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Part Two: Supply
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Chapter 2: Factors Shaping Research Activities
Total war requires the use of all national resources and the exploitation of all scientific knowledge and technological skills. In World War II the United States was engaged in global war which posed a supply problem of tremendous proportions. The supply responsibility of the Quartermaster Corps included the procurement, storage, distribution, and salvage of such supplies as clothing, food, petroleum products, individual and organizational equipment, and numerous “housekeeping” items. The QMC, under the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1920, was the most nearly universal supply agency of the Army. An essential part of its supply activity was research and developmental work to improve existing items and provide new equipment as the need became apparent.
To assure victory in the war it was necessary for the American soldier to be so equipped that he would be superior to his opponents in the field. As a result of the mechanization of warfare and the extension of battle fronts to all kinds of terrain in all types of climate, an enormous demand was created for a wide range of equipment of the highest attainable quality. From the standpoint of Quartermaster responsibility, this equipment included water-repellent fabrics, arctic and jungle clothing, shoepacs, ski boots, shrinkproof socks, and waterproof matches, as well as nutritious rations, mobile laundry and bath units, clothing and textile repair units, and portable field bakeries. So great was the emphasis on research and developmental work in World War II that the war’s end found such activities established as a permanent feature of military planning.
When the war began, however, the status of research and developmental activities left much to be desired. Such activities had been carried on since 1918, but there were two schools of thought as to the significance of the achievements of these twenty years. One group viewed the work done in that interval as the foundation for much that was accomplished in World War II. The second group deemed negligible the research activities of those years. The latter view was well expressed by the wartime director of the Military Planning Division.
It has been said too often that the Army started this war with the equipment with which it had ended World War I. Actually, the situation was much worse. Many items which had been developed as the result of field experience in the mud and rain of northern France in 1917 and 1918 were “modified” in peacetime to be more suitable for the garrison life at Ft. Benning, Georgia, or Ft. Sam Houston, Texas. Even after the outbreak of the war, the importance of immediately improving existing equipment was not recognized by many. … Furthermore, many of the items which are procured by the Quartermaster Corps are of commercial types. In peacetime research had to be carried out on Ordnance material because there were no commercial items available. On the other hand, it was felt by many that the Quartermaster Corps could and would accept standard
commercial designs and items without difficulty. No single point of view has perhaps done the Army more harm than this one. There are extremely few commercial items which are suitable for military use. The demands which the Army places upon equipment are such that the use of commercial items results in lower efficiency, higher casualties, and incidentally, higher costs. The inadequacies of existing equipment and the dangers implicit in its use were brought out at once in the snow and mud of supposedly subtropical North Africa and in the early campaigns in the Aleutians.1
Influence of World War I Surplus Property
Research and developmental activities of any period are conditioned chiefly by economic factors which determine their character and scope. In the years immediately following World War I surplus property was such a determining factor. When World War I ended, the existence of great stocks of nearly all the items of clothing and equipment which were then standard hindered the development of new items. It was approved War Department policy to issue such stocks until they were exhausted. The War Department recognized the danger of complacency resulting from the possession of such a tremendous mass of war gear. It kept in mind, too, the fact that much of this equipment was already
obsolescent at the time of its production. Accordingly, in 1922 the War Department inaugurated a policy of modernization.
The policy of the War Department is to develop and complete the best types of equipment and armament in time of peace, irrespective of the amount on hand as a result of the World War. Wherever the amount of a particular article of equipment or armament on hand precludes the possibility of production of a newer type, nevertheless the new type will be adopted, and complete specifications drawn up and approved, to the end that, in the event of an emergency, production could be begun of the latest type. It was found, during the World War, that in some instances necessity forced the quantity production of old types of equipment because improved types had never been developed, and new types of equipment were produced without an adequate service test. ... The War Department policy which requires the use of equipment and armament now on hand, until exhausted, should not interfere with the development of new types to be authorized for adoption for future use.2
To put this policy into effect the War Department directed the chiefs of branches of the Army to make an annual survey of adopted types of equipment and armament with which their troops were provided in order to determine if such types were up to date and satisfactory for an emergency. On or before 31 December of each year the chiefs of branches were to submit a report of this survey to G-4 (the Supply Division) of the General Staff. Whenever it was found that new or improved types were desirable, steps were to be taken looking toward their development in accordance with instructions which had already been issued.
These instructions of the Secretary of War, issued on 5 January 1922, directed the chiefs of the supply branches to systematize procedures for determining acceptable types of equipment, for conducting research and developmental activities in connection with the standardization of equipment, and for preparing and standardizing specifications.3 Subsequently these instructions were formalized in Army Regulations4 first published 15 December 1924 and revised from time to time thereafter as necessitated by the growth and reorganization of the Army. In general, both the instructions and the later
regulations provided for determination of policy and general supervision in the development of equipment by the General Staff. The latter was to indicate the types of equipment which it deemed necessary and the general characteristics which they should possess. The several chiefs of the supply branches might also initiate the development of new items or changes in existing ones. The respective supply branches, with the cooperation of the using branches, were to conduct the research and developmental work in connection with those items for the procurement of which they were responsible. Each supply branch was to maintain a technical committee, on which all the supply and combat branches as well as the General Staff were to be represented. The technical committees were to pass upon proposed new or revised designs and to make recommendations for the approval of specifications and the standardization of items. Types were to be submitted to The Adjutant General for approval. Items were to be cleared for procurement through the Assistant Secretary of War to assure that, insofar as possible, they were of such design as to be readily produced in quantity in time of emergency. The General Staff, as the coordinating agency, was to be kept advised of the progress of research and developmental work in the various branches and of the lines along which it was being conducted.
Throughout the period between the two wars the annual surveys of equipment and reports of deficiencies based on them were continued. They constituted the principal stimulus to the improvement of designs. The War Department in 1923 called attention to the importance of these surveys and the action which it was hoped would result from them, particularly in connection with mobilization plans.
The established type of each article of equipment and supply must not only be determined in time of peace, but specifications drawn up so that in a great emergency the procurement plans can be carried out without the delay incident to seeking a suitable type. ... It is necessary and essential for war plans that there be a standard type adopted, and the principal purpose of the annual survey of equipment is to determine this fact and to determine also the deficiencies which exist and the remedy which must be applied at the earliest practicable date.5
Those portions of the annual survey reports from the using services which pointed out inadequacies in items of Quartermaster issue were forwarded to The Quartermaster General for action in accordance with the provision of Army Regulations 850-25. Each year The Quartermaster General in turn submitted to the War Department a report indicating the progress which had been made in correcting deficiencies in equipment, either through the improvement of existing designs or the development of new ones.
In the first of these annual survey reports the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and other using branches reported seventy items of Quartermaster equipment as being deficient in one or more respects. The number declined somewhat in later years, but a considerable group of items continued to be reported on each year all during the period between the two wars. Many of the complaints, especially in the earlier years, had to do with the quality of clothing and other items purchased during World War I. Because it was approved policy to issue stocks on hand until they were exhausted and large quantities of these items were available, little could be done to meet these deficiencies as far as immediate issue was concerned. Though the statement of policy laid down in 1922 warned against the tendency, it was inevitable that the existence of surpluses should tend to postpone action looking toward improvement. Nevertheless, there was a gradual development of
improved specifications so that better types would be ready to go into production when their issue became feasible. In 1927, for instance, the OQMG was able to report that, except for two items, “with reference to the Annual Survey of Equipment, it is believed that satisfactory progress is being made on all items reported thereunder by the War Department branches.”6
Lack of Integrated Research Program
In the interval between World Wars I and II, however, the QMC established no integrated program of research. Except for motor transport planning, the Corps did little to promote a program in which the relationships of items of equipment to each other were developed. Precise objectives to be attained within any given group were not worked out. For the most part, items of clothing and equipment were taken up for improvement individually and only as deficiencies were reported in them. To be sure some efforts were made to coordinate Quartermaster research, both within the Corps and with other supply services. Thus, within the OQMG a Standardization Branch7 was established in the summer of 1921, specifically charged with the responsibility of preparing specifications for approved types and coordinating Quartermaster research and developmental work. Never very large or active until 1935, the Standardization Branch in practice acted mainly as a clearinghouse, transmitting correspondence to the commodity branches of the Supply Division, which in turn worked through the manufacturing depots. The several Quartermaster depots, or industries cooperating with them, accomplished whatever research was done during this period. In response to instructions from the Secretary of War, The Quartermaster General established on 24 January 1922 a Quartermaster Corps Technical Committee (QMCTC) as an advisory board on equipment problems. During the process of developing types of equipment for which the QMC had responsibility, this committee was charged with effecting a complete coordination among all interested branches of the Army.8 Because the executive officer of the committee was also the chief of the Standardization Branch these two units during the next twenty years functioned almost as one in coordinating and promoting Quartermaster research and development.
While the early QMCTC served to bring to bear on Quartermaster research and developmental activities the several points of view of the using arms and services, neither the committee nor the Standardization Branch promoted an aggressive, integrated program of research within the QMC. Their mission was to coordinate and not to control or direct developmental activities. As a consequence, each of the operating branches of the Supply Division and each of the manufacturing depots was left free to develop its own research and developmental program, in the light of the annual equipment reports from the using arms. The results of these individual programs were made known, however, to the other services by the QMCTC.
Had the committee and the Standardization Branch attempted to guide an integrated research program, their efforts would have been foredoomed to failure in the period of the twenties and the thirties. Manufacturing depots, such as the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot, would have opposed such a program. Developmental work had for many years been decentralized in the several Quartermaster depots and was for them a traditional prerogative that was jealously insisted upon long after an integrated research program was initiated in 1942.
Furthermore, it was War Department policy to leave research and developmental work to the efforts of industry as much as possible. The financial limitations imposed during this period, particularly in the depression years, further restricted the possibilities of developing an integrated research program.
Financial Restrictions
The lack of adequate funds for research and developmental work was another factor—in many respects the controlling factor—limiting these activities in the years following World War I. In those years the fiscal estimates proposed by The Quartermaster General for research purposes were modest. Even so, the lack of a long-range planned program of Quartermaster research hampered a strong defense of these estimates. As a consequence the estimates were generally sharply reduced by the Budget Advisory Committee of the War Department when representatives of the OQMG appeared at its hearings to defend them. They were further lowered by the Bureau of the Budget. For the most part, the cuts made usually affected funds designed for the development of motor vehicles. In the thirties reductions were also made in the estimates for developmental work in the field of clothing and equipment. The sharpest decline in funds for research purposes took place after the depression began. Such funds, along with all others for the Army, were consistently reduced during the thirties. The trend persisted until the fiscal year 1940 and was completely reversed only in the following fiscal year. This situation was analyzed by the chief of the Fiscal Division in the following terms:
It will be noted that the policy of approving, without substantial cuts, the stated estimates for research and development has been apparent only since the “emergency” has been in full swing. In the six years prior to that time, ... the situation was quite the opposite, and very little consideration was given by either the Budget Advisory Committee or the Bureau of the Budget to the requirements as presented to them. During the six-year period, the Budget Advisory Committee, for example, heard estimates which included requirements of $524,650 for research and development and made deletions amounting to $290,250 or 55%. The Bureau of the Budget in their action on the estimates made cuts of 80% of the amounts presented or 36% of the requirements as originally stated. It is interesting to note that Congress made no changes in the estimates and thus appropriated funds for research and development amounting to only 9% of the money originally requested.9
Although there were reductions of funds, a comparable curtailment of research and developmental activities did not necessarily follow. Because of lump sum appropriation, it was possible to utilize a portion of the funds allocated for procurement or other Quartermaster operations to complete a given research project.10 There is no way of calculating the extent to which this practice alleviated the scarcity of funds appropriated for research and developmental activities. Without it, even the modest programs of the period would have been hopelessly crippled.
Despite financial restrictions and the lack of a coordinated research program, there was a steady, if slow, modernization of standard equipment for which the QMC was responsible during the twenty-year interval between the wars. Particularly in the thirties much of value was accomplished. A few important new pieces of equipment, such as the gasoline-burning field range, were developed. In the textile field the basic uniform fabrics used throughout World War II were developed before 1941. These included the 18-ounce serge used in making
enlisted men’s uniforms, 32-ounce melton for overcoats, elastique for officers’ uniforms, and herringbone twill for work clothes. Although these textiles were modified from time to time during World War II, the basic developmental work had been accomplished prior to the outbreak of the war. Much was also done in the motor transport field, notably in the development of the jeep and other multiple-wheel-drive vehicles.
Influence of Procurement Planning
Aside from developmental work aimed at modernizing Army equipment, the OQMG was engaged in a type of research that evolved from the procurement planning undertaken during the years 1920-40. This had involved the preparation of plans to secure adequate and satisfactory raw materials for Army items in the event of a major crisis. Materials in which shortages might be expected to develop were divided into “strategic” and “critical” categories. Strategic materials were essential wartime commodities which were wholly or in large part obtained from foreign sources. Critical materials were those ordinarily produced at home but which might be difficult to procure in an emergency.
Continuous studies of the procurement of commodities were initiated as early as 1921 by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. At first intended to cover the whole field of Army procurement, these studies were soon confined to the strategic and critical groups of materials. In 1924 there were formed “War Department Commodity Committees” for the ,clearance of plans for the procurement of specified raw materials within these categories. The preparation of these plans was assigned to the several supply services on the basis of major interest in the individual commodity involved. The QMC was thus to prepare plans for the emergency procurement of coffee, cork, flaxseed, hides, jute, manila fiber, quebracho, rubber, sisal, tin, and wool. This list was later considerably extended. The plans were revised from time to time in the following years under the supervision of the committees, and new items were added for study. Occasionally, because of the development of sufficient domestic production, a commodity was removed from the list. Plans for a given commodity embraced a full description of it, an estimate of wartime military and civilian requirements, its sources, a comparison of requirements and estimated available supply, substitutes, prices, possible conservation, recommendation of emergency control and distribution measures, and other pertinent data. The Navy finally came to participate in the program and joint “Army and Navy Munitions Board Commodity Committees” were formed for the study of materials in which the Navy had a procurement interest. Quartermaster Corps officers, drawn from the procurement planning organization in the OQMG, were active as chairmen or members of a considerable number of these committees, which continued to function into the period of the national emergency.11
Corollary to the preparation of plans for the emergency procurement of strategic and critical materials was research in substitutes. The necessity for such a program early became apparent to both the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and the OQMG. The only alternative was to build huge reserves of strategic materials as Germany and Japan were doing, a course of action that the War Department, in view of the strong pacifist feeling of the time, could not pursue lest it be accused of fostering war.
In 1927 the Assistant Secretary of War requested The Quartermaster General to
supplement his estimates for funds with additional data which would establish the value and necessity of such research, thus making defense of the request for funds easier.12 Unfortunately, this line of action was ineffectual and the lack of funds continued to be a hampering factor. In fact, for each of the five fiscal years 1934 through 1938—the all-important years preceding the national emergency—The Quartermaster General was forced to report to the Assistant Secretary of War that no funds had been available “for the development of substitutes for strategic and critical raw materials and, as a consequence, no work in this connection was accomplished during the year.”13
Despite the lack of funds considerable progress was made by the QMC in developing substitute materials. Research was undertaken to develop substitutes for mercury and shellac heretofore used in manufacturing the service hat; for leather, utilized in the production of harness and items of equipage; and for silk, used in Army cravats, hat cords, and waists for Army nurses. The Corps also established close cooperation with industries engaged in developing synthetic rubber, tinless cans, and substitutes to replace shellac used in lacquering food containers. These examples are illustrative of the earnest efforts made by the Corps to develop substitutes for critical raw materials. Even after funds for such research were cut off in 1934 efforts along these lines continued. When the country entered the emergency period, frantic efforts were necessary to recover lost ground.
Once Pearl Harbor was attacked, financial stringency was eliminated as a factor. Estimates of research and developmental funds submitted by the OQMG continued to be reviewed and in some instances were cut by the War Department Budget Advisory Committee or the Bureau of the Budget. Since The Quartermaster General was authorized to transfer funds between fiscal projects, however, developmental work did not suffer.
Impact of Global War
The impact of global war greatly stimulated research and developmental activities. This fact was nowhere more apparent than in the OQMG. Prior to 1940, military planning had been based on a defensive concept which visualized operations as taking place mainly near or within the borders of the continental United States, or in similar climatic areas. As a result, comparatively little attention had been given to the possibility of waging campaigns in steaming jungles, in extensive desert areas, in arctic regions, or in extremely mountainous terrain. Operational planning by the General Staff, which envisioned no movement of large forces to extreme climatic environments, set the tone for equipment planning within the supply services of the Army.
In the interval between the wars the QMC had gradually modernized standard items of clothing and equipment for which it was responsible, but it had developed no program looking toward the preparation of specialized gear for use in areas of climatic extremes. With the rapid expansion of the Army beginning in 1940, the declaration of the unlimited national emergency a year later, and especially with the participation of the United States in the new world conflict, problems of this nature presented themselves for solution in rapid succession. The growing Japanese menace to Alaska called for an increased garrison for that territory, in much of which arctic conditions prevailed. The occupation of bases in the North Atlantic which followed soon after brought additional pressure for the design and procurement of
suitable clothing and equipment for arctic operations. The rapid and spectacular development of the technique of mechanized desert warfare in North Africa, or winter and mountain operations in northern Europe, and of airborne tactics on the continent and in Crete forced the creation of new types of military organizations and, concurrently, of new equipment. The swift Japanese conquests in the Southwest Pacific, involving operations in supposedly impassable jungles and with the use of improved amphibious tactics, called imperatively for the rapid development of counter-techniques and new types of clothing and equipment. The impact of the war also brought marked changes in the field of subsistence. These developments will be discussed at length in succeeding chapters.
Effect of Materials Shortages on Design
The war also increased the need for conservation, probably the most important single factor in shaping wartime Quartermaster research and developmental work. Enemy conquests of producing areas led to shortages of many raw materials, forcing the use of substitutes. Wartime limitations in trade and the enormous increase in domestic consumption due to the defense program itself had the same effect. In many instances the use of substitute materials involved a more or less complete redesign of the item. At the same time, industrial advance in the field of plastics, in textile fabrication, and elsewhere permitted many shifts from traditional to new materials.
Some of these changes were difficult to make, and in many cases the QMC was forced to resort to inferior products, sometimes unnecessarily. The Corps regarded most of these changes as temporary expedients. However, occasionally a new material proved so satisfactory that the Corps contemplated no return to the original when it should become available. In a number of instances, a succession of shortages forced the substitution of one material for another which was itself a substitution for something else. This situation could have been alleviated to some extent if, at the time the priority system was established, a higher relative importance had been accorded to Quartermaster items involved in the over-all supply program. This would have saved considerable time, effort, and expense.
Although some progress had been made in the development of substitute materials in the interval between the wars, the lack of funds for that purpose had handicapped such research. With the outbreak of war in 1939 and especially with the sharpening of the crisis in the following year, problems of materials shortages, actual or potential, began to make their appearance on the national horizon. From all indications these shortages would become more acute as the procurement program expanded.
The problem of the assignment of strategic and critical materials to manufacturers and defense agencies became the subject of a series of administrative measures. The Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB) on 17 June 1940 set up a Priorities Committee to assign priorities, as between the two services, in the materials which were becoming critical. The President some months later appointed an “Administrator of Priorities,” and in January 1941 established the Office of Production Management (OPM) to direct the whole complex of defense production.14 All matters of priorities, preference ratings, conservation studies, and the like were under its jurisdiction until it, in turn, was succeeded by the War Production Board a year later. The policies of these agencies, insofar as they affected the QMC and the other supply services of the Army, were effectuated through the Office of the Under Secretary of War until
the reorganization of the Army in March 1942. After that time Headquarters, SOS (later ASF), was the point of mutual contact.
By early 1941 the procurement program of the QMC had begun to be affected by scarcities in such metals as aluminum, copper, nickel, brass, and stainless steel. The shortage of basic and semi-finished materials and the low priority status accorded Quartermaster equipment necessitated a comprehensive conservation program. In this the OQMG sought to substitute less critical or noncritical materials wherever possible, thereby insuring successful procurement and at the same time making critical materials available for indispensable purposes. This policy was initiated in the OQMG on 24 February 1941. Expecting the shortages to become more and more drastic as the procurement program went on, the OQMG recommended to the Under Secretary of War the following week that steps be initiated “to coordinate all engineering and designing branches with the procurement branches for the purpose of establishing the flexibility required to meet the necessities of substitutions of metals as such necessities arise.”15
Conservation measures affecting the design of equipment had thus already been projected by the Corps when the Office of the Under Secretary of War took up the problem of conservation of materials by the Army through a series of directives to the supply services. These memoranda, issued at intervals during the spring, called attention to the need for the conservation of various metals. On 11 June 1941 the Under Secretary of War stressed the need for strict enforcement of a comprehensive conservation policy. He directed the supply services to conduct “a continuous study” of all specifications in order to reduce or eliminate requirements for strategic or critical materials which had been placed under allocation or priority control unless such action seriously impaired military efficiency of the equipment.16 On the first of each month, each supply service was to report to the Office of the Under Secretary the progress it had made in such revision of specifications.
The Quartermaster General immediately turned to the task of announcing the policy to the Corps17 and setting up the necessary organization. A policy was outlined with reference to materials on the “Priorities Critical List.” These were to be specified only when no substitution could be made without seriously impairing military efficiency. None of the materials listed as critical were to be used “except on such items or projects for which there is no known substitute that will not result in the loss of essential efficiency.” Suitable substitutes should not be construed as meaning “equal” or “equivalent,” but should be interpreted as meaning “those that will serve the same essential purpose even though they may be less durable and involve some increased initial or ultimate cost.” This policy was to be applied immediately to new materials subsequently placed under mandatory control by the OPM.
Some months later more detailed instructions to the Corps emphasized that “conservation should not be considered of secondary importance but should be made the first order of business of all personnel concerned with specifications and procurement.” In considering the suitability of substitutes, the military characteristics and efficiency of the items were of fundamental importance but the procurability, durability, and cost of substitutes were also to be duly weighed. When an item possessed definite military characteristics, that is, when it had
certain essential qualities which it must possess in order to fulfill a definite military purpose, the effect on these characteristics of the use of a substitute was to be carefully considered. When no definite military characteristics were in-involved, the essential efficiency of the item was to be given first consideration. The commercial procurability of a substitute within a reasonable time was to be weighed against the time involved in obtaining the material originally specified with applicable preference ratings. Durability of a substitute was to receive due consideration, and items which could be readily repaired or replaced might be designed of materials having a shorter probable life than the original. Increase in original and maintenance cost was to be weighed against durability, efficiency, and procurability, but in general, where the other prerequisites were met, “cost should not be the determining factor in deciding whether or not the substitution should be made.”18
The administrative details of the conservation program were handled initially by a Conservation Steering Committee, established in July by The Quartermaster General in the Planning and Control Division. It effected coordination and general supervision of the conservation work of the Corps.19 Responsibility for changes in specifications, however, remained with the division chiefs. The committee also consolidated and reviewed the monthly reports prepared by the various divisions for the conservation report to the Under Secretary of War as required by his instructions on 11 June. A requirements section prepared studies on raw materials requirements for Quartermaster items. Subsequently, in a reorganization at the end of 1941, the functions of preparing estimates of raw materials requirements and of carrying out the conservation policy were grouped together in a Production Branch of the Planning and Control Division.20 When the major reorganizations of the OQMG occurred in 1942, these functions, administered by a Materials and Conservation Section, ultimately were lodged in the Research and Development Branch of the Military Planning Division.
Under the policy set forth, Quartermaster specifications were subjected to close study with a view to conserving scarce materials. Every effort was made to find suitable substitutes that could be used either wholly or in part and that possessed the same performance abilities and military characteristics as those then in use. The basic work was accomplished at Quartermaster depots, laboratories, and shops. Exceptions to OPM and later WPB conservation orders were requested only after continued research and experimentation failed to produce satisfactory substitute materials. An analysis of the specific critical materials affecting the Quartermaster procurement program reveals the scope of the Quartermaster conservation program and its impact on the design and development of items for which the Corps had responsibility.
Under the strain of the defense program, shortages in a number of metals, such as aluminum, copper, zinc, nickel, tin, and stainless steel, were first to appear. Aluminum, which had been produced in this country by only a single firm and largely from imported bauxite, quickly came to present a very acute problem because of the extensive use of this metal in the manufacture of airplanes. The initial effort of the QMC in conserving aluminum was made in the field of garrison equipment, the purchase of which was forbidden if it required the use of aluminum.21 But a number of Quartermaster field items also made extensive use of this metal. The necessity of maintaining satisfactory
military characteristics for field items precluded such blanket prohibition of the use of aluminum as could safely be applied to garrison equipment. Nevertheless, specifications for mess gear and other field items utilizing aluminum were revised to incorporate satisfactory substitute materials.
The Army field mess gear, consisting of meat can, canteen cup, canteen, knife, fork, and spoon, had for many years been made largely of aluminum. Mess gear made of this metal was easy to clean, would stand fire, did not easily corrode, and was extremely light. It had served the Army well through one war and there was great reluctance on the part of the QMC and the using arms to undertake the use of substitutes. It was easy to design a plastic handle to the knife, which effected some saving of aluminum. Redesign of the meat can, canteen cup, and canteen was another matter. Under pressure of a dwindling supply of aluminum, however, experimentation continued, and in 1943 large orders of stainless steel meat cans and canteen cups were procured. These items, though much more costly than the aluminum types, proved satisfactory and were finally standardized. Satisfactory canteens of both plastic and stainless steel were eventually produced and received classification as substitute standard items.22
Among other field items of Quartermaster issue making extensive use of aluminum, the most important was the field range, M-1937. Until well into the war period the QMC was harassed by serious delinquency in the delivery of spare parts and accessories for this item. Delinquencies were due in varying degrees to delays in receipt of raw materials and equipment by the manufacturer and to engineering changes made necessary by the elimination of critical materials, as well as to a lack of production capacity in the case of some contractors. To help break the bottleneck created by the materials situation the QMC resorted both to higher priority ratings and to revision of specifications. In their efforts to eliminate strategic materials, engineers at the Jeffersonville Depot, the procuring depot for most Quartermaster mechanical equipment, soon produced a revised design for the field range. Blued steel sheets and galvanized steel replaced aluminum and stainless steel, leaving a small amount of copper, essential for the fuel lines, as the only critical metal in this important mobile cooking unit. In use this new design, which was later somewhat modified, proved entirely satisfactory as far as its basic materials were concerned. The weight was only moderately increased and the efficiency perhaps somewhat improved.23
Shortages of certain types of steel and of the alloy metals for making them began to be felt before the defense program had gone far. The whole group of ferro-alloy metals, such as nickel, chromium, manganese, tungsten, and the like, were on the list of materials specified as critical in June 1941.24 Most of the world’s nickel came from Canada and ample supplies of it were available in the United States until it began to be used in fantastic quantities for the tough nickel steel needed in armor plate and projectiles. Expansion of production was a slow process, involving the construction of new mills and smelters as well as the mining of more ore. Chromium, the master alloy metal in stainless steels, had a variety of other industrial uses. It was produced mainly in South Africa, Turkey, and the distant Pacific islands. The acute shipping situation contributed to the shortage of this important material. Tungsten, essential in
the manufacture of tool steel, had been produced chiefly in China. Though deposits in the United States and in South America were being opened up, the growing difficulty of communication with China and the vast increase in tool making incidental to the defense program produced a temporary scarcity. Manganese, a de-sulphurizing and deoxidizing agent in the basic steel making process as well as an important alloy metal, was largely imported from abroad. A large stockpile of it had been built up in the United States, however, and it was considered somewhat less critical than some of the other alloy metals.25
A large part of the alloy steel used by the QMC in 1941 went into automotive equipment, which was then still a Quartermaster responsibility. Specification changes in the motor transport program, however, had to be viewed with caution. The elimination of some critical materials would have had unfortunate effects upon the ruggedness and performance of the vehicles involved. Substitutions also would have required complete redesigning and retooling of particular parts and of the vehicle as a whole, which would have consumed considerable time and resulted in complete production stoppage. In addition, substitutions in certain types of automotive parts would have required fuel and lubricants differing appreciably from those in use for military vehicles. Despite these handicaps the Corps liberalized specifications and substituted less essential materials for aluminum, alloy steel, rubber, and other critical materials as rapidly as suitable substitutes could be found to provide the performance considered essential for military vehicles.26
As shortages of ferro-alloy metals became more acute, specifications of Quartermaster items were repeatedly reviewed to conserve these critical materials. Some thirty-eight minor items, chiefly accessories in harnessware, were found in which substitutes of less critical materials could be made for nickel. At the same time a procurement of 6,600,000 stainless steel identification tags—an item previously manufactured of monel metal which contains 60 percent nickel—was made, thus conserving approximately 50,000 pounds of nickel.27
Chromium was conserved largely through the substitution of other materials for stainless steel. Much of the tableware and many miscellaneous kitchen utensils of the Army had been made of stainless steel. These were now, for the most part, redesigned in tinned or enameled steel. Large quantities of corrosion-resisting steel were freed by the use of galvanized iron in laundry equipment Stainless steel was also replaced by cast iron in all mixers for bakers. In the shipbuilding program, still under Quartermaster direction in 1941, stainless steel was therefore used in the construction of vessels and equipment only where excess corrosion resulted if mild steel or other ferrous materials were employed.28
The sheer bulk of the requirements of the defense program and of the expanding civilian economy accompanying it, which was imposed on an industrial system that had been static for many years, soon brought about shortages in most types of steel. Pig iron and steel were placed under priority control by the OPM at the end of the summer of 1941. The QMC was instructed to make “every effort to conserve the use of iron and steel products where they are now specified and substitute wood and other
materials wherever possible.”29 Accordingly on numerous construction projects, which at this time were still a Quartermaster responsibility, efforts were made to conserve steel through structural designs involving greater use of wood and concrete. Wood sheathing replaced corrugated steel for siding and roofing. Construction quartermasters stopped using galvanized fencing, specifying wood in place of steel for fence posts.
A survey had revealed that the QMC purchased approximately 150 items requiring large amounts of steel. Excluding the large quantities that went into the automotive program, construction, and shipbuilding, a few important items, including field ranges, tent stoves, cots, and lockers, utilized the remainder of the Corps’ steel requirements. It was a simple matter to substitute wood for steel in the procurement of office furniture and filing equipment. Little could be done, however, about eliminating steel entirely from such items as field ranges and stoves, although redesign of the range practically eliminated the more critical types of the metal. On the other hand, wood replaced steel in the standard Army cot and the folding chair while the locker box and field safe were redesigned so as to save much of the weight of steel and to effect other improvements.30
A considerable amount of copper, in the form of brass and bronze, has traditionally been used in the clothing and personal equipment of the soldier. Brass is considered good for ornamental purposes because it takes on a high polish and resembles gold. Copper alloys are also favored for utilitarian uses, since they are hard and strong while at the same time much more resistant to corrosion than iron or steel. Buttons for the uniform coat as well as distinctive military insignia have for generations been made of brass. Brass or bronze has been used extensively in the form of buckles and, since the introduction of webbing, in eyelets, snaps, rings, and end clips on personal gear such as cartridge belts and packs. Eyelets for shoes and canvas leggings also make use of one or another copper alloy. In organizational equipment of Quartermaster types, copper alloys are used for tent grommets, musical instruments, kitchen utensils, and incidentally in caparison equipage and various mechanical items. Although QMC consumption of copper in all forms was relatively slight when compared with the use of this metal by the Ordnance Department in such items as small arms ammunition and shell casings, its conservation was considered important in view of the scarcity of copper which developed with the defense program.
While the national copper supply had seemed ample only a short time before, direct military uses in the rearmament program beginning in 1940, with the infinitely varied uses of the metal in the expanding industrial economy, soon produced a shortage. A record production in the United States of 842,000 tons in 1937 had seemed sufficient for any possible need, but in 1941, even with the importation of 500,000 tons from South America, there was an acute shortage. Requirements for 1942 were at that time estimated at 2,500,000 tons.31
As the supply of copper became inadequate to meet vital military needs, requests for allocation for personal hardware—buckles, clips, grommets, and the like—were disapproved regardless of how essential they appeared to the QMC. This caused a serious delay in the procurement program. Whereas manufacturers had been working three shifts to supply the Corps, many were forced to cut down to one-shift operation and some shut down completely for
lack of materials. In addition, the shortage of skilled molders made it difficult to obtain adequate supplies of molded types of hardware and created a major chokepoint in the production of several types of buckles and clips.
Production engineers and expediters from the OQMG conferred with the Jeffersonville Quartermaster Depot and leading suppliers of hardware components. As a result of their study they recommended a comprehensive survey of the entire line of Quartermaster hardware with a view to standardizing designs and material specifications, eliminating unnecessary types and sizes, and substituting stamped for molded hardware wherever practicable. These recommendations were adopted.
At the same time the QMC endeavored to substitute for copper wherever possible. Among the substitutes considered for small hardware items of bronze and brass, such as grommets, buckles, clips, loops, and hinges, were enamel-coated iron or steel, and zinc.32 Zinc sheet was used to replace brass in tent grommets, conserving an estimated 2,000,000 pounds of brass during a period of six to eight months, and a number of other effective substitutions were soon made in the small hardware field, largely eliminating brass from Quartermaster items of equipage.33
A more difficult problem was posed in the replacement of the metal used in the attachments and findings of the soldier’s personal equipment. The QMC finally issued an appeal to industry to offer suggestions.34 Zinc substitutes, tried out for the eyelets in such heavy webbing items as cartridge and pistol belts, proved too soft for use. However, plastic eyelets which met with approval after tests by the Quartermaster Board were finally developed.35 They were not used because in the manufacturing process they were found difficult to apply. Snap fasteners, used for the pockets of cartridge belts and in a number of other items, presented a peculiar problem. They called for hard metal while their use involved friction which would scrape off any coating applied to an iron or steel substitute, exposing it to rust. The director of the Military Planning Division was convinced that brass was essential for snap fasteners, but nevertheless under pressure the QMC allowed the use of steel snap fasteners on a few items.36 Plastic substitutes were used in making end clips, which bound the tips of webbing belts and straps. Olive drab plastic buttons replaced the bronze buttons heretofore used to brighten the uniform.37 Plastic proved to be one of the most effective substitutes for brass in many Quartermaster items.
Tin was used in great quantity by the QMC in the form of tin plate in cans for food packaging. In 1940, after the beginning of the limited national emergency, the Corps, in collaboration
with the National Canners’ Association and the several large can manufacturers of the country, began a series of tests of tin plate of lighter grade than that normally used for food packaging. These tests established the feasibility of reducing the tin content in food cans. After the United States entered the war the tests became the basis of a WPB order directing that no tin plate should be manufactured heavier than the light grade which had been established as satisfactory. As Japanese conquests extended through the tin-producing regions of southeast Asia, effectively cutting off the bulk of the normal supply of the metal, the QMC also directed its attention actively toward the development of substitute food-packaging materials, such as black plate, glass, and fiber containers.38
In addition, the procurement divisions of the OQMG were directed to survey the items for which they were responsible and report those making use of tin and tin-bearing materials, with a view to effecting substitutions wherever possible.39 Conservation of aluminum and stainless steel in kitchenware had turned attention to the possibilities of enamel steel as a substitute. Efforts were now made to redesign, in enamel steel, cooking equipment and various containers which had been manufactured of tin-coated steel, sometimes as a substitute for aluminum.
Although zinc was a metal which had never been on the critical list, as early as February 1941 the Office of the Under Secretary of War informed the supply services that steps would have to be taken to reduce the quantities of zinc being specified in order to guard against an acute shortage. Zinc, as a component of brass, entered into the construction of a great many Quartermaster items. It was also used as a galvanizing agent in such items as buckets and G. I. cans, and as part of a compound in the manufacture of rubber goods. A few pieces of equipment used the metal in the pure state.40
One of the basic measures taken toward zinc conservation consisted of eliminating the “hot- dip” galvanizing process in the manufacture of items calling for a zinc coating. Instead, the less wasteful electroplating or sherardizing processes were to be used for applying zinc coatings to steel.41 Galvanizing was eliminated entirely in many metal construction items, painting being ordinarily substituted.
Late in 1943 the increased production of zinc, together with the reduction of the small arms ammunition program, brought about a definite surplus of the metal. The supply services were then encouraged to make all possible use of zinc inasmuch as the War Department desired to keep marginal mines in operation so that their production would be available for brass in the event that the ammunition program should be expanded again.42
In general, by the end of 1943 scarcities in most metals had disappeared. Aluminum had become so plentiful that the supply services were encouraged to find new uses for certain types of the metal. Brass and bronze once more became available for design purposes. By that time, too, the situation in regard to chromium and stainless steel had eased so much that these metals were available for a number of important Quartermaster uses, such as identification tags, canteens, mess trays, and certain parts of the field range. Most grades and alloys of steel had become available in ample quantity and were reintroduced into various pieces of
equipment from which they had been eliminated during the period of scarcity.43 The story of metal conservation was one of famine followed by feast.
Of all the nonmetallic raw materials in which shortages developed during the war, rubber was by far the most vital. Rubber had come to occupy a unique place in the national economy, its applications constantly broadening as the knowledge of its chemistry developed. It was always an exotic, a product of the tropics. Native to Brazil though it was, its cultivation had been developed in British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies until more than 90 percent of our imports came from these regions and nearby areas which were equally in danger of conquest by Japan, in case of war involving Japan with the white colonial powers in the Pacific.
In the period of procurement planning, the wartime supply of rubber had been the subject of a progressive commodity study by the QMC. When there was an obvious abundance of rubber and when the legend of “invincible Singapore” was still part of the accepted popular mythology, little was done to insure an adequate emergency supply. By 1940, however, the government was taking belated steps to stockpile rubber. Not until some time after Pearl Harbor, however, did rubber figure largely in the Army conservation program. Prior to that time Donald M. Nelson, then Director of Purchases, OPM, had suggested the retreading of automobile tires as a conservation measure.44 By August 1941 rubber was listed among the materials considered most critical and The Quartermaster General had instructed the Corps to eliminate and reduce its use as much as possible.
It was the middle of January 1942, when Japanese conquest of the whole of southeastern Asia was imminent, that the Under Secretary issued his first special directive to The Quartermaster General and to the other supply chiefs on the subject of rubber conservation. “The matter of a supply of crude rubber has reached a critical stage. Notwithstanding the drastic curtailment of civilian uses of rubber, it is evident that the armed services must also materially conserve and curtail the use of rubber by all practicable means.”45
Rubber needed for automotive equipment, including tires, tubes, and mechanical parts, consumed 73 percent of Quartermaster rubber requirements. The rest was used in the manufacture of service shoes, overshoes, raincoats, rubber boots, and a variety of other items.46 In the active rubber conservation program which now took place, the greatest emphasis was naturally placed on automotive items, which remained a Quartermaster responsibility for several months longer. Numerous items of clothing and equipage, however, were also affected by the program. Specifications were revised to cut down sharply the weight of rubber in the raincoat, to reduce the rubber content in rubber boots and overshoes, and to substitute plastic for rubber in all combs. The purchase of all types of rubber matting had been stopped and all outstanding contracts were canceled. At the same time The Quartermaster General set forth the policy henceforth to be observed by the Corps in conserving rubber. All specifications were to be reviewed either to reduce the quantity of rubber prescribed or to substitute synthetic or reclaimed rubber where this could be done without impairing military characteristics of the items involved.47
As the Japanese conquests continued and it became apparent that very little new crude rubber would be available for years to come, the pressure on the supply services to reduce their consumption of this material increased. The elimination of all rubber from supply procurements soon came to be the objective of the QMC. This ideal was never attained, though surprising progress was made toward it. A review of rubber conservation projects prepared by the OQMG in August 1942 indicated that thirty-seven different items and groups of related items containing rubber had been under study with a view to eliminating this material. Great progress had been made in reducing the rubber content in the service shoe. All crude rubber had been eliminated from the heel, and the use of reclaimed rubber had been minimized by the adoption of a heel with a wood core. Crude rubber had been completely replaced by reclaimed rubber in shoe taps. The rubber content of the overshoe had been successively reduced by lowering the compound specifications and by the adoption of a cloth instead of a rubber top. The rubber content of hip and knee boots had been considerably reduced by changes in the specifications for the compounds involved. Oil-treated fabrics and synthetic resins were specified in the raincoat, completely eliminating rubber. The former were quickly found to be unsatisfactory, particularly in extreme climatic conditions. The synthetic resin coats, on the other hand, were developed to the point where they were equal or even superior to those using natural rubber. Waxes and other finishing materials had been found suitable to replace the chlorinated rubber formerly used in the water-repellent and fire-resistant treatment of tentage duck. Completed or under way were projects for the elimination or reduction of the rubber content in such miscellaneous items as firemen’s coats, wire cutters, shoepacs, ski boots, latex-dipped gloves, gaskets for food and water containers, canvas field bags, and the elastic webbing in the suspension of the helmet liner.48
In the summer of 1942 a new series of items, constituting the specialized clothing and personal equipment for jungle operations, became a QMC responsibility. Jungle equipment was soon in production on a large scale, in preparation for major American offensive operations in the Southwest Pacific. Some of the items involved the extensive use of rubber and in the urgent need for this equipment first procurements had been made without question of the amount of rubber involved. Specifications for jungle items, such as the jungle boot, essentially a high-top sneaker made with a full rubber sole and heel, and the jungle food bag, used for carrying dried foods, were soon revised, however, to conserve rubber.49
In the course of the conservation program, every item of Quartermaster issue involving the use of rubber was carefully scrutinized. In most cases, satisfactory substitutes from the plastic field or elsewhere were eventually found for rubber items, or the crude rubber content was at least materially reduced through the use of reclaimed or synthetic material. The urgency of rubber conservation continued for a long time. Since changes in the design of Quartermaster equipment containing rubber had been pushed as far and as rapidly as possible in the direction of conservation, there remained for the time being only tightened control measures covering the use of rubber items and the suggested delay of procurement as means for further reducing rubber consumption. As the production of synthetic rubber began to take on significant proportions, however, the supply services were
urged to emphasize conversion of remaining rubber items from the natural to the synthetic product.50 Rubber conservation measures in the QMC from the fall of 1943 on, insofar as they involved the design of equipment, centered in the application of one or another of the synthetics, as these became available, to uses formerly calling for crude rubber.
Cordage fibers, such as hemp, sisal, and jute, constituted a group of largely imported raw materials extensively used by the Corps. Jute, a product of India, was used chiefly for burlap bagging. Noting the increased shipping rates on burlap from India, the hazardous nature of such shipping, and the heavy stocks of cotton accumulated within the United States because of the loss of export markets, The Quartermaster General in 1941 directed that cotton cloth and cotton bagging be procured in the place of jute burlap whenever possible.51
Shortly afterward all stocks of first-class Manila fiber, produced in the Philippines and generally used for the better grades of rope, were ordered “frozen” by the OPM. Since this Manila fiber was essential to the expanding Navy, the QMC was requested to review its cordage specifications with a view to utilizing sisal and cotton rope or Grade C Manila, as far as possible, to meet its requirements. Tentage rope was the most important single classification of Quartermaster cordage. Sisal replaced the use of Manila fiber. The best sisal is obtained from Java and East Africa; somewhat lower grades are grown in Mexico. With the supply of the best grades soon cut off or reduced by the progress of the war, Quartermaster specifications made use of the less desirable Mexican variety. Also, a considerable amount of cotton rope had already been procured for a number of uses. Cotton rope has a tensile strength about half that of Manila of the same diameter. It has a high rate of water absorption and lacks resistance to mildew. The material was cheap and abundant, however, and further development of cotton rope, with a view to its more extended use, as well as experiments with rope made of jute, of which a considerable quantity was now found available, were carried on by the Jeffersonville Quartermaster Depot and the Bureau of Standards. Ropes of jute and of both braided and twisted cotton, satisfactory for most purposes, were developed and specifications drafted.52
Among the items needed for the new mountain troops was a climbing rope. Such rope had to have a great tensile strength and unusual resistance to sudden shock. Climbing ropes had traditionally been made of first-class Manila. While it was believed by mountaineers that no other material would serve, under the pressure of critical shortage lower grade Manila was used. At the same time reports of experiments by manufacturers with nylon rope were followed up and actively encouraged by the OQMG. Ultimately mountain climbing rope made of nylon, actually superior to the best Manila, was produced. However, nylon itself was a critical material, and there was some difficulty at first in getting it allocated for this purpose. Limited quantities were finally made available to meet the most urgent needs for climbing rope.53
Developmental work in the textile and clothing program was conditioned by the need for the conservation of various fabrics. Wool was used by the QMC in great quantity for winter clothing and blankets. It had been a scarce commodity during World War I. As a consequence, during the period of procurement planning, the OQMG had studied the means of assuring a
supply of it in another emergency as well as the possibilities of effecting substitutions for it. For the most part, domestic production was sufficient for ordinary needs during the early part of World War II. The prospect of a considerable mobilization of manpower, however, foreshadowed An eventual shortage and caused the OQMG in the spring of 1940 to urge that measures be taken toward building up a stockpile of Australian wool.54 This action eventually resulted in the accumulation of a supply sufficient to meet all essential military needs.
Before this program had become effective, however, and when for a time military events threatened to cut off the larger part of wool imports, prospective shortages had considerable effect on the design of items using wool. In the summer of 1941 the OQMG reviewed its wool uses and began active consideration of substitute materials. The increased rate of mobilization resulting from our entry into the war in December and the possibility that wool supplies from abroad might be cut off or seriously reduced forced the OPM to take measures controlling civilian consumption and brought a renewed study of Army specifications.
A movement began among conservation officials to persuade the QMC to lighten the weight of the winter uniform and effect other savings in wool. The wool conservation program urged upon the Corps by the WPB centered upon four principal items and materials—blankets, 32-ounce overcoating, 18-ounce serge, and flannel shirting—which accounted for over 80 percent of Army wool purchases.55 These recommendations, prepared in the light of civilian experience, were discussed at a conference in the OQMG between representatives of the WPB, the QMC, and civilian textile specialists: Some of the dangers involved in effecting substitutions for wool in basic field items were clarified. While 16-ounce woolen cloth, for instance, might be considered ample for ordinary civilian use, it was hardly suitable for troops who might be ordered to extremely cold climates. The 18-ounce serge, used for much of the Army’s winter clothing, was lighter than the material used in any previous war and lighter than the fabric used by other armies.
The Corps had already substituted cotton comforters for wool blankets for use in barracks. Substitutions for the field blanket, however, had to be viewed with caution. Preliminary tests had shown that a mixture of reworked wool or cotton immediately resulted in reduced warmth. The peculiar virtue of wool was that it absorbed large quantities of moisture without becoming saturated. Blankets with an admixture of cotton would be less efficient in this respect and less wind resistant. Nor would it be efficient to increase the weight of the blanket to offset the reduction in wool content, since the soldier would have to carry the added burden on his back.
Quartermaster representatives revealed that 35 percent of reworked wool was already being used in the material for overcoating and that flannel shirting was 20 percent cotton. Thus it appeared that wool requirements could not be materially reduced through lowering the weight and quality of basic Quartermaster items. Nevertheless, the OQMG undertook to cut wool consumption wherever possible and a committee was formed to study the subject of wool conservation. This committee held meetings at intervals throughout the next few months at the OQMG and at the Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot, the procuring depot for clothing.
As a result of the committee’s deliberations a number of additional measures were taken.
The “bi-swing back,” designed to allow greater freedom of movement, was taken out of the service coat, effecting a 12 percent saving in the yardage of serge used on each garment. Since the introduction of the field jacket, this coat was no longer considered a combat garment nor did the return to the snug-fitting back lessen its utility for ordinary wear. The proportion of reworked wool in overcoating material was in-increased further by 15 percent. A trench coat of water-repellent, wind-resistant poplin, with a removable wool lining, was proposed as a possible replacement for the woolen overcoat and the raincoat in the European theater. Blankets with a low percentage of wool content were proposed for barrack use, making all-wool blankets in use in barracks available for reissue in the field and eventually cutting down the procurement of the all-wool type. In line with the committee’s recommendations, trench coats and experimental blankets of various mixtures were procured for thorough testing, while investigations of possible substitute wool and rayon mixtures to take the place of the basic 18-ounce uniform serge cloth were undertaken.56
Tests conducted by the Quartermaster Board indicated that blankets made with as much as 35 percent of reworked wool were as warm as those made entirely of virgin wool, while any considerable admixture of rayon was inadvisable as it increased the tendency to absorb moisture and lessened the fire resistance of the blanket. Trench coats were approved for use by officers, and extensive tests by service boards of similar coats for enlisted men were undertaken. The project was dropped, however, in August 1943 when the M-1943 combat ensemble was adopted. By that time, in fact, there was little need of further experimentation along the-line of wool substitutions. The size of the Army was becoming stabilized and initial clothing issues were expected to decline rapidly. The military situation had so improved that there was little likelihood of interruption of the lines of communication with Australia and other wool-producing countries. It was anticipated that the QMC would not consume even the domestic wool clip for 1943 or 1944. The stockpile of wool in the country was large and could even be reduced with safety. While it might be desirable to maintain a modest reserve, The Quartermaster General advised the WPB that “the same reasons do not prevail today, as did prevail a year and one-half ago, for carrying a reserve of the present size.”57
Silk had always been one of the strategic materials under the classification maintained during the procurement planning period. Imported largely from Japan, this material would be practically unobtainable in case of a war with that power. Silk, on which the Air Corps had first claim for use in parachutes, became subject to strict conservation measures in the summer of 1941. The Supply Division of the OQMG was directed to prepare a report indicating the uses of this material in Quartermaster items and the measures that could be taken to conserve it.58
Silk was used extensively by the Corps in banners and ribbons for decorations and medals, in nurses’ white waists and enlisted men’s black ties, in hat cords, as lining or seam material in numerous items of clothing, and as thread. For most uses substitutions were readily effected. Mercerized cotton thread replaced silk thread; mercerized cotton and rayon replaced silk lining; the issue of silk neckties and nurses’ waists was discontinued; rayon replaced silk in hat cords and in some other items.59 For banners and decoration ribbons, replacement was a little
more difficult and was not at first recommended. The special weathering and draping qualities of silk, together with its high degree of strength, made it the most desirable material for such items, intimately associated as they were with individual and organizational morale. The Philadelphia Depot had, however, for a number of years been investigating all types of synthetic fibers for use as substitutes for banner silk. By June 1942 it had developed a specification for rayon banner cloth which was approved as satisfactory for procurement.60
It had long been known in the QMC that the facilities available for the production of cotton duck, used for tentage, tarpaulins, and many items of clothing and personal equipment, would be insufficient to meet all needs in case of a great emergency involving the mobilization of a large army. This situation had made the study of duck procurement one of the most important aspects of Quartermaster procurement planning.
Even the limited expansion of the Army which took place in 1940 forced almost immediate departures from the specifications of tentage duck. By November procurement officers in the OQMG were admittedly “securing practically every fabric that can be be considered as a possible substitute for the regular 15.5 oz. plied yarn duck.”61 Tentage made from substitute material, it was directed, was to be marked so that it could be readily identified in the field. The shortage of duck was so serious by the following year that a study of clothing items was made with a view to eliminating this material. One of the savings effected was replacement of the 10.2-ounce waterproofed duck used as the outer fabric of the mackinaw by a lighter cotton fabric that was in greater production and could be readily waterproofed.
With the increased rate of mobilization following Pearl Harbor, the Army’s duck requirements approximately doubled. Every effort was made to extend the production of this material. Carpet, plush, tapestry, and upholstery industries were converted to its production despite a substantial increase in cost to the government. The QMC was assigned the task of buying all duck for the Army. Efforts already under way were stepped up to develop a substitute material for the type of duck used in shelter tents. In the face of enormous demands, specifications for numbered and flat duck had to be revised to include the more abundant double- and single-filled flat duck, heavy twill, and other substitute materials. Because of the difficulties in procuring the heavy duck required for pyramidal and other large tents, the Army had to gear its specifications more realistically to potential supply and accept a wide variety of nonstandard tentage. Concessions were made with respect to color, weight, and width in order to eliminate the difference between commercial and Army production where possible.62 In addition, a study was made of all items of duck and webbing equipment, primarily to reduce the weight carried by the soldier but also in an effort to make greater use of lighter and more available materials. The WPB issued an order forbidding, in general, the use of duck for civilian purposes, “unless such cotton duck has been rejected as unfit for use by both the Army and the Navy of the United States.”63
With many new manufacturers brought into the field and with substitutions and changes in the finishing technique, the production of duck
was gradually stepped up to meet the needs of the armed forces, and procurements of substitute fabrics were made less frequently. The duck problem, however, was and continued to be one of the most serious production difficulties which the QMC was called upon to face and, for a time, a large proportion of the items into which the material entered was affected by the shortage.
Fur had been extensively used in the special list of clothing for the small peacetime Alaskan garrison. With the expansion of the Army and the establishment of large garrisons in Alaska and other far northern areas, any large dependence upon furs for cold-climate clothing became impracticable. For a time the Corps made wide use of “shearling,” or yearling lambskin, in its cold-climate clothing. But there were practical objections to this material, and its use by the Air Corps was so great that by the end of 1941 it tended to become a critical material. For some years explorers and mountaineers had been tending to minimize the use of furs in their clothing, substituting loosely woven woolen protected by outer shells of closely woven, wind-resistant cotton. Textile men had also been experimenting with the use of plush or “pile” of alpaca and mohair for cold weather garments. The QMC, after conducting cold-chamber laboratory experiments with soldiers wearing different types of garments, found that pile clothing with wind-breaker shells was efficient. The clothing designers of the Corps turned more and more to pile material to meet cold-climate clothing needs. By 1943 the Army clothing list for cold areas included very few items involving the use of fur.64
The expansion of the northern garrison also brought to light another serious material shortage. Sleeping bags are essential equipment for troops in cold climates. Down, which consists of the soft, fluffy under feathers of ducks, geese, and other aquatic birds, is considered the most efficient filler for sleeping bags. Early in the emergency a shortage of down became apparent. Kapok, a fluffy vegetable fiber, was an obvious substitute, and this material was used for some procurements for the Alaskan garrison. It proved, however, to lack sufficient warmth to meet the rigors of the arctic winter, and Maj. Gen. S. B. Buckner, commanding in Alaska, protested vigorously against its use.65
Down had been largely imported from China and Europe. Most of the foreign sources were soon shut off. The WPB in February 1942 issued an order restricting the use of goose and duck feathers and down to fulfilling defense contracts, but the limited domestic supply, even when so channeled, proved insufficient to meet the needs of the Army. The QMC explored every avenue in the search for a really efficient substitute for down. Extensive experimentation was carried on with milkweed fiber, curled chicken feathers, kinked acetate fiber, and other natural and synthetic materials. Nothing as effective as the mixture of 40 percent down and 60 percent waterfowl feathers was discovered, however, though the shorter feathers of turkeys and chickens made a reasonably satisfactory material when used in a mixture not exceeding 25 percent with down and waterfowl feathers. Sleeping bags were purchased chiefly with the 40-60 percent mixture of down and feathers, although in 1944 dilution with 25 percent of chicken feathers was authorized.66
Quartermaster items also made use of large quantities of leather of various types, much of which was normally imported. Most of the leathers used in the manufacture of equipment became critical materials sooner or later. The first serious shortage to appear was in horsehide, used for heavy leather gloves. A cowhide tannage was developed which was intended to give cowhide the same characteristics as horsehide, and this material was used as a substitute. Another substitute specification for horsehide gloves was worked out in goatskin. As cowhide itself became a critical material, a new glove design, in which leather was used only in the palm, was developed in 1942. This cut-and-sewn glove replaced the wool knit glove previously supplied as the general issue item of hand-wear.67
Within a few months after Pearl Harbor, hides, skins, and most types of leather were placed under close control by the WPB, primarily to make these materials available for military needs. The Army supply services, however, were not brought under such heavy pressure to eliminate leather as in the case of rubber and certain of the metals. Footwear consumed by far the largest part of the leather used in Quartermaster items. The most effective measure taken by the Corps to conserve leather was the initiation of a shoe-rebuilding program both in this country and in the theaters.68 In addition, the QMC took advantage of every opportunity to reduce its consumption by effecting substitutions or eliminating leather from a number of other items, such as scabbards for rifles, carbines, and submachine guns. Specifications were relaxed to permit the use of lower grade and thinner leathers.
The most important new development in the design of the service shoe, affecting the quantity of leather used, consisted in the change from a leather to a composition sole. This step was taken primarily because of the superior wearing qualities of the composition material, but the growing shortage of sole leather was a consideration. Its effect was to reduce greatly the leather requirements for this basic Quartermaster item.69 A further conservation measure consisted in the replacement of the leather bottom filler by a cork filler. Since the rubber situation became very tight after the United States entered the war, conservation in the footwear program from this time on was centered more in efforts to reduce the amount of crude rubber consumed than in the saving of leather. In fact, at one time it was expected that it would be necessary to return to the use of leather soles. Nevertheless, leather remained a critical commodity and the QMC continued to watch for opportunities to save this material.
A notable feature of the whole conservation program was the extensive use of synthetic plastic materials as substitutes for natural raw materials. Plastics constituted a relatively new field of industrial development. Progress in this field was immensely stimulated during the war by the needs of the QMC and the other supply services. For Quartermaster items alone plastics were considered, tested, and to some extent used as substitutes for metals, rubber, and other materials. This new group of substances also occasionally permitted the development of a new item for which no natural material was quite suitable. In a number of instances, plastic substitutes for orthodox materials were so superior to the original that no return to the latter was contemplated when it should again become abundant.
Plastic buttons not only replaced the brass buttons of the uniform, but also took the place of vegetable ivory and bone buttons of other garments. Plastic replaced brass in whistles, water bag faucets, bugles, and razors; it took the place of aluminum in knife handles and, in a limited procurement, in canteens; it replaced rubber in raincoats and other waterproof fabrics. Certain new and important Quartermaster items, such as the helmet liner and the methyl bromide delousing set, were made of plastic substances from the beginning. Rifle and other weapon covers of expendable plastic material were developed for the use of the amphibious forces. Plastic insoles for the jungle boot added to the health and comfort of troops campaigning in the steaming tropical forests of the Southwest Pacific.70 The applications of plastics, largely but not entirely as substitutes, eventually became so extensive that shortages of these synthetic substances frequently appeared, sometimes forcing the substitution of one plastic for another.
Nylon was a new plastic material which came to have varied and useful applications in Quartermaster equipment. Best known before the war as a silk substitute from which sheer stockings were made, nylon showed protean possibilities under the stimulus of war. Mountain climbing rope, superior to the best Manila, was developed from it. Shoe laces made of filament nylon showed such excellent wearing qualities that they came to be used with all jungle foot wear. Rainsuits and light-weight ponchos for tropical wear were designed in nylon. Toothbrush and shaving brush bristles were made of it, and the material was considered for a whole range of jungle fabric items. Nylon was also deemed the best material for mountain tents!71
Unfortunately for the Corps, nylon was the only satisfactory substitute available to the Air Forces for the Japanese silk formerly used in parachutes. It was used not only for the fabric but also for the shroud lines of the parachutes. Nylon fabric was therefore largely allocated to the Air Forces, and the supply services for some time had to do without it or to accept such quantities of rejected parachute material as became available. Production of nylon increased but so too did Air Forces’ requirements. While substantial allocations were eventually made to the QMC in 1944, the organization was for a long time unable to make as free use of this amazingly versatile product as it would otherwise have done!72