Chapter 11: Beginnings of Industrial Mobilization
The years 1939-41 were a period of initial industrial mobilization, during which programs for the construction of badly needed facilities got under way and a start was made in procuring critical and essential items. This period was to reap the reward of the labors of the previous years, when so many blueprints for arsenals and plants had been drawn up and so many procurement plans had been made in the Chemical Warfare Service.
Although the President did not put the Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1939 into operation, the plan was nevertheless followed rather closely in War Department procurement activities for the Army at large.1 So far as the CWS was concerned, it had a much more restricted application. In the general scramble for contracts by all elements of the armed forces and by foreign governments after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, many allocated plants were lost to the CWS. In only one chemical warfare procurement district, New York, were contracts awarded on a considerable scale to previously allocated manufacturers.2 This situation was probably due to the fact that the majority of the contracts in the New York district were for certain raw chemicals for which there was no keen competition. In other districts, it was the exception rather than the rule for a previously allocated plant to be awarded a contract.3
Procurement planning in the emergency period took on a new sense of urgency because of the immediate need to supply a progressively growing army with the implements of war. The initiation of the building and procurement programs affected the nature of procurement planning, for considerable attention had to be paid to such matters as priorities and the availability of machine tools. While such matters were of primary concern to those then engaged in construction and procurement operations, they were also of vital interest to the procurement planners.
Educational Order Program
After the enactment of educational order legislation on 18 June 1938 and the selection of the gas mask as one of the six Army items to be procured, the Assistant Secretary of War called upon the Chief, CWS, for a suggested 5-year educational order program for his service to include items and facilities to be procured, the order of priority, and the amount of funds to cover each item.4 In reply the Chief, CWS, listed the following gas mask items and facilities in the order of priority. For fiscal year 1939, Number 1 priority was the procurement and installation of all equipment required for assembling the complete standardized service gas masks at a rate of 100,000 per month; Number 2, the procurement of equipment for manufacturing impregnated charcoal at the rate of 4,000 pounds per day; Number 3, the procurement of required metal components for the canister; Number 4, the procurement of manufacturing aids such as molds, dies, jigs, and gauges; and Number 5, the procurement of additional components. Under the first three priorities, specific manufacturers were recommended for contracts. For the fiscal year 1940 the Chief, CWS, recommended substantially the same priorities as those for fiscal 1939. For the fiscal years 1941–1943 inclusive the CWS planned only comparatively minor activities, such as retesting of equipment by contractors. Because of the outbreak of the war, the educational order program lasted not five years, but only about half that period. During that time it was to follow rather closely the lines proposed by the Chief, CWS, to the Secretary of War in the summer of 1938.
The fact was that the planners in the CWS had been discussing the educational order programs for a number of years and had well formulated ideas by the time the legislation was finally enacted.5 Those
manufacturers whom the Chief, CWS, recommended for contracts were well known to CWS procurement planners as well as to the research and development personnel, for there had been constant contact with industry with regard to the improvement of the mask. An example of benefit deriving from such contact was the case of the fully molded facepiece. In the 1930s the government scientists at Edgewood were doing a great deal of work on improving the facepiece of the mask and eventually a new and better faceblank was devised consisting of a single piece of molded rubber.6 While this faceblank was still in the development stage, the CWS considered the feasibility of mass producing the item. It approached a number of rubber manufacturers who for a time showed an interest in the problem. But after a couple of years the general reaction was one of discouragement among both the industrialists and CWS planners.7 Only two manufacturers, the Acushnet Process Co. of New Bedford, Mass., and the General Tire and Rubber Co. of Akron, Ohio, remained hopeful. One CWS officer in close touch with the problem, Maj. Charles E. Loucks, technical director at Edgewood, shared their optimism and gave them all possible encouragement. The reward came when P. E. Young, president of the Acushnet Process Co., through his own personal research and experimentation, demonstrated that fully molded face blanks could be produced in mass, a conclusion which the General Tire and Rubber Co. arrived at independently.8 Through such contacts as these the CWS increased its knowledge of the capabilities of the various prospective gas mask contractors.
Under educational order legislation, bids were received only from those firms that had been selected by the Secretary of War and any contract entered into as a result of the invitation to bid had to be approved by the President of the United States. Usually, although not always, the Secretary of War solicited bids from the firms recommended by the CWS.
The first educational order of the CWS went to the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. for the operation of a service gas mask assembly plant at Akron, Ohio. This contract, the only CWS educational order contract written in fiscal year 1939, resembled all later contracts in requiring the
actual manufacture of a specified number of items in connection with the contract, in this instance 3,000 masks. In fiscal 1940 the CWS awarded two other contracts for service gas mask assembly plants, one to the Firestone Rubber and Latex Products Co. of Fall River, Mass., and the other to Johnson and Johnson at its Chicago plant. The same year also saw the following additional awards:
1. Construction of a gas mask carrier line at the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. plant in Akron, Ohio.
2. Construction of charcoal and whetlerite plants by Barnebey-Cheney Brothers Engineering Co. at Columbus, Ohio, and Carlisle Lumber Co. at Onalaska, Wash.
3. Erection of a complete canister component manufacturing plant at the Milwaukee Stamping Co. in Milwaukee, Wis.
4. Construction of plants at Akron, Ohio, and New Bedford, Mass., for the manufacture of faceblanks.
5. Construction of five noncombatant gas mask assembly plants at various points throughout the country.
6. Erection of an impregnite (CC-2) plant at Niagara Falls, N.Y.
Although educational order contracts were awarded mostly for gas masks and components, one contract was written in fiscal 1940 for a CC-2 plant. In the following fiscal year the CWS awarded educational order contracts for the construction of a shoe impregnite plant and for the manufacture of filter paper. (Tables 4 and 5)9
The educational order program in the CWS proved invaluable in supplying much needed facilities and in enabling the representatives of the government and industry to cooperate in solving manufacturing and other problems. At the time the program was initiated the Chief, CWS, delegated responsibility for its administration to the chief of the Manufacturing and Supply Division of his office. At the same time he directed that an additional officer of company grade be assigned to the War Plans Division at Edgewood Arsenal to assist in the administration of the program. This procedure was followed throughout the life of the contracts.
The Munitions Program
If the educational order program permitted the CWS to take the first faltering step in an accelerated procurement program in the emergency
Table 4: CWS Educational Orders Program, fy 1939, 1940 & 1941 Summary of Awards
| Items & Awardee | Quantity | Cost of Item | Cost of Gages, Jigs, M. & E. | Cost of Production study | Total Amount of contract |
| Service Gas Mask Assembly | |||||
| Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co | 3, 000 | $192,516 | |||
| Firestone Tire & Rubber Co | 10, 000 | $62,986 | $253,283 | $12,000 | 328,269 |
| Johnson & Johnson | 10, 000 | 64,500 | 270,159 | 5,000 | 339,669 |
| Gas Mask Carrier | |||||
| Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co | 10, 000 | 14,580 | 73,136 | 450 | 88,166 |
| Non-Coconut Charcoal | |||||
| Barnebey-Cheney Eng. Co | 125T | 96,312 | 222,600 | 2,000 | 320,912 |
| Carlisle Lumber Co | 125T | 76,090 | 206,900 | 1,000 | 283,990 |
| CC-2 | |||||
| E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co | 1, 000 | 173,250 | 201,300 | 3,850 | 378,400 |
| Canister Components | |||||
| Milwaukee Stamping Co | 36, 000 | 19,800 | 232,614 | 302 | 252,716 |
| Faceblanks | |||||
| Firestone Tire & Rubber Co | 12, 000 | 8,880 | 48,800 | 1,500 | 59,180 |
| Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co | 12, 000 | 9,840 | 48,470 | 750 | 59,060 |
| Optical Faceblanks | |||||
| Acushnet Process Co | 3, 000 | 8,820 | 34,200 | 500 | 43,520 |
| Noncombatant Gas Mask | |||||
| Kember-Thomas Co | 10, 000 | 41,043 | 104,725 | 450 | 146,218 |
| Sprague Specialties Co | 20, 000 | 78,640 | 96,521 | 2,500 | 177,661 |
| Eureka Vacuum Cleaner Co | 10, 000 | 42,446 | 90,853 | 1,750 | 135,049 |
| Pitt. St. Fix. & Eq. Co. | 10, 000 | 39,950 | 94,705 | 500 | 135,155 |
| B.K.B. Co. | 10,000 | 47,900 | 102,654 | 1,200 | 151,754 |
| Shoe Impregnite | |||||
| Baldwin Laboratories, Inc | 125T | 72,286 | 43,033 | 1,000 | 116,319 |
| Filter Paper | |||||
| Knowlton Brothers | 25T | 4,429 | 19,000 | 1,000 | 24,429 |
| John A. Manning Paper Co. | 25T | 4,429 | 19,000 | 1,000 | 24,429 |
| Whetlerite | |||||
| Barnebey-Cheney Eng. Co | 95T | 6,669 | 53,766 | 500 | 60,935 |
| Carlisle Lumber Co | 95T | 6,602 | 54,525 | 500 | 61,627 |
Source: All the data in this chart, with the exception of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. assembly contract, were taken from a study prepared by the Purchase Policies Branch, OC CWS, in 1945, entitled Analysis of Chemical Warfare Service Pricing Record World War II, p. 34. CWS 314.7 Educational Order Program File. This study makes no reference to the Goodyear assembly contract, which was the first contract under the Educational Order Program. The data on this contract were obtained in 1949 in a file of the Procurement Agency, Army Chemical Center,
Table 4: Cost to Government of Gas Mask Educational Program
| Quantity | Total cost | Item cost | Mach. & equip. | Production study | |
| Total | $2,643,888 | $625,061 | $1,987,925 | $30,902 | |
| Service gas mask assembly | *20, 000 | 667,940 | 127,487 | 523,453 | 17,000 |
| Gas mask carrier | 10, 000 | 88,166 | 14,580 | 73,136 | 450 |
| Charcoal | 250 tons | 604,902 | 172,402 | 429,500 | 3,000 |
| Whetlerite | 190 tons | 122,563 | 13,272 | 108,291 | 1,000 |
| Canister components | 36, 000 | 252,717 | 19,800 | 232,615 | 302 |
| Faceblanks | 24, 000 | 118,240 | 18,720 | 97,270 | 2,250 |
| Optical faceblanks | 3, 000 | 43,520 | 8,820 | 34,200 | 500 |
| Noncombatant masks | 60, 000 | 745,840 | 249,980 | 489,460 | 6,400 |
* This figure does not include the 3,000 masks procured under the Goodyear Tire & Rubber contract listed in Table 4, since full cost data were not available.
Source: Data in this chart were obtained from Analysis of Chemical Warfare Service Pricing Record in World War II, p. 35, prepared in 1945 by the Purchase Policies Branch, OC CWS.
period, the Munitions Program of 30 June 1940 and the subsequent appropriation acts which the Congress passed to finance that program enabled the service to advance to the toddling stage. The Munitions Program was a requirements and fiscal plan worked out by the War Department, the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense, and the President.10 It became the new overall guide for all procurement planners.
In August 1939, when the war clouds were hanging heavy over Europe, the War Department undertook a quick review of its plans for emergency action. In this connection the Assistant Secretary of War called the chiefs of the technical services to his office on 19 August and outlined three more or less distinct phases through which the nation might pass in the change from peace to war. These phases were:
1. A period of neutrality when peacetime legislation was in effect and only current appropriations available.
2. A national emergency declared by the President and provisions of Section 120 of the National Defense Act invoked.
3. A declaration of war by the Congress.
The Assistant Secretary then listed a number of actions which his office or the Army and Navy Munitions Board would initiate in each of the
three periods and requested the chiefs of the supply services to send him a list of the steps they individually planned.11
Maj. Gen. Walter C. Baker, in his reply to this request on 21 August 1939, stated that during the present period of neutrality—Phase I—he was taking measures to: (1) accelerate all current procurement and educational orders then being planned; (2) round out Edgewood Arsenal; (3) request the removal of the field artillery garrison at Fort Hoyle, Md., and the incorporation of that reservation into Edgewood Arsenal; (4) present plans for the establishment of an additional manufacturing arsenal with necessary storage and range facilities; (5) freeze all completed specifications and drawings and expedite the completion of all others; (6) review and perfect plans for accomplishing and controlling procurement in war; (7) request funds to accumulate stockpiles of strategic materials; and (8) request the detail of selected Reserve officers for training in key positions connected with procurement.
Passing on to the second phase, that of the state of a national emergency, the Chief, CWS, said that he would: (1) request additional funds for carrying out requirements of the initial stages of a war; (2) start the construction of a new arsenal; (3) utilize to the greatest extent possible the productive capacity of industry; (4) prepare a war budget for the possible prosecution of a war through the second year; and (5) request a detail of additional selected Reserve officers for training in key positions connected with procurement.
Coming to the final phase, when the nation would be at war, General Baker listed only two steps: (1) the acceleration of all procurement programs in both government arsenals and commercial plants, and (2) the revision of existing procurement plans for a possible second year of war.12
During Phase I, the period of neutrality, the Assistant Secretary of War, Louis Johnson, personally took steps to insure that increased requirements for chemicals would be met in the event of war. Acting upon a suggestion of Edward M. Allen, president of the Manufacturing Chemists Association, he recommended early in 1939 that a national defense committee be set up to assist the War and Navy Departments in perfecting plans for utilizing the chemical industry should war break out.13
Members of the chemical advisory committee receiving Army Certificates of Appreciation from Brig. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, November 1945. From left (front). Charles S. Munson, Warren N. Watson, James W. McLaughlin, Harry L. Derby, General Waitt, Col. Harry A. Kuhn. From left (back). George W. Merck, Lammot du Pont.
Mr. Allen, who was also the civilian chief of the New York Chemical Procurement District, had suggested that the district advisory committee be designated the Chemical Advisory Committee to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. This suggestion was adopted and from early 1939 until after the close of World War II the committee, whose members were leading representatives of the chemical industry, met monthly in Washington or New York.14 Liaison officers from the Army and Navy Munitions Board, the Ordnance Department, and the CWS attended the meetings. A representative from the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense and, later, one from the War Production Board, were often in attendance.15
Upon its activation the committee called the attention of the War Department to the fact that its members might be suspected of conspiring to violate the federal antitrust acts. The War Department sought the opinion of the Attorney General of the United States on this matter. The Attorney General ruled that reports made by the Chemical Advisory Committee to the Army and Navy Munitions Board were considered confidential in nature and were therefore not subject to subpoena or investigation by other government agencies.16 In other words, the recommendations of the committee were placed in the same category as war plans.
In 1939 and 1940 the committee set up fifteen commodity subcommittees which were responsible for making reports and recommendations to the parent committee. The reports covered such matters as consumption of specific chemicals by industries, means for transporting specific chemicals, and suggested locations for new plants. On the basis of production statistics and estimated industrial capacity furnished by the subcommittee as well as through statistics on military requirements furnished by the military services, the committee made recommendations on allocation of chemicals to the Army and Navy Munitions Board. Largely because of assistance which the Chemical Advisory Committee rendered during the emergency and war periods, chemical facilities were erected at the proper locations and the turnaround time on railroad cars carrying chemicals was cut down.17
Another development that facilitated preparations for chemical warfare under the Munitions Program was the receipt of pertinent information from the British. The assistant military attache in London in the emergency period, a CWS officer, obtained access to data on development and production methods for chemical warfare items, on British smoke operations for screening critical installations, on the effects of incendiary bombing, and on the types of German incendiaries dropped on London.
This information he sent to the Office of the Chief or to Edgewood Arsenal.
Appropriations
The Munitions Program would of course be merely an academic exercise without the money to implement it. As early as the fall of 1939 the Chief, CWS, again made an urgent appeal to the General Staff to take immediate steps to secure authorization and funds for rounding out the plant facilities at Edgewood Arsenal. Both the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-3 and G-4, concurred in the recommendation of the Chief, CWS, and suggested that a deficiency appropriation of approximately $5,500,000 be requested for this purpose.18 This proposed request was conceived of just half a year ahead of the time when the Bureau of the Budget was in a mood to approve it. The temper of the bureau with regard to such requests was demonstrated by its action early in January 1940 when it excluded from the President’s budget for fiscal year 1941 all supplemental estimates covering the “Critical Item Program,” the “Essential Item Program,” and the “Arsenal and Depot Facilities Program.”19 This was the winter of the “phony war” in Europe, and neither the Bureau of the Budget nor Congress was convinced of the need for greater expenditures for the Army. Hitler’s invasion of Denmark and Norway in April and of the Low Countries and France in May changed their minds.20
Notwithstanding the action of the Bureau of the Budget in January 1940 the General Staff did not relax its efforts to gather all information possible on munition shortages preparatory to future requests for funds. On the very day after the Bureau of the Budget’s action, for example, General Marshall requested G-4 to furnish him with a half page statement on Edgewood Arsenal, to include the approximate amount that had been invested in the installation along with additional “pieces” that the CWS might wish to add. The Chief of Staff wanted this information to enable him to withstand “pressure to reduce appropriations for Edgewood Arsenal in order to promote a large brand new arsenal somewhere else.” In compliance with General Marshall’s request he was furnished with the following information: Edgewood Arsenal was the only chemical warfare research, manufacturing, and chemical storage installation in the United
States. The arsenal plants, with the exception of the gas mask assembly plant, were of the experimental type and not suitable for meeting the needs of the Initial Protective Force. The cost of constructing and maintaining the arsenal since 1917 was estimated at $43,600,000, with deterioration due to budgetary limitations at $29,100,000, making the value of the facilities as of January 1940, $14,500,000. The value of the existing stocks at the arsenal was put at $31,300,000. It was estimated that it would cost $5,000,000 to remove the stocks to a new arsenal. Therefore, it was planned to spend $5,400,000 to round out the plants at Edgewood Arsenal to enable it to meet the needs of the peacetime and the Initial Protective Force. The cost of a new arsenal of equivalent capacity was placed at $21,000,000 plus 8 to 10 million more for land. These data, according to the Acting Executive, Supply Division, G-4, were to be placed in the Chief of Staff’s small information book where it would be considered confidential.21
The events in Europe in the spring of 1940 had their effect and by May the President and the Congress were in a very liberal mood indeed with regard to military appropriations.22 On 16 May the President delivered in person a special message to the Congress on the need for supplemental outlays for national defense. On 13 June he signed the Military Appropriation Act of 1941 which provided for vast increases in military expenditures, and less than two weeks later, on 26 June, the first of five supplementals to the National Defense Appropriation Act of 1941.23 The President had meanwhile received advice from General Marshall and William S. Knudsen, the newly appointed production authority on the Council of National Defense, on how this appropriated money was to be spent. Their decisions were embodied in the Munitions Program of 30 June 1940.
The appropriations to the CWS for fiscal year 1941 totaled $60,092,532.24 This figure was in contrast to the $2,091,237 appropriated for the previous fiscal year. The increased appropriations gave the CWS the green light to carry out its planned procurement and construction, and these programs got into actual operation in the summer of 1940.
The amounts appropriated to the CWS were arrived at only after the most painstaking calculations. As previously, the CWS passed its estimates on to the General Staff, but in June 1940 Mr. Knudsen also become interested in the estimates. On 11 June Mr. Knudsen informed the Assistant Secretary of War that he wanted the answers to two questions: “How much munitions productive capacity does this country need and how rapidly must it become available?”25 That Mr. Knudsen did not confine his attention solely to the broad aspects of these questions is shown by the fact that on the very day he made his inquiry he personally received a reply from the Chief, CWS, listing quantities and unit prices of critical items as approved by the War Department for procurement and manufacture by CWS, as well as supplemental lists of critical and essential items.26 Six days later the Chief, CWS, in a memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of War, gave detailed data on the new arsenal and plant facilities that would be needed to meet the requirements of the PMP (1,000,000 men), and its augmentation to 4,000,000 men, and requested that the data be passed on to Commissioner Knudsen, who was evidently anxious to get the facts.27 The Chief, CWS, listed the rehabilitation of Edgewood Arsenal which he estimated would require 15 months to complete, a new $21,000,000 arsenal to require 18 months, and $5,000,000 worth of government owned plants in industry to require 15 months to complete.
Facilities Expansion Gets Under Way
In July 1940 G-4 listed the immediate objectives of the CWS, under the Munitions Program in the following order of importance: first, rounding out Edgewood Arsenal; second, placing approved educational orders in industry (already considered above); and third, preparing plans for obtaining manufacturing plants in industry other than those covered by educational orders.28
The Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1941 carried an item of $918,988 for The Quartermaster General “for work authorized by the Act of June 4,
1936 (49 Stat 1462) at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland.”29 This was for construction of badly needed storage facilities. The First Supplemental to the Appropriation Act, signed on 26 June 1940, made the sum of $3,060,300 available to the Chief, CWS, for rounding out and rehabilitating Edge-wood Arsenal.30 These two appropriations of June 1940 enabled the CWS to initiate a program of construction which its chiefs had been advocating for years.31
In August 1940, General Baker, the Chief, CWS, directed Maj. Walter J. Ungethuem, chief of his War Plans Division, to supervise all construction activities at Edgewood. In September actual construction of new manufacturing plants was initiated under contracts drawn up by The Quartermaster General with the architect-engineering firm of Whitman, Requardt, and Smith of Baltimore and two construction companies, Riggs-Distler Co. of Philadelphia and Cummings Construction Co. of Baltimore. In November the General Staff ordered the erection of new troop barracks and gave approval to a CWS recommendation to enlarge the Chemical Warfare School. In the same month the long planned rehabilitation program of the deteriorating structures at Edgewood Arsenal was begun. All this building activity in the winter of 1940-41 resembled in scope that of 1917-18, when the arsenal was originally constructed. Although the forces of nature were considerably kinder in 1940-41 than they had been in 1917-18, winter days at Edgewood are often not too pleasant for outside work.32 Since the Secretary of War insisted on the speedy consummation of construction projects, the commanding officer directed that work be carried on every day regardless of the weather.33 It was not without significance that the funds in the Assistant Secretary’s Office from which the CWS was allotted the money for arsenal construction were earmarked “Expediting Production Funds.” The Chief, CWS, was constantly reminded of the importance of speed on this program.
By December 1941 the initial phase of the construction program at Edgewood was virtually completed. Old plants had been rehabilitated and
a number of new facilities had been erected. These included manufacturing and filling plants, a new steam plant and distribution system, an entirely new sewage system with pumping stations and disposal plant, a research and development center, an airplane runway, a dock on Bush River, paved roads, new railroads, a new wing on the Chemical Warfare School, additions to the post headquarters building, several troop barracks, and two new training fields.34 In addition, new depot facilities had been erected.35 The actual cost of rehabilitation and construction came to over $34,000,000.36 Within a period of sixteen months a considerable face lifting had taken place at Edgewood.
Government-Owned Contractor-Operated Plants
The preparation of plans for securing manufacturing plants in industry, which G-4 listed as one of the chief objectives of the CWS under the Munitions Program, was accomplished in 1940 and 1941. Under the Second Supplemental to the 1941 Appropriations Act, approved on 9 September 1940, funds were allotted to the CWS to erect plants for private industry in order to expedite production.37 The procedure was for the government to build the plants which would be operated under contract with private industry. Both the Ordnance Department and the Chemical Warfare Service followed the practice extensively.38 The CWS built charcoal and whetlerite plants and plants for the manufacture of impregnite (CC-2) under this program.39
Construction was begun on the first of these plants, a charcoal-whetlerite plant at Zanesville, Ohio, in December 1940 on the property of the Barnebey-Cheney Engineering Co.40 The whetlerite portion of this plant
was completed by 5 January 1942 and turned over for operation to the Pittsburgh Coke and Chemical Co. In April 1941 construction of a second charcoal-whetlerite plant was started at Fostoria, Ohio. This was completed by the beginning of 1942 and turned over to the National Carbon Co.41 In February 1941, meanwhile, work had begun on the erection of impregnite plants at Niagara Falls, N.Y., East St. Louis, Ill., and Midland, Mich. These three plants were designed by Du Pont. The Du Pont Co. had been awarded an educational order contract in 1940 for an impregnite plant at Niagara Falls, N.Y.42 At that time the Du Pont engineers had consulted CWS engineers and had surveyed the model impregnite plant at Edgewood Arsenal whose basic design had been drawn up by the Du Pont Co.43 The plant which Du Pont constructed under the educational order contract thus represented the combined thinking of the CWS and Du Pont. On the basis of its experience in constructing the educational order plant the Du Pont Co. was awarded the contract to design the other impregnite plants. Du Pont itself was given the additional impregnite plant at Niagara Falls to operate, Monsanto Chemical Co. the East St. Louis plant, and Dow Chemical Corp. the Midland plant. The Site Location Board of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense had to approve the sites for all these plants.44
Government-Owned and -Operated Plants and Arsenals
By the summer of 1941 the immediate objectives of the Munitions Program in the CWS were well on the way to realization and the service began to concentrate on some of the less urgent objectives. Among the latter were the construction of government plants for the impregnation of clothing, new government arsenals for the manufacture and filling of chemical warfare munitions, and additional storage space for the mass of new items being procured. In May 1941 the government awarded a contract to
the American Laundry Machinery Co. to design, construct, and install four plants to impregnate clothing at Columbus, Ohio; Ogden, Utah; Kansas City, Mo.; and New Cumberland, Pa. These government-owned and -operated plants, with the exception of the one at Ogden, were completed by 15 December 1941. The Ogden plant was dismantled before it was completed and shipped to England where it was erected at the Blythe Colour Works, Cresswell, near Stoke-on-Trent.45
The War Department, meanwhile, began to erect additional CW arsenals. In the years of peace, as mentioned above, the CWS had planned for one additional wartime arsenal in the central or western section of the United States.46 On 30 April 1941 General Baker, in his final report to the Chief of Staff, again brought up the matter saying that he could not “stress too strongly the absolute necessity for the immediate authorization and construction of additional facilities other than those at Edgewood Arsenal at a location west of the Allegheny Mountains.”47 General Baker added that he knew consideration was being given to the construction of a new arsenal, but that to date no positive action had been taken.
Positive action was not taken until May 1941 when General Baker’s successor, General Porter, became the sixth chief of the CWS. At that time several sites in the interior of the United States were being surveyed for a suitable location for a CWS arsenal.48 On 18 June, Porter recommended selection of one of those sites, a stretch of flat lowland in the fertile valley of the Tennessee River near Huntsville, Ala.49 The War Department approved General Porter’s recommendation, and on 21 July construction of the new arsenal was begun. That same month the arsenal was designated an Army installation under command of Col. Rollo C. Ditto.
Lt. Col. Walter J. Ungethuem was transferred from Edgewood Arsenal where the building program was nearing completion, to supervise the construction at Huntsville. Accompanying Ungethuem were several engineers of the War Plans Division (later Industrial Engineering Division) of Edge-wood Arsenal, who had worked on plans for a new CWS arsenal in the late thirties. These included two of the most experienced arsenal engineers in the CWS, E. C. Thompson and L. W. Greene. The CWS engineers
General Porter, Chief of Chemical Warfare Service (holding pointer), discussing construction problems with General Ditto (left), Colonel Prentiss (right), and General Avery (second from right), in General Porter’s office, Washington, January 1942.
worked closely with the engineers of the firm of Whitman, Requardt, and Smith of Baltimore, which on 16 July was awarded a contract for architectural and engineering services for a new arsenal. On 21 July the Corps of Engineers awarded construction contracts to the following firms: C. G. Kershaw Contracting Co. of Birmingham, Engineers Limited of San Francisco, and Walter Butler Co. of St. Paul.
The Chief, CWS, in his recommendation for the construction of the new arsenal, listed the following facilities: four chemical loading plants, a chemical warfare depot, plant storage, laboratories, shops, offices, hospitals, fire and police protection installations, paved roads, and railroads. Construction under this program was getting well under way when the war began. The war period was to see the erection of many more facilities than originally planned.50
The decision of the Chief of Staff in the summer of 1941, to place entire responsibility for the incendiary bomb program with the CWS led to the need for still more facilities. The CWS surveyed industry and drew up a number of contracts for the production of these bombs.51 Since this
country had little experience in the manufacture of incendiaries and since there was a growing demand for them by both United States and the British forces, the War Department decided that the CWS should also manufacture and assemble incendiary bombs in government plants.52 A pilot plant was erected at Edgewood, and in the fall of 1941 the Chief, CWS, obtained approval to construct an arsenal for this purpose at Pine Bluff, Ark., thirty miles southwest of Little Rock.53 Col. Augustin M. Prentiss was named commanding officer of the new installation on 30 September 1941, and two weeks later the government awarded a contract for facilities for manufacturing and assembling incendiary munitions to Sanderson and Porter of New York.54 The CWS arsenal engineers at Huntsville cooperated with the contractor in drawing the plans for Pine Bluff Arsenal, actual construction of which began on 1 December 1941. As at Huntsville, many more facilities than originally planned were to be constructed at Pine Bluff during World War II. Total cost of construction at Huntsville came to over $58,431,200 and at Pine Bluff to over $51,156,748.55
Procurement in the Emergency Period
Even while the new facilities were under construction at Edgewood Arsenal in 1940 and 1941 the manufacturing load rose sharply over that of previous years. Greater quantities of mustard gas, tear grenades, decontaminating apparatus, ton containers, 500-pound smoke clusters, smoke pots, and airplane smoke tanks were produced.56 In the summer of 1940 the procurement districts began to engage in actual procurement, letting contracts for such items as 4.2-inch mortar shells,57 components of the gas mask, and for assembling of the mask, charcoal, and smoke mixtures. Contracts were
let to the lowest bidder and the OC CWS had to approve all contracts over $10,000.58
These increased activities led to organizational changes both in the chief’s office and in the installations.59 In July 1940 separate Procurement and Supply Divisions were established in the Office of the Chief and a year later, in a major reorganization by the newly appointed chief, General Porter, an Industrial Service was activated. Lt. Col. Paul X. English was named chief of the Industrial Service and Maj. Norman D. Gillet, chief of the Supply Division of the Industrial Service. After the initiation of contractual operations in the procurement districts in mid-1940 more Reserve officers were called to active duty and the district civilian personnel rolls were greatly expanded. District organizations resembling those planned in the peace years were put into operation. At Edgewood Arsenal an Arsenal Operations Department was activated in December 1940 to supervise manufacture, inspection, and service activities.60
Like all elements of the military establishment the CWS in the emergency period was faced with procurement problems caused by dislocations in the national economy. Perhaps the most significant of these problems was the low priority rating given chemical warfare items by the Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB), to which Donald Nelson of the Office of Production Management had delegated responsibility for War Department priorities.61 In the summer of 1941 the board formulated a system of priority ratings ranging from A-1-a to A-1-j. Under this system chemical warfare items came under the low rating of A-1-i, undoubtedly because the board did not consider the need for such items as pressing as that of other items, which led at times to considerable delay in CWS facilities and production programs.62 The construction of the charcoal-whetler-ite plants at Zanesville and Fostoria in 1940 was delayed because the CWS was given a low priority for structural steel and steel plate, and in 1941 erection of the new impregnite plants was held up for the same reason. In 1941 also a considerable part of the gas mask factory at Edgewood had to be shut down temporarily because of low priorities.63
Meeting of Chemical Warfare Service officers to discuss procurement problems, Temporary Building F. Washington, D.C., October 1941. From left: Colonel Kuhn, Capt. Walter E. Spicer, Lt. Col. Henry Enterline, Col. Patrick F. Powers, Col. Hugh W. Rowan, General English, Capt. James H. Batte, Col. Sterling E. Whitesides, Jr., Col. Harry R. Lebkicher, Col. Raymond L. Abel, Lt. Col. John L. Miles.
Another problem was the shortage of machine tools needed for the completion of contracts for components of the gas mask. Like most of the prewar procurement and supply problems in the CWS, this problem was national in scope. It originated in the large orders which foreign nations placed with the American tool builders before Congress had finally gotten around to appropriating considerable sums of money for national defense. As early as 30 July 1940 the Chief, CWS, expressed concern over the effect of the shortage of machine tools on the gas mask contracts.64 The problem was not solved until well into the war period.
A third problem was the shortage of raw materials needed in the construction of new facilities and in the manufacture of munitions. With the War Department placing emphasis on rehabilitating Edgewood Arsenal and on building new plants and arsenals, meeting the raw material needs of the construction program was the most important immediate task. But shortages of needed materials for munitions also arose and these became more acute as time went on. By June 1941 material shortages were
considered so serious that the Under Secretary of War inaugurated a program in the technical services for the conservation of certain basic materials.65 He drew up a list of the strategic and critical materials on the ANMB list and a few additional materials which had been placed under allocation or priority control by the Office of Production Management. Of particular interest to the CWS were aluminum, nickel, manganese, chlorine, rubber, copper, steel, cotton duck, and webbing. The Under Secretary directed the Chief, CWS, to conduct a continuous study of all specifications with a view to eliminating or reducing requirements for strategic materials which were under allocation or priority control. Even before receipt of the directive the Chief, CWS, had been investigating the possibility of replacing strategic materials in gas mask parts with plastic and steel.66 To supervise all matters bearing on priorities, as well as to coordinate the growing problem of labor relations, a Priorities and Labor Relations Section was activated in the Industrial Service of OC CWS in August 1941.67
Still another problem of expanding procurement activities was plant protection. The Federal Bureau of Investigation inspected all War Department and contractors’ facilities until the spring of 1941, when the function was transferred to the War Department itself. On 12 May the Under Secretary of War notified the Chief, CWS, of the change and outlined the activities to be carried out. He stressed the safety features of plant protection as well as the need for guarding against sabotage and directed that plant protection units be set up in the Office of the Chief and in the procurement districts. In conformity with this directive, the Chief, CWS, activated a plant protection unit in his office in May 1941 and instructed the chiefs of the districts to do likewise.68
One of the greatest difficulties of the period was meeting the need for trained inspectors. In the peacetime years all CWS inspection was carried on at Edgewood Arsenal under the supervision of the Inspection, Safety, and Proof Division. Inspection was on a 100 percent basis; that is, every major component was inspected on the manufacturing line and later each finished end item was inspected. In addition to the inspection of items being
manufactured, there was a program of surveillance inspection under which chemical warfare materiel was periodically checked to determine the extent of its stability. This was done by making spot checks on materiel from a pilot or production plant or by conducting periodic tests on stocks in storage. Both the technicians and inspectors at Edgewood were vitally interested in these data.
The increase in CWS manufacturing activities led to the hiring in 1940 of a greater number of inspectors at Edgewood and in the districts. The older inspectors at Edgewood acted as a training unit for the new ones, the districts sending their apprentice inspectors to Edgewood for training before sending them out on the job. The concept of 100 percent inspection, as carried out at Edgewood Arsenal, was transferred to the districts and the new gas mask assembly plants such as that of the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. at Akron were planned and operated on that basis. During 1941 the number of inspectors at Edgewood and in the districts multiplied several times. To insure better methods of inspection, an analytical laboratory, a physical testing laboratory, and a gauge manufacturing and testing facility were set up at Edgewood Arsenal in 1941.
The increase in inspection activities in 1940 and 1941 led to several organizational developments in the chief’s office. The most important of these were the activation of a Statistical, Inspection, and Specifications Section in 1940 and establishment of a separate Inspection Division in July 1941.
Mobilization of the Distribution System
Procurement of CWS items initiated under the educational order and munitions programs expanded still more as a result of the passage of the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941.69 A few weeks after the act was passed, the War Department began revising its requirements upward. At the end of August President Roosevelt requested the War and Navy Departments to submit by 10 September their recommendations on how munitions produced in the United States should be distributed as between the United States, Great Britain, Russia, and other friendly powers during the period 30 August 1941 and 30 June 1942. The joint Army-Navy document compiled to fill the President’s request became known as the Victory Program.70
Col Norman D. Gillet
As CWS procurement grew in 1940 and 1941 the demand naturally arose for more storage space. Late in 1940 the CWS leased a large warehouse in Chicago and early in 1941 another warehouse in Indianapolis for the storage of gas masks acquired under the educational order program. Under the provisions of the Military Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1941 over $12,000,000 was allotted to the Chemical Warfare Service for the construction of additional storage facilities. In July a construction program was initiated throughout the continental United States and in the overseas departments. Included within the depot program were the immediate construction of new facilities and the formulation of plans for the construction of additional storage space in the future. Two Reserve lieutenants were called to active duty to assist Major Gillet, chief of the Supply Division, OC CWS, in supervising the program. These officers collected data and drew up plans for modern storage depots where space would be utilized to the best possible advantage and where the latest handling equipment, such as fork lift trucks, would be used on an extensive scale.
After the enactment of the appropriation legislation the CWS began building new storage facilities at Edgewood in September 1940. Within a year the following new additions had been made: 6 warehouses, 13 magazines, 6 igloos, 2 sheds, 1 toxic gas yard, and 1 office. These facilities comprised over 360,000 square feet of storage space.71 Between July 1940 and May 1941 the CWS acquired additional space in the War Department general depots at Ogden, San Antonio, Memphis, New Orleans, Atlanta, and in Panaina, Hawaii, and the Philippines.72 In the latter half of 1941 it was necessary to plan and arrange for modern storage depots at the new arsenals at Huntsville and Pine Bluff.73 Actual construction of
Table 6—CWS depot storage space in operation, December 1941 [Thousands of Square Feet]
| Space Category | Installation | Gross | Net Usable | ||
| Total | Occupied | Vacant | |||
| Warehouse | Total | 769 | 545 | 345 | 200 |
| Chicago Warehouse | 245 | 172 | 117 | 55 | |
| Edgewood CW Depot | 124 | 87 | 62 | 25 | |
| Indianapolis Warehouse | 181 | 126 | 110 | 16 | |
| New Orleans POE | 25 | 18 | 5 | 13 | |
| New York POE | 17 | 12 | 4 | 8 | |
| San Antonio Gen. Depot | 13 | 9 | 3 | 6 | |
| San Francisco POE | 32 | 22 | 9 | 13 | |
| Shamokin, Pa | 32 | 29 | 3 | 26 | |
| Utah Gen. Depot | 100 | 70 | 32 | 38 | |
| Igloo Magazine | Total | 89 | 89 | 51 | 38 |
| Edgewood CW Depot | 78 | 78 | 47 | 31 | |
| Utah Gen. Depot | 11 | 11 | 4 | 7 | |
| Shed | Total | 19 | 14 | 7 | 7 |
| Chicago Warehouse | 3 | 2 | 0 | 2 | |
| Edgewood CW Depot | 15 | 11 | 7 | 4 | |
| San Antonio Gen. Depot | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | |
| Open | Total | 54 | 45 | 21 | 24 |
| Chicago Warehouse | 16 | 12 | 0 | 12 | |
| Edgewood CW Depot | 38 | 33 | 21 | 12 | |
| Toxic yard (semifinished) | Edgewood CW Depot | 93 | 37 | 28 | 9 |
Source: The figures in this table were compiled from data furnished by Supply Division, OC CWS, in 1946.
those facilities was not undertaken, however, until early 1942.74 (Table 6)
While the Supply Division, OC CWS, was planning new depots and acquiring additional storage space, the immediate need arose of furnishing gas masks to troops being inducted into the rapidly expanding Army. In order to prevent delay in delivery, the Supply Division made arrangements to transport the masks and some other equipment directly from the point
of manufacture to post, camps, and stations. This direct delivery, which characterized the period from the fall of 1940 to early 1942, enabled the CWS to carry on its program of depot planning and construction without having to expand its current storage activities. During 1941 gas masks and gasproofing equipment in considerable quantities were also shipped to Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone, the Philippines, and Hawaii.75 This equipment was put to good use in the Malinta Tunnel on Corregidor before the final surrender of the American troops.76
Procurement and supply developments in the two years preceding U.S. entrance into war placed the CWS in a better position to meet the demands of a full-scale conflict. Thanks to the educational order program and the Munitions Program of 30 June 1940, the CWS was able to build new facilities and undertake procurement in the districts and arsenals. Had such construction not been undertaken, the state of CWS preparedness at the time of the outbreak of war would have indeed been tragic. Moreover, by obtaining experience in the production and inspection of munitions, drawing up contracts, and storing and issuing equipment, CWS personnel—military and civilian—were in a much better position to cope with the problems which would confront them after the war got under way. The problems that arose, such as shortages of raw materials and low priorities, were to continue and become even more acute once the nation entered the war.