Chapter 10: The Southwest Pacific
War struck in the Pacific amid hasty efforts by the U.S. Army to strengthen the defenses of the Philippine Islands. After the attack on Pearl Harbor the Japanese for a time pushed steadily southward from their home islands. By mid-March 1942 they had taken most of the Philippines and had captured Hong Kong, Guam, Wake, Rabaul, Malaya, and Singapore, as well as the richest prize of all, the Netherlands East Indies. Japanese forces had already occupied Lae and Salamaua in New Guinea, and they threatened to isolate Australia. The remnants of the U.S. Army in the Philippines surrendered early in May. Shortly thereafter, in the Battle of the Coral Sea, Japanese aggression in the southwest Pacific was checked. Although the Allies were not yet ready to seize the offensive, the enemy had been halted. Ahead lay the long and painful climb up the island ladder of the Pacific, leading to the liberation of the Philippines and the capitulation of Japan.1 (Map 9) But before victory was achieved, many changes took place in the command, supply, and transportation picture.2
The Organizational and Logistical Setting
During the months immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, U.S. Army activity had quickened perceptibly in the Pacific. Late in July 1941 the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) had been established and placed under the command of Lt. Gen. (later General of the Army) Douglas MacArthur with headquarters at Manila. During the ensuing four months, as the storm clouds grew more ominous in the Far East, the reinforcement of MacArthur’s new command became a major concern of the War Department.3
While MacArthur’s men fought the Japanese invaders in a gallant delaying action, two other important Pacific commands came into being. The first was the American - British - Dutch - Australian (ABDA) Command, embracing Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and most of the north and northwest coast of Australia, which functioned only from 10 January to
25 February 1942.4 The second, entirely American, began with the impromptu Task Force, South Pacific.
Task Force, South Pacific, was constituted at sea on 12 December 1941 by Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Julian F. Barnes, the senior officer aboard a U.S. Army troop and cargo convoy originally destined for the Philippines but diverted to Australia after America was drawn into the war. Escorted by the Navy and carrying approximately 4,600 U.S. Army personnel—chiefly Air Corps and Field Artillery troops-52 unassembled A-24 dive bombers, 18 P-40E fighters, about 340 motor vehicles, and sizable amounts of aviation oil and gasoline, bombs, and ammunition, the convoy reached Brisbane on 22 December 1941. On the same day General Barnes and his staff went ashore and established Headquarters, U.S. Forces in Australia (USFIA). USFIA, on 5 January 1942, was redesignated U.S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA).5
Ships of the convoy docked on 23 December 1941. The troops debarked and moved to tent quarters provided by the Australian Army. Cargo was discharged by Australian labor working around the clock and all through the Christmas holiday. Certain items were difficult to locate, and vital parts of the A-24’s, such as trigger motors, solenoids, and gun mounts, were never found.
For the Americans in Australia the prompt reinforcement of General MacArthur’s hard-pressed Americans and Filipinos had already become the supreme objective. Under the supervision of the quartermaster of Task Force, South Pacific, and with the help of the Australians, by 28 December 1941 the two fastest ships of the convoy were reloaded with U.S. Army troops, equipment, ammunition, and supplies for the Philippines. Because of the Japanese blockade these two vessels, the Willard A. Holbrook and the Bloemfontein, never reached that destination.6
Subsequently, in response to urgent appeals from General MacArthur and President Quezon, desperate attempts were repeatedly made to bring relief to the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor. Several small vessels were chartered as blockade runners and a few submarines carried critical cargo, but virtually all such efforts were unsuccessful. The Japanese air and sea blockade of the approaches to the Philippines effectively prevented substantial reinforcement either by ship or by airplane.7
Although the reinforcement of the Philippines remained the principal mission of the U.S. Forces in Australia for some time, as early as mid-December the War Department had decided also to establish on the continent a stable base capable of anchoring the Allied defenses in the southwest Pacific as a whole. With the deterioration of the Allied position in the Philippines and in the ABDA Command during the first months of 1942, emphasis shifted increasingly to the defense of Australia and its development as the main U.S. Army base in the area.8
Such an eventuality had not been anticipated before Pearl Harbor. The USAFIA staff, then headed by Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, was small, aggregating 23 officers and 13 enlisted men on 5 January 1942. Few of them possessed the experience necessary to deal with the formidable supply and transportation problems in the command. The first officer assigned from Washington to fill this need was Brig. Gen. Arthur R. Wilson. Accompanied by several assistants, General Wilson proceeded to Australia, arriving at Melbourne on 11 March. Ten days later he was appointed Chief Quartermaster, USAFIA, subsequently serving as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, in that command, until his return to the United States in late May 1942.9
The magnitude of General Wilson’s task may be gleaned from his instructions. Among other things, he was to survey and report on the local port and warehouse facilities, make recommendations as to reserves and levels of supply, and arrange for a system of local procurement. He was to charter all available craft in Australian waters in order to relieve the burden on American shipping, and he was to expedite the unloading and clearance of all troop and cargo vessels. “Finally and most important,” he was to spare no effort in getting food, ammunition, and other critical supplies forwarded to the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies. Wilson carried out his mission with vigor and dispatch, although enemy action made effective compliance with the last part of his instructions almost impossible.10
Wilson and his staff discovered that Australia’s transport system left much to be desired.11 Except for a narrow coastal fringe, the continent was largely uninhabited desert. Judged by American standards the railroads were quite inadequate, and use of them was complicated by differences in gauges. Motor transport was handicapped by unimproved roads, an acute shortage of gasoline, and insufficient and unsatisfactory vehicles. The ocean linked the large cities along the coast, but water transport was hampered by a war-induced scarcity of ships. However unpromising, this was the transportation situation that confronted Wilson and his staff.
As Chief Quartermaster, USAFIA, General Wilson had both supply and transportation functions. Following the precedent newly established in the zone of interior, where transportation for the U.S. Army had been taken from The Quartermaster General and placed under a Chief of Transportation, Wilson recommended that a similar change be made in Australia. Despite initial disapproval by General Barnes, who clung to the old order, in mid-April 1942 General Wilson succeeded in setting up a separate U.S. Army Transportation Service, charged with the transportation duties previously assigned to the chief quartermaster.
Before his departure from the United States General Wilson had been instrumental in recruiting and commissioning from civilian life a number of experienced transportation executives, who began arriving in Australia in March and April 1942 to fill important positions involving water, rail, highway, and air traffic in Australia. These men included Thomas B. Wilson and Thomas G. Plant, each of whom was later to serve as theater chief of
transportation, as well as Paul W. Johnston, Roy R. Wilson, and Thomas F. Ryan, of whom the last three, respectively, had specialized in rail, highway, and air transportation. Apart from providing such top personnel, General Wilson gave energy and direction to the newly created U.S. Army Transportation Service, which unquestionably owed its early autonomy to his efforts.
USAFIA, including the Transportation Service, was placed under the new and vast Allied command established on 18 April 1942, when General MacArthur set up a general headquarters at Melbourne as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area (GHQ SWPA). As then constituted, SWPA included the Philippine Islands, the South China Sea, the Gulf of Siam, the Netherlands East Indies (except Sumatra), the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomons, Australia, and the waters to the south.12 Some three months later, on 20 July 1942, USAFIA was succeeded by the U.S. Army Services of Supply (USASOS).13
Maj. Gen. Richard J. Marshall, the first USASOS commander, was succeeded early in September 1943 by Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) James L. Frink, who remained at the helm until 30 May 1945. Under General Frink USASOS continued to support huge military operations extending from Australia into New Guinea, Biak, and the Philippines. New bases were developed as needed and abandoned when no longer desired, all as part of the process familiarly known as the “roll-up” whereby men and materiel were pushed forward as the war progressed. Reflecting the change of scene dictated by tactical considerations Headquarters, USASOS, was transferred successively from Bris bane, Australia, in September 1944, to Hollandia, New Guinea; then to Tacloban, Leyte; and finally, in April 1945, to Manila.
The history of USASOS was characterized by constantly changing supply situations and repeated reorganizations to fit these changes. Arrangements suitable for one locale, such as New Guinea where bases had to be carved from the jungle, often proved undesirable in another, such as the Philippines. In general, USASOS headquarters tended to decentralize operational responsibility to the greatest extent to the base section commanders, whose domains flourished or faded in accordance with the varying requirements of each campaign. The commander of each base section maintained a transportation officer on his staff who was responsible for operations of the Transportation Corps within that section, under the technical supervision of the Chief of Transportation, USASOS.14
Beginning in the spring of 1945, the commands under General MacArthur, including both USAFFE and USASOS, entered another cycle of change, preparatory to the final drive against Japan. On 6 April, with the establishment of the U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC), command of all U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific was given General MacArthur, thereby permitting him to operate north of the Philippines beyond the original confines of SWPA. USAFFE was absorbed by AFPAC
on 10 June. In the same month USASOS SWPA was replaced by the U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific (AFWESPAC), under Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, with headquarters at Manila. Following the close of hostilities SWPA disappeared, and on 17 September 1945 Headquarters, AFPAC, was transferred to Tokyo.15
Throughout World War II, several characteristics of the Southwest Pacific Area, either as a geographical entity or as a mélange of military organizations, profoundly affected the supply situation and, in particular, the task of the Transportation Corps.
Distances were enormous. San Francisco, the main port of embarkation supplying the Southwest Pacific, is 6,193 nautical miles from Brisbane, 5,800 from Milne Bay, 6,299 from Manila. Ships required more time to sail from the United States to SWPA and return than to any other area except China–Burma–India and the Persian Gulf. The long turnaround, coupled with the frequent retention of vessels for local service, severely taxed the limited available shipping.
Nearly all military operations took place within coastal areas. There were few interior railways and fewer inland waterways. The Army therefore was highly dependent upon ships and small craft to deliver its men and supplies.
Local transportation facilities were generally poor. Australian railways and highways were far from adequate; New Guinea had no railways, few roads, and only the most primitive and undeveloped ports; and the Philippines had suffered from wartime destruction. Throughout, American equipment and spare parts had to be supplied and new construction had to be undertaken.
Labor was often unsatisfactory. The best manpower of Australia was in military service, and the workers available to the U.S. Army were frequently slow and un-cooperative. The natives of New Guinea served willingly but were too few and too untrained to afford much assistance. Filipino labor, though good, was by no means entirely satisfactory. American service troops had to be used extensively in New Guinea and the Philippines, and their maintenance added to the transportation load.
Except in central and southern Australia, the theater was hot and humid. Rust, rot, mold, and vermin were ever-present plagues, and loss of supplies was bound to occur despite the most scrupulous care in packaging. Malaria, dysentery, and other tropical diseases, combined with the enervating effect of damp heat, undermined the efficiency of the service troops, especially in New Guinea, and swelled the number of patients requiring removal to more salubrious areas. Torrential rains and destructive typhoons hampered and on occasion halted transportation activity.
Naval, ground, and air forces of the United States, the Commonwealth of Australia, and to some extent the Netherlands East Indies were all engaged in transportation. Each operating force had its own organization and methods, but all competed for the limited resources in equipment and fuel.
Against this background in which the geographic, climatic, and military factors all contrived to complicate the task, the Transportation Corps sought to develop a working organization.
The Transportation Office
U.S. Army transportation in Australia began as a Quartermaster function performed by a pitifully small staff feeling its way in a strange land where the first American troops had arrived almost by chance. As originally constituted on 5 March 1942, the Transportation Division, Office of the Chief Quartermaster, USA-FIA, consisted of only one officer and one assistant. The organization hardly attained stature by 1 April 1942, when Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Thomas B. Wilson became deputy chief quartermaster and chief of the Transportation Division.
An alumnus of Kemper Military School and a veteran of World War I, Colonel Wilson had previously held civilian executive positions in the United States, involving rail, highway, water, and air transport. He was a natural selection to head the Transportation Service set up at Melbourne in mid-April 1942 to take over the transportation function from the chief quartermaster. The new chief of Transportation Service, USAFIA, was assigned a twofold mission: to coordinate the employment of all transportation for the U.S. Army; and to operate all transport acquired for its use, except that assigned to combat units, service organizations, or the Air Forces.16
Under Wilson a separate branch was established for each major type of transport. The principal activity in the new office involved water transport. The Rail Branch had only a secondary role, that of arranging and supervising the movement of U.S. Army personnel and supplies over the Australian railways. Motor transportation was negligible, since automotive equipment was organic to the base sections and to the divisions in training. Initially, the Air Branch established a useful chartered air service between the bases in Australia. Later, air transportation became a function of the Air Transport Command, and the transportation office simply provided a booking agency for airlift of U.S. Army passengers and freight.17
The Water Branch of the Transportation Service was headed at first by a former steamship operator, Col. Thomas G. Plant. His main concern was with the large ocean-going vessels bringing U.S. Army personnel and cargo to SWPA. Plant’s small staff arranged for and supervised the discharge and subsequent intra-theater activity of such ships, generally utilizing Australian stevedoring firms and dock workers.
Set up in 1942 and at first operating directly under USAFIA, the Small Ships Supply Command was charged with procuring, manning, maintaining, and operating a fleet of small craft for the U.S. Army in the waters north of Australia. Its vessels were used primarily to deliver ammunition, medical supplies, and perishable foods to outlying bases that could not be readily reached by large ships. The Small Ships Command also assisted when required in tactical operations and in emergency transfers of troops and equipment. Because of possible enemy action, its fleet carried both armament and gun crews. The Small Ships Supply Command, later called the Small Ships Division, came under the control of the Transportation Service on 29 May 1942. Thereafter, emphasis was laid upon the procurement in SWPA and in the United States of
additional small craft to satisfy the almost insatiable demands of the theater.18
In the first week of September 1942 the transportation office, with the rest of the USASOS headquarters, was removed from Melbourne to Sydney. By that time Melbourne was too far to the rear to be useful except for storage. As General Arthur Wilson had already said, using that city as a base for troops poised in northern Australia for a potential offensive in New Guinea was about like trying to operate from New Orleans, Louisiana, for action in the area around St. Paul, Minnesota. From the transportation standpoint the switch to Melbourne eliminated a troublesome change in railway gauge at Albury on the border of Victoria and New South Wales. Sydney had a further advantage in being able to accommodate deep-draft vessels.19
The next significant organizational change resulted from the reactivation at Brisbane on 26 February 1943 of the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East under the command of General MacArthur.20 An American theater headquarters essentially administrative in character, USAFFE interposed another echelon between GHQ SWPA, the Allied theater headquarters, and USASOS, the supply agency for U.S. Forces in SWPA. The chiefs of the several services, including the chief transportation officer, were now transferred from USASOS headquarters at Sydney to USAFFE headquarters at Brisbane, and the authority of USASOS was reduced to routine operational matters.
For the Transportation Corps, as well as the other services, the new arrangement presented a very awkward situation. From February to September 1943, two separate transportation offices had to be maintained, one for USAFFE and the other for USASOS. At Brisbane Colonel Thomas Wilson functioned as chief of transportation on the USAFFE Special Staff, assisted by a small number of key men engaged in planning and staff work for water, rail, air, and motor transport. At Sydney, as Transportation Officer, USASOS, Col. Melville McKinstry was made responsible for day-by-day operations. In order to keep in touch with McKinstry, Wilson had to make frequent calls over Australian telephones, for which he had no high regard. In his opinion the entire system of two offices was impractical, and it would have been much simpler if all his organization had been consolidated in one city. Actually, Brisbane lacked office space and housing for both USAFFE and USASOS, but in the late summer of 1943 as additional accommodations became available at Victoria Park, a progressive transfer of USASOS personnel was effected from Sydney to Brisbane.21
Two transportation offices were maintained in Brisbane until 27 September 1943, when the Office of the Chief of Transportation ceased to function in USAFFE and was returned to USASOS.22 In the same month General Frink, the
new USASOS commander, selected Colonel Plant to head up the consolidated transportation office, and arranged for him in turn to relieve Colonel McKinstry and General Thomas Wilson.23 General Gross, who was then visiting SWPA, was disturbed by the change. He believed that, as good men who were complementary, both Wilson and Plant should have been retained. Frink, however, was apparently sold on Plant as his transportation chief, and he preferred to have Wilson serve in some other capacity.24
Within a few weeks after this reshuffling had been completed, a new regulating system was established in GHQ SWPA, which subsequently was to have a far-reaching effect upon both USASOS and the Transportation Corps. Under Wilson as well as Plant, the transportation organization served not only the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Forces but also the Australian military services. With a chronic shortage of tonnage and many claimants for shipping space, priorities had to be set. This problem was attacked in several ways and with varying degrees of success in the period before 12 November 1943, when a GHQ theater-wide regulating system was set up in SWPA under a chief regulating officer (CREGO), whose primary function was to control on a priority basis all personnel and cargo movements by water, rail, and air. Even opponents of the new regulating system ultimately acknowledged that its basic concept was sound and that it was necessary for GHQ to determine the respective priorities of shipment for the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Forces and as between Americans and Australians. However, considerable difference of opinion developed as to the degree of control to be exercised, and as to whether the regulating system might not have worked better under the Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS, subject only to general priorities and tonnage allotments determined by GHQ. In any event, during the remainder of the wartime period the transportation office functioned in the deepening shadow of the GHQ regulating system.25
Colonel Plant fortunately encountered no difficulty with the chief regulating officer. As a matter of fact, during his comparatively brief tenure as Chief of Transportation Officer, USASOS, the regulating system was just starting and it therefore presented no serious problem. While Plant was in charge, no significant change occurred in the transportation office. Although his technical competence was beyond question, evidently and understandably Plant lacked familiarity with military procedures and organization. General Frink, desiring to get an officer who could see the picture “from a military standpoint,” relieved him on 8 April 1944.26 Plant was replaced by Col. (later Brig. Gen.) William W. Wanamaker, an officer without previous transportation experience. At Washington Generals Somervell and Gross were dismayed at the loss first of General Wilson and then Colonel
Plant, who were regarded as “transportation stalwarts.”27
A graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Colonel Wanamaker had been trained as an engineer. He had come to SWPA in January 1944 to serve with the Sixth Army, which he left reluctantly when General Frink personally requested him for USASOS. The new assignment had been described as an excellent opportunity, and for Wanamaker it represented a real challenge. USASOS was no static command. As the center of activity shifted from Australia to New Guinea and thence to the Philippines, the organizational pattern of USASOS had to be adapted to a constantly changing supply and transportation situation. The necessary readjustment must have been especially trying for Wanamaker, since he had no previous experience to stand him in good stead. At the outset he discovered the need of new personnel, since several of his best officers were already suffering from malaria contracted in New Guinea. The base commanders did not always realize the importance of transportation, and Wana-maker’s organization frequently found its activity restricted by the GHQ regulating system.28
Wanamaker had hardly settled in his new niche when a wave of administrative change swept over USASOS. In May 1944 General Frink embarked upon a “work simplification” program, designed to promote greater operating efficiency in the command. An efficiency expert, Capt. Louis Janos, carried out the prescribed measures for the transportation office, which led to the elimination of three officers, thirteen enlisted men, five civilians, and many forms, reports, and other records. With respect to transportation, Wanamaker thought that this program was completely out of place and might well have been delayed until operations were less pressing and more stable. His problem was the bigger one of improving port operations, in the mud and rain of New Guinea, from an efficiency of, say, 40 percent to 70 percent.29
The same influence from above brought a drastic streamlining of Wanamaker’s transportation office, effective 1 June 1944. In essence, the change involved the wiping out of the previous organization by type of transportation (water, rail, highway, and air, with supporting administrative units), and the reorganization of the transportation office along functional lines (planning, administration, operations, and engineering). Any advantage that might have accrued from the functional approach must have been offset by time lost in reshuffling personnel and functions. In any event, the new order did not last. By the end of the year the new branches had been replaced by a divisional arrangement similar to the system previously in effect. (Chart 6)
Meanwhile, Colonel Wanamaker and his men had begun the long trek from Australia by way of New Guinea to the Philippines. The rear echelon officially closed at Brisbane on 20 September 1944, and by 8 October the entire Transportation Corps headquarters had moved to Hollandia, New Guinea. Late in November 1944, Transportation Corps and other USASOS personnel began to trickle into Tacloban, Leyte. By mid-April 1945
6: Organization of Headquarters, Transportation Corps, USASOS, SWPA: December 1944
Source: OCT HB Monograph 31, James R. Masterson, U. S. Army Transportation in the Southwest Pacific Area, 1941-1947, App. 5.
Wanamaker’s staff had set up offices in the Far Eastern University at Manila.
Throughout his tenure as Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS, Wanamaker headed a comparatively small service. Available figures, by no means satisfactory, indicate that the Transportation Corps personnel, both military and civilian, did not exceed 40,000 until February 1945 and reached their peak of almost 97,000 in the following September, when the war had ended in the Pacific. The civilian component was always considerable, approximately one third of all Transportation Corps personnel in SWPA.30
Wanamaker’s staff was responsible for only part of the U.S. Army transportation load in the theater. Organic transport assigned to the various combat and service units carried a major portion, including virtually all short hauls by motor vehicles. The bulk of the burden naturally fell upon the base commanders whose personnel operated under the technical supervision of the transportation office.31
Beginning with the operations in New Guinea, the theater developed a pattern for establishing new bases and arranging for supply and transportation. In each of the succeeding island campaigns, USA-SOS rendered logistical support, but did not bear responsibility for initial transportation, supply, and base development in the areas forward of its advance bases. Shipping for the movement of assault and supporting forces and for resupply was controlled by the Allied Naval Forces until such time as it was relieved by USASOS. Service and supply functions ashore were at first the responsibility of the ground task force commander, and all service troops assigned were under his command. After the area was secured and where conditions warranted it, USASOS took over the responsibility for these activities from the task force commander and established an advance base. Any elements and functions left behind by the task force in moving on to a new mission were assigned to the base commander. The latter had his own transportation staff, and except for technical supervision he was independent of the Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS.32
The autonomy of the base commanders, perhaps inevitable in a theater where bases and headquarters were so widely separated, was no more disturbing to Wanamaker than the pervasive control of shipping developed by the chief regulating officer. Some duplication and confusion arose as between CREGO and the USASOS transportation office in the issuance of orders for ship movements, and in Wanamaker’s judgment CREGO’s regulation was so detailed as to infringe on USASOS operating responsibilities. He argued that either USASOS should operate, under general staff direction from GHQ, or that GHQ should have a chief of transportation and operate all transportation directly.33 Neither alternative was adopted.
Under these circumstances the Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS,
obviously functioned in a severely restricted sphere. By 23 February 1945 Wana-maker’s dissatisfaction with his situation had reached the point where he requested immediate reassignment to the Corps of Engineers. Transportation activity in SWPA, he said, seemed “destined to be run by several Colonels in several echelons of command.” In ETO the chief of transportation was a major general, although his problems were neither more intricate nor involved than those facing Wana-maker. Despite all talk of the importance of his task, the Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS, felt keenly “the difficulties and discouragements in trying to get things done as just another Colonel.” As a matter of fact, General Frink had already recommended a promotion for Colonel Wanamaker, who finally was made a brigadier general on 6 June 1945.
Other observers shared Wanamaker’s dissatisfaction. In Washington Generals Somervell and Gross both felt very strongly that transportation activities in SWPA would never function efficiently until there was “one Chief of Transportation, speaking with the authority of the theater commander on transportation matters.”34 A long step was taken in that direction in June 1945 when General Somervell’s former chief of staff, General Styer, was appointed to head AFWESPAC so as to furnish logistic support for the invasion of the Japanese homeland. Somervell urged Styer to organize AFWESPAC in such a way as to give his chief of transportation the necessary authority to coordinate and control transportation activities from the theater level, by wearing two hats if necessary.35
General Wanamaker was succeeded on 23 July 1945 by General Stewart, an experienced transportation officer who had previously served with distinction in North Africa, Italy, and France. After his arrival at Manila, Stewart spent a month in diligent study in order to understand the prevailing cumbersome and involved supply and transportation system in SWPA. He was not pleased with what he found. Control of transportation was dispersed, and in his opinion the results were not good. The Transportation Corps, he said, had been browbeaten and held down by curbs on its authority and responsibility. Its personnel were timid, and they lacked pride, leadership, and initiative.
As Chief of Transportation, AFWES-PAC, and with the support of General Styer, Stewart at once adopted an aggressive attitude with a view to raising the prestige and strengthening the position of his office. He made considerable progress along these lines, particularly in the field of water transportation. Shortly after the end of hostilities, the GHQ regulating system was abolished and most of its functions were turned over to Stewart’s organization. This change, which was incident to the regrouping of U.S. and Australian forces into separate commands and the emergence of GHQ as a predominantly U.S. Army organization, was regarded by Stewart as “a great victory for the Transportation Corps.” In any event, in the period of demobilization and postwar adjustment the chief of transportation occupied a far stronger and more authoritative position in the theater than he had enjoyed during the wartime period.36
The Regulating System
As a U.S. Army organization functioning under USASOS during the wartime period, the Transportation Corps was but one of several transportation agencies operating in the Allied SWPA theater. The U.S. Navy, the Air Forces, the Air Transport Command, and the Australian military services were all operators and users. In view of the limited amount of available shipping and other transport, the even more limited receiving capacity of most of the ports, and the multiplicity of customers, there was a need to regulate on a priority basis all cargo and troop movements, regardless of service or nationality. After attempts to cope with the problem at various echelons in the theater, the task was assigned to a GHQ agency, CREGO, in November 1943.
The need of centralized control of military traffic had become apparent as soon as the first Americans landed in Australia. At the outset the coordination of American and Australian traffic was accomplished by a Movements Subcommittee of the Administrative Planning Committee, which had been established by the Australian War Cabinet in early January 1942 to facilitate inter-Allied cooperation. The subcommittee, which included both Americans and Australians, was headed by Sir Thomas Gordon, the Australian representative of the British Ministry of War Transport. The Administrative Planning Committee determined where incoming personnel and goods would be sent, and the Movements Subcommittee determined schedules and routes and allocated carriers. These arrangements were especially helpful to the U.S. Army in coordinating shipping and transportation during the first quarter of 1942, until the creation of GHQ SWPA, provided new machinery for Allied collaboration.37
Under USAFIA, the chief of Transportation Service and his representatives became responsible, in mid-April 1942, for all U.S. Army liaison with Australian transportation agencies. Such liaison was concerned primarily with incoming American vessels, which after clearance by the Royal Australian Navy were routed into the port selected by the U.S. Army for discharge. The G-3 of USAFIA prepared the troop movement directives and the G-4 was responsible for the shipment of supplies. Questions of priority of transportation involving only American troops or materiel were settled in conference between G-3 and G-4, USAFIA.
American and Australian forces both utilized the same slender resources in water transport. With a chronic shortage of tonnage, priorities had to be established. Initially, the decision as to which troops or cargo should move first was reached through informal negotiation between the Transportation Service and G-3 and G-4 of USAFIA, with final recourse if need be to G-3 and G-4 of GHQ SWPA.38
As military operations expanded in New Guinea, there developed a growing need of a more formal theater organization to control traffic. On 13 September 1942 a joint G-3/G-4 movement control office was established in Headquarters, USA-SOS, to handle all priorities for personnel and supply movements within the theater and to supervise the assignment of service units. After USAFFE was reactivated in
late February 1943, the coordination of troop and cargo movements was assigned to the executive for Supply and Transportation in USASOS,39 subject to the supervision of USAFFE. On 20 June 1943 a USAFFE movement priority system was established, nominally in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, USAFFE, to determine and supervise priorities of U.S. Army troop and supply movements in SWPA. In addition to a central office, branch priorities offices were organized in Headquarters, USASOS, and at each USASOS port headquarters.
Early in the following month Lt. Col. (later Col.) H. Bennett Whipple was designated Chief Movement Priority Officer, USAFFE, under G-4, USAFFE. At the same time twelve USAFFE movement priority officers (including three Transportation Corps officers) were named to determine priorities locally, in addition to their supply and troop movement duties. When the Office of the Chief of Transportation, USAFFE, was discontinued in September 1943, the USAFFE movement priority system was retained in USAFFE under G-4.
Stirred by his own experience as a movement priority officer, Colonel Whipple became an ardent advocate of a GHQ regulating system.40 His views were set forth in a detailed memorandum of 22 August 1943, which described a current situation at Port Moresby. There, twelve ships already were in the harbor, many more were due to arrive, and conflicting demands on the limited port facilities were rampant. Everything was top priority. Using Port Moresby as a typical example, Colonel Whipple argued that traffic regulation in SWPA should be made a GHQ and not a USAFFE function, since Allied Land, Air, and Naval Forces, and not merely U.S. Army Forces, were involved. Deciding among these competing “customers” generally required information that the local operators did not have and only GHQ SWPA, was likely to possess. The proposed regulating system was also to include air shipments, for which there existed no over-all booking and priority organization. In short, in the light of his broad knowledge of the supply and shipping situation and the combat plans, the chief regulating officer was to determine the priority of all movements.
The Establishment of the GHQ Regulating System
Colonel Whipple’s recommendation met with approval, and on 12 November 1943 a GHQ regulating system was established under the direction of a chief regulating officer, Col. Charles H. Unger. His functions were to assign priorities to individuals, troops, organizational equipment, and cargo for water, air, and rail movement and to coordinate schedules, except for combat vessels and aircraft; to establish direct contact with supply, transportation, and other similar agencies as required; and to issue detailed instructions to implement the regulating system. Whipple became Colonel Unger’s executive officer and the principal proponent of the new system. The headquarters organization included two former Transportation Corps officers: Lt. Col. Charles A. Miller, chief of the Water Section, and Lt. Col. Thomas F. Ryan, chief of the Air Section. The staff for CREGO was drawn chiefly from the
U.S. Army, but it also included personnel of the U.S. Navy and the Australian armed services. The entire regulating system depended upon direct communication with all agencies and elements in the theater, without which the whole structure would have been ineffectual.
Regulating system procedures, set up on a tentative basis immediately following the establishment of CREGO, were worked out in detail and issued by CREGO during January 1944.41 The instructions covered all air, water, and rail movements to, within, and from the theater, except those by small ships assigned to local commanders and, as already indicated, combat vessels and aircraft.
For water transportation within SWPA, G-3 at GHQ determined priorities for troop movements, while G-4 set those for special cargo movements. CREGO set up these movements in the priorities indicated, directly established priorities on requests for the assignment of shipload lots, and arranged for the movement of individuals or small detachments on available shipping space. The priority of other water cargo movements was determined by the local regulating officer at the destination point. The tool for making these decisions was the weekly consolidated booking list. Prepared at the point of origin by the local transportation officer, the list included all cargo movement requests of the commands being served, all booked cargo remaining unshipped, and the relative priority of movement desired by the commands. The list was then turned over to the point of origin regulating officer or, if movement originated on the Australian mainland, directly to CREGO. It was then transmitted to the regulating officer at destination, who, in consultation with the operating and receiving agencies involved, used the list as the basis for determining the priority of movement. The loading-point regulating officer also provided the regulating officer at destination with information regarding ships loading out for, and those awaiting call forward to, their ports. Based on the local port situation and the recommendations of the local commander or on instructions from CREGO, the destination regulating officer called forward, through the local naval officer in charge (NOIC), ships reported as ready for call to his port. The release of the ships for forward movement was arranged for by the regulating officer at the loading port through the local NOIC. Actual loading of cargo and operation of vessels was performed by the commands that operated transportation.
Intra-SWPA cargo shipments by water were classified according to four priorities, lettered from “B” to “E,” in descending order of importance. To expedite such movements, commands operating transportation were to reserve until thirty-six hours before departure 2 percent of cargo space for high-priority items. All priority cargo was to be moved as rapidly as possible, even if items in two or more priority classifications had to be moved simultaneously.
Provisions for the regulation of intra-theater air movements were similar to those for water movements. Since all air traffic was emergency or special in character, priority classifications were set up according to degree of urgency. Five classifications were used to cover priorities
for movements varying in urgency from immediate precedence to ninety-six hours.
So far as rail movements were concerned, CREGO was to assign priorities for movements of special interest to GHQ and to prescribe procedures for priority movements where regulating officers were not assigned. The regulating officer at Townsville was to establish local priorities on requests submitted by local commands and arrange for the transfer of GHQ priority movements to and from rail. In both cases, actual moves of troops and cargo were handled by the Australian Army’s movement control organization.
Transpacific air passenger and cargo traffic on aircraft allocated to SWPA was classified according to four priorities (Classes 1 through 4), set up in descending order of urgency. CREGO was to coordinate air transport requirements and available aircraft space, clear all priorities for movements to and from the United States and intermediate points, assign identification numbers to all priorities, and advise USAFFE and Seventh Fleet of changes in the availability of aircraft. He would maintain a liaison office at Hickam Field, Hawaii, and at such other terminals as necessary. The liaison officers would represent CREGO and act as advisers to commands operating air transport, and provide CREGO with information regarding actual and projected movements. The commands operating air transport were requested to make all shipments in accordance with assigned priorities and to provide CREGO with monthly estimates of available westbound tonnage, airway bills for all shipments, and passenger and cargo manifests upon arrival at the western terminal.
Provision was also made for CREGO to take over the functions pertaining to transpacific water movements previously exercised by the GHQ Priorities Division. CREGO assumed responsibility for clearing the assignment of special transpacific water cargo priorities. Special priority requisitions were to be submitted by USASOS and Fifth Air Force through USAFFE to CREGO, and directly from Seventh Fleet to CREGO.
From modest beginnings the GHQ regulating system developed into a huge completely centralized agency for the detailed control on a priority basis of troop and cargo movements in the Southwest Pacific Area. Functioning under the immediate supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff, GHQ, the chief regulating officer sought to serve as an impartial referee among the various claimants for the limited transportation within the theater. The chief concern of CREGO was with transportation by air and by water, for which he built up an elaborate control organization. Branch regulating offices (later called stations) were created in the forward areas as the need arose. Through liaison officers the regulating system’s influence was ultimately extended far beyond the confines of SWPA. In connection with the regulation of transpacific air traffic, air liaison offices were established in February 1944 at Hickam Field, Hawaii, and Hamilton Field, California. In June 1944, CREGO assigned two liaison officers to the Headquarters, South Pacific Area (SPA), at Nouméa, New Caledonia, to regulate the flow of troops and their equipment from SPA into SWPA. In the following month a SWPA liaison group was set up at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation to advise as to the desired priorities for movement of SWPA cargo
and personnel and the approximate dates when specific shipping could be received at destination ports. Other liaison officers served at the convoy assembly point of Kossol Roads, in the Palaus, and at Guam.
CREGO moved his headquarters successively from Brisbane to Hollandia, then to Leyte and Manila. At the height of his activity, in mid-January 1945, the chief regulating officer had twenty-two branch regulating stations and liaison offices, sprawling over the Pacific from Australia to California. His headquarters staff, numbering about 150, directed the intra-theater traffic of approximately 500 noncombatant vessels and had access to the available space on about the same number of transport planes. Priorities were assigned in the light of the workload and capacity of each port, the vessels and airplanes available, and the relative urgency of the shipment. During 1944 CREGO arranged for the movement into the forward areas of approximately 110,000 troops per month with all vehicles and equipment and, in addition, one million measurement tons of supplies and equipment.
The chief regulating officer could not function successfully without a thorough up-to-date knowledge of the supply and transportation situation throughout the theater. He kept elaborate records on all matters pertaining to the personnel and cargo traffic under his jurisdiction. Direct contact between CREGO and his regulating and liaison officers was maintained around the clock by means of an excellent communications network, which made possible a steady flow of information, orders, and other operational and administrative data. The status of ports, ships, and movements was shown by entries on cards posted on large boards. These cards, which were kept current, were reproduced periodically by a photographic process, and copies were distributed to interested agencies.42 The system involved numerous records, all containing in substance the same information but compiled from various points of view. The most important data, however, concerned conditions at the destination port, which was always considered the bottleneck.
The GHQ regulating system in SWPA was, indeed, a far cry from the individual U.S. Army regulating station designed primarily for rail transport. The tremendous movement control organization developed by the chief regulating officer presented a tempting target for critics, who suspected that an unnecessary empire was being built. The system was vulnerable, for in determining the priority of movements as between powerful competing interests, CREGO almost inevitably aroused resentment. Among the interested agencies were USASOS, the Transportation Corps, and the Air Transport Command, each of which on occasion felt that its normal activity was hampered by interference from CREGO. With the demand for transportation usually greater than the supply, priority became all important and one or more would-be “customers” necessarily met with disappointment. Except during a brief period of outstanding cooperation when Colonel Plant was Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS, the struggle between the regulating system and the transportation office went on “pretty continuously.”43
The first big offensive against the regulating system was led by the commanding general of USASOS, General Frink. In a memorandum of 19 May 1944, addressed to General MacArthur, General Frink made the following charges. Under the prevailing arrangement the local base commanders had the last word in regard to the booking lists and so could in effect veto USASOS decisions, thereby interfering with the build-up of stocks for operational requirements. Local regulating officers might, and often did, try to run the ports, when their work should have been confined to refereeing conflicting requirements of the several U.S. and Allied forces. The regulating system encompassed the complete control of all vessels, amounting to virtual management of intratheater transportation. Specifically, Frink urged a relaxation of the centralized control exercised by CREGO and a periodic allotment to USASOS of tonnage available for cargo movement on a priority basis but accomplished with shipping scheduled by USASOS. GHQ SWPA, however, was unwilling to make any drastic change in the prevailing system, which it described as basically sound.
Although the regulating system emerged victorious from this encounter, it remained under almost constant attack throughout 1944. According to its most ardent advocate, Colonel Whipple, the main difficulty arose because CREGO was unable to sell his system to USASOS and G-4 of GHQ and to win their complete cooperation. Furthermore, in 1944 an increasingly serious congestion of shipping in SWPA drew heavy fire from the War Department, the Transportation Corps, and the War Shipping Administration, culminating in a stern call from Washington for drastic action in the theater to expedite the turn- around of the cargo vessels so desperately needed to fight a global war.
By its very nature, the regulating system often led to duplication and confusion. Within the theater no ships could sail from their loading ports without being cleared by instructions from CREGO. Such shipping instructions were issued simultaneously by CREGO to the Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS, and the local regulating officer. The latter, by virtue of his direct contact with CREGO, received instructions, and often also the changes, long before the USASOS data, which passed through command channels, reached the port. On occasion the base port commander was confronted by apparently conflicting instructions, which had to be reconciled by reference to USASOS headquarters and consultation with CREGO. Such instances obviously hindered efforts to coordinate ship movements efficiently, and undoubtedly strained relations between CREGO and USASOS.44
Still more disturbing for CREGO was the repeated tendency in USASOS to bypass the regulating system and to appeal directly to G-4, GHQ. From about July 1944, G-4, GHQ, built up its Transportation Section. The Transportation Section then began to relegate CREGO to a subordinate “bookkeeping agency,” which had to submit even the most minor action for final decision. According to Colonel Whipple, the belligerent attitude of USASOS and the aggressive stand of G-4 at GHQ in large measure represented a very human urge “to get into the act,” which was coupled with a burning desire
to control theater shipping.45 In his opinion, USASOS could have gained the same ends without confusion or turmoil by merely booking its cargo in the prescribed manner and applying for priorities, referring any conflicts to CREGO for settlement by G-4 at GHQ if so desired.46
The Problem of Shipping Congestion
Much of the heat and friction generated by this unwholesome situation might be dismissed simply as the byproduct of disagreement as to who should regulate and control traffic within the theater, but the matter unfortunately had wider and more serious ramifications. By autumn 1943 shipping congestion had already become a problem in SWPA. Despite strenuous efforts by CREGO to control the flow of shipping in accordance with supply requirements and the receiving capacity of destination ports, the immobilization of vessels in the theater assumed increasingly serious proportions.47
Congestion developed at Milne Bay, New Guinea, in September and October 1943. It came of routing more ships to the port there than could be promptly discharged and of holding other vessels until they could be called forward to Finschhafen. Later, in January 1944, the harbor at Milne Bay held as many as 140 ships, some of which had been there more than a month. During the first half of February, Milne Bay had the lowest average discharge-261 measurement tons—per vessel per day of any port in SWPA. Seven of the vessels awaiting discharge at the end of this period had been in port for forty days or more. The War Department demanded immediate corrective action. Although the theater tried to comply by expediting cargo discharge, the congestion continued.
Similar difficulties were encountered, successively, at Hollandia, Leyte, and Manila. At each forward base, cargo discharge generally was slowed by the lack of port facilities, a shortage of labor, a shortage of trucks, mud, rain, and enemy air raids. Under these circumstances, with storage space ashore limited or almost nonexistent, the natural tendency in the theater was to use Liberty ships as floating warehouses and to meet the most urgent requirements by means of selective discharge. As a result, vessels in increasing numbers lay idle, the scarcity of bottoms became more acute, and drastic expedients ultimately had to be adopted in order to bring relief.
Aware of the growing congestion, the chief regulating officer unsuccessfully attempted to obtain satisfactory corrective action, by which he meant the retarding of
scheduled loadings. His office reported on 18 October 1944 that there were 87 ships at Hollandia-12 discharging, 3 loading, 24 awaiting call to Leyte, 33 waiting to discharge, 5 waiting to load, and 10 miscellaneous. Of the 45 ships discharging or waiting to discharge, 7 were troop transports and 38 were cargo ships, of which only 9 had been scheduled for Hollandia by CREGO. The remaining 29 evidently had come directly from the zone of interior. These last 29 shiploads could just as well have remained in the United States, because they were no closer to being in the hands of combat troops than if they had been held in San Francisco and loaded at a time that would have permitted immediate discharge on arrival at Hollandia.
The invasion of Leyte in late October 1944 brought further difficulty. Major changes in operational plans calculated by the theater commander to speed up the campaign in the Philippines created unanticipated requirements. The effort to meet these needs, together with delays in cargo discharge caused by the elements and enemy action, resulted in a large accumulation of vessels at Leyte. Meanwhile, despite some improvement at Hollandia, a major supporting base, too many freighters were still being held entirely too long. Thoroughly alarmed, CREGO again attempted to arrange for a cutback in scheduled loadings, notifying G-4, GHQ, on 11 November that information on hand indicated that by early January 1945 approximately 100 vessels would be idle awaiting discharge or call forward to Leyte. No action was taken, and the shipping tie-up materialized as predicted. According to Colonel Whipple, both G-4, GHQ, and USASOS realized the situation but appeared unable to resist pressure from various agencies to “load out more and more items and more and more ships” for Leyte; apparently the supply people “found some security in having their supply backlogs on ships” even though the vessels might not be discharged for some time to come.48 As for the theater commander, he believed that the speedup of the campaign had justified the expense in shipping.49
The tie-up of shipping at Hollandia and Leyte finally led to drastic action in late November 1944 by the President acting through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The theater was notified that from May through October 1944, inclusive, a total of 270 ships had been loaded and sent out, of which 177 were completely discharged. Only 98 of the latter had been released for return to the zone of interior. Vessel retentions had swollen from 112 on 15 May to 190 on 11 November, and the theater commander was therefore ordered to release at once at least 20 vessels in this category. He was not to exceed 170 retentions at any time during December 1944, and he was asked to report the number of additional vessels to be released for return to the United States by the end of January 1945. Further, the planned sailings from the west coast to SWPA during December 1944 were to be reduced arbitrarily from 40 to 30 ships.
In view of the growing port and shipping congestion in the Philippines, the War Department, on 8 December 1944, notified the theater commander that only two courses of action seemed open: (1) reduction of vessel retentions from 170 on 20 December 1944 to 100 by 15 January
1945; and (2) elimination, where practicable, of U.S. sailings for SWPA in December and in January 1945. The War Department called for “immediate drastic action.” General MacArthur asked to have the proposed reduction postponed for two months because of the impending invasion of Luzon, but before his reply could reach Washington, where patience had worn thin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already directed all theater commanders to cease using ships as floating warehouses, to reduce sailing schedules to conform to port discharge capacities, to discontinue selective discharge except for urgent operations, and to submit detailed reports on the position and employment of ships.
General MacArthur again protested, but to no avail. He also sent a representative, Brig. Gen. Harold E. Eastwood, to Washington to urge reconsideration of the cut in shipping to SWPA. General Eastwood felt that the War Department was hostile to SWPA while other theaters grew fat at its expense. General Wylie, Assistant Chief of Transportation for Operations, regretted this misconception and pointed to the fact that ETO, the top-priority theater, had suffered far deeper proportionate cuts in shipping than had as yet been applied against SWPA.
General Wylie believed that the theater had consistently leaned far over on the safe side in setting up its supplies and in loading for operations on the basis of “too early and too much.”50 There had been no realistic appreciation of discharge capacity and no inclination to reduce requirements once it had become apparent that optimistic forecasts would not be met. Later, in June 1945, a study of Pacific supply, based on data from San Francisco Port of Embarkation, disclosed that SWPA had “consistently requisitioned tonnages in excess of ability to receive and unload,” and that a total of 750,000 tons of cargo was awaiting shipment from the west coast to SWPA. According to Colonel Whipple, USASOS had built up a tremendous backlog of cargo in San Francisco despite repeated objections by CREGO that fell upon deaf ears in G-4 of GHQ.51
In SWPA, as in ETO, efficient utilization of shipping had obviously been made secondary to a comfortable supply position. Transportation Corps officers in Washington, however, felt that the operations in SWPA could be supported without an excessive floating reserve of idle vessels. None of General Eastwood’s comments, said General Wylie, could excuse ships lying at anchor 40, 50, and 60 days awaiting discharge. This firm stand had a salutary effect upon SWPA, which at long last sought to adjust shipping requests to the approximate discharge rates.
Experience with confusion and congestion at Milne Bay, Hollandia, and Leyte by no means prevented similar conditions at Manila. General Wylie, who visited that port in the spring of 1945, found that USASOS, in dealing with G-4, GHQ, often bypassed the chief transportation officer as well as CREGO. General MacArthur personally accepted full blame for any shipping congestion, for he believed that getting into Manila at an early date justified some logistic difficulties. What he did not mention, said Wylie, was that his staff had been slow to adjust the shipping requirements to the changed target dates. As a result, the War Department had to
make arbitrary cuts in tonnage, action that might better have been taken by the theater in light of its own needs and capabilities.52
In fairness to SWPA, it should be pointed out that the port facilities at Manila had suffered severely from wartime damage and destruction, with a resultant adverse effect upon the rate of cargo discharge. A shortage of trucks and labor at the dumps hampered port clearance. However, the worst congestion came in the late summer and early fall of 1945, when ships arrived from the United States and Europe but could not be unloaded because of the scrambled situation after the surrender of Japan. The subsequent outloading of forces for occupation duties and demobilization further complicated the picture.
The Disbandment of CREGO
Following the end of hostilities, the theater took steps to dismantle the GHQ regulating system. Effective 31 August 1945 the CREGO organization was formally disbanded. Priority controls over water traffic were transferred to AFWESPAC, but GHQ SWPA, retained the function of establishing and implementing air priorities.53 Among the CREGO functions assumed by AFWESPAC as of 1 September were: (1) control of “intra-area water movements of Army personnel and cargo except movements made in assault shipping”; (2) preparation and submission of ACTREPs (activity reports) and PACTREPs (Pacific activity reports); (3) preparation and distribution of a “consolidated daily port status report”; (4) routing of intra-area vessels assigned to AFWESPAC, of transpacific vessels destined for ports under the control of AFWESPAC, and of such other vessels as might be assigned by GHQ AFPAC; and (5) assignment and publication of SWPA and local numbers of all Army-allocated and Navy-allocated vessels in the area. Movements of assault shipping and assignment and release of vessels from the local fleet continued to be as directed by GHQ.
As already indicated, the newly appointed Chief of Transportation, AFWESPAC, General Stewart, regarded this transfer as a triumph for the Transportation Corps. But irrespective of the aggressive stand taken by Stewart, the end of the war against Japan and the ultimate regrouping of the Allied forces in SWPA into separate independent commands undoubtedly would have led to the abandonment of the GHQ regulating system. The reversion of SWPA from an Allied headquarters to one predominantly U.S. Army in make-up made logical a shift of regulating responsibilities from the Allied GHQ level to AFWESPAC.54
While it functioned, the GHQ regulating system all too often provided a convenient scapegoat for the frequent failures to tie in transportation and supply within the theater. The chief regulating officer undoubtedly took the blame for many conditions beyond his control, such as inadequate port facilities and unexpected demands created by changes in tactical plans. Accusations and countercharges tended to obscure substantial achievement attained in the priority control of theater traffic. Like many another referee, CREGO discovered that his decisions
were not always cheered. The maze of controls, regulations, and reports was forbidding, particularly for the transportation operator who felt that he could direct his own traffic.
The chief regulating officer had neither a perfect nor an infallible system. Given the same handicaps, another agency might or might not have done the job with fewer headaches. Even the critics of the regulating system, such as Generals Frink and Wanamaker, conceded that the control of Allied traffic on a priority basis was necessary. The problem was to determine the proper place and scope of the control mechanism within the theater organization.
According to Frink, the regulating system would have worked better in SWPA had GHQ been content simply to allot tonnages to the various forces involved and left the regulating function to his chief of transportation. As it was, he believed that CREGO attempted to exercise a much too detailed control over the movement of ships, personnel, and cargo.55 On the other hand, CREGO found that he lacked the necessary authority and support to do a fully effective job. Apparently with the encouragement of some staff members of G-4, GHQ USASOS in many instances circumvented CREGO directives. Moreover the G-4 Transportation Section, which was actually duplicative in function, increasingly dominated CREGO from the summer of 1944 onward.
The division of transportation responsibilities and functions as between the GHQ G-4 Transportation Section, CREGO, and the Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS, almost inevitably led to misunderstandings, clashes, and some duplication.56 Colonel Whipple, who had been instrumental in the establishment of the regulating system and the guiding spirit behind it, believed that better results would have been attained if the control of all transportation and regulation had been placed in the hands of one officer, responsible only to the Chief of Staff, GHQ. Located in the Allied headquarters and utilizing all port facilities, ships, railways, and transport aircraft, including the necessary personnel, this officer would meet the requirements of G-3 and G-4, referring to the chief of staff any conflicts that could not be settled by conference. Such a system, if supported by all concerned, he contended, would have eliminated much of the difficulty encountered.57
The U.S. Army Fleet in SWPA
From beginning to end the war in the Southwest Pacific was highly dependent upon movement by water. Almost all American support in men and material had to be sent by ship from the United States, a distance of approximately 6,000 nautical miles. Within SWPA the bulk of wartime traffic was by sea, from island to island and along the coastal fringes of the larger land masses.
The shipping that supported the U.S. Army in SWPA consisted of ocean-going vessels moving back and forth between the United States and the theater, and vessels
used solely within the theater. Ships normally engaged in transpacific runs might be retained for temporary service in SWPA, and while so employed they were in effect part of the local fleet. Within SWPA all shipping was under the control of the Allied theater commander.
Fortunately, except for a brief period before and after Pearl Harbor, ocean traffic to and from the Southwest Pacific was unhampered by the convoy system, which of necessity obtained in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas. In October 1941, because of growing concern over possible hazardous conditions in the Pacific, the U.S. Navy recommended that all troop transports, as well as freighters carrying valuable military cargo such as airplanes and tanks, be convoyed between Honolulu and Manila. The Army acquiesced, and thereafter the required escorts and routing were furnished by the Navy. The Navy announced on 26 December 1941 that it could not escort more than one fast troop convoy to Australia per month and that all slow cargo ships bound for that area would simply be “turned loose to proceed individually.”58
The policy of protecting only the troop transports and letting the cargo vessels fend for themselves was agreeable to General Somervell, who was willing to accept the risk of loss at sea in order to move urgently needed supplies to the Far East. In the first few months of the war providing escorts proved troublesome. The Army generally was impatient of the delay in setting up convoys, and the Navy was reluctant to carry troops in vessels with a speed of less than 15 knots. Luckily, enemy submarine activity never became serious in the Southwest Pacific. From the fall of 1942 on, troop and cargo ships usually traveled without escort, except in the forward areas where naval and air protection had to be given.59
Like the other Pacific areas, SWPA experienced an urgent need for ships because of its utter dependence upon water transport. The world-wide shortage of bottoms precluded full compliance with SWPA requests, and until V-E Day the shipping needs of the war in Europe took priority over those of the conflict with Japan. In Australia, as in the United Kingdom, local resources were exploited as fully as possible so as to reduce shipping requirements. An unexpected but welcome source of supply for SWPA was the “distress cargo” from sixty-one American, British, and Dutch ships that had taken refuge in Australian ports during the early months of the war.
Ocean-Going Vessels in Intratheater Service
With ocean shipping short everywhere and Australian tonnage already depleted by two years of war, the U.S. Army had difficulty in assembling a local fleet for intratheater use.60 The initial acquisitions for this purpose were effected by purchase or charter from private owners, but thereafter new construction provided the principal source of supply. Vessels of Australian registry were procured through Sir Thomas Gordon, director of shipping for the Australian Commonwealth. American flag vessels and available ships of other flags were obtained by the War Department through the War Shipping
Administration, which had its representatives in Australia.61
After Pearl Harbor the theater, under desperate pressure to supply the Philippines and Java, had been forced to seize every ship within reach. Enemy action resulted in severe losses, notably at Darwin where Japanese bombers destroyed almost all the shipping in the harbor, including the veteran Army transport Meigs. In mid-March 1942 the USAFIA local fleet totaled only seven vessels: three U.S. craft, one Philippine ship, and three small vessels belonging to the British-controlled China Navigation Company.
With the fall of Java and the impending loss of the Philippines, Australia became the main base of operations in the Southwest Pacific. A local fleet was therefore essential in order to move personnel, equipment, and supplies from the Australian ports to the forward areas. The first substantial increment for this fleet came in the spring of 1942, when 21 small vessels were obtained by charter from the Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (KPM). Known as KPM vessels, the ships had formerly operated in the Netherlands East Indies. Loaded with refugees, they had limped into the nearest Australian ports to avoid capture by the Japanese.62
Large ships generally were obtained by retention of WSA vessels dispatched to SWPA from the zone of interior. Since such ships were retained only for temporary assignments, the theater had to secure other vessels that could be kept for a longer time in a so-called permanent local fleet. Beginning in the summer of 1942, SWPA repeatedly requested additional vessels, large and small, that could be used for intratheater missions. Initially, the theater demanded at least twenty ships of the “Laker” type,63 which were of moderate draft and had large hatches. That number, minus one sunk en route, was procured ship by ship in the United States, and delivered to the theater by the Transportation Corps. The first Laker, City of Fort Worth, reached SWPA on 12 March 1943, and the others arrived at various dates thereafter. These vessels were generally about 251 feet long, of approximately 2,600 gross tons, and had a speed of 8 to 9 knots. They were supplemented by a dozen other vessels, somewhat larger but with similar characteristics.
The Lakers had seen hard service for twenty years or more, and all required considerable reconditioning before being sent across the Pacific. Originally designed for short voyages, they had limited water and fuel capacity. After a year of experience with these vessels, Colonel Plant, Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS, reported that they were “a constant repair problem” and had been “very much of a headache.” Yet unsatisfactory as these ships were, the theater could not have done without them.
Indeed, to meet the ever-urgent demand for intratheater shipping, an additional assortment of ocean-going vessels,
ranging from 200 to 400 feet in length, was acquired from private owners. Of both American and foreign registry, these ships became part of the local SWPA fleet, which by December 1943 totaled 52 vessels, varying in speed from 8 to 16 knots. At that time one KPM ship, the Maetsuycker, had been converted into a hospital ship, ten vessels were employed as troop carriers, and the remaining forty-one served as freighters.64
From the very beginning the slow but versatile “work-horse of the sea,” the EC-2 Liberty ship, was included in the local fleet. Ultimately, most of the Liberties in intratheater traffic consisted of vessels temporarily withdrawn from transpacific runs, a practice that had been authorized on an emergency basis as early as mid-February 1942. To the dismay of the War Shipping Administration and the Transportation Corps at Washington, the theater’s appetite for such retentions grew and grew until it finally had to be curbed.65
The theater found Liberty ships very useful as cargo carriers because of their large hatches and deep ‘tween decks and lower holds. These vessels also gave good service as emergency troopships. Under the direction of Colonel Plant, in the fall of 1942 Liberty ships were converted overnight into troopers to meet a pressing need for that type of transport for operations in New Guinea. Field kitchens, protected by shelters made of dunnage, were placed on the port side between numbers two and three hatches. Trough latrines were installed on both sides on the after deck between numbers four and five hatches. They were flushed by lengths of hose connected to the fire hydrants. A few fresh water outlets were added at each end of the amidships house. No standee bunks were installed, and the ‘tween decks were kept clear of all cargo. Usually, both officers and men slept on the deck in good weather. Normally, each ship carried 900 troops. These conversions provided the necessities such as lifesaving equipment but no frills, and the ships could be quickly reconverted into freighters when so needed. Division commanders later told Plant that the passage on a Liberty troopship served well as preparation for the hardships that lay ahead.66
Liberty ships, while highly desirable for ocean voyages between Australia and New Guinea, were too large for coastal service in shallow and uncharted waters. Accordingly, early in 1943 the theater urged the development and standardization of a medium-size vessel, 250 to 300 feet long, with adequate cargo gear, large hatches, refrigeration, and a speed of around 14 knots. At least 200 ships with these specifications were desired for intra-theater supply missions. They were needed to expedite deliveries, to minimize transshipment delays, and to avoid possible loss of large vessels in the poorly charted and frequently hazardous waters of the forward areas.
All told, in June 1943 the theater requested a total of 420 vessels of various types, a requirement deemed “excessive” by the Office of the Chief of Transportation at Washington. Although that demand could not be met, the theater’s vessel requirements were partially filled by
the continued procurement of older vessels. Lacking enough ships for local assignments, the theater relied increasingly on the temporary retention of WSA vessels. Relief came in 1944 with the construction by the U.S. Maritime Commission of three types of vessels that were especially suited for service in SWPA—C1-M-AV1 vessels, Baltic coasters, and concrete storage-ships.
The C1-M-AV1, a steel cargo vessel of 3,805 gross tons, diesel powered, with a length of approximately 339 feet and a speed of 11 knots, became the answer to the theater’s request for 200 craft of medium size. Production difficulties delayed deliveries of the C1-M-AV1 type to the theater. Bearing such salty names as Clove Hitch, Star Knot, and Sailor’s Splice, these ships began to reach SWPA in limited numbers in February 1945. The C1-M-AV1’s were satisfactory, and their earlier availability might have made unnecessary the employment of the old Lakers, which were costly to convert, maintain, and repair.
As partial substitutes for C 1-M-AV1’s, the theater requisitioned fifteen Baltic coasters on 16 March 1944. The Baltic coasters delivered to SWPA were oilfired cargo ships of 1,791 gross tons, with a length of approximately 259 feet and a draft when loaded of almost 18 feet. These vessels were well adapted for operations in the shallow waters of New Guinea. The Baltic coasters began arriving in September 1944, in time for the landings on Leyte.
Much less desirable than the Baltic coasters were the concrete vessels, which began to anchor in the theater in late November 1944. Described as Type C1-S-D1, they were of 4,826 gross tons, with an approximate length of 367 feet and a speed of 7 knots. Because of known deficiencies, such as seepage through the porous concrete bulkheads of the fuel and water tanks, these ships were employed solely as floating warehouses.
The local ocean-going fleet in SWPA increased by almost one half between 15 July 1944 and 24 January 1945, but it remained almost stationary in size thereafter. By 1 August 1945 the proportion of these vessels built in the United States for use in World War II had increased to about 54 percent as compared with about 3 percent on 15 July 1944. The following tabulation indicates the change in the composition of the local fleet between 1 December 1943 and 1 August 1945:67
| Type of Vessel | 1 Dec 43 | 15 Jul 44 | 21 Jan 45 | 9 May 45 | 1 Aug 45 |
| Total | 52 | 64 | 93 | 94 | 98 |
| KPM | 21 | 22 | 19 | 13 | 9 |
| China Nav. Co | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Lakers | 17 | 26 | 25 | 21 | 19 |
| Other private | 7 | 11 | 17 | 16 | 14 |
| Liberties | 4 | 2 | 11 | 8 | 5 |
| Baltic coasters | 0 | 0 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
| Concrete | 0 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 14 |
| C1-M-AV1’s | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 18 |
The foregoing figures illustrate forcefully that, at the peak of its wartime strength, the entire SWPA local fleet of ocean-going vessels was well under a fourth of the 420 ships requested in June 1943. This discrepancy explains why the theater resorted increasingly to the retention of WSA vessels for local use. On the other hand, some believed that more could have been done with the ships at hand. According to General Frink, there was one problem in SWPA over which neither USASOS nor the Transportation
Corps had any control—the wasteful employment of ocean transport because of the overestimation of the requirements of the troops, with the result that thousands of tons of cargo remained afloat for months on end without being unloaded. Much of this excess was the natural fruit of fear that the commanders in the field might not have enough to do the job, but much of it also came from sudden and sweeping changes in tactical plans. Whatever the cause, in Frink’s opinion more realistic estimates of requirements would have made it possible to do the job with fewer vessels.68
Small Ships and Craft
The local fleet formed only part of the shipping resources of the theater. The war in the Southwest Pacific required a large number and a wide variety of small ships and craft, ranging from native canoes to vessels of nearly 1,000 gross tons. At the outset the available floating equipment at the Australian ports was in poor condition and obviously unsuited to wartime traffic. Operations off New Guinea and neighboring islands called for small vessels of shallow draft that could navigate among coral reefs and reach primitive landing places. At all ports operated in the theater small craft were needed for lighterage and other harbor duties.
At first, of necessity, the U.S. Army’s small ships consisted entirely of craft obtained from the Australians—battered schooners, old ferry boats, rusty trawlers, luggers, launches, lighters, tugs, surf boats, ketches, yachts, and yawls—a miscellaneous collection known officially as the “catboat flotilla.” The Americans in the beginning took anything they could get since urgency forbade discrimination or selection. Ultimately a large fleet was assembled in three ways:69 by charter or purchase from Australian owners, requisition from the United States, and local construction in Australia and New Zealand.
A program for the construction in Australia and New Zealand of small craft for the U.S. Army was begun by Colonel Thomas Wilson in September 1942 on a reverse lend-lease basis. The Australian Shipbuilding Board, a governmental agency, contracted directly with the local shipbuilders, who then geared their production to meet American needs. Australian construction was confined mainly to hulls. Engines, navigational instruments, and auxiliary equipment were supplied from the United States and installed by the Australians.
Construction was hampered by labor shortages, delays in the shipment of lumber and steel, and slow deliveries of engines and other equipment from the United States. The Chief of Transportation, USAFFE, reported in April 1943 that no appreciable amount of major equipment had arrived, that a number of hulls “built on promises” awaited engines, and that the entire project might be abandoned. Nevertheless, the Australians were persuaded to continue, and a concerted effort was put forth in the United States to expedite the production and shipment of engines and accessories. Local builders made considerable use of plywood, notably for the small but seaworthy motor dories. Steel and wooden barges, for which the need was critical, were the most numerous single item produced.
All together, almost 3,200 small craft were completed in the theater for the Transportation Corps. In 1944, with increased deliveries from the United States, local production was curtailed. In the opinion of Colonel Plant, this program was of real assistance to the U.S. Army.70
It was recognized before the close of 1942 that neither the Australian vessels acquired from private owners nor the craft to be constructed locally would satisfy all requirements of the theater. The deficiency had to be met by craft acquired or constructed in the United States and then delivered to the theater under their own power, under tow, or as cargo. During the period from January 1944 through August 1945 a total of 1,149 units was procured in the United States and delivered to SWPA for the Transportation Corps. Most of these were of new construction and were larger and heavier than those produced in the theater. The total included 531 barges, 203 freight supply vessels, 138 tugs, and 106 marine tractors, as well as smaller numbers of floating cranes, small tankers, and launches.71
Because small craft were essential to the development of port operations in the forward areas, the Transportation Corps had to organize and direct the most extensive interisland towing projects in his-tory—from Australia to New Guinea, thence to the Philippines, and lastly from the Philippines to Okinawa. Deliveries of towed barges from Australia to New Guinea began in the summer of 1943 and reached their peak during 1944. The first Philippine convoy left Hollandia for Tacloban on 10 October 1944. Its 13 tugs hauled 40 units, chiefly barges. The officer responsible for the outstanding success of this towing operation was Lt. Col. (later Col.) Leon J. Lancaster, whose work was highly commended by both Army and Navy personnel.72
Maritime Personnel
The Army’s ships in intratheater service were manned throughout the war by military as well as civilian personnel. The military contingent, which had both combat and service elements, came originally from Ship and Gun Crew Command No. 1, USAFIA, activated at Sydney on 3 July 1942. Two years later, it was reorganized and expanded to form the 35th Transportation Corps Composite Group, which subsequently underwent further organizational shuffling. Its major function was to furnish gun crews and operating personnel for Army vessels in SWPA. Soldiers assigned to this duty received rigorous training in both gunnery and seamanship. The work was dangerous, and the men were almost always at sea. As the war progressed, ship and gun crew pools were established at the principal ports in SWPA for convenience in providing for replacements, for paying crews, and for other administrative details. At Finschhafen in January 1945, for example, the commanding officer of the pool supplied gunners, radio operators, signalmen, cooks, and seamen for the Army’s local fleet.73
The first civilian maritime personnel in the theater came aboard the KPM and other locally procured vessels.74 These
men were a conglomerate lot of Australians, Dutch, Javanese, Chinese, Lascars, Malays, and Hindus. Strikes were frequent among them. At Brisbane in January 1943 a Chinese crew in jail for mutiny refused freedom and the chance to work on another ship unless paid in full for their time behind bars. Fortunately, the KPM and other local ship operators, and not the Americans, had to cope with these crews. It was another matter when the U.S. Army had to man its own vessels. Since there were no units on hand to provide crews, the theater activated ten Quartermaster boat companies (the 316th through the 325th) on 1 January 1943 from available personnel in SWPA. Despite subsequent accretions, the Transportation Corps never had enough military personnel to operate more than a fraction of its ships in local service. As a result, extensive use had to be made of Australian civilians. However, by May 1943 the supply of maritime labor in SWPA was almost exhausted.
At the request of the theater, the Chief of Transportation, ASF, in 1943 carried on a vigorous program of recruitment and training in the United States. In June of that year Colonel Plant personally presented the theater’s case in Washington. Plant, in particular, was responsible for obtaining the adoption by the Army and the War Shipping Administration of a new type of contract for civilian maritime employees that featured a 100-percent increase in compensation in lieu of all bonuses. This change ended the previous lucrative but often farcical bonus system for service in hazardous waters. Among other advantages it facilitated the calculation of pay and reduced the number of controversial claims. Inevitably, in SWPA as in ETO, considerable dissatisfaction arose because of the disparity in pay between civilians and military service personnel doing the same work.
The first group of approximately 700 American maritime employees, recruited in the United States to man small vessels in SWPA, arrived at Sydney in September 1943. During the ensuing months of the war the theater continued to depend heavily upon American and Australian civilians to operate its ships. In August 1945 the U.S. Army employed a total of 4,699 civilian maritime personnel, of whom 1,372 were Americans engaged in the United States on contract. Of necessity, the policy in the theater was to make the maximum use of civilians. Although the Army took the lead in procuring maritime personnel, the Navy supplied Coast Guard crews on a number of larger sea-going vessels operating in SWPA.75
Reefers, Tankers, and Hospital Ships
Apart from the vessels already mentioned, other types of ships were required in the theater to perform specialized functions. Among these were the refrigerated vessels. According to General Frink, the main gripe he encountered in the Southwest Pacific concerned the lack of an adequate supply of fresh meat in the forward areas and the consequent reliance by the troops on Australian canned rations.76 Humid heat, especially in New Guinea and the Philippines, prevented the shipment of perishable foods such as Australian beef unless refrigeration could be furnished. Unfortunately, in the
beginning very few vessels offered any refrigerated space other than the ship’s icebox. The soldier’s frequent diet of canned rations therefore had to be supplemented by vitamin pills.
The efforts of the Transportation Corps to procure refrigerated vessels for SWPA may be summed up in the familiar words “too little and too late.” Throughout 1943–44 the theater suffered from a critical shortage of reefer space. When the first Laker arrived in March 1943, its refrigeration was hailed as “manna from Heaven.” Yet at best such ships could give only partial relief. For the forward areas where the need was acute, the suggestion was made that refrigerated barges be built to serve as floating warehouses from which daily issues could be made to the troops on shore.
Both the proposed barges and the C1-M-AV1 vessels, which together were calculated to furnish adequate reefer space, were late in reaching the theater. Reefer barges began arriving in August 1944, but the first two C1-M-AV1’s did not arrive until February 1945. Meanwhile, unsuccessful efforts were made to get aid from the U.S. Navy and the British Ministry of War Transport. Within the theater, the number of issues of perishables per month to forward areas dropped from nine in July to four in November 1944. Then, as before, the forces in New Guinea, the most unhealthful and uncomfortable part of the theater, existed on canned rations and vitamin tablets. However, some relief was obtained by large direct shipments of perishables from San Francisco and New York.
Ample reefer space finally began to materialize in the summer of 1945. The most urgent need had passed when, considerably after V-J Day, three large refrigerated barges arrived in the theater. These were of a new type 265 feet long. Each was equipped to produce 5 tons of ice per day and to make 10 gallons of ice cream every 7 minutes, and each had a capacity of approximately 64 carloads of frozen meat and 500 measurement tons of other perishables.
Another shipping problem that confronted the theater was the distribution of sufficient petroleum products to keep the Army’s aircraft and motorized equipment in operation. Initially, American oil was delivered to Australia either in drums or in bulk and then transshipped where required. As new bases were established in New Guinea and later in the Philippines, a demand developed for small tankers and oil barges that could deliver bulk petroleum at landing places in shallow waters or that could be used to discharge large tankers lying offshore.
Construction both in Australia and in the United States made available a considerable number of oil barges varying from 80 to 120 feet in length. These were supplemented by at least 31 of the so-called Y-tankers, 162 to 182 feet long, that began to trickle into the theater in August 1943. The Y-tankers usually were damaged crossing the Pacific and had to be repaired before going into service. Their activity was hampered by inexperienced crews and a shortage of spare parts. Toward the close of the war, with the help of Navy-owned vessels, commercial oil carriers, and the Army’s own tankers and barges, there was material improvement in the tight petroleum shipping situation.77
The evacuation of patients called for another specialized type of ship. In the early months of the war most of the sick
and wounded were hospitalized in Australia. The first officially designated hospital ship in the theater, the Mactan, was chartered by the American Red Cross. At the close of 1941 she brought a load of patients from Manila to Brisbane, but the ship was not used for this purpose thereafter. As in other theaters, except for certain cases moved by air, evacuation to the United States normally involved the use of hospital space aboard returning troopships.
The principal problem in evacuation by ship concerned the inadequate facilities for neuropsychiatric patients. By August 1943 it had become evident that almost 12 percent of all casualties returned from SWPA were psychotic and required security accommodations, whereas previously only 1 percent of the hospital space aboard ship had been allowed for this type of patient. Subsequently, at Washington, the Transportation Corps and the Maritime Commission took action to provide additional specially equipped quarters on the ships, and the allotment of troop space for the returning mental patient was increased to 4 percent as recommended by the U.S. Army Medical Department.
The arrival of registered hospital ships in SWPA was delayed in part by the difficulties of vessel conversion and in part by the superior urgency attached to evacuation of casualties from the North African and European theaters. Beginning in the summer of 1944, Army patients were evacuated to the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation by the three Navy-owned and Navy-operated hospital ships, Comfort, Hope, and Mercy, all new, superbly equipped floating hospitals with complete U.S. Army medical staffs.78
No Army hospital ships were dispatched from the United States to SWPA until after the invasion of Leyte on 20 October 1944. First to arrive was the USAHS Marigold, a converted troop transport that sailed from Charleston, South Carolina, on 9 October and reached Finschhafen on 14 November. The Marigold had a gross tonnage of 11,350, a speed of 13 knots, and a patient capacity of 761. She saw extensive service in the theater, calling at Hollandia, Milne Bay, Biak, Leyte, Lingayen Gulf, Subic Bay, and Manila, before returning with a load of patients to Los Angeles on 12 May 1945. Later in the same year, several other U.S. Army hospital ships, notably the Emily H. M. Weder and the Dogwood, were sent to SWPA.79
Port Operations
The ports in Australia, New Guinea, and the Philippines formed three separate groups, each with distinctive characteristics and each vital to the U.S. Army at different stages of the war against Japan.80 The Australian ports in general constituted the chief transportation centers of a continent on which the rail, highway, and air facilities were limited. They were indispensable to the U.S. Army, first in the build-up of Australia as a defensive base and then in the funneling of troops, equipment, and supplies into New Guinea. Army use of Australian installations
declined somewhat after the ports of New Guinea became available and direct shipments could be received from the United States, and declined still further after the invasion of the Philippines.
Ports in Australia
After the first months of the war, when American forces were being established in the theater and when Australia itself appeared to be threatened with invasion, the U.S. Army tended increasingly to utilize the ports on the east coast of Australia. By mid-1942 it was obvious that Darwin, Adelaide, Perth, and Melbourne were too remote to support activity in New Guinea. The volume of U.S. Army traffic through Darwin, Adelaide, and Perth was very small. A well-equipped port, Melbourne had no heavy American traffic after the summer of that year, although it was used for a time as a storage area.81 Of continuing importance to the U.S. Army were the ports of Sydney, Brisbane, Townsville, and Cairns. However, at none of these installations was there a regularly assigned U.S. Army port organization functioning as in the United Kingdom. Except for occasional employment of troop labor, during a strike for example, cargo discharge in Australia was generally accomplished by civilian employees of local stevedoring firms working at the direction of the base commanders and under the technical supervision of the Transportation Corps. Australian labor was averse to the employment of U.S. port troops. Only two U.S. port battalions reached Australia in 1942, and they spent very little time there before being hurried off to New Guinea, where the need for their services was more urgent.
Sydney was both the largest port and the largest city in Australia. The port consisted of a series of harbors in the coves of a large irregular bay with a deep, mile-wide entrance. In April 1942 the port had 177 ship berths, of which 44 were directly connected with railways and most were provided with electric cranes. Ample storage space was available on or adjacent to the wharves. In 1942 the docks could accommodate 81 ocean-going vessels at one time in addition to 10 to 15 ships unloading at anchor. Depths alongside varied from 7 to 35 feet. Sydney was the main industrial shipping and commercial center of Australia and had the best facilities for marine construction and repair. Army traffic through Sydney was consistently heavy. Available statistics, beginning with February 1944, show that almost 95,000 long tons of cargo were handled during the peak month of May 1945, practically all of which was outloaded.82
Brisbane, a much smaller port than Sydney, had the advantage of lying 515 miles nearer New Guinea. The city and port were situated on the Brisbane River, 15 miles from the sea. The river, constantly dredged, could take vessels 650 feet long with a draft of 26 to 27 feet, which meant that the port was able to berth Liberty ships but not large troop transports. In 1942 Brisbane had 50 marginal wharves providing 28 berths for large vessels, of which 14 had rail connections. At first there were no cranes capable of lifting more than 10 tons, but by March 1943 the U.S. Army had added one 50-ton crane and two 15-ton cranes.
Considerable cargo was accumulated in Brisbane for transshipment to New Guinea, and the process of discharging, sorting, storing, and outloading the materiel to be forwarded was time consuming and a frequent cause of delay in turnaround. Because of widely scattered storage space and a change in gauge at the railway yards that prevented the free movement of cars, motor transportation had to be used extensively and there was constant danger of congestion in the port area.
Following the arrival of the first American convoy at Brisbane on 22 December 1941, that port became for a time the principal one for sending supplies to the Philippines and to the advance base and transshipment point at Darwin. After the loss of the Philippines, Brisbane supported the operations in New Guinea. In July 1942 General MacArthur moved GHQ SWPA, to Brisbane, and late in the following year the Headquarters, USASOS, was also shifted to that city, the latter remaining there until November 1944. As a result, Brisbane was a busy port with considerable U.S. Army traffic.
Townsville, although much smaller than Brisbane and poorly equipped, was 785 miles nearer New Guinea. In consequence, its limited port facilities were used to the utmost by the U.S. Army, though no new piers were built. Anchorage was available for at least 75 vessels from two to six miles offshore. By constantly dredging the entrance channel to the port, sufficient depth was obtained to accommodate Liberty ships at the two piers. The six berths had rail connections, were equipped to handle lifts up to 20 tons, and were adjacent to 112,010 square feet of enclosed storage space. Only minor marine repairs were possible. Except for occasional troop labor, cargo discharge was performed by Australian longshoremen, who by American standards were considered slow and none too efficient. Masters of WSA vessels often complained of delay at this port. Townsville was a stopover point for northbound convoys, and in September 1943 as many as thirty-six ships at one time were lying at anchor awaiting call forward to New Guinea. The peak activity came in that year.
The subtropical port of Cairns, still closer to New Guinea, became a temporary base in September 1943 when the heavy demands of New Guinea exceeded the capacity of Townsville. Situated at the mouth of the Barron River, Cairns could receive a maximum of seven ocean-going vessels at one time. The harbor had to be dredged. Port equipment was poor, and the civilian longshoremen there, as elsewhere, were slow in discharging cargo. U.S. Army activity at Cairns rapidly dwindled as traffic shifted to Port Moresby and Milne Bay.
Ports in New Guinea and Adjacent Islands
In contrast with the fairly well-developed Australian ports, most of those in New Guinea and neighboring islands were little more than temporary creations that came into being as the focus of Allied activities moved northward from Australia. To the few small ports in that area remaining in Allied hands in the spring of 1942 were added numerous others in the course of the Papua Campaign (23 July 1942–23 January 1943) and subsequent advances on the northern side of eastern New Guinea, in the Admiralties, and in western New Britain. These operations, conducted in concert with a drive of the South Pacific forces up the Solomons,
were aimed principally at the reduction of the Japanese base at Rabaul.
Since there were no railways and only a few miles of surfaced roads in New Guinea and on the adjacent islands, at least 95 percent of the movements in the region north and east of Australia had to be made by water. As islands and coastal points were taken in eastern New Guinea and vicinity, it was necessary to develop ports for the transshipment or reception of the men and materiel required for local maintenance, base development, and for the staging and support of new advances. The task was difficult. Port facilities and equipment, where they existed at all, were generally primitive. The import capacities of the principal New Guinea ports in early 1943 ranged from 100 ship-tons per day at Salamaua to 2,500 ship-tons daily at Milne Bay. At most points cargo had to be lightered ashore, at best a slow and time-consuming process. Such native labor as was available was unskilled, and the hot and humid climate hampered operational efficiency and caused the rapid deterioration of supplies and equipment.
The conditions in and around eastern New Guinea necessitated considerable port construction by the Corps of Engineers before the Transportation Corps could function effectively. In these rugged mountainous islands, fringed with mangrove swamps and coral reefs, the Army’s facilities had literally to be “hewn from the jungle.” The standard pier or wharf, built on hardwood piles, was 30 feet wide and 330 feet long, usually set parallel to the beach and connected with it at each end by approaches 30 feet wide. Jetties had to be built for smaller craft, and earth and rock fills were made to serve as landing points. Such improvements were quickly effected with the aid of dredges, tractors, bulldozers, and portable sawmills, and, though primitive by modern standards, met the immediate need.
Much the same situation prevailed at ports in the New Guinea area uncovered during the accelerated SWPA drive toward the Philippines in the period April—September 1944. Bypassing the strongly held enemy positions in the New Britain–New Ireland area, SWPA forces launched a series of leapfrog advances along the New Guinea–Mindanao axis. They struck in turn at Hollandia and Aitape, Wakde, Biak, the Vogelkop Peninsula, and Morotai.83 As these objectives were taken and built up as forward air, naval, staging, and/or supply bases, it was necessary to repeat the process of port development. At the new forward ports, notably Hollandia and Biak, docks and storage facilities had to be built, and troops, floating and materials-handling equipment, and trucks had to be brought in.
Port Moresby, headquarters of the territorial government of Papua, was the first U.S. Army port developed in New Guinea. This small tropical port was entered through a narrow channel between reefs leading to a deep almost landlocked harbor with anchorage for about fifty ships. Cordial relations obtained between the Americans, who arrived in April 1942, and the local Australian forces, who originally were responsible for all port activity. The main Australian wharf consisted of a wooden causeway 250 feet long and 25 feet wide, ending in a T pier, 330 feet long and 30 feet wide. It was supplemented late in 1942 by new docks constructed by U.S. Army Engineers on nearby Tatana Island.
The first port company, the 611th, arrived on 19 June and was joined on 26 November by the 609th and 610th, all three being colored units of the 394th Port Battalion. During this period discharge was hampered by the lack of barges, tugs, and heavy lift gear. Supply dumps were scattered in the hills as far as twenty-five miles from Port Moresby; the roads were poor; and most cargo was stored in the open. The lack of storage space at the water front and a serious shortage of trucks limited the rate of cargo discharge, so that the harbor was crowded with ships waiting to be unloaded. The turnaround for vessels from Townsville to Port Moresby was from 11 to 13 days, of which 5 to 7 days were spent in awaiting discharge at the New Guinea end. Despite these difficulties and frequent air raid warnings, 125 vessels were worked at this port between May and November 1942.
Port Moresby was not only an important U.S. Army advance supply base during 1942 but also the headquarters for a unique Allied operating command that played an important role in the support of the advance in the Buna–Gona area. In the absence of roads and railways, Allied combat troops operating on the northern coast of Australian New Guinea could be supplied only by sea or air. In order to render the most effective support with the limited resources available, in October 1942 an Allied Combined Operational Service Command was established at Port Moresby under the command of the U.S. Brig. Gen. Dwight F. Johns.84 Serving under the Commander, New Guinea Force, General Johns was assigned operational control of all USASOS and Australian lines of communications in New Guinea. He was charged with responsibility for coordinating construction, dock operations, sanitation, and hospitalization and evacuation activities, as well as for providing transportation in the line of communications areas. Branches of his command were set up at Milne Bay, the principal center for transshipping cargo from ocean-going ships to smaller vessels, and later at Oro Bay, which was developed as an advanced base.
The water transportation activities were handled by a combined small-boat organization, which operated under the command of COSC. Beginning in late October the COSC fleet, consisting principally of fishing boats and luggers, began operating northeastward from Milne Bay toward Oro Bay. Subsequently, COSC vessels also operated directly from Oro Bay. As the combat troops moved up the coast, these ships moved personnel, tanks, guns, and supplies to forward supply points established on small bays and inlets. After picking up men and cargo from an ocean freighter at Milne Bay, the typical lugger would hide from enemy attack by day and then move ahead by night to complete delivery to the forward coastal supply points. Along the practically uncharted coast of New Guinea the personnel of the small ships had to set up their own markers and buoys, consisting of 55-gallon drums painted red. At the coastal supply points, where operations were carried on by the quartermaster of the 32nd Infantry Division, the cargo was landed by small boats for delivery by native carriers to the combat troops. Maintained under extremely difficult conditions, the seaborne line was a vital factor in sustaining the Allied forces in the area. The Combined Operational Service Command was discontinued about
April 1943, and U.S. Army elements reverted to USASOS.85 By that time American activities at Port Moresby had begun to decline, although the U.S. Army did not withdraw completely until September 1945.
Milne Bay, at the eastern extremity of New Guinea, was approached from the open sea by a difficult and dangerous channel. When the war began there was available only one small jetty. The roads in the area were native trails, and most of the hinterland was mud and swamp. All supplies except fresh fruit had to be shipped in from Australia. American troops arrived at Milne Bay in July 1942 and began assisting the local Australian contingent at the Gili Gili docks, where the first U.S. Army discharging facility, a floating pier, was made of dunnage and empty oil drums.86 Only jeeps, which had four-wheel drive, were able to move through the mud, and cargo was stacked in the open. In spite of heavy rains the Americans and Australians, with native Papuan labor, embarked at once on an extensive construction program. Port areas were developed at Gili Gili, Ahioma, and Waga Waga, comprising a total of 14 docks and an oil jetty, mostly in water 35 to 40 feet deep.
At the principal American installation, Ahioma, a typical dock consisted of a planked platform on piles, which was 400 feet long and 25 feet wide, paralleled the shore line at a distance of 100 feet, and was connected to the land at each end and in the center by ramps wide enough to permit the passage of two trucks. Cargo was moved by motor transport to inland storehouses and open dumps, usually several miles from the docks. Eventually, the port acquired a 30-ton and a 60-ton floating crane, a floating dry dock, 17 cargo barges, 3 tugs, 4 10-ton caterpillar cranes, several LCMs, and 6,000 cubic feet of refrigerated space. The 608th Port Company, a Negro unit of the 394th Port Battalion, was stationed at Milne Bay from 23 July 1942 to 9 April 1943.
The Milne Bay area was essentially a point of storage and transshipment, where cargo was shifted from Liberties and other large ships to smaller craft for delivery to Oro Bay, Lae, and other forward areas. Although its usefulness declined when the port of Finschhafen began to open up in late 1943, during the first nine months of 1944 the U.S. Army cargo loaded and discharged at Milne Bay ran as high as 202,000 short tons per month. The volume fell off sharply thereafter. By April 1945 several of the wooden piers were disintegrating and traffic was light. The last U.S. Army forces left Milne Bay in the following October.
Oro Bay, 211 miles from Milne Bay, provided anchorage for as many as eight vessels. Located only fifteen miles from Buna Village, the port was valuable in the support of the Buna–Gona campaign. Like Milne Bay, it was an important base of operations for the Combined Operational Service Command’s small-boat fleet in the winter of 1942–43. Thereafter, Oro Bay
retained importance as a supply base and staging area for both Australian and U.S. forces.
The first Transportation Corps port personnel, an advance party of Port Detachment E, under Maj. Carroll K. Moffatt, arrived on 13 December 1942. This group was augmented later in the month by troops of the 387th Port Battalion. Although their actual experience was limited to a short stay on the docks at Brisbane, the battalion performed creditably at Oro Bay despite enemy harassment.
Wharves were built, beginning in mid-1943, and by 1 August eight docks had been completed. Cargo discharged and loaded reached a peak of 125,000 short tons between July and September 1944, declining thereafter. The largest wharf was a wooden structure on piles, was 1,500 feet long, had four shore connections, and could berth four Liberties. Ultimately, the port acquired a floating dock, facilities for minor underwater repairs, a fresh-water line, 66,500 cubic feet of refrigerated space, and an ample supply of marine and cargo-handling equipment. Since no storage facilities were available in the port area, all cargo had to be trucked to storehouses and dumps five to twenty miles away. On occasion, heavy rains washed out bridges and flooded supply dumps. By April 1945 the wharves, like those at Milne Bay, were in great need of repair. Already, Oro Bay was far in the rear of the combat forces, and at the end of October 1945 the port reverted to Australian control.
Lae was less a harbor than an unsheltered beach on the open sea with deep water a quarter of a mile from shore. American and Australian combat troops were still disposing of the enemy in mid-September 1943 when an advance detachment of a base port command arrived aboard an LST. The sole discharge facilities were two rickety jetties unable to hold trucks. The first cargo was delivered by LST and discharged on the beach at night in heavy rain. Small ships later were discharged by DUKW, LCM, and lighter. Ashore, cargo clearance was impeded by bomb craters, shattered gun emplacements, barbed-wire entanglements, and the wreckage of Japanese landing craft.
The first ponton dock in New Guinea was erected at Lae. It was made of steel pontons that had been assembled into units at Oro Bay in October 1943. Loaded with Quartermaster and Engineer equipment and propelled by large diesel outboard motors, the entire assemblage then moved under its own power to Lae, where the cargo was discharged and the units were moored into place.87 At Lae a dock for Liberty ships, completed in December 1943, was destroyed in June 1944 by an earthquake. A series of storms severely damaged the port installations, necessitating considerable repair and replacement. At best, no more than five or six large ships could be worked at one time, and cargo handling was always difficult because of the heavy ground swell.
The principal mission of the port organization at Lae was not to supply the forward areas but to support the Air Forces installation at nearby Nadzab, to which bombs, ammunition, and spare parts were delivered by truck. Despite adverse weather conditions the port handled considerable cargo, especially in the first half of 1944. During the peak month of April 1944 a total of 85,623 short tons of cargo was loaded and discharged at Lae. The
volume declined sharply in 1945, although the U.S. Army made use of Lae through August.
Captured early in October 1943, Finschhafen lay on the blunt eastern extremity of the Huon Peninsula. The port installations were at Finsch Harbor, Langemak Bay, and Dreger Harbor. The first Transportation Corps unit, the 608th Port Company, arrived on 17 November 1943. The first Liberty ship docked on 20 December at the ponton unit towed from Lae and installed in Dreger Harbor. Cargo discharge was interrupted by more than a hundred air raid warnings in January 1944 and ninety in February. By July 1944 Finschhafen had a total of 12 Liberty-ship docks and 2 small-ship docks, mostly wooden structures on piles paralleling the shore line. The largest number of vessels berthed at one time was thirty-five.
Before the docks were built, cargo was delivered by LST and LCT. As late as January 1945 a total of 10 LCMs, 33 LCVPs, and 50 DUKWs operated day and night. Ultimately, the port facilities at Finschhafen were expanded to include two small dry docks, a marine railway, a portable machine shop, and two repair shops. Virtually no covered storage space existed until July 1944. The supply of trucks was limited, causing occasional delay in port clearance. Cargo operations were especially heavy from March through December 1944, with a peak of 237,480 short tons loaded and discharged in July. Through 1945, with activity on the decline, the port personnel and equipment at Finschhafen were gradually transferred to the Philippines.
Hollandia, on the rugged northeast coast of New Guinea, lay in the shadow of the Cyclops Mountains. Because of its fine anchorage for both combat and cargo vessels and its potentialities for airdrome development, the capture of this enemy-held area was calculated to provide a valuable base for future operations against the Japanese. Early in March 1944 a number of Transportation Corps officers assigned to the 2nd Port Headquarters began determining the transportation facilities and personnel needed for a major supply port and staging area at Hollandia. Subsequently, a small transportation group, under the command of Lt. Col. Reeford P. Shea, was attached to the I Corps in order to furnish technical advice and assistance to the assault force. The landings, made at Tanahmerah and Humboldt Bays on 22 April 1944, were unopposed. Cargo was at first discharged by the men of the 532nd and 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiments, employing all available Navy landing craft plus their own equipment, the latter including two 30-ton floating cranes, twenty 80-foot steel barges, six harbor tugs, and nine motor dories. The first Transportation Corps port troops at Hollandia were drawn from the 244th, 296th, and 609th Port Companies.88
In the opinion of the task force G-4, the operation ran into logistical difficulties primarily because too great a volume of traffic was directed too early into too restricted an area. Ashore, serious congestion quickly developed. Difficult terrain at one beach and a disastrous fire at another complicated the task. Truck operations were hampered by tortuous roads, steep grades, and almost continuous mud. However, as more dumps became available and access roads were constructed, the congested beaches were gradually
cleared. An acute labor shortage was relieved by the procurement of additional port companies. Early in June 1944 a base port command was organized with Colonel Shea as the Base Port Commander.89
At the close of 1944, the base port command had under its direction one Transportation Corps port battalion headquarters, the 394th, and eleven port companies. Available for operations at Hollandia were 5 Liberty docks, 4 small-ship jetties, 2 fuel jetties, 12 LST ramps, 22 80-foot steel flattop barges, 4 LCMs, 2 LCVs, 2 crane barges, 1 refrigerated barge, and a variety of other equipment. However, the port evidently was never able to berth more than 8 deep-sea vessels at one time. The first Army marine repair ship in SWPA, the William F. Fitch, arrived at Hollandia in August. It was followed by another repair ship, the James M. Davis, both vessels ultimately being sent to the Philippines.
The maximum port activity coincided with the preliminaries to and the early stages of the Philippine campaign. Cargo loaded and discharged reached a peak of 117,643 short tons in August 1944. In the fall of 1944 the waters around Hollandia were crowded with vessels awaiting call forward to Tacloban and Lingayen Gulf. Beginning in October vast quantities of equipment and supplies that had accumulated at this base and large numbers of harbor craft were removed to the Philippines in a series of impressive towing operations managed by the Transportation Corps. Progressive transfers of personnel to the Philippines resulted in a kaleidoscopic turnover of transportation units at Hollandia. The volume of traffic began to fall off in January 1945, and thereafter, until the inactivation of the base one year later, the effort was concentrated on “rolling up the rear.”
Biak, fringed with reefs and islets, is the largest of the Schouten Islands and lies off the north coast of New Guinea. Army facilities were located at the village of Sorido on Biak and on the adjacent islets of Owi and Mios Woendi. The invasion of Biak began on 27 May 1944, and much bitter fighting followed before the Japanese resistance was finally broken. The 296th Port Company was temporarily attached to the task force for the primary purpose of cargo discharge in direct support of combat operations. After a landing had been made, the 296th unloaded supplies from beached LSTs, even as enemy planes strafed the area. The discharge of cargo vessels began on 18 June, with the port troops working two six-hour shifts daily. Two days later, the 296th Port Company was assigned to the newly created USASOS Base H at Biak.90
The earliest port facilities, set up on Owi Island while the fighting was still in progress on Biak, including a Liberty dock, a jetty for barges, and approaches for landing craft. Discharge at Owi was hampered by rough seas and water too deep for anchorage. Better facilities were found at Sorido in and near a lagoon about six miles long, skirted by an ample level area with good coral roads. All told by 1 February 1945 Base H had five Liberty docks, seven jetties, four small dry docks, two 30-ton floating cranes, six 5-ton shore cranes, sixteen landing craft, two refrigerated barges, and 80,000 cubic feet of refrigerated space. The only USASOS base between Hollandia and Tacloban, Base H shared in mom_ .ng and supporting the
invasion of the Philippines in late October 1944.91
Ports in the Philippines
By mid-September 1944 the Allied advance in the Southwest and Central Pacific was within effective striking distance of the Philippines.92 At that time it was decided to drop plans for further intermediate operations and proceed directly to the invasion of Leyte. The scheduled date for the assault was moved forward by two months, to 20 October, and forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas theater, which were intended originally to capture Yap, were made available for participation in the Leyte operation. The conquest of the island, substantially completed by the end of the year, was the first of a series of amphibious operations calculated to liberate the Philippines. Landings were made in Mindoro in December, and in January 1945 Luzon was invaded. In subsequent months other amphibious landings were made in the Philippines at Palawan, in the Sulu Archipelago, and on Mindanao. The end of organized resistance on Luzon in June 1945 marked the liberation of the Philippines.93
The Philippine Archipelago, with its 7,083 islands extending 1,152 miles north and south and 688 miles east and west, was dependent on ocean transport, and its ports had been fairly well developed long before Pearl Harbor. However, wartime destruction of port facilities and equipment, enemy action, adverse weather conditions, and limited interior transport, among other difficulties, severely restricted the reception and clearance capacity of captured ports and necessitated considerable port development by the U.S. Army. The five principal port areas placed in operation in the course of the campaign in the Philippines were Tacloban on Leyte, Lingayen Gulf, Batangas, Manila on Luzon, and Cebu City on Cebu Island.
Tacloban was only one of several adjacent ports on the east coast of Leyte facing San Pedro Bay that was used by the Army. From Tacloban, the headquarters of USASOS Base K, a series of sand and coral beaches extended approximately fifty miles to the south, past the villages of Tolosa and Dulag to Abuyog. A coastal highway connected these beaches, behind which lay heavy woods and dense jungles.
San Pedro Bay provided anchorage for about 75 ocean-going vessels. Navigation was impeded by shoals, reefs, and wreckage. There was no protection from heavy swells, and the coastal waters were too shallow for any but small craft. Only at Dulag were LSTs able to approach as close as 50 feet to shore. Although Tacloban had a concrete wharf, the first Liberty ships could not dock without preliminary partial discharge to reduce their draft. At all times a large part of the cargo received in the Tacloban area had to be moved in landing craft and DUKWs.94
The Port Command, Base K, began functioning in late October 1944, only a few days after the first landings. Its work was greatly hampered by inadequate cargo-handling facilities, persistent enemy
action, and adverse weather. At Tacloban discharge of the first Liberty ship was slowed by no fewer than fifty-six air raids in four days. Suicidal attacks by Japanese planes on Army vessels resulted in casualties, damage, and delay. Within three months three typhoons struck and 33 inches of rain fell, further impeding cargo clearance. Supplies deteriorated in open storage, and trucks stalled in the mud and water. Improved roads and additional transportation equipment helped relieve port congestion during the early phase when Leyte had the only U.S. Army discharge facilities in SWPA north of Biak. At the peak, in December 1944, the port command loaded and discharged 240,051 short tons of U.S. Army cargo.
The U.S. Sixth Army landed on the beaches in Lingayen Gulf, Luzon, on 9 January 1945. No fewer than 4 port battalion headquarters, 20 port companies, and 8 DUKW companies were involved in the campaign, and a total of 60 LCTs, 360 LCMs, 400 DUKWs, and 44 barges were scheduled to arrive during the initial phase. Of the Transportation Corps units set up for the operation, a total of 2 port battalion headquarters, 10 port companies, and 6 DUKW units were attached to the tactical forces, including the I Corps, the XIV Corps, and the 158th Regimental Combat Team. These troops, together with other attached service units, operated under the five Engineer boat and shore regiments, which were responsible for lighterage and beach operations at the divisional beachheads.95
The Transportation Corps units, along with others that were to begin arriving two days after the first landings (S plus 2), were to be assigned to the Army Service Command (ASCOM), the logistical agency operating directly under the Sixth Army, which, among other things, would take over responsibility for all unloading operations approximately S plus 6. This responsibility, as well as the command of the Transportation Corps units, would then be delegated to Base M, a subordinate command of ASCOM. At that time, too, the Engineer boat and shore regiments were to be relieved of attachment to the tactical forces and would be placed under the 4th Engineer Special Brigade commander. Serving as a member of the ASCOM staff, the brigade commander would assign them to assist with lighterage and other port activities. All craft organic to the Engineer units and LCTs made available to Sixth Army by the Navy were to be pooled and allocated by him.
The assault beaches faced only unprotected roadsteads, where troops and cargo ships had to anchor about a half mile from shore. Cargo was discharged into landing craft, DUKWs, and barges. Considerable difficulty was experienced because of the heavy surf, and many of the landing craft were broached. At the beaches, the unloading and clearing of cargo was handicapped by intermittent enemy mortar and artillery fire, muddy roads, and a shortage of trucks.
Because of the difficulties encountered at the beaches and the delay in bringing in additional service units and equipment,
the transfer of control to ASCOM was not made until 19 January 1945 (S plus 10). Meanwhile, the first Port Command, Base M, personnel had arrived at Blue Beach on S plus 2. There, they provided ships and beach details and undertook a reconnaissance of the area. By mid-January, San Fabian had been selected as the port command headquarters, and White Beach 2, Dagupan, and Port Sual had been designated for development as the principal landing and dump areas. By that time one port battalion, nine port companies, and three DUKW units, all earmarked for the port command, had reported for duty.
Upon the ASCOMs delegation of responsibility for all unloading activities to Base M, the port command assumed command of the Transportation Corps units and commenced operations at the three installations as planned. Elements of the 4th Engineer Special Brigade continued to assist with lighterage and other port activities.96 During the remainder of the month a 450-foot dock was completed at Dagupan for small vessels and reefers. All operations at Port Sual were closed, and port command units there were transferred to White Beach 2, where two 2,700-foot jetties were built. One jetty was employed for the discharge of rail equipment. The other, equipped with four pipelines, was used to provide vessels with water and to discharge oil tankers.
The logistical responsibility in the Lin-gayen Gulf area was transferred from Sixth Army to USASOS on 13 February 1945. ASCOM, which was then redesignated the Luzon Base Section (later Philippine Base Section), continued to be responsible for the development of Base M. The Port Command, Base M, concentrating its activities principally at White Beach 2 and Dagupan, handled a peak load of 303,377 long tons during the month. Operating under the port command at the end of February were 5,710 troops, including those of port, DUKW, harbor craft, base depot, ship repair, and marine maintenance units, and 495 Filipino civilians.
Port command headquarters was transferred on 21 April 1945 to San Fernando, La Union, which, because of the safe anchorages afforded by its harbors, was selected for development as the principal port in the area. A small rear echelon was left behind at White Beach 2 to supervise activities there and at Dagupan and Damortis. By this time the availability of Manila had caused activity to decline at the Lingayen Gulf ports.97
Batangas, on the southwest coast of Luzon, was nearly intact when occupied. Early operations were carried on by the 592nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Considerable cargo was discharged directly from landing craft to the beach. The first Liberty ship docked on 17 June, and
in August the last of five new Liberty piers was completed. Anchorage for fifty-three vessels was available not far from shore. Rough water and the tides repeatedly interrupted cargo discharge. After mid-1945, when the maximum tonnage was handled, this port fell increasingly into disuse.
Unlike Batangas, the port at Cebu City, on Cebu Island west of Leyte, suffered severely from the war. The harbor afforded good anchorage. The long marginal wharf had been largely repaired when the port command took over from the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment in June 1945. The peak of 113,120 long tons of cargo handled—mainly inbound shipments—was reached in the following August. At the close of the year the port was no longer important.
The port and capital city of Manila on Luzon had seen extensive development during some four decades of American control. Within a few months after its liberation in January 1945, the volume of U.S. Army traffic at this port far exceeded that of any other port in SWPA. The results attained at Manila determined the rate at which Army activity was curtailed at other ports within the theater. Manila became the site of the principal U.S. Army base for the final phase of the war against Japan.
The port of Manila, on the eastern shore of the almost landlocked Manila Bay, consisted of three areas: the Pasig River, and, protected by long breakwaters, North Harbor and South Harbor. Before the war South Harbor had an anchorage of about 1,250 acres, dredged to hold large ocean-going vessels. It contained four large, well-equipped piers. Of these, Pier 7, reportedly the largest finger pier in the world, could accommodate seven ocean-going ships at one time. North Harbor, still under construction in 1941, was designed mainly to hold small craft and coastwise shipping. Marginal wharves along both banks of the Pasig River could receive ships with a draft under 18 feet.
Restoration of the war-torn facilities of this highly developed port presented problems comparable to those encountered at Naples, Marseille, and Cherbourg. Destruction by the Japanese had been systematic. Approximately 500 ships, ranging in size from harbor craft to an 18,000-ton liner, had been sunk in Manila Bay and the Pasig River. According to Commodore William A. Sullivan, USN, who was in charge of rehabilitating the Manila Harbor, the salvage job involved was the greatest in history. The entrances and channels had all been severely damaged, the piers and wharves were blocked, and the harbor and shore were strewn with mines. Within the city the streets, highways, and railways were badly damaged, and traffic was impeded by water-filled bomb craters. Most of the larger buildings were twisted skeletons in mounds of rubble. Oil tanks and water reservoirs were destroyed, and the local power system had been methodically dismantled.
When the port command arrived at Manila on 13 February 1945, the Japanese were still holding much of the city in a desperate last-ditch stand. About the only available material for cargo discharge was a quantity of rope, wire, and blocks to make slings and nets. Electricity was lacking until mid-March, and lights were being installed on the piers as late as July. The first cargo vessel entered Manila Harbor on 1 March, followed on the same day by a convoy of eleven large freighters, which brought Army supplies
as well as food and clothing for civilian relief.
At first, all port operations were controlled by the 4th Engineer Special Brigade, and the port command served only in an advisory capacity. On 3 March 1945 the port command was assigned control of all port operations, although the Engineers continued for some time to provide most of the troops and equipment used in discharge activities. The Navy also rendered valuable assistance through the temporary assignment of LCTs to aid Transportation Corps and Engineer units in working vessels. By the end of April 1945 a total of 10,713 military personnel was on duty at the port. Roughly one half of this number consisted of 4th Engineer Special Brigade units working under the operational control of the port command. The remaining port troops, exclusive of those at port headquarters, were administered for the port command by the 54th Transportation Corps Service Group. The troops were augmented by 7,494 local civilians, who were employed by the port command to serve as longshoremen, laborers, and clerks. Within the port, separate pier commands were set up to handle operations in the North Harbor, in the South Harbor, in the stream, and on the Pasig River.98
Early operations were conducted under grave handicaps. Much lighterage was necessary until the approaches to the wharves and piers could be cleared of mines, wreckage, and debris so as to permit unloading directly from ship to shore. While the port was being rehabilitated, an extremely heavy burden was placed upon all transportation equipment. Cargo clearance was retarded by a shortage of trucks and by a lack of depots and dumps. Many of the landing craft used at Manila had seen hard service in New Guinea, Leyte, and Lingayen Gulf, and the proportion of deadlined equipment was therefore high. Because of the physical handicaps, no great output was attained at Manila until April 1945, when a total of 274,186 long tons of cargo was handled.
Considerable confusion and congestion obtained during the ensuing months. In large part, this came of insufficient means for the job, but it also came of an inadequate and unstable port organization. In the period 3 March-2 June 1945, there were three changes in the command of the port, and as many port reorganizations.99 Although such changes were probably more a result than a cause of the operating difficulties encountered at Manila, they reflected the need for a more satisfactory organization. According to General Wanamaker there were too many cooks. When General Styer took over at Manila, he at once began to reorganize and to hold frequent conferences on how to speed up port clearance. Pilferage was common and entire truckloads disappeared. Wanamaker urged that the port work on a twelve-hour daylight basis with picked personnel, so as to minimize the
loss at night, but Styer preferred to continue operating around the clock. During this period port personnel was increased, aggregating 13,800 troops and 28,347 civilians on 31 July, and continued progress was made in rehabilitating port facilities.
Despite the efforts to improve operations, the port remained crowded until well after the cessation of hostilities. During the summer of 1945 Manila received an increasingly heavy volume of shipping, intended to meet the requirements in the Philippines and for the projected invasion of Japan. Incoming traffic included vessels carrying men and materiel shipped directly from the United States, redeployed from Europe, and “rolled up” from rear Pacific bases. The port was able to increase the tonnage handled from 278,224 tons in May 1945 to 421,530 long tons in July, but the situation again worsened with the sudden capitulation of Japan. Although cargo discharge was halted, ships already en route to the Philippines on 15 August 1945 continued to arrive. Several months were to pass before the theater could make the logistical readjustments necessary to dissipate the immobilized shipping at the port. Meanwhile, the outloading of occupation forces for Japan and the return of troops to the zone of interior for demobilization had become major activities at Manila.100
Writing to Washington on 30 August 1945, General Stewart, the Chief of Transportation, AFWESPAC, characterized the performance of the port of Manila as “disgraceful.” There had been a “lack of discipline” and an “almost total absence of leadership.” Life, he wrote, was “a state of daily crises,” and there was “great hullabaloo and confusion over the loading of every ship.” In particular, he complained that the Transportation Corps had no voice in outloading the occupation forces, a project planned and arranged by the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies and the U.S. Navy. He found that a basic weakness at Manila, as well as the other ports in the theater, had been the improvised nature of the port headquarters. In his opinion, the absence of organized ports of the type found in the Mediterranean and European theaters had been a major factor in preventing the Transportation Corps from playing a more prominent role in operations in SWPA.101
U.S. port activity at Manila actually reached its height during the postwar period. The peak in personnel movements came in November 1945, when major emphasis was being laid upon the quickest possible return of Army personnel to the United States. The peak in cargo handling had already been reached in the previous month, when 400,305 long tons were discharged, and 79,355 long tons were outloaded. During the ensuing winter, Manila, the last large Army port in the Southwest Pacific, reverted to a peacetime status.102
Port Personnel and Equipment
In each of the foregoing ports the major problem was to secure the men and the
means needed for satisfactory operation. Large quantities of port equipment were necessary as soon as the Americans became active in the Southwest Pacific. Since the local resources were insufficient, many mobile cranes, fork-lift trucks, trailers, and tractors had to be requested immediately. When the fighting extended into the forward areas in New Guinea, practically all cargo-handling equipment for the initial operation had to be brought in from Australian bases. To meet the demand, which always exceeded the supply, enormous requisitions had to be drawn upon the zone of interior. Primitive discharge facilities, hard usage, and a high percentage of deadlined items resulted in almost constant complaint from the theater that it did not have enough equipment.
At first, there was a scramble for any cargo-handling equipment that could be obtained. Later, the theater’s requirements were computed systematically on the basis of the specific items needed for the discharge of a standard 5-hatch Liberty ship. For example, three LCMs and at least three DUKWs were desired for each hatch. The prescribed list also included lighters, barges, cranes, gravity conveyors, fork-lift trucks, pallets, slings, wires, ropes, shackles, and spreaders.103
The theater’s equipment needs were not fully met until late in the war. By the summer of 1945 huge quantities of transportation materiel had been shipped to the theater and a large Transportation Corps general depot had been established at the old, battered Fort Santiago in Manila.104 The irony was that when relief finally came on an appreciable scale, the war against Japan was already in its last phase.
If the theater lacked sufficient cargo-handling equipment, much the same could be said of its manpower in the ports. As already indicated, the theater used both military and civilian personnel. In Australia most cargo was handled by local labor, which in accordance with War Department policy was to be substituted for military labor to the fullest extent possible. In New Guinea most of this work had to be done by troops. In the Philippines the U.S. Army port activities were carried on by both native civilians and American service troops.
The use of local civilian labor was attended by many difficulties, which were most pronounced in Australia. The Australian longshoremen were organized in “a strong, militant, articulate union,” the Waterfront Workers Federation. Its bargaining position was excellent, both because of political influence and because of the acute wartime labor shortage. As in the United Kingdom and the United States, the Army did no direct hiring but dealt instead with stevedoring firms, which secured dock workers from the unions.
The Transportation Corps frequently found the Australian dockers trying, none too efficient, and costly. The water-front workers sometimes refused to handle refrigerated or other special cargo, or they suspended operations because of rain. On occasion they were described as insolent, thievish, and resentful of the presence of the U.S. Army. They resorted to frequent strikes and walkouts, thus requiring the use of American and Australian troops to insure the movement of urgent cargo. According to Colonel Plant, the Australian longshoremen had an average discharge rate of five tons per hatch per hour, whereas untrained American soldiers
under the same conditions could turn out four to five times as much cargo.
Much of the Australian output at the ports entailed costly overtime, premium, and penalty rates. Overtime could not be avoided since an Australian law required that every vessel arriving there be worked around the clock. Premium and penalty cargoes were determined by contract. One effect of the high wages resulting from this system was that the workers often took vacations after three or four weeks of steady employment. Considerable time was lost each day because of the morning and afternoon “smoke-o,” the lunch hour, and, of course, the “tea-o.” The actual working time of a shift was about five hours, although the men were paid for eight. American transportation officers were well aware of this unsatisfactory situation, but they could do little except complain in their reports. Since the local government was under union dominance, the U.S. Army in Australia had to preserve a delicate balance between its own desires and the demands of labor, employing troops at the ports only under the direst circumstances.105
Both in New Guinea and in the Philippines, native labor proved much less exacting and disappointing than in Australia. The Papuans, though limited in numbers and totally unskilled, were loyal and cooperative workers. Weak from undernourishment, the Filipinos were fortified with rice and canned fish. They worked on Sundays and holidays without overtime pay. Filipino laborers were diligent and careful, and while the war lasted they caused no difficulty.
No port units were included among the first U.S. Army personnel that reached Australia. Indeed, General Arthur Wilson believed that the U.S. Army could rely upon Australian labor, and he warned against sending Negro units to “white Australia,” since this was likely to cause trouble. Because of the higher priority accorded the requests of the European theater and the natural tendency in the Southwest Pacific Area to prefer combat to service troops if a choice had to be made because of shipping limitations, a serious shortage of service units soon developed. As a result, the Transportation Corps in SWPA at first got very few units, either white or colored, from the United States.
The first port battalions sent to SWPA arrived at Brisbane in 1942, the 394th on 9 March and the 387th on 15 August. Later, both units were shifted to New Guinea, where they were urgently needed. At the end of 1943, seven additional port battalions had reached the theater, and another was en route. Others followed. On the whole, these port units gave efficient and valuable service in the heavy and monotonous task of cargo handling, although their living conditions, especially in New Guinea, often were far from conducive to high morale.
The wide dispersion of ports and the limited amount of traffic at some of them, notably in New Guinea, led to a demand for composite service units suitable for assignment to small installations. This need was ultimately met by the creation of Transportation Corps composite (later redesignated Transportation Corps service) platoons, companies, and battalions.106 This type of organization enabled the theater to order the numbers, kinds, and combinations of large or small groups needed to meet the various requirements of different ports. This type of unit
apparently was not used until mid-1944. In addition to port battalions and port companies, the ports in SWPA generally made use of amphibian truck units and harbor craft companies.107
The theater was handicapped by a shortage of transportation officers able to supervise stevedoring, barge, and small-boat operations. Appropriate instruction, first given at the SWPA Officer Candidate School in April 1943, naturally stressed water transportation. The need was especially great for units skilled in the port operations, and such training therefore became extensive. By March 1944, 230 men—among them 15 Negroes and l Filipino—had graduated and had been commissioned as second lieutenants in the Transportation Corps. Short-lived courses for special purposes were given at various ports. At Manila, in the fall of 1945, transportation personnel were trained in the use of harbor craft, cargo documentation, and fork-lift trucks.
The 2nd, 22nd, and 23rd Ports of Embarkation were mere pools of personnel from which various headquarters had been formed.108 The procedure in SWPA of trying to build a port organization on the ground from individuals gathered together and directed to run the port, as was done at Manila, proved far less effective than the system in ETO of sending in a regular port, fully organized, equipped, and manned to do the job.
For most SWPA ports in World War II the prevailing organizational pattern was that of the base port command under the base section. Water transportation was always the principal function of the base port commander. Early in 1944, control of the base motor pool and its operating personnel was taken away from the base port command and was centralized in a separate and coordinate base motor command.109 In effect, this change made the base port commander responsible only for loading and unloading ships, thereby unfortunately leaving him without jurisdiction over motor transport, the principal means of accomplishing port clearance.
Port operations in SWPA were by no means confined exclusively to the base port command since it would function only after a base had been established. A few ports such as Merauke, Morotai, and Zamboanga remained under tactical commands and were never transferred to USASOS. In the forward areas, particularly during the assault phase, -combat troops were used to discharge and deliver cargo over the beaches to inland dumps, a task for which they often had little training and less liking. Both in New Guinea and in the Philippines, Engineer special brigades or components thereof participated in many assault landings and were responsible for port operations until relieved by a base port command under USASOS. For example, elements of the Americal Division, with the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment attached, captured Cebu City, which contained the second largest port in the Philippines. The Cebu City port then functioned under the 542nd until the base port command took over in June 1945. Throughout the war, excellent cooperation obtained between the Transportation Corps and the
Engineer special brigades in SWPA. As a rule, Transportation Corps units relieved Engineer special brigade units after the initial assault and supply phase had ended.110
Cargo Shipment Problems
Apart from persistent difficulty in getting enough equipment and personnel to insure satisfactory operations, the ports had other problems by no means peculiar to this theater. A common complaint was that the shipping information from the zone of interior that the theater had to have to assure prompt and effective unloading and distribution of cargo was either inadequate or not available. This condition naturally was most serious in 1942, but despite corrective measures such as air delivery of manifests the base port commander at the destination in SWPA often did not know exactly what to expect. The inevitable time lag because of sheer distance and the many echelons within the theater contributed on occasion to both delay and confusion. A distressing corollary of this situation was that the War Department often was at a loss to determine the precise ships or shipments that had arrived in the Southwest Pacific.111
Deficiencies in the packaging and marking of the cargo received in SWPA were often noted during the first year of the war, but such complaints became less frequent thereafter as the originating supply services in the zone of interior improved their methods and procedures and the ports of embarkation policed outbound shipments. The Transportation Corps had only a general responsibility to inspect U.S. Army cargo, other than Transportation Corps items, so as to determine the adequacy of the marking and packaging for safe shipment overseas. The extraordinary heat, dampness, and rough handling encountered in the forward areas of the Southwest Pacific called for sturdy containers—not plywood or fiberboard boxes that collapsed or disintegrated—and for other suitable measures against rust, mold, and corrosion. Since many supplies had to be transported by native bearers trudging over jungle trails, the ideal container had to be light enough to be carried by one man. Although some loss of supplies was inevitable, on-the-spot inspections within the theater indicated that as of late 1944 packaging had definitely improved and outside markings were usually satisfactory.112
Another problem encountered in SWPA, as well as other theaters, was the improper stowage of incoming cargo. The first shipments received in Australia were badly scrambled because of hasty loading in the United States. Normally, the ports in the zone of interior resorted to commercial loading, in which the goal was the maximum utilization of the cargo-carrying capacity of each ship. The theater, however, preferred unit loading, which meant keeping an organization and its equipment and supplies together, either on the same vessel or in the same convoy, even if some cargo space was sacrificed. The tight shipping situation precluded any wide application of unit loading at first, but in the spring of 1942 the U.S. ports were directed to practice unit loading and block stowage as far as practicable.
The theater’s insistence upon unit loading was grounded upon practical
considerations. The great distances and the inadequate local transport systems between the widely separated bases in SWPA made the assembly and distribution of scattered shipments most difficult. Moreover, certain units were kept idle for months awaiting the delivery of their organizational equipment.
At first the forwarding of cargo to SWPA was attended by a complete lack of knowledge as to the ultimate port or ports of discharge. Of necessity, U.S. ports of embarkation simply loaded the ships for Australia, leaving further determination to the theater. In the spring of 1943, USAFFE promised to indicate the desired port of discharge for all material requisitioned from the zone of interior. Following an exchange of views between the War Department and the theater, the latter agreed, on 10 November, to notify the San Francisco Port of Embarkation of the destination of units as early as practicable and to request unit loading only for specific units when the necessity was urgent. It was anticipated that the new system would eliminate considerable unloading and transshipment. Later in the same month, the port commander at San Francisco reported that he had arranged with the Commanding General, USASOS, to ship directly to designated advance bases whenever the latter so requested.113
Cargo Pilferage
Pilferage, a problem common to all theaters, was particularly prevalent in Australia, and no great progress was made in protecting U.S. Army property or in punishing the thieves. At Melbourne, in October 1942, extensive thefts were reported at the piers, in warehouses, and on freight trains. The U.S. Army made every effort to reduce the loss, but the cooperation of civilian authorities was deemed inadequate.114
Pilferage continued heavy and constant in 1943. Australian dock workers suspended activity or went on strike if armed guards were posted to watch the removal of cargo. USASOS directives, aimed at preventing pilferage by closer supervision of cargo discharge, generally proved inadequate or were not enforced. The reports of cargo security officers made after visiting Australian ports merely confirmed the existence of widespread and persistent theft and the general apathy of the local authorities. At Brisbane the U.S. Army obviously was unwilling to employ armed guards and to search Australian longshoremen as they left the ships or wharves, lest such action provoke a strike that would halt all cargo operations. Only at Cairns, where armed military police were plentiful, was the thievery kept within bounds.
As elsewhere overseas, pilferage in Australia was motivated largely by the lure of fantastic black-market prices. On occasion, both military and civilian personnel were implicated. Although the Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS, recommended stern measures both by military and by civilian authorities to cope with recurring losses, cargo pilferage at the ports was not and evidently could not be eliminated while the U.S. Army remained in Australia.
Little complaint of pilferage came from New Guinea, but it developed in the Philippines as soon as the U.S. Army came on the scene. A shortage of military police to guard the hatches and docks led
to losses. Cargo security officers tried to prevent pilfering and obtained the arrest of a few offenders. Stolen cigarettes, candy, and sugar found a ready and lucrative market among the Philippine civilians. It was a common practice for men working in the holds of the ship to break cartons of beer or candy for consumption on the spot. Hungry Filipinos also were likely to break open any boxes that they thought might contain rations. Despite various measures taken by the provost marshal to check pilferage at Manila, it remained a vexing problem long after hostilities had ceased.
The problems—and they were many—at the U.S. Army ports in SWPA must not be allowed to obscure the pattern of substantial accomplishment under wartime conditions. In this theater, where the ocean was the main highway through a maze of islands large and small, ports and ships were a must. Though most traffic was by water, here as elsewhere the Army made use of all available rail and motor transport in order to accomplish its mission.
Rail Transport
The only railways of military significance in the Southwest Pacific Area were in Australia and Luzon. The U.S. Army had no control over the Australian railways, but it assisted with advice, with lend-lease equipment, and with personnel to arrange for the movement of troops and freight. In the Philippines the U.S. Army operated the railways of Luzon from January 1945 to January 1946.115
Rail Operations in Australia
Concentrated mainly along or near the ocean and built essentially to serve local interests, the railways of Australia had not been welded into an effective national system. Differences in gauge, of which there were five in all, and the generally small capacity of rail equipment tended to slow traffic and limit the utilization of rail transportation for military purposes. Even in peacetime the Australian railways, which were mostly government-owned, carried only about 10 percent of the interstate traffic. The balance moved by water transport, since coastal shipping usually involved no greater distances and was somewhat less expensive than movement by rail.
The three main railway gauges were: 5 feet 3 inches (the Victoria Government Railway and part of the South Australian Government Railways); 4 feet 8½ inches (the New South Wales Government Railways and part of the Commonwealth Government Railways); and 3 feet 6 inches (the Western Australian Government Railways and the Queensland State Railways). When the war began, only about one quarter of the total mileage had the standard gauge of 4 feet 8½ inches. Transfer of freight at the breaks in gauge was usually made by manual labor and with an average delay of twenty-four hours. On the most heavily traveled route, between Melbourne and Townsville, there were changes in gauge at Albury and at Brisbane.116
The railways in the Victoria–New South Wales area had fairly modern rolling stock of larger capacity (average, 20 to 30 tons) than other lines, but they were heavily committed to meeting the local needs of that industrialized region. The Queensland State Railways, which became increasingly important as the concentration of men and materiel shifted to Brisbane
and northward, had only 10-ton boxcars (American average, 50½ tons). Moreover, floods on the coast of Queensland, which has the heaviest rainfall in all Australia, frequently interrupted rail traffic between Brisbane and Townsville. The narrow-gauge, 18-foot wooden cars at Townsville held 8 to 12 tons. Darwin, developed initially for Army use as the port nearest the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines, was not connected by rail with the rest of the continent. The gap, consisting of 636 miles of gravel road through the most desolate part of Australia, greatly complicated the task of supplying Darwin during the period when supply by sea was unsafe.
According to the Chief of Transportation, USASOS, the average Australian train capacity was 300 tons (American, as much as 10,000 tons) and the Australian train speed averaged 15 miles an hour (American, about 20). None of the railways had any reserve of cars or locomotives. Hand signaling was used on narrow-gauge lines; dispatch methods varied; railway workers were not deferred from military service; and the working hours were limited. Regardless of congestion, about 75 percent of the Queensland locomotives stood idle on Sunday. The Australians, themselves, realized the inadequacy of their railways, but any basic improvement such as uniformity of gauge had to be postponed to the postwar period.117
Railway matters for the U.S. Army in Australia were assigned initially to the Chief Quartermaster, USAFIA, who was advised and assisted by two Australian railway employees. When a separate Transportation Service was established in Australia in mid-April 1942, it included a Rail Section headed by Col. Paul W. Johnston, an experienced American railway executive. His main functions were to coordinate all phases of railway service for the U.S. Army and to arrange and supervise all movements of its personnel, supplies, and equipment. Following Johnston’s transfer to a new position in December 1942, these activities were handled under various designations in the USA-SOS and USAFFE transportation organizations. In 1944, when USASOS headquarters moved to Hollandia, the responsibility was left with the Base Section, USASOS (later Australian Base Section), which continued active into the postwar period.
Pending the arrival in October 1942 of thirty additional American railway officers, about twenty experienced Australian railway men were borrowed from various government railways to assist in supervising the loading, unloading, and transfer of troops, supplies, and equipment. Meanwhile, Colonel Johnston had cultivated friendly relations with the Australian railway officials. With their help, his staff sought to improve operating efficiency of the railways for military purposes by such measures as curtailment of civilian travel, full utilization of available car capacities, exemption of railway labor from military service, and the reduction of service on branch lines to release personnel and equipment for the main lines serving the American and Australian forces.
Considerable materiel, including rails and rolling stock, was requisitioned from the United States early in 1942, but production difficulties and the lack of
shipping delayed delivery. Although large-scale replacement of old and worn-out rail equipment at first appeared to be necessary, further study by Johnston’s staff revealed that the railway shops in Australia were adequate for the production of new equipment, and that imports from the United States could be limited to boiler plate and a few locomotive accessories.
All rail transport for the American forces was highly dependent on the Australians, who were generally helpful and cooperative. Utilizing its movement control organization, the Australian Army regulated all military traffic, both Australian and American. Beginning in the spring of 1942 U.S. regulating officers (later separate rail transportation officers) were assigned to each base section. Subject to the technical direction of the theater chief of the Transportation Service, these officers received and consolidated all requests for troop and freight movements, arranged for intrabase section hauls directly with local Australian Movement Control officers, and forwarded requests for interbase section movements to the U.S. Rail Section, which made the necessary arrangements through Movement Control headquarters. In November 1943 a CREGO regulating officer was assigned to Townsville, and, among other duties, he set priorities for rail movements of special interest to General Headquarters, SWPA.
After the first few months, U.S. Army traffic increasingly was confined to the east coast, especially Queensland. Time and distance were formidable factors. In August 1942, for example, it required approximately ten days to move freight over the 2,246 miles on the main line from Melbourne to Cairns via Albury, Sydney, Brisbane, and Townsville. Wartime short ages of cranes, trucks, labor, and coal brought periodic crises in rail traffic; errors in the billing of cars were frequent; and, on occasion, Australian and American rail movements were not properly coordinated. Also, military demands on the railways were limited by the need of providing for essential civilian traffic.
As in other overseas areas, pilferage was a serious problem, necessitating such preventive measures as the assignment of U.S. Army troops to guard trains and check freight at change-in-gauge points and the use of large steel packing cases for the shipment of specially valuable or vital freight.
Available statistics of Australian rail movements for the U.S. Army, though only fragmentary, suggest that the volume of traffic was its highest in 1944, with the movement of 93,000 passengers in January and 116,167 tons of freight in March.118 In all other months the passengers carried were under 85,000, and the total freight was less than 100,000 tons. During the U.S. Army’s stay in Australia, the need for rail transportation exceeded the supply, the service received was slow and uncertain, and no reform of the fundamental shortcoming—the differences in gauge—was possible. Nonetheless, careful and extensive cooperation enabled the Australian railways to handle far more traffic than they were originally intended to carry. No Transportation Corps railway troops were found necessary in Australia.
Rail Operations in the Philippines
In May 1944 the Philippines had approximately 708 miles of railways, including 454 miles of main track on the island
of Luzon. As the plans developed, it became clear that only the Luzon railways would assume military importance. Transportation Corps railway troops of the 775th Railway Grand Division, commanded by Lt. Col. Henry G. Balch, began taking over the railways in Lingayen Gulf area on 10 February 1945, where operations had already been started in the previous month by the 790th Railway Operating Company. In March most elements of the 775th were transferred to Manila, which then became headquarters for U.S. Army railway activities in Luzon.
The planning for and the early supervision of the 775th Railway Grand Division had been the responsibility of the U.S. Army Service Command, which was redesignated the Luzon Base Section (LUBSEC) on 13 February 1945. One week later, on 20 February, a Transportation Command, embracing the 775th Railway Grand Division and the Highway Transportation Division, was set up under the Luzon Base Section. When LUBSEC, including its Transportation Command, was abolished on 1 April, the 775th Railway Grand Division and the Highway Transportation Division became separate field agencies of a new Philippine Base Section (PHIBSEC).
The 775th Railway Grand Division remained under PHIBSEC until 13 July 1945, when it was transferred to Headquarters, Special Troops, AFWESPAC. Operational control was then delegated to the Chief Transportation Officer, AF-WESPAC, but traffic control was retained by PHIBSEC. In the same month a Military Railway Service, staffed by the 775th Railway Grand Division, was established as a division under the Deputy Chief of Transportation for Operations, AFWESPAC.119
When the 790th Railway Operating Company began running the Luzon Military Railway in January 1945, all rail facilities showed the results of wartime neglect, sabotage, and destruction. The Japanese had removed rails and other equipment. Enemy demolition and American bombing had destroyed or damaged rolling stock, bridges, stations, and yards. Reconstruction was started at once, and considerable trackage was ready before additional military railway operating personnel could be obtained. By mid-March train service had been restored from San Fabian, on the Lingayen Gulf, southeast to Manila, a distance of 150 miles. New railway equipment was received from the United States, Philippine rolling stock was reconditioned and put into service, and at the close of March 1945 eight scheduled trains a day were arriving and departing at the Manila terminal. By the following month the 775th Railway Grand Division had been reinforced by the arrival from the United States of the 131st, 132nd, and 133rd Service Detachment Workshops, the 793rd Transportation Corps Depot Company, and the 737th and 749th Railway Operating Battalions.120
Subsequent U.S. Army railway activity in the Philippines was marked by steady expansion of personnel, equipment, and traffic. The maximum wartime freight movement on the Luzon Military Railway occurred in July 1945, when 152,628
net tons were hauled. Thereafter, because of demobilization, passenger traffic was unusually heavy, reaching a peak, of 353,310 in December 1945. Following V-J Day the military railway organization in the Philippines was gradually dismantled. Various military railway units went to Japan, and Filipinos replaced American personnel on the railways of Luzon. A strike by the civilian employees temporarily delayed the return of private control, which finally took place at midnight on 31 January 1946.
Motor Transport
Motor transport in the Southwest Pacific was used mainly for short hauls, rarely more than 25 miles, between dock and supply dump, storehouse, rail yard, or airport. Only two long-distance highway projects were undertaken by the U.S. Army. These were operated by Motor Transport Command No. 1 in Australia (1942), and the Highway Transportation Division (later the 100th Highway Transport Service) in Luzon (1945–46).
Highway Operations in Australia
Australian highways in June 1941 stretched 473,114 miles, distributed as follows:
| State | Mileage |
| Western Australia | 65,210 |
| South Australia | 53,199 |
| Victoria | 104,004 |
| New South Wales | 126,059 |
| Queensland | 124,642 |
Less than a quarter of this mileage was surfaced, and more than half was not fit for military use. Some highways that might have been employed included bridges and ferries incapable of supporting heavy loads. The best roads were in the southeast, between Melbourne and Brisbane. Queensland was so poorly provided with improved highways that long-distance travel was not feasible much beyond Brisbane. Australian motorized equipment was insufficient to permit fullest use of the available highways. In March 1942 the Australian Army found that 70,149 Australian vehicles were suitable for military purposes, of which only 307 exceeded 3-ton capacity, the remainder ranging from motorcycles to light trucks.
Administration of highway matters for the U.S. Army in the Southwest Pacific was originally under the Chief Quartermaster, USAFIA, but on 15 April 1942 the technical supervision and coordination of motor transport operations passed to the Motor Transportation Section of the newly organized Transportation Service, under Lt. Col. Roy R. Wilson. The section was successively redesignated a branch and division, and then, in February 1944, it was combined with the Rail Transport Division to form the Land Transport Division with Colonel Wilson as chief. When USASOS headquarters shifted to Hollandia in September 1944, supervision of highway matters in Australia was assigned to the base section at Brisbane, an arrangement that obtained until the withdrawal of the U.S. Army from Australia.
As in other theaters, the Transportation Corps in SWPA shared responsibilities pertaining to motor transport with the Ordnance Department and the Quartermaster Corps. The duties of the several services were outlined by USASOS on 14 September 1942. Briefly, the theater chief of the Transportation Service was
responsible for the supervision of all U.S. Army motor transport operations, except those performed by organic vehicles; the chief of ordnance was charged with the supervision of the procurement, storage, distribution, and maintenance of motor vehicles; and the chief quartermaster supervised the procurement of the operating personnel, other than for maintenance.
In the beginning the Americans had to depend heavily on Australian vehicles since comparatively few trucks were obtained from the United States. By 21 August 1942 the U.S. Army had procured 6,706 vehicles from local sources, including Dutch distress cargo. However, at that date only 2,930 units had been delivered, the rest being in process of rehabilitation or manufacture. Subsequently, thousands of additional vehicles were received from the United States. Despite this fact, the supply of motor transport was never adequate, and the U.S. Army had to be assisted by local trucking firms and the Australian Army Motor Transport Service.
Since ocean transport was limited and since Australia had fairly good facilities for assembling Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler sedans and trucks, these makes were generally shipped from the United States completely knocked down. Other vehicles could be sent partially unassembled. The resultant saving in shipping space was considerable.121
Although American-built trucks were reported to be the best, poor roads, careless operation, and inadequate maintenance inflicted severe punishment on the Army’s vehicles in Australia. All types showed excessive consumption of brake shoes and lines, brake fluid, batteries, and springs. The chief fault of the standard Army 2½-ton 6x6 cargo truck was the ease with which the hydraulic brake hose was broken by careless handling or by driving through brush or wiry grass. This vehicle was classed as essentially a low-speed, short-haul type.122
The rough operating conditions, driver abuse, and the shipment of used trucks to the theater in lieu of new ones meant that considerable labor and equipment had to be assigned for maintenance and repair. Keeping the trucks in operation became “a mammoth problem.” Abnormal consumption of critical parts under peculiar local conditions made the standard automatic supply system unsatisfactory. The resultant shortage of spare parts placed a premium on improvisation and ingenuity. Vehicles had to be kept going, if need be, with parts salvaged or made on the spot.
Motor Transport Command No. 1
The first long-haul trucking operation in the theater was undertaken in the spring of 1942. At that time the Japanese were within striking distance of Darwin, and the sea lanes to that port were insecure. Since Darwin was not completely linked by rail with the rest of Australia, a decision was made to supply its defenders by highway. The Australian Army operated the 636-mile road filling the gap between the Central Australian Railway’s northern terminal at Alice Springs and Birdum, the southern terminal of the North Australia Railway, a 316-mile narrow-gauge line extending to Darwin.123
The U.S. Army assumed responsibility for operating a convoy system on the 687-mile road connecting Birdum with the railhead at Mt. Isa, Queensland, to the southeast. The total distance from Brisbane via this route was 2,438 miles. Though later it was much improved, the highway at that time was “nothing more than a dirt track stretched across a vast expanse of dry wasteland.”124
The mission of operating the motor transport service between Mt. Isa and Birdum, via Tennant Creek, was assigned to Motor Transport Command No. 1, established on 26 May 1942, with headquarters at the mining town of Mt. Isa. Col. Lewis Landes, the commanding officer, functioning under the direct control of the chief of Transportation Service, USAFIA, was made responsible for all Quartermaster supplies, equipment, and personnel replacements. The units assigned to the command were the 48th and 29th Quartermaster Regiments (Truck), the 92nd Quartermaster Railhead Company, the 169th Quartermaster Heavy Maintenance Company, the 86th Quartermaster Medium Maintenance Battalion, the 190th Quartermaster Gas Company, the 17th Station Hospital, and elements of the 394th Port Battalion.
Operations were begun on 28 June with a fleet of 1,482 vehicles manned by nearly 3,500 Negro drivers. The camp at Mt. Isa was located in an area abounding with wallabies, rock pythons, and spinifex, a wiry, oily grass that blazed fiercely when ignited. Three intermediate camps were established along the route, each of which had a driven well for water supply, radio communication facilities, a gasoline supply, and an open-hearth kitchen. Night Camp 4 was at Birdum. A twelve-day round-trip schedule was followed.
The motor convoys traversed “some of the grimmest, hardest country on earth,” almost entirely uninhabited.125 Even in the middle of the Australian winter, when the project began, the days were hot. Vehicles, drivers, and landscape were coated with a red “bull dust,” as fine as talc, which impaired visibility and necessitated wide spacing between trucks in the convoys. Dust respirators were necessary. Tiny bush flies filled eyes, ears, nose, and mouth and invaded mess kits. The drivers serviced their vehicles after each day’s run. Heavy repairs were made by mechanics, who sometimes worked all night. Maintenance costs increased steadily during months of operation on rough roads. Spring leaves snapped, radiator hoses gave way, and abnormal engine wear was shown by a steeply rising oil-mile curve. The experiment of removing outer dual wheels to halve tire maintenance made tires burst into flame at noon temperatures of 130 degrees. By September 1942 a mess hall, a dispensary, power pumps, showers, and latrines had been constructed at each camp. However, the weaker men were breaking down under the strain. Because of the dust, respiratory and eye infections were on the increase, and one of every three drivers had kidney complaints caused by constant jolting.126
Motor Transport Command No. 1 was disbanded on 30 October 1942, when water communication with Darwin had become less hazardous. Between 28 June and 29 October Colonel Landes’ men had
driven 9,504,948 vehicle miles (173 convoys) and had carried 30,329 tons of cargo, 2,402 mail bags, 3,487 Australian soldiers, and 842 Americans. Most units left early in November 1942, but a few remained to continue the operation on a reduced scale. During the ensuing summer months the noon temperatures soared as high as 146 degrees. The drivers in increasing numbers fell prey to kidney and respiratory ailments, scurvy, and heat exhaustion. The rainy season in the following February flooded the ordinarily dry river beds, bringing mud and high waters to impede motor traffic. On 26 April 1943 the last of the Americans, with trucks loaded on flatcars, pulled out of Mt. Isa for the east coast, leaving behind a series of wells, a bitumen highway, and a telephone line. No other comparable long-distance motor transport was found necessary until the Army entered Luzon.
Highway Operations in Luzon
Before the war, the Philippines possessed 14,267 miles of highway (of which 7,315 miles were first class), 33,898 motor cars, 20,236 trucks, and 630 motorcycles. Although much improvement and repair proved necessary, the highways of Luzon had suffered less damage than might have been expected from the Japanese occupation.
In preparation for Philippine operations, a Highway Branch was established in the Rail, Highway, and Air Division under the Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS, in December 1944. The chief transportation officer recommended, and USASOS approved the proposal, that long-haul transportation be made a function of the Transportation Corps and that heavy truck companies be organized on a provisional basis from troops already in the theater. During the first half of 1945 the War Department and SWPA debated the exact organizational pattern to be adopted for a highway transportation service in the theater.127
In the meantime, trucking operations had been carried on in Luzon by a provisional Highway Transportation Division. Activated 13 February 1945 and headed by Lt. Col. Ralph H. Sievers, it was assigned to the Luzon Base Section, USASOS. On 15 February Sievers and his men took on long-distance hauling from Base M, on Lingayen Gulf. Seven Quartermaster truck companies were attached to the organization for operational control. These units had already served in two campaigns, and their equipment was battered and poorly maintained. All facilities were pooled and operations continued around the clock, chiefly over the excellent main road between Lingayen Gulf and Manila.
In March Colonel Sievers obtained sixteen provisional truck companies formed from the personnel of four Coast Artillery battalions, but these new units were only partially trained and had no equipment. By the following month he had a total of 454 2½-ton trucks, which ran in convoys of five to ten vehicles operated on twelve-hour shifts. In spite of later accessions, the available motorized equipment at the end of June was still considered inadequate. Throughout this period the principal mission of the Highway Transportation Division was to support Sixth Army activity in northern and central Luzon.
The provisional status was terminated by the activation of the 100th Highway Transport Service at Manila on 17 July 1945, with an authorized strength of 28 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 101 enlisted men.128 The organization, whose primary mission was long-distance hauling, continued under the command of Colonel Sievers. In order to attain maximum utilization, its vehicles were operated as a fleet, all maintenance was pooled, and its men worked around the clock. In the summer of 1945 the main job of the 100th Highway Transport Service was to truck supplies over difficult mountainous terrain in direct support of American combat units and Filipino guerrillas. Additional responsibilities came after victory over Japan, when large numbers of enemy troops and recovered Allied prisoners of war had to be evacuated by truck. During demobilization the movement of personnel naturally took precedence over freight traffic. The first military bus service, from Manila to Baguio, was inaugurated in October, and other routes were soon developed.
The peak in daily tonnage hauled (3,604) was attained in August 1945. The heaviest passenger traffic came after V-J Day, with a peak in September of 253,648 persons transported. The strength of the 100th Highway Transport Service reached the maximum in the following month, aggregating approximately 4,600 military and civilian personnel.129
Motor Operations in Bases
With the exception of the two special motor transport organizations described above that functioned respectively in Australia and in the Philippines, the motor operations supervised by the Chief Transportation Officer, USASOS, were administered in detail in the bases and base sections. Differing arrangements as to the supervision of vehicle operations obtained in the various bases, but as a rule a motor transport officer was appointed to serve within the transportation section (later base port command) of the base headquarters. In practice the base motor transport officer in SWPA had only limited means with which to discharge his responsibilities. He was obliged to requisition labor for each separate operation, and the only experienced truck drivers available to him from U.S. Army sources were from the Quartermaster truck companies, which were limited in number. Most units, whether service or combat, depended heavily upon their organic equipment for personnel and cargo movements. In many base sections the motor transport officer was little more than an agent who borrowed or hired motorized equipment, on occasion competing with other officers for trucks and drivers.
As already mentioned, the establishment of separate base motor commands early in 1944 deprived the base port commanders of jurisdiction over motor transports. Trucks, though essential for port clearance, henceforth were provided and operated by the base motor command. The Chief Transportation Officer, USA-SOS, objected to this arrangement, but he was unable to win approval for his recommendation of August 1944 that the port and motor commands be placed under a single transportation officer on the staff of the base commander. Subsequently, in each of the new Philippine bases a motor command was established independent of the port command.130
The Transportation Load in SWPA
An adequate appraisal of the tremendous wartime movement of men and materiel in the Southwest Pacific is difficult because the available statistics covering personnel and cargo traffic are frequently neither complete nor satisfactory. From the data at hand it is, however, possible to draw certain conclusions with respect to the volume of cargo handled and the variation in peak activity as between the respective areas and ports in SWPA.131
Cargo Traffic
The total tonnage of Army cargo handled (that is, discharged and loaded) in all ports of SWPA varied little between February 1944 and January 1945, averaging under 800,000 tons a month. The total exceeded 900,000 tons each month thereafter, reaching a peak of 1,368,303 tons in August 1945, when hostilities ended in the Pacific. Tonnage declined after October 1945.132
Total tonnage handled in Australia attained a peak of 246,424 tons in March 1944 and thereafter exceeded 200,000 tons only in April 1944 and May 1945. It first fell below 100,000 tons in January and April 1945, and remained below that monthly total after August 1945. Total tonnage handled in New Guinea reached a peak of 693,111 tons in August 1944, exceeded 500,000 tons in each month from March through December 1944, suddenly declined in January and February 1945, remained without much change through August 1945, and fell again with extreme abruptness in September 1945. In the Philippines, the total tonnage handled reached a peak of more than a million tons in July and August 1945, and greatly exceeded the combined total for New Guinea and Australia in every month thereafter. Significantly, this record tonnage in the Philippines came near the end of the long and arduous climb up the island ladder of the Southwest Pacific.
Milne Bay was the port that handled the largest quantity of Army cargo in February and March 1944. It was succeeded by Finschhafen (April–November 1944), Leyte (December 1944–January 1945), Lingayen Gulf (February–March 1945), and Manila (April 1945–June 1946). Separate figures for discharge and loading show that by May 1945, as was to be expected, outloading exceeded cargo discharge in each of the Australian and New Guinea ports, which were then supporting the forward areas to the north. In the Philippines the loading first exceeded discharge at Leyte and Cebu City in October 1945.
Personnel Traffic
During the 44 months from January 1942 through August 1945, inclusive, a total of 1,073,673 troops and other passengers was embarked by the Army in the United States for destinations in the Southwest Pacific Area.133 Of this total, approximately 36 percent sailed in the
first eight months of 1945 after the most pressing requirements of the European theater had been met. The peak embarkation of 129,354 occurred in August 1945. During the wartime period the vast majority of the personnel sent to SWPA consisted of U.S. Army troops. Most of the rest were U.S. Navy personnel, with some Allied military personnel and a few civilians.
During the 28 months from June 1943 to September 1945, the Army debarked a total of 267,755 troops and other passengers in the United States from SWPA. Available figures show that of those debarked in the United States between July 1943 and September 1945, approximately 89 percent consisted of U.S. Army troops, including 59,730 Army patients. Of the remainder more than one half were U.S. Navy personnel. In each month through August 1945, the numbers embarked for SWPA greatly exceeded those debarked from it. Reflecting the change in direction of personnel traffic brought about by the end of the war against Japan, during each month between September 1945 and December 1946 debarkations from SWPA exceeded embarkations. The total debarked from SWPA was especially heavy during the five-month period from September 1945 to January 1946 inclusive, amounting to 52,378 in September, 73,721 in October, 80,221 in November, 191,490 in December, and 175,919 in January—altogether 573,729, or more than 58 percent of all debarkations between August 1943 and December 1946.
Until Japan surrendered, for the average American soldier an assignment to the Southwest Pacific usually signified a long tour of duty with no hope of relief. At first there was little opportunity to return troops from SWPA, since all men were needed desperately for its defense, and re placements were not easily procured. General MacArthur announced on 29 July 1943 that lack of shipping would “operate to prevent the return of individuals or units to the United States under any rotation policy or at the end of any specified period of duty.”134 Individuals and units were to be rotated within the theater—for example, from New Guinea to Australia—so as to furnish relief in remote and isolated stations and in localities where climatic conditions were severe. Special consideration was given to the sick and wounded and to Air Forces personnel, and in November 1943 the War Department notified the theater of the increasing pressure to establish a policy for return to the zone of interior of personnel long engaged in “especially hard, debilitating, or isolated service overseas.” However, the return of any appreciable number of military personnel could not be effected until the latter stages of the war. In each of ten of the fifteen months from August 1943 through October 1944, fewer than 1,000 troops from SWPA were debarked in the United States.135 The number debarked per month fell as low as 11 in October 1944, but thereafter troop debarkations increased substantially, exceeding 20,000 per month in July and August 1945.
The end of the fighting in Europe made available additional troops for the Southwest Pacific Area, of which the first contingent, 4,725 men, arrived at Manila aboard the Uruguay from Naples on 15 July 1945. Fora short time the Panama Canal was the busy gateway to the Pacific, through which passed a steady succession of ships carrying redeployed troops.136
Demobilization
Demobilization began with the close of hostilities in mid-August 1945. During this period much bitter criticism arose from American soldiers anxious to leave the theater at once and impatient of any delay in the homeward trek. In the United States a distraught public, an alert press, and a querulous Congress complained vigorously about the low rate of repatriation, particularly from the Pacific.137 The Army was blamed for not converting more cargo vessels in the United States to transport returning troops, to which the Army replied that additional conversions of freighters could not be justified since completion could not be assured in time to make any appreciable contribution to the repatriation program.138
As a matter of fact, in SWPA as elsewhere overseas all available types of ocean transport were employed by the Army, the Navy, and the War Shipping Administration to bring the men back. In order to provide more passenger space the theater was authorized to make hasty conversions of a limited number of Liberty ships into troop carriers, an expedient that Colonel Plant had introduced in SWPA some three years before. The operations officer of the 2nd Port at Manila, Lt. Col. Cecil H. Davidson, took the lead in this program. Under his direction a Ship Conversion Branch was established in late October 1945. Upon learning of the project, hundreds of soldiers immediately volunteered their labor in converting Liberties. A typical conversion involved the installation of bunks, a sick bay, a storeroom, a recreation room, a post exchange, sanitary and messing facilities, and lifesaving equipment. Completed in five days, the first converted Liberty ship, the Otto Mears, sailed from Manila with 534 homebound troops on 28 October 1945. Two more vessels were completed in that month.
In November, twenty-seven Liberty ships and two Victory ships were converted at various ports in the Philippines. Despite crude temporary accommodations such as trough latrines and washstands consisting of helmets suspended in holed planks, all these conversions had to conform to established minimum safety and health standards. On the long transpacific voyage of at least a month, considerable discomfort could be expected and was borne willingly by troops eager to get home.139
Although the hastily converted Liberty ships helped relieve the pressure, they proved poor substitutes for speedy, well-equipped troop transports with large passenger capacities. Within the theater the most acute crisis developed at the crowded port of Manila, where the shortage of shipping for demobilization was aggravated by the need of redeploying U.S. troops for occupation duty, evacuating liberated American and Allied prisoners of war, and removing captured Japanese to their homeland. Time was required to divert more ships to the Southwest Pacific. Meanwhile, the replacement camps
remained full of restless men. Attempts to explain the emergency to the average soldier frequently fell on deaf ears, and in Manila the cry of the disgruntled troops was: “No boats, no votes. Get us home.”
Under unrelenting pressure from the American public, the Congress, and the press, the theater made extraordinary efforts to speed demobilization. The result is shown in the following figures for personnel embarked by the Army for return to the United States.140
| Month | By Water | By Air |
| 1945 | ||
| September | 61,461 | 2,165 |
| October | 86,858 | 4,467 |
| November | 197,973 | 4,616 |
| December | 211,921 | 1,958 |
| 1946 | ||
| January | 88,654 | 1,040 |
| February | 41,025 | 505 |
Early in December 1945 General MacArthur praised all echelons of his command for the efficient and expeditious manner in which the readjustment program had been carried on within the theater, even though the responsible agencies had been handicapped by the return of their own eligible experienced personnel to the United States. He urged continued effort to complete the program “with the least possible delay and upon the most equitable basis.”141 During that month the homeward movement was more than eight times as great as the return movement in the previous August.142
The transfer in 1946 of additional troopships to the Pacific brought marked relief. Among these vessels was the USS West Point, a former luxury liner and the largest American-built ship afloat. It sailed in mid-January from Manila directly to New York, via Pearl Harbor and the Panama Canal, arriving on 7 February 1946 with 7,616 passengers, of whom 6,106 were Army personnel.143
Demobilization continued well into 1946, but the trend was steadily downward. Apart from the repatriation of liberated American and Allied prisoners of war, which had been substantially completed by the end of 1945, the only other significant personnel movement concerned the dependents of U.S. Army personnel. Mostly Australian war brides and their children, such passengers began to pose a problem as early as 1944. The lack of suitable shipping, coupled with procedural difficulties, led to long delays in their transportation. Comparatively few dependents were removed to the United States during the period of hostilities. The great bulk of this traffic developed after the surrender of Japan.144
For the U.S. Army in the theater demobilization signified the end of the long trek from Brisbane to Tokyo, in which transportation had always been a limiting factor. But much remained to be done. Even after the bulk of the U.S. Army forces was repatriated, it would still be necessary to perform important transportation jobs, including those involved in the “roll-up” of supplies and equipment awaiting shipment forward from inactive rear bases and in the maintenance of the U.S. Army troops assigned to occupation and garrison duties in Japan, Korea, the Ryukyus, the Philippines, and other Pacific bases. These tasks were to keep the Transportation Corps in the theater occupied well into the postwar period.