Chapter 15: Procurement of Offensive Materiel
Among the offensive munitions which the CWS procured in World War II were incendiaries of various types, 4.2 inch mortars and shells, flame throwers, smoke, and smoke munitions.
Incendiaries
The M54 Thermate Bomb
Even before the Secretary of War officially notified the Chief, CWS, of his responsibility for the- entire incendiary bomb program,1 General Porter was authorized on 28 August 1941 to procure over twenty-five million 4-pound incendiary bombs with magnesium bodies at a cost of something under $50,000,000. On 20 September, after a decision by the General Staff, procurement of fifteen million more bombs was approved, bringing the aggregate to forty million incendiary bombs.2 General Porter took immediate steps to obtain these bombs, assigning direct responsibility to Col. Joachim E. Zanetti whom he appointed chief of a newly activated Incendiaries Branch, Technical Service, OC CWS.3 After surveying a number of industrial facilities the CWS began awarding contracts for the assembly and filling of the bombs as well as for the procurement of metal components.
On the very day that Pearl Harbor was attacked The Adjutant General telephoned General Porter’s office and advised that over sixty-nine
million dollars still available to the Chief of Ordnance from funds originally estimated for the incendiary bomb program would be suballotted to the Chief, CWS. Before another two weeks elapsed contracts for assembling and filling twenty million incendiary bombs had been awarded to thirteen contractors throughout all the various procurement districts.4 Construction of new manufacturing and loading facilities for incendiaries was meanwhile progressing at Pine Bluff and Huntsville Arsenals. Actual requirements for the 4-pound incendiary, as covered by the first supplemental appropriation act, Fiscal Year 1942, totaled over seventy-four million bombs, but since there was no possibility of obtaining magnesium, the steel body thermate bomb (M54) had to be substituted. For this reason the Office of the Under Secretary of War had held the requirements for the time being to twenty million bombs.5
In letting contracts for the M54 bomb the chiefs office directed each procurement district to start negotiations with a minimum of five competent firms for the metal components and subassemblies. Prime contractors were required to subcontract at least 40 percent of the dollar value of their contracts. This provision was aimed at spreading the contracts through certified distressed areas and industries, which still existed in the period of initial war production. The procurement districts awarded these contracts to firms with experience in manufacturing such items as vacuum cleaners, oil filters, and household appliances. While this commercial background was valuable, it was inevitable that problems should arise in the manufacture of new items. The most serious difficulty was fitting the nose and tail to the hexagonal bomb body. The contractors found it hard to obtain the services of qualified tool makers, engineers, and plant inspectors.6
These production and manpower experiences foreshadowed the more pronounced snarls of the later war period both in private industry and in government installations.
The CWS awarded separate contracts for the final assembly and loading of the bomb. The service aimed at confining this type of contract to peacetime manufacturers of fireworks, powder, and explosives. This objective was not always possible, and CWS loading contractors included a wallpaper manufacturer in Chicago and a stove manufacturer on the west coast.
The loading contracts required the government to furnish all items including various fire ingredients such as barium nitrate, grained and flaked aluminum, black powder, and thermite.7 The need for these and other chemicals in manufacturing incendiary bombs led to unprecedented demands on the chemical industry. For example, before the war only about four hundred tons of barium nitrate per year were manufactured in the United States; the incendiary bomb program required over twice that amount each month. Again, the one producer of thermite in the country turned out about fifty tons a month; the CWS needs rose to over two thousand tons per month. To supply the additional chemicals a number of new plants had to be constructed for the manufacture of barium nitrate and grained aluminum. The facilities of the ceramic industry, which were found to be lying idle because of WPB restrictions, were adapted to the manufacture of thermite.8
Immediately after the Pearl Harbor attack, the Under Secretary of War directed the Chief of the Chemical Warfare Service to “take all measures necessary to expedite so far as possible the delivery of incendiary bombs.”9 In January 1942 the OC CWS, after hearing from the War Production Board that magnesium would be available by May or June, notified each of five procurement district offices to arrange for the purchase of components of the M50 bomb.10 The district offices began immediately to negotiate contracts for components and for casting magnesium bomb bodies.
The Magnesium Bomb
Magnesium was one of the most critical of wartime metals. In the emergency period the sole producer of the metal in this country was the Dow Chemical Co., which in 1939 turned out a peak peacetime quantity of 6,700,000 pounds.11 Concern over the need for far greater amounts of magnesium for war needs led to a government loan to the Permanente Metals Corp., organized by Henry J. Kaiser, to build a new plant at Permanente, Calif. in 1941. About the same time the Defense Plant Corp. (DPC) initiated construction of other magnesium plants. By 1943 the DPC had built 13 new plants, which were operated under private contract for the government.12 For three consecutive years in World War II the CWS took more than one third of all the magnesium produced in the United States for the magnesium bomb program.13 Total CWS procurement of the metal from 1942 to 1945 amounted to over 288,000,000 pounds.14 The service wrote contracts with the individual producers for magnesium alloy used in the manufacture of the incendiary munition.15
The magnesium bomb (M50) had a magnesium body and a cast iron nose, the body being molded around the nose. Casting of the bomb body in permanent type molds was a new art which made it possible to produce the bombs in large quantities in a relatively short time, at a reasonable cost, and without undue use of critical raw materials. Neither the Germans nor the Japanese developed the art of casting this type of bomb in molds and throughout the war both nations continued to machine the bomb bodies. American manufacturers at first developed their own individual manufacturing techniques, but eventually, with the cooperation of the CWS,-they set up a steering committee to exchange information.16
Among the very successful CWS contractors on this vital work were the International Silver Co. of Meriden, Conn; L. E. Mason Co. of Hyde Park, Mass.; Dow Chemical Co. of Midland, Mich.; the Permanente
Metals Corp. of Permanente, Calif.; the American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp. of Richmond, Calif; and the Austin Bridge Co. of Dallas, Tex. In May 1942 the first M50s came off the production line in the New York procurement district.17 A problem that arose in the manufacture of the bomb body was its tendency to oxidize or “bloom.” The oxidation was caused by flux left on the body after the casting operation. The flux was a magnesium chloride compound used on the surface of the molten metal to prevent fires. When a worker dipped his ladle into the melting pot he often picked up some of the flux with the magnesium alloy. Although workers were instructed to push away as much of the flux as possible, they could not entirely eliminate it. In order to remove the substance and thus prevent the oxidation of the bomb, the bodies were pickled after casting. The pickling was generally performed by contractors in the pickling business.18 In the fall of 1942 the Dow Chemical Co. conducted a study of “bloomed” bombs and concluded that “blooming” was harmful only when it was so pronounced as to prevent the bombs from being tied in bundles, that a wire brush could be used to good effect to eradicate the “bloom,” and that as a preventative bomb bodies should be filled as soon as possible after casting and packed in airtight shipping cases.19
Another complication in the manufacture of the bomb was the formation of black deposits on the body during casting. It was found that bodies with such deposits would cause fires if rubbed against a metallic substance. By mid-1944 a million and a half of such bombs were segregated and shipped to Pine Bluff Arsenal for storage. A study conducted by representatives of the CWS and the bomb manufacturers disclosed that the deposits were caused by lack of sufficient sulphur dioxide to keep air out of the mold. After considerable experimentation researchers found that the deposit could be prevented to a large degree by regulating the casting temperature, using more sulphur dioxide, cleaning the mold frequently, and taking care to eliminate flux.20
A series of explosions in bomb loading plants plagued the CWS in the spring of 1942. Over a 6-week period in March and April four
explosions occurred which resulted in eight fatalities. The CWS was so concerned that it shut down the loading plants for several weeks pending an investigation and study by representatives of the Ordnance Department, the CWS, and the loading contractors.21
The general causes of the explosion were plain enough. The CWS had taken over a partially developed bomb from the Ordnance Department and under pressure from the War Department had put it into production without adequate lead time. In doing this the CWS did not insist that loading contractors construct explosive proof buildings and use the best safety procedures in filling the bombs. Actually no one knew exactly what the best procedures were, as is indicated by the fact that the War Department had previously classified incendiaries as pyrotechnics instead of explosives. In fact, one of the explosions had occurred at the loading plant at Huntsville Arsenal.22
Although the specific causes of the explosions were not fully resolved, investigators learned enough to realize the need for certain changes. One of these related to the handling of the mix that was loaded into the bombs; the decision was made that it should be handled in small batches-100 to 200 pounds. The second change indicated was the need for better housekeeping to prevent the accumulation of dust, to insure proper ventilation of the building, and to provide for the installation of conductive flooring as a means of preventing static electricity.23
Oil Bombs
After the M69 6-pound oil bomb was successfully tested at Jefferson Proving Ground in July 1942,24 the CWS awarded an experimental
contract for 52,000 of the bombs to the American Machine Defense Corp., New York City. In the fall, after the AAF had indicated heavy requirements for the bomb, the chiefs office directed the procurement districts to award contracts for components and filling of the M69. As in the case of the thermate and magnesium bombs, the contracts were of two general types: (1) those for the bomb casing and its components, and (2) those for loading, assembling, clustering, packing, and marking the bomb. In the manufacture of the bomb casing the most difficult problem encountered was brazing the nose of the bomb body. Specifications called for copper brazing, but since copper brazing equipment was in short supply other metals which melted at lower temperatures were used. For example, a New York district contractor employed brass as a weld while several New England contractors used silver solder.25 The CWS awarded loading, clustering, packing, and marking contracts to firms in the East, the Midwest, and the Far West. The bombs were also loaded under private contract at the CWS Firelands Plant, Marion, Ohio, and Huntsville Arsenal produced over 4,000,000 M69 bombs, which it assembled into more than 111,000 clusters.26
In the summer of 1943 the CWS interrupted the M69 procurement program, terminating all existing contracts. The main reason for this action was dissatisfaction with the quick opening cluster, which had not yet been replaced by the aimable cluster. The design of the bomb itself also needed improvement. Early in 1944 technicians developed and put into production an aimable cluster and in the spring the procurement districts began awarding contracts on an improved M69 bomb. This later phase of the M69 program turned out to be much more satisfactory than the earlier phase. With CWS encouragement the contractors set up an integrating committee, which met at frequent intervals with representatives of the CWS in an effort to solve specific manufacturing problems. These meetings were alternately held at various manufacturing plants, thus enabling the contractors to inspect each other’s facilities.27
In the summer of 1943, meanwhile, the procurement districts began to let contracts for the production of casings for the M74 10-pound oil bomb.
But not until the following summer did this program get actively under way. In the manufacture of this bomb, no less than in the M69, difficulties arose. For example, the copper brazing of the bomb presented a problem. It was essential that all components fit correctly before the brazing operation, which was carried out in special electrical furnaces built by the General Electric Co. The CWS had to furnish the contractors with these furnaces and most of the other equipment used in making the bomb. The most serious problem encountered in the bomb body was the fabrication of the nosecup. This cup, which measured 3½ inches in length by 2¾ inches in diameter, with a wall thickness of 1/8 inch, required 17 different operations. Since ordinary steel dies could not stand the strain, carboloy dies were developed.
As with other small incendiary bombs, the M74 was loaded and clustered not only under private contract, but at certain CWS arsenals as well. Rocky Mountain and Huntsville Arsenals loaded, clustered, and packed this bomb.28 No serious complication arose in filling the M74, but the M142 fuze caused a considerable amount of trouble. The design of this fuze, which was manufactured under private contract at the Ordnance Fire-lands Plant, Marion, Ohio, was such that visual observation did not reveal whether the fuze was armed. After several accidents caused by explosion of the fuze, the CWS changed contractors. The new contractor, the Ferro Enamel Corp., initiated a number of changes to improve safety and handling procedures, which resulted in satisfactory working conditions and a satisfactory fuze.29
Since the M74 bomb was designed to penetrate light structures and to eject its incendiary charge in the most vulnerable interior locations, it was regarded as a prime weapon against Japanese structures. The ASF and the CWS therefore rated the procurement of the M74 bomb among the most urgent wartime programs.30 By the spring of 1945 AAF requirements for the M74 bomb, in anticipation of the invasion of Japan, reached a scale that called for the CWS to multiply its M74 component facilities by five and its loading lines by better than three. At the same time the AAF stepped
up requirements for the M50 to a point where CWS facilities would have to be more than doubled.31 The war ended before this expansion could be carried out.
Large Incendiary Bombs
The Ordnance Department furnished the bomb bodies for the M47 (100-pound) and M76 (500-pound) bombs which the CWS filled in its own facilities.32 Edgewood, Rocky Mountain, and Pine Bluff arsenals filled M47’s, while Edgewood, Huntsville, and the CWS Firelands Plant filled M76’s.33
Large facilities and equipment were needed for filling heavy incendiary bombs. For example, at Pine Bluff a tank farm was set up consisting of eight 20,000-gallon tanks. Four centrifugal pumps were used to pump gasoline from car tanks to these storage tanks to the reactor room. The reactor room, one of the largest buildings at the arsenal, was equipped with four 1,000-gallon reactors to prepare the gel for filling the bombs.34 Plants of this type were set up to perform operations that had no counterpart in industry. It was inevitable that changes in operations would have to be made on the basis of experience.
Napalm35
The manufacture of napalm, the metallic soap used to thicken gasoline to form a fill for incendiary bombs and a fuel for flame throwers,
presented unforeseen problems. Prospective contractors did a great deal of development work at their own expense before any procurement contracts were awarded. The CWS required proof of performance by actually testing samples of the material at Edgewood and at the CWS laboratory in New York City and awarded contracts only to those firms that appeared capable of producing. These contractors included Nuodex Products Co., Elizabeth, N.J.; Imperial Paper and Color Corp., Glens Falls, N.J.; Ferro Enamel Corp. and McGean Chemical Corp., both of Cleveland, Ohio, and California Ink Co. and Oronite Chemical Co., both of San Francisco, Calif. These contractors almost invariably believed that the production of napalm would be a relatively simple matter, much like the manufacture of a commercial soap. In this they were mistaken, as experience soon demonstrated. While the same general processes were employed as in the manufacture of other soaps, napalm had to have standard components and low moisture content in all stages of its manufacture.
One of the item’s chief components, naphthenic acid, was a by-product of the petroleum refining process. Since oil from Venezuela and Aruba was rich in that particular acid, it was essential that the producers obtain the oil from those sources. Frequently they could do this by direct contact with commercial handlers, but often the CWS had to assist in securing a supply. Because naphthenic acid was also used as a paint drier and because many paints, particularly those of the quick drying variety, were war requirements, the War Production Board found it necessary to allocate naphthenic acid.
A second important component of napalm, coconut fatty acid, was obtained by boiling and pressing the kernel of dried coconut known as copra. This product, which was also used in the manufacture of shortenings and commercial soaps, was imported. Since many of the coconut producing regions were in war zones, it became very difficult to obtain copra during the war.
Next to the difficulty of securing consistently pure components, the chief problem that arose in producing napalm was its required low moisture content. If the moisture content of napalm was too high, it would result in an ineffective and short-lived mix. Various measures were employed to overcome this difficulty, such as reducing the exposure time of the soap to the surrounding humid atmosphere to a minimum, adding a dehydrating agent to the gasoline along with the soap, and air-conditioning the rooms in which the soap was exposed. The manufacturers used various methods to dry granular napalm. The United Wall Paper Co., for
example, spread it thinly on wallpaper conveyers and passed it through a heated room. Most contractors placed the powdered napalm on shallow trays which were fitted into mobile racks and then pushed into drying ovens.
In May 1943 the chiefs office appointed an officer from the Industrial Division to follow the napalm program closely and report progress to the Production Division, ASF.36 The CWS laboratories at Edgewood and Columbia University, as well as the NDRC laboratory at Stanford University did considerable research aimed at improving the manufacture of napalm. In addition, government contracts along this line were awarded to such firms as Eastman Kodak Co., Ferro Drier and Chemical Co., Harshaw Chemical Co., Shell Development Co., and Standard Oil Development Co. Despite all these efforts the quality of the napalm continued to vary considerably and mixing problems beset the CWS and the using units throughout the war.37
Procurement of the 4.2-Inch Mortar38
In directing that two battalions of troops be supplied with 4.2-inch mortars, the Chief of Staff in September 1941 revoked an earlier directive of 19 July 1938 which had suspended the manufacture of the mortar.39 The decision to supply two battalions presented the Chief, CWS, with an immediate problem of procurement. General Porter’s office turned to the Chicago procurement district office, because the 4.2-inch mortar had been allocated to the Crane Co. of Chicago under the prewar procurement plan. But by the fall of 1941 that company was working on other war contracts with higher priority and could not undertake the manufacture of the mortar. The Chicago district office therefore secured bids from five other manufacturers, two of whom were awarded contracts—the Bell Machine Co. of Oshkosh, Wis., and the Oakes Products Division of Houdaille-Hershey Co., Decatur, Ill. The Bell Machine Co. concentrated on the
manufacture of the barrel, while the Oakes Products Division made the carts for the mortar.40 Other contracts were let for such parts as base plates, recoil springs, and elevating screws.
The Bell Machine Co., a manufacturer of custom-made woodworking machinery in peacetime, undoubtedly did not foresee the tough job it would encounter in rifling the barrel of the mortar. The 4.2-inch barrel was unique in U.S. Army munitions in that it employed ratchet type rifling rather than the simple spiral rifling employed in small arms and in most field pieces. This feature seriously complicated the broaching of the barrel, as the Bell Co. and the CWS inspectors from the Chicago district shortly came to learn.
Early in 1942 a broaching machine arrived at Oshkosh from Edgewood. Some 56 barrels had been rifled on this machine when it was discovered that 4 inches of the rifling toward the muzzle were defective. Little progress could be made in manufacturing the barrel until a suitable broaching machine was obtained. To overcome the difficulty the OC CWS, awarded a contract to the American Broach Co., Ann Arbor, for the design of a new 35-ton hydraulic broach. This broach when put into operation was to prove very satisfactory, but it was not ready for installation at the Bell Machine Co. until June 1943. Meanwhile the manufacture of the barrels had been delayed for more than a year. Only 823 barrels were manufactured in 1942, compared to 2,002 in 1943 and 2,600 in 1944.41 By October 1944 the Bell plant had a capacity of 800 to 1,000 mortars a month, but the production schedule called for only 200.42
While the rifling of the barrel was the most perplexing task encountered in producing the mortar, several other hitches arose. In each instance these difficulties were the outgrowth of efforts to increase the range of the mortar. Base plates and recoil springs broke and elevating screws bent. The CWS laboratories at Edgewood and M.I.T. worked on these problems and, in addition, the service awarded contracts to private manufacturers who were specialists in particular items. For example, it awarded a contract to A. O. Smith Corp. of Milwaukee to improve the welding technique employed in the manufacture of the base plate. This company did an excellent job in working out the necessary preheating, positioning,
welding sequence, and heat treatment for a base plate suitable for CWS purposes. The Pullman Standard Car Co. of Hammond, Ind., also worked on the improvement of the base plate. L. A. Young Steel and Wire Co. of Detroit provided the CWS with a greatly improved spring, while Foote Brothers Gear and Machine Co. and the Lindberg Engineering Co., both of Chicago, did much to perfect the elevating screw. By mid-1944 most of the technical problems arising in the manufacture of the mortar had been solved.43
In 1943, as indicated above, the CWS began to develop a recoilless 4.2-inch mortar. In September 1944 the service placed an experimental contract with the Budd Wheel Co. of Detroit for the manufacture of 25 of the new recoilless mortars.44 After receiving these 25 prototype samples the Office of the Chief directed the Chicago procurement district to investigate the possibility of procuring the item on a mass basis. Late in 1944 the Office of the Chief sent the drawings and specifications on the new recoilless mortar to the Chicago procurement district with the view of obtaining a contractor to produce the item on a mass production basis. On examining the drawings and specifications, the Chicago district decided that the most practicable procedure would be to superimpose the contract on the Bell Machine Co. and on 24 January 1945 a letter of intent for 1,000 barrels was issued to that company. The Bell plant had to be retooled for the new mortar, a process which proved very time consuming, and by the war’s end Bell had turned out only 100 of the models.45 Two days after V-J Day 12 of these reached the Pacific theater.46
The CWS first conducted proofing of the mortar exclusively at Edgewood Arsenal, but beginning in late 1942 some mortars were also proofed at Huntsville Arsenal. From mid-1943 until the spring of 1944 all mortars were fired for acceptance inspection at Huntsville. The mortars were shipped from the points of manufacture, assembled, and fired. Proofing procedures consisted of firing sand filled shells, using a heavy propellant
charge. If found satisfactory, the mortars, together with mortar carts, were shipped to the theaters of operation or points in the zone of interior.47
Since shipping the mortar parts to Edgewood and Huntsville caused considerable delay, the CWS in the spring of 1944 investigated the possibility of acquiring a proofing site nearer the point of manufacture. After arrangements were made in July 1944 all mortars were proofed at Camp McCoy, Sparta, Wis., until the war was over.48
Procurement of the 4.2-Inch Mortar Shell49
In the prewar years the CWS procured 4.2-inch shells from Frankford Ordnance Arsenal. While the Ordnance Department could supply the peacetime needs of the CWS, it was in no position in mid-1940 to fill an order for 47,626 E38R2 shells. The Office of the Chief was therefore obliged to obtain these shells through private contract. It directed the commanding officer of the Pittsburgh procurement district to send invitations to bid to four likely contractors for machining, assembling, and packing the shells. The lowest bidder was the H. K. Porter Co. of Pittsburgh, a reputable manufacturer of industrial locomotives, diesel engines, and chemical processing equipment. Under the contract the government agreed to furnish some $77,000 worth of equipment—government-furnished equipment being a common feature of wartime contracts. About the same time that the Porter contract was awarded, other contracts were let to some
half dozen prime contractors for such components of the shell as the burster tube well, the vane, the cartridge container, and the striker nut. A contract for forging shell bodies was awarded to the Pennsylvania Forge Co.50
In October 1941 the War Department authorized procurement of 160,879 more E38R2 shells; later this authorization was changed to 143,230 M2 shells and 33,584 M3 shells. The OC, CWS, directed the Pittsburgh district to procure these additional shells, whereupon the contracting officer of that district sent invitations to bid to six prospective contractors. The successful bidders were the Lempco Products Co. of Cleveland, a producer of industrial machine tools, grinders, and equipment used in the automotive industry; the Hydril Corp., Rochester, Pa., a manufacturer of oil field supplies and equipment; and the H. K. Porter Co. which was already working on the shell.
With the vast increase in requirements for 4.2-inch mortar ammunition, the CWS began to investigate the possibility of manufacturing the shell more quickly and economically than by the forging process. In the 1930s the Ordnance Department in an effort to make a less expensive shell had experimented with one fabricated from seamless steel tubing, but this experiment had not proved successful.51 In the summer of 1941 the matter was brought up in a discussion between Maj. J. L. Rose of the Office of the Chief and R. F. Cecil, vice president of the Scaife Co., Oakmont, Pa. The Scaife Co., a producer of boilers, pressure vessels, and commercial and domestic hot water tanks, specialized in the field of steel tubing. Cecil suggested to Rose the possibility of fabricating the shell from commercial hot rolled tubing and of brazing both base and nose adapter to the casing of the shell.52 The practice at the time was to weld the base and adapter to the casing and this had not proved satisfactory. After the CWS had shown keen interest in Cecil’s suggestions, the Scaife Co., at its own expense, worked on these developments both in its own laboratories and at the Mellon Institute of Industrial Research, Pittsburgh, Pa., where it sponsored a research fellowship. On 22 December 1941 the company was able to deliver ten fabricated shells with bases and adapters brazed to the casings to Edgewood Arsenal, where the shells were tested and proved
satisfactory.53 The CWS then awarded the Scaife Co. the first of several wartime production contracts. The company’s findings were made available to other mortar shell manufacturers, so that the bulk of 4.2-inch shells produced in World War II were of the fabricated variety. In the fabricated shell the requirement for steel was 20 pounds to the shell as compared to 50 pounds in the forged shell.
By the spring of 1942 requirements for the shell had reached a point where the CWS felt obliged to seek additional contractors, and the service awarded 4 additional prime contracts at that time. Two of the new contractors, Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., and the David Bradley Manufacturing Division of Sears Roebuck and Co., were located in the Chicago Chemical Procurement District. The other 2, the Guiberson Co. and Hardwicke Etter Co., were in the Dallas procurement district. In 1943 -mother prime contractor was added, the Day and Night Manufacturing Co. in the San Francisco district. Early in 1945 prime contracts were awarded 5 more manufacturers, 3 in the Boston procurement district and 2 in the Dallas procurement district. But the war came to an end before any of these 5 got into production.
In order to exchange information on the 4.2-inch shell program, a Shell Manufacturers Coordinating Committee was established in 1942. This committee, whose chairman was Mr. Cecil of the Scaife Co., held monthly meetings, at which one representative of each manufacturer in the United States was present. In attendance also, but not as active committee members, were experienced officers and civilians from the CWS.54
The CWS estimated requirements for the shell on the basis of a continually growing theater demand and, of course, passed on the requirements to Headquarters, ASF, to be incorporated into the Army Supply Program. On 1 October 1944 the ASF reduced the Army Supply Program figure for 4.2-inch shells from 5,645,306 to 4,007,000 without stating the reasons. After the CWS protested this action, Headquarters, ASF, reversed its decision and on 13 November approved the original figure of 5,645,306. The CWS had meanwhile been retarded over a six-week period in efforts to secure steel for its 1945 production, a procedure that required considerable
lead time. Early in 1945 reports from the theaters of operations indicated that the 4.2-inch shell was in such short supply that commanders had resorted to rationing. This development was probably an outcome of the ASF action of 1 October in cutting back shell requirements; at least the CWS felt that it was.55
The Shell Fuze
When the procurement of the shell was allocated to the Pittsburgh district in 1940 a contract was awarded to the Westinghouse Airbrake Co. for assembling the metal components of the fuze and to the Acme Die and Machine Co. for loading the fuze. Later, contractors for the assembly of the metal components were Casco Products Co., Bridgeport, Conn.; Atlas Ansonia, North Haven, Conn.; Heckethorne Manufacturing Co., Littleton, Colo.; Milwaukee Stamping Co., Milwaukee, Wis.; Louis S. Dow, Minneapolis, Minn.; and Simset Manufacturing Co., Oakland, Calif. In addition to the Acme Die and Machine Co., the following contractors and arsenals loaded fuzes during the war: Atlas Ansonia; William M. Fencil Manufacturing Co., Huntley, Ill.; National Fireworks, Inc., West Hanover, Mass.; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas Ordnance Plant, Little Rock, Ark.; and Picatinny Ordnance Arsenal, Dover, N.J. Loaded fuzes and empty shells were shipped to CWS arsenals (Edgewood, Pine Bluff, and Huntsville) for loading with chemicals and to Ordnance plants or contractors for loading with high explosives. Ordnance plants loading HE shells were Kansas Ordnance Plant, Parsons, Kans.; Louisiana Ordnance Plant, Minden, La.; and Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, N.J. Ordnance contractors loading the shell were National Fireworks Inc., and National Munitions, Eldred, Pa.56
During the war there were a number of instances when rounds of ammunition exploded prematurely either in the barrel of the 4.2-inch mortar or immediately after leaving the muzzle. This matter was given considerable publicity after the war when the Special Senate Committee Investigating the National Defense Program was holding hearings on Erie Basin
WP chemical mortar shells on an assembly line, Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas.
Metal Products, Inc.57 The committee then requested the Chief, CWS, to furnish accurate figures on how many were killed and wounded by these premature explosions or bursts.58
The CWS reported that during the war there were sixty-three premature explosions in the zone of interior and the theaters of operation. These explosions brought death to thirty-eight American soldiers and injury to 127. After each explosion the lot of ammunition was impounded and a thorough investigation made. Some commanding officers in the field felt it tactically urgent to utilize the ammunition even after it had been declared unsafe.59 In every instance, it was found that faulty fuzes were a factor in premature bursts.60 Various malpractices in fuze manufacture, in some cases the result of lack of experience, were discovered. Among these were failure to put steel safety balls in the fuzes, the use of inaccurate and uncontrolled methods of loading the fuze, the stacking of detonators
into position rather than cementing the detonator cap.61 One manufacturer, National Fireworks, Inc., was singled out has having had a disproportionate number of detonator rejects and faulty plant practices. The CWS conceded that had inspectors been on the alert these conditions would not have existed.62
The CWS required its inspectors to examine all fuzes before they were released to the loading plants by the assemblers. After receiving complaints from the field on the malfunctioning of 4.2-inch mortar ammunition, the service reviewed all inspection practices. The Inspection Division, OC CWS, called several conferences, the most noteworthy being held in Milwaukee on 5 January 1945. The purpose behind this conference was restudy of all phases of fuze manufacture and review of all authorized waivers and changes to insure that they did not compromise proper functioning of the fuze. In attendance at the conference were representatives of the CWS and all contractors assembling and loading the fuze. The day after the conference the group visited the Fencil plant at Huntley, Ill., to review at first hand problems associated with the assembling and loading of the fuze.63 This plant had an excellent record in producing safe fuzes.
The Fencil plant’s success was the result of the extreme precautions its owner took both in constructing the plant and in carrying out loading operations. William M. Fencil, who headed the company, had been trained as a chemical engineer and in peacetime had been a manufacturer of gaskets. He wanted to engage in war work and after approaching the office of the CWS Chicago procurement district in mid-1942 he learned of the search for suitable contractors to assemble and load the fuze. Fencil’s educational background and business experience impressed the CWS procurement office, where he was given favorable consideration. Before undertaking a contract Fencil made a thorough study of Ordnance manuals on ammunition and made a tour of a well run ammunition loading plant. When he built his own plant at Huntley, Fencil took pains to see that all safety features were incorporated into the design. He was equally cautious in carrying out loading operations. Convinced that the primary need was for
safety rather than mass production, he hired a great many inspectors to insure that every fuze was properly loaded. He set up a procedure whereby after 100 fuzes had been loaded operations were interrupted to ascertain if one or more components were left over. If such was the case the entire 100 were disassembled and reworked. While this procedure tended to slow up production, it insured the loading of safe fuzes.64
In contrast to the practice at CWS arsenals and privately operated plants, there was no CWS inspection of fuzes loaded at Ordnance plants. Since the Ordnance Department was the biggest and presumably the most competent munitions loader in the United States, the CWS felt that it did not need to have inspectors at those plants. This arrangement was discussed and agreed upon by the CWS and the Ordnance Department.65
Criminal Involvement of Mortar Shell Contractors
During World War II CWS contractors became involved on two separate occasions in criminal activities that led to court trials and convictions.66 While both these trials attracted considerable publicity, the second elicited far more attention than the first for it involved a prominent United States Representative from Kentucky, Andrew Jackson May, who was Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs. May, together with Murray Garsson and his brother Henry M. Garsson, were tried and convicted in a federal court in the District of Columbia for conspiring to defraud the government. In July 1947 they were each sentenced to serve from eight months to three years in a federal penitentiary.67
Just a year before sentence was passed the affairs of Congressman May and the Garssons were publicly aired at hearings before the Special Committee of the U.S. Senate Investigating the National Defense Program.68 In July 1946 this committee took testimony relative to government
contracts with two corporations in which the Garsson brothers served as officers, Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., and Batavia Metal Products, Inc. The government agency party to the contracts was the Ordnance Department in some instances and the Chemical Warfare Service in others. A great deal of the testimony centered around the contacts between several key officers of the Chemical Warfare Service and the Garsson brothers. It was disclosed that in the summer of 1941 Henry Garsson went to the office of Col. Paul X. English, then executive officer to the Chief, CWS, to inquire about the possibility of obtaining a war contract. Garsson said he was representing the Segal Lock and Hardware Co., Brooklyn, N.Y., which was setting up a subsidiary, the Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., for the purpose of doing war work. This company, Garsson stated, was particularly interested in a contract to manufacture 4.2-inch mortar shells.69 On 7 October 1941 Henry Garsson wrote a letter to the Chemical Warfare Service in which he made a bid on the mortar shell. He stated that Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., “organized under the laws of state of New York,” was an affiliate of the Norwalk Lock Co. and a subsidiary of the Segal Lock and Hardware Co. One week later, Colonel English thereupon addressed a letter to Henry Garsson, Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., 395 Broadway, New York, N.Y., pointing out that there would not be the immediate demand for the 4.2-inch shell that had been anticipated and that the CWS therefore would not be able to award a contract.70 It was brought out at the hearings that at that time the Erie Basin Metal Products company had not come into existence, that it was not incorporated in the state of New York until 29 January 1942, and that it was not at any time an affiliate of the Norwalk Lock Co. or a subsidiary of the Segal Lock and Hardware Co.71
Actually Henry Garsson was employed as a consultant engineer by the Segal Co. and according to Louis Segal, president of that company, he performed very satisfactorily. Garsson had suggested to Segal that the Erie Basin company be set up as a subsidiary of the Segal Lock and Hardware but the suggestion was never implemented.72 Apparently while awaiting word from Mr. Segal, Henry Garsson on 25 January 1942 met Allen B.
Gellman in the Washington office of Congressman Sabath of Illinois. Gellman’s family and the family of Joseph T. Weiss owned several Illinois corporations, including the Illinois Watch Case Co., which made watch cases and metallic novelties, and the United States Wind Engine and Pump Co., which made farm implements and railroad supplies. When Gellman heard of Garsson’s interest in the 4.2-inch mortar shell, his curiosity was aroused because he recognized that this was a mass production item which his plants could make.73 Gellman agreed to assist Henry Garsson and his brother financially and this agreement flowered into an amazingly complicated financial structure, in the manipulations of which Congressman May became entangled. These manipulations were the chief target of Senate investigators, who contended that their purpose was the realization of excessive war profits.
Five days after Gellman met Garsson and one day after Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., was certified as a New York corporation, Colonel English, now Chief, Industrial Service, OC CWS, as CWS contracting officer, issued a letter of intent to the new company at 75 West Street, New York, N.Y.74 This letter was an order for 15,000 4.2-inch chemical mortar shell bodies and 15,000 chemical mortar shell fuzes, “the shell bodies f.o.b. common carrier, Brooklyn, N.Y., or Elgin, Ill., the fuzes, f.o.b. common carrier, point of loading and assembly.”75 A provision to manufacture an item at either of two locations was seldom if ever included in government contracts. The provision for the manufacture of fuzes was deleted as of 27 April 1942.76
At the time Colonel English issued the letter of intent to Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., he forwarded a directive to the New York procurement district, and apparently to the Chicago district also, to begin preparation of a formal contract. On 23 February 1942 the commanding officer of the New York district sent a confidential memorandum to the Chief, CWS, stating that Henry Garsson’s statements regarding the status of Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., were contradicted by Louis Segal. A copy of this memorandum was sent to the commanding officer of the Chicago Chemical Warfare Procurement District.77
Why did neither the chief’s office nor the Chicago Procurement District office act on this memorandum casting doubt on Henry Garsson’s trustworthiness? To this question the Senate investigators were most anxious to obtain an answer. Brig. Gen. Paul X. English testified that he did not see the memorandum until it was brought to his attention in the latter part of 1943 in connection with the renegotiation of the contract. He stated that if he had seen it in February 1942 he would not have gone through with the contract, at least not before thoroughly investigating Mr. Segal’s statement.78 The commanding officer of the Chicago district recalled having received the memorandum but could not recall whether it was before or after he signed the contract.79 But regardless of the memorandum, he declared, he would have signed the contract because the letter of intent and General English’s signature on the contract itself, dated 1 March 1942, gave him no alternative.80 To this statement General English took vigorous exception, saying that under no conditions was a commanding officer supposed to “go blindly into” a contract.81 The 1 March contract was the first of a number which the CWS awarded to two companies in which the Garssons obtained an interest—Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., and the Batavia Metal Products company.
Why wasn’t the memorandum from the commanding officer of the New York Procurement District brought to General English’s attention in February 1942? No definite answer to that question was forthcoming at the hearings. But the committee left little doubt as to whom it thought was responsible for the failure. It strongly intimated that a civilian lawyer in the Office of the Chief, CWS, who was closely associated with Congressman May and the Garssons, was the culprit. Toward the end of the hearings several members of the committee accused this lawyer, whose legal career before coming into the Chemical Warfare Service had been under a cloud, of perjury and of purloining documents and records. The chairman of the committee said he hoped the Department of Justice would look into the man’s record.82 If the Department of Justice followed up the suggestion, it apparently did not feel there was sufficient evidence for conviction because the individual was not prosecuted.
He was the only person in the CWS whose motives the committee questioned. Several committee members did imply, and with seemingly
good reason, that the judgment of several CWS officers left something to be desired. On the other hand, the committee hearings brought to light that other CWS officers used extremely good judgment and were most solicitous for the welfare of the government in their dealings with companies controlled by the Garsson interests. Particularly noteworthy was the role played by the chief of the Purchase Policies Branch, Colonel Estes,83 Estes’ attention was drawn to the Erie Basin and Batavia Metal companies by the unusual high prices in the contracts. He had made some headway in reducing these prices, but in December 1944 they were still so high that Estes advised the Renegotiation Division, ASF, to request a Bureau of Internal Revenue audit on the Garsson brothers.84 On 2 January 1945 the Renegotiation Division replied, stating that Estes’ proposal for an audit was considered impractical. Then on 8 May, Estes personally conferred with the Chicago Bureau of Internal Revenue District Field Office, where he learned that an audit on the Garssons was already under way. Early in the summer of 1945 the ASF reversed its previous decision and concurred in requesting an audit from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.85
In January 1945, meanwhile, Estes called the attention of a CWS procurement conference to the terms of the Erie Basin contract, terms which enabled the contractor “to pay higher salaries, buy $500,000 worth of equipment from an affiliate, and within half a year write off half of his shell production facilities, in addition to paying $250,000 rent to another affiliate.”86 These remarks attracted the attention of Brig. Gen. Charles E. Loucks, Chief, Industrial Division, OC CWS, who had been making some observations on his own on the “fantastic” prices in the Garsson contracts.87 General Loucks deputized Colonel Sanson of his staff to review those contracts for the purpose of revising them downward, and early in 1945 this was done.88
On V-J Day, 14 August 1945, Colonel Estes advised the Legal Branch, OC CWS, through the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Materiel, General
Ditto, that no termination payments should be made to the Erie Basin Metal Products companies until the full extent of the liabilities of those companies to the government had been determined.89 A week later Estes addressed a second memorandum directly to the Renegotiation Division, ASF, in which he again urged the withholding of invoice and termination claims to the Erie Basin company in order to protect the interests of government in recovering excessive profits.90 Colonel Estes’ letter was followed by positive action on the part of the Renegotiation Division, ASF, which suggested to the Office of the Under Secretary of War that a withholding order be issued against Erie Basin. The Under Secretary’s office issued such an order on 6 September 1945.91
The Under Secretary’s order to withhold funds brought vigorous reaction from the Garssons and their associates. Before it was issued the civilian lawyer in the OC CWS referred to above, drafted a letter for the Commanding General, ASF, which the Assistant Chief, CWS, for Materiel signed, criticizing the position the Purchase Policies Branch had taken.92 Congressman May bombarded Under Secretary Patterson’s office with phone calls. Patterson turned the problem over to Kenneth C. Royall, a special assistant. On the basis of a survey the Under Secretary issued a directive on 15 September modifying the freeze order of 6 September.93
No mention whatever was made in the withholding orders of any company other than the Erie Basin Metal company. Mr. Royall, after he had become Under Secretary of War, said he had never even heard of the Batavia Metals company until May 1946 when he was informed of the following developments.94 On 13 September 1945 the Settlement Advisory Board of the Chemical Warfare Procurement District, acting on what they considered reliable data, made a partial payment to the Batavia Metal Products company of $3,846,700 of which amount $3,231,649.60 went to liquidate the outstanding balance of the government’s advance payment account and the remainder was paid to the contractor. Subsequently, an audit of this company’s account disclosed some rather unusual accounting
practices and it was concluded that the Batavia company’s invoices to the government should have been $1,067,000 less than previously reported, or, in other words, that the Batavia Metal Products owed the government over a million dollars. A later audit reduced the figure somewhat.95 In May the Batavia company agreed to repay the government $140,000 at once and $50,000 a month thereafter to liquidate the debt.96 Mr. Royall referred the matter to the Department of Justice for advice and on 18 June 1946 Theron L. Caudle, Assistant Attorney General, wrote to Mr. Royall:
If a criminal case should result from the Department’s investigation of the Batavia Metal Products Co. and related companies, it is felt that acceptance of the contractor’s offer would make successful prosecution more difficult. However, the investigation to date is not sufficiently complete for the Department to express any opinion as to whether a criminal case will develop, and therefore, no determination can be made at the present time as to the advisability of accepting the contractor’s offer.97
Acting upon the advice of the Department of Justice, Mr. Royall made no move to accept payments under the terms suggested by the Batavia company.98 Instead, the War Department, through the CWS, served a demand on Batavia Metal Products, Inc., to repay the excessive portion of the partial payment which had been made.99 This demand against the Batavia company, which went into the hands of receivers in the fall of 1946, was never honored. In the spring of 1952 the case against the Batavia company, so far as its civil aspects were concerned, was nol-prossed by the government. But action against the Erie Basin company was to continue for a number of years.100
Flame Throwers
Portable Flame Throwers101
In April 1942 the CWS awarded a contract to the Beattie Manufacturing Co., Little Falls, N.J., a nationally known manufacturer of rugs and
carpets, for production of the M1A1 flame thrower, the development of which was well under way.102 In mid-1941 this company had acquired the services of Lawrence J. Beck, an engineer who had worked closely with the CWS on the development and production of early model flame throwers. Beck’s background and experience plus the company’s standing in the business world virtually guaranteed creditable performances. In July 1943 the CWS engaged another prime contractor, the E. C. Brown Co., Rochester, N.Y., a manufacturer of agricultural sprayers, especially of the portable type. These two companies produced over 14,000 M1A1’s in such an excellent manner that they were awarded contracts on the later model, the M2-2. In May 1944 a third contractor, R. F. Sedgley, Inc., of Philadelphia, was awarded a prime contract on the M2 model. Sedgley was a well known manufacturer of high grade sporting rifles. Over 24,500 M2-2 flame throwers were produced in 1944 and 1945.103
Of the three prime contractors, E. C. Brown was the most self-contained facility. This company manufactured production tools and made certain components not only for itself but also for the other two primes. Numerous subcontractors supplied components to all the primes—such items as pressure regulators, high pressure valves, safety heads, die castings, rubber components, and fuel filling lines. All contracts were under high priority, particularly after the ASF, in June 1944, issued an urgency circular describing the M2-2 as a “new and superior weapon.”104
In the manufacture of the M2-2 the contractors used the latest techniques to insure uniformity and quality. All silver brazing on the gun assembly was done by induction heating and die cast aluminum parts were used for lightness and interchangeability. Corrosion resistant materials were used to withstand the effects of extreme climatic conditions. Complications arose in the manufacture of the fuel valve, the safety mechanism, and the outlet valve needle. The technique for the construction of the fuel valve, which consisted of a rubber diaphragm molded to a metal pin, was never fully developed, and on several occasions the service had to suspend production because of the number of rejects of this valve.105 The safety mechanism had two objectionable features: it frequently pinched the operator’s hand and it had a tendency to shift to the “off safety”
position should the operator accidentally touch it. The outlet valve was difficult to adjust with the result that frequent leaks occurred. These defects were never entirely eliminated.
All the prime contractors built test ranges to proof test the flame throwers. These ranges were completely equipped to handle and service the weapon and its parts. Although the CWS and the contractors took safety measures to protect workers against the hazards involved in testing, three cases of severe burns occurred during the war period.
Auxiliary Flame Throwers
In December 1943, after a successful demonstration for representatives of the ASF, the CWS, the AGF, U.S. Marine Corps, and the Navy, production of the tank mounted auxiliary flame thrower (E4-5) was begun.106 The CWS awarded a contract to the Kemp Manufacturing Co. of Baltimore to develop a pilot model. By early 1944 this company had devised a flame thrower consisting of a ten-gallon fuel tank, a gun utilizing a gasoline-electrical ignition system, and compressed air for propelling the flame.’107 Later an improved ten-gallon unit was developed jointly by the Westinghouse Electrical Corp., Atlantic Division, Philadelphia (also known as the Atlantic Elevator Co.), and J. B. Blair Co., Mineola, N.Y. These companies had produced fifty experimental models by the time the war came to an end.
Meanwhile the M3-4-3 auxiliary type flame thrower had been developed,108 and the CWS awarded a production contract to the Atlantic Elevator Co. for production of these units. Over 1,700 were manufactured in 1944 and 1945.109 The principal engineering difficulties in this type of flame thrower were the malfunctioning of the gasoline ignition valve, the faulty design of the diaphragm on the fuel discharge valve, and the clogging of the atomizer of the ignition system. Many units had to be rejected until these defects were rectified.
In November 1944 the CWS awarded a contract to Pressurelube Inc. for 500 periscope-type flame throwers.110 The manufacture of the periscope type proved very troublesome. The ignition system failed to function unless
the air pressure in the gasoline tank was at a critical point between 12 and 30 pounds per square inch, and the exact point for each unit could be determined only by experience. Another obstacle was leakage in the fuel valve; in some instances this was caused by defective valve seals, in others by porosity in the valve housing. Technicians took steps to improve the valve by impregnating the castings with a polyspastic and cashew nut oil, by using different bronze alloys, and by improving manufacturing processes in the foundry. Pressurelube produced only 192 of the 500 units ordered.111
Main Armament Flame Throwers
Early in 1945 the CWS awarded prime contracts to M. W. Kellogg Co. of Jersey City and the Pullman Standard Car Co. of Hammond, Ind., for the main armament flame thrower (E12-7R1). They made little progress on the contracts largely because priorities for material were too low. The WPB upon request granted higher priorities for specific items but this procedure was time consuming. To rectify the situation, the Director of the New Developments Division, War Department Special Staff, Brig. Gen. William A. Borden, on 26 June 1945 suggested to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, that, in view of reports from the Pacific areas indicating the great effectiveness of the armored flame thrower, the E12-7R1 project should be assigned a priority “equally as high as the Manhattan Project.”112 Upon reviewing General Borden’s memorandum the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, passed it on to OPD for comment. Someone apparently brought the matter to the immediate attention of the Under Secretary of War, for the very next day the Under Secretary informed the Commanding General, ASF, that production of the E12-7R1 should have sufficient priority to insure delivery on schedule.113 The following day—28 June—General MacArthur cabled the War Department urging that units be equipped with the E12-7R1 flame thrower.114
The personal interest in the armored flame thrower displayed by echelons of the War Department and by General MacArthur led to accelerated production of the E12-7R1. On 4 July 1945 General Somervell wrote a personal letter to 83 subcontractors appealing to them to meet their schedules. In this letter he indicated that the War Production Board would be most cooperative in the matter of priorities and urged the contractors to take any problem or anticipated problem directly to a CWS officer whom he named as his personal representative. On 21 July the Industrial Division, OC CWS, reported to the Commanding General, ASF, that one or more telephone calls had been received from 21 of these contractors and letters from 23 others pledging cooperation. Late in July the acting director of Plans and Operations, ASF, was able to report to OPD that after the issuance of a triple A priority, 25 flame throwers were being produced in July, and 85 scheduled for August. Contemplated production for September ran to 115 and for each of the following three months to 175.115 But the war ended before this scheduled production could be carried out.
Smoke and Smoke Munitions
Hexachloroethane (HC)
Hexachloroethane was the principal ingredient in making HC smoke mixture used in smoke pots, smoke grenades, smoke bombs, and certain types of shells and rockets. The prewar requirement for hexachloroethane was relatively small and the chief source of supply was the Pittsburg, Calif., plant of the Dow Chemical Co. The estimated capacity of that plant was about 3,000 tons a year, while the CWS requirements under the Army Supply Program (as of 14 January 1943) were 16,191 tons for 1943, and 33,222 tons for 1944. In order to fill immediate requirements the CWS contracted with a Canadian firm to deliver 2,500 tons late in 1942. At the same time, the service began writing contracts for future delivery with the Dow Chemical Co., the Hooker Electrochemical Co. of Niagara Falls, N.Y., and the Westvaco Chlorine Products Co. of South Charleston, W.Va.116 In August 1942 the government started construction
of the CWS Kanawha Plant adjacent to the property of the Westvaco Chlorine Products Co. The following summer the CWS Marshall Plant at New Martinsville, W.Va., was erected for the production of hexachloroethane and other chemicals and a contract awarded to Du Pont to operate the plant. From these various sources the CWS procured over 9,000,000 pounds of hexachloroethane in 1943 and almost 8,000,000 pounds in 1944.117
In 1943 a priority problem arose on perchlorethylene, the chief ingredient of hexachloroethane. Perchlorethylene is produced from acetylene tetrachloride, which is also the source of chemicals used in degreasing metal parts and in dry cleaning. The CWS had to work closely with the War Production Board to set up a schedule that would guarantee perchlorethylene in sufficient quantities.
Among the munitions filled with HC smoke mixture were 2-pound bombs, M8 grenades, rifle smoke grenades, M88 and M89 shells, canisters for 105-mm. and 155-mm. shells, 100-pound and 500-pound clusters, 2.35-inch rockets, and smoke pots. Virtually all the 2-pound bombs were loaded under private contract in the Pittsburgh and Chicago procurement districts. Rifle grenades, smoke shells, and canisters were loaded at CWS arsenals, particularly Huntsville and Pine Bluff. Edgewood Arsenal filled all 100- and 500-pound clusters.118
The M1 smoke pots were manufactured and filled at Huntsville and Pine Bluff Arsenals and under contract in the New York and Dallas procurement districts. The latter districts also procured all the M5 smoke pots. Maintaining safety in the loading plants took constant attention. The creation of static sparks was an ever present possibility and to eliminate it a high degree of humidity had to be maintained in the plants. The tragic experience of one of the contractors with a poorly designed air conditioning system pointed up the need for extreme care. Because of the scarcity of raw materials this company set up a system wherein all the air conditioning ducts throughout the entire plant were connected. One day a fire broke out in one of the explosive-proof cubicles. The fire itself proved
Brig. Gen. William A. Borden
relatively harmless, but the air cooling system spread the smoke created by the burning HC mix throughout every room and department of the plant. So thick was the smoke that workers could not find doors and windows only a few feet away. Two employees suffocated. This experience led the Plant Protection and Safety Branch, OC CWS, to rule that air conditioning systems should have elaborate automatic safety cutoffs and that in all future installations each section of a plant should have a separate air conditioning system.119 During the war the CWS procured over 5,000,000 M1 and over 880,000 M5 smoke pots.120 The service also procured a great quantity of floating smoke pots for use in amphibious operations. Almost all of these—over 2,000,000—were filled at Huntsville Arsenal.121 The loading process consisted of pressing the 26 pounds of HC mix into the 5-gallon buckets with 8 tons of dead weight. A delay train ignition device, which consisted of a pyrotechnic mixture pressed into a metal tube, was attached to the lid. The lid was then strapped on the bucket, after which the pot was ready for packing. At first wooden boxes were used for packing but later these were replaced by steel drums. As in the case of other type smoke pots, the loading of the floating pot presented hazards. In pressing the mix into the buckets a certain portion was forced out as dust. To overcome this health and safety hazard Huntsville Arsenal constructed shields to force the dust back to the base of the presses.122
White Phosphorus (WP)
In August 1941 the CWS awarded a contract for delivery of white phosphorus, the smoke and incendiary agent, to the Victor Chemical
Works. The Victor company’s Mount Pleasant, Tenn., plant supplied Edge-wood Arsenal with the material until December 1941. After the outbreak of war the CWS procured the bulk of its WP from Tennessee Valley Authority (Wilson Dam, Ala.) although between April 1943 and April 1946 it also obtained some from the Columbia, Tenn., plant of the Monsanto Chemical Co.123 Two conditions necessary for producing WP are proximity to phosphate rock deposits and a cheap source of electricity.124 The CWS arranged to have most of TVA’s product shipped to Huntsville Arsenal, since transportation was relatively direct and inexpensive between these two points. The Monsanto plant supplied the other three CWS arsenals as well as the Ferro Enamel Co., Cleveland, Ohio, which also filled some WP munitions.125
Shipping WP to the loading plants presented a problem. Because the chemical burned upon contact with air, it had to be shipped under a covering of water. Trained operators filled the white phosphorus in liquid form into tank cars or trucks, which were insulated with 4 inches of rock wool and equipped with steam coils. The CWS bought 25 of these tank cars and 10 trailer trucks, the latter for the exclusive use of Huntsville Arsenal. Before the phosphorus was poured in, the tanks were partially filled with water, all but a small portion of which was to be replaced by the WP. The workmen had to exercise great care to make certain that all the water was not replaced by the chemical, else a fire would occur. On a short journey the chemical remained in liquid form and was unloaded at its destination by a reverse process, that is, by forcing a sufficient quantity of water into the tank to replace the WP. On a long journey the material solidified and the tanks had to be treated with steam to liquefy the WP and make it ready for unloading. It was essential that the tanks be unloaded without undue delay because the combination of the phosphorus and water produced a weak solution of sulphuric acid which attacked steel. The material had to be stored in concrete structures.
White phosphorus was loaded into artillery shells, 4.2-inch chemical mortar shells, 30-pound M46 bombs, and 100-pound M47 bombs, M15 hand grenades, explosive type igniters, and 3.5-inch and 4.5-inch rockets. It was also loaded into catalin, bakelite, or glass containers, which in turn
served as ignition charges in the M74, M69, and M69X incendiary bombs. In the loading process the munitions were filled with hot liquid phosphorus under water and then cooled to solidify the WP in such a way as to maintain proper ballistic properties.126
The CWS conducted training courses for phosphorus fillers and press operators at Edgewood Arsenal, to which key individuals from other arsenals were sent for periods of from thirty to ninety days. Upon their return to their home stations these workers trained others in the various procedures.127
Smoke Generators
Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor a demand arose for stationary smoke generators in the Panama Canal Zone and in the Western Defense Command. The OC CWS allocated procurement of this item to the Chicago procurement district office. Early in February 1942 the Chicago office drew up a contract with Gendar, Paeschke and Frey Co. of Milwaukee to produce about 10,000 stationary generators in 30 days. At the same time contracts for parts were drawn up with the Grand Sheet Metal Co. of Chicago and dozens of small sheet metal shops in the Chicago vicinity. A big problem was obtaining the 5,000 tons of 18-gauge sheet steel to fabricate the generators. A search revealed that the Ford Motor Co. in Detroit could spare this quantity of steel and the procurement district office arranged for transporting it to Milwaukee. Late in February an express trainload of stationary generators and auxiliary equipment was rolling to the New Orleans port of embarkation, destination MERCURY.128
The CWS was responsible not only for the procurement of the generator itself but also for a list of some 35 auxiliary items. These items included 10,000-gallon bolted steel tanks for storing the fuel oil, 750-gallon refueling units mounted on Army 2½-ton trucks, 55-gallon drums, funnels, and torch igniters.129
By the fall of 1942, 123,800 smoke generators had been procured. Of this number 55,800 were in the hands of smoke generator companies in
the Canal Zone, at the Sault Ste. Marie Canal, and at aircraft factories on the west coast. Companies found that it was difficult to move the large bulky generators quickly when the wind changed, and this disadvantage, coupled with the development of better generators, led the service to abandon the device in 1944.130
In mid-1942 the CWS let a contract through the Chicago procurement district to the Heil Co. of Milwaukee for the manufacture of the M1 mechanical generator.131 This company worked closely with CWS technicians and representatives of the Standard Oil Development Co. on production difficulties. Among the serious production problems encountered was a tendency of the oil burners to overheat; this was solved by installing temperature regulators on the burners. Another difficulty was obtaining efficient pumps for the water and oil. The CWS procured over a thousand of these models.132
The Besler Corp., Emeryville, Calif., which was mainly responsible for developing the M-2 mechanical smoke generator, was the sole prime contractor for this item.133 Besler, whose peacetime business was the engineering, developing, and building of high pressure generating units and engines, had already manufactured somewhat similar units for the Navy. Consequently, no outstanding production manufacturing troubles arose. The Clayton Manufacturing Co., Alhambra, Calif, the chief subcontractor, cooperated in an excellent manner in furnishing parts. Over 2,700 M2s were procured and shipped overseas.134
Airplane Smoke Tanks135
The CWS procured all airplane smoke tanks through its Chicago district. By far the greatest number—over ninety-two thousand—was of the
M10 type, which was wing mounted and expendable. Over ten thousand each of the M33 and M33A1 models were procured. These models, which were mounted in the bomb bays of the planes, were not expendable. As indicated above, some M20s and M21’s were procured before decision was made to abandon these models.136
The principal contractor for smoke ranks was the Empire Stove Co., Belleville, Ill. Other contractors were the James Manufacturing Co., Fort Atkinson, Wis., and the National Roadjoint Manufacturing Co. of Chicago. The contracts called not only for the delivery of the tanks but also of such parts as wrenches, elbows, air inlet plates, and plate closures. A hitch was encountered in the procurement of the parts by the shortage of copper bearing steel. In the installation of the M33 and M33A1 models a difficulty arose in developing satisfactory mounting lugs and braces. Both the Navy and the Air Forces cooperated closely with the CWS in resolving this matter.
Colored Smoke Munitions137
The loading of colored smoke munitions was confined to two CWS arsenals, Edgewood and Huntsville. By far, most of the loading was done at Huntsville. There the colored smoke was loaded into M16 and M18 grenades, and M22 and M23 -rifle grenades, furnished by the Ordnance Department, and canisters for 105-mm. and 155-mm. Ordnance shells.
The job of loading these munitions raised a number of problems which were solved on a pragmatic basis. For example, when the production of M16 grenades was initiated in the fall of 1942 a hazard was created in filling the grenade with the dry mix, the dust of which caused fires and explosions. To overcome this hazard the dry mix was placed in a dough mixer and granulated with water. In the spring of 1943, when the schedule for M16 grenades was increased, a quicker method of filling had to be found. Huntsville Arsenal experimented with a Stokes-Smith filling machine using dry mix instead of granulated mix. This method proved successful for red and violet grenades, but not for yellow and green grenades, because the latter were more sensitive; consequently, they continued to be loaded by the granulated method. The finished batch of mix was tested by filling two grenades and firing them. If the grenades functioned
according to specifications the mix was used in the filling line; if not, it was reworked. In filling the M16 three increments were used, each increment being subjected to pressure of about two tons. As a preventative against dust, fuel oil was poured into the mix in the filling machine.
In loading the M16 grenades, and all other colored smoke munitions, safety was the biggest problem. The danger of fire from dust and other causes was always present. Workers had to wear fireproofed clothing and safety shoes at all times. The plants had to have sprinkler systems, and the workers had to be taught how to use them. Dust was not only a fire hazard, but it also caused some workers to become ill for several hours at a stretch.
Problem of Morale
Complications arose in storing and issuing chemical warfare materiel no less than in its procurement. These complications began to appear in the emergency period and continued to challenge the CWS throughout the period of the war.
Notwithstanding the hazards inherent in the operation of chemical warfare plants, the CWS and its contractors did obtain the services of a body of loyal and efficient workers. When one considers these hazards together with the difficulties besetting the mass production of certain chemical warfare items, it is not surprising that the CWS was sensitive to the need for maintaining a high level of morale. The chiefs office initiated the practice of sending military officers who were on production assignments to Dugway Proving Ground to witness demonstrations of airplanes dropping incendiaries on specially built targets. These visits gave the officers an opportunity to see in action the munitions they had labored to produce. If there were any duds the officers were impressed with the need for producing only high grade materiel. Civilian workers at the arsenals and plants, many of whom were wives of servicemen, were spurred on by motion pictures depicting the effectiveness of chemical warfare munitions as well as through lectures given by soldiers who had been overseas.
The contractors, no less than military and civilian workers, needed incentives to bring out their maximum potentialities. Problems associated with CWS procurement had particular implications for the contractors. In the matter of priorities, for example, a manufacturer who was faced with a low priority would naturally tend to assume that his product was not so important as others. He would, moreover, be put in the embarrassing
position of having his work interrupted for lack of materials and labor without any provision being made for equitable compensation. Again, frequent changes in drawings and specifications resulting from the backward state of development of a number of chemical warfare items caused frustration among contractors. Sometimes the contractors would but recently have succeeded in mastering the manufacturing techniques on a certain model when a change would come along. Another source of irritation was the frequent revisions in production schedules resulting usually from a change in Army requirements. These changes might lead to cancellation of contracts or to the need for setting up new assembly lines with consequent dislocation of workers. Another possible source of annoyance was. the inspection standards on certain items such as the gas mask. Regardless of the merits or lack of merit of certain CWS inspection procedures, the fact was that many contractors resented the procedures.
The principal medium for improving morale of contractors was the Army-Navy E (for Excellent) award. The quality and quantity of the contractor’s production in the light of the facilities available to him were prime considerations in selecting recipients for this award. Other criteria included the contractor’s record in (1) overcoming production obstacles; (2) avoiding work stoppages; (3) maintaining fair labor standards; (4) training additional labor forces; (5) managing his business effectively; (6) maintaining a safe and sanitary plant; and (7) utilizing subcontracting facilities. Final selection of Army recipients for E awards rested with the Army Board for Production Awards appointed by the Under Secretary of War.138
The CWS presented over 150 E awards during the war. In the granting of two of these awards, those to Erie Basin Metal Products, Inc., and to Batavia Metal Products, Inc., the CWS is open to criticism. The lack of cooperation on the part of these contractors in connection with the pricing program in the CWS would in itself seem to have been sufficient reason for precluding them from the awards. But their records on labor turnover and on use of facilities were also bad. These facts came to public notice in the open hearings before the Special Committee of the U.S. Senate Investigating the National Defense Program in July 1946. There it was revealed that the former wartime chiefs of the Chicago Ordnance District offices, Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Hammond and Col. John Slezak, steadfastly refused to recommend these contractors for E awards. To quote
General Hammond, “If you gave the E award to them, the E award wasn’t worth very much in the Fox River Valley after that.”139
But there is good reason for believing that the E awards granted to the Erie Basin and Batavia Metals companies were the exception to the rule among CWS contractors. The standards for this award were very high—perhaps somewhat too high—and most of those who received it deserve the highest praise. There is little doubt that the other CWS contractors who got the E award richly deserved the honor.