Chapter 11: The South and Central Pacific
The war in the South and Central Pacific involved logistical problems of unusual complexity. As in the Southwest Pacific, the conduct of operations was heavily dependent on water transportation. The lack of large land masses and the paucity of physical facilities ruled out extensive rail, river, or motor operations. To be sure, there were small railroads in the Hawaiian Islands and New Zealand and a tiny, obsolete rail line on New Caledonia, but these were operated effectively by civilian agencies with military control or played an extremely minor role in operations. Truck transportation was important largely in connection with port, depot, and other base activities. With the exception of larger islands, such as Saipan and Okinawa, hauls were short and were concerned principally with clearing supplies from beaches or piers to storage areas and forward dumps. These activities may well be considered together with port operations. Air transportation, though increasingly important in the latter stages of the war, was limited primarily to emergency and high-priority movements. The main transportation problems were concerned with shipping and port activities. Army, Navy, and Marine forces had to be moved over vast ocean areas to occupy or capture isolated, far-flung objectives. The limited amount of shipping available and the distances involved made difficult the task of mounting and sup porting assault and garrison forces and, particularly in the early war years, dictated strategy to a considerable degree.
Operations were further complicated by the generally primitive nature of the bases forward of Hawaii. Pending the construction of adequate port and storage facilities badly needed shipping piled up, congesting harbors and intensifying the over-all shortage of vessels. Cargo was usually discharged by lighterage, supplies were stacked in the open, and ships were kept in port for weeks, sometimes months. Although the problem was mitigated by the echeloning procedure evolved in the Central Pacific, whereby shipping was directed to a destination in accordance with its discharge capabilities, the reception capacity of forward ports remained a limiting factor until the end of the war.
These difficulties were accentuated by the secondary priority given the Pacific until mid-1943. With the major effort devoted to the defeat of Germany, only limited support could be given Pacific operations during the first year and a half of war. Amphibious campaigns were executed with the scanty means at hand, and shipping, troop, and equipment shortages were the rule. By mid-1943, American productivity and manpower mobilization had developed to such an extent that it was possible to provide an increasing volume of support to the Pacific over and
above the requirements of the transatlantic theaters; and during 1944 the general condition of scarcity was being overcome. When the end of the war in Europe at last made possible the provision of fully adequate support, the last great battle of the Pacific was already in progress.
Of the various shortages, none was more chronic than that of service personnel. Amphibious campaigns required a larger proportion of service troops than was ordinarily provided--to man ports and depots in rear areas as well as to garrison and develop forward bases. The Pacific never received a sufficient number of service troops, and as a result combat troops were used extensively in port and other activities. Although Army commanders deplored this practice, the absence of service units left no alternative. This was particularly true of the South Pacific, where original task forces arrived with an extremely low proportion of service personnel. Not until early 1944 was a more equitable number on hand. To a somewhat lesser extent, the same situation prevailed in the Central Pacific. Although the shortage there was relieved in the latter part of the war, it was never completely remedied.1
The handicaps would have rendered operations difficult even if they had involved only one service, but participation by Army, Navy, Marine, and Allied forces further complicated the picture. In order to insure that the limited means available achieved the strategic aims, close cooperation was necessary between the services in the utilization of manpower, materiel, and shipping. This was accomplished within the framework of the unified command structure established in the theater.2
Unified command carried with it power to take steps to insure logistical support of all participating services, but such measures were not effected immediately because of the newness of joint action and the differences in supply systems. Effective joint Army-Navy logistical action was first developed in the South Pacific, the arena of the first sustained operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas.3 There, cooperation on such matters as local procurement, supply, port operations, and shipping was developed on an improvised basis. In the spring of 1943 more formal provision was made in both the South and the Central Pacific for Army-Navy cooperation in the field of logistics and, ultimately, joint logistical staffs were established under the unified commanders in both areas. Despite many difficulties, such as the
impracticability of unifying the supply systems, large amounts of material were interchanged, personnel and supplies were pooled in the forward areas, and shipping was utilized effectively in meeting the requirements of all three services.4
The scope and emphasis of Army transportation operations varied with changes in the strategic picture. Initially, transportation activities were concerned principally with the effort to strengthen the defenses in the Hawaiian area and to secure the air and sea lanes to the Southwest Pacific. With the elimination of the threat to Hawaii as the result of the Battle of Midway (4–6 June 1942), the emphasis shifted to operations in support of the limited offensive in the South Pacific (August 1942–March 1944). Meanwhile, the Central Pacific had become the scene of important transportation operations, beginning in the summer of 1943 with the build-up for and execution of the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas Campaigns. By the summer of 1944 there was a marked contrast between transportation activities in the South Pacific and those in the Central Pacific. In the South Pacific, which had become inoperational, the transportation effort was directed toward the redeployment of Army forces to the Southwest Pacific, the support and rehabilitation of Central Pacific forces, and the “roll-up” of inactive bases. In the Central Pacific activities were concentrated on the accelerated drive to Japan, which was climaxed by the conquest of the Ryukyus. Following the Japanese surrender, attention was turned to the outloading of troops for demobilization, the disposition of supplies piled up in the Pacific, and the continued support of bases retained for peacetime occupation.
The Hawaiian Area—Pearl Harbor to Midway
In the first months following the Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese posed a serious threat to the Hawaiian area and the lines of communication to the Southwest Pacific. In response to this danger, the Army and Navy acquired the use of available shipping and hurriedly dispatched troops, supplies, and equipment to reinforce the Hawaiian area and to occupy the islands commanding the air and sea lanes to New Zealand and Australia.
The effort to build up the defenses in the Hawaiian area precipitated the first shipping crisis of the war. The Navy’s insistence on convoy protection, congestion and some confused loadings at the rapidly expanding San Francisco Port of Embarkation, and the general vessel shortage inevitably produced delays. To add to these difficulties, the convoys’ turnaround times increased when fast vessels were taken off the Hawaiian run and placed on the longer, more dangerous routes to the South and Southwest Pacific.
These developments slowed the flow of supplies to the Hawaiian area. Apprehensive of this threat to the delivery of the essential needs of the Army forces and the
civilian population, Lt. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, sent a steady stream of complaints about the shipping situation to Washington. The crisis was short lived. The lifting of the ban on unescorted vessels in late January 1942 improved loading at San Francisco, and the assignment of additional vessels combined to break the west coast bottleneck. In March, over 200,000 measurement tons of Army cargo were shipped to the Hawaiian area, double the amount received during January when the first wartime convoys had arrived. In April General Emmons reported the shipping situation considerably improved. Construction of fortifications and airfields, deployment of troops on Oahu and to the outlying islands, and support of Army task forces at the air ferry bases within the jurisdiction of the Hawaiian Department were all progressing satisfactorily.5
The influx of shipping resulted in an expansion of transportation activity in the Hawaiian Department. At the outbreak of the war a small Army Transport Service staff, operating as the Transportation Division of the Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, directed water transportation activities concentrated at one Army-owned and three Army-leased piers at Honolulu. Longshore work was handled by civilians augmented by one Army port company. A limited amount of Army harbor and cargo-handling equipment was available, and the ATS had one small vessel, the General Royal T. Frank, to transport passengers and freight to other islands in the Hawaiian group.6
As the main destination for Army shipping routed to the area, Honolulu was called upon to handle greatly increased traffic.. Handicapped by an inadequate labor force and insufficient equipment, the port was hard pressed. Contributing to its problems was the replacement of workers of Japanese ancestry with inexperienced Filipino plantation laborers. Nevertheless, the institution of around-the-clock operations enabled the port to discharge approximately 180,000 measurement tons of Army cargo in March, over four times the tonnage discharged in the last prewar month. More than 170,000 measurement tons were discharged in each of the next two months. During this period additional cargo-handling equipment arrived, and on 9 March ATS was established as a separate branch directly under the department commander and was given an authorized strength of 13 officers and 33 enlisted men to manage activities at Honolulu and its subports. The arrival of two port companies from the mainland in June and the drop in incoming tonnage relieved congestion at the port.
Whenever possible, troops and cargo were moved from the Honolulu docks by the small Oahu Railway and Land Company rail line. Because of the acute motor fuel shortage, the use of trucks was
restricted, but the railroad’s limited facilities often made recourse to motor transport necessary. Trucks allotted to ATS for the movement of freight were increased from 45 to 100, and arrangements were made by ATS for the use of tactical vehicles to move troops from shipside. By mid-1942 little difficulty was being encountered in moving either troops or freight from the piers.
Aside from receiving incoming traffic, Honolulu served as the transshipment center for the support of troops deployed to outlying islands. To accomplish this mission ATS was given the use of six small vessels that had been acquired by the Corps of Engineers, for the transport of materials to air ferry bases then under construction in the Central and South Pacific. In addition, troopships from the mainland were either diverted to these islands or were used to transship troops from Honolulu.
On the more important islands, ATS established subports to handle cargo and passengers. In March 1942 an ATS officer was assigned to each of the islands of Hawaii, Maui, and Kauai to direct port activities performed by civilian workers and supervise equipment obtained through hire or on contract. In a few instances, some ATS operating personnel and equipment were also provided. Although some vessels arrived at these subports directly from the mainland, that practice was soon abandoned since the ports were inadequately equipped to handle large vessels. As a result, cargo was generally discharged at Honolulu for transshipment to the other ports on the small interisland vessels.
To the shipping requirements of the outlying islands were added those of the air ferry bases. In February 1942 Army task forces dispatched from the United States landed on Christmas and Canton Islands to defend airfields on which construction had been started in 1941. In April troops were shipped from Oahu to Fanning Island to relieve a New Zealand garrison stationed there. The support of these islands was assigned to the Hawaiian Department, placing a strain on ATS-operated vessels, which were also carrying on transshipment activities between Honolulu and the outlying islands. In the middle of 1942 five additional freighters were made available to ATS by the War Department for interisland and ferry-base shipping. Also, arrangements were made for the use of space available on Navy supply vessels destined for the South Pacific.
For a time the evacuation of civilians from the Hawaiian Islands to the United States required considerable attention. ATS had complete responsibility for the removal of military dependents, dependents of federal employees, and all civilians returning on a commercial basis. Using ships calling at Honolulu, 12,547 civilians were embarked between December 1941 and the end of July 1942. The Army handled the small continuing flow of evacuees until August 1943, when the job was turned over to WSA.
In the first six months of the war, only a limited degree of cooperation was developed between the Army and Navy. In January 1942 the Cargo and Passenger Control agency was established under the Office of the Military Governor. Headed by a naval officer and containing Army, Navy, and civilian representation, it controlled and allotted berthing space and longshoremen and coordinated all
shipping in the Honolulu harbor. Other relationships were informal and were carried on by Army officers with their Navy counterparts as the need arose. In general, Army and Navy operations were handled separately, each service maintaining its own construction program, priorities of materials, and shipping.7
In April 1942 General Emmons had considered the idea of pooling all transportation in the Pacific and placing the determination of priorities of shipments under Admiral (later Fleet Admiral) Chester W. Nimitz, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. Before discussing the matter with Nimitz, Emmons wrote to General Somervell, then commanding general of the newly organized SOS in Washington, to ascertain the War Department’s attitude. Emmons’ proposal received a cool response. Somervell informed him that the Army had to “control the means” if it was to carry out its responsibility for the supply of its forces. “We are moving along these lines,” he wrote, “and preserving our control over supply of all forces served out of San Francisco and out of Australia and partially out of Hawaii.”8 Emmons abandoned the idea.
By July 1942 Army transportation operations in the Hawaiian area presented few serious problems. Although there was still some congestion at Honolulu, incoming tonnage had fallen off from the March peak and the scheduled arrival of additional port troops and equipment was expected to clear up the situation. Activities at the subports and the support of the ferry bases were being effectively accomplished. The air of urgency that had characterized early operations was fading, and the mission of the Hawaiian Department had reverted to that of static defense.
Safeguarding the Lines of Communication in the South Pacific
The emergency in the Hawaiian area was soon overshadowed by events in the South and Southwest Pacific. The swift Japanese drive through the Netherlands Indies, New Guinea, and the British Solo-mons threatened to sever the vital air and sea lanes to Australia and New Zealand. In order to avert this possibility, Army, Navy, and Marine forces were organized in the United States and, beginning in January 1942, occupied a series of friendly bases extending from the Society Islands through New Caledonia and thrusting northward into the New Hebrides. By July there were over 50,000 Army ground and air troops in the South Pacific. The principal Army task forces were located in the Fiji Islands and on New Caledonia, Tongatabu, and Bora Bora. Smaller Army forces were stationed in New Zealand and on Efate and Espiritu Santo. Other islands occupied by U.S. Army troops during 1942 included Wallis, Upolo, Aitutaki, and Tongareva (Penrhyn). Navy and Marine forces, meanwhile, had landed on many of these islands and, in addition, garrisoned a number of others in Samoa and the Ellice Islands.9
The islands occupied in the South Pacific were scattered across an immense expanse of ocean, some 3,000 miles separating the two most distant bases. With the exception of New Zealand, which had
fairly adequate facilities for handling troops and cargo, the islands were small and often possessed only meager material and human resources. At Nouméa, on New Caledonia, the Army had access to one three-berth dock—the Grand Quay—and could occasionally use the berth at the Nickel Dock when it was not being used for commercial activities. Cargo-handling equipment was rudimentary and only a small number of tugs, barges, and other craft was available. Similar facilities were on hand in the Fijis, but the other bases lacked even these limited resources. Espiritu Santo had an excellent natural harbor but was bereft of piers capable of berthing ocean-going vessels. On this island and virtually all the others, cargo had to be lightered to barge piers or the beach until more adequate facilities could be constructed. Throughout the area, except in the Fijis, there was a sparse native population. Laborers were few and often incompetent. Although conditions varied from island to island, the limited facilities and the inadequate supply of native labor limited the development of Army transportation operations throughout the South Pacific.10
Upon their arrival at the various island bases the Army task forces provided details to unload the ships. Where berthing facilities were available, cargo and troops were unloaded directly from vessels, using ships’ gear and such local cargo-handling equipment as there was. Where berthing facilities were lacking or inadequate, locally owned and manned craft were hired to carry troops and cargo. Once ashore, the task forces set up informal port organizations to supervise troops, and native labor where available, in the conduct of continuing port activities. Provision was made for clearing dock areas by using the limited number of trucks brought in and other available transport. Generally, the units themselves picked up their supplies with organic vehicles. In a number of instances, coastwise vessels were hired to move supplies to outlying portions of the islands. On many of the islands the Navy and Marines were handling their ships with their own personnel and equipment and without relation to similar Army activities.
On New Caledonia, a unique operation was instituted in April 1942 when the Army took over the obsolete, long-unused Nouméa–Paita Railroad. Operated by a small Army Engineer detachment and French and Javanese employees, this twenty-mile meter-gauge line relieved the burden on truck transport by carrying supplies from the Grand Quay to various supply dumps in the area.
In the course of developing its transportation operations, the Army early experienced a severe shortage of service troops. Desiring to retain the highest possible combat effectiveness, task force commanders had kept the number of service troops to a minimum. This was particularly true in the case of port personnel. The only organized port headquarters provided to the South Pacific was the 1st Port of Embarkation (Mobile), which arrived at Auckland, New Zealand, in May 1942 as part of an Army task force. The 1st Port, consisting originally of 10 officers, 100 enlisted men, and 21 civilians, took over control of Army port activities at Auckland, supervising local labor at
Prince’s Wharf. In June 1942 a portion of the 1st Port’s personnel was transferred to the Fijis and there took over supervision of port operations at Suva and Lautoka.
At Nouméa, a provisional port company, with 4 officers and 69 enlisted men, was activated in June. Under the Water Transportation Section established under the task force in April, the port company, assisted by native labor and heavily supplemented by details of combat troops, managed Army port activities. Cargo handling and allied activities on other islands were performed by tactical troops, assisted by such native labor as was available. The shortage of experienced port personnel, together with inadequate port and other base facilities and limited, usually obsolete, cargo-handling equipment, adversely affected efficiency. Ships were slow in being discharged and operations were often confused.11
The difficulties experienced at the individual island bases were intensified by the lack of coordination between bases and poor communications with the United States. Army task forces had been rushed out with little opportunity to consider the details of their administration and supply. Each Army task force commander reported directly to the War Department. With the exception of some limited and temporary support of Bora Bora, the Fijis, and New Caledonia from Hawaii and Australia, Army commanders were supplied directly from the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. Requisitions were made without regard to personnel and equipment on other islands. Moreover, because of poor communications, manifests were late in arriving and estimated times of arrival of vessels were frequently unknown. Some ships arrived with supplies stowed below cargo destined
for other ports, necessitating unloading, searching, and reloading. Others were properly loaded but were difficult to handle with the cargo-handling equipment on hand.12
Some order began to emerge out of the confused situation with the organization of the South Pacific Area. Vice Adm. Robert Lee Ghormley, Commander, South Pacific Area, assumed active command of his headquarters at Auckland in June 1942. In addition to the protection of the lines of communications to New Zealand and Australia, he was charged with the preparation of a counteroffensive against Japanese positions. By early July 1942 plans were made and forces selected for the invasion of the southern Solomons. With active combat operations in the offing, Ghormley decided to shift his headquarters from New Zealand, and on 1 August he moved his advance echelon to Nouméa. Meanwhile, Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA), had arrived from the United States with a small forward echelon and had established his headquarters at Nouméa on 29 July. Under the operational control of Admiral Ghormley, Harmon was responsible for the administration and training of U.S. Army ground and air forces and for assisting the Commander, South Pacific, in
preparing and implementing plans for their employment.
The establishment of the South Pacific Area and USAFISPA headquarters marked the beginning of efforts to coordinate the use of the limited resources at hand. In June 1942 a Joint Purchasing Board (JPB) was set up in New Zealand, under the Navy Commander, Service Squadron, South Pacific, to procure locally obtainable supplies. On 15 July a joint logistical plan was formulated dividing responsibilities for the support of the South Pacific bases between the services. The Army commander was assigned supervision of all items of logistical support for which the Army was responsible. With the exception of JPB-procured supplies, this included the provision of subsistence for all services at bases commanded by the Army and supplies other than petroleum products for all Army units. The Navy was responsible for petroleum products for all services, subsistence for all services at Navy-commanded bases, other classes of supply for all Navy units, and all supplies procured by JPB. It was also charged with the control of all ships, the assignment of space in vessels, and the designation of ports available to shipping.
This rough and ready division of responsibility laid the foundation for joint logistical action, but Harmon’s skeleton staff had its hands full assisting Ghormley in planning and executing the Guadalcanal Campaign. Harmon’s rear echelon, organized in Washington, did not arrive in the South Pacific until late September 1942. Without a central logistical agency, it was virtually impossible to coordinate supply requirements of the various bases, direct the flow of shipping into the area, and control transportation activities within the command. Furthermore, despite joint local procurement and the assumption of joint supply responsibilities by commanders at individual bases, wasteful duplication of manpower and equipment continued as each service handled its own port and construction activities. In large measure, integration of Army and Navy supply and transportation activities at this time was a goal yet to be attained. Under the pressure of combat operations it later became a reality.13
Transportation in Support of the South Pacific Offensives
Conditions for the initiation of the Guadalcanal Campaign could scarcely have been less favorable. Shipping, troops, and equipment were all in short supply, leaving little margin for error. Nevertheless, it was imperative that the Japanese advance toward the Allied lines of communications to the Southwest Pacific be contained. On 2 July 1942 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered a limited offensive to be mounted against the Japanese, and in line with this directive plans were made for a drive on the southern Solomons. Marine forces assaulted Tulagi and Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942.14
Five island bases were important in the support of the Guadalcanal action—New Caledonia, Espiritu Santo, Efate, the Fijis, and New Zealand. The other islands played a minor role and were concerned mainly with maintaining their own garrison forces. New Caledonia became the
principal administrative and supply center. Much of the cargoes for all services arrived there for discharge and for transshipment forward. Espiritu Santo and Efate were developed as forward naval and air bases. The Fijis had an important air base and were the training ground for the 37th Infantry Division. New Zealand, initially a major base, was too far from the scene of operations to be important in direct support of the campaign, though it retained significance as a source of local procurement and as a rehabilitation center for troops returning from combat.
With the exception of New Zealand, none of the bases were equipped or manned to handle the growing volume of shipping that came into the South Pacific in connection with the Guadalcanal Campaign. In the fall of 1942 the growing number of troop and cargo arrivals precipitated a major shipping crisis at Nouméa and, to a lesser extent, at ports of other island bases. The ports’ inability to handle the load threatened the success of operations on Guadalcanal.15 While troops engaged in combat were experiencing critical shortages, thousands of tons of supplies and equipment destined for their use awaited discharge from ships in the harbors of supporting bases.
While the shipping crisis was coming to a head, a theater-wide Army logistical agency came into being. Late in September 1942 the rear echelon of Harmon’s headquarters arrived at Auckland, where it was activated as the Service Command, USAFISPA, on 8 October. Under the command of Brig. Gen. Robert G. Breene, the Service Command, USAFISPA, was assigned responsibility for the logistical support of Army forces in the South Pacific.
A Transportation Section was established as part of the service command under Maj. (later Col.) Jack A. Fraser, who had had civilian experience in water transportation. Assisted by a captain and an enlisted man, Fraser set his organization in motion. Before leaving the United States, he had arranged for the San Francisco Port of Embarkation to forward in advance copies of all manifests of ships bound for South Pacific ports. Measures were also taken to control intratheater Army shipping and to develop contacts with Navy authorities. Through October and early November, the Transportation Section arranged all movements of Army personnel and cargo directed by USAFISPA, using space on Navy and WSA vessels. In this early period, the section also handled all Army rail bookings in and air bookings from New Zealand.
Scarcely had the service command completed its organization when it was ordered to Nouméa. On 10 November its duties were expanded, and it was redesignated Services of Supply headquarters for the South Pacific Area, General Breene continuing in command. The SOS organization took on the responsibility for general theater and base supply and assumed command of all organizations, personnel, installations, and equipment engaged in SOS activities for U.S. Army ground and air forces. On the same date that SOS was activated, Army service commands were organized in New Zealand, on New Caledonia, and in the Fijis to operate under SOS headquarters, and provision was made for Breene to maintain direct contact with commanders of other islands regarding SOS activities. Under Breene’s aggressive leadership, SOS made rapid progress in controlling
and coordinating Army supply and transport in the South Pacific.
Among the responsibilities assigned SOS were the direction of water transportation, port operations, and motor transportation pertaining to its activities. Fraser and his staff turned over their air and rail functions to the newly activated service command in New Zealand and moved to Nouméa to set up the SOS Transportation Division. There, Fraser concentrated on building up his functions pertaining to port and shipping operations. The isolated nature of the islands made impossible centralized direction of motor transportation, and these activities were handled independently at each base. By the end of 1942 manifests were arriving more regularly and the Transportation Division was exercising an increasing measure of control over port operations and intratheater shipping.16
Meanwhile, congestion at the port of Nouméa had reached alarming proportions. The arrival of supplies, ammunition, and construction material destined for Guadalcanal and other bases to the north seriously taxed Nouméa’s facilities. Adding to the burden on the port were the Americal Division’s departure to reinforce the marines on Guadalcanal and the coincidental arrival of the 43rd Infantry Division and the 3rd New Zealand Division. Moreover, there was a backlog of cargo awaiting movement forward, and convoys to Guadalcanal were limited in size because of the tactical situation and the inadequate receiving facilities there. These difficulties were compounded by the lack of cooperation between the services. Army personnel and equipment sometimes lay idle while the Navy worked its vessels and vice versa. The Navy tended to use vessels as floating warehouses, keeping cargoes aboard ship until they were needed. Both services practiced selective discharge, unloading emergency supplies from one vessel and then halting work to begin on another. It was not unusual for ships to be kept in port for as long as ninety days. By the end of November the number of vessels awaiting discharge in the Nouméa harbor reportedly had increased to ninety-one.17 Many of the ships carried cargo destined for transshipment forward. Immobilization of shipping of a lesser magnitude was developing at Espiritu Santo.18
The port bottleneck at Nouméa endangered the support of Guadalcanal where fighting was reaching a climax. To deal with this crisis, Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., who had succeeded Ghormley in October, requested the Army to take over responsibility for all discharge and loading activities at the port as of 20 November. In line with Halsey’s directive, direction of port activities at Nouméa was
given to SOS. Operational control of Navy equipment and longshoremen was assumed by the Army Service Command at New Caledonia and ships were handled regardless of ownership or control.
Although the unification of port activities at Nouméa brought immediate improvement, the combined local resources of the Army and Navy were woefully inadequate. Immediately available to Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Raymond E. S. Williamson, the service commander on New Caledonia, were the three berths at the Grand Quay, a barge dock, seventeen barges and four towboats, and a small amount of cargo-handling equipment. To direct port operations, he had a small transportation section staffed by seven officers. Available for cargo-handling activities were an improvised port company of 4 officers and 98 enlisted men, 280 Navy Seabees and casuals, 539 native laborers, and the incidental services of three Quartermaster truck companies with a total of 69 serviceable trucks. None of the Army personnel had had experience in longshore work before arriving on the island.19
In an effort to break the Nouméa bottleneck, steps were taken to prevent further aggravation of the situation and to make additional troops and equipment available to the port. In December 1942, the 25th Infantry Division, then en route from Hawaii to Nouméa and the Fijis, was diverted directly to Guadalcanal. At about the same time, the bulk of the 1st Port was transferred from Auckland, Suva, and Lautoka to Nouméa to augment and reorganize the service command port organization, and a Navy construction battalion was assigned to provide more longshore labor. Also, civilians experienced in port and small-boat operations were moved in from New Zealand. To facilitate discharge of vessels at anchor, small boats were purchased in New Zealand. In the meantime, emergency requisitions for Transportation Corps troops and equipment were forwarded to Washington.
At Nouméa, the service command reorganized and expanded port operations, arranged for the use of the Nickel Dock berth, and embarked on a program of improving port facilities. By mid-February 1943, the situation was considerably improved. General Williamson now had a port headquarters aggregating 23 officers, 178 enlisted men, and 80 civilians, all experienced in terminal operations. Army port company strength had been increased by 130 enlisted men through transfers from other units; the Navy had provided 520 cargo-handling personnel; and 764 other men were secured from combat units for longshore duties. A significant amount of cargo-handling equipment and twenty-five additional Navy barges had been secured, and trucks of combat and other local units had been pressed into service. Army and Navy construction troops had completed a two-berth finger pier at Nickel Dock, making a total of six sure berths, and work was begun on another. Other improvements included the repair and extension of the railroad tracks along the Grand Quay.
Unification of port operations and augmentation of personnel, equipment, and facilities resulted in a spectacular acceleration of activity. The following reveals, in short tons, the increasing amount of traffic handled at Nouméa:
| November 1942 | December 1942 | January 1943 | |
| Total | 53,545 | 154,654 | 239,660 |
| Cargo discharged | 38,447 | 141,362 | 217,449 |
| Cargo loaded | 14,175 | 13,183 | 20,619 |
| Coastwise shipments | 923 | 109 | 1,592 |
Despite this increase in activities, incoming shipping piled into the already crowded harbor and continued for some time to outrun the port’s capabilities. At the end of February 1943 there were still 113,030 short tons awaiting discharge, but from that point on congestion rapidly cleared up. The port organization, now set up as a provisional port of embarkation, was operating efficiently, an Army port company had arrived from the United States, and a second finger pier and a ponton floating dock were completed. In the middle of April, with only 24,000 short tons awaiting discharge, General Breene reported the problem of congestion at Nouméa definitely solved.20
During this period the congestion at Espiritu Santo was also being relieved by the acquistion of personnel and equipment and the construction of terminal facilities. In February 1943 the 390th Port Battalion, the first such organization to arrive in the South Pacific, debarked at Espiritu Santo and immediately took over cargo-handling operations. A month later the 390th was followed by the 3rd U.S. Navy Construction Battalion (Special). Upon the arrival of the port troops, arrangements were made for the unification of port activities along lines similar to those developed at Nouméa. In early 1943 the remaining members of the 1st Port of Embarkation at Auckland, with the exception of the commanding officer and a small cadre, were transferred to Espiritu Santo to take over port operations for the newly organized local service command. At this base and at Efate and in the Fijis unified or cooperative operations were developed. Priority of unloading and division of labor were worked out jointly by Army port commanders and Navy port directors, and responsibility for port construction and cargo operations was shared.21
The discharge of cargo at the rear base ports was in many respects a job half-done, for much of it, particularly at Nouméa, was destined for transshipment forward. The limited amount of shipping available, the lack of facilities at forward destinations, and, due to the tactical situation, the necessity of organizing the ships moving to the Guadalcanal area into small convoys resulted in the accumulation of large backlogs of supplies. In these circumstances, it became necessary to decide what could be sent to, and discharged at, Guadalcanal. On 31 December 1942 Admiral Halsey placed responsibility for coordinating logistical support of Guadalcanal in the hands of General Breene. To assist and advise in determining priority of shipment of supplies and equipment, and of personnel other than tactical units to Guadalcanal, the Commanding General,
I Marine Amphibious Corps, and the respective commanders of naval bases, aircraft, amphibious force, and service squadron of the South Pacific Force appointed representatives to an advisory group known as the Priorities Board. As Breene’s representative, the Director of
Transportation, SOS, served as chairman of the board.
All requests for the movement within the area of Army cargo and personnel and, after 31 December, of Navy and Marine cargo and personnel moving forward to Guadalcanal area, were received by the SOS Transportation Division. After the requests were considered by the Priorities Board, the Transportation Division arranged for the use of Army, Navy, or WSA vessels for movement forward of urgently needed supplies from New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, New Zealand, and the Fijis and issued directives to the individual ports to load specific personnel or cargo aboard the vessels in their harbors.22
By April 1943 transportation operations were improved. On the theater level, the SOS Transportation Division had become an effective supervisory and coordinating agency. At the major bases Army service commands handled port operations through provisional ports of embarkation. Close cooperation and coordination between the Army and Navy was the rule in port and construction activities. More Transportation Corps units and equipment were beginning to arrive. Nouméa was being cleared of congestion, and Espiritu Santo, although still experiencing difficulty because of a lack of facilities, was being relieved. But a new crisis had arisen. In February 1943 Guadalcanal was secured and the Russells were taken without opposition. As Guadalcanal developed into the principal advance base for new amphibious operations, shipping was again immobilized.
The completion of the Guadalcanal Campaign and the occupation of the Russells secured the lines of communications in the South Pacific and provided a springboard for offensive action against Japanese strongholds in the northern Solomons and on New Ireland and New Britain. Since all these objectives were west of 159 degrees east longitude, the line of demarkation between the South and Southwest Pacific Areas, plans were formulated for a coordinated two-pronged attack by South and Southwest Pacific forces along the Solomons–New Guinea ladder toward Rabaul.
The first objective of the South Pacific under this strategic plan was the New Georgia group. In preparation for the forthcoming campaign, Guadalcanal was selected as the main forward base and as the staging and stockpiling center. Guadalcanal was even less equipped to handle the burden than Nouméa had been. There were no facilities for berthing ocean-going vessels. There was a total of four landing points over an eight-mile stretch of sea, two of them, Kukum and Tenaru, being merely beaches. At Lunga there was a half-sunken barge mounted with a three-ton crane, while a small jetty was under construction at Koli Point. Ships had to anchor about one-half mile offshore and discharge their cargoes into lighters or barges, mostly Navy-owned, which carried them to barge piers or the shore. The Army service command was still in the process of organization and was woefully short of labor and trucks. Virtually all troops on the island were detailed at one time or another to work aboard ship or on the beach. In addition, approximately 1,000 native laborers were utilized. Because of vulnerability to attack from Munda airfield in New Georgia, vessels were worked only from daylight to dusk. Ships would then move out to sea
and return the next morning. If unloading was urgent, they would move to Tulagi, which was under Marine control, for discharge during the night. The fact that movements to Guadalcanal had to be organized into a limited number of convoys complicated matters still further. As supply, equipment, and troop arrivals increased, Guadalcanal became congested and a large backlog of shipping again developed in the South Pacific. In April 1943 the Army and Navy had thirty vessels, with approximately 160,000 short tons aboard, awaiting convoy to Guadalcanal.23
In an effort to relieve congestion, General Breene on 14 April 1943 radioed the San Francisco Port of Embarkation to cease loading, until further notice, all cargo destined for the Solomons, except for certain specified items and cargo-handling equipment that would be sent to Nouméa for later transshipment. The Navy took similar action. Then, in order to make possible the target date of 30 June set for the New Georgia assault, Breene and his staff together with Navy and Marine Corps representatives worked out a scheme whereby 65,000 short tons of supplies needed for the New Georgia operation could be extracted and unloaded at Guadalcanal with a minimum of handling. For the most part, entire shiploads were routed directly to Guadalcanal and their cargoes were added to the stockpiles there. Ships loaded partially for Guadalcanal or containing nonessential cargoes were released to Australia or diverted to Nouméa or New Zealand. By 12 May approximately 91,000 short tons had been directed to noncongested ports, thereby relieving much of the pressure on Guadalcanal.24
At the same time, Guadalcanal was being built up. A pier capable of berthing a Liberty ship was erected at Kukum; additional service troops, including the 481st Port Battalion, were brought in; a battalion of the 24th Infantry Regiment and other combat troops were assigned to beach operations; large storage areas were provided; and equipment, including motorized cranes, barges, lift trucks, cargo nets, pallet boards, and floating cranes, were shipped in by both the Army and the Navy.25
During this build-up the 2½-ton amphibian truck (the DUKW) was placed in operation for the first time in the South Pacific. The first DUKWs arrived at Nouméa in April 1943. After a successful experimental test, fifty DUKWs and a provisional company, later organized as the 451st Amphibian Truck Company, moved to Guadalcanal early in May. They were immediately placed in service after a serious storm smashed the quays and wrecked floating equipment. Until damage could be repaired, the DUKWs were used to bridge the gap between ship and shore. In further activities, the DUKWs proved invaluable in expediting the discharge and turnaround of vessels at ports where berthing facilities were inadequate or nonexistent.26 Other bases at
which they were subsequently used were Espiritu Santo and Munda. But DUKWs could only handle a portion of the port load. Docking facilities had to be constructed at rear area bases and at forward destinations as soon as the tactical situation made such construction possible.
By 7 June 1943 diversions of nonessential cargo and expanded port operations relieved the congestion sufficiently to permit resumption of direct deliveries to the Solomons from the United States. Arrangements were also made with the San Francisco Port of Embarkation to stow Nouméa cargo over incomplete Solomons shiploads. The vessels were then routed to Nouméa for partial discharge and topping-off with cargo available for transshipment to the Solomons.27 With the initiation of the New Georgia campaign on 30 June 1943, Guadalcanal was called upon to handle steadily mounting traffic. During August the port discharged 107,821 short tons, more than double the tonnage discharged during May. Despite the handicaps imposed by the limited size of convoys moving into Guadalcanal and continued enemy air attacks, the requirements of the New Georgia campaign were being met.
The four months during which the New Georgia group was assaulted, occupied, and secured witnessed a marked acceleration in the forward movement of troops and equipment. Nouméa, the destination for the major portion of the shipping arriving from the United States and the principal center for transshipment to forward bases, notably Guadalcanal, increased its cargo loadings from 25,477 short tons in June 1943 to 74,800 short tons in October. Espiritu Santo, which continued as an important air and naval base, was growing in importance as a base for transshipment. Loadings there rose from 5,466 short tons to 19,584 short tons in the same period. Some support loadings were made in the Fijis, but these islands served chiefly as a rehabilitation center. Efate, because of its proximity to Espiritu Santo, declined in importance as the latter was built up. Troop movements within the theater began rising in June as personnel were called forward for service duties in Guadalcanal and staging for combat operations. During September 1943 some 59,759 Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and New Zealand troops were moved within the area, exclusive of those shipped forward from the Guadalcanal area to the combat zone.28
Shipments were made northward from the rear bases to the Guadalcanal area by Navy-owned or Navy-controlled cargo vessels and troopships, supplemented by Army and Navy allocated WSA ships retained for use in the area after completing their transpacific runs. Because of enemy air activity, it was necessary to organize these vessels into small convoys. In order to effect the most efficient use of this shipping, Admiral Halsey in April 1943 had delegated to the Army SOS the booking of all personnel and cargo moving to Guadalcanal. This authority was expanded until by the end of August the SOS Transportation Division became the agency for coordinating the movement of all cargo and personnel within the area. The Priorities Board, which had become
experienced in supplying Guadalcanal, continued to advise the SOS in determining shipping requirements for cargo to all other South Pacific bases. The assignment of priorities for intratheater movement of personnel, however, was taken over and exercised directly by the Navy. The Transportation Division secured the shipping from the Navy, the WSA, and the Chief of Transportation in Washington, and, in accordance with the priorities laid down, issued loading instructions to the individual ports. Movements from the Guadalcanal–Russells area to positions of actual combat, however, were effected by Navy landing ships of all types and were controlled by the Navy.29
The influx of shipping into Guadalcanal from other South Pacific bases and from the United States continued to outrun the port’s ability to discharge throughout the New Georgia campaign. In August supplies shipped into Guadalcanal were again limited to those essential for the support of combat operations and for the maintenance and construction of port and other installations vital to the success of these operations. Furthermore, the enemy air attacks, which continued until late in 1943, necessitated continued convoying and harassed port operations. Nevertheless, the port steadily bettered its performance. Under the Army service command port organization, Army port troops and Navy Seabee longshoremen, heavily augmented by details of combat troops and assisted by native laborers, exceeded the discharge performance of Nouméa after August 1943. As the main forward base, Guadalcanal also loaded the bulk of support supplies. Monthly cargo loadings, exclusive of those performed by the troop units themselves in connection with amphibious operations, rose from 22,631 short tons in July 1943 to 34,048 short tons in October.30
After securing the New Georgia group, the South Pacific forces continued their drive into the northern Solomons. The Treasury Islands were invaded on 27 October. In the meantime, stockpiling for an assault on the strongly fortified island of Bougainville had begun at Guadalcanal, the Russells, and Vella Lavella. In preparation for the campaign, Admiral Halsey, on 19 October 1943, expanded the boundaries of the forward area, which had originally included Guadalcanal and the Russells, to encompass New Georgia. The forward area was placed under the Army island commander of Guadalcanal, who was made responsible for assembling and loading troops, equipment, and supplies from the forward area. His deputy commander for services arranged for the necessary shipping with the Navy, which was responsible for water transport within the forward area and from the forward area to the combat area.
In order to meet the increased shipping requirements forward from Guadalcanal, the Navy amphibious force commander, on 7 October 1943, withdrew all but ten of his ships from the rear areas and concentrated his cargo vessels and troopships in the forward area. The commanding general of SOS remained responsible for assembling and loading from the rear areas. To accomplish this movement, the SOS Transportation Division called upon the Navy commander of the Service Squadron, South Pacific, for the use of the ten
attack cargo vessels assigned to him by the amphibious force and, to a much greater degree than had been done previously, arranged for the retention in the area of cargo vessels and troopships that had completed their transpacific runs. In addition, a large number of personnel transfers were made on three Navy hospital transports (APHs), which ran a continuous shuttle of evacuated casualties southward and fresh troops northward. Some troop movements were also made by LSTs.
On 1 November 1943 amphibious landings were effected on Bougainville at Empress Augusta Bay. In the months that followed, Marine and Army units engaged in heavy fighting to secure a solid and stabilized foothold. The assault on Bougainville greatly extended the lines of communications of the South Pacific Area. Cape Torokina, the principal supply point on the island, was 409 nautical miles from Guadalcanal. Yet this campaign did not place as great an emergency burden on transportation as did the move on New Georgia. The high level of supply that had been maintained by the shipping to the Guadalcanal area through the previous months had created sufficient reserves from which much of the supply for the Bougainville move was obtained without undue strain on shipping from rear bases northward.31
Transportation operations had also improved as additional Transportation Corps personnel and equipment arrived in the theater. At the end of 1942, the only Transportation Corps organizations in the theater had been the 1st Port and the locally activated 196th Port Company. One year later there were four port battalion headquarters, nineteen port companies, and six DUKW companies in the South Pacific. The largest number of port units were assigned at Nouméa and on Guadalcanal and Espiritu Santo. Five of the DUKW companies were on Guadalcanal. Single port companies were stationed at Efate and in the Fijis and a DUKW company was on duty at Munda. At Nouméa, the 790th Transportation Corps Railway Operating Company had been activated in July 1943 to take over the Nouméa–Paita Railroad from the Engineer detachment. On 1 February 1944 operation of this obsolete line was discontinued and the unit was converted into a truck company. Although the Transportation Corps units provided were still insufficient to handle the burden of port operations, as indicated by the fact that as late as January 1944 there were as many combat troops engaged in cargo-handling activities as there were Transportation Corps personnel, the time was approaching when combat troops could be relieved of service duties. In the latter part of 1943 the shortage of marine and cargo-handling equipment was eased by the arrival in the theater of harbor craft, cranes, nets, and other items requisitioned earlier in the year. Through the efforts of the Transportation Division, a portion of the new equipment destined originally for Nouméa was diverted to Guadalcanal, the Russells, New Georgia, and Bougainville. In December alone, thirty-four cranes arrived and were assigned to ports in the Solomons
area. Other equipment that could be spared from Nouméa and the Fijis was also shipped north.
During these months the small Transportation Division staff was gradually augmented, and by the end of the year Colonel Fraser had eight officers, one warrant officer, and eighteen enlisted men. In the last quarter of 1943, the Transportation Division for the first time had separate branches handling water transportation, troop movements, and port and supply activities. In addition to its regular duties relating to incoming shipping, intratheater movements, and coordination of port activities, the division was giving increasing attention to the clearing of rear bases and the shifting of supplies northward. Vessels from the United States and from the South Pacific Area were routed to lift supplies from Efate and the Fijis, which were declining in importance, and from the now unimportant island outposts on Aitutaki, Bora Bora, Tongareva, and Tongatabu. In some instances, entire shiploads bound for rear areas were diverted farther forward to avoid double handling.
With the Bougainville operation under way in November 1943, troop and cargo movement was again accelerated. Major troop transfers arranged by the Transportation Division in late 1943 involved the movement of the Americal Division from the Fijis to Bougainville to relieve a Marine division there; the 25th Infantry Division from Guadalcanal to Auckland for rest; the 2nd Marine Division from Wellington to Pearl Harbor; and several naval construction and special battalions to forward positions and to Australia. The number of troops moved within the theater, exclusive of transfers within or from the forward area, rose from 45,413 in October 1943 to 61,166 in November, and stayed at a relatively high level.
Cargo-handling operations at major ports were at or near their peak. Nouméa experienced a decline in discharge activities as Guadalcanal received an increasing proportion of shipping from the United States, but this was counterbalanced by the continued transshipment forward of a large volume of supplies and equipment. Espiritu Santo also became increasingly important as a transshipment point, some 25 percent of the tonnage handled there in the last quarter of 1943 consisting of shipments to the forward area. A contributing factor was the establishment of a drum-fill plant, which packaged bulk fuel discharged from tankers for shipment to the Russells, New Georgia, and points north. Empty drums were returned for refilling and sent out again. Guadalcanal, now the main forward base, was beginning to outstrip Nouméa. Forward from Guadalcanal, islands were opened to direct shipping from rear bases and the United States as soon as the tactical situation permitted. By the end of 1943, Munda in New Georgia, Torokina on Bougainville, and the Treasury Islands were opened as direct shipping destinations. Early in 1944 two or three ships a day were handled at these discharging points. To support these operations, Transportation Corps units were transferred to the Army service commands established on the islands. The 455th Amphibian Truck Company moved from Guadalcanal to Munda late in November 1943. Another DUKW unit moved from Guadalcanal to Torokina in January 1944, and in March two port companies were transferred from the Fijis and New Caledonia.
The bulk of the supplies for the forward
bases, however, continued to come from Guadalcanal. Despite improvements in facilities and augmentation of personnel, the heavy volume of shipping directed to Guadalcanal in the latter part of 1943 again outran the island’s discharge and transshipment capacity. To provide the necessary relief, the South Pacific naval commander on 17 November ordered the transfer of all possible staging and transshipment activities to the Russells, which had been placed under development after their occupation in February 1943. By November completed dock facilities consisted of Blue Beach Dock on Renard Sound and a ponton floating pier at Tillotson Cove, each capable of handling one ship of Liberty size and LSTs. A second ponton pier was being erected. With the diversion of transshipping activities to the Russells, the ponton pier was rushed to completion and numerous warehouses were built. Ship arrivals initially outstripped the port’s discharge capacity, but by the end of the year four or five vessels were being worked constantly, and the Russells had replaced Espiritu Santo as the third ranking port in the South Pacific.
The development of the Russells provided but temporary relief for Guadalcanal. To the handling of supplies for the continuing support of Bougainville was added the burden of stockpiling for a large-scale offensive against Kavieng, set for 1 March 1944. In addition, a severe storm on 15 January 1944 seriously damaged docks and piers and handicapped port operations. Despite the fact that Guadalcanal had unloaded 142,676 short tons in January, it was unable to keep pace with incoming shipping. As of 11 February a total of 280,427 short tons of cargo aboard 80 vessels was reported as awaiting discharge in the Solomon area.
The congestion was relieved in March 1944. The Kavieng operation was canceled and the base bypassed. Green Island was seized in February, and Emirau Island was taken in March. Little opposition was encountered in either operation. As a result, the volume of shipping moving to the Solomons fell off somewhat. In the meantime, two port battalions had arrived in the theater and had been assigned to Guadalcanal and the Russells. The arrival of the 40th and 93rd Infantry divisions provided an additional source of labor. In March 1944, and again in May, Guadalcanal discharged and loaded a record total of over 180,000 short tons. The tie-up of shipping in the Solomons area in February 1944 was the last one of a serious nature in the South Pacific area.
In the spring of 1944, transportation operations were characterized by gradually declining activity in the rear area, counterbalanced by increasing activity in the forward area. Troop movements to the South Pacific fell off drastically, while the volume of incoming supplies was stabilized. Within the theater, personnel movements were kept over 40,000 a month as troops continued to move toward the forward areas. Nouméa and Espiritu Santo, the principal rear bases, were handling a large, but by now static, volume of tonnage. Guadalcanal and the Russells were at the peak of their development as bases handling the bulk of supplies moving into the forward areas. As successive amphibious assaults extended the lines of communications, newly occupied bases were opened as shipping destinations for cargo vessels. In March 1944 Emirau and Green Islands were both opened to shipping from the rear bases and the United States. In the same month the 218th Port Company moved from the Russells to Emirau and took over operations. Green Island received its first Transportation Corps unit
in May, when the 313th Port Company arrived from the United States.
At this time, theater and base transportation organizations were better able to handle operations than ever before. On 1 April 1944 the Transportation Division, staffed by twenty officers, thirty enlisted men, and four civilian stenographers, was an experienced agency performing its functions in a well-defined manner. At the major bases Army service command transportation sections, formerly known as provisional ports of embarkation, directed port operations in close cooperation with Navy and Marine authorities. At their disposal were six port battalion headquarters, twenty-six port companies, six DUKW companies, a significant number of special naval construction battalions, and an increasing supply of harbor craft and cargo-handling equipment.32 Although port facilities often left much to be desired, they had been considerably improved.
The rate of movement of troops and supplies in the South Pacific remained high through June 1944, but the South Pacific was rapidly becoming inoperational. With the bypassing of Kavieng and the seizure of western New Britain and the Admiralties by Southwest Pacific forces, isolated enemy forces were left to die on the vine, and the Japanese airfields at Rabaul were hammered into impotence from forward air bases in the South Pacific and New Guinea areas. The offensive campaigns of the South Pacific forces were virtually over.33
From Static Defense to Offensive Operations in the Central Pacific
For a year after the assault on Guadalcanal, the Hawaiian area remained in the background. The Battle of Midway had restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific and, except for the Aleutians, confined enemy action to the South Pacific. During this period Army traffic in the Hawaiian area was relatively light. As the deployment of troops and construction activities slowed down, the volume of tonnage arriving in Honolulu for discharge and transshipment to outlying islands and the ferry bases leveled off. After May 1942 cargo discharged did not exceed 140,000 measurement tons a month, and during July 1943 the total Army tonnage discharged and loaded at the port amounted to only 74,672 measurement tons.34
Water transportation operations continued under the direction of the Army Transport Service until October 1942, when the Hawaiian Department SOS was established. At that time, the ATS staff and functions were incorporated into the Port and Transportation Division. Under the SOS, later redesignated the Hawaiian Department Service Forces, the Port and Transportation Division supervised Army port and allied motor and rail activities at Honolulu and the outlying islands and operated vessels engaged in interisland and ferry-base shipping. These operations required only modest augmentation of labor and port facilities. The arrival of the 376th Port Battalion in August 1942 had added
four companies to the three on duty at Honolulu, increasing the number of troops engaged in cargo-handling duties from 662 to 1,582. Together with civilian dock workers employed by the division or secured through the Cargo and Passenger Control agency, they formed an adequate labor force. Construction work was begun on new piers during 1942 and additional cargo-handling equipment, vehicles, and harbor craft arrived.
At the miniature ports on the outlying islands, Transportation Corps officer representatives supervised cargo handling and movements from docks to warehouses. These activities were performed by civilians, occasionally supplemented by Transportation Corps personnel and equipment. At the ferry-base islands of Christmas, Fanning, Canton, and, later, Palmyra, port operations were handled by task force troops. With the exception of that at Canton, all cargo had to be light-ered ashore. In early 1943 one Transportation Corps officer was on duty with each of the task forces on Canton and Christmas, and later in the year port detachments were sent out from Honolulu to supervise port operations. The supply of the outlying islands and ferry bases was maintained through Honolulu on Army-operated vessels manned by civilians and Navy ships bound for the South Pacific. In the latter part of 1942, two additional small vessels were received by the Army and placed on interisland runs. The only serious problem in these shipping operations was the lack of refrigerator vessels, which necessitated installation of refrigerator boxes on interisland vessels and the shipment of many types of perishables in ventilator space.
A new activity became important in late 1942 when the Hawaiian Department was called upon to transfer the 25th Infantry Division to the South Pacific. Assuming that the Navy would provide all major shipping requirements incident to convoy and operational control, the Army G-4 arranged for the Navy to provide vessels for the movement. After being loaded at Honolulu, three convoys carrying the division’s troops and equipment departed for the South Pacific between 25 November and 16 December 1942. In the first half of 1943 the Army continued to ship a limited number of troops and equipment in Navy vessels. These shipments did not appreciably affect the over-all decline in port traffic.
On the organizational side, the Port and Transportation Division’s administrative staff was increased and more civilians were hired to man harbor craft and the small vessels. In January 1943 the division had approximately 2,000 military and civilian personnel engaged in administrative duties, in pier and wharf work, and in the operation of harbor craft and interisland vessels. Water transportation activities were being handled efficiently and few serious problems were encountered.35
During this defensive period, coordination of Army, Navy, and civilian operations was informal and confined largely to local Hawaiian matters. The Cargo and Passenger Control agency assigned vessels in Honolulu harbor to piers for unloading, assigned cargo to ships returning to the United States, and apportioned cargo-handling personnel and equipment among the various port agencies. In April 1943 joint logistical and working boards were
established, and a number of cooperative practices were added to those already in effect. The arrangements made by G-4 for the use of Navy vessels for ferry-base and forward shipments evolved into a system whereby the Navy made routine offerings of space to the Army. Data on cargo shipping requirements from the United States were exchanged, and beginning in May 1943 joint priority lists were drawn up for the movement of personnel from the United States.36
As long as the Central Pacific’s role was purely that of defense and incoming supplies were limited largely to the maintenance of the Hawaiian area, there was little inclination further to unify Army and Navy supply and transportation operations or greatly to expand the Army’s port organization. By mid-1943, however, the area’s strategic mission was in process of change. The decisions adopted at TRIDENT and QUADRANT to seize the Gilberts and Marshalls as a preliminary to a general westward advance across the Central Pacific were premised on the use of the Hawaiian area for the reception, training, mounting, and support of forces engaged in the projected campaigns.37 To handle the expected expansion of operations, the Army reorganized its command, and as the first campaign approached Admiral Nimitz took steps to coordinate Army and Navy logistical efforts for its support.
The Establishment of the Army Port and Service Command
In August 1943 a new headquarters, the U.S. Army Forces in the Central Pacific Area (USAFICPA), was created with Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Jr., in command.38 General Richardson, who had assumed command of the Hawaiian Department in June, retained his responsibilities as department commander and military governor, and was charged with the administration and training of Army forces throughout the Central Pacific Area. Since the area was under Nimitz’ unified command, Richardson was subject to Nimitz’ direction in the preparation and execution of plans for the employment of Army forces in the area. In the months that followed, USAFICPA became the Army logistical agency for the support of offensive operations, the training agency for Army forces mounting from the Hawaiian area, and the administrative agency for all Army forces in the Central Pacific.
As part of the general reorientation to its new role, the Army radically altered the organization of its service functions. General Richardson abolished the Hawaiian Department Service Forces and centralized Army activities pertaining to the movement of troops and supplies in a new agency, the Army Port and Service Command (AP&SC). This headquarters was established on 10 August 1943 as a major echelon of USAFICPA and was headed by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Roy E. Blount, a cavalry officer. As commander of the AP&SC, Colonel Blount also acted as executive to the Military Governor for Cargo and Passenger Control. Later, in
February 1944, Blount was appointed transportation officer on the USAFICPA special staff in addition to his other duties.
The AP&SC, as its name suggests, combined functions ordinarily performed by ports of embarkation and service commands in the zone of interior. It directed port operations at Honolulu and all sub-ports at territorial harbors, controlled all rail transportation in the area used by the Army, and maintained liaison with the 14th Naval District and the Pacific Fleet in all matters affecting joint shipping on which a policy had been established by higher headquarters. As the service command, the AP&SC commanded all posts, camps, and stations, and all staging and billeting areas on Oahu other than Air Forces installations and certain exempted stations. It operated the Hawaiian Department Replacement Depot, performed housekeeping functions, and operated recreational facilities on installations under its command.
At the time of its activation, the AP&SC commanded a total of 406 officers and 8,085 enlisted men. These included personnel of the former Port and Transportation Division and the port troops under its control. In the new organization, port and other water transportation activities were placed under an Army Transport Service, and motor and rail operations were assigned to a Port Transportation Section. Other personnel assigned to AP&SC were those of the Hawaiian Department Replacement Depot, the station complements of the staging and billeting installations, and the Army and civilian members of the Cargo and Passenger Control agency. The AP&SC established its headquarters on Sand Island in Honolulu harbor and began the task of building an effective organization.39
Established as a provisional headquarters company to be staffed from sources within the Hawaiian area, the AP&SC experienced a severe shortage of administrative and service personnel. Accretions to the staff were slow, handicapping Colonel Blount in his efforts to build up his headquarters. It was not until 13 April 1944, when the War Department authorized the activation of the 24th Port (Overseas) with an authorized strength of 111 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 408 enlisted men, that the basis for an adequate administrative organization was provided. The shortage of port and other service troops was even more chronic. Although several new port companies arrived in the fall of 1943, the growing volume of supplies moving across the docks at Honolulu and the necessity for shipping Transportation Corps units forward left the port shorthanded. Like the South Pacific, the Central Pacific made up for this deficiency by employing combat troops extensively. During the height of operations, as many as 10,000 tactical troops a week were employed on the docks and at the depots. Still another problem was the inadequacy of pier facilities at Honolulu. With the establishment of AP&SC, construction work on the two piers begun early in 1942 was accelerated. Army Engineers completed the first pier in December 1943 and finished work on the second in July 1944. The two new piers could handle six Liberty ships simultaneously and solved the problem of berthing space.40
Even while the infant AP&SC was in process of organization, it was called upon to handle the supplies and troops pouring into Honolulu in addition to the normal flow of supplies for the maintenance of the Hawaiian and ferry-base islands. In the last three months of 1943, a total of 518,193 measurement tons of cargo was discharged and 36,505 troops debarked at Honolulu, largely destined for use in the Gilberts and Marshalls campaigns. To handle this influx and to train port units for duty in forward areas, the Army port units were removed from the control of the Army Transport Service and formed into a provisional port group in November 1943. Together with civilian workers, the port group personnel performed longshore and allied services at the Honolulu port and the subports.
In addition to its primary mission of handling the cargo and troops moving across the docks at Honolulu and the sub-ports and providing billeting, training, and staging facilities, the AP&SC assisted in the mounting and support of amphibious operations. Beginning with the Gilberts campaign, the AP&SC coordinated traffic control from staging areas to troopships; aided assault and garrison forces in loading; provided materials for and supervised palletizing and crating; selected, equipped, and trained Transportation Corps personnel scheduled to participate in assault and garrison phases; handled returning casualties; and, as consignor for Army shipments, loaded the supplies required for the support of operations.41
The Development of Joint Logistical Action
While Army port and supply operations were being reorganized, the unified command was intensifying its efforts to correlate Army and Navy logistical activities in support of projected operations. In the months preceding the Gilberts campaign assault forces were selected, initial requirements for classes of all supplies were determined, and garrison forces were organized to follow the assault troops and take over responsibility for the defense and development of the islands. In order to provide for continued Army-Navy cooperation in support of this and subsequent campaigns, Admiral Nimitz on 6 September set up a joint staff, appointing Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Edmond H. Leavey as J-4 for Logistics. The J-4 Division took over the duties of the joint logistical and working boards and the usual functions of a theater G-4 Section.
The mechanics for joint logistical support of advance bases were set down in a directive issued by Nimitz on 20 September. In this directive he prescribed maintenance supplies to be carried in the initial movement of garrison troops as well as the levels to be maintained at each captured base. The J-4 Division was given general supervision over supply for the island bases. Responsibility for providing all services at forward islands with common supplies, such as subsistence and gasoline, was divided between the Army and Navy, and provision was made for pooling construction equipment and personnel. The Navy was given responsibility for furnishing the shipping required to support the bases, arranging for convoys, escorts, and routing all ships, assigning shipping space, and the delivery of all supplies to the beach. The service providing the garrison force was to furnish the necessary working parties aboard ship to assist in the discharge of vessels and to handle cargo de-
livered at the beach.42 With numerous modifications, these principles were adhered to in the drive across the Central Pacific.
Admiral Nimitz also established a Joint Overseas Control Office (JOSCO) on Oahu on 8 November 1943. Operating under the Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet, and containing Army and Navy representatives, JOSCO controlled loadings and shipping originating in the Hawaiian area for forward areas, excluding shipping to the ferry-base islands. In the spring of 1944 Nimitz set up a Joint Army-Navy-WSA Committee to discuss and interchange information on all port facilities and ships’ status, utilization, priorities, cargo, and personnel. This agency took over many of the functions of JOSCO, although the latter continued to perform all paper work and routine staff activities.43
The various measures instituted by Admiral Nimitz were successful in bringing the Army, Navy, and Marines into an unprecedented correlation of logistical efforts. So far as water transportation was concerned, joint action was secured through increasing centralization and integration of shipping control. From the Gilberts campaign to December 1944, all shipping for the initial movement and continuous support of U.S. forces in POA forward from the Hawaiian area was allocated to the Navy. This shipping included vessels operated by the WSA, Army, and Navy that were dispatched from the mainland as well as those moving forward from Hawaiian ports. Upon the establishment of the J-4 Division, Admiral Nimitz delegated to it responsibility for the control and employment of support shipping, other than routing and escorting. Through its Transportation Section, J-4 controlled water movements into operational areas once operations had passed from the assault to the garrison phase. It set up shipping, allocated it, scheduled its movement to forward ports, and in general planned for, supervised, and coordinated movements required for the logistical support of POA forces regardless of service. In this manner, a centralized cargo-priority and shipping-control system evolved under the Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas.
The arrangements for the allocation and control of shipping into the forward area naturally limited the role played by the Army in the Central Pacific in the field of water transportation. The Army was allocated shipping from the United States for the support of Army forces and civilians in the Hawaiian area and, after August 1944, the South Pacific. In addition, the Army owned or operated vessels engaged in intratheater shipping in the Hawaiian area. But it was dependent on shipping allocated to the Navy and regulated by the commander of the Pacific Ocean Areas for movements to, from, and within the forward areas west of Hawaii. This dependence was particularly disturbing to General Richardson. Charged with the logistical support of Army forces in the theater, he found existing procedures in effect denied him the means of implementing this responsibility. The system was also distasteful to the Chief of Transportation in Washington, who was unable to trace arrivals, diversions, and departures of vessels loaded in the United States
with Army cargo moving to the forward areas of POA.44
Nevertheless, control of shipping by the commander of POA was not only retained but strengthened. As part of its effort to cope with a world-wide shipping crisis, JCS in December 1944 made Nimitz responsible for the supervision of the utilization of all shipping in his command. All dry shipping tonnage for the area was allocated by Washington to Nimitz, who in turn allocated tonnage to meet requirements for operational areas and suballotted tonnages to the Army and Navy to meet their respective needs in nonoperational areas. In addition, Nimitz was given specific responsibility for many of the functions already being performed by his J-4 Transportation Section, including determining dry cargo shipping required for operational areas, scheduling and controlling support shipping to operational objectives, and matching shipping with beach and discharge capacities of forward destinations. Nimitz’ over-all control of shipping was retained through the remainder of the war.45
Centralized control of shipping was a natural sequel to unity of command. In a theater so dependent on water transport, it was imperative that the limited shipping available be effectively utilized to meet the needs of all participating services. In General Leavey’s opinion, if each service had been permitted to provide its own shipping in the quantity it considered necessary, the resultant duplication, waste, conflict, and congestion would have been disastrous. He believed that Nimitz’ central control had made possible the adequate supply of Army as well as Navy and Marine forces through enforcing a planned, impartial, balanced flow of shipping.46 Nor did control by the commander of POA mean that Army interests were neglected. Aside from the fact that the J-4 Division, including its Transportation Section, was staffed by Army as well as Navy officers, the Army was consulted in developing shipping requirements, in the preparation of joint personnel priority lists, and in the allocation and scheduling of shipping. Army staff and operational agencies maintained contact with joint staff and Navy officers dealing with transportation matters, and sympathetic consideration was generally given Army requests. The Army was also given representation on joint committees controlling port and shipping activities. On the whole, control by the commander of POA worked well and probably represented the best possible arrangement.47
If the Army was dependent on the commander in chief of POA for the shipping necessary to fulfill the responsibility for the logistical support of Army forces in the forward areas, it nonetheless played a direct and vital role in transportation operations in the Central Pacific campaigns. It received, staged, and mounted Army personnel and their equipment, loaded the supplies for the support, and, when an Army garrison force was provided, handled port and other operations at the forward island bases.
Participation in the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas Campaigns
The assault on the Gilberts touched off offensive operations in the Central Pacific. Between 20 and 23 November 1943, the 27th Infantry Division assaulted and secured Makin, while Marine forces seized Tarawa and Apamama. During the preparation for the campaign, the AP&SC received, stored, and reshipped a steadily growing volume of Army supplies and equipment, together with the personnel necessary for the seizure and development of the island objectives. At the same time, it directly assisted in the training and mounting of assault and garrison forces.48
Beginning in October 1943, AP&SC conducted transport quartermaster (TQM) classes to train selected personnel from tactical units in principles and practices of loading and unloading. Some ninety officers and enlisted men of the 27th Infantry Division and attached units received training in teams of one officer and two men for the assault on Makin. When the assault forces mounted out, the AP&SC partially stripped Army-operated piers at Honolulu of cargo-handling equipment and provided vehicles to supplement equipment available to the Navy at Pearl Harbor, where most of the transports were loaded. It also furnished winch operators and an officer adviser to assist Army combat units in loading; provided prefabricated boxes and crates, strapping materials, and lumber for the construction of pallets and dunnage; and assigned MPs to convoy troops to the docks, route traffic, and guard the piers. The Army garrison force, which was organized on Oahu and was to follow the 27th Division into Makin, was completely loaded by AP&SC troops. Finally, the AP&SC handled the debarkation of the returning force.
The Gilberts campaign marked the innovation of techniques and practices that became standard for subsequent operations. Palletization of supplies was adopted on an experimental basis for assault force and high-priority garrison force supplies. As a result of favorable reports from the 7th Infantry Division regarding their use in the Aleutians, 1,850 pallets of the toboggan and sled type were constructed with towing bridges and cargo-handling slings. Supplies were strapped to the pallets. The experiments in the Gilberts were successful, and a high percentage of assault force supplies continued to be palletized in subsequent operations. The Gilberts operation also marked the first use of an AP &SC-trained and AP &SC-equipped Transportation Corps port company in the combat area. Company D of the 376th Port Battalion, which had seen service at Honolulu and the sub-ports, accompanied the Army garrison force to Makin and took over port and depot activities.49
Concurrently with preparation for the Gilberts operation, plans were developed for the invasion of the Marshalls. In early February 1944 the 7th Infantry Division captured Kwajalein Island and the 4th Marine Division took Roi and Namur. Subsequently, the 106th Infantry Regiment and the 22nd Marine Regiment seized Eniwetok Atoll. In the mounting of this campaign, the AP&SC repeated and systematized its services for Army assault and garrison forces. It furnished units with technical assistance and advice pertaining to combat loading and the movement of troops; provided crating, palletizing, and packing facilities and personnel to the units involved; assigned Transportation Corps troops and equipment to unload freight cars and carry cargo to shipside; loaded high-priority items for use in the initial assault; and made available cranes, fork-lift trucks, and jitneys to the 7th and 27th Divisions to unload supplies arriving in the staging area, to place supplies on pallets, and, after strapping, to stack and load pallets for shipment to the dock. Training facilities were improved and expanded. The transport quartermaster school was established on a permanent basis and instruction of port companies in cargo handling under combat and forward base conditions was instituted at a training deck at Camp Kahili. Once more a Transportation Corps unit was assigned to participate in the early stages of a campaign. Company B of the 376th Port Battalion was given training at Camp Kahili and released to the 4th Army Defense Battalion, the garrison force for Kwajalein. The company moved to Carlson Island on 31 January 1944 (D minus 1) to discharge artillery and ammunition used to shell nearby Kwajalein Island on D Day. The company completed its mission on D plus 4 and moved to Kwajalein, where it discharged ships and worked supply dumps for the next twelve months.50
The Marshalls campaign was the first Central Pacific operation in which the DUKW saw service. Unlike the South Pacific forces, which used DUKWs in the garrison phase of operations to compensate for the lack of port facilities and to expedite ship turnaround, Central Pacific forces used them in the assault phase as well. At Tarawa, “various deficiencies in both the quantity and quality of naval preparatory fire” had been revealed.51 To increase the effectiveness of preliminary gunfire, it was decided to land artillery on Carlson Island the day before landing on the adjacent island of Kwajalein. At the suggestion of Brig. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold, commander of the 7th Division artillery, DUKWs were used to land and emplace the artillery. Sixty DUKWs were provided and, in the absence of Transportation Corps amphibian truck units, drivers and maintenance personnel were selected from the 7th Division artillery. Four battalions of field artillery embarked on four LSTs along with their initial supply of ammunition. On the tank deck of each LST were twelve DUKWs, each carrying one 105-mm. howitzer, and three DUKWs, each equipped with an A-frame. The LSTs closed to within a short distance of the shore and launched the DUKWs. The DUKWs carried the artillery pieces to their beach positions, where they were lifted from the DUKWs by A-frame. The LSTs were then beached, the DUKWs shuttling supplies between LSTs and the dumps. After completing this job, the DUKWs were employed at Kwajalein and the other
islands to carry high-priority supplies ashore.
The preliminary gunfire from the artillery that had been landed on Carlson Island the day before the invasion, together with effective and intensive naval and air bombardment, had a devastating effect on enemy resistance in the beaches. At the conclusion of the Kwajalein operation the Joint Expeditionary Force commander reported that the DUKWs had proved invaluable for the rapid transfer of supplies and ammunition immediately needed. The DUKW was considered ideal for carrying artillery and effectively supplemented the LVT (landing vehicle, tracked) in bringing supplies ashore.52 In February 1944 the first three Transportation Corps amphibian truck companies were assigned to AP&SC and began training for combat operations to come.
While the AP&SC was establishing itself as an authority in the preparation for and support of the Gilberts and Marshalls assaults, its main functions continued to center in the handling of the heavy flow of cargo and troops through the Honolulu port. The volume of Army tonnage arriving from the mainland and discharged at Honolulu had mounted steadily since August 1943, reaching 256,945 measurement tons in January 1944. During the same period, monthly loadings for destinations forward from the Hawaiian Islands increased from 14,639 to 84,389 measurement tons. In January 1944 the total Army tonnage handled at Honolulu, including cargo received from or shipped to outlying islands, amounted to 484,591 measurement tons. This did not include a substantial amount of commercial and Navy cargo that crossed the Honolulu piers under AP&SC supervision. Accelerated cargo traffic was accompanied by an increase in troop movements. In September 1943, as preparations were made for the Gilberts assault, 23,908 Army troops arriving from the mainland debarked at Honolulu. In November, when the assault was made, 23,912 troops embarked for forward destinations. After falling off in October and November, troop debarkations again rose as additional forces were brought in for the Marshalls assault. In the next two months a total of 34,702 troops arrived from the mainland, and 32,219 embarked at Honolulu for forward destinations.
The heavy movement of troops, supplies, and equipment through Honolulu severely taxed AP&SC personnel and facilities. On 31 March 1944 there were four port battalion headquarters and fourteen port companies on Oahu. The port load at Honolulu compelled these units, together with civilian longshoremen, to work on shifts around the clock and made difficult the in-service training of port troops, many of whom were inexperienced. Despite the arrival of additional units during 1944, there were never enough men to handle the work without stress. Other Transportation Corps units on Oahu at the end of March were three DUKW companies in training for forward area operations and a harbor craft company. Port company detachments were also stationed at Maui, Canton, and Christmas. At Makin and Kwajalein one port company was serving with each of
the Army garrison forces, while a port unit and a small detachment were assigned to Tarawa, which was under Navy command.53
The expansion of transportation operations which had begun in mid-1943 was again accelerated in the spring of 1944. By that time, U.S. forces in the Pacific had established bases and airfields in the Marshalls and had successfully bypassed strongly held Japanese positions in the South and Southwest Pacific. It was then decided to make a bold amphibious strike at the southern Marianas, including Saipan, Guam, and Tinian, which were over 1,000 miles forward of the most advanced Central Pacific base at Eniwetok.
The assembly and embarkation of amphibious forces and the loading of supplies for the assault on the Marianas were conducted mainly in the Hawaiian area and the South Pacific. The Marianas forces, including corps troops of the III and V Amphibious Corps, three Marine divisions and a Marine provisional brigade, the 27th and 77th Infantry Divisions, and elements of the garrison forces, embarked in late May and early June 1944 and proceeded to staging bases at Eniwetok and Kwajalein. There, all troops assigned to the initial assaults on Saipan and Guam were transferred from transports to LSTs and moved to their objectives along with supporting cargo ships and transports. On 15 June Saipan was assaulted. Following Saipan’s conquest, Marine forces on Saipan invaded Tinian on 23 July. In the meantime, Guam had been invaded.54
The bulk of the immediate support and resupply of assault and garrison forces was provided from the Hawaiian area. Support vessels carrying troops and materials for resupply and base development were organized into garrison echelons and followed behind the assault waves. The garrison echelons moved first to the regulating point at Eniwetok and were then called forward as needed. Continued support and maintenance for the Marianas came from the Hawaiian area and direct from the United States. Since the Gilberts and Marshalls lacked the facilities necessary to establish them as supply bases for operations to the west, both the Army and the Navy continued to rely heavily on the Hawaiian area, but it was evident that it could not carry the burden alone. In February 1944 Admiral Nimitz directed that, to the greatest practicable extent, all materials, supplies, and equipment for development and subsequent replenishment of advanced bases be loaded at mainland ports for direct shipment to destinations. After conferences of representatives of the Army and Navy commanders in POA, the Navy, through the commander of the 12th Naval District at San Francisco, was made responsible for lifting all cargo moving direct to forward bases, using Navy-allocated vessels. In the spring of 1944 a small but growing volume of supplies was shipped into the Marshalls and Gilberts. In the course of the Marianas campaign, a significant amount of base development supplies was shipped direct from the United States. During 1944 over 815,000 measurement tons of Army cargo were shipped direct to the Marianas, and in 1945 more Army cargo moved from the
United States to the Marianas than was shipped to the Hawaiian group.55
In the months preceding the Marianas campaign, the Hawaiian area was the scene of busy preparations. Assault and garrison forces were selected, plans were jointly made for their supply and maintenance, shipping was lined up, and arrangements were made for mounting out forces. For the AP &SC, the period was marked by a continuing acceleration of port activities. After reaching a high plateau in February and March 1944, traffic at Honolulu again began to climb, reaching a peak in July, when almost 300,000 measurement tons of Army cargo from the mainland were discharged and approximately 150,000 measurement tons were loaded for destinations forward from the Hawaiian Islands, principally the Marianas. During the latter month Honolulu handled a record total of 527,783 measurement tons of Army cargo.56
In the meantime, the AP&SC was also engaged in developing its program of assisting in the mounting of assault and garrison forces and in the training and equipping of participating Transportation Corps units.57 In preparation for the campaign, AP&SC trained 275 TQM teams from combat units. Although assault forces were responsible for their own loading and berthing of assault vessels, AP&SC maintained close liaison with them, giving technical assistance and advice. It also furnished materials and assisted Army assault and garrison forces in crating and palletizing, arranged for transportation of personnel from staging areas to piers by truck and rail, and expedited the loading of cargo on board ship.
AP&SC units selected to participate in the Marianas operation were the 376th Port Battalion headquarters, five port companies, and a DUKW company. Because the pressure of work at Honolulu made impossible extended training, the port troops were given only one week’s intensive schooling in handling cargo under combat conditions at Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center and the Kahili training deck. They were then assigned to the Provisional Troop Port Command of the Army Garrison Force for Saipan, which had been organized on Oahu in April 1944. Troop Port Command headquarters and two of the port companies, the 311th and 539th, were attached to the
V Amphibious Corps and prepared to move to Saipan with the 4th Marine Division. Arrangements were made for the 376th Port Battalion and two additional port companies to arrive in the first support echelon, followed later by the fifth port company.
The 477th Amphibian Truck Company, selected for the Saipan assault, had been activated with inexperienced Negro personnel from disbanded air base security battalions. After screening out and replacing a high percentage of unqualified
personnel, AP&SC gave the company intensive training in DUKW operation, beach landings, and swimming at Waimanalo and at the Central Pacific Area amphibious training center at Waeanae. The unit was then attached to the V Amphibious Corps and included in the assault shipping for Saipan.
The assault forces made their initial landing on the southwestern beaches of Saipan on 15 June 1944. From the beginning, Transportation Corps units performed creditably despite their inexperience. On D Day thirty-seven DUKWs of the 477th Amphibian Truck Company debarked combat-loaded from LSTs and AK’s with equipment and supplies for the XXIV Corps artillery. For the duration of the operation the unit operated under the direction and control of the G-4 Section of the XXIV Corps artillery, hauling from ship to shore dumps and between shore dumps.
Troop Port Command headquarters and the 311th and 539th Port Companies also arrived with the assault forces. The two port units assisted in unloading operations under the control of the Marine Corps shore party commander. Since there were practically no piers available during the early stages of the operation, LCTs, LCMs, LVTs, and DUKWs were used to transport cargo from ship to beach. Port troops were used offshore to move cargoes from the ships, anchored in the outer harbor, to landing craft. The men lived on board the vessels they were working and slept on deck. On approximately D plus 6, cargo-handling equipment, including cranes, tractors, and low-bed trailers, was brought into a small Japanese causeway-type pier at Charan Kanoa, and shortly thereafter a ponton pier was constructed about 400 yards away and additional crane equipment was brought in. As these facilities were placed in operation, the port companies unloaded cargo from landing craft at the piers as well as from ships at anchor. The port units were augmented by the 376th Port Battalion headquarters and two port companies, which arrived in the first support echelon and assisted in the unloading of the vessels of that echelon, a task completed on 27 June (D plus 12). Meanwhile, the Army troop commander, the commanding officer of the port battalion, and several of their staff had been placed on full-time duty with the shore party commander to gain experience and prepare for assumption of control over unloading of ships.
During initial combat operations, parties provided by tactical units handled cargo on the beaches under the shore party commander’s control, and organic vehicles moved supplies from the beaches to dumps and from the dumps forward. Because Saipan was a relatively large island lacking any but the most primitive roads, land transport was a serious problem. Trucks were scarce, turnaround time was a matter of hours rather than minutes, poor roads caused excessive breakdowns, and the movement of supplies away from beaches and dumps lagged behind unloading operations. To supplement motor transport, many units used bullock carts to carry water and rations to their bivouac areas. Another step to relieve the situation was taken shortly after the landings when Army Engineer troops took over a seven-mile section of an obsolete, narrow-gauge Japanese railroad, using it to carry rations, ammunition, and gasoline drums from the beaches to the central part of the island. The rail line was operated for about a month, at which time the
roads had been sufficiently improved to permit its abandonment.
The beaches were turned over to the control of the Army Garrison Force on 29 June 1944 (D plus 14) and cargo handling was performed under the Army Troop Port Command’s supervision by the port battalion personnel, supplemented by working parties drawn from using units or Navy base companies. When Saipan was secured on 9 July, the Troop Port Command was responsible for loading and unloading all cargo, Navy and Marine as well as Army. Despite the recent capture of Japanese port installations to the north, pier and storage facilities were still extremely limited. A small pier at Garapan could handle three LCTs and a few additional LCMs and was used for landing cargo from ships in the outer harbor. At Tanapag, where port activities were ultimately to be concentrated, an earth-causeway pier capable of berthing one vessel was the only space for accommodating ocean-going vessels, provided they were lightened to a draft of twenty-four feet or less before entering the channel at Tanapag Harbor.
In the months that followed, port facilities were augmented and operations were improved. Dredging operations were started, and by the end of the year ships of thirty-foot draft could clear the channel. In August 1944 a ponton pier capable of berthing two additional vessels was completed, permitting the port simultaneously to discharge three ships at the piers while working four other ships in the outer harbor. In the same month, the Troop Port Command took over responsibility for truck delivery from the piers to consignees on the island. Previously, trucks from the units or dumps had come to the port to
pick up their cargo. Ships often arrived with mixed cargo and the arrival of trucks was not synchronized with that of the ships, thereby impeding efficient discharge. To correct this situation, the Troop Port Command established a Central Motor Pool. Army, Navy, and Marine tactical and service units on the island were required to give up all but the absolute minimum number of heavy vehicles. Using drivers from two Quartermaster truck companies as a nucleus, the pool made rapid progress in eliminating bottlenecks. Ships no longer had to wait for trucks in order to unload, and a steady flow of cargo was maintained for the development of base projects.
As supplies from the Hawaiian area and the United States poured in for the build-up of B-29 and other operations on Saipan additional improvements were made, and Army port troops were augmented by Navy Seabee longshoremen. Close collaboration was developed between the Troop Port Command and the Navy port director regarding the use of Navy troops, the priority of unloading of ships, and movements of ships to and from the piers. By the end of March 1945 the port had thirteen berths and was handling over 387,000 measurement tons of cargo a month.
The initial landing on Tinian was made on 24 July 1944. Like Saipan, Tinian lacked berthing facilities. Although a ponton pier was constructed in short order by Navy Seabees, most of the supplies were brought to or across the beach by landing craft, amphibian tractors, and DUKWs. The 477th Amphibian Truck Company, along with provisional Marine DUKW units, carried artillery, ammunition, and other high-priority supplies for the 2nd
Marine Division. The Saipan Troop Port Command provided winchmen and longshoremen to load supplies for transshipment to Tinian, and loaded out casualties returned to Saipan after the Tinian action. After occupation by U.S. forces, the discharge of cargo was handled by the Navy until November 1944, when an Army Troop Port Command took over.
No Transportation Corps units participated in the Guam operation.
Redeployment, Rehabilitation, and Roll-up in the South Pacific
As the tempo of the war in the Central Pacific was stepped up, the South Pacific declined in importance. Even before the Marianas campaign active combat in the South Pacific had virtually ended, and the area was fast becoming a zone of communications. On 15 June 1944 Admiral Halsey was relieved of combat responsibility along the Solomons–New Ireland axis, all Army forces west of 159 degrees east longitude were turned over to MacArthur’s command, and provision was made for the transfer of other troops from the South Pacific when required and as shipping became available. Logistical support of forces west of the boundary line, however, remained the responsibility of the South Pacific Area. In the months that followed, the South Pacific’s principal activities involved troop redeployment to the Southwest Pacific, maintenance of a dwindling force, rehabilitation of a limited number of Central Pacific troops, and the close-out of inactive bases and the roll-up of excess materials that had accumulated.
The end of combat operations in the South Pacific and its assumption of purely logistical functions led naturally to the re placement of USAFISPA by a zone of communications organization. On 1 August 1944 the South Pacific Base Command (SPBC) was established as a major echelon of USAFPOA. Command of SPBC was assumed on 10 August by Maj. Gen. Frederick Gilbreath, former head of the San Francisco Port of Embarkation. Although the new headquarters was subordinate to General Richardson, command and logistical relationships with the Commander, South Pacific, remained unaltered.
The establishment of SPBC produced little change in the transportation organization. On 19 August the theater SOS was abolished and most of its functions were absorbed by the base command G-4. The Transportation Division became a special staff section and retained most of its former duties, although the G-4 Troop Movement Section took over the preparation of troop movement orders and supervised air and water transportation priorities. The Transportation Section continued to direct the loading of Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Allied personnel and cargo within and from the base command in accordance with established priorities and arranged for the use of the vessels to effect the movements. In November a new function was added when an Air Priorities Sub-Section was organized within the section to take over from G-4 the screening of requests for air transportation and the coordination of airplane space allotted to SPBC with requirements for air movement of personnel and cargo. At that time the Transportation Section had an experienced staff of fifty officers and enlisted men divided into subsections to handle administration, water operations and troop movements,
port and supply activities, and air priorities control.58
At major island bases the service commands were abolished and incorporated into the island commands. The former service command transportation sections continued to supervise port operations directly under the island commands. Operating under the transportation sections, Army and Navy personnel, assisted by native labor, were handling cargo. On 31 October 1944 there were six port battalion headquarters, twenty-eight port companies, and three DUKW companies in the South Pacific. These units were concentrated mainly at Nouméa, Guadalcanal, and Espiritu Santo, with a port battalion headquarters and one company on duty in the Russells and a single port unit at Efate.59 Adequate labor facilities were available and port congestion was now a thing of the past.
The end of South Pacific combat operations brought to the fore the problem of redeploying Army forces to the Southwest Pacific. As of 15 June 1944 approximately 130,000 Army troops were either in the area transferred to MacArthur’s command or were scheduled for shipment from east of the boundary line. In order to coordinate and arrange for the transfer of these forces from the South Pacific and northern Solomons, liaison was established between the Southwest Pacific chief regulating officer and USAFISPA. A CREGO representative arrived at Nouméa on 24 June to serve as Regulating Officer, South Pacific (ROSOP), and continued on duty after the establishment of SPBC.
Working closely with G-4 Troop Movements and the Transportation Section, ROSOP kept CREGO informed on all troops and cargo to be moved; determined which vessels in the South Pacific could be used to transport cargo and personnel to the Southwest Pacific; insured that vessels were loaded and dispatched to arrive at destinations as ports were ready to receive them; and received desired routing and priorities of movement from CREGO. Under the system of coordinating troop transfers that evolved, ROSOP arranged with the Transportation Section for retention of vessels required and planned for the use of available shipping space in line with the priorities set up by CREGO. Upon receiving these plans from ROSOP, the Transportation Section issued loading instructions to ports, whether in the South Pacific Area or the northern Solomons, and the Commander, South Pacific, issued routing instructions. In some cases, the Southwest Pacific sent in vessels to pick up troops and equipment, but more often, due to the shipping shortage, transfers were made on transpacific ships retained in the area by Southwest Pacific request to Washington.60
During the latter half of 1944, loading directives were issued by the
Transportation Section for the movement of the 43rd Infantry Division from New Zealand, the 93rd Infantry Division from New Caledonia, and the 37th Infantry Division from Bougainville. A large part of the Americal Division was also loaded at Bougainville for Leyte by the year’s close. All of these forces were supplied and equipped by the South Pacific. Many smaller units, including Air Forces and Navy organizations as well as casuals, were also moved to SWPA during this period.61
While some troops were being transferred to the Southwest Pacific, others arrived in the South Pacific from the Central Pacific for rehabilitation, staging, and mounting. Originally, it had been planned to send a significant number of Army divisions to the South Pacific for this purpose, but the diversion of forces intended for Yap to the Philippines radically altered these plans. Central Pacific forces were used in the Leyte operation and were then prepared for the Okinawa assault without rehabilitation. As it developed, only two Army divisions moved into the South Pacific. The 27th Infantry Division arrived at Espiritu Santo from Saipan in the fall of 1944, and the 81st Infantry Division arrived at New Caledonia from the Palaus in January 1945. After being rested and outfitted in the South Pacific, the 27th Division departed for Central Pacific operations in March, while the 81st Division embarked for the Southwest Pacific during May. In the meantime, the 147th Infantry Regiment and the remainder of the Americal Division had departed. By the end of May 1945, there were no longer any major combat units in the area, and operations had moved too far north to use the South Pacific as a rehabilitation site.
Along with redeployment and rehabilitation, the South Pacific’s postcombat mission included the maintenance of the bases in the area and the logistical support of forces west of 159 degrees east longitude. The main receiving and transshipment bases were New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santo, and the Russells. Loading instructions for the movement of cargo and personnel within the South Pacific Area were issued by the Transportation Section. The coordination of troop and supply movements between the southern and northern Solomons, however, was the responsibility of the Guadalcanal Island Command, which had taken over the logistical functions of the former Forward Area. Because of the decline in the number of vessels bound for South Pacific ports, most of the troop and cargo movements within the South Pacific-northern Solomons area were effected by vessels assigned to the Navy Commander, Service Squadron, South Pacific. Beginning in early 1945, these ships were augmented by six small Army retriever freighters. The limited number of available transpacific vessels were used for shipments to the Southwest and Central Pacific and charged to their retention allotments.
During this period the drop in cargo and troop arrivals from the United States, departures from the area, and a decrease in intratheater shipping caused a sharp decline in port activity in the area. Guadalcanal, which had handled 189,652 short tons in May 1944, handled only 65,105 short tons in December. The same downward trend was evident at Nouméa and Espiritu Santo and in the Russells.
Traffic continued to dwindle, and during May 1945 no port discharged more than 11,000 short tons or, despite increased shipments out of the area, handled more than 62,000 short tons.
As activities in the South Pacific declined, preparations were made to close out nonessential bases. Actually, many bases in the area had been in the process of reduction for some time but, after the establishment of SPBC, efforts in this direction were intensified. By the end of 1944, islands that had been completely closed out or where only token garrisons were retained included Efate, Aitutaki, Tongareva, Bora Bora, and Nukufetau. New Zealand was closed out on 19 December, except for a small detachment on duty with the Joint Purchasing Board. By 7 January 1945, most Army personnel were removed from the Russells. Continuing operations were left in Navy hands. The Army force in the Fijis was reduced to 22 officers and 188 enlisted men by 21 May. Throughout the period, New Caledonia, Espiritu Santo, and Guadalcanal remained the principal bases in the South Pacific, and as of 30 April 1945 they were the only islands having Transportation Corps personnel.
A major problem involved in closing or reducing the island bases was the disposition of the large volume of excess Army stocks that had accumulated. In January 1945 SWPA and SPBC representatives meeting at Tacloban, Leyte, worked out the “Transo Agreement,” a coordinated plan for the transfer of excess supplies and equipment, service units, and overhead personnel from the South Pacific to SWPA in a fashion that would permit the South Pacific bases to be closed out in an orderly fashion. The agreement set up priorities for the movement of units then available or to become available as bases closed out, beginning 1 February 1945. Under the agreement, the Southwest Pacific also accepted and set up priorities for the movement of 202,744 measurement tons of the 268,157 measurement tons reported as excess in SPBC as of 15 December 1944. The remainder was reported to USAFPOA for disposition. Shipping for the movement of supplies and personnel was to be provided by SWPA, supplemented where possible by vessels that might become available in the South Pacific.62
The Transo program got under way slowly. There was a continued shortage of shipping, and destination ports in the Philippines were congested. Moreover, it was far simpler to secure supplies through regular channels from the United States than to send ships from Manila to the South Pacific to pick up excess supplies there. By the end of April 1945, only 15,000 measurement tons and a small number of service personnel had been shipped to SWPA under the agreement. Meanwhile, surplus supplies continued to accumulate. As of 1 May, 508,363 measurement tons of excess materials were reported as committed to SWPA or awaiting other disposition.
The SPBC mission, meanwhile, was becoming steadily more limited in scope. On 30 April 1945 the South Pacific was relieved of responsibility for the logistical support of the forces in the northern Solomons. By this time, redeployment and rehabilitation of combat forces were virtually completed and discharge operations at ports were minor, being concerned with supplies lifted from other bases. The main preoccupation of SPBC was now the preparation and shipment forward of excess
supplies and service units in the area. On 1 May a detailed plan was worked out for the reduction of New Caledonia and for the closing of Guadalcanal, Espiritu Santo, and the bases where small garrisons were still stationed as soon as excess supplies were lifted. New Caledonia, the last of the Army bases to be rolled up, was to receive all service units and supplies necessary to close the other bases.63
At this juncture SPBC headquarters, at MacArthur’s request, was converted into an Army service command headquarters and moved to the Philippines. General Gilbreath and an advance party departed from Nouméa for Manila on 15 May, and the remaining personnel moved out by ship and airplane during the next two months. Lt. Col. Alfred H. Lee stayed behind with a small staff and continued as transportation officer. Upon Gilbreath’s departure, remaining SPBC functions were taken over by the New Caledonia Island Command. Under the new set-up, the base command and island command transportation sections were integrated. On 26 June new Port and Transportation Sections were established as special staff sections operating under the New Caledonia Island Command G-4. The Transportation Section continued to perform its former duties, including preparation of plans and directives for air and water movement between and from South Pacific bases, coordination of cargo-handling operations in the area, and maintenance of liaison with the Navy and WSA in shipping matters. The Port Section, formerly the New Caledonia Island Command Transportation Section, supervised the loading and unloading of ships at Nouméa.64
Beginning in May 1945, better progress was made in moving excess supplies and service personnel out of the South Pacific. In that month 132,138 short tons of Army, Navy, and Marine Corps cargo moved out of the area to destinations in SWPA, the Central Pacific, and the United States. During the same period troopships arrived from SWPA to lift units to the Philippines. In June another 130,000 short tons were loaded at Nouméa, Guadalcanal, and Espiritu Santo, and 15,041 service personnel embarked, destined mainly for the Philippines. At the end of the month only 23,752 Army troops were left in the South Pacific, but 692,252 measurement tons of excess supplies still remained. Troops and materials were located principally at the three major bases, with small concentrations in the Fijis, New Zealand, the Russells, Tongareva, and Aitutaki. In preparation for the final roll-up of the area, the Central Pacific Base Command assumed logistical responsibility for the South Pacific on 15 June. Although pressure continued throughout the rest of the war to move supplies into active areas, there were still about 600,000 measurement tons of Army materials in the South Pacific on 15 September 1945. It was estimated that 150,000 measurement tons could be disposed of locally and that the remainder could be lifted in four months, provided Philippine and Central Pacific ports could receive the amounts consigned to them.65
Transportation in the Final Phase of the War
The end of combat operations in the South Pacific and the stepping up of the war in the Central Pacific led to a
reorganization of the Army theater structure in mid-1944. Hoping to move his USA-FICPA headquarters to Saipan to direct the fighting of Army forces in the forward areas, General Richardson established the Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC) on 30 June, assigning it responsibility for the administration and logistical support of the Army in the Central Pacific. On 1 August USAFICPA headquarters was redesignated Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas. At the same time the Army organization in the South Pacific Area was converted into a base command and became a subordinate echelon of USAFPOA.
The theater reorganization, in effect, decentralized logistical operations in the base commands, leaving top-level staff work and policy-making functions to USAFPOA headquarters.66 This was reflected in the organization of transportation. In the Central Pacific, the AP &SC, formerly operating directly under theater headquarters, was placed under the Central Pacific Base Command (CPBC), and its commander, General Blount, was removed from the theater staff and named transportation officer on the CPBC special staff. On 14 August a CPBC Transportation Service was established under the Transportation Office, Blount assuming command of this organization in addition to his other duties. Although the Transportation Service was assigned responsibility for the movement of personnel and cargo within the base command’s jurisdiction, its major activities were in practice concentrated on Oahu, where it assumed centralized direction of base motor transportation operations.67 Heading the AP&-SC, the CPBC Transportation Office, and the Central Pacific Base Section Transportation Service, Blount controlled virtually all Army transportation activities in the Hawaiian area, but in forward areas command of port and other transportation operations was vested in the island commands, and control from Oahu was largely theoretical. In the South Pacific, the SOS Transportation Division retained its former duties as a SPBC special staff section.
Blount’s removal from the USAFICPA special staff left Richardson without a theater transportation headquarters. Concurrently with USAFPOA’s establishment, he appointed Colonel Moore, recently arrived from duty with the Chief of Transportation in Washington, as transportation officer, directing him to set up a technical staff section and to make a complete survey of the transportation situation in POA. After visiting the forward areas, Moore returned to Oahu in mid-September 1944 and began the task of building his section. This proved difficult in view of the shortage of qualified officers in the theater, and in December Moore had only three officers on his staff. He was also handicapped by the necessity of weaning away many planning, coordinating, and liaison functions pertaining to transportation from older and well-established agencies, notably the AP&SC and the theater G-4 and G-5.68
In these circumstances, Colonel Moore was able to make only limited progress. He began to perform staff functions relating to the utilization and training of
Transportation Corps personnel and to plan for transportation operations, and in October he took over from G-4 responsibility for general control over the use of all air transport capacity allocated to USAF-POA by ATC. An Air subsection was set up to determine air transport requirements, suballocate space to the base commands, and establish policies and procedures for and supervise the granting of air priorities. In November priority-control agencies were set up in CPBC and SPBC transportation sections, and when the Western Pacific Base Command was set up, a similar agency functioned there. Under the Air subsection, these agencies screened requests for air transportation, established priorities for shipments, and maintained liaison with command components and air carriers. But little more could be done without additional personnel. After visiting the Chief of Transportation in Washington, Moore managed to secure additional experienced officers and was finally able to complete his section’s organization in March 1945. The section was composed of the transportation officer, an executive officer, an officer to maintain liaison with the Navy, WSA, and other transportation agencies, and six staff sections—Administration and Personnel, Planning, Troop and Training, Supply and Maintenance, Troop Movement and Equipment, and Statistics and Reports. Four service branches, Water, Rail, Motor, and Air, were also set up. With the exception of the Air subsection, the branches existed largely on paper and were established so that they could be staffed rapidly in the event the Transportation Section took on operational as well as staff functions.69
Transportation Section organization was set up by Moore with the hope that it would evolve into a transportation service for USAFPOA similar in scope and functions to that which had proved so successful in ETO. In early 1945 he submitted a survey of the transportation situation in POA to General Richardson and used it to argue for the establishment of an integrated, theater-wide Transportation Service with operational as well as staff functions relating to water, air, motor, and rail transportation.70
At the time of Colonel Moore’s survey, allocation of all POA shipping had recently been centralized by JCS directive in the hands of the commander in chief of POA. Dry cargo shipping for all needs was made available by the Joint Military Transportation Committee (JMTC) in Washington on the basis of Army and Navy tonnage estimates and the over-all availability of vessels. Admiral Nimitz in turn allotted tonnage to meet the requirements for operational areas and sub-allotted nonoperational tonnage to the Army and Navy. He also controlled all refrigerated cargo vessels assigned to POA, arranged for retentions, and insured that shipping would not outstrip the port capacity and capabilities in areas of combat operations.71
All shipping in POA, except Army interisland vessels in the Hawaiian area, operated from the Pacific Shipping Pool, controlled by Nimitz. Shipping from the pool was allocated according to the use for which it was required. Operational
shipping was divided into three classifications—assault, garrison, and maintenance. Assault shipping was that necessary to lift the forces of a landing operation. Garrison shipping was that necessary to transport garrison forces, their equipment, and initial base development supplies and materials. The compilation of Army shipping requirements during the assault and garrison phases of operations was made by the USAFPOA G-5 and coordinated with the needs of other services by Nimitz. Maintenance shipping was that, other than garrison shipping, required to transport supplies needed to build up and maintain prescribed supply levels for the forces in the field. Army requirements for this phase were estimated by the base command G-4’s and submitted through USAFPOA to the POA commander. Nonoperational shipping was limited to that for the support of the Hawaiian area, the Marshalls–Gilberts area, and the South Pacific. Army estimates for this shipping were prepared by base command G-4’s and, after clearance by the POA commander as to tonnages, submitted by USAFPOA to the Chief of Transportation in Washington. The JMTC then allocated the shipping to Nimitz, who in turn reallocated to the Army.
Shipping required for the assault was allocated by Nimitz to the Navy amphibious force commander involved, who provided the shipping to the joint expeditionary force commander and assisted him in arranging loading details with local Army and Navy agencies. Army TQM teams, when available, were attached to Army units to plan combat loading and discharge of assault force ships. During the garrison phase, shipping was divided into several echelons by Nimitz’ J-4 Transportation Section. The garrison force commander selected units and cargo to be moved in echelons, other than those scheduled to arrive during the assault. During the maintenance phase, ship schedules were set up by the J-4 Transportation Section and echeloned according to the discharge capacity of the port of destination. Echelons of the garrison and maintenance shipping moved to regulating points, first at Eniwetok or other designated atoll anchorages and later at Ulithi and Saipan, to await call forward to their destinations as their cargoes were needed and the ports could receive them.72 Shipping from the mainland to nonoperational areas was performed in ships suballocated to the Army and Navy by Admiral Nimitz. Intratheater shipping in the Hawaiian and other nonoperational areas in the Central Pacific was handled by the services concerned, although joint shipping was often effected.
In the matter of port operations, Honolulu, the subports on the outlying islands, and the ports on Christmas, Canton, and Fanning were operated by the Army. In the Gilberts–Marshalls area, all port operations except those at Kwajalein Atoll were the responsibility of the Navy in early 1945. Forces on Makin had been reduced to a token garrison in December 1944, and Transportation Corps troops had been moved out. In the early spring of 1945, the Army port company on Kwajalein was returned to Oahu and its duties were taken over by the Navy, which took complete control of the atoll on 30 June. In the meantime, Tarawa was transferred from Navy to Army command and a small
detachment was assigned to take over port operations there.73
In the forward areas, port and cargo-handling responsibilities, like shipping, varied with the phase of operation. During the assault phase, the joint expeditionary force commander was responsible for the delivery of supplies to the beach. The commander of expeditionary troops provided stevedores and working parties on board ship to assist in the discharge of vessels either at piers or at anchor and was responsible for the organization and operation of the shore party that discharged cargo delivered at the beach, for keeping the beach clear, and for moving cargo to dispersal dumps. When the beachhead was secured, port operations were turned over to the service providing the garrison force. In general, the troop port command of the garrison force handled cargo for all services. It delivered supplies to the beach, wharf, or other unloading point, discharged cargo, and moved cargo to dispersal dumps or depots. At these advanced bases, the Navy was usually responsible for providing all personnel and equipment for moving ships into and within the harbor, including boarding, piloting, mooring and berthing, servicing, and onward routine.
Motor transportation was important largely in moving supplies to and from the ports. Although truck operations on Oahu were consolidated under the CPBC Transportation Service, motor transport on the islands in the forward area was handled independently by each island command. Control of air transportation allocated to USAFPOA was centralized under the USAFPOA transportation officer, but with this exception—Moore reported—planning, control, and operation of all types of Army transportation within POA were accomplished by a multiplicity of staff sections and subordinate commands, making effective coordination difficult. In marked contrast to this situation, the commander in chief of POA had a well-organized J-4 Transportation Section in which were centralized theater-wide planning, control, and coordinating responsibilities pertaining to transportation. Other major transportation functions were performed by the Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet, whose primary mission was the support of the fleet and naval shore-based units in forward areas. Under him, the Joint Overseas Shipping Control, containing Army, Navy, and Marine Corps representatives, coordinated bookings, loadings, and movements from the Hawaiian area forward.74
On the basis of his survey, Colonel Moore concluded that Army transportation activities were conducted by too many staff sections of all echelons. The numerous parallel and un-coordinated contacts had tended to weaken the Army’s position in dealing with the commander of POA on transportation matters. To correct this deficiency, Moore argued that it was necessary to centralize transportation liaison functions, combine all means of transportation throughout the theater, and organize transportation along lines that had proved successful in the ETO and other theaters. He recommended that a transportation service be organized to plan, control, and coordinate all means of transportation and to handle all matters pertaining to transportation with Nimitz’ headquarters and the Army Service Forces in Washington. It was proposed that the
USAFPOA transportation officer be designated Chief of the Transportation Service and Traffic Manager for the Commanding General, USAFPOA. Control of operations would be exercised through technical guidance of transportation officers on the staff of the commander of each subordinate echelon from the base commander down through the individual islands.
For a time, prospects for the establishment of a theater-wide transportation service appeared bright, but adoption of the plan was postponed and later abandoned. The proposal had come late in the day and ran counter to the existing Army theater structure, in which USAFPOA performed purely staff functions, and operations were decentralized under the base commands. From March 1945 through the end of the war, the USAFPOA Transportation Section continued in existence purely as a special staff section, picking up an increasing number of planning and liaison functions. In December 1944 it had replaced the G-4 representative sitting in on meetings of the Joint Army-Navy-WSA Shipping Committee on Oahu, although AP&SC provided regular representation on the committee. In April 1945 the section also secured representation on JOSCO. It continued to control air transport priorities and, in increasing measure, performed staff work in coordination with Nimitz’ headquarters and Army agencies pertaining to current and projected transportation operations.75
Regardless of complaints about the lack of an integrated theater-wide Army transportation service, operations were conducted effectively and with a large degree of cooperation between services. In less than a year the forces under Nimitz moved from the Marianas to the threshold of Japan. During this period the necessary troops and supplies were moved forward to guarantee the success of the assaults and subsequent base development.
Operational Developments in the Hawaiian Area
In the months following the Marianas campaign, outlying bases in the Hawaiian and Gilberts–Marshalls area were being closed out or reduced. Oahu, however, continued as the main rear supply base and, despite a steady increase in tonnage shipped direct from the United States to forward destinations, Honolulu received and loaded a large proportion of the Army supplies and equipment in support of Central Pacific forces. During 1944 approximately 1,425,000 of the 3,122,225 measurement tons of Army cargo reaching the Hawaiian base were shipped forward from Honolulu as compared with 969,100 measurement tons moved from the mainland to ports forward of the Hawaiian group. In 1945, the 5,900,000 measurement tons shipped direct from the United States to forward ports greatly overshadowed those shipped from Honolulu, but even then Honolulu shipped out over 1,300,000 measurement tons between January 1945 and the end of September, in addition to handling Army and civilian tonnage for the Hawaiian area.76 The port load at Honolulu was carried successfully despite a chronic labor shortage. Transfer of Army port units to forward areas and losses of civilian longshoremen produced a serious labor crisis in late 1944 and early
1945. The emergency was partially relieved by using combat troops and Navy Seabees to help load and discharge ships, but continued serious until April 1945, when additional Seabees were assigned to longshore duties.
In addition to operating the port of Honolulu, AP&SC controlled the small ports at the outlying islands and ferry bases and operated a fleet of vessels engaged in harbor activities and interisland shipping. By June 1945, AP&SC was operating 200 boats and vessels, including 13 ocean-going cargo and passenger vessels, 7 freight supply (FS) vessels, 61 barges, 27 tugs, 63 launches, 11 cabin cruisers, and 7 sampans. Although sub-port and interisland operations became increasingly routine, there was one persistent problem. Since early 1944 the AP&SC had barely met commitments for chill and freeze shipments to outlying Hawaiian islands, the ferry bases, and the Gilberts and Marshalls by diverting combination general cargo and reefer ships from other missions. In September 1944 some relief was provided when the first two of three FS ships requisitioned by AP&SC reached Honolulu, underwent conversion to reefers, and carried fresh food and other perishables westward. However, when the Marianas and Palaus were captured there was an even greater need for reefer shipping. Other vessels were assigned, and in March 1945 nine AP&SC cargo and FS vessels were operating on regular schedules to the Gilberts–Marshalls area carrying subsistence and general supplies to Army, Navy, and Marine Corps garrisons. Despite the increases in shipping and a decrease in the allotment of chill and freeze products to forces in the Hawaiian and Gilberts–Marshalls area, the provision of reefer supplies continued to be a problem. In the spring of 1945 arrangements were being made to secure from New Orleans three additional FS vessels. It was anticipated that the arrival of these ships would enable AP&SC to relieve the shortage of reefer shipping.
Along with the conduct of port and shipping operations, AP&SC continued to assist assault and garrison forces mounting from the Hawaiian area. It billeted and staged troops at Oahu, supervised palletizing activities, and controlled the movement of troops and cargo from staging areas to piers. Although the assault forces were responsible for loading and berthing their own vessels, AP&SC provided technical advisers and cargo-handling equipment. Training schools were expanded and set up on a more permanent basis. The TQM school evolved an elaborate curriculum based on the experience gained in actual operations, and between 1 July 1944 and 31 May 1945 trained over 800 officers and 1,600 enlisted men from combat organizations as TQMs. For participating Transportation Corps units, a formal DUKW Operation and Maintenance School was organized at the Waimanalo Amphibious Training Center and the Stevedoring, Winch Operating, and Rigging School was set up on a regular basis.77
Participation in the Western Caro lines and Leyte Campaigns
During this period an increasing number of Transportation Corps units were trained and provided by the AP&SC for participation in assault and garrison
operations. Between 15 and 30 September 1944, Army and Marine forces assaulted and secured Peleliu, Angaur, and Ulithi. Two AP& SC-trained units accompanied the assault forces landing at Angaur on 17 September. The 290th Port Company, attached to the 1138th Engineer Combat Group of the 81st Division, provided hold gangs to discharge cargo into landing craft and assisted in getting casualties aboard. The 481st Amphibian Truck Company, attached to the artillery units, operated seventy-two DUKWs carrying artillery and ammunition from LSTs to shore. After emplacing the artillery, the DUKW crews unloaded and stacked supplies in dumps and evacuated casualties when heavy seas made impossible removal by LCMs and other landing craft. The DUKWs operated a shuttle service from beach to hospital ship, each DUKW carrying twelve litter cases. The DUKWs were hoisted aboard ship, eliminating the need for handling casualties. On 20 September elements of the DUKW company moved to Ulithi to assist in the assault there, while a detachment from the port company accompanied units of the 81st Division moving to Peleliu to assist Marine forces. Meanwhile, two DUKW companies, the 454th and the 456th, had accompanied the 1st Marine Division from the South Pacific and participated in the Peleliu assault. After Peleliu was secured these units, under the control of the garrison force on the island, continued to carry cargo from ships to the beach.78
After the capture of Peleliu, Angaur, and Ulithi, combat operations were stepped up and became increasingly opportunistic. It had originally been planned to follow this campaign with the capture of Yap by the XXIV Corps, which was composed of the 7th and 96th Infantry Divisions. The 504th Port Battalion headquarters, three port companies, and a harbor craft detachment were provided by the AP &SC, assigned to the Army garrison force, and attached to the XXIV Corps for assault operations. The XXIV Corps moved from Oahu to Eniwetok, the regulating point, and then set out for Yap. At this point, as already indicated in the discussion of SWPA operations, it was decided to attack Leyte immediately. The XXIV Corps was offered to MacArthur and was diverted in mid-ocean to Leyte. The 77th Infantry Division, then en route to Guadalcanal for rehabilitation, was turned around and was also made available for the operation. Between 20 October and 25 December 1944, these and Southwest Pacific forces assaulted and secured Leyte.
During the assault the 291st, 292nd, and 293rd Port Companies, attached to the infantry divisions, were used as ships’ working parties and to augment shore parties after their ships had been unloaded. After the beachhead was secured and turned over to the Army garrison force, the port companies, under the 504th Port Battalion, took over operation of Duiag on Leyte. The detachment of the 331st Harbor Craft Company, consisting of four officers and ninety-eight enlisted men, was the first such unit used in support of an operational move. The unit was assigned to the Army garrison force and was intended to handle berthing, towing, and ferrying at Leyte when that port area was secured. At the stopover at Eniwetok, however, most of its harbor equipment was
taken over by the Navy for higher-priority uses. When the unit arrived at Leyte, it had to use whatever equipment could be made available.
The XXIV Corps was also accompanied by five DUKW companies that had arrived at Oahu from the United States in the middle of 1944 and were attached directly to elements of the assault force. The 828th Amphibian Truck Company moved out with the corps troops, the 472nd and 480th moved forward with the 7th Infantry Division, and the 823rd and 827th accompanied the 96th Infantry Division. All five DUKW units participated in the initial assault on the Leyte beaches, beginning on 20 October 1944. Their principal job consisted of moving artillery pieces, personnel, equipment, and initial ammunition from LSTs and other craft to shore and from shore to gun positions. The DUKWs were also used to evacuate casualties to ships offshore and to move general cargo as well as ammunition from ships at anchor and beached landing craft to gun positions and dumps. As combat operations moved inland, the DUKWs were used as supporting land vehicles as well as for ship-to-shore delivery. Used as a field expedient to make up for the vehicle shortage and operated over rough terrain, the DUKWs deteriorated rapidly. Toward the end of the campaign, the DUKW units were relieved from their duties with the XXIV Corps and assigned to ship-to-shore activities at the ports at Abuyog, Taragona, and Dulag.79
Iwo Jima
Iwo Jima was the next target for the POA forces. Although the assault was primarily a Marine Corps operation, supporting Army units were to be provided, and an Army garrison force was to take over port and base development activities after the beachhead was secured. Two Army port companies and three DUKW companies were assigned to the garrison force and attached to the V Amphibious Corps for the assault.80 A fourth DUKW company was assigned to the garrison force to carry ashore cargo and equipment after the initial phases of the assault.
The 471st, 473rd, and 476th Amphibian Truck Companies and two Marine DUKW units were attached to the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions and the 1st Field Artillery Group (Provisional). Their initial assignment on D Day, 19 February 1945, was to land the artillery. The DUKWs, preloaded with artillery and supplies, were launched from the tank decks of LSTs and set out on their scheduled runs to the beaches. Initial landings were severely handicapped by enemy fire and heavy surf. All of the DUKWs experienced difficulty in beaching without aid from tractors or vehicles with winches. The front wheels of the DUKWs were not capable of pulling them forward when
they hit the steep beach. If a vehicle with sufficient power was not available, the DUKWs overturned and were pounded by the surf. Several DUKWs had been overloaded against the advice of the DUKW company officers and sank almost immediately upon leaving the LSTs, while others were swamped when lack of fuel or mechanical breakdown caused motors to fail.
Despite the adverse conditions, most of the artillery was landed successfully. After emplacing the artillery, the DUKWs hauled ammunition and other high-priority supplies from ship to shore and evacuated casualties. Continuous operation under rugged conditions resulted in heavy losses of equipment. On 1 March 1945 the hundred DUKWs that were still seaworthy were pooled under the command of the V Amphibious Corps and used to unload urgently needed ammunition. On 11 March the three Army DUKW companies and another, the 475th, which had arrived in the early support shipping, were transferred from Marine Corps control to the Army garrison force.
Despite the fact that 133 DUKWs, over half of those employed, were lost in the course of the campaign, the DUKW units were reported to be the most reliable and rapid means of bringing critical supplies and ammunition from ship to shore or to gun positions, and their service in evacuating the wounded was considered invaluable.
The 592nd Port Company, attached to the 5th Marine Division, landed in the fourth assault wave and operated as part of the Marine shore party, unloading landing craft as they arrived at the beach. The 442nd Port Company, attached to the V Amphibious Corps, disembarked at Iwo Jima on 2 March (D plus 11) and was used in operating the 4th Marine Division dumps. On 9 March attachment to the Marine Division was terminated, and the port company’s troops were used aboard ship, serving as hold gangs in discharging cargo and in getting casualties aboard. Like the DUKW companies, the port units had heavy losses in equipment during the landings.
In the meantime, the main elements of the Army garrison force had arrived, including a Transportation Section headquarters and the 43rd Amphibian Truck Battalion headquarters. On 14 March 1945 (D plus 23), the Transportation Section took over port operations and organized itself as a port group headquarters. Units under its control included the two port companies, the DUKW battalion headquarters and four DUKW companies, two Quartermaster truck companies, and the 23rd Naval Construction Battalion (Special). Standing operating procedures for port group operations were prepared, and close liaison was established with Navy and Marine units to coordinate cargo and beach operations.
Like many other forward area islands, Iwo Jima lacked port facilities. Loading and discharge of vessels were performed entirely by lighters and DUKWs. Because of the steep beach gradient and heavy surf, tractors had to be used to anchor lighters to the beach and to tow trucks from lighters to ground favorable for operation. A general dump was maintained to receive mixed loads of cargo and to augment the facilities of supply agencies when the latter were unable to handle the volume of cargo being discharged. In spite of the absence of port facilities, the port group handled 269,520 measurement tons of cargo and 15,982 passengers during the period from 14 March to 20 May 1945.
Harbor development at Iwo Jima was restricted by the steep beach, heavy winds, and treacherous surf, and was confined mainly to measures to facilitate lighter and DUKW operation. Steel and concrete hulks were sunk to provide a breakwater for the harbor and to protect beaching operations, the beach was given a hard surface to facilitate vehicle and equipment operation, and a ship-to-shore radio communications system was set up to control and dispatch lighters and DUKWs. Cargo-handling activities were performed by the Army and Navy units until 11 July 1945, when the 23rd Naval Construction Battalion was relieved from duty. Continuing operations were carried on by the Army port and DUKW companies, assisted by ground and air force troops. During the three months ending 30 September 1945, traffic at Iwo Jima was on the decline, port group troops handling 134,930 measurement tons and 12,369 passengers.
Activities in the Western Pacific Base Command
When Iwo Jima was secured on 16 March 1945, a significant number of Army troops were stationed in the forward areas of POA. Principal concentrations of Army forces were located at Saipan, Guam, and Tinian, with smaller numbers in Angaur, Peleliu, and Ulithi. The enormous distance separating the islands from Oahu made it difficult for USAFPOA and CPBC effectively to administer and support the Army personnel in the forward area. On 25 April 1945 General Richardson established the Western Pacific Base Command (WPBC) and appointed Maj. Gen. Sanderford Jarman as commanding general. Functioning as Richardson’s sole operating agent in all logistical and administrative matters except those specifically exempted by him, the WPBC commander was to provide logistical support for all Army forces in the Marianas, the western Carolines, and Iwo Jima, and for all elements of Navy, Marine Corps, and other forces when so directed by the POA commander.81 Because the Ryukyus campaign was under way, logistical support of Army forces on those islands remained a CPBC responsibility.
General Jarman’s staff, already serving as the Saipan Garrison Force and Island Command headquarters, was augmented and formed WPBC headquarters. Although command of the island was subsequently turned over to the Navy, the port continued to be operated by the Army. With the activation of WPBC, Col. Ernest B. Gray, Troop Port Commander, Saipan, was appointed transportation officer on the special staff. Under his direction, his staff acted as WPBC Transportation Section and, in addition, continued to supervise local port operations. It performed planning functions for the command, surveyed WPBC port facilities, studied Transportation Corps supply requirements, and set up an air priorities control agency. The Transportation Section continued to act both as a special staff agency and as a port command until 1 October 1945, when the two functions were separated.82
The two main Army ports in WPBC were at Saipan and Tinian. At Guam, which contained the other major port of the area, the Navy handled all cargo activities through the end of the war. At both Saipan and Tinian, the Army troop port command was responsible for loading and unloading ships and controlled Army and Navy personnel engaged in the work, while the Navy port director was responsible for all ship movements in the harbors, the operation of tugs and lighters, servicing of vessels, and routing vessels from the ports. Matters of common interest, such as priorities of discharge and loading, were jointly determined.
The Saipan port had been considerably expanded since the island had been secured in July 1944. In March 1945 the five companies of the 376th Port Battalion and the 31st Naval Construction Battalion (Special), operating under the Saipan Army Troop Port Command, were handling vessels at thirteen berths and working an average of three ships daily in the water. In addition, three Army FS vessels had arrived to carry B-29 supplies and other interisland freight between Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. At Saipan, between 15 June 1944 and 31 March 1945, 1,790,913 measurement tons were discharged and 228,674 measurement tons loaded, 27,122 passengers embarked and 38,732 debarked. In subsequent months, port traffic was kept at a high level, reaching a peak in July, when 302,062 measurement tons were discharged, 77,192 measurement tons loaded, and 21,400 troops embarked and debarked. Despite greatly improved facilities, the heavy volume of tonnage moving across the dock produced a large backlog. Saipan Troop Port Command units, consisting of the 376th Port Battalion, the 372nd Port Battalion—which arrived with three companies early in July—the 31st Naval Construction Battalion, and several Quartermaster truck companies, were unable to handle the load. To correct this situation, 2nd Marine Division troops were provided and were integrated with experienced Seabee stevedore gangs. In addition, Marine Corps trucks and drivers were placed under the operational control of the Central Motor Pool. By 10 August the port backlog was eliminated.
Immediately following the end of hostilities, Saipan was directed to discontinue unloading ships that were carrying aircraft ammunition. At that time three such vessels were in the harbor. These and others arriving later were returned to the United States. With the end of B-29 operations and the curtailment of base-development activities, ship arrivals fell off and port activities declined. There then remained one large operation before the port could turn to purely postwar activities. Between 10 and 17 September 1945, the 2nd Marine Division loaded out. Eleven of the thirteen cargo berths were placed at its disposal and 91,863 measurement tons were loaded during the operation. Meanwhile, the 115th Port Company had arrived for assignment to the 372nd Port Battalion, bringing the number of Army port companies on Saipan to nine. On 18 September the 55th Medium Port headquarters, the second such unit employed in the Central Pacific, arrived at Saipan and prepared to take over port operations from the troop port command. During that month, the port load was small by wartime standards. Although cargo loadings had been temporarily increased because of the 2nd Marine Division’s move, cargo discharge had dropped from 249,165 measurement tons in August
to 83,252 measurement tons in September. Work schedules were being lightened and the emphasis of port operations rested upon the return of troops for demobilization, the disposition of excess supplies, and the separation of Army and Navy port activities and installations.83
Port activities at Tinian had been completely controlled by the Navy until 19 November 1944, when the Tinian Troop Port Command was assumed by the Army. During the previous month the 510th Port Battalion had arrived with three companies and performed longshore duties under Navy supervision. The Army Troop Port Commander, Tinian (later designated Port Superintendent, Tinian), took over these Transportation Corps units and, in addition, had under his control the 1036th Naval Construction Battalion and, later, the 27th Naval Construction Battalion (Special), plus two Quartermaster companies and one Marine Corps DUKW company. On 28 December 1944, the Marine unit was relieved by the 474th Amphibian Truck Company.
At the time the Army took over the Tinian Troop Port Command, pier facilities consisted of a single ponton pier constructed by the Navy to replace the two piers that had been destroyed by heavy seas in October 1944. Additional berthing facilities were placed under construction by Navy personnel in mid-November, and four berths were completed by the end of March 1945. Most of the cargo, however, continued to be discharged at offshore anchorages into LCTs, LCMs, barges, and DUKWs. The cargo was moved to one of two small landing beaches or, when DUKWs were employed, transported direct from ship-side, across the beaches, to the dumps.
By the end of May four additional berths had been completed. All ships were then unloaded at berthside, although it was still necessary to lighten some vessels before they could enter a berth. Movement of cargo from the docks and beach areas to various supply depots and dumps throughout the island was handled by six Quartermaster truck companies. At that time, units under the supervision of the Army port superintendent included six port companies under the 510th Port Battalion and the six Quartermaster truck companies. The 474th Amphibian Truck Company had departed from Tinian in February, and the 27th Naval Construction Battalion had recently been relieved in preparation for movement to another base. Traffic at Tinian continued to increase until July, when an all-time high of 171,159 measurement tons were discharged, 49,375 measurement tons loaded, and 8,843 troops debarked and embarked. To handle the load, the 510th Port Battalion was augmented by details from antiaircraft battalions and excess hospital units. With the end of hostilities, port activities declined sharply. During September, the 510th Port Battalion had little difficulty in handling 61,299 measurement tons of cargo and 6,946 passengers.84
The Ryukyus
The war in the Pacific was climaxed by the seizure of the Ryukyus. Between 1 April and 2 July 1945, the Tenth Army, comprised of Army and Marine forces, assaulted and secured the primary objective,
Okinawa, and captured other islands in the chain.85 This campaign dwarfed all previous operations in POA. A postwar study of the operation has indicated the magnitude of the transportation tasks involved in its mounting and support and the basic division of responsibility for their execution:
For the assault echelon alone, about 183,000 troops and 747,000 measurement tons of cargo were loaded into over 430 assault transports and landings ships at 11 different ports from Seattle to Leyte, a distance of 6,000 miles... . After the landings, maintenance had to be provided for the combat troops and a continuously increasing garrison force that eventually numbered 270,000. Concurrently, the development of Okinawa as an advanced air and fleet base and mounting area for future operations involved supply and construction programs extending over a period of many months subsequent to the initial assault. Close integration of assault, maintenance, and garrison shipping and supply was necessary at all times... . Cargo and troops were lifted on the West Coast, Oahu, Espiritu Santo, New Caledonia, Guadalcanal, the Russell Islands, Saipan, and Leyte, and were assembled at Eniwetok, Ulithi, Saipan, and Leyte... . Admiral Turner, as commander of the Amphibious Forces Pacific Fleet [and Commander, Joint Expeditionary Force] furnished the shipping for the assault troops and their supplies, determined the loading schedules, and was responsible for the delivery of men and cargo to the beaches. General Buckner [Commanding General, Tenth Army, and Commander, Expeditionary Troops] allocated assault shipping space to the elements of his command and was responsible for landing the supplies and transporting them to the dumps. The control of maintenance and garrison shipping, which was largely loaded on the West Coast, was retained by CINCPOA.86
Among other preparations, the combat divisions selected for the initial assaults were augmented by supporting service units, including Transportation Corps organizations. Two port and two Transportation Corps DUKW companies accompanied each of the three Army divisions mounting from Leyte, and the 504th Port Battalion headquarters moved with the corps troops of the XXIV Corps (Army). One Transportation Corps DUKW company was assigned to the III Amphibious Corps (Marine) and to each of the two Marine divisions loading from the South Pacific. For the Transportation Corps units and the elements of the assault echelon to which they were attached, see table on page 541.
Tenth Army headquarters, attached troops, and the Army garrison forces loaded from Oahu.87 Although the Tenth Army was responsible for loading its own vessels, the AP&SC continued to perform its usual services. It billeted and staged assault and garrison troops, supervised palletizing, moved personnel and
Transportation units participating in the Ryukyus campaign
| Unit | Attached to |
| Hq. and Hq. Det., 504th Port Battalion | XXIV Corps |
| 200th, 291st Port Companies | 7th Infantry Division |
| 472nd, 481st Amphibian Truck Companies | 7th Infantry Division |
| 204th, 293rd Port Companies | 96th Infantry Division |
| 474th, 827th Amphibian Truck Companies | 96th Infantry Division |
| 292nd, 203rd Port Companies | 77th Infantry Division |
| 477th, 828th Amphibian Truck Companies | 77th Infantry Division |
| 456th Amphibian Truck Company | III Amphibious Corps |
| 454th Amphibian Truck Company | 1st Marine Division |
| 814th Amphibian Truck Company | 6th Marine Division |
equipment to the piers, and assisted in the loading of ships. All units were provided instruction at the TQM school and a TQM team was assigned by the AP&SC to the Tenth Army. In the course of the campaign, the AP&SC received and shipped forward a significant proportion of the Army supplies and equipment, loading 315,294 measurement tons for Okinawa and 16,427 measurement tons for Ie Shima.
The AP&SC also trained, equipped, and assigned Transportation Corps and other service units to participate in the Ryukyus operation after the initial landings. For the first time in the Central Pacific, a formal port headquarters was established to operate west of Hawaii. On 24 January 1945, the 53rd Medium Port Headquarters and Headquarters Company was activated and assigned to the AP&SC. This unit was organized on Oahu and was scheduled to move to Okinawa to take over the operation of the port of Naha upon its capture. The personnel were drawn largely from units within USAFPOA, although a number of key officers were secured from the mainland through the efforts of the USAFPOA transportation officer. After a period of training with the 24th Port, the 53rd Medium Port was assigned to the Tenth Army on 25 February 1945 and embarked for Okinawa on 27 March. Other units drawn from and trained by the AP&SC and scheduled for departure in the support shipping were three port battalion headquarters, a Quartermaster truck battalion with three truck companies, and four Quartermaster service companies.
As a preliminary to the assault on Okinawa, the 77th Infantry Division landed in the Kerama Retto on 26 March 1945 (L minus 6). The 203rd and 292nd Port Companies, attached to the division, participated in the assault landings, assisting in discharging the vessels and in handling cargo on the beaches. The 477th and 828th Amphibian Truck Companies were attached to division artillery. DUKWs, preloaded with 105-mm. howitzers, delivered the artillery and gun crews from LSTs to gun positions on the beach and then began ship-to-shore movement of ammunition, water, and rations. They worked in direct support of firing batteries during the assault and, when the island was secured on 29 March, carried
the artillery back to the vessels. The 203rd Port Company and the 828th Amphibian Truck Company then moved with elements of the 77th Infantry Division to Okinawa. The 292nd Port Company took part in the landings on Ie Shima, which was captured between 16 and 21 April 1945, and remained there for the unloading of resupply shipping. The 477th Amphibian Truck Company landed artillery in the assaults on Menna Shima and Ie Shima.88
On 1 April 1945 troops of the XXIV Corps and the III Amphibious Corps landed on the Hagushi beaches on the west coast of Okinawa. Shore parties were at first attached to the assault battalions of participating divisions. As battalion beachheads were established and expanded to regiment, division, and corps beachheads, the battalion shore parties were consolidated and came under the control of the higher headquarters. The Army divisions landed on the south Hagushi beaches, while the Marines landed on north Hagushi beaches. Ship-to-shore movement was carried out by landing craft, LVTs, and DUKWs. The Navy established control vessels in each sector to regulate the movement of supplies to the beach and prevent congestion.
Early unloading operations progressed smoothly. The major obstacle was a coral reef extending the length of the beaches. During flood tide, which lasted four or five hours a day, LCMs and LCVPs could cross the reef and unload directly on the beach. During low and middle tides, however, it was necessary to transfer cargo to amphibian vehicles at ponton transfer barges equipped with cranes. This difficulty was soon relieved by the location of DUKW exits over the reef and the construction of earthen and ponton cause ways for the unloading of lighterage. Despite a violent storm on 4-5 April and continued bad weather thereafter, 577,000 measurement tons, or four fifths of the assault shipping, were landed by 16 April.
During the assault, the four port companies attached to the 96th and 7th Infantry Divisions and the 203rd Port Company, which had participated in the Kerama Retto action, assisted in unloading the vessels. After coming ashore, the port companies were relieved from assignment with the divisions and reverted to the control of the XXIV Corps shore party. Each unit was attached for operations to a combat engineer battalion for work on the south Hagushi beaches. In the meantime, DUKWs preloaded with artillery, ammunition, gasoline, and water were lowered from APA’s and AKA’s and launched from LSTs and carried their cargoes to shore positions. At the time of the assault, twelve DUKW companies, including Marine DUKW units, were available for operations on the basis of two companies per Army or Marine division. After completing their initial mission, the DUKWs worked off both beach areas, carrying priority and bulk supplies to the shore and to inland dumps and assisting in the evacuation of the wounded.89
The number of DUKW companies proved adequate, but their operations were handicapped by the long water trip to the ships’ anchorage and by the continuous shortage of motor transport.
Original estimates of the number of Quartermaster truck companies required for the early phases of the operation had been too low. One truck company had landed in the assault and two followed in the first garrison echelon, but no others were available for shore operations until the middle of May. As a result, it was impossible to establish transfer points for the DUKWs and it was necessary for the DUKWs to make long overland trips to inland dumps. The situation was relieved somewhat on 15 May when two provisional truck companies were organized, but it was not until late May, when nine Quartermaster truck companies, two provisional truck companies, and forty trucks of the III Amphibious Corps were operating on the beach, that the situation emerged from the critical stage.
On 9 April 1945 shore operations at the Hagushi beaches were turned over to the control of the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, an experienced Army headquarters brought in from ETO, and the Okinawa Island Command assumed the responsibility for the logistical support of the Tenth Army. All troops engaged in unloading operations were relieved from their respective corps, assigned to the Okinawa Island Command, and attached to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade for operations. The five Army port companies, under the 504th Port Battalion, which had landed during the assault, handled cargo on the south Hagushi beaches. Two additional port companies arrived on 4 May, one of which moved to Ie Shima. Eleven DUKW companies were also attached to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. The twelfth was placed on duty at Ie Shima. Two amphibian truck battalion headquarters arrived on 28 April and were attached to the brigade. One battalion was placed at each of the Hagushi beaches to operate the companies already assigned. As additional Transportation Corps and Quartermaster units arrived, they were attached to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade for work on the beaches.
On 3 May 1945 the 53rd Medium Port arrived and was placed on duty with the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. This unit was expected to operate the port of Naha. The port, however, was not cleared of the enemy until late in June. The failure to capture and rehabilitate Naha at an early stage of the campaign threw plans off schedule and shipping began to outrun the unloading capacity of the beaches. By mid-June the discharge of cargo had fallen 200,000 measurement tons behind schedule. The lack of pier facilities, bad weather, enemy air raids, and the necessity for selective discharge slowed unloading and produced congestion in the harbor.
Throughout the campaign, the bulk of the tonnage arriving at Okinawa was handled over the beaches in the Hagushi area. A number of other points, however, were opened on the west and east coasts to supplement the facilities on the Hagushi beaches and to provide closer support for forward elements of the XXIV Corps and the III Amphibious Corps. The opening of additional points became necessary when rains in late May and early June made overland supply routes impassable. In order to furnish continuous support to the combat forces, who were advancing swiftly after breaking through at Shuri, landing craft and DUKWs were used to carry subsistence, POL, and ammunition to points well south of those already established. The diversion of craft from lighterage activities adversely affected discharge operations at the older beaches until the advent of dry weather, when roads were
made serviceable and craft were returned to their normal duties.
The 1st Engineer Special Brigade was relieved of all shore party operations on 31 May 1945, and control was assumed by the Joint Freight Handling Facilities, a Navy agency. All Transportation Corps units, Quartermaster service companies, and Quartermaster truck companies previously assigned to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade were assigned to the 53rd Medium Port, which in turn was attached to the Joint Freight Handling Facilities for use in beach and port operations. This relationship continued until August, when Army and Navy cargo operations were separated.
Meanwhile, Naha harbor had been opened on 7 June 1945 for the limited discharge of cargo by lighters. During the remainder of the month, construction was begun on piers and wharves and additional Transportation Corps and Quartermaster units arrived. On 21 June transportation units under the 53rd Medium Port consisted of four port battalion headquarters, eleven port companies, three amphibian truck battalion headquarters, and fourteen amphibian truck companies.
Organized resistance on Okinawa ceased on 20 June 1945, and the island was declared secured on 2 July. During the campaign over 2,000,000 measurement tons had been unloaded on Okinawa. With the end of combat, base development was stepped up. Airfields were enlarged, roads constructed, and port facilities improved as additional labor and materials were made available. During July, 1,015,374 measurement tons were discharged, and average daily discharge had increased from the 20,400 measurement tons of June to 32,754 measurement tons. At this point, command responsibility for the Ryukyus passed from Nimitz to MacArthur. Effective 31 July, the Tenth Army and U.S. Army forces on Ie Shima were transferred from Nimitz to the Commander in Chief, Army Forces in the Pacific.
The transfer of command of the Ryukyus was but one phase of a general reorganization in the Pacific, which had begun in preparation for the invasion of the Japanese mainland. With the establishment of AFPAC in April 1945, arrangements had been made for Nimitz to release to MacArthur all Army forces not essential to operations, defense, or base development. MacArthur was to make parallel releases of naval personnel.
The creation of AFPAC had little immediate effect on USAFPOA’s organization and functions. USAFPOA became a subordinate command of AFPAC but continued responsible for the administration and logistical support of all Army forces engaged in operations for which Nimitz had earlier received approval, as well as for all Army forces in the area released from Nimitz’ operational control. General Richardson’s headquarters remained primarily as a planning and policy-making agency supervising the supply operations of the Army base commands within POA. The subsequent redesignation of USAFPOA as the U.S. Army Forces in the Middle Pacific (USAFMIDPAC) was a change in name only, leaving the Army structure unaltered. After command of the Ryukyus was transferred to AFPAC on 31 July, USAFMIDPAC, through CPBC, continued to provide logistical support of the Tenth Army and other Army forces in the Ryukyus until 1 September, when this responsibility was transferred to AFWESPAC. However, USAFMIDPAC delivered supplies requisitioned by the Tenth Army
before 1 September until the pipeline of supplies was emptied.
As long as CPBC remained responsible for the logistical support of the Ryukyus, Oahu continued as an important supply base, but the shipment of an increasing proportion of supplies for forward destinations direct from the United States and the decreasing requirements of other areas serviced by CPBC brought a decline in activities. Reflecting these developments, Honolulu discharged or loaded approximately 300,000 measurement tons a month during the period from June through August 1945, much below the average of 440,000 measurement tons handled during the first five months of 1945. The port load was now well within the capabilities of available labor, equipment, and facilities. Other AP&SC operations, including the subports and interisland shipping, had long since become routine. In the final months of the war AP&SC’s main activities involved the delivery of supplies westward to the Ryukyus and the staging and training of the 98th Infantry Division and two garrison forces on Oahu for participation in the projected Kyushu operation. With the end of hostilities, the provision of garrison forces proved unnecessary, but the 98th Division was assigned to occupation duties in Japan and loaded out on 3 September. Its combat support mission completed, AP&SC closed its TQM, DUKW, and stevedore schools and concentrated on processing returnees and maintaining Army forces in the Hawaiian area and at the remaining Central Pacific bases.90
Postwar Transportation Operations in the Middle Pacific
With the abrupt end of hostilities on 14 August 1945, the westward movement of men and supplies was sharply curtailed and wholesale diversions of shipping were effected, some vessels returning to the United States while others were held at regulating points awaiting decisions regarding their disposition. Meanwhile, the machinery for demobilization was set in motion. On the basis of estimates compiled by the base commands, USAFMIDPAC submitted requirements for the eastbound movement of Army personnel to the commander of AFPAC and the Chief of Transportation in Washington. To meet these requirements, the latter scheduled troop transports on a round-trip basis from a U.S. port of embarkation to USAFMIDPAC loading ports for embarkation and return to the United States. Additional space was procured from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. After a slow start because of an initial shortage of troop carrying vessels and the limited capacity of reception stations, the rate at which personnel were returned to the United States increased steadily. In the three months ending 30 November, nearly 153,000 Army returnees were lifted from the South, Central, and Western Pacific. At the end of this period, demobilization was at its peak and all areas were ahead of schedule.91
A far more persistent problem was the roll-up of excess supplies and property which had accumulated in
USAFMIDPAC. With the coming of V-J Day, inventories of all supplies in the South, Central, and Western Pacific Base Commands were undertaken, and arrangements were made for available excess lists to be screened by the base commands, other services, and AFWESPAC for supplies they could use. It was soon found that the disposition of these stocks would be a long-term project. The screening process was time consuming, and in many cases the various areas and services had similar needs and excesses. At the same time, delays by the War Department in determining a postwar troop basis and the islands that would be retained for peacetime occupation made it difficult to determine surpluses. Despite the shipment of supplies to the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and China, and the local disposal of surplus property as authorized by the War Department, a large volume of excess stocks remained on Pacific islands awaiting disposition at the end of the year.
In the postwar period the compelling reasons for control of shipping by the commander in chief of POA were removed. Shipping had been adequate to fill all requirements for space in POA since shortly after V-E Day, but it was still necessary for Nimitz to control operational and forward area shipping in order to insure the success of amphibious campaigns under his direction and to match the flow of supplies moving forward with port and beach capacities at destinations. With the war’s end, the availability of shipping and the ability of forward ports to handle peacetime traffic led to the abandonment of controls by Nimitz. In October 1945 the Joint Overseas Shipping Control Office, the agency controlling shipping out of the Hawaiian area, was abolished, and the May 1943 directive providing for joint priority lists for personnel shipments to the Pacific was canceled. Finally, on 1 November Admiral Nimitz declared the. Marianas area, including Iwo Jima and the western Carolines, nonoperational for purposes of shipping control. In effect, this directive abrogated his authority and returned control to the Army and Navy. This action was given formal sanction on 4 December when JCS rescinded its directive charging Nimitz with over-all supervision of shipping in POA and provided that in the future Navy requirements for dry cargo shipping, including reefers, would be submitted to the Navy Department and Army requirements to the War Department.92
Nimitz’ abrogation of shipping control was accompanied by the separation of Army and Navy activities in the Western Pacific Base Command, where port operation on individual islands had been handled jointly. As part of a general plan for the divorce of Army and Navy installations in the area worked out at a conference at Guam in October 1945, local agreements were made regarding the division of port facilities and equipment, although cooperation between the two services was continued. Separation of activities was accomplished gradually, and was not completed until 1946.
At the beginning of 1946 USAFMIDPAC was in transition from a wartime to a peacetime basis. Demobilization was moving toward completion, nonpermanent bases were being closed out, and efforts were being made to ship out or effect the local disposition of excess stocks and property. Upon completion of these tasks, the primary mission of transportation would be the maintenance of relatively small forces stationed on peacetime bases in the Central, South, and Western Pacific.