Chapter 12: China, Burma, and India
The fall of Rangoon in March 1942 and the subsequent occupation of Burma by the Japanese cut the Burma Road, the last practicable overland route linking China with the other Allied powers, and left as an immediate alternative only a tenuous air supply line from Assam in northeastern India over the Himalayas (the Hump).1 The sole remaining base from which communications to China could be restored was India, and it was there that the United States concentrated its effort to develop the airlift and, through the recapture of Burma, to reopen the land route to China. This effort was designed to support American air operations in China and to deliver lend-lease supplies intended to assist China in reorganizing and increasing the combat efficiency of her armies. It involved the deployment of relatively small and scattered American forces, principally Air Forces and construction and other service troops, and the support of the north Burma campaigns, which the Chinese Army in India fought with the assistance of British and American forces. (Map 8)
The Strategical and Logistical Setting
From the outset, transportation loomed as a major problem in the task of delivering the supplies that would keep China in the war and eventually enable her to take the offensive against Japan. Indian ports were limited in number and were located 10,000 to 12,000 miles from the United States. None was equipped to handle greatly expanded traffic. Since the highway system, with the exception of that on the northwest frontier, was undeveloped, ports were served mainly by railroad, supplemented by coastwise shipping and river transportation. Before the war the possibility that India would be a base for operations to the east had received scant consideration. When, contrary to expectation, Assam became the scene of airfield construction and the supply base for construction and combat forces moving into Burma, transportation facilities in that area were found to be sadly deficient.
Although Assam was the main operational center, it was at first necessary to use ports on the west coast of India since eastern ports were blocked by Japanese activity in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. Supplies had to be moved an additional 2,100 to 3,000 miles, after being discharged, in order to reach their destinations in Assam and China. From Karachi, the first major American port of entry, supplies were hauled across India by rail to eastern Assam for local use or for movement by air over the Hump to the Kunming area, whence they were transported to Chungking and to advanced Chinese bases by rail, highway, river, and coolie or animal transport.
The Indian railway system was
Map 8 Calcutta–Kunming line of communications
ill-prepared to handle additional traffic. The virtual closing in early 1942 of the eastern ports, particularly Calcutta, placed a heavy burden on trans-India rail facilities, lengthening hauls and forcing movement by rail of materials normally shipped on coastwise vessels. The worst bottleneck in the rail system was the meter-gauge railway serving the eastern frontier. This line was extremely limited in capacity, and the Brahmaputra River was unbridged. The railroads were centrally controlled by the Railway Department of the Government of India, and were supervised by a civilian railway board. Although the board exercised control in matters of general policy, individual railroads worked as separate entities and were not fully coordinated.
Inland water transport, concentrated mainly on the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers and their tributaries, supplemented the rail facilities in east Bengal and Assam. Handled exclusively by civilian firms, river transportation was slow and subject to seasonal disruption. Transfer of craft to the Persian Gulf area in 1941 and 1942 cut into carrying capacity, and there was little coordination of rail and river movements.2
The Pioneer Period
The task of receiving and forwarding lend-lease and U.S. Army supplies from the Indian ports was given to Brig. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Raymond A. Wheeler, then heading the U.S. Military Iranian Mission. On 28 February 1942 the War Department placed him in command of the Services of Supply, under Lt. Gen. (later General) Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of the U.S. Army forces in the the China–Burma–India (CBI) theater. Wheeler and a small staff arrived at Karachi on 9 March and there established SOS headquarters. Three days later the first contingent to arrive in CBI, air force troops diverted from Jaya, debarked. Borrowing men from this group as well as from the Iranian mission and groups of casuals destined for Stilwell’s headquarters in China, Wheeler organized a temporary staff and got port and other operations under way.
At this time, the resources available to the U.S. Army were meager. Shaken by the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, scarcely started in “the battle of production,” and faced with the necessity of holding the enemy in Europe and the Pacific, the United States could make only limited provision for the war in Asia. Instructed to live off the country insofar as possible, Wheeler decided to decentralize supply operations to the areas where American troops would be stationed in number. After the arrival of the first service troops in May, he moved his headquarters to New Delhi where British General Headquarters (India) was located, and divided the SOS organization into geographical base and advance sections. As SOS activities fanned out from Karachi across India to Bengal and up to Assam and China, existing sections were consolidated or inactivated and new ones created.
The SOS organization had crystallized by April 1943. Base Section One, with headquarters at Karachi, controlled SOS activities in western India. Base Section Two, with headquarters at Calcutta, exercised jurisdiction over the area along the route to Assam. Advance Section Two (later Intermediate Section Two), with headquarters first at Dibrugarh and later at Chabua, received supplies for China or Burma. Base Section Three (later Advance Section Three) had its headquarters at Ledo, Assam, the base for construction and for the projected combat operations in north Burma. Advance Section Three, established at Kunming in June 1942, conducted SOS operations in China. Later, Advance Section Four was to be set up at Kweilin to handle supplies for U.S. forces in east China. The two sections were consolidated in January 1944 to form a single SOS agency for China. Except for certain exempted installations and operations directly under control of SOS headquarters, section commanders were responsible for all SOS activities within their jurisdiction.3
Initially, U.S. Army transportation operations were controlled by the section commanders since no theater or SOS transportation organization existed. As the sections expanded, they tended to develop transportation organizations and, depending on the activities in the locality, assigned water, rail, air, and motor transportation officers. When in April 1943 a Transportation Section was organized at SOS headquarters, it was given the status of a special staff section. Under the command of Col. Otto R. Stillinger, this
section dealt primarily with planning for motor, rail, and inland water operations. Stillinger reported to G-4 and the chief of staff, communicating through these channels with the base and advance sections, which directed actual operations.4
The decentralization of U.S. Army transportation operations and the establishment of a transportation section with purely staff functions were natural outgrowths of the situation in CBI. Higher strategic priorities afforded other areas precluded the large-scale provision of American troops, equipment, and supplies. In addition, CBI, as the arena of diverse and often conflicting national interests, was perhaps more subject to uncertainties of planning than any other over-sea area. These two factors, together with the formidable barriers of time and space, resulted in a limited development of American transportation activities in the area. In line with War Department directives, the U.S. Army wherever possible relied on the British for transport and geared its SOS organization to make use of the resources locally available. Indeed, when the British in the summer of 1942 proposed that the Americans take over bottleneck portions of the railroad in Assam, Stilwell and Wheeler rejected the idea.5
Aside from air operations, American transport activities were confined to base hauling and to small-scale port operations at Karachi, Bombay, and, as soon as tactical conditions permitted, Calcutta. During 1942 Karachi, which received virtually all U.S. Army cargo and China Defense Supplies (CDS), discharged only 130,342 long tons of such freight. Arrangements for rail or river movement to the interior were made through British movements authorities. In October 1942 the U.S. Army assumed responsibility for construction of the Ledo Road and, toward the end of the year, began operations. As in the case of the ports, transport in support of this project was the responsibility of the section commander. In China, which received only a trickle of supplies over the Hump, the U.S. Army was almost totally dependent on the Chinese for interior distribution from the Kunming air terminal.
As long as the flow of supplies from the United States was small, the Indian transport system was able to absorb it, albeit with some difficulty. By early 1943, however, plans were in the making for greatly expanded operations. In January, at Casablanca, the Allied planners agreed to undertake ANAKIM, an operation to retake all of Burma, and tentatively set up for mid-November 1943. Following the conference, General Somervell, the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, visited India and discussed logistical problems with Wheeler. At Somervell’s request, Wheeler submitted a plan for the support of 100,000 American troops in China, assuming the early conquest of north Burma, followed by the recapture of the remainder of the country, including Rangoon. His plan outlined the personnel and equipment required for motor transport deliveries on the Ledo–Burma Road and for a large-scale barge operation on the Irrawaddy River northward from Rangoon. Upon its receipt in Washington, the plan was used by the ASF as a basis for the procurement of vehicles and barge-line equipment.6
The strategic assumptions upon which the Wheeler plan was based were soon altered. At TRIDENT, in May 1943, the major emphasis was placed on the support of an air offensive in China, and ANAKIM was watered down. The Combined Chiefs of Staff set a goal of 10,000 tons a month for Hump deliveries by November 1943, and made definite commitments only for a campaign to retake north Burma in the 1943–44 dry season. The ensuing expansion of base installations in Assam and Manipur State in support of the Hump airlift and the projected Burma campaign created a heavy demand for supplies and equipment. To meet these requirements, supplies were laid down at Calcutta, now emerging as the major American cargo port, far in excess of the capacity of the inadequate line of communications leading into Assam. During the latter half of the year, congestion at Calcutta and along the rail and river routes reached serious proportions and endangered construction, airlift, and combat operations.7
Quadrant—Planning and Implementation
The TRIDENT decisions had been reached without coming to grips with the logistical problems involved in their execution. This task was undertaken in August 1943 at the QUADRANT Conference at Quebec. There, the logistical requirements for augmented Hump deliveries and construction and combat operations to re-establish land communications with China were determined. In the implementation of these decisions, beginning in the fall of 1943, the U.S. Army received the means with which to break the bottleneck between the port of Calcutta and operational centers in Assam and to carry forward projected operations.
During his visit to India in February 1943, General Somervell had analyzed the central logistical problem as the buildup of communications to Assam and from Assam into Burma and he believed that “with firm purpose the Assam LOC [line of communications] could carry far greater tonnage than it was then doing and furthermore, far greater tonnage than the British had stated was possible.”8 At QUADRANT this belief was translated into action when Somervell joined with his British counterpart, General Sir Thomas Sheridan Riddell-Webster, to present a plan for the monthly air and truck delivery to China of 85,000 short tons of supplies and up to 54,000 short tons of petroleum by 1 January 1946. This goal depended on the development of the capacity of the Assam LOC from 102,000 short tons monthly, the estimated capacity for November 1943, to 220,000 short tons, and the construction of pipelines to carry an additional 72,000 short tons of petroleum monthly.
In making their proposals, Somervell and Riddell-Webster noted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had agreed to provide special American personnel, equipment, and supplies to construct and operate the Ledo–Kunming route, and also to achieve the increased tonnage on the Assam LOC. There was a specific proposal to establish an American barge line on the Brahmaputra River to deliver 30,000 short tons a month to Dibrugarh. They also recommended that the Supreme Commander, Southeast Asia, soon to be appointed, be
directed to take the necessary action for the development of transportation to attain the target figures, and that pending his assumption of command, the Commander-in-Chief, India, be charged with primary responsibility.
The plan was incorporated by the CCS into their over-all strategic plan for Asia. In their final report, the CCS placed the main emphasis on the establishment of land communications with China and the improvement and security of the air route. These aims were to be furthered by operations to capture Upper Burma, preparations for amphibious operations in the spring of 1944 against a point to be decided, and a continued build-up and increase of air routes and air supplies to China. To provide the means with which to support these operations, the CCS adopted Somervell’s and Riddell-Webster’s plan.9
In the months following the conference, negotiations were begun with the British regarding the use of American troops and equipment in the development of the Assam LOC. The proposed barge line on the Brahmaputra, intended to supplement civilian river lines, was accepted without reservation, but planning for rail operations proved more difficult. When the Americans first proposed militarizing and placing American railway troops on the bottlenecked meter-gauge portion of the Bengal and Assam Railway leading across Assam to Ledo, Government of India officials vetoed the idea, believing that the railroad was doing as well as could be expected and fearing adverse effects on the civil economy and political repercussions.
The need for drastic increases in the movement of supplies to Assam brought continued pressure for militarization of the railroad. While Somervell and the Chief of Transportation, General Gross, were on a visit to India, an intercommand meeting was called in New Delhi in October 1943 to consider means of speeding up the development of the Assam LOC. Among the participants were Vice-Adm. Lord Louis Mountbatten (the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia), representatives of General Headquarters (India), the War Transport and Railway Department of the Government of India, and American officers, including Stilwell, Wheeler, Somervell, and Gross.
At this meeting Somervell pointed out that a 50 percent increase in tonnage was required by April 1944 if commitments to China were to be met. If the Government of India was unable to achieve this goal, he asserted, sufficient American railway troops could be provided to assure its accomplishment. When British and Indian railway officials were unable to guarantee the desired 50 percent increase, Mountbatten considered it necessary to press the Government of India to accept the American offer. After the conference, opposition diminished and negotiations proceeded smoothly.10 A Military Railway Service was established, railway troops were brought in, and the Americans took control of the meter-gauge lines between Katihar and Ledo, effective 1 March 1944. Meanwhile, additional port troops and equipment had arrived at Calcutta,
an American barge-line organization had been established in India, and inland waterway troops and equipment had been shipped from the United States.
Organization of a Transportation Service
Expanded American transportation operations brought into being a Transportation Service with command as well as staff functions. Maj. Gen. W. E. R. Covell, who assumed command of SOS in CBI in November 1943, considered transportation “our most difficult and most important problem.”11 One of his first actions was to propose reorganization of SOS along the lines of a zone of communications. Included was a specific recommendation for the establishment of a transportation service that would operate under a division of the zone of communications headquarters. Although his plans were not accepted in their entirety, the proposal for the creation of a transportation service was adopted.12
The Transportation Service of SOS was established at New Delhi on 1 January 1944 to direct, coordinate, and supervise all transportation functions of the U.S. forces in CBI. General Thomas Wilson was appointed commanding general and acted as transportation officer on Covell’s staff. Wilson, former Chief of Transportation, Southwest Pacific, had been transferred to CBI at the request of Wheeler in October 1943 in order to replace Colonel Stillinger, who was to return to the United States. Wilson’s arrival coincided with that of Covell, and the two worked closely in organizing the Transportation Service.13
In addition to his staff functions, Wilson was given command of the Military Railway Service, the American Barge Lines, and the Bombay Port of Debarkation, which was removed from the jurisdiction of Base Section One and established as an exempted installation on 31 December 1943. The order setting up the service also attempted to coordinate its functions with those of the base and advance sections. Transportation officers, to be assigned to the staff of each section command, would receive operational and technical instructions directly from Transportation Service.
A rather elaborate organization was outlined, but it did not go into effect immediately, chiefly because of a lack of personnel. An acute shortage of qualified officers continued through the early months of 1944 and retarded full realization of the new organization. The situation was disturbing to Wilson, and in April he reported to Washington that it was getting worse rather than better.14
Despite this handicap, the Transportation Service had begun to function. Staff and operating divisions were set up separately or consolidated, according to available personnel, and liaison channels were established to coordinate American and British transportation efforts. Wilson personally maintained constant contact with the Director of Movements, General Headquarters, India, and Transportation Service officers attended meetings at New Delhi of the British military and Government of India agencies that controlled rail
movements and coordinated port and shipping operations. When Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) headquarters were set up at Kandy, Ceylon, a Transportation Service officer was sent to Colombo to act as port officer and to maintain liaison with SEAC and the British Eastern Fleet.
During this early period, Wilson, together with Covell and Brig. Gen. Gilbert X. Cheves, the new Base Section Two commander, devoted his major effort to breaking the bottlenecks at the port of Calcutta and along the Assam LOC. Arrangements were made with the British to give the U.S. Army exclusive use of the modern King George Docks at Calcutta and to open Madras as an overflow port. The British were also persuaded to appoint a port controller at Calcutta and to accept an American officer as one of his deputies. With the assistance of pressure from Washington, a committee was set up to control and coordinate movements over the Assam LOC and a Transportation Service officer was appointed as a representative.15
Provision was first made for the extension of the Transportation Service into China in February 1944, when Wilson assigned Col. Maurice E. Sheahan to handle the critical transportation situation there. Sheahan, Wilson’s deputy in China, also acted as transportation officer of Advance Section One and controlled transportation operations into the forward areas beyond the section’s boundaries. Under his direction a significant motor transport operation was developed in support of the advanced airfields of the Fourteenth Air Force in China.
In June 1944 the Transportation Service was reorganized. The chief of staff was redesignated executive officer, and staff and operating divisions were consolidated into four sections each. The Military Railway Service and the American Barge Lines continued to be assigned to Transportation Service, and the Bombay Port of Debarkation remained an exempt station under Transportation Service. To a large extent, the reduction of the Transportation Service organization was due to a shortage of personnel and the curtailment of what had originally been planned as a large-scale American barge-line project. Perhaps equally important was the fact that Covell’s plan for a centralized zone of communications organization, of which Transportation Service was to be a part, was never implemented and, as a consequence, the section commanders retained a large degree of autonomy.
Although Transportation Service gave technical and operational guidance to SOS sections, section commanders continued to control transportation operations within their areas. Base Section Two, for example, retained command of the Army port organization and troops at Calcutta along with base motor, rail, air, and liaison activities. In Advance Section Three, convoy operations on the Ledo Road were directed by a provisional organization under the section commander. Despite Wilson’s efforts to bring the operation under Transportation Service, his functions relating to motor transport in Burma were limited largely to planning for the opening of the road to China. During 1944 Intermediate Section Two also provided an example of independent
transportation operations, conducting a convoy route from the Bongaigaon railhead to Chabua, the main base for Hump deliveries from Assam to China.16
Whatever the deficiencies in the duality of organization and authority, they were not serious enough to impair transportation operations. There was a large degree of cooperation between Transportation Service and section commanders. As the major transportation problems moved toward a solution during 1944, there was little pressure for change.
General Wilson returned to the United States in July 1944 and was succeeded by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Edward C. Rose. During Wilson’s command, transportation operations had been greatly expanded. Until December 1943, two port companies were the only Transportation Corps units in the command. By the middle of 1944 there were on duty two port battalion headquarters, ten port companies, a railway grand division, five railway operating battalions, one railway shop battalion, and two harbor craft companies. American rail and barge operations had been instituted and the bottlenecks at Calcutta and along the Assam LOC had been broken; American motor operations had commenced in China; close relations with British authorities had been developed; and plans had been formulated for motor transport on the Ledo–Burma Road. Covell reported that Wilson had done “a splendid job in building our Transportation Service from practically nothing.”17
Under Rose, the Transportation Service organization underwent several changes in the latter half of 1944. To its existing air transportation activities, consisting largely of screening requests for priorities for air movement of SOS personnel and cargo from New Delhi, was added responsibility for administering the Army’s contract with the China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC). This airline, jointly owned by the Chinese Government and Pan American Airlines, flew lend-lease materials to China. Beginning in July 1944 the Air Section of Transportation Service kept a record of CNAC operations, insured compliance with the contract, and assisted CNAC in solving supply and other problems. This responsibility was retained until 1 September 1945, when it was turned over to the China Theater.
Another new development occurred in September 1944, when direction of transportation projects in China was turned over to Advance Section One, and Sheahan’s organization became a special staff section under the section commander. In the following month the American Barge Lines, operating entirely within Base Section Two, was assigned to that section.
The division of CBI on 24 October 1944 into the India–Burma and the China Theaters was effected without causing major reorganization of SOS. Advance Section One already had been granted virtual autonomy and became SOS in the China Theater. Transportation Service was little affected. Aside from providing several key rail, port, and inland waterway men requested by the China Theater, its personnel and functions remained unchanged.18
Developments in India–Burma Theater
When the India–Burma Theater came into being, most of the major transportation problems had been overcome or appeared susceptible of early solution. The once congested Calcutta port was now one of the world’s leading U.S. Army port installations. QUADRANT capacity targets for the Assam LOC were being exceeded, and supplies were flowing smoothly to the forward area thanks to centralized movement control, MRS operations, and American and British pipeline and other construction. The American barge equipment proved unsuitable for long hauls on the Brahmaputra, but proved useful in Calcutta port operations and for the support of airfields in east Bengal. Karachi, now a minor port, and the Bombay Port of Debarkation were operating efficiently.
There had also been good progress in the build-up of air deliveries to China and the prosecution of combat and construction operations in north Burma. The capture of the Myitkyina airfield in May 1944 had greatly improved air routes to China from India and, together with the increased flow of supplies into Assam, brought a spectacular rise in traffic over the Hump. In October 1944 Air Transport Command (ATC) and other carriers delivered 35,131 short tons to China, dwarfing the 8,632 short tons carried to China in October 1943.19 The town of Myitkyina fell to the Allies in August 1944 and was rapidly converted into a forward supply and air base. It appeared certain that the reopening of the land route to China would not be long delayed.
Transportation activities continued to expand into early 1945 as cargo arrivals were accelerated in support of developing airlift, construction, and combat operations. Traffic at Calcutta and along the Assam LOC increased, reaching a peak in March and April. Meanwhile, the long-awaited restoration of overland communications had been effected in January, and in the following month organized through-deliveries of vehicles over the Stilwell Road to China were begun.
By the late spring of 1945, transportation operations tended to level off and decline. To be sure, the build-up of China traffic continued from some time. Hump deliveries reached a peak of over 73,000 short tons in July; the four-inch pipeline extending along the Stilwell Road from Ledo to Kunming was opened in June; and China road deliveries were kept near peak levels through the middle of the year. Over-all traffic, however, declined as fighting in central Burma came to an end. Burma cargo deliveries fell off, MRS traffic declined, and cargo arrivals at Calcutta diminished. The port of Karachi was closed, and, at the request of the British, American troop debarkations were transferred from Bombay to Calcutta.
With the end of hostilities, shipments to India–Burma were sharply curtailed and all projects canceled. After clearing the supply routes to China, major wartime operations were speedily concluded. By the middle of October 1945 the MRS railway had been turned back to the British, Stilwell Road deliveries completed, and the American Barge Lines operation abandoned. Hump and pipeline deliveries were terminated shortly thereafter.
SOS had been inactivated in May 1945 and its responsibilities turned over to the
theater G-4, but the Transportation Service had retained its functions. In September 1945 General Rose left the theater and was succeeded by Col. A. C. Bigelow. On 8 October the Transportation Service was discontinued as a command and established as a special staff section, functioning primarily in an advisory capacity to G-3 and G-4 in theater headquarters on evacuation activities.20 Troop departures and the outloading of supplies and equipment were substantially completed by the end of April 1946, and in May the India–Burma Theater was inactivated.
Transportation in China Theater
The military situation in China was critical in the fall of 1944. The Japanese offensive, begun in the spring, threatened to engulf central and southwestern China. After taking Kweilin on 10 November, the Japanese seized Liuchow and Nanning. The only bright spot in the tactical picture was on the Salween front, where Chinese forces were clearing a path for the Burma Road engineers, who were pushing toward a junction with the Ledo Road.
Believing the enemy intended to take the vital Kunming air terminal, Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) Albert C. Wedemeyer, Stilwell’s successor in China, developed plans to deploy all available Sino-American forces for the defense of the area and most transport facilities were diverted toward that end. The threat to Kunming never materialized. After advancing within sixty miles of Kweiyang in early December, the Japanese offensive stalled.
Although the Japanese failed to take Kunming, they had wreaked enormous havoc. The East Line of Communications (ELOC), extending eastward from Kunming to the advance airfields of the Fourteenth Air Force, had been cut in half. With the exception of Chihchiang, the eastern airfields had been captured or destroyed, and the standard-gauge railway lines had been taken, leaving only two short meter-gauge lines in Chinese hands. On the operable highway portions of the ELOC, freezing weather, hordes of refugees, and the deterioration of motor vehicles had reduced the movement of supplies to a trickle.
Throughout Free China, transportation facilities were hopelessly inadequate. The Chinese vehicles, in early 1944 reported on the verge of collapse, were now a year older, and the 544 U.S. Army trucks flown in between April and the end of December 1944 provided little relief. Vehicles, drivers, and maintenance personnel and facilities were lacking, road conditions were bad, and the lack of centralized control made for inefficient utilization of the battered and overworked transport.
The situation was so critical that General Wedemeyer on 13 December 1944 sent an emergency request to Somervell for the earliest possible delivery of 5,000 lend-lease trucks, already on order, even if it meant an increase in the China Theater’s allotment of ships. He also asked for the expedited shipment of 2,000 additional 2½-ton 6x6 U.S. Army trucks. In summarizing the transportation situation, Wedemeyer reported that the Chinese had only about 2,000 trucks in good condition and that the capacity of Chinese transport was rapidly declining. Wedemeyer’s requests were approved in Washington, and
immediate action was taken to deliver the trucks. This was followed by the establishment of a program to bring 15,000 vehicles to China by the end of 1945 and an additional 5,000 trucks shortly thereafter.21
The establishment of the China Theater was followed by a general elaboration of American and Chinese transportation organizations. Advance Section One became SOS U.S. Forces China Theater, and its principal transportation activities shifted from support of the eastern airfields of the Fourteenth Air Force to the supply and movement of U.S.-sponsored Chinese divisions, which had been designated by China to receive supplementary American training and equipment. SOS was charged with the responsibility for insuring the uninterrupted flow of supplies, equipment, and personnel to the U.S. Forces and to U.S.-sponsored Chinese forces. This responsibility extended from the bases where supplies were picked up to the forward truckheads where they were turned over to the American liaison officers with the Chinese combat commands. Within SOS, a Transportation Section coordinated and guided transportation operations, while area commands (later base sections) assumed an increasing degree of control over transportation operations.22
The Chinese set up a parallel supply service organization at Kunming in February 1945. The Chinese supply service was responsible for the supply and transport of Chinese military forces and operated under American SOS guidance. Meanwhile, a War Transport Board (WTB) had been established at Chungking in January as an agency of the Chinese National Military Council. The WTB, a Chinese organization with American liaison representation, was to exercise centralized control over all Chinese transportation. Liaison with this agency was an important function of Col. Lacey
V. Murrow, who was appointed theater chief of transportation in the same month. Heading a small special staff section at theater headquarters at Chungking, Mur-row engaged in planning activities and worked closely with WTB and other agencies in integrating American and Chinese transportation activities. The WTB was slow in assuming all its assigned functions, but as finally organized it proved a reasonably effective control agency.23
The turning point in the critical transportation situation came with the opening of the Stilwell Road. The flow of vehicles and drivers from India and Burma gave new life to motor transport operations. At the same time, the limited rail facilities were improved through Amer--
can technical advice and some material assistance, and inland water transport, heretofore restricted in development by the shortage of supplies and the need for fast delivery, was more fully exploited.
The increased delivery of supplies to China and the beginning of an improved transportation system within China brightened the tactical situation. In February 1945 the China Theater drew up a plan for offensive operations aimed at the ultimate seizure of the ports of Canton and Hong Kong. The opportunity to set the plan in motion came earlier than anticipated. After resuming the offensive in March and April 1945, the Japanese, apparently alarmed by the threat to the China coast posed by the Iwo Jima and Okinawa invasions and the possibility of Russian intervention, began to withdraw from south and central China. The Chinese followed and reoccupied the evacuated territory, retaking Nanzning, Liuchow, and Kweilin. With the occupation of these cities, motor transport routes were lengthened, inland water routes were established in liberated areas, and the possibility of rehabilitating recaptured standard-gauge railroads was explored.
In June 1945 Wedemeyer notified the War Department that Fort Bayard, a port on the Liuchow Peninsula could be taken by 1 August. This operation would open a new line of supply to China and provide a steppingstone for the capture of Canton and Hong Kong. Five loaded Liberty ships were readied at Manila for shipment to Fort Bayard, a program of highway construction and improvement got under way in the Liuchow area, and arrangements were made to transfer port companies from Calcutta. During this period, Hump, pipeline, and vehicle deliveries to China were at a peak, and within China a mounting volume of supplies moved to forward areas from Kunming, Chanyi, and other points of delivery. Motor transport operations continued to expand as additional trucks and drivers were assigned; rail traffic, although still small in volume, increased; and inland water deliveries were at their highest.
The Fort Bayard project was not carried out because of the end of hostilities and the opening of Shanghai. After completing the immediate postwar task of supporting the air deployment of Chinese troops to east China and clearing the pipe, air, and road supply lines to China, American wartime operations ended. By the end of the year, U.S. Army troops had been completely evacuated from west China and continuing postwar activities were confined to the Shanghai area.
The Indian Ports
When U.S. Army transportation operations began in CBI early in 1942, the ports available for American use were limited in number. The presence of Japanese forces within striking distance of the east coast of India prevented use of east coast ports. Bombay, on the west coast, was the main British port of entry and was heavily congested. Cochin was available, but unsuitable rail connections made its use inadvisable.
Karachi
Karachi, on the northwest coast of India, offered the most satisfactory service at the time, and it became the first port of entry for American cargo and personnel. Like other Indian ports, Karachi was administered by a civilian port trust created by and operating under the Government
of India. There were 22 ship berths, with maximum drafts varying from 10 to 30 feet, and 12 fixed moorings with drafts up to 30 feet. Large vessels could be moored two miles below the end of the wharves in 60 feet of water. There were adequate water and bunkering facilities, a limited number of floating cranes and lighters, and a few tugs and launches; all wharves were equipped with 1½-ton electric shore cranes. The wharves were rail served and most cargo was unloaded from ship to railway cars. Since there were no shipside or transit sheds, cargo was at once transported to warehouses by rail, truck, or lighter.
Upon the arrival of the first shipment of American troops in March 1942, Wheeler set up a provisional port detachment. Classification, sorting, and movement to storage areas of 20,000 long tons of China lend-lease cargo diverted from Singapore and Rangoon became the first duty of this group. These supplies had been received by the Karachi Port Trust and dumped on the docks without any attempt to classify and store them.24
The provisional detachment functioned until May, when its duties were taken over by the newly arrived headquarters and two companies of the 393rd Port Battalion, consisting of white officers and Negro enlisted men. With the move of SOS headquarters to New Delhi, port operations came under the direction of Base Section One. Under the section commander, the commanding officer of the port battalion was appointed port quartermaster, and junior officers were assigned to supervise water and port activities and to arrange for air and rail transportation.
During 1942 practically all equipment and supplies for CBI entered through the port of Karachi. Cargo handling was under American direction. The port troops supervised native coolie labor provided by stevedoring contractors and served as drivers, checkers, guards, crane operators, dock foremen, and riggers. Although the battalion had no stevedoring equipment upon arrival in India, it was gradually acquired or constructed by port personnel. Improvisation and on-the-job training resulted in a steady improvement of port operations. During the year, Karachi discharged a total of 130,342 long tons of cargo, loaded 8,065 long tons, and arranged for the rail shipment of 54,140 long tons to other parts of the theater. In addition, approximately 13,800 troops were debarked and 4,908 were shipped by rail to other sections.
Although U.S. Army and CDS tonnage arriving in the theater mounted steadily during 1943, incoming traffic at Karachi did not increase. As soon as the tactical situation permitted, an east coast port closer to the forward areas was opened. Beginning in September 1942, supplies were transshipped from Karachi to Calcutta. The latter was opened to vessels arriving from the United States in March 1943 and soon surpassed Karachi in importance.
With the shift of emphasis from Karachi to Calcutta, the two port companies were transferred, one moving to Calcutta in February 1943 and the other in August. Continuing port activities at Karachi were handled by a small Army staff supervising native labor. The loss of the port
units did not impair operational efficiency. During 1943 Karachi three times stood first among overseas ports in monthly cargo discharge performance, and in December set a new port record for itself, unloading 5,645 long tons from the SS Mark Hopkins in three days and ten hours working time.
Despite the designation of Karachi as the main delivery port for assembled aircraft, it handled a dwindling traffic in 1944. After January 1944 Karachi was unimportant as a supply base, except for the units in Base Section One. The major activity was the discharge of a monthly average of two ZEC-2 vessels carrying assembled aircraft. The port’s outstanding performance during the year was the discharge of the Mark Twain. This fully loaded cargo ship carrying 5,597 long tons was completely unloaded 48.5 hours after docking.
With the progressive withdrawal of personnel from western India, the need for an Army port organization at Karachi gradually disappeared. On 15 May 1945 Base Section One was officially inactivated, and with the exception of a small detachment that supervised the unloading of small shipments arriving on tankers and some coastwise cargo, all troops were transferred to other installations in the India–Burma and China theaters.25
After the termination of hostilities, Karachi became an important port for the evacuation of personnel from the theater. The Karachi Port of Embarkation was activated in August 1945, and in the following month a series of trans-India rail movements began that brought troops from the Ledo and Chabua areas to Karachi. As aircraft were withdrawn from the Hump run, they supplemented and later supplanted the troop trains.
Troops arriving at Karachi were billeted at the Replacement Depot at North Malir, fourteen miles from the port. After processing and as ships became available, personnel were trucked to shipside and embarked. The first troop transport to arrive, the General McRae, berthed on 22 September and took on 3,008 passengers. Evacuation operations reached a peak in October, when 26,352 troops were loaded on eight transports. The Army port at Karachi was closed in January 1946, having embarked 80,185 personnel, and all port troops were either transferred to Calcutta or returned to the United States.26
Bombay
Despite its magnificent deepwater harbor and excellent port facilities, Bombay was overtaxed by British and Indian traffic and remained so into 1943. As a result it was never used to handle much American cargo. However, since neither Karachi nor Calcutta could accommodate large transports, Bombay became the major port of debarkation for American troops entering CBI. During 1943 a total of 118,983 Americans passed through the port, including troops debarked and transshipped to the Persian Gulf Service Command.
During this period American operations were conducted by a small staff from Base Section One. Much of the work consisted of making the necessary arrangements with the British, who directed the debarkation of troops and the discharge of
cargo, provided berthing and staging facilities, and handled the onward rail movement. From Bombay the troops traveled 1,300 miles by rail to Calcutta and more than 2,100 miles to east Bengal or Assam.27
On 31 December 1943 the Bombay Port of Debarkation was established as an exempt station directly under the commanding general of Transportation Service. A port commander and a military staff were assigned and civilians were hired to supplement them. Subsequent accretions brought the number of port personnel to approximately 500. The port’s principal mission was the debarkation of U.S. Army troops, from transports usually berthed at Ballard Pier. It also handled the embarkation of U.S. and Allied military and civilian personnel leaving on American vessels and the unloading and transshipment of a limited amount of coastwise cargo.28
Although the U.S. port organization supervised the debarkation of American troops, the British at first retained control of all port installations, staging areas, and rail movements. Every action had to be cleared with the British authorities, an arrangement the Americans found unsatisfactory. They complained that debarkations were delayed by the provision of insufficient rolling stock and poor timing of trains scheduled to move troops from ship-side, and that the staging facilities were not up to American standards.
Gradually, one function after another was transferred, and eventually the U.S. port commander assumed responsibility for most activities pertaining to American operations, including the actual debarkation and embarkation of personnel, the loading of special trains, and the discharge and loading of cargo and organizational impedimenta. Reliance on British staging facilities ended in July 1944 when an American staging area was opened at Lake Beale, 125 miles from Bombay at one of the main trans-India railway connections. Camp Beale handled debarking and embarking personnel until October, when a section of Camp Kalyan, a British staging area at Bombay, was released to the U.S. Army and placed under the port commander. It was used to stage military and civilian personnel departing from the India–Burma theater. Camp Beale was then assigned to SOS Replacement Service and was used exclusively as a staging area for troops arriving in the theater.
Until the late spring of 1944, most U.S. Army troops arrived on British transports after transshipment from WSA vessels in the Mediterranean. Thereafter, they were brought in by U.S. Navy transports of the P-2 type. The first of these, the General Butner, arrived in May, followed in July by the General Randall. On the basis of the experience gained in handling these two vessels, the port staff was reorganized and operating procedures were modified.
By the latter part of 1944 the Bombay port operation was proceeding satisfactorily. Although the problem of timing the arrival of troop trains at quayside persisted, there was a steady improvement. Debarkation procedures were established to insure a five-day turnaround for the ships, although the wait for convoy escorts
occasionally extended the time to seven days.
American operations were brought to a close when the British expressed their desire to secure the exclusive use of Bombay for anticipated post-V-E Day redeployment of their troops to India. After a successful experimental run of two smaller American transports to Calcutta in February 1945, it was decided to give up the west coast port. The last transport to arrive at Bombay, the Admiral Benson, berthed late in March, unloading 4,866 troops and taking on 1,363 passengers. All debarkation activities were then shifted to Calcutta, and on 1 June Bombay was officially closed as an American port.
Calcutta
Calcutta is located in Bengal, eighty miles up the Hooghly River. The stream followed a winding course and was relatively shallow, accommodating ships with a draft of 22 to 30 feet, depending on the season. The port had a total of 49 berths, most of which could accommodate oceangoing vessels, and 44 ships could be anchored in the stream. The more modern of these facilities, the King George and the Kiddepore Docks, were inside the tidal locks. Most wharves were equipped with transit sheds, and there was a fair amount of shore and floating equipment. The port was served by three broad-gauge rail lines, the Bengal and Assam Railway having tracks into the docks. The labor supply was ample.
Although Calcutta by virtue of its location and facilities was more desirable than the west coast ports, Japanese activity in the Bay of Bengal initially barred its use. Beginning in September 1942, however, supplies were transshipped by water from Karachi to Calcutta, and by the end of the year six small vessels had been discharged under the supervision of an Engineer unit that had been detailed to the task. Enemy action did not seriously hamper port operations, although an air raid in December 1942 caused a large-scale civilian evacuation and produced a temporary labor shortage. Later raids in January and December 1943 had little effect on port activities.29
Port operations began to expand when, upon the recommendation of the Anglo-American Shipping Mission, shipping was routed directly from the United States to Calcutta. About 8,000 long tons of U.S. Army and China-aid supplies arrived in March 1943, and incoming tonnage mounted steadily thereafter. Under the command of Base Section Two, the two port companies transferred from Karachi, the 540th and 541st, took over supervision of U.S. longshore and dock operations. U.S. Army port activities tended to be centered at the King George Docks, although some cargo was discharged at the Kiddepore Docks or, in the case of heavy items such as steel, at berths outside the tidal locks.
The port troops supervised coolie labor, checked and sorted cargo, prepared tallies, and loaded cargo into trucks, barges, and rail wagons for transshipment to the proper consignees. In an effort to unload maximum tonnages, they operated in twelve-hour shifts and often worked as long as eighteen hours at a stretch. The
port troops trained Indians in cargo checking and the operation of mechanical equipment. To counteract the acute officer shortage, noncommissioned officers were assigned to many responsible positions.30
These measures substantially increased cargo discharge, but not enough to keep up with incoming tonnage. There were insufficient port personnel and equipment, centralized direction of military and civilian activities was lacking, and ships arriving from Colombo, Ceylon, were bunched in convoys and were delayed from three to ten days awaiting berths. At the same time, the inability of the Assam LOC to lift the cargo landed caused an accumulation of freight at the docks, warehouses, and sheds. The developing congestion at Calcutta in the latter part of 1943 threatened to handicap current and projected operations, and in December Covell termed the port “our No. 1 problem.”31
The first solid relief came in late December 1943 and early January 1944 when two port battalions, the 497th and 408th, including headquarters and headquarters companies and a total of eight port companies, arrived at Calcutta. The organizations were accompanied by cargo-handling equipment and possessed a number of experienced officers and enlisted men. The two battalions began operations at the King George Docks, where they handled all U.S. Army transports. The 540th and 541st Port Companies were then moved to the Kiddepore Docks and the Calcutta Jetties, where they supervised the discharge of commercial vessels and animal ships.
As the new port troops tackled the job of clearing the congestion at Calcutta, steps were being taken to facilitate their task. Arrangements were made to discontinue convoys from Colombo temporarily in order to relieve pressure on Calcutta; Madras was opened as a subport to which overflow cargo could be diverted from Calcutta; British agreement was obtained to appoint a port controller for Calcutta; and, effective 1 March 1944, the King George Docks, with four general cargo berths, completely equipped sheds, shore cranes, and a fifth berth under construction, were leased for the exclusive use of the U.S. Army.32
The importation of port troops and equipment and other measures taken to relieve congestion had their desired effect. Tonnage discharged monthly at the port more than doubled in January 1944, and in February totaled 128,397 long tons, a record for the year. By the middle of March, the base section commander was able to report that the bottleneck at Calcutta had been broken. With the British port controller finally arrived in May, the port was operating smoothly. As a result of improved methods and the better spacing of ship arrivals at Calcutta, the maximum time lost by any vessel waiting for a berth between June and October was one day. During this period the port units, spurred on by friendly competition, steadily improved their operations, and unloading activities were further facilitated when American barge equipment and low-bed trailers and tractors were received.33 As will be seen, the Assam LOC’s increased ability to move supplies forward was also
an important factor in making port operations more fluid.
During 1944 Calcutta handled most of the U.S. Army and CDS cargo arriving in the theater. In that year the port discharged 1,092,625 long tons, while Karachi unloaded less than 100,000 long tons. As the theater’s major cargo port, Calcutta played an important role in making CBI the leader in port discharge performance. After February 1944 the theater, with few exceptions, stood first among the overseas commands in the rate of discharge. Calcutta, however, had a number of advantages. With the exception of a few air raids, all of them before January 1944, the port did not operate under combat conditions; a large supply of native labor was available; and the U.S. Army controlled a modern, well-equipped dock area. These factors, together with the performance at Karachi, which handled a relatively small amount of “easy” cargo, helped keep the theater in the number one spot.
Increased cargo arrivals, beginning in November 1944, resulted in further expansion of port activities.34 Discharge operations reached their peak in March 1945, when 173,441 long tons were discharged from 66 vessels. This increased traffic was handled without increases in men or machinery. Operating under the Water Division of Base Section Two, the port troops had developed standardized operational procedures and were now seasoned veterans. Discharge activities were conducted twenty-four hours a day, the port personnel supervising native labor in the hatches and on the docks. Arrangements had been made with contractors to supply the same coolies each day, thereby permitting them to develop skills on the job. The Army men checked cargo, super vised the loading of freight cars, and operated all floating cranes and other cargo-handling equipment. The system of competition between units was retained and intensified, and wherever possible cargo was unloaded directly from shipside into rail wagons, barges, and trucks for movement to depots or direct to forward destinations.
Monthly cargo arrivals fell off after March 1945, although they were still greater than during most of 1944. With the exception of a brief period of congestion beginning in May, when a large number of British and foreign flag vessels were brought into the port in preparation for the Rangoon operation, cargo was handled expeditiously and the average cargo vessel was discharged in three days. As the sole cargo port in the command after Karachi closed, Calcutta continued to function smoothly. Port troops and native labor, working at five berths at the King George Docks, discharged an average of 122,549 long tons a month from June through September 1945, and in July established a new theater record, discharging 3,034 measurement tons and releasing the Alden Besse in thirty hours.
The port also continued to load some coastwise cargo and handled a limited amount of export shipping to the United States, loading such items as repairable airplane engines and salvage. The one large loading operation before the end of hostilities was the transfer of personnel and equipment of the XX Bomber Command to the Pacific Ocean Areas. The
movement, effected between May and July 1945, involved the water shipment of 10,257 men and the loading of 10 cargo ships with 13,932 long tons of cargo, including 2,291 special and general type vehicles.
Meanwhile, Calcutta had taken over the theater’s debarkation and embarkation activities. After the successful experimental run of two C-4 transports into Calcutta in February 1945, the Bombay Port of Debarkation was closed and key personnel were transferred to Calcutta, where they organized an Embarkation and Debarkation (E&D) Section under the base transportation officer. Liaison was established with U.S. Navy and British port authorities, and plans were made for handling troop transports. The first two regularly scheduled C-4’s arrived at Calcutta on 27 April 1945 and anchored in the stream. Under the supervision of the E&D Section, 5,762 debarking troops were ferried to Princep Ghat, where they were loaded on special trains arranged for with British Movements. Embarking troops were then ferried to the ships and were all aboard on 6 May.
Procedures were improved as successive troopships arrived. However, selection of Shalimar Siding for embarkation proved unfortunate, since troops had to carry their duffle bags one quarter of a mile in the heat over railroad ties before reaching the ferry. After the first regular operation, Princep Ghat was used for both embarkation and debarkation. Another improvement was put in hand when experiments proved that the transports could come aside the jetties and deliver personnel directly to shore without the use of ferries. To deal with delays in obtaining trains, troops were moved by river steamer from Princep Ghat to Kanchrapara staging
area, the temporary destination of most troops. Later, movements to and from Kanchrapara were made by truck. In the closing months of the war, as backlogs of high-point, rotational, and other personnel awaiting departure by water began to develop, efforts were made to ship troops aboard cargo vessels as well as troop transports. From 20 May to 2 September 1945, a total of 17,666 troops embarked at Calcutta, while 16,028 debarked.
With the termination of hostilities, the flow of traffic into Calcutta was rapidly reversed. Eleven of twenty-nine ships en route to the India–Burma theater were returned to the United States and three were diverted to Shanghai.35 Cargo and troop arrivals at Calcutta declined sharply in September and were negligible thereafter. At the same time personnel being evacuated from China and all parts of India and Burma began moving into the Calcutta area, and programs were formulated to ship supplies accumulated or backhauled to the port.
The principal postwar cargo operations involved the shipment of POL and general cargo to the newly opened port of Shanghai, the dumping at sea of deteriorating ammunition and chemical warfare toxics, and the return to the United States of materials not otherwise disposed of in the theater. Vessels for these purposes were allocated by the War Department. Loadings were performed exclusively by the U.S. Army port organization until late 1945, when personnel losses caused the Americans to arrange for the assistance of commercial shipping agents. By the end of February 1946, as the shipping program neared completion, most of the facilities at the King George Docks were returned to
the Calcutta Port Trust. The last port company was inactivated on 19 April, and the port was then operated on a purely commercial basis. From the beginning of October 1945 through April 1946, a total of 320,437 long tons was shipped to the United States, Shanghai, or other overseas areas, and 73,547 long tons of ammunition and toxic gas were dumped. With the exception of minor tonnages loaded at Karachi for Shanghai in October 1945, all loadings were made out of Calcutta.36
In the meantime, Calcutta had joined Karachi in effecting the water evacuation of troops. The first ship under the postwar program, the General Black, arrived on 26 September 1945 and took on 3,005 passengers. Subsequent arrivals were either other C-4 “General” troopships or smaller War Shipping Administration “Marine” vessels, capable of carrying about 2,500 passengers. Transports were generally berthed at Princep Ghat or the Man-of-War Mooring. Embarkation activities at Calcutta reached a peak in November, when 21,990 embarked on eight transports. The closing of Karachi in January 1946 kept Calcutta busy for another month, but activities fell off as evacuation approached completion. By the end of April, 187,761 troops had departed the theater by water. Of these, 107,576 left from Calcutta. The final embarkation operation of the India–Burma Theater took place on 30 May, when 812 military and civilian passengers boarded the Marine Jumper.37
Madras and Colombo
Used at first as an emergency port to lighten vessels whose draft did not permit entrance into the Hooghly River, Madras was opened as a subport of Calcutta in February 1944 to handle overflow ship- ping. After discharging a total of 24,363 long tons in February and March, the port received only minor tonnages. With the clearing of congestion at Calcutta, the port’s activities were limited to the lightening of vessels and the discharge of small coastwise shipments for the supply of U.S. Army detachments and a small Army drum plant located in the vicinity. A small transportation staff was retained at Madras to expedite transfer of port operations in the event Calcutta should be rendered inaccessible.
Another minor American port operation was established following the transfer of Southeast Asia Command headquarters from New Delhi to Kandy, Ceylon. A Transportation Service officer was stationed at Colombo in April 1944 to act as port transportation officer and to maintain liaison with SEAC and the Eastern Fleet. Aside from his liaison functions, the officer’s principal activity involved supervision of the discharge of cargo for the supply of the small group of U.S. Army personnel serving with SEAC. By October 1945 cargo arrivals had ceased, and all that remained to be accomplished was the shipment of some surplus supplies to Calcutta.38
The Assam Line of Communications
The transportation system leading from Calcutta into Assam, called the Assam
LOC, was described by one Army observer as “the most fascinating and complex problem we have in the world.”39 (Map 9) It consisted of rail, water, rail/ water, water/rail, and to a limited extent rail/highway routes.
The Bengal and Assam Railway, a state-owned line controlled by a civilian railway board, was the main carrier on the LOC. Supplies were shipped from Calcutta over a broad-gauge line 200 and 275 miles respectively to Santahar and Parbatipur, the principal points for transfer from broad-gauge to meter-gauge railroads. At these stations freight was transferred to the meter-gauge line, which cut across the broad-gauge line from the west. The rail wagons were moved to the Brahmaputra River where they were ferried across, and then they proceeded to Tinsukia, whence they traveled over the short meter-gauge Dibru–Sadiya Railway to Ledo, 576 miles from Parbatipur.
The railroads were supplemented by two civilian steamship lines, which hauled supplies approximately 1,100 miles up the Brahmaputra from Calcutta to Dibrugarh in Assam. The river and rail systems were closely intertwined, and there were numerous junctions along the route where supplies might be shipped by rail to Goalundo, barged to Dhubri or Neamati, and thence hauled by rail to final destination.
There was no all-weather through highway from Calcutta to Assam. A motor road, however, did extend eastward from Siliguri, at the northern terminus of the Bengal and Assam Railway, through Bongaigaon to Jogighopa. From this point vehicles could be ferried across the Brahmaputra and then proceed over the Assam Trunk Road to Chabua and Ledo. Late in 1943, a limited convoy operation was being conducted by Intermediate Section Two from Bongaigaon to Chabua.
The LOC was ill-prepared to take on wartime traffic. Part of the broad-gauge rail line and most of the meter-gauge line were single tracked. The meter-gauge line in particular was a bottleneck: there were no bridges across the Brahmaputra; the steep gradient at the eastern end of the line made travel slow and hazardous; and monsoon rains annually disrupted service by washing out rail lines and damaging rail bridges across smaller rivers such as the Beki. To add to these difficulties, the Bengal and Assam Railway was called upon to handle increasing traffic with little additional equipment; lacking replacements and proper maintenance, rail equipment deteriorated. Like the railways, the inland waterway lines were subject to disruption during the monsoons, and, in addition, their operation was slow and restricted during low-water periods.40
At the outbreak of war, the Assam LOC carried only about 1,000 to 1,500 long tons daily. In an effort to increase its capacity to support developing military activities in northeastern India, military movement control was gradually introduced, although operation of the carriers remained in the civilian hands. In March 1943 the British established a Regional Priorities Committee to allot military and civilian traffic in the Assam area. By October the capmity for military traffic had been increased to 2,800 long tons a day, but this was inadequate to cope with the supplies poured into the LOC.
During this period, the British also formulated plans to develop the LOC
Map 9: Assam Line of Communications
through new construction. Projects undertaken in 1943 included construction of double-track, railway sidings, yards, and a railway bridge over the Brahmaputra. Progress was slow, however, and few of the jobs were completed during the year.41
The LOC’s inability to lift the military supplies laid down at Calcutta became increasingly evident in the latter half of 1943. The port was congested with accumulated cargo. Supplies forwarded to Assam required up to fifty-five days for delivery, and it was not uncommon for shipments to be held more than thirty days on river barges. As the year ended, the theater G-4 reported that congestion on the LOC had reached serious proportions.
The tie-up on the Assam LOC was a matter of vital interest to the U.S. Army, then engaged in expanding construction and airlift operations in Assam and about to launch a campaign in north Burma. The American participation in QUADRANT planning for the LOC and the arrangements for the use of American railway troops have already been discussed. In addition, Covell, Wilson, and other interested officers in early 1944 pressed the British to militarize transport on the LOC completely. After negotiations, a compromise in February 1944 resulted in a system of semimilitary control in which the Americans participated.42
Under this system, the British deputy director of movements, assisted by a U.S. Army representative and in consultation with the railway and river transportation carriers, periodically estimated the total capacity of the LOC. Tonnage was then allotted for British and American military needs, essential civil requirements, and railway construction and maintenance. A LOC panel sitting in Calcutta implemented the allotments and controlled day-by-day operation. The Calcutta panel was headed by the deputy director of movements and consisted of representatives of the British regional controller of priorities (Calcutta North), the commanding general of the U.S. Army SOS in the theater, the Bengal and Assam Railway, the two commercial steamship companies, U.S. Military Railway Service, and British Movements Control. Although there was American representation on the panel and, beginning in March 1944, the Americans operated a portion of the meter-gauge railway, over-all control of the LOC remained in the hands of the British. However, despite inevitable differences of opinion between British and American authorities, a remarkable cooperation was maintained.
The primary function of the Calcutta panel was to coordinate the transport facilities on the LOC effectively. In addition to implementing tonnage allotments, the panel regulated traffic, issuing orders regarding the routes to be followed, the terminals to be used, the means of transport to be employed, and other operational practices. The panel ordered diversions from congested stations and when necessary ordered the complete or partial suspension of movements at points of origin until congestion was eliminated. In exercising its control, the panel early adopted the policy of reducing the length of the rail haul and increasing the use of river craft. The more rapid train turnaround
that resulted, together with the maximum use of the river lines, produced an over-all increase in tonnage moved.43
The centralization of traffic control was accompanied by other improvements. The British built new river ghats (landing stages) at river-rail junctions, provided additional labor and supervisory personnel, and augmented cargo-handling equipment at important rail and river transshipment points. Although rail construction lagged, some progress was made in double-tracking and in constructing passing tracks. Another major development in 1944 was the construction of pipelines. In March the British completed the Chandranathpur–Manipur Road (Dimapur) sector of a four-inch pipeline that ultimately was extended from Chittagong, India, to Tamu, Burma, and in August the Americans completed construction of a six-inch line from Calcutta to Tinsukia, Assam. These new facilities eased the burden on the hard-pressed railway and greatly increased the capacity of the Assam LOC.
Playing a vital part in the LOC’s development was the transfer to U.S. Army control of the meter-gauge line from Katihar to Ledo, a portion of the LOC long considered a major obstacle to accelerated movement of supplies to Assam. American operations brought an immediate speedup of traffic and gave a pronounced impetus to the entire project.44
The various improvements brought an immediate and sustained increase in traffic. What had been the major transportation problem in March 1944 was being “licked” in May. On 15 July Wilson was able to inform Somervell that the QUADRANT target for LOC tonnage set for January 1946 already had been exceeded, exclusive of pipelines. Performance was not up to capacity only because sufficient supplies were unavailable for shipment. In the ensuing months American and British tonnage shipped by rail, river, and pipeline increased steadily.45
When the India–Burma Theater was created in October 1944, the Assam LOC was no longer a major problem in the movement of supplies to the forward areas. U.S. and British military shipments had increased from 112,500 long tons in March 1944 to 209,748 long tons in October. To be sure, there was some difficulty in handling heavy lifts at transshipment points and in meeting the ever-increasing demand for petroleum products from the east Bengal and Assam airfields, but in general shipments were being made promptly. There was confidence that the LOC would be able to handle expeditiously “anything now planned or expected.”46
Traffic mounted steadily into the spring of 1945. The QUADRANT target for capacity, including pipelines, was reached in January, although operation to capacity never proved necessary. In March a record 274,121 long tons of U.S. and British military supplies were shipped by river,
rail, and pipeline. Although total tonnage decreased slightly in April, the daily average tonnage dispatched over the LOC reached a peak of 8,975 long tons.
During this period control by the Calcutta panel was increasingly effective, the Military Railway Service continued to step up its operations, and there was continued expansion of physical facilities. British track construction work on the broad-gauge and meter-gauge lines was continued, rail yards were improved, and additional cargo-handling equipment was provided at transshipment points. The largest new addition to the physical plant of the Assam LOC came in March 1945 with the completion of the American six-inch pipeline from Chittagong to Tinsukia. The new pipeline augmented deliveries by the Calcutta–Tinsukia pipeline and the rail and river carriers. Together, they provided gasoline and other petroleum products needed for Hump deliveries, filled the U.S. pipelines extending from Tinsukia into Burma toward China, and supplied fuel for the operation of vehicles on the Stilwell Road.
Tonnage movement over the LOC fell off after April 1945, when the central Burma campaign came to an end. As Chinese, American, and British combat and supporting forces withdrew, the demand for supplies in the forward areas lessened. The decline in this traffic, however, was partially offset by the acceleration of deliveries to China. The demand for POL, needed for air, truck, and pipeline operations, was particularly heavy, and amounted to 135,796 long tons in August.
Traffic moving forward on the LOC dropped sharply with the termination of hostilities and soon dwindled to minor proportions. The backhaul of supplies to Calcutta was well within the capabilities of peacetime transportation agencies. The Calcutta panel was discontinued on 1 October, and by the middle of that month American railway troops had been removed from the MRS-operated line. Backhaul operations, involving the movement of 141,512 long tons of American materials from Assam and east Bengal, were completed in February 1946.47
The Military Railway Service in India–Burma
The use of American railway troops on the bottleneck meter-gauge rail portion of the Assam LOC, a proposal made by Somervell at the October 1943 intercommand meeting, was approved in principle by the Government of India. The final agreement, reached in February 1944, provided that effective 1 March the U.S. Army would operate 804 miles of meter-gauge railroad, consisting of the main Bengal and Assam Railway line from Katihar eastward to Tinsukia, branch lines from Dhubri and from Neamati and from Furkating to Jorhat, and the short Dibru–Sadiya meter-gauge line, which met the Bengal and Assam Railway at Tinsukia to complete the rail link to Ledo.
In general, the agreement provided for the substitution of military for civilian management and the augmentation of the civilian staff by military personnel. Commercial work was to be the sole responsibility of the Bengal and Assam Railway, which was also to provide all normal consumable stores. The general manager of the railway retained nominal control over
the American-operated line, but in practice did not interfere in methods of operation or assignment of staff. Movements remained under British Movements Control, and British construction proceeded as before.48
In December 1943, before the final agreement, the SOS had established a Military Railway Service headquarters at Gauhati under Col. John A. Appleton, former Chief of the Rail Division, Office Chief of Transportation. In January a railway grand division, five railway operating battalions, and a railway shop battalion arrived. The units moved to assigned positions along the line during the latter part of the month and prepared to begin operations.
Taking Over the Bengal and Assam
The MRS took over the railroad on 1 March without interference to traffic, superimposing some 4,200 troops on the existing civilian staff of 13,000. The 705th Railway Grand Division was stationed about midway on the line at Gauhati. The 758th Railway Shop Battalion moved into the railway shops at Saidpur, a few miles north of Parbatipur, and sent a detachment to Dibrugarh, near the eastern end of the line. The railway operating battalions each controlled a division of the line, the sectors varying between 111 and 175 miles in length. Three Bengal and Assam Railway officials were assigned to each headquarters to advise battalion commanders and handle the civilian staff.49
From the beginning, it was evident that planned expansion of physical facilities would not immediately expand the railroad’s capacity. The British had instituted a program to double-track the line, including the section between Lumding and Manipur Road, which because of its steep gradient was a limiting factor in movement over the entire Assam LOC. Plans were also made to break the other major bottleneck by replacing the Brahmaputra River Pandu–Amingaon Ferry with a bridge. However, no major rail construction was expected to be completed before August 1944, and plans for the rail bridge, scheduled for completion in two years, were dropped because of the time involved.
If an immediate increase in traffic was to be achieved, MRS would have to rely on operational improvements. This Appleton did. Abandoning the previous practice of maintaining a fixed debit balance of wagons owed to neighboring lines, Appleton forced the loading of the maximum number of wagons at Parbatipur and moved them to points of unloading. This measure inevitably resulted in a large increase in the number of wagons on loan from other lines and brought British criticism to the effect that the absorption of borrowed wagons into the MRS railway was impeding essential supply movements programed by the Government of India. When the cycle of return movements of empties caught up with dispatches, however, the drain on adjoining lines diminished, and the problem ceased to be serious. Another innovation was the operation of longer trains in order to
compensate for the motive power shortage and to increase tonnage movement without increasing traffic density. Also, movements across the Brahmaputra River from Amingaon to Pandu were stepped up by using two locomotives simultaneously on each of the two ferries to move freight wagons, and by increasing crews at the river ghats.50
As a result of these improvements, overall eastbound traffic in March increased 31 percent over February, and deliveries to the forward areas at Manipur Road, Chabua, and Ledo were increased 44.6 percent, only 5.4 percent below Somervell’s prediction. One surprising result of this rapid development was that the meter-gauge railway was actually hauling more tonnage from Parbatipur than the 233-mile broad-gauge system running north from Calcutta could provide. Remedial measures by the British eventually brought this problem under control.
In early April 1944 the Japanese, advancing on the Imphal front, threatened to cut off the MRS line, but the threat never materialized. Despite the tension, heavy troop movements, and the unloading at Pandu of a considerable amount of supplies destined for Manipur Road, the increased traffic was maintained.51
At this juncture Appleton was transferred to another theater and was succeeded in May by Colonel Yount, formerly the head of MRS in the Persian Gulf Command and a member of the early SOS organization in CBI.52 Under Yount MRS operations continued to improve. Procedures were standardized, continued attention was given to the elimination of bottlenecks, communication facilities were augmented, additional rail equipment was provided, repair and maintenance of equipment were stepped up, and track construction and maintenance were pushed forward.
A Period of Development
Since language difficulties and the lack of sufficient American operators and train personnel made basic changes in the manner of train operation undesirable, MRS decided to rely on intensive supervision and to fit American methods in only where they were consistent with the Indian book of rules. In line with this policy, the Americans retained the Indian “block” system, whereby a token was given the engineer of a train entering the block, the engineer releasing a token to a station operator after passing through the block. The operator then inserted the token into an electrically operated machine, simultaneously releasing a token at the other end of the block for the use of the following train. Within this block system, American measures taken to improve operations included the use of long trains of approximately 100 wagons, assignment of U.S. Army stationmasters at many dispatching points, and the instruction of Indian nationals in American methods of train handling.
Progress was also made in breaking the main bottlenecks along the line. The
construction of additional ghats, changes in track arrangements, and the institution of a third ferry line in September greatly increased traffic on the Pandu–Amingaon Ferry. The number of wagons moved eastward over the ferry rose from 10,125 in March 1944 to 19,076 in October. Although the basic solution of the problem of the Lumding–Manipur Road section depended on completion of the double track, the tonnage moved forward over that portion of the line increased from 75,110 long tons in February 1944 to 138,393 long tons in October.
As these critical points were brought under control Parbatipur, the main terminal for transshipment from broad-gauge to meter-gauge cars, became the limiting factor in the movement of traffic. MRS was responsible for transshipment at this point, but the British controlled facilities and performed actual operations. Despite increases in loadings from broad-gauge to meter-gauge cars, the British were unable to keep pace with forward movement. In October MRS took over all transshipment activities and facilities at Parbatipur, a U.S. Army terminal superintendent was appointed, and the 28th Traffic Regulating Group assumed direction of operations.53
Contributing heavily to the increase of traffic during 1944 was the provision of locomotives and rolling stock. Before MRS took over, War Department steam locomotives, principally Mikados, and eight-wheel meter-gauge freight cars had been delivered to India under the lend-lease program. On 1 March 1944 there were 396 locomotives on the MRS line, of which 167 were American-built. Rail equipment continued to arrive, and by the end of the year there were 238 American locomotives and approximately 6,500 War Department freight cars on the line. Because the latter had double the capacity of the standard four-wheel Bengal and Assam freight wagon, it was estimated that they were equal to the road’s own meter-gauge equipment.54
Railway construction further developed the line’s capacity. By the end of 1944, approximately 20 percent of the railroad had been double-tracked, passing tracks were being extended, and the main railway yards enlarged. The work was performed by the British, often with the assistance of American bulldozers and earth-moving equipment.
All of these improvements would have been futile if monsoon rains interrupted the line as they had done regularly in years past. In the path of the railroad were some thirty rivers and tributaries that represented a constant threat to bridges and track during the monsoon rains. With the onset of the monsoon season in May 1944, the MRS took flood-control measures. Heavy stone rip-rap provided reinforcement at piers and adjacent embankments. The important bridge across the Beki River was saved when the 725th Railway Operating Battalion cut a diversion channel from the Beki to the neighboring Bulkadhoba River to carry away flood waters. Throughout the year the MRS gave constant attention to the line’s maintenance, raising and lining new double track, ballasting the main track,
correcting kinky rails, and erecting new water installations.
During the year there was also a marked improvement in the repair and maintenance of rail equipment through the efforts of the 758th Railway Shop Battalion. When the MRS took over the line, the Bengal and Assam motive power and rolling stock had deteriorated. The British were responsible for the procurement of railway supplies, but spare parts and repair materials were unavailable. The MRS therefore requisitioned critically short materials from the United States through Transportation Service. As American spare parts and other supplies arrived during 1944 it was no longer necessary to cannibalize equipment or hold engines and cars out of service. Between March 1944 and the end of the year the shop battalion repaired over 47,000 cars, converted 132 boxcars into low-side gondolas and 46 boxcars into refrigerator cars, and changed others into snack cars for troop trains.
One problem that plagued the MRS was the absence of brake equipment on newly arrived American freight cars coming from British erection plants in other parts of India. The operation of these cars caused collisions and other accidents. The situation was relieved in October 1944, when the Railway Board assured General Yount that all cars assembled would be equipped with brakes and that it would furnish MRS six hundred sets a month for installation on cars already in service on the MRS track.55
From the time the MRS took over the meter-gauge railroad, records for tonnage hauled continued to be broken. From February 1944 to May the over-all traffic increased 50 percent, and by October the increase was 125 percent. In the same period the number of troops carried by rail more than doubled, reaching a peak of 92,000 U.S. and Allied military personnel moving eastward through Pandu and 135,900 returning westward.56 The MRS, aided by additional motive power and rolling stock and by British and Indian cooperation in making available supplies, construction, and labor, had improved the meter-gauge railroad to a point where it could handle expeditiously the forward movement of supplies and troops.
In December 1944, the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, wrote of the MRS:
In the first few months of my appointment to this Command the inadequacy of the Assam L of C (Line of Communication) to meet in full the requirements of the forces in the forward area and of the air lift over the Hump into China was a major obstacle hindering the full deployment of our strength against the enemy. ...
Already the capacity of the Assam L of C as a whole has been developed to a stage where planned development is being reached months ahead of schedule. Through the hard work and resourcefulness of your railway battalions and those associated with them, the volume of traffic handled has mounted rapidly until the L of C is functioning with a substantial margin over essential requirements which will enable unforeseen contingencies to be met.57
Traffic over the MRS line continued to increase into the first months of 1945. With operations generally standardized and “choke” points under control, major emphasis was placed on increased efficiency and further improvement of the physical plant. At Parbatipur, the arrival of modern cargo-handling equipment enabled MRS to increase the number of meter-gauge wagons transshipped from 13,470 in October 1944 to 26,796 in May 1945. Other transshipment points, such as Dhubri, Bongaigaon, and Neamati, showed comparable increases in efficiency. At Amingaon–Pandu, a fourth ferry was placed in operation, and loaded freight cars ferried eastward across the Brahmaputra rose to a peak of 23,209 in March 1945.58
The double tracking of the 48-mile-line bottleneck between Lumding and Manipur Road was completed by the British in January 1945, and movements over that section reached a peak of 215,170 long tons in March. With the exception of certain critical sections, much of the remainder of the double-tracking program was abandoned at Yount’s request. Instead, passing tracks were lengthened so that two or more long trains could travel over the same track in either direction. The construction of 47 miles of passing tracks eliminated 360 miles of double tracking without loss to operating efficiency. Other improvements jointly planned by the British and Americans included the enlargement of railroad yards and the erection of new shop and water facilities.59
Operations were further improved by the arrival of additional American equipment. By the end of May 1945 a total of 263 of the 444 locomotives on the line were American, and 10,113 War Department freight cars were in operation. This American rolling stock either arrived with braking equipment or had it installed in the MRS shops. In addition to other repair and maintenance work, the shop battalions vacuum-equipped 2,452 American cars and applied 30,000 hoses between November 1944 and July 1945. By the latter month 96 percent of the American rolling stock was vacuum equipped. Throughout this period, the MRS Engineering Section concentrated on the maintenance of track and bridges and their protection against the next monsoon season. Protective measures instituted in 1944 were intensified and others added so that the line operated through its second rainy season without interruption.
The Close of MRS Operations
Activity along the MRS line reached a climax in March 1945 when 34,088 cars carrying supplies to the forward areas were shipped east of Lumding or transshipped at Neamati or Dhubri. This traffic represented a more than 160 percent increase over the tonnage delivered in February 1944. After April 1945 the MRS handled a steadily declining volume of traffic. Like the rest of the Assam LOC, the MRS railway was affected by the end of fighting in central Burma and did not receive sufficient supplies for delivery to China to offset the lessened demand. After August 1945 rail movements, with the obvious exception of the westward movement of evacuated troops, fell off sharply.
The demands were then well within the capabilities of the Bengal and Assam Railway, and the need for military operation was eliminated.
Evacuation of the railway troops was begun late in August 1945. The departure of the units was staggered so that as one moved out, its territory could be taken over by one of the remaining units, which then supervised activities until Bengal and Assam officials and employees could take over complete control. Transfer of the line to the Bengal and Assam Railway was completed on 15 October, and the last MRS units then moved to Calcutta for return to the United States.60
Rail Operations in Burma
During its existence, the MRS also provided personnel for an unusual rail operation in support of Allied forces driving down the rail corridor from Myitkyina. In the spring of 1944 Allied troops, spearheaded by Merrill’s Marauders, had penetrated north Burma and were moving toward Myitkyina, a vital air base and rail terminal. Anticipating the capture of the upper portion of the meter-gauge Burma Railway, theater headquarters set up a provisional detachment of 2 officers and 158 enlisted men drawn from MRS units.
The detachment was flown into Myitkyina in August and began operation of the captured portion of the railway as the 61st Transportation Corps Composite Company. At this time Myitkyina had just been taken and fighting had moved to Mogaung, with isolated enemy raiding parties operating between the two points. Allied aerial bombardment and Japanese demolition had inflicted heavy damage. Motive power was inoperable; only 376 of 571 rail wagons were serviceable or in need of minor repair; and yards, track, bridges, and signal communications had been torn up or destroyed.
The company set up its shops, mounted armed jeeps on flanged wheels, placing them at each end of trains for motive power and protection, and began moving supplies and troops to the fighting front, principally in support of the British 36th Division. Engineer troops had already begun to repair track and bridges, making possible jeep-train operation over the thirty-eight miles from Myitkyina to Mogaung. Despite enemy raiding activities, the line carried 15,616 troops and 1,883 long tons of freight in August 1944.
During the ensuing months, the rail operation was pushed forward to support the continued Allied advance. Rail equipment, bridges, and track were repaired, signal communications restored, and jeeps gradually replaced by locomotives. By the end of January 1945, the rail line extended 128 miles to Mawlu. Meanwhile, the Tenth Air Force had established a base at Sahmaw, between Myitkyina and Mawlu, and the railroad supplied this installation as well as combat forces farther forward. In February the line was in operation as far as Katha and Indaw. By this time there were in service seven wood-burning and oil-burning locomotives, and two diesels that had been shipped to India from the South Pacific.
After moving 40,271 passengers and 73,312 long tons of freight in January 1945, the traffic declined. As the Japanese were cleared from the railway corridor, the 61st Transportation Corps Company’s mission was reduced to serving the Tenth Air Force and hauling building materials and local produce. In March the unit
returned to Assam, where it acted as a general utility company for the 721st Railway Operating Battalion until late August 1945, when it became the first unit from the theater to return to the United States for demobilization.61
American Barge Lines in India
American barge operations had their origin in General Wheeler’s 8 May 1943 plan for the restoration of communications in Burma, which included a proposal to establish an American barge line on the Irrawaddy River between Rangoon and Bhamo. On the basis of this plan, ASF in June began procurement of equipment and prepared to secure the necessary personnel. By the QUADRANT Conference, however, the emphasis had shifted to the development of the Assam LOC, and it was decided to use a portion of the equipment and troops originally intended for the Irrawaddy to set up a long-haul barge operation on the Brahmaputra River. Modified requirements set forth in the fall of 1943 included 400 barges of 4-foot and 5½-foot draft, 180 Chrysler sea mules of 5-foot, 6-inch draft, 114 wooden towboats of 3½-foot draft, 26 wooden patrol boats, an inland waterways headquarters, 4 harbor craft companies, a port battalion, and an Engineer battalion.
The project soon ran into difficulties. The Chief of Transportation found in September that equipment then on order apparently did not meet the CBI requirements, the units having too much draft and insufficient power for the planned operation. Tests in the United States confirmed this as did later tests on the Brahmaputra. Nevertheless, in January 1944 the theater requested that the troops and craft en route or earmarked for shipment to CBI be forwarded, since they could be used for harbor duty and short river hauls. Subsequent improvements on the Assam LOC made further planning for extensive long-haul operations on the Brahmaputra unnecessary.62
Meanwhile, the American Barge Lines (ABL), with headquarters near Calcutta, had been established in November 1943 under the supervision of the Chief of Transportation, SOS, CBI. A director and five other officers were appointed, and an Engineer unit was assigned. Equipment began arriving early in 1944, and assembly was started by the Engineer troops, assisted by native labor. The 326th and 327th Transportation Corps Harbor Craft companies arrived in April, and as equipment became available they began the operation and maintenance of craft in the Calcutta area, where initial ABL activities were centered. The harbor craft troops operated motor towing launches and hauled lighters in the port and on the Hooghly River. In mid-1944 they were hauling approximately 5,000 long tons a month from shipside to depots and airfields upriver.
A second important activity was launched in August in support of Tezgaon and Kurmitola, two important U.S. airfields near Dacca in east Bengal. With
equipment not particularly suited to the operation, the ABL hauled gasoline and oil from Goalundo to Dacca, a round trip of approximately 200 miles. A dry cargo route for hauling Air Forces general supplies from Khulna to Dacca also was opened, but it did not handle a significant amount of traffic until November.63
Control of the ABL was transferred from Transportation Service to Base Section Two in October 1944. By this time the bulk of the equipment had been received and assembled, including 48 Chrysler sea mules, 38 wooden 46-foot towboats, 17 patrol boats, 87 wooden 60-foot barges, 86 steel 104-foot barges, 12 derrick barges, and 4 floating cranes.
Operations around the port of Calcutta continued to expand and proceeded smoothly. Aside from harbor lighterage and short hauls, involving the movement of about 20,000 long tons a month in the spring of 1945, the ABL provided general passenger service. But the river hauls from Goalundo and Khulna presented difficulties. As earlier tests had indicated, sea mules, the principal towing craft, were unsuitable for the long continuous hauling of heavy barges against strong currents. Despite constant maintenance, the equipment deteriorated rapidly, and in October 1944 it was estimated that even with limited use the equipment would not be suitable for efficient operation much beyond the spring of 1945.64 In late 1944, however, developments placed new and greatly increased demands on the barge line.
As part of a general plan for augmenting deliveries to China over the Hump, the Air Transport Command was preparing to accelerate shipments from the east Bengal airfields. To lighten the load on rail and pipeline facilities, Transportation Service prepared a project for ABL to de liver 4,000,000 Imperial gallons of aviation fuel monthly from Goalundo to Dacca, an increase of almost 3,400,000 Imperial gallons over previous deliveries.65 This project called for more suitable towboats, but even before these were available ABL began to carry a greatly increased volume of traffic on the Goalundo—Dacca run. During April 1945 POL deliveries exceeded 3,400,000 Imperial gallons, while dry cargo carried from Khulna to Dacca reached 10,172 long tons. In July, after six 86-foot, 600-horsepower diesel tugs had been placed in operation, the ABL for the first time exceeded its target, delivering 4,400,000 Imperial gallons to Dacca. Floods and washouts caused a suspension of operations in August, and in September the ABL river routes were officially closed, most equipment was placed in storage at Khulna, and the remaining craft and personnel were used at Calcutta to assist in the evacuation of troops and supplies.66
Motor Transport on the Stilwell (Ledo–Burma) Road
The task of restoring land communications with China was put in hand in December 1942. As an expedient pending the recapture of the line of
communications extending northward from Rangoon, it had been decided to follow a route from Ledo through the Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys in north Burma to a junction with the Burma Road. After the U.S. Army had assumed responsibility for construction of the road, American troops took over and continued work begun by the British.
The mountainous jungle of the Patkai Hills between Ledo and Shingbwiyang, at the foot of the Hukawng Valley, presented a formidable barrier. After trucks had carried supplies as far as the road would permit, native porters took over, narrow trails and mud precluding the use of elephants and pack animals. Some additional supplies were made available by airdrop, beginning in the spring of 1943. Construction proceeded slowly, and virtually halted with the onset of the monsoon season in May. In October Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Lewis A. Pick was appointed Commanding Officer, Base Section Three (later Advance Section Three), and took command of all SOS forces on the Ledo Road. With the end of the monsoon season, rapid progress was made under his leadership. By the close of the year bulldozers had reached Shingbwiyang, at the 103-mile mark, and in late December the first convoy arrived there from Ledo. As Allied combat forces struck deeper into north Burma, the road was pushed forward behind them.67
Plans for Ledo–Burma Road Operations
Planning for the time when the road would be completed was set in motion by Wheeler’s memorandum of 8 May 1943, which set down requirements for a motor transport operation that would deliver 89,250 short tons a month to Kunming and 16,500 short tons for use in Burma.
Assuming that the Allies would recapture north Burma down to Bhamo by February 1944, and that the rest of Burma would be retaken by the onset of the monsoon season in May 1944, the plan called for the development of lines of communications, first from India through north Burma, and then northward from Rangoon. It envisaged water shipments to Calcutta and Rangoon, the latter to receive the bulk of the tonnage for China; onward movement from Calcutta by rail and river to Ledo and from Rangoon by barge on the Irrawaddy River to Bhamo; and final deliveries to Kunming by truck and pipeline from Bhamo and Ledo. Anticipating the complete re-establishment of communications with China by the end of the 1944 monsoon season, the plan called for 18,000 drivers, 12,000 3-4-ton truck-tractors, and 10,000 5-ton semitrailers, all to arrive between January and June 1944.
The Wheeler plan was studied by ASF headquarters, and in July 1943 preliminary arrangements were made for vehicle procurement. By this time, however, the TRIDENT decisions had made it apparent that the projected operation to retake all Burma would be delayed and that combat operations in the dry season of 1943–44 would be limited to a north Burma campaign. These decisions lessened the importance of planning for the use of Rangoon LOC and concentrated attention on the Ledo–Burma Road as the means of restoring land communications with China. Since it was clear that the strategic goals upon which Wheeler’s proposals were based would be delayed in attainment, there remained time for further consideration of vehicle requirements.
After correspondence and conferences, the combination of the 5-ton 4x2 truck-tractor and the 5-ton semitrailer was selected as most desirable for the planned operation, and in September ASF undertook procurement of 8,000 of these units.68
At QUADRANT, meanwhile, new plans were made based on the monthly input of 96,000 short tons at Ledo, of which 65,000 tons would be delivered to Kunming. The Office of the Chief of Transportation in Washington was asked to study personnel and equipment requirements, and in February 1944 presented a report based on a block system of operation requiring 8,270 truck-trailers and 92,800 motor transport, road maintenance, pipeline, and other service troops. QUADRANT targets were accepted, but with qualifications. Construction progress on the road indicated that initial operations, set for October 1944, would be postponed. More important still, if tonnage targets were to be reached, the road would have to be constructed to certain minimum standards, including bitumen surfacing and completion to two-way width. Otherwise, the report pointed out, it would be next to impossible to use the proposed truck-trailer operation during the monsoon and a change to an all-wheel-drive, single-unit vehicle would be necessary.69
In India, the newly established Transportation Service prepared its first project for a self-sustaining motor transport service in January 1944, setting up lower targets than those proposed at QUADRANT and based on a lower type road than the Transportation Corps study being prepared in Washington. Assuming the completion of a two-way, all-weather gravel road from Ledo to Kunming, the plan proposed the ultimate monthly input of 57,000 short tons, of which 45,000 tons would be delivered to Kunming, and recommended 36,727 troops for driver, maintenance, supply, and other service units.
Not content with purely planning activities relating to Ledo–Burma Road operations, General Wilson believed that Transportation Service should take over motor transport activities as construction progressed rather than wait upon completion of the road. In April 1944 he reported that approximately 300 cargo vehicles were being dispatched daily over the Ledo Road, adding that these activities were directed by the section commander through a “makeshift” organization. Upon Wilson’s recommendation, the War Department was requested to forward a Motor Transport Service headquarters. When this unit proved unavailable, permission was requested to activate one in the theater, but this was not granted by the War Department. Motor transport on the Ledo Road continued under Advance Section Three, and Transportation Service activities remained in the planning sphere.70
Until the fall of 1944, plans for Ledo–Burma Road operations were based on two-way traffic from Ledo to Kunming
and the use of truck-trailers, although the possibility that the vehicles might not be able to operate over the mountainous Ledo—Shingbwiyang section gave rise to proposals for the partial use of standard 2½-ton 6x6 trucks. In the meantime, however, Army planners in Washington, in an effort to make additional personnel and other resources available to the Pacific, cut back construction plans for the Ledo Road. In August 1944 the War Department notified CBI that a two-track, gravel all-weather road would be completed from Ledo to Myitkyina and that the existing trail from Myitkyina would be improved with the minimum construction required to complete projected pipelines into China and to deliver vehicles and artillery. It now appeared that there would be two-way traffic to Myitkyina, but only one-way traffic to Kunming.71 Since motor transport operations would be more limited than originally anticipated, the scheduled production of truck-tractors and semitrailers was cut back to 5,050 and 4,210, respectively.72
When the theater was divided in October 1944, the India–Burma Theater assumed responsibility for road construction to the Burma–China border and for pipeline, signal, and motor operations from Ledo to Kunming. China Theater’s responsibility was limited to road construction and maintenance from Wanting to Kunming and designation of the cargo to be delivered to China. The Ledo Road was then operational as far as Warazup, 190 miles beyond Ledo, and was being pushed rapidly toward Myitkyina.
At this time, theater planners contemplated only one-way road delivery of trucks, artillery, and other military supplies to China. Based on construction outlined in the War Department directive of August 1944, Engineer estimates placed maximum traffic at 45,000 tons a month from Ledo to Myitkyina and 15,000 tons a month from Ledo to Kunming. Planning was further dampened by the fact that the forty to fifty Quartermaster truck companies expected to be available when the road to China opened would all be required for construction and combat operations in Burma, so that no transport would be available for China deliveries. In an effort to provide drivers, a training school was opened in November at the Ramgarh Training Center in India, with an initial class of 500 students. Other Chinese were flown in from China and a number of Chinese tank battalions at Ramgarh were converted to truck units.73
During this period vehicle requirements were again modified. Tests in December 1944 confirmed the unsuitability of truck-trailers for operation over the mountainous Ledo—Shingbwiyang run, and the India–Burma Theater requested the War Department to cease shipment of the un-floated balance of these vehicles and substitute 2½-ton 6x6 trucks. After reconsideration by the theater, truck-tractor requirements for CBI were reduced in January 1945 from 5,050 to 3,590, including
some 1,430 already delivered or en route. At the same time, because 2½-ton trucks were committed to theaters of higher priority, arrangements were made to ship all-wheel-drive truck-tractors, which could be used with the originally planned semitrailers on the Ledo—Shingbwiyang section.74
Meanwhile, as the date for opening the road drew near in late 1944, the entire scope of motor transport operations came up for review in Washington and the theaters. For a brief time, large-scale road deliveries to China appeared likely, but comparison of requirements for road, pipeline, and Hump deliveries made obvious the advantage of air transport augmentation over motor transport. Final decision, reached after the road was opened, provided that road operations would be limited to one-way deliveries of vehicles; that the six-inch pipeline originally planned for extension into China would be suspended at Myitkyina, leaving only a four-inch line to be completed to Kunming; and that Hump deliveries would be greatly increased.75
The Opening of the Stilwell Road
By 12 January 1945 the Ledo Road had been brought to a junction with the old Burma Road and the Japanese were being cleared from the route. Restoration of land communications with China was at hand. Accompanied by press and public relations personnel, engineers, military police, and Chinese drivers and convoy guards, American drivers under Col. Dewitt T. Mullett, convoy commander, pushed off for China with the first convoy. After being delayed by fighting en route, the vehicles rolled triumphantly into Kunming on 4 February. Three days earlier, the dispatch of regular convoys had begun.76
The opening of the Ledo–Burma Road, soon to be redesignated the Stilwell Road, forged the last link in the chain of land communications between Calcutta and Kunming. To feed this supply line, vehicles were moved by rail from Calcutta to Siliguri, Bongaigaon, or direct to Ledo. Under the direction of Intermediate Section Two, vehicles were convoyed from Siliguri or Bongaigaon to Chabua for delivery to Ledo and onward shipment to China. Thus, the highway LOC actually extended 1,759 miles from Siliguri to Kunming.
The Stilwell Road itself was 1,079 miles long. From Ledo to Myitkyina the road was of two-way, all-weather, gravel construction, the first 103 miles traversing the Patkai Hills before extending across the flat jungle country of the Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys to Myitkyina. From Myitkyina to Bhamo, a one-lane route continued to join the Burma Road at Mong Yu, 470 miles from Ledo. From Mong Yu to Kunming, the road was two-lane, all-weather, and hard surfaced over
most of the distance, but rough with long grades.77
The Organization of Stilwell Road Operations
Anxious to begin operations as soon as possible, SOS headquarters on 31 January 1945 ordered Advance Section Three to start the one-way movement of vehicles to China immediately. The section was ill-prepared, having scheduled operations to begin on 1 March, and the effort to implement the order was made in an atmosphere of stress and confusion. No organization had yet been set up for assembling, dispatching, controlling, and documenting convoys, and the only vehicles immediately obtainable in the Ledo area were CDS trucks, many of which had long lain in open storage and were in poor repair. A temporary organization was hurriedly formed and Ordnance personnel worked through the night reconditioning vehicles. Drivers were provided by the Chinese Army in India, and personnel from a Quartermaster truck company were diverted from Burma operations to accompany them as far as Myitkyina. On the following morning, 50 vehicles and 100 drivers made the start.78
At first, Transportation Service played a direct role in the management of through motor transport operations to China. Early in 1945, however, a Motor Transport Service was activated, and in February a headquarters and headquarters company was established at Ledo under Advance Section Three. As the MTS, under Col. Charles C. Davis, began functioning, Transportation Service’s activities relating to the road were reduced to record keeping, coordination of movement over the entire LOC from Calcutta to Kunming, and technical and operational guidance. In effect, Transportation Service retained staff responsibility for the LOC to China, but transportation on the Stilwell Road became the responsibility of the MTS, which continued to operate under Advance Section Three.79
MTS operations included vehicle and cargo deliveries to China, hauls into Burma in support of combat, construction, and supply forces, and intrabase traffic. Convoys to China involved the one-way delivery of vehicles and a small amount of cargo by a mixed group of Chinese and American drivers and units. Burma hauls involved two-way traffic to points within Burma maintained largely by American Quartermaster truck companies. Base operations included depot and railhead hauling and other local transportation activities. On 15 July 1945 responsibility for base transportation was transferred back to Advance Section and thereafter the MTS was concerned exclusively with convoys to China and the Burma haul.
The Burma Haul
Burma convoy operations had been established long before the Stilwell Road was opened in China. Since late 1943 Quartermaster truck companies had been convoying supplies and personnel from
Table 3: Vehicle and cargo deliveries to China and Burma by months: 1945
| Month | China | Burma | |||||
| Convoys | Vehicles | Trailers | Gross Weight* | Vehicle and Trailer Weight* | Cargo Weight* | Cargo Weight* | |
| Total | 433 | 25,783 | 6,539 | 146,948 | 108,886 | 38,062 | 161,986 |
| February | 22 | 1,333 | 609 | 5,231 | 4,120 | 1,111 | 27,087 |
| March | 22 | 1,152 | 745 | 6,788 | 5,279 | 1,509 | 34,579 |
| April | 38 | 2,342 | 1,185 | 15,447 | 11,249 | 4,198 | 31,797 |
| May | 78 | 4,682 | 1,103 | 28,080 | 19,645 | 8,435 | 28,357 |
| June | 82 | 4,901 | 964 | 27,962 | 20,977 | 6,985 | 14,923 |
| July | 75 | 4,745 | 828 | 23,370 | 17,470 | 5,900 | 16,085 |
| August | 51 | 2,652 | 647 | 15,866 | 11,582 | 4,284 | 5,046 |
| September | 53 | 3,060 | 408 | 18,599 | 14,291 | 4,308 | 4,112 |
| October | 12 | 916 | 50 | 5,605 | 4,273 | 1,332 | |
* Short tons.
Source: Hist of IBT, 1945–46, Vol. I, Ch. 3, p. 147.
Ledo to Shingbwiyang and beyond as road construction moved forward. In dry weather and through the 1944 monsoon, the drivers carried everything from rations and PX supplies to ammunition, artillery, and pipe in support of combat, construction, and base activities. Although the men and animals in combat were dependent on airdrop, the forward air supply bases at Shingbwiyang and Warazup were themselves supplied by road. Throughout the year, the Quartermaster truck drivers moved supplies from Ledo to Burma bases, negotiating steep grades and hairpin turns and traveling through dust and mud. In the rainy season, it was not unusual to see bulldozers dragging vehicles over flooded-out muddy sections of the road.
As the monsoon neared its end in October 1944, all available drivers and vehicles in Advance Section Three were assigned to Burma convoy operations, and in the latter part of the month about 550 short tons a day were being carried. By January 1945 forty-six Quartermaster truck companies were engaged in the Burma haul, carrying an increasing volume of supplies. At this time thirteen other companies were assigned to intrabase and depot operations, and eighteen additional units were en route to the theater.80
When MTS was activated, that organization, as an agency of the Commanding General, Advance Section Three, directed and supervised movements from Ledo to destinations in Burma. At first Burma hauls were directed by the MTS Operations Division along with other activities, but by 4 April the MTS was sufficiently organized to set up a separate Burma Traffic Branch.
In early 1945 all cargo deliveries to Burma destinations were being made by 2½-ton 6x6 trucks, which returned to Ledo. These trucks were retained on the Ledo—Shingbwiyang section, but beginning in February 5-ton 4x2 truck-tractors and semitrailers were substituted over the rest of the Burma run. A block system was inaugurated, and by mid-April truck-trailer operation was in full swing. In May there were thirty-eight Quartermaster truck companies assigned to the Burma haul, about equally divided between 2½-ton truck and semitrailer operations. A transfer shed had been built at Shingbwiyang, and Burma control stations were established at Shingbwiyang, Warazup, Myitkyina, and Bhamo, with housing, messing, maintenance, and service facilities.
Convoys of 2½-ton 6x6 trucks moved supplies to Shingbwiyang under the block system. Cargo destined for onward shipment was unloaded at the transfer shed, loaded aboard semitrailers, and then hauled to Warazup by truck-tractors. At Warazup the truck-tractors dropped the semitrailers destined for forward movement and picked up empty trailers or trailers with backhaul shipments and returned to Shingbwiyang. Other truck-tractors operating out of Warazup picked up the loaded trailers and moved them to Myitkyina, where a similar exchange was effected. With the exception of a few special shipments, Bhamo was the southern terminal of the Burma haul. There, final deliveries were made and all equipment returned to Myitkyina.
For a time, American trucking units employed on the block system were supplemented by convoys driven by Chinese military units. The Chinese never proved satisfactory, largely because American liaison officers assigned to the units had no command functions. Problems of this nature ceased abruptly with the movement of Chinese troops out of Burma.
Even as truck-trailers were placed in full operation, Burma hauls were beginning to fall off. After a peak of 34,579 tons was delivered to Burma in March 1945, the end of combat operations brought a decline in traffic. Burma deliveries declined markedly after May, making possible the diversion of an increasing number of Quartermaster truck units to China convoy operations, and in August only 5,046 tons were hauled.
In the course of operations, the Burma Traffic Branch set up an integrated system of loading, dispatching, and controlling convoys. Convoy discipline, preventive maintenance, and accurate documentation were stressed, and, to deal with the chronic problem of pilferage, a cargo-sealing program was instituted. In an effort to eliminate the transfer of cargo at Shingbwiyang, all-wheel-drive truck-tractors were assigned to the Ledo—Shingbwiyang run in June, but their use was soon abandoned when it was found that they could not operate over this section during the monsoon season.
China Convoy Operations
The first month of China convoy operations was one of constant crisis, with a lack of drivers the most serious problem. After the dispatch of the first regular convoy on 1 February 1945, efforts were made to use Chinese drivers with American officers in charge, but the experiment proved a dismal failure. The training at Ramgarh was inadequate, and on 24 February General Pick reported that he had 1,400 Chinese graduate drivers at
Ledo, none of whom was prepared for convoy duty. Despite additional training in Advance Section Three, the trainees never proved entirely satisfactory and, as will be seen, use of them was discontinued in June 1945.
In order to keep vehicles moving to China, several converted Chinese tank battalions, which were en route to China and possessed experienced drivers, were drawn upon, and 150 of these troops were returned by air for an additional haul after delivering vehicles. Other drivers were secured from the 330th Engineer Regiment—volunteers who chose this extraordinary diversion before returning to the United States—and from Chinese graduates completing advanced training at Ledo. In addition, American units moving to China were assigned vehicles consigned to China as well as their own organizational equipment.81 By using these expedients, 22 convoys, consisting of 1,333 vehicles and 609 trailers and carrying 1,111 short tons of cargo were delivered to Kunming in February.
In the months that followed, the MTS used volunteers from all over the India–Burma Theater, Chinese and American casuals and units moving to China, some Chinese trainees, and such Quartermaster truck drivers as could be spared from Burma operations. Volunteers and other MTS drivers were returned by air over the Hump. In this manner, MTS was able to increase deliveries to 2,342 vehicles, 1,185 trailers, and 4,198 short tons of cargo in April, but a firm solution to the driver problem had yet to be found.
Relief of the driver shortage came in May and June with the end of combat operations in central Burma and the assignment of Indian civilian driver units, obtained through contractors, to base operations in Intermediate Section Two and the Ledo area. Both these developments permitted the release of Quartermaster truck companies for China convoy operations and in June enabled the MTS completely to discontinue the use t. of Chinese drivers. On 17 July 1945 a total of 26 Quartermaster truck companies was being used for deliveries to China, and the only other vehicles consigned to China that were being delivered were those added to the organizational vehicles of U.S. Army units moving to China on permanent change of station.82
While coping with the driver problem, the MTS took steps to place operations on a sound basis. A China Traffic Branch was set up with full responsibility for the makeup, supply, maintenance, and control of all convoys from the pick-up point near Ledo to final delivery in Kunming. Coordination with Intermediate Section Two was effected, and commitments were obtained for the delivery of vehicles loaded with cargo for consignment to China. Assembly areas and dispatch points were selected, and procedures were adopted for documenting vehicles and cargo and for the necessary border clearance. By 24 March 1945 China convoy operations were sufficiently developed to permit the publication of a detailed standing operating procedure covering the movement from Ledo to Kunming.
A pressing problem when MTS took
over operations was the lack of terminals and traffic control stations. In March terminals were set up at Makum Junction, mile 2.8, where vehicles and cargo were delivered by Intermediate Section; at Lekha Pani, mile 4, the point of dispatch; and at Kunming, mile 1,079, where first and second echelon maintenance was performed and final delivery made to China Theater. Meanwhile, control station sites in China had been selected and construction begun. Ultimately, nine such stations were established along the route to provide maintenance, messing, and communications facilities and overnight quarters. The stations were manned by detachments drawn from MTS headquarters and operating units. Rounding out the China convoy installations was the Border Guard Station, located first at Wanting and later at Mong Yu, where American MPs checked convoys to see that only authorized personnel passed through.
Other problems continued to crop up in the course of MTS operations. The India–Burma Theater complained that road facilities provided by China Theater were inadequate, while China Theater pointed out that India–Burma Theater terminal personnel and facilities at Kunming were insufficient to insure the transfer of vehicles in good operating condition. By the middle of May, the provision of additional facilities and personnel had corrected both deficiencies. Poor convoy discipline, particularly of units moving to China, and drivers’ laxity in performing first and second echelon maintenance also were problems. The first was dealt with by vigorous MP control and the other by assignment of tools and native labor at control stations to assist convoy personnel in maintaining vehicles. The problem of in complete and faulty documentation was remedied in June with the assignment of documentation officers to each convoy.
By May 1945 China convoy operations had been placed in high gear; MTS drivers and units on change of station, moving in 78 convoys, delivered 4,682 trucks, 1,103 trailers, and 8,435 short tons of cargo. In this and subsequent months, vehicle deliveries exceeded theater targets. With the exclusive use of American drivers in June, the average time consumed on the trip from Ledo to Kunming, which had originally taken about 18 days, was reduced to 12 to 14 days. In August 1945 the MTS experienced its most difficult operating month as damage caused by heavy monsoon rains closed the road to all China-bound traffic for 17 days and caused a drastic reduction in deliveries.83
The Close of Stilwell Road Operations
The end of hostilities was followed by the termination of all motor transport operations on the Stilwell Road. In September 1945 only 4,112 short tons were delivered to bases in Burma, where lines of supply had begun to draw back toward Ledo as construction halted and outlying installations were closed. Meanwhile, on 27 August the theater had set up as a final road mission the delivery to Kunming of 4,000 trucks and 8,000 net tons of cargo, vehicles along the route that had been repaired, and some organic vehicles. The job got under way in September. On the 23rd of the month the theater ordered the immediate end of vehicle dispatches, with the exception of a few special movements.
Final deliveries were completed during the first eight days of October, and on 1 November the Stilwell Road was officially closed. Six days later the MTS was inactivated.84
From 1 February through 8 October 1945, a total of 25,783 vehicles and 6,539 trailers was delivered to China by MTS drivers and by American and Chinese units moving on permanent change of station. The 2½-ton 6x6 cargo trucks, of which 12,386 were delivered, led the list, although jeeps, weapons carriers, Foreign Economic Administration 3-ton T-234 trucks, and other miscellaneous types constituted more than one half the total. Trailer deliveries included 4,130 1-ton trailers and 1,413 ¼-ton trailers. Aside from 8,055 trucks and 2,794 trailers brought in as organizational equipment, the vehicles were delivered to the Commanding General, SOS, China Theater, and were employed under his control to improve the military transportation system in China.85
The vehicles and trailers carried to China a total of 38,062 short tons of cargo, mainly artillery, ammunition, and heavy equipment for U.S.-sponsored Chinese divisions. If the weight of the vehicles and trailers is included, the total tonnage delivered is raised to 146,948 short tons. In making these deliveries, 31,736,078 vehicle-miles were traveled at the cost of .22 tons of fuel for each ton of cargo, including the weight of the vehicles.
Stilwell Road deliveries were overshadowed by the Hump airlift, and after the pipeline to Kunming was placed in full operation its deliveries exceeded the net cargo carried over the road. The following table indicates tonnages delivered to China by the three carriers from February through September 1945:86
| Month | Hump | Road Gross* | Road Net (Cargo) | Pipeline |
| Total | 426,336 | 141,343 | 36,730 | 46,074 |
| February | 42,469 | 5,231 | 1,111 | |
| March | 48,944 | 6,788 | 1,509 | |
| April | 46,478 | 15,447 | 4,198 | 439 |
| May | 51,462 | 28,080 | 8,435 | 5,530 |
| June | 58,219 | 27,962 | 6,985 | 5,187 |
| July | 73,682 | 23,370 | 5,900 | 11,601 |
| August | 63,162 | 15,866 | 4,284 | 10,899 |
| September | 41,920 | 18,599 | 4,308 | 12,418 |
* Includes weight of vehicles.
In evaluating the performance of the Stilwell Road, it should be remembered that the failure to measure up to goals for deliveries to China set up in 1943 had its roots in strategic decisions that cut back the standards of road construction and reduced the highway’s mission to one-way deliveries of vehicles and a relatively small amount of artillery and other military supplies. In effect, this ruled out the large-scale, two-way, truck-trailer operation originally planned. Truck-tractor and semitrailer requirements were progressively curtailed, and those that finally reached the theater were used entirely within Burma. Driver units were never provided to the theater for China deliveries, compelling the use of Chinese drivers and American volunteers as expedients until Quartermaster truck units could be released from the Burma haul. In the meantime there had been a rapid development of the Hump operation, and
by the time the road opened it was possible to rely on air transport as the principal means of delivering supplies to China.
Considering the limitations imposed on the mission of the road, the lack of personnel, and the handicaps of road and climatic conditions, the record of motor transport on the Stilwell Road is impressive. The vehicles delivered over the road greatly relieved the critical transportation situation in China. Moreover, cargo delivered to bases in Burma helped make possible the successful prosecution of the north and central Burma campaigns and road and pipeline construction. Within the confines of its mission and the resources available, the Stilwell Road made a valuable contribution to the war in southeast Asia and materially improved the intra-China transportation system.
U.S. Army Transportation in China
Delivery of materials from Calcutta to Assam and from there over the Hump to airfields in Yunnan was a job half done. From Kunming, supplies had to be hauled forward by rail, road, and water over the Kunming East Line of Communications, a complex and difficult route. (Map 10) Supplies were carried from Kunming to Kutsing by meter-gauge railroad. From Kutsing, the Southwest Highway Transport Administration (SWHTA), a quasi-governmental agency, or other carriers trucked cargo eastward to Kweiyang, and thence north to Chungking or south to Tushan. A standard-gauge railroad delivered supplies from Tushan to Liuchow and/or Kweilin, and from those bases materials were moved forward by rail, truck, river craft, animal, or coolie.
Before 1944 the U.S. Army relied almost completely on Chinese agencies for transportation within China. When the first SOS organization was established at Kunming in July 1942, few men and virtually no equipment were available for American transportation operations. The closing of the Burma Road and the small Hump capacity made difficult the importation of transport equipment, and most early SOS activities were devoted to receiving air freight and expediting the forward movement of supplies.
SOS in China at first had no transportation organization, although Mr. Lemuel K. Taylor, a civilian, rendered valuable service as consultant on transportation matters. As SOS activities extended eastward, officers were stationed at important bases and transshipment points to keep supplies moving. When SOS opened a branch office at Heng-yang in May 1943, a few vehicles purchased locally and operated by SOS personnel joined private trucks hired by SOS to carry bombs and ammunition to newly constructed Fourteenth Air Force bases. In September a Transportation Control office set up at Kukong hired Chinese carriers to haul supplies from the railhead to airfields farther forward. A transportation officer for SOS was appointed in December, but his job consisted mainly in arranging for rail movement of Army freight out of Kunming. In February 1944 one Transportation Corps officer was included among the nine officers assigned to transportation duties east of Kunming.
The only transportation operation directly controlled by SOS was air-freight reception and discharge, begun in July 1942 when the first air-freight depot was established at Kunming. Other depots were subsequently activated at Yangkai, Yun-nany-i, Chanyi, and Chungking. Their function was to unload and ware-
Map 10: Kunming—East Loc
house cargo from India for transshipment in China and to warehouse and load cargo for shipment to India. These activities were handled by SOS personnel with the assistance of Chinese coolies until October 1943, when the Air Transport Command took control of all air-freight depots.87
Motor Transport
The ELOC assumed importance in U.S. Army planning in the latter part of 1943. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, head of the Fourteenth Air Force, had begun to expand his operations and by the end of October had five fighter and two medium bomber squadrons in east China, all dependent on the tortuous ELOC for logistical support. Although what went into the ELOC and what came out was unknown, it was estimated that 1,500 short tons a month were carried over this route during 1943, obviously far below Chennault’s requirements. As a result, U.S. Air Forces units east of Kunming were being compelled to rely heavily on the extremely limited air transport facilities for supply deliveries, and Chennault had to use his force in accordance with the supplies available rather than in terms of their best tactical use.
The transportation situation in China had long been a difficult one. Prewar vehicles had been operated over primitive roads with no replacements and only a
small dribble of spare parts. By the end of 1943 truck fleets were being rapidly reduced to junk, bringing motor transport on the ELOC to the verge of complete collapse. The main bottleneck on the ELOC was the 400-mile highway linking the railheads at Kutsing and Tushan. This road, running through the mountainous terrain of Kweichow Province had been built by hand and was rugged, poorly maintained, and full of hairpin turns and steep grades. It contributed still further to the deterioration of vehicles brought on by obsolescence and poor vehicle maintenance.
Toward the end of the year, Chennault exerted strong pressure to bring about improvements on the ELOC to support expanded air operations in east China. His attempts to focus the attention of theater and SOS headquarters on the problem of the ELOC, particularly on the Kutsing–Tushan highway, were effective. Early in 1944 General Wilson assigned Colonel Sheahan to China where, as Wilson’s deputy and Transportation Officer, Advance Section One, Sheahan assumed direction of U.S. Army transportation operations within the section and beyond to the forward delivery points.88
Sheahan’s reconnaissance of the ELOC revealed disheartening conditions. The Southwest Highway Transport Administration, the principal carrier, owned 1,196 vehicles, but in January only 183 were operable. During that month 2,959 other trucks, governmental, quasi-governmental, and commercial, were operated at one time or another by SWHTA. Most trucks were using substituted fuels—alcohol and charcoal, plus some diesel and Tung oil. Preventive maintenance was practically nonexistent and overhaul work was primitive and poorly executed. Most shops were out in the open and much of the work was done on the ground. Worker morale was low and SWHTA officials were discouraged, having operated this transport agency since 1940 under adverse conditions.89
In order to provide more adequate support for the advanced airfields of the Fourteenth Air Force, Sheahan in February 1944 proposed the development of a movement rate of 8,000 short tons of military cargo per month from Kutsing to Tushan, the goal to be reached through coordination with Chinese carriers, rehabilitation of 1,500 Chinese trucks, and the establishment of supplementary American motor transport operations. Required to effect the plan was the air shipment from India of 700 1½-ton to 2½-ton trucks, 2,000 tons of spare parts, three Quartermaster truck companies, and a heavy automotive maintenance company.
Transportation Service developed Sheahan’s proposals into Project TIGAR 26-A, and when the plan was approved in June implementation had already begun. An immediate increase in tonnage deliveries to Tushan was achieved by exerting pressure on SWHTA to speed up operation. As a result of negotiations with Chinese officials, appropriations were made for construction, repair, and improvement of highways, bridges, and roadside facilities, and rail lines were extended from Kutsing eastward to Chanyi and from Tushan
north to Tuyun, shortening the highway mileage by about 10 percent. Largely through such efforts, shipments eastward from Chanyi increased from 1,931 short tons in February to 3,068 short tons in May, before a single new U.S. Army truck was in operation.90
While Sheahan tackled the problem of motor transport on the ELOC, he also began building a transportation organization. Until the end of February, when one Transportation Corps officer arrived, he was without trained personnel. In April he had sufficient staff to assign one officer each to way stations at Chanyi, An-nan, Kewiyang, and Tushan to safeguard, expedite, and keep record of U.S. Army cargo. By the end of August Sheahan had nine officers at his Kunming headquarters, a Motor Transport Division director at Kweiyang, and eighteen other transportation officers at key points. The staff, at best, constituted a skeleton organization and never numbered more than sixty-five.
After delays in securing air priorities, the various elements of TIGAR 26-A began to jell. By the end of May the 857th Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company had set up shop at Chanyi and started maintenance and repair work on the vehicles that had begun to arrive. The 3843rd Quartermaster Truck Company arrived at Chanyi on 1 June and three days later, with ninety-three trucks available, began to run convoys to the Tuyun railhead. Despite poor road conditions and the absence of maintenance and drivers’ facilities, the first round trip was made in seven days, in contrast with the two to twelve weeks previously required by Chinese trucks. After the first convoy, a regular schedule of hauls was set up with overnight stops at An-nan, Kweiyang, and Tuyun. By the end of the month, U.S. Army vehicles were carrying 17 percent of the total tonnage on this part of the route.91
Efforts to improve the operation of Chinese trucks and the institution of American motor transport operations brought a substantial increase in ELOC traffic. During June 3,379 short tons were dispatched eastward from Chanyi, mainly aviation fuel and lubricants, bombs, and ammunition for the Fourteenth Air Force. This, however, was less than one half the needs of Chennault, who, along with the Chinese armies, was faced with the task of containing a major Japanese offensive.
Among factors hampering expansion of ELOC operations was the critical shortage of alcohol, the basic motor fuel. Also, vehicles and spare parts scheduled for July air delivery were delayed. In June the lion’s share of the Hump tonnage was allocated to the Fourteenth Air Force, but ironically, the shipment of high-priority aviation gasoline, bombs, and ammunition took air space from the trucks and spare parts necessary for the movement of these supplies to the eastern fields. The limited Hump capacity not only delayed delivery of additional vehicles, but also handicapped existing operations, particularly in the field of maintenance, where a spare-parts shortage kept a high percentage of Chinese and U.S. Army vehicles deadlined.
Despite such obstacles, the ELOC’s output increased during the summer of 1944, and in August the arrival of two Quartermaster truck companies and additional trucks provided considerable impetus to supply movements. Operations reached their peak in September, when 6,112 short tons were dispatched over the LOC from Chanyi. The August and September tonnage for the first time approximated the support which Chennault considered necessary. But the improvement came too late, for by then the Japanese had destroyed most of the east China air bases and were threatening those in central and south China.92
In April 1944 the Japanese had driven south of the Yellow River, occupying the Pinghan Railway Zone and an important segment of the Lunghai Railway Zone. In their continuing offensive, they took Hengyang in August and then moved on Kweilin. By the end of October, Kweilin was evacuated and about to fall, and it appeared that Liuchow and Nan-ning would follow. As the enemy disrupted service to the forward bases, alternate routes were set up but none survived except that from Kweiyang to Chihchiang, which, alone among the eastern airfields, withstood the Japanese. American transportation personnel were active in the evacuation of refugees and troops from the eastern bases and aided in the rescue or demolition of critical equipment.
Disruption of traffic on the ELOC became increasingly severe during the fall of 1944. In August, highway transport forward of Kweiyang and Chihchiang was at a standstill except between Liuchow and Nan-ning. The Chinese Army had commandeered all Chinese-owned transportation east of Liuchow and the absence of maintenance and drivers’ facilities pre vented the use of American vehicles in that area. Roads were clogged with refugees and truck service on the Chanyi—Tushan highway was overtaxed by Chinese troop movements. In these circumstances shipments eastward from Chanyi dropped to 2,772 short tons in October and, with the onset of bitter winter weather, fell to 1,760 short tons in November. During the first twenty days of December, transport was almost completely immobilized, only 198 short tons moving eastward from Chanyi. By the end of 1944 the ELOC extended only as far as Tushan and Chih-chiang, just half its length, before the Japanese offensive began.
As a result of the offensive, the ELOC had been radically shortened to the east, but at the same time the tactical situation necessitated expansion of supply operations to the north. Beginning in October, two of the three American truck companies were diverted from the ELOC to support the main B-29 bases in the Cheng-tu area and other northern airfields. Operations were over unsurveyed routes with no communications and maintenance facilities, and were limited by severe winter weather.93
In the meantime, Sheahan’s organization had ceased to exist as an operating service. On 1 September 1944 it became a staff section of Advance Section One, which soon was designated SOS, China Theater. The Transportation Section continued to guide transportation activities, but operational control was placed in the hands of the commanding general of SOS. The last vestige of the Transportation Section’s operational control over TIGAR 26-A personnel was removed in December when the 857th Company was placed under the Ordnance Section.94
The disruption of the ELOC and the destruction of the eastern airfields should not detract from credit due Sheahan and his organization, for with a limited amount of trucks, personnel, and maintenance and repair equipment they had done a remarkable job under difficult conditions. Under their direction Chinese carriers, supplemented by American truck units, had increased shipment eastward from Kutsing or Chanyi from 1,931 short tons in February 1944 to 6,112 tons in September. This tonnage did not include fuel hauls from Nekiang and Chungking to Kweiyang, evacuation of personnel and supplies from the eastern bases, or the westward movement of thousands of Chinese troops over the ELOC for training in India. Sheahan was highly commended by the Air Service Command, and Chennault later characterized his work as “superb.”95
The critical tactical situation in the latter part of 1944 was marked by radical readjustment in the mission of motor transport. Chinese carriers were pulled off LOC hauling for the Fourteenth Air Force and used in evacuation activities and the movement of troops into defensive positions. The three American truck units, reinforced with Chinese civilian drivers, were also affected. Operating from Kweiyang, the 3731st Quartermaster Truck Company assisted in evacuating Liuchow and Nan-ning and hauled supplies from Kweiyang to the besieged air base at Chihchiang. The other two units, after being diverted to the support of the northern airfields, were returned to the ELOC for the movement and supply of Chinese troops. Such vehicles as could be spared from these activities were used to haul Air Forces supplies, but the Fourteenth Air Force was compelled to move most of its supplies by air from Kunming and Chanyi to its remaining fields. Operating in freezing weather, Chinese vehicles were deteriorating rapidly and American personnel and equipment were being worn out.
The transportation picture remained bleak in early 1945. Chinese civilian carriers, then being brought under the War Transport Board, were failing to meet their commitments by 50 to 75 percent, and American truck operations showed no marked improvement. Such operations as were carried on centered about the movement of Chinese troops and supplies to defensive areas and the hauling of some Fourteenth Air Force supplies over the Chanyi–Kweiyang–Chihchiang route.96
The arrival in February of the first vehicles delivered over the Stilwell Road
from India–Burma marked the beginning of an improved transportation situation in China, although most of them were used to fill shortages in organizational equipment of units in the theater. The first large addition to ELOC operations came with the arrival of the Lux Convoy in March, This convoy, consisting of the 517th Quartermaster Group (Mobile) headquarters, two Quartermaster truck battalions with a total of seven truck companies, an Ordnance medium automotive maintenance company, and a medical company, brought in over 600 2½-ton trucks and 83 truck-trailers.
The Lux Convoy had its origin in Project TIGAR 26-B, a plan for the overland delivery of vehicles to China. Conceiving of TIGAR 26-A as a stopgap operation, Transportation Service had hoped to place support of the Fourteenth Air Force on a sound basis by delivering a sufficient number of heavy vehicles to permit the movement of 10,000 short tons a month over the ELOC. To this end, in February 1944, it investigated the possibility of using the trans-Turkestan route, extending 5,534 miles by rail and highway from Khorramshahr, Iran, to Chungking, China, via Soviet Turkestan. The Soviet Union was at first unwilling to permit American vehicles to travel through its territory, and consequently TIGAR 26-B, submitted to theater by Transportation Service in June, was held in abeyance. The project was revived in September when the Soviet Union finally agreed to the delivery of 500 trucks through its territory. A convoy was organized in the Persian Gulf Command, given the code name Lux, and readied for movement, starting 1 December. Shortly before the convoy was scheduled to leave, news of disturbances in Sinkiang Province caused it to be delayed.97 Finally, it was shipped by water to India for movement over the Stilwell Road, arriving in Kunming early in March 1945.
Later in the month, the 517th Quartermaster group, reinforced by the three Quartermaster truck companies already on duty, began operations out of Chanyi. In order to make the maximum use of vehicles, a block system was inaugurated over the 327-mile route from Chanyi to Kweiyang. Relay and terminal stations were established about one day’s travel apart at Chanyi, Panhsien, An-nan, An-shun, and Kweiyang, and supervisory and maintenance personnel were assigned. Drivers traveling in convoy delivered loaded vehicles to the next station, where new drivers took over for delivery over the following block. This was continued until the final cargo destination was reached. The vehicles then returned by the same system.98
The 517th Quartermaster Group also operated a route to carry fuel and food from Chungking and Nekiang to Kwei-yang and hauled supplies forward from Kweiyang to Chihchiang and Nantan. These routes were not operated on the block system, convoys carrying supplies to
their destination and then returning. For purposes of control, two divisions were set up. The Western Division under the 198th Quartermaster Battalion supervised movement of all freight over the LOC east of Chanyi, but not including Kweiyang. The Eastern Division under the 93rd Quartermaster Battalion handled movement over the routes east, north, and south of Kweiyang.
The introduction of these new trucks and personnel produced immediate results. In March 1945 U.S. Army trucks hauled 12,506 metric tons in local, intra-base, and LOC movements—almost double the February figure. The 517th was heavily reinforced and by the end of June had 436 American and 2,367 Chinese drivers operating 1,318 trucks.99
Motor transport operations were given an additional boost in May, when two Chinese tank battalions that had been converted into truck units in India were placed in operation on the ELOC. By July 1945 five such units, now designated motor transport battalions, and two Chinese truck regiments were operating under American supervision. In general, they were used on branch routes running west, north, east, and south from the main Chanyi–Kweiyang LOC. The Chinese units were under the command of the Chinese supply services, but their operations were controlled by the American SOS. They did not use the block system but made regular convoy runs on the routes assigned.
The establishment of American and American-supervised operations profoundly affected the nature of motor transport in China. Until early 1945 motor transport was performed largely by Chinese civilian carriers, supplemented by a few American truck companies. Now the picture was being reversed as a system of American military truck operation evolved, with civilian carriers under the War Transport Board relegated to an increasingly minor role. With the exception of organizational vehicles, trucks delivered over the Stilwell Road were consigned to the commanding general of SOS and operated by American truck companies augmented by civilian drivers or Chinese military truck units under American control. Only a small number of nonstandard vehicles was assigned to WTB carriers. Thus, American and Chinese military-operated trucks steadily increased their tonnage movement, while the WTB carriers had difficulty in maintaining their movement rate of early 1945. As time went on, WTB vehicles tended to be limited to hauls from east to west on the main LOC and to routes to the north. In May 1945 American-controlled vehicles were hauling more than five times ate tonnage of WTB carriers that early in the year had been carrying about 80 percent of the supplies over the LOC.100
As the Japanese began withdrawing from south and central China, the LOC was lengthened to the south and east. From May through July, motor transport had as its primary mission the movement of Chinese troops and supplies to areas of combat in southwest Kwangsi and western Hunan Provinces and to support actions resulting in the liberation of Nan-ning and Liuchow and the opening of a drive from Chihchiang toward Heng-yang. Some supplies were also carried to
Fourteenth Air Force fields, principally Chihchiang.
During this period the 517th Quartermaster Group handled increasing traffic between Chanyi and Kweiyang, continued operations on the Kweiyang–Chungking highway, and set up a route from Chanyi to the newly constructed Luhsien air base. At the same time, as new territories were occupied, Chinese military truck units were shifted from old to new routes and additional units were assigned. In June and July, Chinese units were moved to Kweiyang to haul supplies to Chihchiang and forward from there to advance combat forces. Others were assigned to haul southward from Pai-se to Nanning and from Kweiyang to Liuchow. Peak traffic was attained in June 1945, when U.S.-controlled carriers moved 58,156 metric tons and accomplished a total of 11,663,710 ton-kilometers. This included local and intrabase hauls as well as LOC shipments.
As the end of hostilities approached in August, 546 American, 2,511 Chinese civilian, and 7,010 Chinese military drivers were operating under American control. This included the 517th Quartermaster Group, the 43rd Quartermaster Battalion, which was engaged in local hauling in the Kunming area, six Chinese motor transport battalions, and five Chinese truck regiments.101 Operation over the main LOC between Chanyi and Kweiyang had been firmly established on a block system, and plans were being made to extend the system to all motor routes.
In the last months of wartime operations, SOS base sections took over complete control of motor transport, leaving SOS headquarters with purely planning and coordinating functions. The LOC from Chanyi to Chihchiang, Liuchow, Kweilin, and points east became the responsibility of Base Section Three headquarters at Kweiyang, and projected southern lines of communication along the coast in support of the Fort Bayard project were assigned to Base Section Two at Nanning. Plans were being made to extend operations from Chihchiang to Kweilin and to open a route connecting the latter base with Nan-ring and Liuchow.
Inland Water, Rail, and Air Transportation
Although inland water transport traditionally had been the method of moving personnel and cargo in the interior of China, before 1945 the time element and the urgent need for supplies severely restricted its utilization by the U.S. Army. The limited number of river routes in operation in December 1944 were north of the main LOC on the Yangtze River and its tributaries and were used primarily to serve air bases in the Cheng-tu and Chungking areas and to carry motor fuel to Chungking for truck delivery to Kweiyang. At that time, these routes were new and their capacities were unknown.102 (Chart 7)
Chart 7: Schematic diagram of China transportation routes: August 1945
Not drawn to scale
Source: Trans Progress Rpt, compiled by Stat Sec Hq SOS USF CT, Jun–Aug 45, OCT HB CBI-CT Rpts.
As the tactical situation improved and backlogs of supplies accumulated, increasing attention was given to inland water transport as a method of relieving and augmenting motor facilities. In January both the theater and SOS transportation sections began to explore the possibility of developing river routes. Information from Chinese river men indicated that an unlimited supply of craft could be made available through the guilds, which controlled portions of the rivers. While the migratory habits of Chinese boatmen and the fluctuating number of craft in any one area made doubtful any program for their extensive use, they nevertheless represented a significant resource.
An inventory of water routes and floating equipment was completed by the WTB and the SOS Transportation Section in March 1945. By April the latter had set up a new route on the Yangtze system to carry fuel from the Kansu oil fields and existing routes were being further developed. The first new operation away from the northern waterways was established by Transportation Section personnel on the Yuan River in March between Chanyuan and Chihchiang, and by May the river was in use as far cast as Changte with about 950 boats operating over various sections. When the Chinese reoccupied Nan-ning, a route was opened on the Hsiyang River and hauling was begun in June with sufficient craft to move 3,000 metric tons a month.
At the end of June, the Yangtze, Yuan, and Hsiyang river routes had an estimated combined monthly capacity of 14,000 metric tons, although actual traffic was much below that figure. Supplies were moved by sampans, junks, power boats, and other native craft. River guilds controlled sections of the rivers, furnishing boats, pilots, and frequently even insurance for safe delivery. Methods of payment and rates varied from section to section. Loading and unloading were handled by coolies. Because of the great seasonal changes in river depths, virtually no docking facilities existed and advance planning for shipments was a necessity. Arrangements for movements initially were made by local transportation officers with the river guilds, but later, as the WTB took over control of water transportation activities, such matters as securing craft and transportation rates were handled through that agency. Inland water transport was coming into its own, and SOS transportation officials were planning to shift increasing amounts of cargo from truck to water haul when the end of the war brought an abrupt halt to the brief period of development and expansion of Chinese inland water transport.
In the case of rail transportation, the Americans endeavored to effect improvements largely through technical advice and some material assistance. The five principal railroads on the ELOC in early 1944 were two meter-gauge and three standard-gauge lines. These railways were operating worn equipment and lacked tools and spare parts, but the U.S. Army, concentrating its meager resources on the development of highway transport, could give only limited attention to other means of transport.
During 1944 Colonel Sheahan persuaded the Chinese Government to build railway extensions from Kutsing to Chanyi and from Tushan to Tuyun and secured the air delivery of twenty-three tons of braking equipment from India for the meter-gauge Szechwan–Yunnan Railway, which extended 108 miles eastward from Kunming to the Chanyi roadhead. At-
tempts to begin development of the standard-gauge lines to the east were frustrated by the Japanese offensive. In late 1944 rail facilities in Free China were limited to two short meter-gauge lines, the Szechwan–Yunnan and the Yunnan–An-nan Railways, running east and south of Kunming respectively. All other railroads were destroyed or in Japanese hands.
U.S. Army efforts to improve rail operations in 1945 were devoted largely to the Szechwan–Yunnan Railway. Early in the year, the line was dispatching an average of one train a day, and that only during daylight for fear of landslides. Rail operations were greatly stimulated following the assignment to the SOS Transportation Section of two rail officers who advised and assisted Chinese officials. Trains were put on a twenty-four-hour-a-day schedule, equipment was borrowed from the adjoining Yunnan–An-nan Railway, and additional labor was secured. During June seven to eight trains were being run in each direction and freight movement increased from 3,552 metric tons in March to 15,147 metric tons in June. Traffic fell off after June as backlogs at Kunming were cleared and air deliveries were made direct to new air bases farther forward. By September 1945 traffic handled by the railroad had been cut by almost two thirds over June.
In the spring of 1945 American and Chinese transportation officials also investigated the possibility of rehabilitating a portion of the standard-gauge Kwei-chow-Kwangsi Railway, virtually destroyed during the Japanese offensive, and some work was begun. By August, however, it became evident that the railroad could not be restored to service in time to support the war effort and all work was halted in favor of highway construction.
Although other U.S. Army transportation operations in China were new in 1944, air-freight and passenger activities were as old as SOS itself. After the Air Transport Command took over air-freight stations in October 1943, SOS still retained some important air transportation functions. These were delegated to Sheahan’s organization, which in July 1944 established an Air Division. When the Transportation Service became a staff section, the division became the Air Branch, retaining its original duties.
The Air Branch was responsible for the utilization of the monthly air space allotted by theater authorities to SOS. Acting as a screening agent for SOS sections, it booked and secured movement priority for passengers and arranged for the shipment of freight by air-cargo services. Like its counterpart in India, the Air Branch was closely linked with the operations of the China National Aviation Corporation. The branch was responsible for seeing that all the conditions of the contract between CNAC and the Army were met in China. It supervised the loading and unloading of CNAC aircraft, acting through local transportation officers; receipted for and arranged for the delivery of freight to proper representatives of the Chinese National Government; and handled arrangements for the westbound movement of American passengers and cargo on CNAC planes flying from China to India.
The Air Branch also worked closely with ATC, receipting for all SOS cargo delivered from India on ATC aircraft and delivering the cargo to the proper consignee. ATC aircraft were handled by U.S. Air Forces personnel at air-freight depots, SOS trucks moving the cargo from ATC docks to warehouses in the area. In addition, the Air Branch policed the so-called
Jordan Plan, whereby the Chinese National Government undertook to supply sufficient trucks and labor to U.S. Army airfields to insure the efficient discharge of ATC and other aircraft flown into China. This arrangement never proved entirely satisfactory, although SOS issued a number of new trucks to the Chinese in the middle of 1945 for use at the airfields. Other Air Branch activities included the coordination of the air movement of Chinese troops to India and the loading at Kunming of aircraft attached to theater headquarters at Chungking.
Intra-China air transport available to SOS was extremely limited until mid-1945 since the theater used the limited number of cargo aircraft for high-priority Air Forces supplies and emergency troop movements. Only 306 short tons of SOS supplies were airlifted within China in March 1945, but as an increased number of aircraft became available some 3,600 tons were hauled in July. With the end of hostilities, SOS intra-China air traffic dwindled as aircraft were diverted to new postwar tasks.
Closing Operations
Following the Japanese capitulation in August 1945, the immediate U.S. Army task was to assist the Chinese in disarming the Japanese and reoccupying liberated territory. In support of this mission, motor transport in west China was assigned the job of hauling supplies, principally aviation gasoline, to Chihchiang, where Chinese forces were being airlifted to Nanking. Liuchow, the other main airfield for deployment to east China, was cut off from road traffic by rain and floods and was supplied entirely by air.
In mid-August, all north-south traffic on the LOC, except between Kweiyang and Chungking, was halted and drivers and vehicles were placed on the 606-mile run from Chanyi to Chihchiang. The block system was extended over the entire route, and the first trucks assigned to the mission left Chanyi on 22 August. In general, American and Chinese civilian drivers operated trucks between stations from Chanyi to Kweiyang and Chinese military drivers took them forward over the blocks between Kweiyang and Chih-chiang. On 21 September, with 9,833 metric tons of aviation gasoline delivered, the last shipment left Chanyi. LOC operations were then halted, leaving only intra-base and local hauling as continuing American motor transport activities.103
By 21 November the Stilwell Road, the pipeline, and the Hump operations had all been discontinued, the wartime lines of communications with India–Burma were severed, and all supplies and personnel were being brought in through the port of Shanghai. The Shanghai Base Command had been activated on 2 September 1945 to operate the port as the supply and evacuation base for the China Theater. The Shanghai Port Command, operating first under the Shanghai Base Command and then directly under theater headquarters, was responsible for both port and general depot operations. By the end of the year, a total of 47 vessels carrying 156,989 long tons had arrived.104
As China Theater built up its new base in the east, it simultaneously evacuated west China. There, SOS undertook the completion of authorized issues of stocks to the Chinese Army and began to draw back toward Kunming. Installations were closed and, with the exception of residual teams assigned to safeguard and handle the disposal of equipment and property, personnel were evacuated. At Camp Ting Hao, the China Theater Replacement Center at Kunming, personnel were processed and arrangements made for their movement by air to India. Departures reached a peak in October, when 22,314 troops were airlifted over the Hump and a few others left by water from Shanghai. By 31 October theater strength, which had been about 65,000 in August, had been reduced to less than 25,000.
Final evacuation was hastened by general unrest that threatened the safety of remaining personnel. By 12 November all SOS districts except Kunming had been closed. The Hump lift of 8,870 troops during that month virtually cleared out west China, and on 20 November SOS was inactivated, turning over remaining installations and responsibilities to the 301st Air Depot of the Air Service Command. After China Theater completed an agreement with the Chinese National Government whereby the latter paid $25,000,000 for the major portion of U.S. stocks and installations remaining in west China, the 301st Air Depot departed on 8 December. The wartime arena of operations was thereby closed and China Theater’s continuing operations were concentrated in the Shanghai area.105