Chapter IV: Build-up in the Southwest Pacific
Concurrently with their campaign in the Philippines, the Japanese swept rapidly southward into the Netherlands Indies, and were, before long, menacing Australia and the islands of the South Pacific. In all of that vast area Australia remained as the one practicable base of resistance. Because of its great size, the country could not easily be overrun. With its small but expanding munitions industry, its armed strength, and its factories and farms, the Commonwealth could contribute substantially to the Allied effort against Japan. But Australia’s resources were too slender, its population too sparse, and its defenses too weak to resist a possible Japanese invasion effectively or to launch offensives without aid from its allies. The continent had to be transformed into an Allied bastion and a base from which to strike back. To reach such a goal, the amount of engineer work required would be enormous.
Australia—The First Days
Defense Plans
During the early weeks after Pearl Harbor, Australia had assumed an ever greater importance in Allied strategy. Within ten days Secretary Stimson and General Marshall had decided to establish a base on the southern continent from which to supply the Philippines and provide air support for General MacArthur. By Christmas it was apparent that efforts to help the forces in the Philippines, the bulk of them already withdrawing to Bataan, would be of little use. The Allies had to concentrate on holding farther south, and their hope now was to save the Netherlands Indies. Although Roosevelt and Churchill, meeting at the ARCADIA Conference in Washington in late December, agreed to direct the main Allied effort against Germany first, the seriousness of the situation in the Far East prompted them to divert additional strength to the western Pacific. America’s chief contribution was to be air power based on Australia. Toward the close of the year the War Department took steps to send nine air groups to the southwest Pacific.1
The outbreak of war with Japan was to put a heavy strain on Australia’s resources. As large as the United States, the Commonwealth had a population of
Map 7: Australia, 1942
but seven million. Only the southeastern areas were highly developed; two-thirds of the total population lived in the two states of Victoria and New South Wales. (Map 7) Natural resources were limited, with agricultural and pastoral products forming the foundation of the country’s economy. By American or European standards, Australia’s industrial system was small. Its communications network was poor. Except in the southeast, there were few paved roads. Most rail lines were single track and gauges in the various states ranged from three feet six inches to five feet three inches.
Most of the Commonwealth’s trained fighting forces were overseas at the time of Pearl Harbor. Nearly all of the Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) were fighting in Europe and the Mediterranean or helping to protect the Middle East and Malaya. The two heavy and three light cruisers, which comprised the bulk of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), had only recently returned to home waters after serving in the Mediterranean
and the Indian Ocean. The air force assigned to defend Australia consisted of forty-three British and American bombers and an equally small number of Australian-built training planes. The troops on hand included the Australian Military Forces (AMF)—a militia poorly equipped and with little training—and one AIF armored division without its tanks. There was, besides, the Volunteer Defence Corps (VDC), an organized reserve of some 50,000 men, most of them veterans of World War I.2
Because their means were limited, the Australians understandably adopted a defensive strategy. Soon after the Japanese began their rapid thrust southward, the Australian Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that any attempt to hold the islands northeast of the continent or even the underdeveloped, sparsely inhabited areas of the northern part of the Commonwealth would be ill advised. Should the Japanese invade, the Australians would have no choice but to abandon all territories except the southeastern corner of the continent containing the major cities of Brisbane, Sydney, and Melbourne. Most of the military forces in the Commonwealth were therefore concentrated in this important industrial and agricultural area. Only small forces were sent to such distant
outposts as Darwin in the northwest and the Cape York Peninsula in the northeast.3 Not unless the Australians received substantial reinforcements would they be inclined to adopt a more aggressive plan of action.
Reinforcements Arrive
A few reinforcements were soon to come from the United States. When Japan declared war, a convoy of eight transports, carrying men and supplies to the Philippines, was approaching the Fiji Islands. Instructed by General Marshall not to return to Hawaii but to go on to Australia, the convoy headed for Brisbane, arriving there on 22 December. The 4,600 men aboard, commanded by Brig. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, included a regiment and two battalions of field artillery and the ground echelon of a bomber group. There were no engineer units. Late in December Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, at that time on a mission to Chungking, flew down to take command of the American troops. On 1 January his command was designated United States Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA). Marshall gave Brett two major tasks: get supplies to the Philippines and transform Australia into a major air base. As hope of getting help to MacArthur dimmed, Brett concentrated on his second objective.4
Australia, Brett declared, must be a “second England.” On 4 January he laid before the Commonwealth’s Chiefs of Staff his plans for strengthening the continent, placing special emphasis on the northern regions. His program called for constructing air bases at Darwin, Brisbane, and Townsville. He considered Darwin, centrally located on the north coast of Australia, an ideal site from which to launch operations against the Indies and the Philippines. This city would be both an advance air base and a port of embarkation for troops and supplies moving northward. Shipments of planes and airmen from the United States would put in at Brisbane, 1,800 miles to the southeast, where Brett wished to establish his main assembly plant and repair shops for all types of aircraft. Townsville, 750 miles north of Brisbane, was to be a secondary port and a subsidiary base for assembling and maintaining planes. To stage fighters to the Indies, Brett proposed to develop still further the existing air ferry route from Brisbane and Townsville to Darwin. He chose Melbourne as the major port of entry for troops and supplies and as the site for his headquarters. The Australians, while pointing out that the areas north of Brisbane would be difficult to defend, agreed to go along with Brett’s plan.5
A quick trip by plane over eastern and northern Australia revealed to Brett the magnitude of the job ahead. Melbourne and Brisbane would present little difficulty. They were large, modern cities, with deep harbors, well-developed roads and railroads, manufacturing plants, and indeed all the facilities of metropolitan centers. In the surrounding countryside were most of the airfields, camps, and depots of the Australian Army. Townsville and Darwin offered a sharp contrast. A commercial center for the sheepherders, farmers, and miners of northern Queensland, Townsville was a provincial city of 25,000. It was linked with the south by a single-track railroad and a rough coastal highway, neither of them designed to carry heavy traffic. Its harbor was too shallow for large ships. Except for nearby Garbutt Field, being developed for the air ferry route to the Philippines, and the field at Charters Towers, 65 miles to the southwest, Townsville had few of the facilities that go to make up an air base. Darwin, with 1,500 inhabitants, was about 2,000 miles from Melbourne and 1,800 from Brisbane. It had no rail connection with the rest of the continent. The only line out of the city, “two streaks of rust without much rolling stock,” extended southeastward for a distance of 300 miles and ended in the desert at Birdum. Not much better than cattle tracks were the roads leading to the more populous parts of the continent. Darwin’s docks could take only two ships at a time. Near the city were two small airfields—Darwin RAAF Field and Darwin Civil; a third, Batchelor Field, was located 40 miles to the south. Brereton, while visiting Australia in November 1941, had arranged for the improvement of Batchelor to enable it to take heavy
bombers, and the RAAF had begun work two days later. Circumstances now required not one, but a whole series of bomber fields in the Darwin area. As a result of his trip, Brett saw clearly that carrying out his plans would require large-scale construction, but he was convinced his program was necessary if the enemy advance southward was to be halted.6
Asked by the War Department for a rough estimate of his needs, Brett called for a large contingent of engineer troops and generous quantities of construction supplies. In cable after cable, he detailed his requirements—three engineer airdrome units, two labor battalions, one service unit, and one general service regiment; rock crushers, jack hammers, trucks, compressors, landing mat, trucks, 32,000 tons of rail, and 100,000 tons of asphalt. Marshall, when he saw the tack Brett was taking, became somewhat concerned and asked him to trim his sails. The Chief of Staff could not go along with plans for developing “a second England.” He explained to Brett that he did not intend to send many service troops to Australia and reminded him that the shortage of shipping was critical and that the War Department had to save “every possible ton of ship space.” American forces in Australia would therefore have to exploit local resources to the limit. Brett persisted in asking for large shipments, but Marshall refused to yield.7
Eager to do their part, the Australians promised Brett a “maximum measure of cooperation.” The Commonwealth government quickly agreed to furnish supplies, provide workmen, hire contractors, and turn over such buildings as could be spared. The Treasury foresaw little difficulty in financing projects. The Australians were careful to point out the limitations of their resources. They emphasized that construction machinery was scarce, that most of their manpower was already committed to defense, and that many materials, among them asphalt and bitumen, now so urgently needed for airfields, would have to be imported. The “most vital and difficult factors” in construction, they warned, “would be materials, labor, and time.”8
Engineer Tasks
Even though the Australians would do their utmost, the U.S. Army engineers
would have to assume heavy responsibilities. They would have to provide plans and specifications, advise in the selection of sites, and guide the Australians in the unfamiliar task of building for the American Army. The officers who had reached Australia by early January were far too few to carry the load. Brett informed the War Department that more engineer officers were urgently needed. He asked that Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler be sent posthaste to Australia, but since Wheeler was then on an important mission to Iran, General Reybold chose Col. Dwight F. Johns for assignment to the southwest Pacific. The Chief of Engineers also selected several officers of lower rank for Brett’s staff. Meanwhile, Maj. George T. Derby, who had come over on the convoy, served as Brett’s first engineer. Because Brett had so few men to staff his headquarters, Derby served also as finance officer and briefly as G-4.9
On 5 January, Derby moved from Brisbane to Melbourne and before long had set up his office on the top floor of an empty, ramshackle warehouse. During the course of the month, he added an engineer and two infantry officers to his staff and hired a small number of civilians. At the same time he fell heir to a ready-made engineering organization. The firm of Sverdrup and Parcel had built up a staff of Australian civilians for work on airfields for the South Pacific air ferry route. Derby negotiated a contract with the firm whereby he secured the services of about thirty skilled architects, engineers, and draftsmen. The Australians saw to it that he was well supplied with money. The story goes that he went to one of the Melbourne banks, introduced himself, and explained his needs for funds. The bank promptly made out a note for 1,000,000 pounds, adding that he was welcome to more if he needed it.10 Derby scarcely had time to do more than assemble a staff and secure funds before leaving early in February for Java. He was replaced temporarily by Maj. Elvin R. Heiberg.11
To decentralize operations, Brett had established four base sections on 5 January. Base Section One, with headquarters at Darwin, included Northern Territory. Two and Three were set up in Queensland, with headquarters in Townsville and Brisbane, respectively. Base Section Four, with headquarters in Melbourne, included Victoria in southeastern Australia. When the base sections were first organized, there were not enough engineer officers to staff them all. Capt. Willard Farrar was assigned to Brisbane and Maj. Ward T. Abbott to Townsville, while Derby himself, before his departure, assumed the duties of base section engineer in Melbourne. Darwin was left to the RAAF. Base section engineers, like the chief engineer, were to be staff officers only. Under the technical
supervision of Derby and his successors, they were to take orders only from their base section commanders.12
The engineers found themselves almost totally dependent on the Australians. Although the War Department gave Brett authority to use fixed-fee or negotiated lump-sum contracts to lease whatever properties he needed and to overobligate funds if necessary for urgent construction, the engineers could do little without Australian advice and assistance. Not acquainted with local contracting or supply firms, they called on the RAAF, which controlled most airfield work, and on government works agencies for help in getting projects started and pushing them to completion. Lacking knowledge of real estate prices. methods of acquisition, or terms of leasing, they turned to the Australian Army’s Hiring Service for land and buildings. Because of the Americans’ unfamiliarity with the local scene, setting up a procedure whereby the engineers as well as other branches of the Army could work together with the Australians was of fundamental importance. To bring about coordination at the highest level, Brett and the Australian chiefs of staff established three joint committees, made up of representatives of USAFIA and the Commonwealth’s armed services. The Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Joint Planning Committee, the latter composed of the deputy chiefs, were responsible for formulating “policies concerning the distribution of troops and facilities for the U.S. Army in Australia.” In other words, they would decide what to build and where. The Administrative Planning Committee had the task of recommending ways in which the construction effort could best be organized, materials and equipment equitably apportioned between Australians and Americans, and the work of the supply services coordinated. The decisions of these three predominantly Australian committees would greatly affect the progress of construction.13
Work for the Americans would have to be superimposed on a broad defense program which the Commonwealth government was already carrying out. Soon after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, Australia had launched a large construction effort, designed both to strengthen the nation for war and to develop the postwar economy. By the time of Pearl Harbor, work had been undertaken on some thirty-five new munitions plants and on seventy-seven additions to existing ones. The RAAF was building fields for forty-two squadrons in the southern half of the continent. Tanks for motor gasoline were being erected at various points located inland at least one hundred miles from
the eastern and southern coasts, and storage for aviation gasoline was being provided at army and oil company depots. Two major links in the transcontinental highway system were being improved: one, the North-South Road from the railhead at Alice Springs to Darwin, the other, the East-West Road from Mt. Isa in western Queensland to Tennant Creek on the North-South Road. A huge drydock for capital ships was building at Sydney. Two large permanent hospitals were going up, one at Brisbane, the other at Adelaide. These undertakings were already taxing the Commonwealth’s slender resources to near capacity, and with the war coming close to Australia’s shores, a great deal of additional construction would be needed. In the south, where much could be turned over to the Americans, cooperation with the engineers imposed no great burden, but any help the Australians could give for the new projects in the north would have to be at the expense of their own program and in violation of their own strategic concepts.14
Construction Begins
At Melbourne, consequently, the engineers found their task fairly easy. Even though the city was crowded, the headquarters of the Australian Army, Navy, and Air Force being located there,
the Commonwealth government found space for the Americans. Headquarters of Base Section Four moved into the Seamen’s Mission, which Derby converted into an office building. He had the Sailor’s Home altered to accommodate the military police and turned a wool warehouse into an engineer depot. The engineers leased the Royal Melbourne Hospital, 95 percent complete when the war began, thus obtaining space for over 700 beds. They built barracks for enlisted men on the hospital grounds and provided lodgings for nurses and medical officers inside the hospital buildings. Many Americans found quarters in private homes, apartments, and hotels; others pitched tents on cricket fields, race tracks, and other flat ground.15
The establishment of a major base at Brisbane was to require more extensive work. In mid-January, Col. Alexander L. P. Johnson, the base section commander, together with his engineer, Captain Farrar, began pushing base development. Here, as at Melbourne, the Australians made a number of properties available, among them two large airfields, Amberly and Archerfield, a wharf near the mouth of the Brisbane River, and several warehouses. Queensland Agricultural College at Gatton, fifty-five miles west of the city, was also turned over to the Americans. Contractors were soon adapting these facilities to American requirements. At Amberly and Archerfield, they began building additional barracks, operations buildings, and bombproof shelters. Near the
wharf they erected frame office buildings, a warehouse, and a 40-ton crane. They began converting Queensland Agricultural College into a hospital with 250 beds. Quite a few new projects had to be undertaken. Colonel Johnson directed the building of eight frame warehouses to be dispersed throughout the city and arranged for contractors to build an ordnance depot in suburban Derra. Camps were a major requirement. Johnson selected a site near Wacol, fifteen miles southwest of Brisbane, and soon work was under way on a 5,000-man staging camp, later named Camp Columbia. He also set work in motion on a 1,000-man camp near Archerfield. Farrar designed both camps on a dispersal basis, with buildings to be constructed in wooded areas and concealed from air observation. By far the largest of the jobs was Eagle Farm air base, which was to be Brett’s main depot for assembling planes. Designing and laying out the two all-weather runways, assembly plant, hardstandings, shops, and warehouses and finding contractors, workmen, plant, and materials presented Johnson and Farrar with a real challenge, but, with Australian help, they soon succeeded in getting construction started.16
Farther north the engineers faced a tough assignment. At Townsville, destined to be the great base in northeastern Australia, most construction would have to be from the ground up. Brett wanted a plant for assembling fighters, shops for repairing them, and a great deal besides.
Because of the grave danger of Japanese raids, a strong air defense was needed, but placing more fighter planes at Townsville would necessitate construction of at least one new airdrome to supplement the bomber fields at Garbutt and Charters Towers. If oceangoing vessels were to use the port, the harbor would have to be deepened, new wharves built, and roads to the docks improved. On 5 January the base section commander, Brig. Gen. Henry B. Clagett, and his engineer, Major Abbott, arrived. After checking in at their hotel, they set out for a conference at the local headquarters of the RAAF. Having discussed their needs with the Australian airmen, they inspected several airfield sites selected earlier by General Brereton and found them suitable. A tour of the town and the surrounding countryside convinced them that there were “acres of open country on which to build” but little else. Labor was scarce, many residents having fled to the south. Since local merchants stocked few of the items needed for large-scale construction projects, supplies were low. Despite the discouraging outlook, Clagett and Abbott went ahead. Within a few days, they had obtained the RAAF’s permission to award fixed-fee contracts and sent out a call for workmen to all the towns within a radius of 200 miles. By the ninth, contractors had been hired, workmen recruited, and construction started on barracks at Garbutt and on a fighter strip at Charters Towers.17
Brett considered Darwin the key point in the fight for the Indies and
Camp Columbia
Australia, and believed the establishment of a major base there was “absolutely necessary.” He nevertheless recognized that construction in the town and surrounding territory would be extremely difficult. Living conditions in this forbidding tropical outpost were almost unbearable. There were few workmen to be had, and supplies would have to be brought in by tortuous overland routes or shipped by sea from southeastern Australia. To develop Darwin fully would be a long-term proposition. For the time being it would have to serve merely as a staging area for air units moving northward. Brett called initially only for construction of a field for fighters, shops for emergency repairs, and housing for 2,500 troops. Since no American engineer could be spared for Darwin, he persuaded the RAAF to take charge of construction and asked the Australian Government to speed work on the road and railroad leading into the town. Although little could be accomplished immediately, Darwin continued to figure prominently in Brett’s long-range plans.18
The construction program, modest as it was, got off to a faltering start. During their first weeks, the engineers had to grope their way along. Since those who had arrived with the convoy had expected to serve in the Philippines, they
had not even brought along sets of drawings or field manuals.19 The engineers knew little or nothing of the local terrain, rainfall, or wind directions. “The rocks, trees, and soil,” wrote one, “were without parallel in our previous experience. The very stars and constellations were strange.”20 Derby, in Melbourne, at first had difficulty finding out what his engineers one or two thousand miles away were doing or what their needs were. They, on the other hand, with few regulations to guide them, did not always know how far to go in hiring contractors, buying supplies, and dealing with the Australian authorities. Small wonder that construction appeared to be slow in getting under way. When General Brereton visited Australia in late January he complained that “conditions at Darwin were unsatisfactory” and that projects at Brisbane had not “progressed beyond the planning stage.”21
Difficulties in procuring scarce building materials and equipment also had a hampering effect. Of the raw materials needed for construction, only iron ore and timber were plentiful, and the country’s capacity for turning them into finished products was limited. The output of hardware, steel plate, and lumber fell far short of wartime demands, as did the production of roofing and pipe. Cement was the only manufactured product produced in ample quantities. Bitumen was almost impossible to get. Manufacturers
turned out fairly large numbers of concrete mixers and light tractors and trucks. They also produced certain other items of equipment, but without essential parts, which had to be imported; bearings for carryalls, for example, had to come from abroad, as did motors for graders. Spare parts for all types of machinery were at a premium. Only a thin trickle of supplies came from the United States. The Chief of Engineers had little to spare for overseas, and the European Theater of Operations got first priority on that. And, to make matters worse, the shipping shortage slowed delivery of such items as could be earmarked for the southwest Pacific.22
Competition for such supplies as there were further aggravated a bad situation. The Australians placed orders without reference to the needs of the Americans, who also bought up meager stocks, heedless of the requirements of their allies. The American services likewise bid against each other. On 21 January the Commanding General, USAFIA, in an attempt to bring about more orderly procurement, ruled that all supplies procured locally must be obtained through Australian military channels. Also, base section commanders could purchase on their own authority only in amounts up to $500; purchases costing more had to be approved by USAFIA. While this order prevented a good deal of indiscriminate buying, it did not put an end
to competition among the American services. Nor did it stop the Australians from pouring materials into projects which some engineers were beginning to think were unnecessary.23
Total War
By the beginning of 1942 the Japanese had bottled up MacArthur’s forces on Bataan and Corregidor, and enemy troops in Malaya were driving on Singapore. In mid-January, in order to have more unified direction of the war against Japan, the Allied governments had established the ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) Command, under General Sir Archibald Wavell, commander in chief of the British Forces in India. Wavell’s main task was to hold the Malay Peninsula and the Netherlands Indies. General Brett was named his deputy. The American forces in Australia now became in effect a supply service of ABDA. Wavell’s hastily organized command could not contain the Japanese; the enemy continued to advance, ‘fanning out in several directions. On 23 January the Australian base of Rabaul, at the northeast tip of New Britain, fell. On 15 February Singapore capitulated. The enemy was already invading Borneo and Sumatra and preparing to strike at Java. On the 19th Darwin was heavily bombed. The entire Indies appeared to be doomed, and on 25 February, the ABDA Command was dissolved. Wavell returned to India and Brett to Australia, which now seemed threatened not only from the northwest but also from the northeast.24
Where the Japanese would strike next was a question. Brett believed they would launch an attack from the northwest and seize Darwin. The Australian Chiefs of Staff held that the real danger lay to the northeast; the Japanese would want to sever lines of communication between the United States and Australia to prevent reinforcement of the southern continent. Immediately threatened, the Chiefs of Staff believed, were not only New Caledonia and Fiji, but also Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea. To meet the growing peril, Australia would need air power and considerable numbers of ground troops as well. Prime Minister John Curtin had already ordered the AIF divisions home. Roosevelt and Marshall, reversing their earlier stand that only air and service troops were to be shipped to Australia, decided to send ground troops. On 17 February Marshall ordered the 41st Infantry Division to Australia and in early March Roosevelt promised Curtin the 32nd Infantry Division also, if the Commonwealth would keep one of its divisions in the Near East. Curtin agreed. With the first troops of the AIF scheduled to return in mid-March and with the American 41st Division due to arrive in April and the 32nd in May, the outlook for the defense of Australia appeared to be less desperate.25
The planned concentration of Allied power in Australia made necessary a
vastly expanded construction program. Upon his return from the Indies, Brett called for a redoubling of efforts to strengthen the northern bases. Runways at Darwin and Townsville were to be lengthened and the fields provided with camouflaged dispersals. The capacity of the assembly plants at Brisbane and Townsville was to be increased and work on them speeded up. In fact, nearly all the going projects were to be enlarged and given new impetus. Brett knew that this was not enough, and that many new jobs would have to be undertaken. He proposed to build 6 more bomber fields—three near Darwin, 2 near Brisbane, and 1 to the west of Townsville—and 4 more fighter fields—2 south of Darwin and 2 near Townsville. At Darwin he projected a host of smaller jobs, among them increasing the water supply and replacing the bombed-out wharf. He also planned to build a score of aviation fuel depots to be scattered over the continent. The Australian Chiefs of Staff agreed with Brett on the importance of all these projects and at his request gave top priority to those in the Darwin area. But since the steady Japanese advance had forced Allied supply lines southward and increased the danger to the southern part of the continent, Americans and Australians alike recognized the need for additional construction there. Camps and depots would have to be clustered around Melbourne and Adelaide, the safest ports of entry. Airfields would have to be developed in southwestern Australia, particularly around Perth, to defend the continent against attack from the Indian Ocean. On 3 March Brett established two new base sections: Base Section Five
in South Australia, with headquarters at Adelaide, and Base Section Six in Western Australia, with headquarters at Perth.26
Engineer Problems
The engineers were in no position to plan for and direct adequately such a constantly growing construction program. Their staff sections in USAFIA were hardly bigger than they had been in January. Now headed by Brig. Gen. Dwight F. Johns, who had arrived from the United States by way of Java on 28 February, the engineer office in Headquarters, USAFIA, consisted of 4 officers, 3 enlisted men, and 45 civilians. The offices in the base sections in Victoria and Queensland were still undermanned. Engineers had yet to be found for Darwin, Adelaide, and Perth. The difficulties of building in a foreign land were becoming more apparent. Like the other defenders of Australia, the engineers speculated daily on the next Japanese move and had to plan for the construction program in an atmosphere of growing tension. Worried about the future and uncertain over how to proceed, they had the task, as one high-ranking officer put it, of “developing a country the size of the United States.”27
Because so much construction had to be done in the north, reconnaissance alone required a vast amount of time
and effort. In order to find suitable sites for airfields in this largely unexplored region, the engineers took to the air. General Johns chartered a private plane to fly his engineers on inspections. He was fortunate in finding a civilian pilot who “knew well the behavior of soils under traffic, the class and quality of timber which grew on the various soils and possessed the ability to recognize these.” The pilot usually flew at an altitude of 5,000 feet. When he spotted a promising site, he dropped down for a closer look, sometimes circling not much higher than the treetops. Ground parties later surveyed about one-fifth of the areas recommended by the aerial observers and chose the best ones. This method of selection worked so well that it soon became common practice.28
A severe handicap was the lack of plans and specifications. Having no American blueprints, Derby had directed the men transferred from Sverdrup and Parcel to develop suitable designs. Because these men had no acquaintance with the American Army’s standards of construction, they had to gather information from every possible source. They questioned officers who came into engineer headquarters, visited Australian camps occupied by U.S. troops, and studied Australian plans. At length they succeeded in producing some tentative drawings, though still too few to fill the needs of contractors, who consequently adopted designs of their own choosing. The result was that many facilities were overelaborate. Cables
were sent to the Chief of Engineers for complete sets of the standard drawings for theater of operations buildings, which the Engineers had prepared in 1939 and 1940 to simplify overseas construction in time of war. Some time elapsed before the drawings arrived. One package containing plans for different types of airdrome structures was lost in a plane crash. After the engineers had received fairly complete sets of standard drawings, they discovered that quite a few alterations were necessary. Australian hardwoods, among the strongest in the world, had such unusual bearing qualities that much less timber was needed than the theater of operations drawings called for. The plans also had to be modified to conform to Australian sizes of materials. In fact, such radical changes were required that there was some question as to whether the drawings should be used at all. The engineers debated whether it would not be preferable to switch to Australian designs or perhaps develop entirely new plans. The matter was not to be settled for some weeks.29
The growing construction program placed a tremendous strain on Australia’s manpower and production. Early in February the Administrative Planning Committee had recommended that the Commonwealth government set up more effective machinery to direct construction for the armed forces, Australian and American. On the day Singapore fell, 15 February 1942, Prime Minister Curtin determined to put Australia’s
manpower and resources on a “total war basis.” In line with this policy, the Australian Government established the Allied Works Council (AWC) on 26 February. The council was to direct and control “the carrying out of works of whatever nature required for war purposes by Allied Forces in Australia.” Curtin appointed Mr. Edward G. Theodore, former Commonwealth treasurer, as director general, and Mr. C. A. Hoy, head of the works agency of the Department of the Interior, as assistant director. General Brett, asked to nominate a third member, chose Major Heiberg, who was succeeded within a few days by General Johns. The council was given broad powers, including the right to commandeer supplies and equipment, condemn property, and adopt any form of contract that would expedite construction.30
Theodore and his colleagues strove to bring order into the building program. Meeting in Melbourne, they began at once to assemble a staff and to establish offices in each of the states and in Northern Territory. The state organizations would hire contractors, recruit workers, and obtain materials and equipment. Finding it almost impossible to use peacetime methods of contracting, the council adopted the fixed-fee contract for the bulk of the jobs, offering builders an average profit of 3 percent of the estimated cost. In order to alleviate shortages of supplies and equipment, the AWC surveyed existing stocks, impressed privately owned machinery, searched for ways to increase production, and sent urgent requests to the American government for lend-lease aid. One of their major tasks, the members of the council believed, was the recruitment of workers. At first, they relied on private industry and on state construction agencies, such as roads commissions, to round up additional laborers. Appeals for volunteers met with little success. Men could not be readily persuaded to leave defense jobs in Melbourne and Sydney to go to work in the inhospitable regions of the north. When the manpower shortage continued acute, the council considered drafting workers but hesitated to take this unpopular step unless there was no alternative.31
The Allied Works Council was no panacea. It could not alter the basic fact that Australia’s resources were limited, nor could its members simply ignore political considerations and insist on unpopular measures. It had, moreover, to operate as part of a cumbersome system. Before work on a project could begin, the council had to obtain the approval of what many thought was an inordinately large number of governmental bodies, military and civilian. Among them were the Administrative Planning Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who assigned priorities. The
ministers of the Australian armed services were notified of pending construction so that they might determine if existing facilities could be used. The Treasury reviewed projects for American forces to arrange for financing through reverse lend-lease. The war Cabinet reserved the right to pass upon all large projects or those of a controversial nature. Only after all these agencies had approved was the Allied Works Council permitted to go ahead with construction. All too often this procedure proved to be exasperatingly slow.32
Yet, despite many obstacles, the Allied Works Council could by mid-March report considerable progress. The number of going projects was mounting steadily. Most of the new jobs were in the south, where the council was to perform extensive construction for the Australian services and provide numerous key facilities for the Americans. Expansion of camps near Melbourne and Brisbane was continuing. A beginning had been made on the largest job in the entire airfield program—the Tocumwal Repair and Assembly Depot in New South Wales, located on the Murray River, which formed the boundary with Victoria. This gigantic project, covering sixteen square miles, was to include 4 runways for heavy bombers, seventy miles of roads, and 608 buildings. But while the bulk of its effort was in Victoria and New South Wales, the council was beginning to devote some attention to the north. Work on roads leading from South Australia and Queensland to Darwin was being speeded up. An accomplishment the AWC took particular pride in was the launching of work on new runways at Charters Towers. The council’s field representative in Queensland received the request for this job on a Saturday night early in March. He at once suspended operations at most of the other projects in the area and ordered the equipment sent to Charters Towers. He requisitioned three trains to haul the machinery and called workmen from their homes to get everything in readiness at the airfield for construction to begin. By Monday morning 200 men, with 100 trucks, i 2 bulldozers, and a large number of scoops, tractors, and graders, were hard at work. The Australians, well aware that they were just embarking on a vast undertaking, were eager to get on with the program as a whole.33
First Engineer Units
While the Australians were intensifying their efforts, the first engineer troops arrived from the United States. On 2 February the 808th Aviation Battalion had landed at Melbourne. The people of the city, says the battalion chronicler, “were very glad to see the U.S. forces come in” and gave the 808th a “rousing welcome.” But the men so warmly received were in some ways unprepared for the task ahead. Activated in September 1941, the 808th, like most of the early aviation battalions, had received only haphazard training. The unit arrived without its heavy equipment, except for three dump trucks and two
tractors. The bulk of its machinery was to follow later. Brett lost no time in giving the unit its assignment. Under Capt. Andrew D. Chaffin, Jr., the 808th was soon on its way to build airdromes in the Darwin area.34
The long journey northward introduced the engineers to the Australian transportation system. On 12 February the men went by truck to Baccus Marsh near Melbourne, where they boarded a special train. The next day, on reaching Terowie, in the state of South Australia, where the broad gauge ended, they transferred to the narrow gauge line which ran through the desert to Alice Springs, a thousand miles to the north. Having a top speed of twenty miles an hour, the train did not reach Alice Springs until 2130 of the 15th. Since there was no railroad northward out of the town, trucks carried the troops on to Larrimah, 635 miles distant. The passengers found the road rough and the “vibration ... terrific.” Arriving in Larrimah on the 18th the men “broke out laughing” when they saw the train that was to take them on to Darwin. “It consisted,” one wrote, “of cattle cars for personnel, small open cars (trucks) for baggage, and a small wheezy locomotive which looked as though each hour of existence would be its last.” The Australian crew’s custom of stopping every few hours to have a “spot of tea” was an added irritation to the Americans, who were impatient to get to their destination. On 19 February the battalion left the train at Katherine, the site of one of the new bomber fields, instead of going on to Darwin, 200 miles to the north, which that day had been hard hit by an air attack. After experiencing the difficulties of movement between Melbourne and the Darwin area, the men of the 808th, deep in what the Australians called the “Never-Never” land, felt “completely isolated as far as the remainder of the U.S. Army was concerned.”35
The 808th got orders to turn the civil airdrome at Katherine into a field for medium bombers and to find sites for new fields in the area. On his own initiative, Chaffin undertook another project in order to eliminate the need for transshipping cargoes at Larrimah. He decided to improve the road from that point northward so that supplies could be trucked all the way from Alice Springs. The battalion quickly settled down to work. Survey parties, sent out daily, located several good sites for airfields. Men of Company B began removing trees and providing detours around bad spots on the road to the south. At first, the 808th made scant progress on runways. On 6 March Captain Chaffin reported “little ... has been done towards building airfields in this vicinity because of the complete absence of equipment.” The battalion had brought to Katherine only the three dump trucks and two tractors it had unloaded at Melbourne in early February. Chaffin had been able to obtain it cargo trucks and 2 old bulldozers at Darwin. But at least 7 of his 14 trucks were needed to keep the battalion supplied with food and water. The others were
used to haul gravel for the Katherine runway. The cargo trucks were of the type which had to be emptied by hand; unloading these trucks in the tropical sun was so exhausting that the men could work only six hours a day. Still, in spite of these handicaps, occasional Japanese bombings, and the ever-present dread of enemy invasion, the battalion persevered. By mid-March the Katherine runway had been lengthened and was being surfaced with gravel, and the clearing of three sites for new strips had begun.36
Prospects for construction in Australia brightened with the arrival at Melbourne on 26 February of two general service regiments—the 43rd, commanded by Lt. Col. Heston R. Cole, and the 46th, commanded by Lt. Col. Albert G. Matthews. Since these units were older than the aviation battalion, they had received more extensive training in the United States. The 43rd, activated in April 1941 and given seven weeks of basic training, had in June taken part in army maneuvers in Tennessee, where, according to an observer from the Office of the Chief of Engineers, the men had performed “as nearly like veteran troops as could possibly be expected from such a short training period.” The 46th, activated in July 1941, had undergone training in road building, airfield construction, bridging, fortification, and demolitions—the usual instruction given to general service regiments—and in addition had had the benefit of experience in the Louisiana maneuvers in the fall. On 23 January 1942 the 46th and the 43rd had sailed for Australia; three weeks
later the bulk of their equipment was shipped. The units were at full strength when they landed, but did not long remain so. “USAFIA shanghaied both officers and men ruthlessly ... ,” Matthews wrote. Brett took the 46th’s motor repairmen for the base motor pool at Melbourne. When their vehicles arrived early in March, the commanders discovered that the spare tires had been removed in the States. The first days in Australia seemed to portend difficult times ahead.37
The 43rd Engineers began work almost at once preparing Camp Seymour near Melbourne for the 4 1st Division, expected in April. Seymour was an old Australian tent camp. With the addition of huts for kitchens, mess halls, showers, latrines, recreation buildings, and hospitals, it was quickly made ready to accommodate the American division. In mid-March, when the 43rd received its vehicles, the headquarters and service company and the 1st Battalion left to join the 808th in Northern Territory. Except for one company which remained at Seymour, the 2nd Battalion moved to Adelaide to enlarge Australian camps there for the 32nd Division. Using materials supplied by the Commonwealth’s Department of Defence, the Engineers strove to complete the facilities by the time the 32nd would arrive in May.38
After two weeks of combat training near Melbourne, the 46th Engineers left by rail for northern Queensland, an area which might at any time become a battle zone. To protect themselves against enemy air attack the men mounted machine guns on the flatcars of their trains. During the trip they passed trainload after trainload of refugees headed southward. On 13 March the first of the troops reached Woodstock, a town twenty miles southwest of Townsville. Here and in the surrounding countryside the regiment was to build airstrips so vital to the defense of the Townsville area. Colonel Matthews was under exceptional orders. Since the officer who commanded Base Section Two was a major, Matthews was to report directly to General Johns. Matthews was to be largely responsible for the development of airfields in northeastern Australia in the critical days of early 1942.39
On 18 March the entire regiment began the work of clearing and grading three runways for a giant airfield at Woodstock. Matthews ordered around-the-clock operations, scheduling three 8-hour shifts a day. Because general service troops were trained as jacks of all engineering trades rather than as specialists in airfield construction, their equipment included no rooters, rollers, or scrapers. The troops worked mainly with picks and shovels, keeping their trucks and few dozers in reserve for pushing over trees and pulling out stumps. Even final grading often had to be done by hand. Still, the regimental historian reports, “the men were eager and enthusiastic, and went about their work with vigor ... troops laboring under the intense heat of the sun, and in clouds of dust, slashed away at trees and stumps. ...” Four days after construction began, the first plane landed on one of the runways. Matthews had meanwhile lined up sites for additional strips, but soon the regiment was dispersed. On 22 March Company A arrived at Torrens Creek, a small town about 180 miles southwest of Townsville. Here the men rapidly cleared the site and laid steel mat, 2,500 by 100 feet, in five days—possibly, they thought, a speed record for putting down mat up to that time.40 On 29 March, Companies B, C, and F moved to Reid River, 40 miles south of Townsville, where they began building a third airfield. Although this job, undertaken in a heavily wooded area, required much clearing, the first landing strip was ready by 15 April.41
Matthews described the construction of these airstrips as “field improvisation at its ... best.” The officers of the 46th were largely on their own and “did what seemed good to them and in most cases their engineering common sense was the primary and single qualification for the work.” Construction was held to the simplest standards. Because equipment was short, dispersal taxiways,
hardstands, and revetments were omitted. As the long dry season was just beginning, drainage was dispensed with. Since the engineers had no asphalt or tar, they surfaced the runways with rotted granite, semi-decomposed shale, or sometimes merely with gravel and clay. The fields were rough and crude, but planes could land on them. Construction took a heavy toll of equipment. Machinery broke down quickly under hard usage. Constant turning and twisting over rough ground wore out the front tires of the graders, and the tires of many of the trucks were slashed by the stumps of eucalyptus trees, cut off by Australian surveyors just above the ground. Having no maintenance repair truck, Matthews converted a motorized earth augur, “which wasn’t any good anyway,” into a mobile shop and equipped it with tools obtained from the Air Forces and the Australians. For repair work, he relied on men “who ... weren’t experts but ... learned fast.” The shortage of tires was remedied when the 46th took over a retreading plant whose workmen had been evacuated from the Townsville area.42 Despite the regiment’s many difficulties, building in the bush country of northern Queensland was, as Matthews pointed out, “excellent training for the officers and men engaged in doing much with nothing, [and] ... living under the most primitive conditions. ...”43
Supplies
If Brett and Johns were cheered by the coming of engineer units, they were no less gratified by the decreasing competition for supplies. On 21 February the Commanding General, USAFIA, had set up the American Procurement Commission, in response to General Marshall’s suggestion that a central purchasing board be established in Australia, “along the lines which were so successful ... in France during the last war.” The new commission included representatives of all the Army’s procurement services, with Heiberg serving as the Engineer member. Henceforth the services had to send requests for supplies to the commission, which determined priorities and placed orders with the Australians. On 20 March the organization was renamed the General Purchasing Board. It soon succeeded in bettering relations with the Australians and in effecting a more equitable distribution of supplies among the American services.44
Ships fleeing before the Japanese advance through Malaya and the Indies meanwhile were bringing large quantities of “distress cargo” to Australia. Ports were crowded with fugitive merchantmen; so great was the mass of material dumped at Sydney that the wharves threatened to collapse. Many ships had to anchor in the harbor to await their turn to unload, and once they docked, supplies were hurriedly removed and thrown into warehouses. The Australian Department of Import Procurement took possession of the cargoes and began
sorting them, after which the Commonwealth government gave the U.S. Army first choice of all goods brought in by American and Dutch vessels. Distress cargo proved to be a windfall for the engineers, providing them with more tools, steel plate, pipe, cable, generators, and construction machinery than any other source.45
One of the ships which had escaped from Java brought Mr. Albert Wright, a petroleum executive of many years’ experience in the Indies. The engineers immediately pressed him into service, commissioning him a major. Named Johns’ supply officer, Wright was ordered to get equipment quickly. After conferences with officers of the 808th, the 43rd, and the 46th, all of whom stressed the urgent need for earth-moving machinery, Wright began requisitioning farm tractors from the Australians. But these machines were too light for the job, and, since most of them were secondhand, large stocks of spare parts would have to be found. When Wright’s efforts to get parts from dealers met with slight success, distress cargo again proved a godsend; a shipload of parts for caterpillar tractors enabled the engineers to keep most of their equipment running. Meanwhile, rock drills, wire rope, and hand tools from Australian gold mines supplemented the engineers’ meager stocks of equipment, and carbon dioxide cylinders from breweries were rebuilt to hold oxygen for use in welding. While the engineers still had too few supplies and too little equipment, their lot was gradually improving.46
A New Command
On the morning of 17 March the planes bringing MacArthur and his staff from the Philippines to Darwin landed at Batchelor Field. From there the group traveled by plane, train and automobile to Melbourne, where MacArthur set up his headquarters. He and his staff at once began to take stock of the situation. General Casey was particularly anxious to get out into the field and see construction projects firsthand. On 28 March, accompanied by Johns and Theodore, he flew to Amberley Field near Brisbane, which he found “well provided with paved runways.” Proceeding to Eagle Farm, he noted that one 5,000-foot runway had been surfaced and another was under construction. The strips at nearby Archerfield were of turf, soft in spots and slippery when wet. Troops were moving into the recently finished camps near the fields. Inspecting these camps, Casey was disturbed by the “relatively high type construction,” which included tongue and groove flooring, asbestos roofing, and waterborne sewage systems. He suggested that “temporary and less costly shelter ... be provided.” The members of the party continued on to Townsville, where they were met by Colonel Matthews, who took them to see the fields being built by the 46th Engineers. Casey pronounced the fields “excellent” and was
pleased to find the troops still out working at 2200. The activities of the Australians at Townsville evoked less enthusiasm. Much effort was going into the dredging of the harbor and the improvement of the road to Brisbane; Casey wondered if such jobs might not be suspended and the men and equipment put to work on airfields. Nor was he overly impressed with Charters Towers. He noted much equipment on hand but remarked that there were not enough men to run it. The job, he felt, should be reorganized and given a “general push.” The tour convinced him that designs must be simpler, equipment and manpower allocated more wisely, and efforts centered first of all on airfield construction. Much good work had been done, but the program required better overall direction.47
Toward a More Aggressive Strategy Strategic Plans
While MacArthur had been making good his escape from Corregidor, American and British plans for carrying on the war against Japan were beginning to crystallize. On 9 March President Roosevelt proposed that the United States assume responsibility for the conduct of the war in the Pacific; on the 18th Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill agreed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff meanwhile were dividing the Pacific into two main theaters, the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). (Map 8) The latter was to include the large land masses, Australia, New Guinea, the East Indies (except Sumatra), and the Philippines, as well as the Bismarck Archipelago and part of the Solomon Islands. POA was to include most of the remainder of the Pacific. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, who already commanded naval forces in this area, was named commander in chief of Allied forces. Roosevelt’s choice for command of all Allied air, sea, and ground forces in the Southwest Pacific Area was MacArthur. The Australians received Roosevelt’s nomination of the general with great enthusiasm. Almost from the time of his arrival in the Commonwealth, MacArthur had had the prerogatives if not the title of commander in chief. His nomination as supreme commander approved by the governments concerned, MacArthur on 18 April officially assumed his position as the leader of the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific. He organized three new commands under his own General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area: Allied Land Forces under Australian General Sir Thomas Blarney, Allied Air Forces under General Brett, and Allied Naval Forces under Vice Adm. Herbert F. Leary. Continuing under MacArthur’s direction were USFIP, commanded by General Wainwright, and USAFIA, now headed by General Barnes. As set forth in Marshall’s orders, MacArthur’s mission was threefold: to hold Australia, prevent the Japanese from cutting supply lines to the United States, and prepare to take the offensive.48
Map 8: Pacific Ocean Areas, 1 August 1942
MacArthur, on arrival at Melbourne, had learned of the plans of the Australian Chiefs of Staff which called for a defense of the southeastern part of the Commonwealth. He almost at once came to the conclusion that a different strategy was needed. Plans for continental defense he rejected as impractical. To hold the vast stretches of the sparsely inhabited country would require a large army; even
twenty-five divisions might not be enough. Considerable air and naval power would also be necessary, and no such force was available or in prospect. In the near future, the Southwest Pacific could count on having only two American and possibly three Australian divisions and small naval and air forces. But, MacArthur reasoned, it might be possible, with only limited forces, to ward off invasion by striking enemy-held islands and enemy naval forces and shipping during an attempted approach to
Australia. The Japanese seemed most apt to try to seize the rich industrial regions of Victoria and New South Wales rather than the barren deserts of the west and north. Consequently, the islands to the northeast appeared most liable to attack. Port Moresby, on the southern coast of New Guinea, would be a particularly valuable prize, since it controlled the air and sea lanes southward along the Australian coast. MacArthur decided not to wait for the Japanese to come to Australia, but to go north to meet them. With the forces allotted to the Southwest Pacific a good defensive position could be maintained, and it might even be possible to launch limited offensives.49
Role of the Engineers
In choosing to defend Australia in the islands to the north, MacArthur gave the engineers a decisive role. The battle would be joined on mountainous, jungled, rain-drenched islands, where overland movement and supply would be all but impossible. The airplane would be a principal weapon and heavy reliance would have to be placed on water transport. What MacArthur envisioned was a war in which airfields, ports, and bases would be the prerequisites of victory. Northern Australia had few facilities for waging modern war; New Guinea and the nearby islands had almost none. The engineers would have to build what was needed from the ground up and under the most difficult conditions. Construction would be their chief mission, but not their only one. Before Allied troops could advance, the engineers would have to provide maps of the uncharted, enemy-held regions. Once an offensive was launched, they would have to support the infantry in combat, help reduce enemy strongpoints, and perform many of their traditional functions in moving the army forward. Though MacArthur would employ the engineers in many ways, the effectiveness of his strategy would, in large measure, depend on the speed with which they could build bases and, above all, airfields from which fighters and bombers could strike at enemy targets.
That Casey would be chief engineer of SWPA had been a foregone conclusion, and on 19 April MacArthur issued the necessary orders. Having already had several weeks to study conditions in Australia, Casey was aware of the immense task ahead. As chief engineer of an Allied headquarters, he would coordinate the activities of all engineers, Australian and American, under MacArthur’s command, frame the policies under which they would work, and give them technical direction. To handle this assignment, he believed he would need a staff of at least 25 officers and men. But the number of officers in the theater was so scant that at first he could set up only a small section consisting of 5 officers and 5 enlisted men. Heiberg, transferred from Johns’s office, became his executive officer; Maj. Emil F. Klinke, transferred from the 43rd General Service Regiment, became chief of operations and training. Lacking experts in construction, Casey asked Reybold to send him Lt. Col. Bernard L. Robinson, then in Wyman’s office in Honolulu, and Leif J. Sverdrup, at that time about to
General Casey and General Sverdrup (photograph taken in 1944)
return to the United States in connection with work on the air ferry route and soon to be commissioned a colonel. Sverdrup and Robinson reached Australia in late May. Sverdrup became chief of the Construction Section and Robinson, assistant chief. Although his staff was part of an Allied headquarters, Casey had but one subordinate who was not American, an Australian major who served as liaison officer. He nevertheless intended to work closely with Maj. Gen. Clive S. Steele, who was both Engineer in Chief of the Royal Australian Engineers (RAE) and Engineer in Chief of the Allied Land Forces under General Blamey. Working with the Australians and integrating their engineer effort into the Allied program would require not a little tact and diplomacy, since the Commonwealth’s Department of Defence lay outside MacArthur’s jurisdiction.50 (Chart)
Chart: Major Command Channels and lines of engineer technical supervision, Southwest Pacific Area, 1 May 1942
At conferences held during the last weeks of April, Casey and Steele took stock of their resources. They had to assume that they would not have large numbers of American engineers at their disposal. One aviation battalion, 2 general service regiments, 2 separate battalions, and 2 dump truck companies would be in Australia by the end of April. Scheduled to arrive in May and June were 2 divisional combat battalions, 2 topographic units, and a depot company, the only additional engineer units approved by the War Department for SWPA at that time. This small contingent would hardly be sufficient for the tasks ahead, but fortunately, increasing numbers of Australian engineers were available. Units of the RAE were returning home with their divisions, and Steele had launched a strenuous recruiting drive. The engineers of the Australian Military Forces, while poorly trained and equipped, were receiving intensive instruction from veterans of the RAE. Steele expected soon to be in a position to furnish not only combat, construction, and supply units, but also all the camouflage and railway troops MacArthur needed. He was further prepared to supply the Americans with bridging, landing barges, barbed wire, and camouflage nets. Casey reasoned that water supply units from the United States could be dispensed with, since providing water would be difficult only in the parched deserts in the interior of Australia, and in his opinion the Allies did “not propose to have any operations there.” He did believe, however, that more troops trained in general and combat engineering must be sent from the United States. Urgently needed were an additional aviation battalion, 2 separate battalions, and 2 dump truck companies, a depot company, and a combat battalion, all fully equipped, and a heavy ponton battalion without its equipage. This was the absolute minimum but probably all that could be expected in view of the shortage of trained units in the United States, the lack of shipping, and the priority of operations planned for Europe. With a few reinforcements from the United States, Casey and Steele believed they could support the kind of strategy MacArthur had in mind. But engineer strength would have to be spread thin in the Southwest Pacific.51
While Casey drew long-range plans for the coming offensive, he had to supervise a construction program that was growing rapidly larger and more difficult of accomplishment. In announcing his strategy, MacArthur had indicated the need for prodigies of engineering in northern Australia and New Guinea. Port Moresby, northeastern Queensland, and Darwin were now areas of primary military importance. Greatest stress would have to be placed on developing Port Moresby, which MacArthur regarded as the key to the defense of Australia and the springboard for future offensives. Building an air and supply base in this exposed area would require much more than an ordinary engineer effort. Large numbers of men and
quantities of material and equipment needed to improve facilities in the town and to construct roads and airfields in the surrounding countryside would have to be sent in over supply lines that were vulnerable to enemy attack. If Moresby were to serve as the main air base for operations to the north, a string of supporting airfields would have to be constructed along the coast of northern Queensland. This, too, would be a formidable job, for little was known about terrain and soil conditions of the bush and jungles of the Cape York Peninsula. Darwin figured less prominently in MacArthur’s plans, but because the enemy might attack from the northwest and because the Allies might decide to invade the Indies, the hard work of building in remote Northern Territory would have to be continued and indeed stepped up. While emphasis was now on the north as never before, MacArthur could not neglect his flanks; western Australia would have to be provided with more airfields to guard against a Japanese thrust at that part of the continent. Moreover, logistical facilities in southern Australia would have to be expanded. MacArthur chose Sydney, the largest city and port of Australia, as the principal supply center for the American forces, rather than Melbourne, some 400 miles to the south. Thus, not only would a vast new program have to be undertaken, but the existing one would have to be continued.52 Only after base development was fairly well along would MacArthur be able to take the offensive.
Organizing the Engineer Effort
Since the war in the Southwest Pacific was clearly destined to be a “poor man’s war,” the engineers would have to make the most of what they had. As Casey saw it, they would have to build “what is wanted within the minimum time and with the minimum expenditure of manpower and material resources.” This ideal had not yet been attained. There was evidence of waste, duplication of effort, poor management, and inefficient administration. Too much was being done on “a peacetime basis of permanency.” Too many projects were long-term and would be of no help in furthering immediate military objectives and, “in addition, might seriously endanger other urgent military projects direly needed now.” Priorities were almost meaningless. In one case, a dressing room for women in a defense plant carried a higher priority than a hospital for the RAAF. It seemed that nearly every project of any importance was rated A-1. Although the shortage of equipment was acute, many contractors were not operating on a multiple shift basis. Agencies were duplicating each other’s work. In Queensland, the RAAF, the U.S. Air Forces, the Commonwealth government, and the engineers were all engaged in picking sites for airfields. Machinery for working with the Australians was slowed by red tape. It took the Allied Works Council an excessively long time not only to get approval to start a project but also to obtain permission
to make minor changes in specifications. Casey concluded that this state of affairs would force him to take a strong stand.53
One of his prime objectives was to give the program unified direction. He therefore set out to view construction in broad perspective, to consider projects not on an individual basis but as parts of an integrated program. As a first step toward this goal, he directed his staff to inventory jobs, under way and projected, and to make a survey of available manpower, materials, and equipment. He next attempted to formulate “a planned program of ... construction with definite time limits based on ... a knowledge of requirements and resources.” Once the program had been defined, he intended to keep close check on rates of progress and percentages of completion. He asked for uniform progress reports from each project, explaining that “the purpose is to see that the job is approximately up to date and if behind ... [what] action can be taken to bring it up to schedule.”54 Merely analyzing the program and diagnosing its ills were not enough. Casey would have to persuade others to follow his suggestions. Under the command-staff setup, he could not issue orders, but since he was MacArthur’s chief engineer, his recommendations would carry great weight.
He encountered resistance almost at once. The American airmen, not content to be dependent on the base sections, wished to handle their own construction. They were quick to cite examples of waste and inefficiency in the existing arrangement. To strengthen their position, they had already made a beginning toward setting up their own engineer establishment with the appointment on 6 March of Abbott as air engineer. After reminding Casey of the many difficulties the base sections had encountered in getting Air Forces projects finished on time, Brett on 18 April proposed that a separate field organization be created to handle the building of airfields. He asked that each air area commander be assigned an engineer who would be responsible to USAFIA for all Air Forces jobs in the area, selecting the sites and supervising the construction. Casey was unalterably opposed to such an arrangement. Not only would the authority of the air engineers conflict with that of the base section commanders, but this might well be the first step toward the establishment of a dual engineer organization with control of the aviation battalions exclusively by the Air Forces. Because the number of engineers in SWPA was so small, Casey believed that having two separate field systems would merely slow down progress. He countered Brett’s proposal with one of his own. What was needed, he suggested, was not another field organization but better coordination between the existing one and the Air
Forces. He persuaded Brett to let Johns assign engineers from the base sections to air commands in areas where extensive airfield construction was under way. These air engineers would act as liaison officers between the air areas and the base sections. They would also help select sites and inspect projects and could order minor changes in plans and specifications, but they would not be responsible for construction. Thus, Casey was able to forestall the setting up of a separate engineer organization under the Air Forces.55
Casey had no sooner come to an understanding with Brett than he found himself at odds with the RAAF. Although this organization was engaged in an extensive construction program, Casey was unable to get a list of its projects. Nor was the RAAF inclined to tell him how many fields it planned to build or what its overall requirements would be. He learned indirectly that it was concentrating heavily on the southeast and was planning to work on some eighty fields in the Sydney area alone. While these matters were not, strictly speaking, his affair, Casey believed that the concentration of so much effort in the southeast was detrimental to Allied strategy. He prepared a memorandum for Brett, indicating that there was not “complete coordination,” between the American and Australian air forces. He expressed the belief that it was “desirable that the broad picture of Allied Air Force construction requirements be pulled together into an all-embracing program.” He went on to say that if “we are to be forced back into the southeastern Australian area, an extensive construction program in that area is undoubtedly wanted” but implied that if MacArthur’s strategy were sound, many of the southern projects could be dropped. While this memo was still on his desk, Casey received a letter from General Steele of the RAE, telling him of the RAAF’s plan to organize four works units for building airfields, each unit to consist of 1,000 men and to be equipped with heavy machinery. “I feel a little diffident,” Steele wrote, “but in view of [the] manpower shortage feel that I should ... [suggest] that their establishment seems somewhat top-heavy.” Casey had additional grounds for objecting—the works units would probably be used exclusively on RAAF projects. He quickly drafted a second memo to Brett in which he recommended that smaller units, modeled on U.S. engineer aviation companies, be formed and placed under Steele. Taking both memos, he set off for the headquarters of the AAF. Brett glanced over the documents and passed them on to his chief of staff, Australian Air Vice-Marshal William D. Bostock.56
Two days later Bostock held a meeting of air officers and engineers. Casey, away on a field inspection trip, could not attend. Among those present were Lt. Col. Ward T. Abbott, Col. E. S. Bres of Johns’ office, and 1st Lt. Max D. Lovett
of Casey’s staff. A rather heated discussion developed. Bostock opened the conference with the statement that he thought a great many of Casey’s misgivings about the RAAF’s construction program were the result of “incomplete information” and suggested that the chief engineer possibly had not “had an opportunity of thoroughly dealing with ... [the] problem.” Bostock was not inclined to discuss the question of how RAAF works units should be organized. This, he said “was the concern of the Australian Government and a matter for the Ministry of Air to decide. ... It was not a question for Allied Air Forces to worry about.” Remarking that Casey seemed “somewhat worried” over the amount of construction going on in the southeast, Bostock stated that manpower and materials available there could not always be sent elsewhere. On the island of Tasmania, for example, there were plenty of laborers ready to work at home but unwilling to go to New Guinea. When Colonel Abbott asked if the equipment in Tasmania could not be sent north, Bostock retorted that that was a matter for the Allied Works Council. As Colonel Heiberg put it later, the “general attitude ... seemed to be that works are now progressing satisfactorily, and no external control is desired or necessary.” The RAAF nevertheless agreed to make one concession; it would furnish a statement of its airfield program to Brett.57
Even as he attempted to coordinate construction work and to centralize responsibility, Casey, together with other engineers, favored the policy of giving more authority to the field. In the early days the men directly in charge of projects had had little leeway. Approval for even the most trifling jobs had to come from Melbourne. The granting of more power to the base section commanders had been advocated for some time. On 26 March Brett had ruled that jobs costing less than £1,000 (about $3,200) could be undertaken by base section commanders on their own authority. On 3 April he raised the ceiling to £5,000 (about $16,000). Since the vast majority of projects were to cost less than this sum, Brett thus decentralized his authority over most of the program. Many engineers believed that Theodore would have to follow suit. Contractors were having to get the AWC’s approval for practically everything they did. When Colonel Matthews tried to stop certain work he considered unnecessary at Charters Towers and Cloncurry, the contractor refused to quit, saying that he took “his orders from Brisbane.” Both Casey and Steele proposed that the AWC send to the projects representatives clothed with authority comparable to that of the base section commanders. Then, if Matthews wanted a few buildings more or less at Charters Towers, he could get approval directly from the AWC’s man at the site. Theodore at first objected, maintaining that a telephone call to him would bring action within twenty-four hours. To this Steele replied that “he was interested in a method of operation that can go on in the event a bomb should cut the telephone lines.” Finally Theodore agreed
to send out men empowered to make on-the-spot decisions. Soon “coordinating engineers” were on their way to many of the large projects with orders to remove bottlenecks and improve efficiency.58
Minimum Construction Requirements
It was difficult to escape the conclusion that much of the construction was overelaborate and some of it unnecessary. On the road from Townsville to Charters Towers Casey observed workmen putting in a heavy type of culvert, better suited for a permanent peacetime highway than for a temporary military supply route. He learned that the RAAF was planning to build an officers’ club costing $100,000 at Darwin. There were many projects which would not be finished for years but would benefit the Australian economy after the war. Insisting that construction be held to “bare essentials,” Casey suggested that long-term projects be deferred. “The tactical situation might materially alter ...,” he pointed out, and works which will not be completed for say a year or more hence will be of no value insofar as near term operations are concerned.” Many of the AWC officials agreed with him. They too wished to avoid “spit and polish” construction and to eliminate jobs which would not contribute to the winning of the war. But paring down to essentials was no easy matter. Many commanders, American and Australian, were interested in building elaborate installations for themselves and in promoting their own pet projects. Many jobs had been started before Japan declared war, and supplies and materials had already been allocated. Yet the situation was not quite so hopeless as it appeared. Officials of the AWC through their control of manpower, materials, and equipment could do much to correct abuses, and Casey kept up unremitting pressure to make them do so.59
The chief engineer saw still another opportunity to economize. Believing an enemy landing imminent, the Australians were making frantic preparations in the southeast to hold back the invader and, failing that, to destroy everything in his path. Around Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane, large numbers of men were mining roads and bridges, digging trenches, preparing tank traps, and making ready to put a scorched-earth policy into effect. Undoubtedly much of this work could be suspended. Fixed positions would be of little value since the enemy could easily bypass most
of them. Because 10,000 miles of coast line had to be protected, Australia’s defenses should be mobile. Casey held that materials for fortifications and demolitions should be stockpiled at points “where they can be procured quickly in an emergency rather than all emplaced ... beforehand.” In place of the scorched-earth policy, he advocated a “two stage” program for wrecking Australia’s industrial plant; first, a partial demolition, and second, a complete destruction. The Japanese, he argued, would very likely be expelled from the continent within a few months after their first landing. The Australians had therefore but to put important industrial and power plants out of operation for a comparatively short period, a task that could be quickly accomplished by removing or destroying vital machine parts. Total destruction should be carried out only as a final resort and then only on orders from MacArthur. Although General Steele gave this suggested program wholehearted support, the Australian Government insisted that the work of fortifying the southeast and preparing for total destruction be continued.60
Sometimes the engineers themselves were guilty of overelaborate construction. This situation developed largely because they still had so few suitable plans and specifications to work with. Until the Americans had designs for buildings that were both cheap and easy to construct, their projects would continue to consume excessive amounts of effort and materials. On 5 April Johns had settled the question of uniform plans and specifications by ruling that the theater of operations drawings would henceforth be standard. As fast as plans could be modified to meet conditions in Australia, they were to be sent to the field. Base section engineers were permitted to make minor changes which would enable them to utilize locally available materials and to expedite construction.
As the name implied, theater of operations drawings were intended for use in overseas theaters, where only the flimsiest and most temporary structures were required. The Australian Army, building in home territory, erected more durable installations and would have preferred that the Americans also construct along more permanent lines. When MacArthur in April ordered camps for two American divisions in northeastern Queensland, Casey, following the theater of operations plans, directed a minimum of shelter and no conveniences. The enemy, he reasoned, was already accustomed to living under the most primitive conditions. If the Americans were to defeat the Japanese, they must be no less rugged. General Blarney saw the matter in a different light. Contemplating the eventual use of the camps by the Australian Army, he proposed that the Allies work out designs together. If Blarney’s suggestion were followed, the engineers might as well forget the theater of operations plans. Pointing out that General Steele considered American structures suitable
for Australian units, Casey ruled that adherence to the theater of operations drawings would continue to be required at all American projects.61
Supply Policies
Although the campaign to cut down to bare essentials was moderately successful, the demand for materials and equipment still far exceeded the supply. Both Americans and Australians were banking heavily on shipments from the United States. The Commonwealth was calling for tremendous quantities of lend-lease equipment; on one occasion, Prime Minister Curtin had requested nearly a thousand items of heavy machinery, including 445 tractors, 111 carryalls, 142 rollers, 161 rooters, and 83 graders. The U.S. Army’s total requests were nearly as large as those of the Australians. By March, Reybold’s office had on file numerous orders from USAFIA. A single requisition listed 2,000,000 square feet of landing mat, 3,250,000 gallons of asphalt, 200 motors, 70 D-8 tractors with dozers, 50 carryalls, and large quantities of other types of equipment and supplies. The Chief of Engineers promised to do his best to meet requirements in the Southwest Pacific but offered little encouragement. Manufacturers of construction equipment were booked heavily for many months to come. A few of the items, among them asphalt, bitumen, and landing mat, were immediately available, but ships to carry them to Australia were not. Reybold’s advice was to ask for less from the United States and to get more in Australia.62
Surveys of Australia’s industrial capacity showed that local production of engineer items could be considerably expanded. The Broken Hill Proprietary Company, the country’s largest industrial combine, was capable of producing 9,000,000 gallons of tar annually, and this material could be used in place of asphalt or bitumen. Steel fabricating plants could be converted to the manufacture of landing mat. Several concerns had facilities for making stone crushers, portable pumps, and sheepsfoot rollers. The Commonwealth government had ordered the AWC to increase the manufacture of earth-moving equipment. Working closely with members of the council on this job, Casey and Colonel Wright had a hand in promoting the formation of the Earth Moving Manufacturers Group. This body included not only the principal makers of this type of machinery, among them the Australian affiliates of International Harvester and of Le Tourneau, but also a number of concerns which had not previously built such equipment. By pooling their resources and distributing orders so that one plant would not be overburdened with work while others stood idle, the members of the group stepped up production of graders, dozers,
shovels, rooters, cranes, and scrapers. Although certain special parts still had to come from the United States, a large percentage of equipment requirements could be filled in Australia. Meeting in mid-April, Johns, Casey, and Theodore agreed to defer delivery of most American-made goods and to cancel many orders outright.63
Decisions affecting the engineer supply picture, if not always made by Casey, were generally influenced by him. From the first he saw to it that his opinions were well known to the Allied Supply Council, the policy-making body which controlled procurement in the Southwest Pacific. Established in March 1942, the council included Americans, Australians, British, and Dutch, whose job it was to find means of exploiting Australian resources to the fullest and to determine what must be imported. Casey kept abreast of the council’s activities, scrutinizing the minutes of each meeting. By working through the American representative, he obtained sympathetic consideration of the engineers’ needs. Because local manufacturers of earth-moving machinery looked to America for engines and bearings, he also assumed responsibility for apportioning the end products among the Australian and U.S. Armies and the Allied Works Council. After the signing of the American-Australian Lend-Lease agreement in May, the chief engineer occupied a position of considerable power. MacArthur’s office reviewed every request for lend-lease aid and controlled the distribution of incoming shipments. Casey ruled on all matters involving engineer construction supplies and equipment.64
AWC Construction
All these efforts notwithstanding, success of the construction program rested largely with the Allied Works Council. Responsible for the great majority of projects on the continent, the council had made rapid strides during its first few months of existence. By mid-May it was directing a work force of nearly 45,000. Well over 100 airfields were under construction, about 50 in New South Wales alone. Bombers were operating from new runways at Charters Towers, Garbutt, and Eagle Farm; fighters, from numerous smaller fields. The U.S. Air Forces had begun moving into the big depot at Tocumwal. Work had been launched on the 7 fields of an inland ferry route extending from Melbourne to Cloncurry in the interior of Queensland—a communications link that would be vitally needed if the eastern coast came under attack. At Melbourne, Adelaide, and Brisbane, recently completed warehouses were being stocked and more stood ready to receive additional stores. From Sydney, Maj. William Lehr, engineer of the recently organized Base Section Seven in New South Wales, reported that the council
An Australian road builder and his trailer
had begun erecting facilities that would enable the Americans to use the port as their main base of supply. Theodore had meanwhile accelerated work on defense highways, on tank farms for storing 114,526,000 imperial gallons of oil, and on munitions plants. He now had to cope with a program that was increasing at the rate of 2,000 jobs a month. So extensive had construction become that the council reluctantly concluded that workers must be drafted. On 14 April, the government had empowered Theodore to establish the Civil Constructional Corps, an organization of civilian volunteers and draftees. All male civilians between the ages of 18 and 60 were liable for service, except defense workers. While the CCC was to be under Theodore’s direction, recruitment and conscription were left to the states. Victoria, the first state to conscript workers, started calling up men in May; New South Wales began one month later. The Allied Works Council had made a substantial contribution and would soon be in position to make an even larger one. But the fact remained that most of its efforts, directed as they were to the Australian defense program, were confined to the southeastern part of the continent.65
From the American point of view the most crying need was for airfields in the northeast. The critical area of southeastern New Guinea was still almost defenseless. While enemy planes, based at Rabaul on New Britain and at Lae and Salamaua on the northeastern New Guinea coast, bombed Port Moresby at will, Allied airmen were severely handicapped by the lack of bases in New Guinea and on the Cape York Peninsula. At Moresby were two fields, both small and crudely built. Seven-Mile Drome, east of the town, had one 5,000-foot runway, surfaced with bitumen but in poor condition. Surrounding hills made takeoffs hazardous. Kila Drome, a commercial field 3 miles southeast of Moresby, was “a 3,000 foot roller coaster with 300-foot hills at its ends and grades to make your hair stand on end.” The fields on the Cape York Peninsula at Cairns, Cooktown, and Coen, and on Horn Island, off the tip of the peninsula, were small and rough, and so near the sea that they were fogged in much of the time. Small numbers of fighters and light bombers could be based at the Moresby and Cape York fields, but B-17’s had to operate out of Townsville, far down on the Queensland coast. From there the heavy bombers flew the 600 miles to Moresby, arriving at dusk. Taking on fuel and bombs during the night, they left early in the morning to strike at enemy targets to the north.66
The Air Forces could not bring their full strength to bear under these conditions. If the Allies were to neutralize Japanese positions on the northern coast of New Guinea and on New Britain and to gain control of the skies over Moresby, more air power must be based farther north.
Construction there would have to be accomplished without the help of the AWC. Theodore was reluctant to send workers to the Cape York Peninsula, much less to New Guinea. In May, when the council began to consider establishing the Civil Constructional Corps in Queensland, the question arose whether the men should be assigned to forward areas. The Australians hesitated to take such a step. Some thought that because of the possibility of attack by enemy raiding parties, the workers would have to be armed for their own protection. General Steele pointed out there was a chance they would be shot if captured. He was of the opinion that employing the Civil Constructional Corps in forward areas would need “careful consideration.” Australian commanders in New Guinea were adamant against bringing in civilians, insisting that all persons in that threatened area must be under military control. So long as the grave danger of invasion remained, Theodore would not send civilians north of Townsville. Nor would he send large quantities of supplies. Concerned lest Australian defense projects be slighted, he hesitated to “denude” the works agencies in Victoria and New South
Wales of their equipment and to deplete their stock of materials. Americans found that the farther north they went, the more difficult it became to secure the council’s assistance.67
For airfields in the Cape York Peninsula, the engineers would have to depend on the Queensland Main Roads Commission. After reconnaissance parties of the 46th Engineers had located two good sites—one near Mareeba, a small town on the Atherton Tablelands west of Cairns, the other, near Cooktown Mission, about a hundred miles to the north—the commission took over the work of construction. Farther north it began lengthening the principal runway of the small field at Coen and improving the strip on Horn Island. These jobs had to be carried out in the face of great difficulties. All of the sites were isolated. There were no rail or road connections with the remainder of the continent so that supply was possible only by air or sea. Men experienced chiefly in building roads now had to build airfields without adequate equipment or supplies. Progress was understandably slow, but the engineers were grateful for Australian help. “I was deeply impressed with the splendid work performed by the Main Roads Commission organization” at Cooktown Mission and Mareeba, Casey wrote later. “Both of these fields are important ones for our present and proposed operations.” Matthews also had high praise for the Australians’ effort. “Had it not been for Jumbo Jack Mathison, the Main Roads Commissioner, located at Townsville,” he wrote, “the work we undertook in ... [Base Section Two] by civilian forces could not have been accomplished, as AWC was not only unable but apparently unwilling to do much.”68
Engineer Units in Northern Australia and New Guinea
Matthews needed more engineers desperately. Until early April the 46th was the only engineer unit in Queensland. On the loth of that month, two battalions (separate), the 91st under Lt. Col. Burton B. Bruce and the 96th under Lt. Col. Leverett G. Yoder, reached Townsville. With the landing of these two units, some 2,200 troops were added to the labor force.69 Unfortunately, separate battalions were never intended to handle large or complex construction jobs. They were designed rather to serve mainly as labor pools. Men were to be attached as needed to other engineer units. With an authorized strength of 28 officers and 1,059 enlisted men, a battalion had but one motorized road grader, one ½-cubic-yard power shovel, 8 medium tractors with angledozers, and
47 trucks, nearly one-third of which were 2 ½-ton. Hand tools were the principal equipment. After they reached Australia, neither the 91st nor the 96th was to receive the greater part of the machinery assigned to it. What happened is something of a mystery. “These units never did get their organic equipment except their half-tracks and their air compressors,” Matthews wrote. “We know the equipment was landed. But I never could trace it after that. ...” The 46th Engineers furnished a few trucks to both the 91st and the 96th, but the men would have to do their daily work mainly by hand. Although greatly disappointed because he had not received general service regiments, Matthews found plenty of work for the troops to do.70
Most of the men were put to building airfields. After helping the 46th Engineers at Woodstock for a few days, the 91st Battalion moved to Giru, thirty miles southeast of Townsville, to clear ground for a new strip. Meanwhile, Companies A and C of the 96th were assigned the dual mission of providing three 7,000-foot turf strips at Kelso Field near Townsville and furnishing work parties for other jobs. The troops were severely handicapped by their lack of equipment. The 96th tackled the job at Giru with picks, shovels, wheelbarrows, and a carpenter’s level. Requested to supply machinery, the local office of the AWC rented some from farmers in the surrounding countryside. The first implement obtained was a horse-drawn mowing machine. In time the council turned over a few trucks and graders. The three remaining companies of the 96th did not work in Queensland, having been alerted, after a few days ashore, for movement to Port Moresby.71
Plans for developing Moresby into a first-class operational base had been in the making for almost a month. After inspecting the town early in April, Casey had written MacArthur, “[this] is one of our most vital areas, and ... highest priority should be given to the development of the airfields in this locality.” Moresby had much to commend it. Besides the two airfields, it had a deep water harbor with a dock for unloading freighters, two piers for barges, and a seaplane ramp. There was also a power plant, a water supply system, and about twenty-five miles of road, seven of which were asphalted. The chief engineer recommended that the port and the two airfields be improved and that three new fields be built. He asked that one general service company, one separate battalion (less two companies), and one dump truck company be sent in as soon as possible.72
On 22 April an advanced detachment of the 96th left Townsville by air and landed at Seven-Mile Drome, the first American ground troops to reach New Guinea. Late on the evening of the 28th a boat carrying headquarters and Companies B and D steamed into Moresby harbor. Morale was low. The enemy had by some means apparently learned of the movement of the 96th. Someone had picked up a broadcast from Tokyo announcing that on the next day, the Emperor’s birthday, Japanese airmen would make a devastating raid on Port Moresby and promised that before long the streets would run red with American blood. During the night, the engineers worked at the docks in a pouring rain to unload their cargo, for the ship had to be out of the harbor before dawn. When the men entered Moresby proper the next day they found a ghost town. The city’s 2,000 white inhabitants had been evacuated, and nearly all of the natives had fled to the safety of their own villages. Although most buildings were still standing, the effects of repeated bombings were very much in evidence. The Australians had destroyed utilities and there were signs that they had begun to carry out a scorched-earth policy. The Americans took what encouragement they could from the fact that a small number ‘of Royal Australian Engineers were already at work on Seven-Mile Drome, patching up the bomb-damaged runways.73
The 96th had a task it could not perform well—that of building airfields. Company B went to Seven-Mile Drome, where its first job was to help the Australians repair the runway. Then, with their hand tools, the men scraped out extensions at either end and provided additional taxiways and hardstands. Company D began work on two new runways, Bomana and Laloki, about twelve miles northeast of the town. On arriving at the sites, the engineers found that some rough grading had already been done. The men had no specifications to work from, no instructions on how to build, and, as usual, no equipment. Their officers had had little experience in airfield construction. The commander of Company D later described the operation as “building fields with our fingernails.” The engineers at Moresby eventually got a few graders and dozers from the Australians and rounded up several flat-bed trucks which still had the name of a Chinese vegetable dealer lettered on their sides. Air raids were frequent, and the men spent much time jumping in and out of slit trenches. In addition to working on the runways, the troops had to do all sorts of odd jobs. They refueled planes, loaded bombs, and worked as stevedores at Moresby harbor. These engineers could not be expected to accomplish much in the way of airfield construction.74 Until the arrival of more units, better trained and equipped, progress would continue to be slow.
About thirty miles northwest of Port Moresby was a wide, coastal plain, named
Rorona after a native village located there. Airfields at this location would make possible better dispersal of aircraft and would also enable fighters to cover Port Moresby more adequately. But a major drawback was Rorona’s almost inaccessible location. Between the plain and Port Moresby were numerous swamps. Coral reefs and sandbars along the coast made navigation extremely hazardous. Despite these adverse conditions, the Air Forces wished to have an airfield there. When on 4 May, Company E of the 43rd Engineer General Service Regiment, some 165 men, arrived at Port Moresby, it was not assigned to the fields near that town but to Rorona. With no equipment except their hand tools, one Australian grader, and three dump trucks, the men began work, helped by 150 natives.75
Progress in New Guinea was hampered not only by shortages of troops and equipment but also by an inadequate organizational setup. The Royal Australian Engineers were under the Australian commander at Moresby; the American engineers, under the commander of Base Section Two, Maj. Francis I. Irwin. Except for an occasional inspection, neither Irwin nor Matthews, who succeeded him as base section commander on 28 May, could give much attention to the troops in New Guinea. The men at Moresby seemed to be working without any definite purpose, having only vague information as to what to build or why. This partly explained their noticeable lack of incentive. Work of the Americans and Australians was not coordinated. More or less by chance, a division of labor evolved. Under Colonel Yoder, the Americans concentrated their efforts on airfields, including access roads and bridges. The Australians worked principally on camps, roads, and base facilities. Under this haphazard arrangement, neither group was very effective. High-ranking engineer officers generally agreed that something should be done but could not agree on what. Colonel Robinson suggested that units working on airfields be placed under the U.S. Air Forces and that an engineer be assigned to the staff of the Australian commander at Moresby to coordinate all construction in that area. No more willing to place engineer officers under Australian commanders than to assign engineer units to the Air Forces, Casey did not act on these recommendations. Although various proposals were made to develop a more effective Australian-American organization, no solution was reached.76
While the 96th was struggling to get fields started at Moresby, the 808th, the only aviation engineer unit in the theater, reinforced by one battalion of the 43rd General Service Regiment, continued to work in Northern Territory, building fields along the rail line from Darwin to Birdum. Even though the area of greatest danger appeared to be in the northeast, the possibility of an enemy assault from the northwest remained. Brett, still thinking in terms of an advance against the East Indies, continued to emphasize the importance of fields
near Darwin. At a conference with Casey on 24 April, he talked of using Darwin as the main port for launching an expeditionary force. He stressed that the strengthening of the region around the city was urgent. He believed the entire area should be brought under military control, adding that the Air Forces would soon be very active there, “ultimately embracing as much as 8 to 10 bomber squadrons, each of which would require about 400 tons per day for its operation. ...” Casey discouraged plans for using Darwin as an expeditionary port, explaining that “overland supply communications ... [were] too weak to sustain the development of this area” and that forces could be dispatched from large ports for operations in the Indies, in which case there would be no reason for stopping off at Darwin. Nevertheless, the chief engineer went along with Brett’s proposal to continue work on the airfields in Northern Territory.77
Working in a region of diminishing tactical importance, and far removed from Casey’s and Johns’ offices, the 808th and the 43rd Engineers were left largely to their own devices. Located in Northern Territory since early March, the 808th had already acquired considerable experience in working more or less independently. Upon receiving orders to build an airfield, the engineers selected sites, prepared plans and specifications, and began construction. By the time higher headquarters approved the plans, work was well along. The men sometimes found it expedient to disregard prescribed procedures and to resort to innovations. Their method for clearing wooded areas serves as a case in point. As a rule. the trees of this semiarid region, with shallow root systems and with trunks averaging 12 inches in diameter, could be pushed over fairly easily. Taking a cable about 400 feet long, the men fastened the ends to two D-6 tractors. They then drove the machines forward, parallel to each other, uprooting trees. Light cables about one inch in diameter, while they had to be spliced frequently, proved best because the troops had difficulty in raising heavier ones high enough to topple the larger trees. On several occasions, ten men were able to clear an area 5,000 feet long and 100 feet wide in ten hours. The unit took great pride in such exploits. According to the battalion’s chronicler, “the drive and spirit of the 808th seemed to have caught the fancy of the Australians, and from Darwin to Alice Springs and southward the name of the battalion became the watchword for work and efficiency.”78
By May the 808th was the best equipped engineer unit in the theater, a situation for which the men themselves were partly responsible. Moving heavy machinery across the 600-mile stretch of no-man’s-land from Alice Springs to Birdum and then northward on the dilapidated railroad was a hazardous and laborious undertaking. The odyssey of
one D-8 tractor illustrates the type of difficulties the 808th encountered. The big “cat” began its journey north from Alice Springs aboard a 20-ton trailer, which bumped along over the washboard road. The trip ruined the trailer, the only one of its size in the area. North of Birdum the flatcar carrying the tractor buckled under the weight of its cargo. A lieutenant and an enlisted man had to go down and drive the D-8 up to Katherine under its own power. Once the engineers got their equipment, they were hard put to keep it running. Spare parts had to come from Melbourne and shipments were infrequent. Two enlisted men, Pvt. Karl F. Bretschneider and Pvt. Jerald F. Patnode, were especially good at keeping the machines in repair. They combed the area for any materials they might be able to use and even searched bombed-out ships in Darwin harbor. By adapting the parts they could find and by improvising others, they succeeded in keeping most of the battalion’s equipment going.79
The engineers in Northern Territory were meeting the challenge of an arduous assignment. In an area which offered none of the usual American recreations, the men were “enjoying life as far as it was possible ... under the circumstances.” Working in an area 2,000 miles from the main American quartermaster depots, the engineers, after the first few weeks in this remote part of Australia, were able to get abundant quantities of food. They arranged to get rations from the Australian quartermasters, who were able to provide generous amounts of supplies. The country around the Pine Creek airfield had once been a gold mining center, and some of the troops spent their few free hours prospecting and panning for the precious metal. But the greatest boost to the men’s morale was the knowledge that their mission was important. Well aware of their nearness to the fighting zone and realizing only too well that a landing at Darwin could easily take place, the men knew that their best defense was the rapid building of airfields.80
Eastern New Guinea
The long-expected Japanese thrust soon materialized. During April, the enemy assembled near Rabaul a task force of 2 carriers, 7 heavy cruisers, and 13 destroyers, together with transports. Such a concentration of naval forces, coupled with an increase in enemy air strength in eastern New Guinea and on New Britain, was sufficient indication that the Japanese were about to strike, probably at both the Solomons and Port Moresby. Forces in northeast Australia and on New Guinea were alerted. The engineers near Townsville stopped work to prepare for defense. The 91st and Company F of the 46th took up positions in a gap in the coastal range near Giru. Companies E, D, and Headquarters and Service Company of the 46th remained at Woodstock field, ready to move to the beaches should the enemy attempt a landing. Companies A and C of the 96th
were held in reserve near Townsville. At Port Moresby, the newly arrived Headquarters Company and Companies B and D of the 96th got orders to carry full field equipment. They were to help defend a line fifteen miles inland from the beach. Should the Japanese break through, the engineers were to retreat into the jungle and make their way back to Australia as best they could. But the Japanese did not land. The Allied victory in the Battle of the Coral Sea saved Port Moresby and stopped the Japanese thrust southward across the Pacific supply lines.81
MacArthur believed the Japanese would try again. The enemy would need at least a month to prepare for a second assault on Moresby. In the interim the Allies would have to make every effort to build up their forward defenses. Uppermost in the minds of theater planners was the need for locating more air power in southeastern New Guinea to give added protection to Port Moresby and at the same time enable Allied airmen to strike more effective blows at enemy bases and shipping. MacArthur also intended to base more fighters and bombers on the fields of the Cape York Peninsula. If the Allies were not to be caught short, existing fields would have to be improved and new ones made operational before the Japanese returned.82
Of major importance was the construction of a base near the southeastern tip of New Guinea. As demonstrated by the Battle of the Coral Sea, an airfield was needed here so that Allied planes could intercept enemy ships rounding the tip of the island. Brett argued, moreover, that airdromes in that area would be essential to any offensive against Rabaul. On 20 May MacArthur chose as the site for a fighter field the general vicinity of Abau-Mullins Harbor on the southern coast of New Guinea, midway between Moresby and the southeastern end of the island. A landing strip was to be built as quickly as possible and a bomber field constructed later. As soon as a reconnaissance party had picked a specific site, one company of engineers was to be sent in, along with infantry and antiaircraft units. Planes were to be operating from the field three weeks after construction started. Since activity in this area might provoke a Japanese attack, MacArthur enjoined greatest secrecy.83
On 22 May, General MacArthur’s headquarters directed Yoder, the senior Engineer officer in New Guinea, to make a reconnaissance by air of possible airfield sites on the southern coast of the island. Five days later, Yoder with a party of Australians and Americans explored the region around Abau. The location did not appear promising. Information gathered by the group indicated that it would take about four months to build an airdrome at that
point. Twelve days later Yoder, with eleven Americans and Australians, made a second trip, this time to Milne Bay, at the extreme southeastern tip of New Guinea. In and near the coconut plantations at the western end of the bay, they found several good sites for airfields. The next day they turned in a favorable report to Casey. Among the advantages of Milne Bay were the availability of fresh water, coral, and gravel, and the presence of native laborers and Australian overseers. The area already had a landing strip, a road net, and a power plant. One of the principal drawbacks was that the area was “open on all sides to enemy attack.” The new information corroborated the sketchy data Casey’s office already had about Milne Bay. On 11 June MacArthur canceled the project at Abau and on the next day directed that the airdrome be built at Milne Bay instead.84
On 18 June Company E of the 46th Engineers left Townsville for Milne Bay, arriving on the 25th, together with some 500 Australian ground troops. The next day MacArthur’s headquarters set 20 July as the date the bomber field must be ready. Prospects were dim for meeting this deadline. The equipment brought in by the engineers consisted of 2 medium bulldozers, both in need of repair, 2 graders, 4 small dump trucks, and one cargo truck. Twenty additional items were at Moresby awaiting shipment, but no vessel had been found
to carry them eastward. At Milne Bay, unloading of machinery and supplies was rendered difficult by inadequate wharfage. Only one vessel at a time could discharge cargo. To help remedy the situation, the Australian commander ordered one platoon of Company E to build an unloading ramp and an access road. The rest of the engineers shortly began work on Strip No. i, about two miles west of the bay. Not the least of the company’s troubles was the climate. The heat was intense. This was a notorious malarial region, and before long 6 percent of the men of the task force had become ill with the disease. Since the rainfall was extremely heavy, averaging 150 inches a year, the engineers had to provide the field with an extensive drainage system. Despite their many handicaps, the men of Company E, helped by natives, labored day and night in a race against time.85
Meanwhile, the engineers were under pressure to step up construction on the Cape York Peninsula and in the area around Port Moresby. MacArthur directed that going projects be accelerated and that several new fields be built quickly. Responsibility for carrying out these orders now fell on Col. Willis E. Teale, chief engineer of USAFIA after 25 May when Johns became the G-4. Teale was hard put to find enough manpower. No assistance from the AWC
was in sight. The Queensland State Roads Commission already had as much work as it could handle. Any impetus the projects received would have to be provided by engineer units, and Teale pulled as many troops out of Townsville as he could. On 19 June Companies A and C of the 96th moved to Moresby, where they began a new runway at Kila and took over the operation of a quarry. Company A of the 46th went to Horn Island to help the Australians complete two runways for B–17’s. Companies B and C of the 46th sailed to Portland Roads, 150 miles south of Horn Island, to begin work on an airdrome for light bombers. During June MacArthur ordered construction of a bomber field near the tip of the Cape York Peninsula and of a fighter strip at Merauke, on the southern coast of New Guinea 450 miles west of Moresby. Teale, by this time scraping the bottom of the barrel, could not at once find engineer units for these last two jobs.86
Progress by Midyear
As the first half of 1942 drew to a close, construction was progressing over a vast area. By mid-June the Allied Works Council had under way a program comprising more than 10,000 projects estimated to cost a total of £60,520,000. Throughout the southeast new runways, warehouses, tank farms, wharves, camps, and hospitals were coming into use. In northern Australia and on New Guinea, American engineers were providing runways for defense and offense. In Northern Territory 8 fields had been completed by July and 7 more were well along. Of the 4 fields at Port Moresby, one, Seven-Mile, was suitable for all-weather operations; the other three could take bombers in emergencies. The field at Milne Bay had been started. Australians and Americans were developing a chain of fields on the Cape York Peninsula. Few of the runways in these forward areas were sealed, most had not even been treated to hold down dust, and, in the haste to carve out the many strips needed by the Air Forces, drainage had frequently been held in abeyance. Their substantial progress notwithstanding, neither the Allied Works Council nor the engineers were able to keep pace with MacArthur’s demands.87
The inability of the engineers to do more can be charged chiefly to shortages of men, materials, and equipment. So far only 10 engineer units had arrived from the United States—1 aviation battalion, 2 general service regiments, 2 separate battalions, 2 dump truck companies, 2 combat battalions, and 1 depot company—about 6,000 men in all. The RAE and the RAAF had as yet been able to send but few men to the north. The supply situation was not encouraging.
The Australians were continuing to husband their meager stocks, and shipments from the United States were pitifully small. At the end of June, Colonel Teale listed 37 tractors, 62 graders, 36 carryalls, one distributor, and one shovel with dragline, as the principal items received from the United States during the last six months. The one Engineer supply unit, the 391st Depot Company, had reached the theater in May, and its 6 officers and 188 men were attempting to organize and run 3 depots at Melbourne, Brisbane, and Townsville.88 Summing up, late in June, Colonel Robinson wrote that “equipment and personnel are inadequate to accomplish the Engineer mission in the Southwest Pacific Area, and it is therefore recommended that immediate steps he taken to augment Engineer construction forces and equipment.” He declared such action to be “vital to the success of any contemplated offensive.”89
Preparing for the Offensive
The Battle of Midway proved to be a turning point in the war against Japan. In this decisive naval engagement of 3 and 4 June, the main striking force of the Japanese Combined Fleet was destroyed. For the first time, the Allies were in a position to seize the initiative. The Joint Chiefs of Staff began to revise their plans accordingly. On 2 July, they directed Nimitz and MacArthur to mount a joint offensive, northwestward through the Solomon Islands and eastward from
New Guinea, with the ultimate object of capturing Rabaul, the chief Japanese stronghold in the Southwest Pacific. The first phase of the operation was to begin on 1 August, when the marines were to land in the southern Solomons. MacArthur had already been planning a thrust through New Guinea and the Solomons toward Rabaul, a plan of campaign known by the code name TULSA. On receiving the joint chiefs’ directive, he further developed this plan and prepared for the attack.90
To conquer Rabaul, the Allies would first have to gain air supremacy over the approaches to New Britain. Brett estimated the task would require at least twenty-four squadrons based in New Guinea. On 10 July he informed MacArthur that 12 additional airdromes were urgently needed—4 at Moresby, 4 at Milne Bay, and 4 at Buna on the northeastern coast of the island. All were to be provided with dispersals and sealed runways capable of taking heavy bombers. Brett pressed for “speedy consideration,” “prompt action,” and “rapid completion.” Information from Casey indicated that it would take all the engineers in the theater to do the job. This would mean “the withdrawal of all such personnel now in northern Queensland and perhaps in the Darwin area.” Yet, as Brett himself pointed out, much vital work remained to be done in the Cape York Peninsula.91
Casey had been concerned with the problem for some time. As early as 2 July he had suggested that the 808th be
transferred from Northern Territory for urgent construction “now in prospect” on New Guinea and New Britain.92 On 7 July, after receiving advance notice of Brett’s plans, he asked Colonel Sverdrup to estimate how long the work would take. The answer was not reassuring. With so few troops available, Sverdrup did not believe the engineers could build what the Air Forces asked for in anything like the time they stipulated. He spoke in terms of a year or more for the New Guinea fields. Two things seemed apparent. First, Brett must lower his requirements. Second, the engineers must get more units—ten aviation battalions or the equivalent. Casey agreed with the first of Sverdrup’s suggestions, but, since he was under no illusions as to his chances of obtaining so many additional troops, rejected the second in favor of a scheme for accomplishing a maximum amount of construction with the forces at hand.93
What he had in mind was to eliminate all frills from Air Forces projects and to move every available engineer to New Guinea as quickly as possible. He would cut the length of runways from 6,000 to 4,000 feet and treat the surfaces just enough to control dust. He would substitute landing mats for pavements, reduce the number of dispersals, and hold housing to minimum standards. Then, if the engineers remaining at Townsville were moved to New Guinea,
it might be possible to complete three dromes at Moresby and one at Milne Bay by 20 July, and more by the end of the month. With the transfer of the 808th from Darwin to New Guinea, scheduled for some time between 15 and 25 July, other units might be pulled out of Moresby and Milne Bay and sent north to begin work at Buna. At projects in Australia, RAAF works units and civilians could fill the breach left by the departing Americans. The engineers would concentrate on completing facilities first at Port Moresby, next at Milne Bay, and lastly at Buna. By 1 September, the Air Forces would have the requisite number of runways, crude to be sure, but usable. On 10 July Casey laid his plan before Brett, who accepted it in principle. Brett refused, however, to sanction the shortening of runways. Moreover, he reminded Casey that efforts to complete the Cape York fields could not be relaxed. The chief engineer had reservations of his own about the plan, for the difficulties of moving units into advanced areas and keeping them supplied were immense.94
A great deal would depend on the speed with which the engineers could finish their work in the Cape York Peninsula. Though Queensland began drafting men for a Civil Constructional Corps on 6 July, the Air Forces could not wait until the civilians were organized into an effective working force and sent northward.
The troops who left Townsville during July went therefore not to New Guinea but to various points on the peninsula. On 12 July, Headquarters and Service Company and Company D of the 46th arrived at Portland Roads to help elements of the regiment already at work there. One week later the 91st Battalion moved to the tip of the peninsula to build an airfield in an area shown on the maps as Red Island Point but more frequently called Jacky Jacky after a small river nearby. Later, one platoon of the gist went on to Horn Island. While these units were better equipped than before, the conditions they found were not conducive to the rapid completion of airfields. The region was an engineer’s nightmare. Around Portland Roads the terrain was jungled and dotted with huge ant hills, some of them twenty feet high. Jacky Jacky was a forbidding place, barren and desolate. Rocky beaches there prolonged the lightering of men and supplies for twelve days. Horn Island was “an ancient lump of granite,” devoid of gravel or coral. The isolation of these areas complicated supply. Signal communications were poor, so that requests for materials and equipment were difficult to send out and were seldom acknowledged. The best way of getting action was to send a man by plane to Melbourne or Brisbane. The shipping shortage was often given as the reason why engineering supplies and equipment were not getting to Cape York Peninsula, but frequently large quantities of bombs, aviation gasoline, and telephone poles, not yet needed, were dumped on shore. These articles usually had to be hauled away by the engineers, because quartermaster and
Air Forces troops, who should have done the job, were not on hand. There were other interruptions. Because rainfall was infrequent, the engineers had to spend considerable time searching for water. At Horn Island, the Australian commander, fearing enemy attack, insisted that the troops blast a tunnel under the runway. At each of the fields in northeast Australia the men worked steadily, but the pace was slow.95
In New Guinea, the troops were experiencing trouble too. The 96th, still the only engineers at Moresby, were having an especially rough time. About all they had received in the way of additional equipment was a shipment of secondhand items from the AWC. This machinery was in such bad repair that “some of it wouldn’t even run when it came off the ship and had to be towed off the dock.96 Since no bitumen, calcium chloride, or molasses had been received, the engineers had to try to keep down the dust by sprinkling water on the runways. Although multiple shifts were at work in the quarry, there were too few trucks to keep the jobs supplied with gravel, the chief surfacing material. The projects at Moresby lagged behind schedule. At Milne Bay, Company E of the 46th was likewise beset by difficulties. Company E, the sole engineer outfit at this location until mid-July, when one company of RAE landed,
had to rely heavily on the help of natives. Not until 6 July did the bulk of its equipment reach Milne Bay, and even then several badly needed items were lacking. Having no rock crusher to break up the coral in the area and no dragline to remove gravel and sand in the river bed, the company hastily laid the landing mat on a silt base. Rains were especially heavy even for this wet region, and the mud oozed up through the perforations of the mat, making a slick film on the surface. There was then nothing to do but send for drag-lines, take up the mat, and put down a gravel base.97
Meanwhile, pressure was mounting on the engineers to build fields in the vicinity of Buna. Once established on the upper coast of Papua, MacArthur would be in a position to get the offensive rolling. Allied intelligence indicated that there was not much time to spare, for the Japanese were showing increasing interest in the Buna area. On the basis of reports he had received, MacArthur predicted that the enemy would attempt to land and then push southward over the Kokoda Trail. This primitive track ran from the vicinity of Buna to Kokoda, a village in the foothills of the Owen Stanleys, and thence over the mountains to Moresby. MacArthur planned to get to the northeastern New Guinea coast first. On 9 July he ordered a reconnaissance to determine if the small emergency landing strip at Buna would take military aircraft, and if not, whether there were suitable sites nearby. The
next day, a party of six officers, headed by Colonel Robinson, left Moresby by plane. They found the existing field to be of little military value. But on the grass plains at Dobodura, fifteen miles to the southwest, they discovered many excellent sites. Drainage was good, and gravel and timber were plentiful. Workmen could be drawn from the native population of the region. With little effort, a number of runways could be provided. On 15 July MacArthur issued orders to seize and occupy Buna and build an airdrome. He directed the organization of a special task force, Buna Force, to consist of engineers and protective troops. D-day was set for 10 August.98
As plans for the occupation of Buna took form, MacArthur began to ready his command for the offensive. He ordered the 41st and 32nd Divisions north from Melbourne and Adelaide to new camps in Queensland, where they were to undergo training in jungle warfare. In order to be nearer the combat zone, he transferred his headquarters from Melbourne to Brisbane, completing the move on 20 July. These shifts of American forces northward were accompanied by organizational changes. On 20 July, MacArthur redesignated USAFIA as U.S. Army Services of Supply (USASOS).
The organization was henceforth to discontinue such administrative and tactical functions as it had acquired during its first months of operations and concentrate its efforts more and more on providing logistical support. Brig. Gen. Richard J. Marshall replaced Barnes as head. The Allied Air Forces was also to come under new leadership. Sometime before, MacArthur had chosen Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney to replace Brett as commander of the Allied Air Forces and the U.S. Fifth Air Force. Kenney, who arrived from the United States on 28 July, assumed his new duties on 4 August.99
The Japanese acted more quickly than had been expected. Although their disastrous setback at Midway had ruled out further large-scale assaults, they were still strong enough to undertake limited offensives. Having failed, as a result of the Battle of the Coral Sea, in their attempt to take Moresby from the sea, they decided to launch an overland campaign. As MacArthur had anticipated, their strategy called for a landing on the northeastern coast of Papua, after which their troops were to advance through the mountains and take Moresby from the rear. On 21 July enemy transports put a force ashore near Buna. Encountering little opposition, the Japanese started out over the Kokoda Trail toward Moresby. Within a week they had reached Kokoda Village, eighty miles from Buna and almost half way to their goal.100
Four days after the enemy landing at Buna, the 808th engineers reached Moresby. Their arrival was timely, for construction of airfields here was now more imperative than ever before. Additional planes had to be based at Moresby if the Allied Air Forces were effectively to bomb Buna, harass the column advancing along the Kokoda Trail, and drop supplies to Australian infantry units marching north to meet the enemy.101
The 808th’s first job was to build a new airdrome, Waigani Field, about twelve miles north of the town. A part of the site had already been cleared, but a dense growth of timber had still to be taken out. The men found the work much more difficult than had been the case in Northern Territory. The trees were huge, many of them more than seventy-five feet high and with trunks measuring over two feet in diameter. Their roots were large and deep and their branches entangled in a thick growth of vines. The job of clearing was not one that could be accomplished merely with cables hooked to tractors. These trees had to be chopped down or dynamited. The increasingly serious tactical situation added to the strain brought on by long, fatiguing hours of work. Air raids were frequent, even during day time, and at night, “the continual fight against hordes of mosquitoes, the ... sounds of the jungle ... the rotten limbs dropping off the great trees,
small animals scurrying through grass and leaves, and the flying foxes swishing through the air made the men nervous and irritable from loss of sleep and personal discomfort.” The presence of a well-equipped and experienced aviation battalion at Moresby speeded construction, but there was still far more to do than these additional engineers could cope with.102
The enemy landing at Buna likewise rendered construction at Milne Bay all the more urgent. Yet for some time no reinforcements could he sent. While the Australian field company worked to provide seventy miles of road, Company E of the 46th struggled to hasten the building of runways. Colonel Teale was by now able to dispatch larger quantities of supplies to Milne Bay, but the difficulty of unloading ships continued to have a hampering effect. To get materials and equipment ashore, the engineers, using floating gasoline drums, rigged a makeshift wharf on which ships could discharge cargo into four trucks at a time. The new wharf helped the situation, but was not adequate for the quantities of cargo coming in. By late July the engineers had succeeded in getting the first strip far enough along to accommodate a squadron of pursuit planes and had begun clearing a second strip, three miles to the west of the first. MacArthur was meanwhile demanding greater speed. And speed was essential, for reports indicated that the Japanese might soon attempt to land at Milne Bay.103 But if construction were to go any faster, more engineers would be needed.
Help for the New Guinea jobs was in sight. At Darwin the RAAF units had begun to take hold, and Teale was preparing to transfer the 1st Battalion of the 43rd Engineers to Moresby. Since efforts by Australian civilians on the Cape York fields were beginning to produce results, the engineers there could soon move northward, turning unfinished construction over to the Main Roads Commission, which would complete its current projects in the peninsula around the middle of August. The increased support provided by the Australians enabled most of the engineers to pull out of Queensland. By early August the last of the units had left Townsville. On 6 August Company F of the 46th reached Merauke, on the southern coast of Netherlands New Guinea, to build a field to protect Moresby’s western flank. Two days later Companies D and F of the 43rd disembarked at Milne Bay. The withdrawal of the engineers still remaining on the continent would have to be accomplished as soon as possible.104
A clash between the Allies and the Japanese in New Guinea could not be long postponed. With enemy forces beyond Kokoda making their way through the precipitous Owen Stanley Range, the threat to the Allied position
in Papua was growing steadily. While the Japanese advance was much slower than it had been across the coastal plain, it was continuous. Meanwhile, on 7 August, American forces in the South Pacific were moving forward, and fighting had begun on Guadalcanal in the Solomons. The engineers were soon to be involved in combat on a broad front. The strides they had already made in building up defenses in the Southwest Pacific had substantially increased the Allied chances of victory in the coming test of strength.