Chapter 12: More and More of Everything
CWS procurement and supply activities increased tremendously in World War II, reaching proportions never contemplated in the prewar years. Figures on dollar value (Table 7) and the production of selected items (Table 8) give some indication of the volume of CWS procurement. Although the CWS program was small when compared to those of other technical services (Chart 1), the fact that it amounted to over a billion and a half dollars definitely placed it in the class of big business. The CWS procured materiel not only for the Army but also for the Navy, as well as for
Table 7: Summary of estimated dollar value of CWS procurement: 1940–1945*
[Thousands of Dollars)
| Major Groups | Total | Jul 40– Dec 41 | 1942 | 1943 | 1944 | 1945 |
| All CWS Materiel | $1,746,008 | $46,656 | $207,209 | $470,961 | $638,324 | $382,858 |
| Munitions, other than Bombs | 353,507 | 5,431 | 42,760 | 83,768 | 135,686 | 85,862 |
| Bombs | 727,206 | 302 | 50,331 | 161,465 | 305,772 | 209,336 |
| Protective Materiel | 404,444 | 35,636 | 84,446 | 159,122 | 85,720 | 39,520 |
| Weapons | 39,390 | 13 | 4,438 | 6,665 | 15,273 | 13,001 |
| Service Equipment | 49,723 | 2,143 | 10,255 | 19,389 | 14,750 | 3,186 |
| Miscellaneous | 171,738 | 3,131 | 14,979 | 40,552 | 81,123 | 31,953 |
* Value computed by Hqs, Army Service Forces, from Physical quantities of materiel delivered in each year multiplied by unit costs in 1945. The data, therefore, reflect physical volume rather than actual cost to or total expenditure of funds by the government.
Source: Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, “Procurement.” MS in OCMH.
Chart 1: Total Army Service Forces estimated dollar value of procurement deliveries by Technical Services: 1 January 1942–31 December 1945
Source: Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, “Procurement,’ passim.
countries included in the Lend-Lease Act. The total value of CWS items procured for the Navy amounted to about $150,000,000 and for lend-lease countries to almost $303,000,000.1
Procurement of Service Equipment
In addition to toxic, incendiary, and smoke ammunition and bombs, as well as chemical warfare offensive weapons and equipment, the CWS was responsible for the procurement of a variety of service equipment. The latter included a truck mounted with a swinging boom crane, a chemical service truck, a chemical service trailer, a unit for mixing toxic and incendiary agents in the field, and a set for maintaining and repairing chemical warfare equipment in the field. Several of these items presented unusual problems of development and procurement.2 (Table 8)
The truck, crane, swinging boom, was designed to handle ton containers of toxics and was prescribed equipment for airfields where chemical
Table 8: Expansion in production of selected CW items, World War II
| Item | On Hand as of 12 Dec 41* | Procured 1 Jan 42 to 31 Dec 45† |
| Mask, gas | 5,417,078 | 31,739,356 |
| Set, Antidim | 1,739,850 | 7,244,947 |
| Ointment, Protective (tubes) | 152,431 | 57,542,597 |
| Curtain, gasproof | 38,816 | 741,998 |
| Kit, repair | 439,674 | 819,334 |
| Laboratory, Field | 3 | 24 |
| Apparatus, demustardizing (3 gal.) | 53,659 | 230,297 |
| Apparatus, decontaminating, P-D | 6 | 4,561 |
| Agent, demustardizing, bleach (tons) | 501 | 33,307 |
| Impregnite (Protective clothing) (tons) | 456 | 18,816 |
| Impregnite (Shoe) MI (tons) | 1,660 | 15,242 |
| WP Smoke (tons) | 436 | 78,207 |
| H (tons) | 4,137 | 82,451 |
| FS (tons) | 361 | 23,370 |
| CG (tons) | 893 | 19,001 |
| CNS (tons) | 9 | 1,588 |
| 1 Ton Containers | 5,154 | 89,980 |
| Tank, Airplane, Smoke | 812 | 124,181 |
| Incendiary Bombs, 2, 4, 6, and 10 lbs | 0 | 254,793,060 |
| Mortar Chemical, 4.2” | 44 | 8,498 |
| Flame Thrower | 12 | 41,452 |
Source:
* Weekly Report for Chief of Staff, CWS Munitions on Hand as of December 12, 1941.
† Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, Statistics, “Procurement,” pp. 21-24, and CWS Report of Production 1 Jan 40 through 31 Dec 45. Because of the inclusion in this column of certain minor items not considered in Crawford, Cook, and Whiting, some of the totals shown above differ slightly from those in that study.
air service companies were stationed. The service companies were responsible for delivering toxic, smoke, and incendiary bombs to the apron for aircraft loading by Army Air Forces crews. As soon as other services observed how the unit performed, they began using it on jobs for which it had not been intended. For example, it was frequently used to remove wrecked aircraft from fields. Projects such as this were simply too heavy for the mechanism and the truck frequently broke down. The CWS procured the truck, crane, swinging boom, from Gar Wood Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C., which developed the telescopic boom and power takeoff. These were mounted on a 4-ton tractor chassis furnished under subcontract by the Diamond T Co. About 400 of the units were assembled at the Diamond T rebuild plant near Detroit.
The chemical service truck was used to facilitate the loading and handling of chemical containers, such as smoke tanks, ton containers, and 55-gallon drums. The Ordnance Department supplied the 6 by 6 chassis for the truck while the CWS contracted with several firms for mounting the superstructure, which consisted of a monorail frame with a chain hoist, chocks, and equipment lockers. Though development and manufacture of this item proceeded with no more than an average number of obstacles, the task of obtaining priorities for the necessary materials did present a knotty problem. The CWS procured more than 3,000 of these trucks during the war.
Procurement officials experienced some difficulty in getting chemical handling and chemical service trailers because of the failure of the chief prime contractor, the Saginaw Products Corp. of Saginaw, Mich., to obtain critical components on time. These trailers resembled the M5 bomb trailers which the Saginaw company manufactured for the Ordnance Department in that both types featured a special design on which Saginaw Products Corp. held a patent. The special design consisted of two front bogie wheels with electrical brakes and a device that enabled the trailer to cut loose from its tow truck and come to a stop at a specified point. This feature did not always work well. The service trailer, like the service truck, was equipped with beam and hoist, while the handling trailer was designed to carry toxic containers and smoke tanks. The CWS procured over 2,300 of the handling trailers and over 250 of the service trailers.
The service assembled 114 maintenance repair sets for chemical equipment at Edgewood Arsenal between August 1942 and July 1945. These sets consisted essentially of special tools needed for hand-tool repair of flame throwers, collective protectors, air compressors, and portable decontaminating apparatus, as well as gas mask repair tools and test equipment. No single item of field equipment supplied by the CWS proved more useful to the chemical officer in the field than did this set.
Procurement of Chemicals
The CWS was also responsible for procurement in appreciable quantities of 374 chemicals in World War II.3 A few of these, such as toxic agents, decontaminating agents, and napalm, were end items. The others
were components and process chemicals used in the manufacture of chemical warfare items. Although the CWS manufactured certain basic chemicals such as arsenic trichloride, sodium hypochlorite, and chlorine at its own arsenals, it purchased the vast bulk of the basic chemicals from some 600 firms throughout the United States. Since the home offices of most of these companies were in New York City, the OC CWS in November 1941 decided to centralize preliminary negotiations for procurement of chemicals for the incendiary bomb program in that district.4 A year later the entire Chemical Section, Industrial Division, of the chiefs office, was transferred from Washington to New York.5 In the summer of 1944, the Chief, CWS, directed that this section be raised to the status of a division to be known as the Chemical Commodity Division, OC CWS. From that time until the close of the war this division, whose chief was Col. Samuel N. Cummings, supervised the procurement of chemicals at all CWS arsenals and procurement districts.6
While procurement of most chemicals was usually a simple commercial transaction, in the case of some half-dozen real complications arose. This half-dozen included hexachloroethane for smoke mixture, thermite, barium nitrate, barium chromate, magnesium for incendiary bombs, and chlorine.7
Among the basic chemicals, none was considered more important than chlorine, if the extent of CWS planning and the quantity of the item procured are taken as criteria. Although chlorine was used on the battlefield in World War I, the CWS in the postwar years decided against using it as a toxic agent. It was nevertheless an essential component not only of other toxic agents, but also of smoke, protective ointment, bleach, and other decontaminating substances. In the mid-1930s the CWS began to give serious consideration to planning for emergency production of chlorine. The planners in the Office of the Chief made a study of wartime requirements and concluded that it would be necessary to construct an electrolytic caustic plant at Edgewood Arsenal capable of producing 150 net tons of chlorine a day. The CWS believed that its additional war demands
of 550 net tons a day could be met by the chlorine industry through expansion of existing capacity by 40 percent. In the event of an emergency, according to CWS plans, the government would provide funds for expansion of chlorine plants, but the industry was expected to draw up plans for expansion at its own expense. In the fall of 1935 the Chief, CWS, disclosed this idea, in confidence, to the leaders of the chlorine industry. This he did by communicating with the president of the Chlorine Institute in New York City. The Chlorine Institute found its members receptive to the suggestion.8
Among the subcommittees of the Advisory Committee to the Army and Navy Munitions Board was one on alkali-chlorine.9 Set up in the fall of 1939, this subcommittee, whose members were leaders of the industry, continued throughout the war to assist the government in meeting demands for alkali and chlorine products. The subcommittee met periodically in New York City. In attendance was a CWS officer, Col. Harry A. Kuhn. Kuhn was responsible for gathering statistics on production from the manufacturers and passing these on, together with estimates of government requirements, to the Chemical Advisory Committee. From 16 December 1941 to the end of the war a U.S. Naval officer also attended meetings of the Alkali-Chlorine Subcommittee.10
The emergency period witnessed a steadily increasing demand for chlorine. With the inauguration of its procurement program in the summer of 1940, the CWS circulated bids for the delivery of some 3,780 net tons to Edgewood Arsenal to be used in the manufacture of toxic agents. In 1941 the demand continued to rise, especially after passage of the Lend-Lease Act. On 19 March the Office of Production Management put chlorine on the priority critical list, and there it remained throughout the war. By July about 30 percent of the country’s chlorine was being channeled into war uses.11
In the prewar period the CWS had to depend entirely on industry for chlorine. This arrangement was not satisfactory for there were delays in
transporting the chemical. In January 1942, therefore, the War Production Board advised the Chemical Warfare Service to obtain chlorine from its own facilities.12 The CWS, as indicated, had made plans in the peacetime period for construction of a chlorine plant at Edgewood Arsenal capable of producing 150 tons a day. When construction of Huntsville Arsenal was undertaken in the summer of 1941, these plans were modified to provide for a 100 ton a day plant at Huntsville and a 50 ton a day plant at Edgewood. Later a 50 ton plant was built at Pine Bluff and a 100 ton plant at Rocky Mountain Arsenal. These plants were thus capable of turning out 300 tons of chlorine a day, but because gas warfare did not materialize they were not all run to full capacity. Total production at the CWS arsenals ran to something less than 370,000,000 pounds.13 In addition to this chlorine, which was used principally in the manufacture of toxic agents, the CWS bought over 64,000,000 pounds through the procurement districts, for use chiefly in the manufacture of decontaminating agents and for CC-2 manufactured at the Niagara Falls plant.14 Some other CC-2 plants produced their own chlorine.15 Wartime consumption of chlorine, military and civilian, exceeded the estimates of both the peacetime planners and of the chlorine industry. From a total of 696,472 tons in 1940, production in private industry jumped to a yearly wartime peak of 1,343,956 tons in 1944.16
By the fall of 1943 the CWS had accumulated a surplus of chlorine while the civilian demands for the chemical and for its by-product, caustic soda, were not being filled. Under an arrangement agreed upon by the War Production Board, the Army Service Forces, and the Chemical Warfare Service, CWS arsenals sold excess chlorine and caustic soda to private industry.17
Estimating Requirements in Wartime
A significant feature of the CWS procurement program in World War II was the inclusion of several important end items not planned for in the pre-
war years. As late as the fall of 1941, CWS requirements under the Victory Program made no mention of 4.2-inch mortars, 4.2-inch mortar shells, or flame throwers. It listed other gas warfare items, both offensive and defensive, and certain types of incendiaries, and estimated, sometimes with astounding accuracy, the quantities of such material that would be needed during the war.18 The Victory Program, in a word, did an excellent job of estimating CWS requirements in terms of the CWS mission as it was then envisioned, but it did not (and could not) take into account ramifications of the CWS mission as it developed in 1942.19
The Office of the Chief, CWS, estimated requirements for chemical warfare items, other than ammunition and toxics, on the basis of the planned size and composition of the Army. The size of the Army was projected by totals of types of organizations and units and by totals of individuals. Each arm and service evolved tables of organization and equipment for the units under its jurisdiction. Each technical service, including the CWS, then worked out tables of basic allowances for each type of organization and unit, specifying the material the service would furnish the organization or unit as a whole and the individuals within the unit. The total material to be provided under tables of basic allowances therefore comprised the initial issue requirement for items provided by the service. Early in the war factors for resupply, maintenance, and distribution were assigned rather haphazardly. The total of the items required under these factors plus the initial issue requirement equaled the first procurement objective of the service. Ammunition requirements were computed on the basis of the unit of fire per weapon. Units of fire were determined by the War Department General Staff, in cooperation with the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces, on the basis of the firing potential of each weapon as adjusted by contemplated usage of weapon in operation. The unit of fire method of determining requirements was only as good as the estimate of operational usage, which proved a poor basis for computation prior to the availability of experience data. Toxic requirements during World War II were determined by the United States Chemical Warfare Committee.20
All chemical warfare requirements were subject to review by the War Department General Staff (G-4), and later by Headquarters, ASF, before
being passed on to the Munitions Assignments Board and other agencies of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the summer of 1941 when the computation of requirements was beginning to assume the proportions of a major activity, the Chief, CWS, established a separate Planning Division in his office to perform this function.
In November 1941 Brig. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, War Department General Staff This appointment was to have a marked effect on the development of requirements procedures as well as on all procurement and supply activities in the Army. The new G-4 soon came to learn that civilian agencies responsible for determining the production capabilities of the nation for war, such as the Office of Production Management (OPM), were critical of the Army’s estimates of requirements. Somervell came to the conclusion that what the Army needed was a single comprehensive report reflecting military needs and the ability to fill such needs. Such a report was devised in early 1942 in the form of the Army Supply Program, which listed estimated requirements for two and sometimes three years ahead. This directive, issued periodically and in several parts, was the overall Army directive for procurement and supply during the first two years and more of the war.
When General Somervell was appointed commanding general of the Army Service Forces in March 1942 he took most of his G-4 organization with him. From that time until the end of the war the CWS, as a technical service of the Army, usually reported directly to ASF headquarters on procurement and supply activities.21
The day war was declared on Japan the Planning Division, OC CWS, was combined with the Fiscal Division.22 Computing requirements was apparently considered so closely related to fiscal matters that both activities were put under the jurisdiction of a single agency, the new Fiscal and Planning Division. Whatever the seeming justification, there were serious drawbacks to the arrangement. This the War Department came to realize, and in August 1942 it directed that fiscal officers confine their activities strictly to fiscal and budgetary matters.23
Actually the estimating of supply requirements was more closely related to the drawing up of operational plans than to fiscal matters. The
decision of the chiefs office to set up a Field Requirements Branch in the Operations Division in the fall of 1942 was therefore sound. As part of the reorganization of General Porter’s Office in May 1943 the Field Requirements Branch was raised to the status of a division under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Field Operations, General Waitt.24 It had final responsibility for chemical warfare requirements until the end of the war. While the Field Requirements Division had ultimate responsibility for chemical warfare requirements for the ground forces, two other elements of the chiefs office, the Supply Division and the Control Division, worked on the computation of those requirements. The Supply Di vision needed requirements data in order to carry out its mission of storing and issuing materiel, while the Control Division had the responsibility of correlating all statistical data transmitted from the OC CWS to higher echelons. With the inauguration of the supply control system throughout the ASF in March 1944, the CWS set up a Materiel Planning Branch and a Requirements Planning Committee to work on requirements.25
Three factors had to be considered in calculating supply requirements during the first two years of the war—initial equipment, maintenance, and building up a reserve of material. Special difficulty arose in calculating maintenance and reserve factors because there was no field experience on which to base estimates, which were at times nothing more than educated guesses. The problem was not confined to the CWS but was general throughout the Army, and occupied the attention of ASF headquarters throughout most of 1943.
The CWS confined itself to estimating requirements for the ground forces, leaving the task of estimating Air Forces chemical warfare requirements to the Air Corps and later to Headquarters, AAF. The AAF requirements for chemical warfare items, particularly incendiary bombs, were high. Among the duties of the Air Chemical Officer was that of assisting the AAF in estimating their chemical warfare requirements. Shortly after the outbreak of war, Lt. Col. Thomas A. Doxey, Jr., CWS, was appointed to this post. Late in 1943 Colonel Doxey was succeeded by Col. Edward Montgomery.
The factors that were considered in estimating the chemical warfare requirements of the AAF were the number of planes to be operated, the sortie rate, the bomb load per sortie, and the types of bombs to be used.
As experience data became available, statistics on actual expenditure, on theater levels of supply, and on transit time were utilized.26
In arriving at chemical warfare requirements the Office of the Air Chemical Officer worked closely with the Requirements Division of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Operations Commitments and Requirements, which correlated all AAF requirements. Once the requirements were computed they were included in the Army Supply Program. Administratively the Office of the Air Chemical Officer was under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff for Materiel, Maintenance and Distribution, after that office was established in March 1943.27 It devolved upon the Air Chemical Officer not only to estimate chemical warfare requirements, but to check closely with the CWS to see that the requirements were translated into actuality, for the CWS procured all AAF chemical warfare items. In accomplishing its mission the Office of the Air Chemical Officer, as a representative of and speaking for the Commanding General, AAF, dealt directly with OC CWS. On matters of policy or command the Air Chemical Officer conducted correspondence through the Commanding General, ASF.
Facilities Expansion in Wartime
The chief impediments to full production in 1942 and the early part of 1943 were shortages of facilities, shortages of manpower, difficulty in obtaining suitable contractors to handle the ever expanding volume of procurement, technical problems inherent in the initial manufacture of noncommercial items, shortages of raw material, and imbalances in the supply of materials and components. There was also a need for certain refinements in organization and administrative procedures in the CWS and among higher echelons of the government. In some instances, as indicated above, the problems had already risen in the prewar period, and merely became more complicated after entrance of the United States into the war.
Of more immediate concern than estimating requirements was providing facilities for the manufacture of materiel. The construction program
which got under way in the emergency period was greatly accelerated after the outbreak of war. At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, none of the manufacturing plants at the new arsenals was completed and Edgewood was still the sole source of all types of chemical agents.
The years 1942-43 saw the number of CWS facilities increased several times over. In addition to the erection of most of the plants at Huntsville and Pine Bluff, a third new CWS arsenal, Rocky Mountain, was built outside Denver. Here the government acquired some 20,000 acres of land, the southern boundary of which was adjacent to the city limits of Denver. The choice of this site was a happy one. Considered relatively immune from attack by air, it was near the main lines of the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy and the Union Pacific Railroads, and to main highways. The climate was favorable and there was an adequate supply of electric power furnished by the Public Service Company of Colorado. Irrigation water from the Platte River was available for industrial purposes, but potable water had to be brought in by laying about ten miles of piping to connect with the Denver water system.28
In the construction of this last CWS arsenal, of which Lt. Col. Marshall Stubbs was named first commanding officer on 2 June 1942, the CWS benefited from its experience in planning and building the earlier arsenals. In mid-June Colonel Ungethuem, who had supervised the new construction at Edgewood and later at Huntsville, was transferred to Rocky Mountain to lend assistance. The War Department awarded prime contracts to Kershaw, Swinerton, and Walberg of San Francisco and Birmingham, and H. K. Furgeson Co. of Cleveland to build the arsenal. Contracts as design consultants were awarded to H. K. Furgeson and Du Pont, and architect-engineer contracts to Whitman, Requardt, and Smith of Baltimore, and Kershaw, Heyer, Swinerton, and Walberg of San Francisco and Denver.29
In 1942 construction was also begun on two government-owned and privately operated plants and in 1943 on another five such plants. Besides the construction work done on arsenals and plants, the following major CWS facilities were erected in whole or part in 1942-43: Camp Sibert, Deseret Depot, Dugway Proving Ground, and Camp Detrick. In 1944, when War Department construction had been virtually completed,
additions were made to the arsenals and two more manufacturing plants were built.30
From 1 July 1940 to 31 December 1945 a total of $315,658,264 was spent on construction of CWS facilities.31
“The most critical problem of the whole war program was that of facilities expansion,” said an Industrial College research study of 1947.32 To win the war the munitions capacity of the country had to be increased tremendously and many of the same materials needed for munitions were also needed for facilities. The Executive Order establishing the War Production Board (WPB) placed the solution of the construction problem in the hands of that agency.33 On 9 April 1942 WPB Order L-41 limited construction to facilities contributing to the war effort.34 With the initiation of the Controlled Materials Plan (CMP) in November 1942 the following critical items were strictly rationed by the WPB: carbon and alloy steels, high octane gasoline, copper, aluminum, and nickel.35 That this rationing had an adverse effect on the CWS construction and production program is evidenced by a complaint registered by the Chief, CWS, with the Commanding General, ASF, on 31 December 1942.36
While the complaint of the Chief, CWS, is understandable, for the War Department was obviously not giving priority to chemical warfare items, there was sound reasoning behind the War Department’s action. Seven months after the date of the CWS complaint, the Director of Production Division, ASF, Brig. Gen. H. C. Minton, observed that it was War Department policy to operate many CWS projects at low rates and to maintain a large number of CWS facilities in standby. This policy, Minton said, was based on the character of chemical warfare to date. “Operations now and in the past,” he stated, “have been only for the purpose of
building up our base supply of materials for chemical warfare and the plant capacity must be maintained in token operation with trained crews ready to start full production at a moment’s notice, should the enemy elect the use of chemicals. These plants are insurance against changes in warfare tactics.”37
To administer expanding construction functions, the Chief, CWS, in May 1942 directed that a Construction Division be activated in the Industrial Service of his headquarters. This division, whose chief was Col. Lester W. Hurd, was charged with collecting data on construction and maintaining liaison with the Office of the Under Secretary of War, the General Staff, Headquarters, ASF, and the Corps of Engineers. As of 1 May 1942 the organization chart of the division listed its strength as ten officers and fifty-two civilians. In August 1942 the division was renamed a branch of the Industrial Division and because the Corps of Engineers maintained that construction of facilities was its function the name was changed to Facilities and Engineering Branch and later to Facilities and Requirements Branch.38
Materiel Shortages and Imbalances
The shortage of raw materials which arose in the emergency period became even more acute once war was declared. Until the end of 1942 the chief need for such materials was for construction facilities. From then until the close of hostilities the principal demand for raw materials was for production of munitions, which started to mount sharply once war was declared. Typical shortages in the CWS were steel for decontaminating apparatus, nickel-chrome steel for elevating screws for 4.2-inch mortars, Monel metal and stainless steel for valves for one-ton containers, and raw chemicals for protective ointment and smoke mixtures.39
The problem of shortages was complicated by the lack of an efficient system of overall administration for the country. The government first established the priorities system to control the flow of materials during the emergency period. Under this system ratings were assigned to end items.
By the fall of 1941 this arrangement was supplemented by one of allocations which aimed at control of materials in the component stage.40 Under the priorities system, the Office of Production Management examined the applications of prospective claimants, and notified producers to ship allotted quantities of critical items to those contractors whose applications were approved.
To supervise its priority and allocation activities, the CWS set up a separate section in the Procurement Planning Division, OC CWS, early in 1941.41 This section had responsibility for estimating the amounts of critical materials needed and recommending priorities to be assigned to end items. The Chief, CWS, submitted these recommendations to the Army and Navy Munitions Board for assignment of certification of priorities. They were then passed on to the Office of Production Management for final approval.
With the great increase in the volume of contracts after the outbreak of war came a corresponding rise in priority and allocation activities. In the OC CWS the priorities unit was raised to the status of a branch—the Priorities and Allocation Branch—which remained one of the largest administrative units in the OC CWS during 1942 and early 1943.42 For each contract entered into by the CWS, this branch drew up a schedule of every pound of critical material needed.
Notwithstanding that much time and effort were put into the compilation of these schedules the information did not always reflect the true situation. The reason was that the manufacturers made the same item in different ways (even though they used identical specifications). Consequently, some manufacturers consumed a much greater quantity of critical material than others. In view of the serious problem of scarcities, it was essential that the situation be corrected.
The solution adopted by the chiefs office was to have bills of material drawn up which listed component parts of every item as well as the
exact time and quantity of critical material going into each item. General Porter decided to use recent graduates of the CWS Officer Candidate School on this project and other officers were borrowed from the procurement districts. In the summer of 1942 about 300 of these young officers were housed in a hotel owned by the Bata Shoe Co. near Edgewood, Md., where for six weeks, seven days a week, they worked hour after hour drawing up bills of material. As of 1 November a temporary freeze was imposed on drawings and specifications because the bills were subject to continual changes from waivers and changes in specifications. The freeze was lifted upon completion of an initial bill of material.43
The compilation of up-to-date bills of material was one of the most significant procurement developments of the war, for these bills enabled the service to determine the precise quantity of raw materials needed and where and how it was being used. The CWS could refer to them to iron out discrepancies between its figures and those submitted by contractors. The bills also aided in forecasting production more accurately since gross critical materials requirements could be exactly computed for scheduled delivery; they furnished data later required by the War Production Board and the Army Service Forces under the Controlled Materials Plan.
Defects inherent in the overall system of government priorities led to the inauguration of the CMP in late 1942.44 The CMP provided for an allocation of critical materials to each service according to the national supply and according to the relative needs of that service. Under the CMP, priorities were no longer assigned to end items but to the critical materials. Since steel, copper, and aluminum were the most critical, these materials were the first to be included in the CMP. Later, other items such as rubber were added.
The Controlled Materials Plan was a far more orderly and equitable system than any that had preceded it. In the CWS the system worked extremely well, partly because the list of chemical warfare items was smaller than that of the other technical services, and partly because the CWS had already compiled accurate bills of materials. The CMP enabled
the service to delegate priority and allocation responsibilities to its installations, with staff responsibility being retained in the chief’s office. Unfortunately the system was inaugurated after the construction program had passed its peak and after the procurement of certain items was well advanced. But this was perhaps inevitable. The CMP was a system that grew out of the trials and errors of several years of procurement experiences and it is difficult to see how it could have been drawn up beforehand.
The Search for Suitable Contractors
The procurement of items through private contract, initiated in the CWS with the awarding of the first educational order contract in 1939, continued in 1940 and 1941 financed by appropriations in support of the Munitions Program of 1940. All educational order contracts and many of the other contracts were written in the Office of the Chief, CWS. Relatively few contracts of any kind were written in the district offices before December 1941 because the chief’s office, as already indicated, had to approve all contracts exceeding $10,000. Actual entrance into war led to the immediate need for eliminating such a highly centralized procedure. Nine days after war was declared Under Secretary Patterson urged the chiefs of the technical services to expedite and decentralize war procurement. He directed them to award contracts without advertising and specified that only contracts in excess of five million dollars need be submitted to his office for approval.45 On the very next day, 18 December, the First War Powers Act, vesting broad procurement powers in the Secretary of War, became law. One feature of this act was the decentralization of procurement activities to field offices;46 another was the authorization of contracts through negotiation.
In pursuance of the First War Powers Act and of Executive Order 9001, 27 December 1941, which President Roosevelt issued to implement
the act, and in conformity with directives from the Under Secretary of War, the Chief, CWS, decentralized procurement activities to the field installations under his command in January and March 1942.47 From then until the close of the hostilities CWS procured the bulk of its materiel through private contracts. The CWS arsenals and plants generally confined their activities to manufacturing chemical agents and to chemical warfare munitions which were difficult to obtain through private contract.
The hardships which the Chemical Warfare Service began to experience in obtaining suitable contractors in the emergency period became much more pronounced after the declaration of war. Since the Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1939 had not been put into operation, the CWS, as indicated, in some instances had lost allocated contractors to other elements of the armed forces, particularly the Ordnance Department and the Navy. This state of affairs continued into, the war period. Only for the gas mask and raw chemicals did the CWS experience little difficulty in obtaining contractors with the necessary experience and equipment. Thanks to the educational order contracts on the mask, excellent contractors with well-equipped plants were already in production and were willing and able to proceed with other gas mask contracts. In the case of raw chemicals, a sizable number of well-established houses were available for government work. On all other items, CWS usually placed contracts with establishments that had not been allocated to it under the Industrial Mobilization Plan. In almost all instances these establishments were small operators who had to convert their plants in order to manufacture the items.
While the CWS was not in the most favorable position with regard to prospective contractors, the difficulties can be exaggerated. It is true that many of the contractors were small businessmen, but most CWS contracts were for components which small contractors were well able to handle. It is also true that the contractors had to convert their plants, but this would have been the case even with larger contractors since 95 percent of all CWS items were noncommercial.48 Actually there was seldom any dearth of bidders for CWS contracts and generally when the contractors had gained experience they did an excellent job. A more serious problem than securing contractors and converting plants was the lack of
proper specifications for the contractors. As already indicated, the CWS drew up specifications during the peacetime period, but in some instances these were of little value when the items had to be produced under assembly line procedures. Moreover, time did not permit the development of complete specifications on the important items for which the CWS was given definite procurement responsibility in the emergency period—the 4.2-inch mortar and shell, the incendiary bomb, and the flame thrower. These and other items the CWS, and in some cases the contractors, continued to develop after the service had awarded production contracts on the items. Since much of the materiel produced under the early contracts soon became obsolete, much time and money were lost. It would have been to the advantage of the government, from the standpoint of both economy and preparedness, if in the 1930s the CWS had been allowed to expend on the development and engineering of munitions a fraction of the funds that were allocated after Pearl Harbor.
The Chemical Warfare Service had already been placing contracts with small business firms over a period of months when the Small Business Act was passed in June 1942.49 To administer that act the ASF set up a Small War Plants Branch in its purchases division, and shortly thereafter the technical services appointed liaison officers in their headquarters and field installations. These officers were in constant touch with the representatives of the Smaller War Plants Corp. (SWPC) which was set up under the act.50
The CWS soon acquired something of a reputation in the War Department for awarding contracts to smaller war plants and for assisting the small fellow generally.51 When General Somervell’s office conducted surveys in New York and Cincinnati in 1942, for instance, it found that the CWS through its New York district office would call in manufacturers to help delinquent contractors straighten out their difficulties.52 In the fall of 1942 a witness before the Small Business Committee of the United States
Senate stated that the only government agency in New York in which there was any “real cooperation” and “any degree of efficiency” so far as procurement work was concerned was the CWS. “The manufacturer,” the witness stated, “may go to the Office of Chemical Warfare, bring his brochure, his financial statement, a line of his material and equipment, and within a short time an engineer will go out from Chemical Warfare to inspect the plant, to determine whether or not it is available for present war work or can be converted into war work.”53
The award of numerous contracts to smaller businesses was not without its drawbacks. Most small contractors lacked facilities for volume production of standard or specialized parts and had to let subcontracts to smaller firms for such parts. Again, while the small prime contractors were often purchasers of standard commercial raw materials, the volume of their business did not warrant maintaining skilled purchasing departments capable of contracting for made-to-order components on the scale called for under war contracts. Moreover, government inspection methods were almost completely foreign to the commercial experience of the smaller companies. All these factors complicated the job of the CWS procurement officer, who had to provide administrative, technical, and engineering assistance to a number of contractors who could not afford to hire men trained in these various fields. The CWS procurement officers, both in the chief’s office and the installations, were generally Reserve officers with engineering education and some experience in industry. Without the assistance of these men the service could not have carried out its procurement mission.
Particularly burdensome, from the point of view of administration, was the practice of awarding numerous contracts for components to small war plants. This practice entailed a tremendous amount of administrative work both in the chief’s office and in the procurement districts. Although the system worked fairly well during the first year of the war, by the spring of 1943 a definite change was indicated, for by then` General Somervell’s office was emphasizing controls of all sorts, including control of manpower and control of production. The matter came up for serious discussion in the conference of CWS procurement officers in March 1943.54 By
the fall of 1943 the CWS had worked out a new system of procurement which emphasized end-item buying rather than component buying. Contracting officers were urged to make end-item contractors responsible for the procurement of their own components. The end-item contracting system was not immediately successful in all cases since some contractors were reluctant to undertake responsibility for subcontracts or were unable to find subcontractors.55 But despite its defects, end-item buying was one of the most important administrative developments in the CWS during World War II.
Inspection of Matériel
After the outbreak of hostilities the number of inspectors rapidly increased. They were needed not only in the existing installations but also in those newly activated—Pine Bluff, Huntsville, and Rocky Mountain Arsenals, and Atlanta and Dallas Procurement Districts. By the close of 1942 the CWS reached its peak wartime figure of 6,398 inspectors. From then until the end of the war the number dropped sharply—less than 3,000 in December 1943 and less than 2,500 in May 1945.56
The training and experience requirements of CWS inspectors varied with the type of positions they had to fill. Those in key posts had to have technical training and were expected to have a college degree or its equivalent, particularly if they were engaged in inspecting chemicals. Line inspectors were required to have a high school education, be intelligent, and be willing to learn. As the war went on, women were hired in great numbers as line inspectors. In general their performance was equal to that of the men and many women were advanced to supervisory positions, even to that of chief inspector. However, it was difficult to find women with the necessary formal education and practical experience required for key positions, and these were generally filled by men.
The chief reason for the great number of inspectors in 1942 was the prevailing practice of inspecting end items and components on a 100 percent basis. Despite this practice inferior chemical warfare munitions were being sent to installations in the zone of interior and to the theaters.57
The Chief, CWS, felt that before any real improvement in inspection procedures could be effected, some changes would have to be made in the organization of his office and the installations. Until May 1943 the Inspection Branch of the chiefs office was an element of the Industrial Division. The inspection units at the installations reported to the division’s commanding officers, whose chief objective in accordance with War Department policy in 1942 and early 1943 was to procure more and more of everything with the greatest possible speed. To solve the problem of inferior inspection the Chief, CWS, in the reorganization of his office on 27 May 1943, made the inspection unit independent of the procurement unit by putting the Inspection Division on the same echelon as the Industrial Division.58 At the same time he directed that the inspection units at the installations be put under the direct jurisdiction of the Inspection Division, OC CWS. While commanding officers of some installations later questioned the wisdom of this action, none ever expressed doubt that from May 1943 until the end of the war a great improvement took place in the quality of CWS items.59
The CWS’s first step to improve inspection procedures after the 27 May 1943 reorganization was the elimination of inspection of components. On 4 August 1943 the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Materiel, announced that henceforth all contracts would contain a clause to the effect that the contractor would be responsible for such inspection.60 After this policy was announced a number of former CWS inspectors were hired by the contractors to carry out the same work they had done for the government.
A second step toward improved administration of inspection was the inauguration of the practice of accepting chemical components on the basis of notarized certificates of analysis submitted by the contractor. Under this procedure the duties of the CWS inspector were confined to making spot checks of the material.61
A third move in the direction of improved inspection was the introduction of a system of statistical quality control. As early as the fall of 1942 the CWS became interested in this type of inspection as carried out by such industrial concerns as the General Electric Co. and the American
Telephone and Telegraph Co. The system was mathematical in nature, embodying the sample inspection of a fixed number of items from each lot produced. The number of items selected from a lot was based on records of past performance. Little headway was made in the CWS with statistical quality control until Headquarters, ASF, directed the service to draw up and adopt tables based on the “laws of probability reconciled with results of actual experience.”62 From the fall of 1943 until the close of the war the CWS inaugurated the system on a gradual basis. Although the project involved considerable planning and retraining of personnel, the results obtained more than justified the time and effort expended. By properly applying the principles of quality control, Inspection Division, OC CWS, was able to greatly improve inspection and at the same time reduce the number of inspectors. To take but a single example, after the Quality Control System was established the number of inspectors on the M50 bomb program was reduced from 66 to 35.63
Another significant administrative innovation was the centralization of the control of waivers. A waiver, as the term implied, dispensed with a particular requirement of a drawing or specification. It permitted a variation in the standard of quality, but not to the extent of causing a deterioration in the product. Waivers were intended to apply only to a minimum quantity over a particular period of time. Their issuance was a perfectly legitimate procedure so long as the practice was not abused. But unfortunately the practice was abused, and it became necessary for the Inspection Division, OC CWS, to revise procedures on issuance of waivers. In June 1943 the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Materiel, issued a directive that districts and arsenals could grant waivers only with the concurrence of the Chief, Inspection Division, OC CWS. The Inspection Division was to use its discretion in obtaining the concurrence of the Technical Division. In all instances the Chief, Inspection Division, was to notify the Industrial Liaison Branch, which would in turn notify the installation.64
Other important measures taken to improve inspection were the use of standardized gauges throughout the CWS, standardization of procedures for operating CWS inspection laboratories, an adequate system of surveillance, and the compilation of an inventory of items in CWS depots.
In 1943 the Specification and Inspection Branch, ASF, contracted with the Trundle Engineering Co. of Cleveland to survey inspection practices in the technical services. The report of this survey, which was turned over to the Director of Production, ASF, on 2 July 1943, indicated that the CWS was outstanding among the technical services with regard to inspection organization and procedures.65 One of the most significant results of the Trundle survey was the formulation by the War Department of general inspection policies, which were eventually published in ASF Inspection Manual M608, in March 1944. This manual was to be implemented by inspection manuals in the technical services, with CWS Inspection Manual M608 not published until 1 September 1944.
Inspection manuals were extremely useful in keeping the inspectors informed on government policies and procedures, but they were not intended to serve as guides for individual inspectors working on specific items. For that purpose the Inspection Division, OC CWS, prepared individual standard inspection procedures. A standard inspection procedure described the item, specified the parts to be inspected and the tools or instruments needed to accomplish the inspection, and finally, indicated where pertinent how the item would be proof tested, inspected for surveillance, and packaged.
Inspection in the CWS improved so markedly after the independent Inspection Division was set up in the chief’s office in May 1943, that the action stands out as one of the wisest organizational moves of the wartime period in the CWS. Not only did the quality of inspection improve; the attitude of the inspectors took a marked turn for the better. For, once they were removed from the control of those who at OC CWS level were responsible for meeting production schedules, the inspectors carried out their duties in a more effective manner.
The Pricing Program
The Second War Powers Act, supplemented by Presidential order, authorized certain government agencies, including the War Department, to inspect and audit the books of war contractors and subcontractors.66 The War Department established administrative units for securing voluntary adjustments or refunds whenever prices, costs, or profits were considered
excessive. In the CWS, for example, a Price Adjustment Section was activated in the Legal Branch on 8 August 1942.67 Later a Cost Analysis Branch was set up in the Fiscal Division to collect data on costs and profits on War Department contracts.68 Close liaison was maintained between the fiscal and legal officers on all matters pertaining to costs.69
The enactment of renegotiation legislation in 1942 and 1943 led to greater emphasis on pricing analysis in the War Department.70 In one of the Procurement Regulations which the War Department began to issue in the spring of 1943 provision was made for a revision of pricing organization and procedures.71 In conformity with this regulation, Headquarters, ASF, established a Purchases Division and the technical services activated similar units at their headquarters.72 In the CWS the unit was known as the Purchase Policies Branch.73 Throughout the war it was headed by Lt. Col. Robert M. Estes. In September 1943 the branch was transferred from the Washington headquarters to the Baltimore suboffice of the Chief, CWS, where it remained for the duration of the war.
The chief of the new Purchase Policies Branch faced the problem of attempting to carry out the provisions of an act that was not popular either with the contractors or with CWS contracting officers. Each group felt that price analysis tended to interfere with production, their principal mission. If the law was to be carried out in letter and in spirit, this prejudice against pricing activities had to be overcome.
Lt. Col. Robert M. Estes
The first step which the Purchase Policies Branch took was to secure the cooperation and obtain the support of the procurement district staff. A survey of the districts conducted by the branch in the fall of 1943 revealed an almost total lack of interest and initiative with regard to pricing functions.74 To rectify this situation General Ditto, Assistant Chief, CWS, for Materiel, wrote a letter in December 1943 to the commanding officers of the districts in which he emphasized that price analysis was primarily a district function.75 From then until the close of the war the procurement districts were more active in conducting pricing operations. The Purchase Policies Branch, OC CWS, continued to act in a staff capacity on all pricing matters.
The cooperation of the district officials was secured not alone by directive from the chief’s office, but also through demonstration of the practical utility of pricing studies. One of the principal means of convincing contracting officers of the value of such studies was the dissemination of comparative price and cost data throughout all CWS procurement installations. From January 1944 on, the Purchase Policies Branch distributed copies of the price reports covering the most important (from the standpoint of cost) chemical warfare items of procurement on a weekly basis. Each installation was thus advised of every change in the unit price or cost of important CW items. Price analysts in the districts compiled the data on index cards for ready reference. Another method whereby increased interest in pricing was fostered was through conferences of all CWS purchase policy personnel.
Opposition on the part of contractors was considerably mollified by the threat of prolonged renegotiation of their contracts. For while a great
many contractors disliked the inconvenience caused by price and cost analysis, they thoroughly detested renegotiation, which they conceived of as both un-American and unconstitutional.76 During 1943 a number of businessmen testified in Congressional hearings before four separate committees that in their opinion government contracting officers should have sufficient information to draw up contracts which guaranteed that no excess profits would be made and thus do away with the need for renegotiation. After this testimony, the President ruled that by June 1944 the need for renegotiation of contracts should have been eliminated. The War Department thereupon put considerable pressure on the technical services to improve their knowledge and handling of all aspects of purchase policies. The June 1944 deadline was not met and renegotiation activities were still being carried on when the war ended. This deadline, however, plus the continued uncertainty over whether Congress would continue renegotiation legislation, acted as incentives to sound pricing policies in the CWS.77
In the spring of 1944 the Purchase Policies Branch brought about a significant improvement in price analysis techniques by adding to its staff a qualified industrial engineer and an accountant experienced in production cost procedures. The branch required the services of the engineer to evaluate different drawings and specifications and to act in an advisory capacity to the accountant and other pricing personnel.78 In July 1945 the Chief, Industrial Division, OC CWS, recommended that the services of industrial engineers be utilized also in pricing operations in the districts, but the war came to an end before this suggestion was acted on.79
The fact that very few chemical warfare items were manufactured in peacetime made it generally impossible to establish equitable prices at the start of the war. In the emergency and early wartime period, the CWS wrote contracts for most items without too much regard to price. Assistant Secretary Patterson himself urged the chiefs of the technical services not to be too concerned about prices, but rather to see that the supplies for the troops were delivered on time. Excess profits, he said, could be recaptured through legislation.80
The only major item on which the CWS had cost and price data was the gas mask because that was the one item which continued to be manufactured in considerable quantity after World War I. Experience gained under the educational order contracts was especially productive of valuable data on the cost of the mask. The Purchase Policies Branch had little trouble, therefore, compiling charts depicting the discrepancies in prices charged by the various contracts. By simply calling the attention of the contractors to these charts it was sometimes possible to secure a reduction in prices. The price level of the gas mask declined over 9 percent between January 1942 and June 1945.81
Contractors on other CW items, lacking as they were in experience, often quoted prices which were later considered exorbitant. It was almost inevitable that the initial cost of production would be high, because the manufacturer first had to learn how to produce the item. After he mastered that, he learned how to make it more economically. In most instances the manufacturers gave the government the benefit of their ability to produce at lower cost by voluntarily reducing their prices. Those who cooperated with the government received preferential treatment under the Renegotiation Act.82 Those who did not were thoroughly checked not only by the War Department but by the General Accounting Office. As of February 1945 the CWS was investigating some twenty companies whose profits exceeded 15 percent or whose profits in renegotiation had been cut by 25 percent.83
Pricing operations, as noted, were always simplified when a number of contractors worked on the same item. As in the case of the mask, it was possible to make comparisons between the prices charged by the various manufacturers and on that basis to attempt price adjustments. Practically all items manufactured by the CWS followed the competitive pattern. Although originally a single manufacturer might have been awarded a contract, eventually several competing firms were also given contracts and the prices of all were subject to study. In the case of the portable flame
thrower, for example, the Kincaid Manufacturing Co. of New York City early in 1941 was assigned the job of developing a flame thrower. By the time this contract was completed the E. C. Brown Co. of Rochester, N.Y., was called on to manufacture the item. Later two other companies, the Beattie Manufacturing Co. of Little Falls, N.J., and R. F. Sedgley, Inc., of Philadelphia were also awarded similar contracts. A comparison of the prices charged by these contractors enabled the CWS to effect reductions. These price reductions amounted to over 27 percent for the period of the war.84
While most CW items were manufactured by a number of contractors, there were occasional exceptions. For example, the barrel of the M1A1 and the later M2 chemical mortar was made exclusively by the Bell Machine Co. of Oshkosh, Wis., which also assembled the mortar. It was not possible, therefore, for the CWS Purchase Policies staff to make comparative studies of prices and costs of this item. On its own initiative the Bell Machine Co. reduced prices and made large refunds to the government in the period 1942-45. Acknowledging that the attitude of the contractor was commendable, the chief of the Purchase Policies Branch felt that completely accurate cost data could not be obtained unless the company installed an adequate cost accounting system. The company readily accepted this suggestion and it further agreed to cooperate with CWS engineers and accountants who went to its plant in the spring of 1945 to conduct an extensive study of costs. As a result of the CWS study, the Bell Machine Co. voluntarily reduced its prices once more, from $724.30 to $575.00 per unit on one contract and from $649.30 to $575.00 per unit on another.85
CWS experience with pricing chemicals dated from the emergency period, when, as has been indicated, unprecedented demands arose for certain components of the incendiary bomb, including thermite. Thermite was manufactured in relatively small quantities in peacetime, and it sold on the open market for twenty-eight cents a pound. In the fall of 1941 the commanding officer of the New York Procurement District conducted an investigation into the price at which the chemical could be manufactured profitably on a large scale. With the assistance of a chemical broker and two officers with accounting background, he learned that something
in the neighborhood of eight cents a pound would be a reasonable price. He then made arrangements with certain ceramic manufacturers, whose plants were idle because of WPB restrictions, to produce the thermite at eight cents a pound or less.86 This was the start of a campaign carried on throughout the war period to secure chemicals at a reasonable price to the government, a campaign that between January 1942 and May 1945 led to a reduction of 20 percent in the price of chemicals.87 This figure compared favorably to the overall price reduction of 22 percent for all CW items and components from 1 January 1942 through 15 August 1945.88
The activity of the Chemical Commodity Division in effecting a reduction in prices is well illustrated in the case of napalm.89 By the spring of 1944 seven contractors throughout the United States were producing this material at prices which varied as much as ten cents a pound. Upon investigation the Chemical Commodity Division discovered that the low cost producers were invariably those who had installed up-to-date labor saving equipment. The division representatives thereupon made arrangements to have such equipment adopted by other manufacturers, This action resulted in a general leveling off in the prices of the various manufacturers.90
Some of the problems the service and its contractors faced were common to all military procurement. These included the shortage of raw materials and machine tools, frequent changes in production schedules, and difficulty in obtaining and training competent workers for arsenal and depot operations. But the CWS generally found these problems more complicated because of the low priority which the War Department placed on chemical warfare items and because the CWS lacked experience in the manufacture of every item except the gas mask.
In carrying out its vast and varied procurement program in the early war years, the CWS made notable advances, particularly in compiling up-to-date bills of material and in inaugurating an improved system of inspection and a sound pricing program. Impressive as this record was there was still considerable room for improvement. But before improvement could be made, a drastic change had to be brought about in Army
thinking with regard to supply. A basic defect was the tendency to treat the main facets of supply—procurement and distribution—as separate entities. During the second half of World War II the Army initiated a program aimed at correcting the situation, a program whose main objective was the balancing of procurement and distribution.