplies deemed necessary for the patients aboard.192
Following the invasion of France, the majority of the patients evacuated from the Continent were first moved to the United Kingdom for hospitalization before being returned to the zone of interior. When D Day arrived, careful plans had been laid by General Ross and Maj. Gen. Paul R. Hawley, the Chief Surgeon, ETO. Special railway equipment had been provided for use in the United Kingdom and on the Continent. Since U.S. hospital ships were not available for the purpose, specially equipped and manned LSTs as
well as several British hospital carriers were assigned to move American patients across the Channel. Provision for evacuation by air also had been made.193
As quickly as possible after the assault landings, the casualties were collected on the beaches. Evacuation activities were carried out jointly by U.S. Army and U.S. Navy personnel. Initially, all patients were ferried by DUKWs and small craft to LSTs lying offshore. The first hospital carrier arrived on D plus 1, and patients were delivered to it in a similar manner. Althbugh removals from the beaches began on D Day, the casualties did not begin to arrive in large numbers in the United Kingdom until 9 June because of the time required for the formation of a convoy. In the United Kingdom, Southampton and Portland initially served as reception ports. Patients debarking at piers and hards were either moved by ambulance and truck to nearby transit hospitals, or were placed in hospital trains for movement direct to general hospitals.194
Of the five British hospital carriers assigned to the Normandy beachheads, three were staffed with U.S. and two with British Army medical personnel. Their role may be illustrated by the activity of the American 13th Hospital Train, a medical unit attached to the 14th Port at Southampton but stationed aboard the hospital carrier Lady Connaught. Anchored off UTAH Beach, at 1730 on 8 June 1944, her staff began the loading and treating of casualties despite continuous enemy air action, which luckily caused no loss of life or damage to the ship. Loading ceased at 1310 on 9 June, and the vessel weighed anchor and proceeded to Southampton, where the 449 patients were discharged at 1030 on 10 June. Subsequently, this ship evacuated casualties from both the Ameri can and British sectors in Normandy. During the period from D Day to 30 September 1944, the 13th Hospital Train completed 16 medical operational missions, evacuating and treating a total of 3,795 patients.195
Meanwhile, Cherbourg had begun to function as an evacuation port, loading its first hospital carrier on 15 August. Evacuations from the invasion beaches fell off thereafter and were halted in September. During that month the use of LSTs was discontinued, Portland ceased to be a reception port for patients, and sea evacuation to the United Kingdom was then effected entirely by hospital carriers, which operated between Cherbourg and Southampton. Upon arrival at Southampton, most patients moved by rail directly to general hospitals.196
Evacuation by water was necessarily slow, but patients flown from France were sometimes delivered to general hospitals in the United Kingdom within three hours after they had become casualties. Air evacuation from the invasion beaches began on D plus 4. By D plus 14 the airlift
to Great Britain was so successful that thereafter, until their use was discontinued, LSTs were employed only when unfavorable weather kept aircraft grounded. During the storm of 19-22 June, when sea evacuation was impossible, many patients left by air. In the last six months of 1944 aircraft accounted for 56 percent of all patients moved from the Continent to the United Kingdom. This traffic reached its wartime peak in December 1944, when 33,878 patients were flown to the United Kingdom.197
Evacuation by U.S. Army hospital ship to the zone of interior began on 15 June 1944 when the Chateau Thierry sailed from Liverpool with 466 patients.198 The only other U.S. Army hospital ship then in the European theater, the Acadia, had to be diverted to Naples to assist the Mediterranean theater. Consequently, there were no further hospital ship sailings until 22 July, when the Blanche F. Sigman embarked 557 patients, mainly casualties of the Normandy invasion, for the passage from Liverpool to Charleston, South Carolina.199
Evacuation continued on a modest scale during the summer of 1944. Only a few hospital ships were available, and although there was ample space for patients on troop transports little of it was used. Even in September 1944 when the patient movement increased sharply, the total number of evacuations by troopship was only 4,012 (including 330 U.S. Navy and 1,786 POW patients), a figure that was far below the number that could have been taken.200
The poor showing in the clearing of casualties from the theater during this period can be attributed to three major causes: (1) the chronic shortage of hospital ships; (2) the reluctance of the chief
surgeon of the theater (General Hawley) to use troopships for evacuation of patients, particularly litter cases; and (3) sharply divided opinion between Hawley’s medical staff and the War Department concerning the suitability of hospital accommodations on the troop transports. With regard to the last cause, disagreement had developed as early as June 1944 as to the numbers and types of cases that could be accommodated aboard a given vessel. Although each ship had been surveyed and the patient capacity had been determined at the home port, say, the New York Port of Embarkation, the transport surgeon and the port surgeon in the theater often disagreed with the accuracy of that figure.201
In Washington the matter was of common concern to the Chief of
Transportation and The Surgeon General, both of whom had a vital interest in the prompt removal of patients to the zone of interior. The Surgeon General, Maj. Gen. Norman T. Kirk, was critical of General Hawley’s failure to fill the hospital spaces on returning U.S. and British troopships, especially since hospital ships were arriving with more of certain types of patients than they were supposed to carry. There was a strong conviction in Washington that maximum utilization would have to be made of troop transports before they became unavailable because of redeployment demands, and it was foreseen that greater use would have to be made of air evacuation.202
General Hawley challenged this point of view. He claimed that the greatest use had been made of airlift, but that it was limited because returning airmen had a higher priority than casualties. He stated that approximately 50 percent of the casualties to be evacuated were litter cases, whereas only 10 percent of the troopship accommodations were, by War Department classification, satisfactory for such patients. As to the alleged failure to utilize British troopships, notably the Queen Elizabeth, he declared that the theater rarely received all the space requested and that facilities on such vessels were so poor as to warrant only emergency use.203
Hawley’s comments were transmitted to General Gross, who in turn forwarded them to General Ross with a letter stressing the need of an early remedy. In his reply of late October 1944, Ross reported that his staff had done its utmost to find a solution. Like Hawley, Ross had made a study, from which emerged these salient points: (1) the chief surgeon had been offered and had refused certain troopship hospital spaces; (2) the disagreement as to hospital accommodations on the troop transports should be settled in Washington, not in the theater; (3) exclusive of Class IV (troop) patients, who presented no problem, the troop transports were carrying only about 50 percent of their patient capacity; and (4) the only vessels currently being filled to capacity were the hospital ships, which Hawley preferred.204
In the letter that accompanied his comments, General Hawley had promised General Kirk that he would exploit the available patient lift to the fullest extent. This decision, prompted no doubt by prodding from Washington, was followed by a decided spurt in the number of patients embarked. This trend was aided by a change in evacuation policy from 180 to 120 days, effective in October. Some lift was lost while Hawley’s medical personnel evaluated patients in relation to the new policy. Meanwhile, the Transportation Corps continued to press for maximum utilization of the available shipping, including the British Queens.205
As already indicated, the chief surgeon of the European theater was reluctant to employ British vessels for patient evacuation. A permanent American medical staff (one officer and twelve enlisted men) had functioned aboard both the Queen Mary and Queen Elizabeth since 1942, but the
voyage reports of the American transport surgeons carried frequent complaints about the hospital facilities, food served, quarters, and lack of water. A further source of difficulty was the recurring friction between American and British medical personnel. Although the U.S. Army furnished its own medical supplies, equipment, and personnel, the British maintained a strict control, allegedly even to the extent of restricting the issue of the new marvel drug, penicillin, to American patients.206
The Queens carried fairly small numbers of American patients until late in 1944. On 25 July of that year the Queen Elizabeth brought only 344 patients, although her rated capacity was much greater.207 In mid-August when she arrived at New York with no patients aboard, there was instant complaint from Washington. Since the patient capacity of the Queens was disputed, both vessels were resurveyed at New York and specific berthing assignments were made for the several classes of patients. By mid-October this matter had become a “pretty hot subject” for both Ross and Hawley. Subsequently, action was taken to increase the number of patients carried on the Queens by providing more American medical personnel, equipment, and supplies. After further negotiation, arrangements were completed in November 1944 whereby approximately 1,700 Class II and III patients could be lifted on each of these ships.208
Early in December 1944 the War Department directed the European theater to exploit all possible U.S. and British lift (air and sea) for the evacuation of patients, even if it entailed lowering the evacuation policy to 90 days or less. The backlog of patients who were awaiting removal to the zone of interior was reduced. However, the number of new patients was then on the increase, in part because of severe winter weather and in part because of casualties incident to the Battle of the Bulge.209
By mid-December 1944 it was clear that the U.S. Army hospitals in the United Kingdom would soon be filled to capacity and that during the first half of 1945 the admissions would be considerably in excess of releases. The situation was so serious that it aroused attention at the highest level. The Joint Chiefs of Staff took action to meet the deficit in evacuation capacity by authorizing the conversion of six troop transports to ambulance-type hospital ships. In addition, the British were requested to furnish four hospital ships for temporary service. Having no hospital ships to offer, the British countered by proposing an equivalent lift through increased patient capacity on the Queens. After further negotiation in London and Washington, an understanding was obtained in January 1945 whereby both Queens were to be employed on the westbound voyage
for the return of U.S. sick and wounded personnel. Upon completion of certain structural alterations and with additional medical personnel and supplies, the capacity of the Queen Elizabeth was raised to 2,500 Class II and IV and 1,000 Class III patients, and that of the Queen Mary to 2,000 Class II and IV and 1,000 Class III patients.210
During this period efforts also were made to increase air evacuations to the zone of interior. The cross-Channel airlift had been successful from the start, but transatlantic air evacuation at first was disappointing. Most patients had to embark at Prestwick in northern Scotland, which was far removed from the general hospitals in the United Kingdom. Moreover, as previously indicated, combat-weary air crews were given preference over patients in the use of the limited air space. In December 1944 direct air evacuation to the United States began from the more conveniently located Orly Field near Paris. Air evacuation to the zone of interior reached a record high of 5,945 patients in May 1945.211
Although aircraft had a prominent role, most patients reached the United States by water. From January through April 1945 the number of patients evacuated from the theater by ship never fell below 23,000 a month. The principal evacuation ports were Cherbourg, Marseille, and Southampton. On 22 March 1945 a detachment of the 17th Port started evacuating patients from Boulogne to the British Isles, thereby relieving the pressure on Cherbourg. Port facilities at Boulogne sufficed for two hospital ships per day, one departing at each tide.212
The War Department never relaxed its pressure for the greatest possible utilization of evacuation facilities. On 23 February 1945 General Somervell cautioned General Gross to make due allowance in his redeployment planning for the removal of the sick and wounded from Europe, a process that Somervell believed had been inexcusably prolonged in World War I. During that month almost 30,000 patients were evacuated to the zone of interior by sea and air. General Marshall termed this an excellent showing on the part of all concerned, but he continued to insist that the number of patients in the theater be kept at the lowest possible level in order to release the maximum number of medical units for redeployment to the Pacific. Accordingly, the European theater was directed to retain the temporary 90-day evacuation policy.213
The favorable showing of February was repeated in March and April. The removal of casualties was further expedited when the War Department set a new evacuation policy of 60 days for the European theater, effective 1 May 1945. This change, plus a marked increase in the available lift, resulted in a total of 41,848 patients being shipped to the United States by water and air in May, the peak month for this traffic.214
After V-E Day the evacuation of
patients proceeded rapidly with all available means. By the fall of 1945 the bulk of the transportable patients had been returned to the zone of interior. The last battle casualty to be evacuated from the United Kingdom left Southampton on 19 August 1945 aboard the U.S. Army hospital ship Adela E. Lutz.215
Redeployment and Demobilization
Redeployment planning by the Transportation Corps in the European theater commenced during the last quarter of 1944 when General Ross’s staff undertook a preliminary survey of the transportation aspects and began drafting necessary changes in existing movement procedures. In March 1945 a deputation from the theater, including two Transportation Corps officers, came to the United States to study packing and stowage for the movement of cargo from Europe to the Far East. Further planning developed from a theater conference of late April, at which the chief of transportation was asked to make suggestions and to approve details on such questions as time phasing, documentation, and movement procedures. In this connection Ross insisted on certain arrangements that he considered fundamental to an orderly process. In particular, he deemed it necessary for his port commanders to be informed sufficiently in advance of prospective movements so that stowage plans could be developed, ships allocated, and staging areas prepared for the reception of troops. He also considered it essential that trucks and supplies should not move until called forward by the port commanders. In view of the critical shortage of railway freight cars and the great difficulty in obtaining passenger coaches, the maximum use was to be made of organic motor trans port to deliver men and materiel to the ports.216
As the result of a series of sessions in Paris, at which these and other redeployment problems were discussed, a standing operating procedure was devised in late May 1945 for outloading redeployed troops and cargo. In that month General Ross also visited Washington on behalf of the G-4, COMZONE, to ascertain the requirements for the Pacific in sufficient time to pack, mark, and load supplies, to ready the units, and to preship their organizational equipment. Redeployment was to be either direct—from France to the Pacific—or indirect—via the United States. So rapid was the march of events that redeployment lasted only three months, and after Japan surrendered, it disappeared in the larger program of demobilization.217
As of May 1945 there were approximately 3,500,000 American troops in the European and Mediterranean theaters, most of whom were to be returned to the United States for demobilization, reassignment, or retention incident to further redeployment. The Chief of Transportation in Washington estimated that the return movement could be accomplished at the rate of approximately 280,000 men per month in the first quarter after V-E Day, 395,000 per month in the second quarter, and 269,000 in the third quarter. Thereafter, redeployment was to continue at the same rate until the agreed garrison strength of 400,000 troops (later reduced to
370,000) was attained on the Continent. All available water transportation, including British vessels and converted Liberties, was to be employed. The use of seized enemy shipping was contemplated, but actually only two such vessels, the Europa and the Vulcania, were placed in operation. The Air Transport Command was expected to assist with an airlift of about 50,000 men per month.218
The principal redeployment ports in the European theater were Southampton in the United Kingdom and Le Havre and Marseille in France. Other ports met special needs, notably Cherbourg and Boulogne for patient evacuation and Antwerp for cargo outloading. Marseille was responsible for heavy shipments of redeployed vehicles and ammunition. That port also dispatched many service units to the Pacific, including the transportation personnel required to receive redeployed troops and cargo. In keeping with their new role, both Le Havre and Southampton were formally designated ports of embarkation.219
Despite preliminary work on redeployment policies and procedures, the European theater was not wholly prepared for immediate action following the declaration of R Day (12 May 1945). The first difficulty arose in timing the shipment of organizational equipment from Europe. In some instances it proved necessary to delay troop movements and to expedite the shipment of their equipment so that both would arrive in the Pacific at approximately the same date.220
The theater chief of transportation, himself, had difficult adjustments to make. He had to provide for the movement of personnel and cargo while at the same time his own organization was being depleted by redeployment. Beginning in April 1945, at the direction of General Ross, the respective Transportation Corps units were designated for service in occupied Germany, for the communications zone including the United Kingdom, or for redeployment. Although the general policy was to assign units with the shortest overseas service for redeployment, many exceptions had to be made in order to retain Transportation Corps organizations with training essential to successful execution of the outloading program.221
Outbound troops normally moved by rail or truck from their unit stations to camps in a huge assembly area near Reims, and thence to staging areas near the embarkation ports from which they were called forward by the port commanders as shipping space became available.222 Motor convoys from Germany to the assembly area camps followed three main routes—the Brown, the Red, and the Green—each of which had its own bivouac camp. Other motor routes were established for movements from the assembly area to staging camps in the Marseille
and Le Havre areas. Regular daily schedules and train routes were set up for rail movements from Germany to the assembly area and from the assembly area to staging areas for the ports of Antwerp, Le Havre, and Marseille. Troop trains had special main numbers for ready identification of each train and movement. Effective liaison had to be maintained at all times with the French railway officials, since they furnished the bulk of the train service. A train normally consisted of 17 coaches and 3 baggage cars, with a capacity of approximately 1,000 men.
Rail traffic was very heavy in the Reims area, which was under the jurisdiction of the transportation officer of the Oise Intermediate Section. To assist in clearing the rail congestion that developed there, a Paris Railway Grand Division (Provisional) was organized on 1 June 1945. It gave special attention to rail transportation from the assembly area to the ports.223
The redeployment program strained to the utmost the resources of the theater chief of transportation. Additional transportation personnel was necessary for the staging and assembly areas. The principal demand was for staging area companies, truck companies, and traffic regulation units. The RTO remained an important figure as the local trouble shooter in transportation matters. Two special radio circuits were established to expedite the flow of information on U.S. Army movements to the assembly area at Reims. At first, direct movement to the ports by train and motor convoy exceeded that by way of the assembly area, a development that had not been foreseen in the planning period. Fortunately, because of the selection of suitable direct routes for the motor convoys to Le Havre and Marseille, this traffic did not conflict with the movement to the assembly area. To facilitate travel by motor, detailed strip maps were prepared and issued giving routes and mileages in much the same way as the road maps distributed by American oil companies. Camp directional signs were posted along each route.224
Redeployment travel was crude, particularly during the early phase. The trains were usually slow and poorly equipped. On occasion troops had to travel in boxcars, subsisting on cold rations en route. Because of faulty maintenance and driver abuse, the trucks in the motor convoys often broke down, causing delay and inconvenience. The veterans complained of the lack of coordination and the failure to make adequate provision for their needs. At certain installations, notably Camp Twenty Grand, the food was poor and housing unsatisfactory. The picture usually brightened when the redeployed soldier finally reached the port and embarked for the homeward voyage, even though the transport also might be crowded and uncomfortable.225
The first large unit redeployed from Europe through the United States was the 86th Infantry Division. It embarked at Le Havre for New York aboard four troop transports on 8-9 June 1945. In that month a total of 185,929 military passengers sailed
from Le Havre for the United States.226 During the same period the port personnel at Marseille were busily engaged in direct redeployment, which was their primary mission. The first troopship dispatched from ETO to the Pacific was the Admiral C. F. Hughes. She departed Marseille on 16 June, went through the Panama Canal, and arrived at Manila late in July with 4,832 service troops aboard. Direct redeployment ceased as soon as Japan capitulated, but Marseille remained an important embarkation port.227
Many troops being returned to the United States traveled via the United Kingdom, and such routing made possible the employment of the Queens. Since these vessels at first sailed from the Clyde, considerable rail travel was involved and the burden on the British railways was heavy. By June 1945 plans had been laid for the Queens to sail from Southampton, but necessary dredging of the harbor delayed their return to their prewar home port until August.228
Although redeployment was a serious drain on all theater transportation, the greatest problem was to provide sufficient ocean shipping. The Transportation Corps and the War Shipping Administration therefore arranged the hasty conversion of several hundred Liberty and Victory cargo ships. As a rule, all redeployment vessels left the theater with maximum passenger loads. American soldiers, at least before sailing, were generally willing to sacrifice comfort and travel in the hold of a freighter, if necessary, to reach home.
Ultimately, every available vessel, including Army hospital ships and British craft, was pressed into service for the homebound armada. After the surrender of Japan the U.S. Navy supplemented the personnel lift by using its combatant vessels to carry troops. At Southampton the loss in U.S. troop space resulting from the removal in October 1945 of the Cunard liners Queen Elizabeth and Aquitania from American service was made up by converted U.S. Navy vessels. The first ship so used was the aircraft carrier Lake Champlain.229
Apart from the heavy troop traffic, the European theater outloaded considerable cargo after V-E Day. Procedures governing packing, marking, and documentation, had been worked out before the cessation of hostilities in Europe, and provision was made for a minimum of fourteen mobile packing squads to supervise and assist units in these activities. Later, courses were offered in Paris on redeployment packaging, and a procedure was established for reporting the status of redeployed cargo.230
At the height of the redeployment program, in the twenty-four weeks between R Day and 27 October 1945, the European theater loaded 446,878 long tons of equipment and supplies for shipment direct to the Pacific. Of this total by far the greatest portion, 295,628 long tons, was loaded at Marseille; the next largest amount, 73,505 long tons, was shipped
through Antwerp. During the same period the European theater forwarded a total of 847,149 long tons of cargo to the United States, of which 337,837 long tons were loaded at Antwerp, 209,464 long tons in the United Kingdom, and 102,739 long tons at Cherbourg. At the same time the European theater outloaded 1,470,779 troops to the zone of interior. Of this total 701,761 embarked at Le Havre, 297,568 at Marseille, and 321,327 from the United Kingdom, particularly Southampton. Simultaneously, the European theater also shipped 117,085 men to Pacific destinations, of whom a total of 109,555 embarked at Marseille.231
In late November 1945 General Gross estimated that by the close of the year shipping would be no longer a critical factor in redeployment from Europe. At the end of January 1946 he anticipated the withdrawal of all U.S. forces, except for troops to occupy enemy territory and the minimum personnel to dispose of the Army’s surplus property. In a comprehensive report on troop returns released on 20 November 1945, Gross listed a redeployment fleet in the Atlantic with the following composition and capacity:232
| Number and Type of Vessels | Total Personnel Capacity |
| 80 U.S.-controlled troopships | 242,489 |
| 210 Converted Liberty ships | 115,000 |
| 87 Converted Victory ships | 168,450 |
|
1 British ship (Queen Mary) |
11,400 |
| 15 U.S. Navy combatant vessels | 36,212 (U.S. Army only) |
| 7 Hospital ships | 4,969 (patients only) |
Never before, concluded General Gross, had so many troops been moved so far and so fast. American soldiers were returning to the zone of interior from bases all over the world at a rate slightly more than three times faster than that at which General Pershing’s men were repatriated from France at the close of World War I.
Despite this favorable showing, during the winter of 1945–46 American troops overseas became more and more restive. They wanted to go home as quickly as possible, and no talk of the shipping shortage or the international situation could still the angry wave of discontent. The worst demonstration occurred in Manila, but American soldiers also paraded in protest in Paris and Frankfurt. Behind the unrest lay the continued need for troops overseas, which resulted in slowing down the Army’s rate of demobilization. In Washington, in January 1946, the Army Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower, defended the demobilization program before Congress, stating that if repatriation were continued at the current rate, by the following April the Army would have nothing left but a “woefully inadequate number of volunteers.” As a matter of fact, when Eisenhower spoke, the demobilization program had already reached the peak.233
At the close of 1945 the troop requirements, rather than shipping, constituted the governing factor in demobilization. The current replacements were simply not sufficient to cope with the progressive reduction in troop strength. Since the availability of shipping was no longer a problem, in January 1946 the loading of troops aboard converted Liberty vessels was halted, and the ports of embarkation in the theater were authorized to place only 1,000 men on each Victory ship. At Marseille, troop redeployment ceased, and the emphasis shifted to outloading the
remaining surplus cargo. At the same time, at Le Havre, both personnel and cargo movements fell off perceptibly. In all ports the transportation personnel dwindled in number as more and more men left for home. Symptomatic of the change to postwar activity, the 14th Port at Southampton directed its attention toward the shipment to the United States of thousands of British dependents of American servicemen. The Transportation Corps at last was nearing the end of its immediate postwar mission in the theater. After the cessation of hostilities, General Ross had said that his job was not finished until the bulk of redeployment was accomplished. That goal was attained on 26 February 1946 when he sailed from Le Havre to the United States, closing a colorful and successful career as the U.S. Army Chief of Transportation, European Theater of Operations.234
War Brides
While the nation was at war the movement of brides and other dependents of American military personnel necessarily was restricted, but when peace came many of these wanted to come to the United States as soon as possible. The shipping requirements of redeployment and demobilization were so overwhelming as to rule out any large-scale evacuation of dependents during 1945, but this movement finally got under way early in 1946. Meanwhile, in line with War Department directives issued pursuant to Congressional and Presidential action on the subject, the Chief of Transportation in Washington had formulated a plan for the shipment of approximately 45,000 war brides and their children from Europe to the United States.235 Certain vessels were to be specially equipped for this purpose with, for example, such unmilitary items as high chairs, play pens, toys, nursing bottles, and disposable diapers. Nurses and Red Cross workers were to be added to the usual ship’s complement. The first large movement was to be from the British Isles, which had the greatest number of dependents (40,000 or more) and where demonstrations by war brides seeking passage to the United States had already aroused concern in the U.S. Department of State. Southampton was selected as the principal port for embarking dependents, and reception areas were set up nearby at Tid-worth and Bournemouth.
The first “bride and baby special” carried approximately 630 dependents to New York. They sailed aboard the SS Argentina from Southampton on 26 January 1946, inaugurating the European phase of the Army’s highly publicized “Operation Diaper.” The next major shipment of approximately 2,340 British war brides and children left on the Queen Mary in the following month. A fleet of eleven vessels, including several hospital ships, was assigned to this program, which eventually involved the movement of dependents of virtually all nationalities in western and southern Europe. A human interest story that attracted widespread attention, the exodus of war brides to the United States continued well into the postwar period.236