Chapter 3: Build-up in Britain
Shortly after its entrance into the war, the United States, in line with the long-range Allied objective of defeating Germany first, commenced the build-up in Britain of forces and equipment intended for eventual employment in a major amphibious assault against the Nazi-held coast of northwestern Europe. Great Britain was in many respects admirably suited to serve as a base for the accumulation of American strength and the organization of British and American armies into a coordinated striking force. Although 3,000 miles from U.S. North Atlantic ports, she was but a few miles from the European Continent. Aside from the resources of military manpower and materiel that she herself could contribute, Britain possessed excellent ports, a strong industrial system, well-organized railways, and a skilled though depleted labor force.
The American build-up, involving the movement by water of almost 1,700,000 U.S. Army troops and over 14,000,000 measurement tons of cargo into the United Kingdom by 6 June 1944, posed formidable transportation problems for both the United States and Britain.1 Deployment from the zone of interior was narrowly circumscribed by the shortage of shipping, heavy losses of vessels and freight to enemy submarine action, and diversions to meet immediate needs in other overseas areas. In the United Kingdom, the influx of American men and materials placed an additional load on transport facilities already heavily taxed by wartime requirements. The ports, many of them damaged by enemy aerial bombardment, were handling a large import program in addition to heavy military shipments; the railways were crowded with abnormal traffic; transport equipment and personnel were limited; and highly centralized civil and military control of traffic was necessary to keep the situation fluid.
The Americans in Britain at first had to rely entirely on the British for the reception and distribution of men and equipment, and indeed were largely dependent on British transport facilities, installations, and local civilian labor throughout the war. The U.S. Army had to orient and adapt itself to British operations and procedures and to work closely with British military and civil shipping, port, rail, motor transport, and movement control authorities, and with labor unions, stevedores, and other agencies affecting their activities. As the American establishment grew, the U.S. Army gradually assumed control of the handling of U.S. ships in British ports and of the movement of American troops and cargo. U.S. port troops were brought in to augment the
inadequate civilian labor force; locomotives and rolling stock were imported to bolster the overburdened railroads; and a separate American movements control system was set up to parallel that of the British. The growth of American authority in no way mitigated the necessity for close coordination of U.S. and British transportation activities. The tight transportation situation required integrated control of the flow of men and supply to and within the United Kingdom, if a breakdown was to be avoided. Despite some inevitable friction and occasional conflicts of interest, this was achieved to a remarkable degree.
The task of directing American transportation activities in the United Kingdom was assumed by a young, inexperienced Transportation Corps. Still in the process of organization in the United States in the spring of 1942, the Corps’ functions and authority were in the formative stage. There was no large pool of officers experienced in transportation matters and no doctrine covering the Corps’ responsibilities overseas. A pioneer among overseas theater organizations, the Transportation Corps in Britain had to gain recognition within the theater and assume authority over transportation activities formerly handled by the Quartermaster Corps and the Corps of Engineers. Within the theater Services of Supply, the Transportation Corps’ authority had to be defined vis-à-vis territorial base section commands. Moreover, as already indicated, relations had to be worked out with British transportation agencies. By an evolutionary process the Transportation Corps grew from a small handful of officers and enlisted men into an effective organization that played a vital role in the build-up in Britain, the mounting of the invasion, and the continental operations that followed.
Bolero Against a Shifting Strategic Background
American interest in Great Britain antedated the actual entry of the United States into the war.2 U.S. military observers had been sent to Britain in 1940, and in March of the following year Congress enacted legislation extending lend-lease aid to the British. Joint staff discussions between the American and British military authorities were initiated early in 1941. At these meetings the decision was made that should the United States become involved in the war with both Germany and Japan, the major emphasis would first be placed on the defeat of Germany. Also, plans were worked out to deploy U.S. forces to Iceland and the United Kingdom in the event of war, and arrangements were made for an immediate exchange of military missions.
Shortly after Pearl Harbor the Allied planners at the ARCADIA Conference reaffirmed the objective of defeating Germany first, but the method of implementing this strategic aim still had to be agreed upon. British plans for invading the Continent from the United Kingdom (ROUNDUP) were vague and limited in scope, and more serious attention was devoted to a proposed invasion of North Africa (GYMNAST). Both plans soon became dormant, however, in view of the critical situation in the Pacific and the shipping shortage. At ARCADIA, steps were taken to expand the
U.S. force planned for deployment to North Ireland from 30,000 to 105,000, in order to relieve British divisions for service elsewhere. The first contingent of the expanded force, designated MAGNET, sailed from New York to Belfast in mid-January 1942, but the same factors that deterred the accomplishment of other long-range strategic objectives resulted in a cutback of the MAGNET Force, and only part of the projected number was eventually shipped.
By March 1942 War Department planners were able to look beyond readjustments in the immediate situation and outline a plan for a cross-Channel invasion of northern France in the spring of 1943. Proposed measures to be taken during the period of preparation for this operation included amphibious raids along the enemy-held European coast, an air offensive, and the accumulation of U.S. forces and materiel in Britain. Provision was also to be made for a more limited assault in the autumn of 1942, should this prove desirable to avert a collapse of Soviet forces or to capitalize on any serious weakening of the German stand in the west. The proposals, accepted by the British in April 1942, were referred to as the BOLERO Plan. However, by summer the term BOLERO was applied only to the build-up phase of the plan, while ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHAMMER were code names used for the operational phases.
The planning machinery for BOLERO was set in motion with the establishment of special committees in Washington and London. The Washington BOLERO Combined Committee, which held its first meeting on 29 April 1942, was described as “a shipping agency ... charged with recommendations adequate for placing in England the necessary personnel and equipment to carry out the BOLERO Plan.” Lt. Col. Marcus B. Stokes, Jr., chief of the Planning Division, Transportation Service, SOS, began attending on 9 May 1942, as the representative of Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) Charles P. Gross.3 By this time a similar committee had been established in London, and both committees were at work on the details of the over-all plan for the movement of U.S. forces into the British Isles and for their reception, accommodation, and supply.
From the spring of 1942 onward BOLERO planning was continuous, but was soon hedged about by diversions, delays, and uncertainties arising from a shifting strategic situation. This can best be illustrated by a discussion of the four BOLERO Key Plans, which were drawn up by the British on the basis of the decisions of the BOLERO planners and included complete details regarding the over-all arrangements for accommodating American personnel, equipment, and supplies in the British Isles. All were simply revisions or new editions of a single basic plan. Issued by the British War Office, primarily to inform the pertinent British agencies of U.S. Army requirements in the United Kingdom, these plans were useful to all concerned.4
The first BOLERO Key Plan, dated 31 May 1942, was based on an ultimate total strength of 1,049,000 American troops and an invasion date of spring 1943. The estimated rate of arrival of U.S. forces in the United Kingdom was to reach a peak of
100,000 to 120,000 men per month by September 1942. For planning purposes it was assumed that 80 ships carrying a total of 320,000 dead-weight tons would be discharged each month. Maximum use was to be made of all suitable British ports. The plan also included the evacuation of almost all British troops from the southwestern part of England to give space to incoming American personnel. The Second Key Plan, dated 25 July 1942, raised the target figures somewhat, but developments were already under way that were to result in a drastic cutback of the build-up program.5
In July 1942 the American and British chiefs of state decided to undertake a North African invasion (TORCH} in the fall of the year. This operation would not only require a great diversion of shipping, personnel, and equipment from BOLERO but also would necessitate shifting to North Africa men and materials already in the United Kingdom. It was generally conceded by American planners that launching and supporting TORCH would in all probability rule out a cross-Channel operation in 1943. A Third Key Plan, taking these circumstances into consideration and issued on 11 November 1942, had as its first objective a contingent of only 427,000 U.S. troops in the United Kingdom by the late spring of 1943 and a goal of 1,049,000 by the end of that year. In view of the higher priority given the Mediterranean, the severe shipping losses, and the uncertainty regarding the date and scope of the cross-Channel assault, these figures could hardly be considered firm.
The strategic basis for the resumption of a large-scale BOLERO movement was firmed up slowly during 1943. Although at the Casablanca Conference, held early in the year, no fixed commitment was made with reference to a cross-Channel operation, it was decided that a combined staff under a Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) would be set up in Britain to plan for coastal raids and for a possible invasion of the Continent in 1943–44, and that BOLERO would be resumed.6 The COSSAC staff was established in April 1943, but the immediate execution of the conference’s decision regarding BOLERO was rendered impossible by Mediterranean operations planned for the summer, continued heavy losses of vessels, lend-lease assistance to the Soviet Union, and British civilian import requirements.
Prospects for BOLERO brightened perceptibly during the spring of 1943 as shipping losses decreased and the Allied strategic situation cleared. At the TRIDENT Conference in Washington in May it was decided to intensify offensive air operations based on the British Isles and to build up troops, supplies, and equipment in Britain for a cross-Channel assault to take place about 1 May 1944. To attain these objectives, Mediterranean operations subsequent to the scheduled invasion of Sicily were made subject to approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and the commander in that area was limited to the use of forces already allotted to him.
Based on schedules proposed at TRIDENT, the fourth and last BOLERO Key Plan appeared on 12 July 1943. It set the time of the projected assault as the spring of 1944 and called for a total U.S. troop strength in the United Kingdom of 1,340,000. It contemplated a maximum of 160 cargo ships to arrive during April 1944,
carrying an average load of 4,000 deadweight tons.
Plans were further crystallized in August 1943 at the QUADRANT Conference at Quebec, where the TRIDENT decisions were endorsed and the COSSAC plan for a cross-Channel invasion (OVERLORD) in May 1944 was affirmed. Also, in view of reduced shipping losses, the BOLERO commitment was increased, 1,446,000 troops to be available in the British Isles by the projected invasion date of 1 May 1944.7 The target date was subsequently postponed a month in order to make available an additional month’s production.
QUADRANT did not wholly eliminate uncertainty in strategic planning. Later in the year the British made proposals for the postponement of OVERLORD in favor of Mediterranean operations, but these were definitely set aside at the Tehran and Cairo Conferences of late 1943. There, commitments were made for the cross-Channel invasion and also for simultaneous landings in southern France (ANVIL). Primarily because of the landing craft shortage, ANVIL was later delayed until August 1944.
The progressive firming up of strategic planning was reflected in the implementation of BOLERO. The flow of troops and materials into the United Kingdom, a trickle during the North African operation, began to increase steadily during the summer of 1943, reached the flood stage in the final six months before the cross-Channel assault, and continued for several months thereafter. Meanwhile, strategic and logistic planning for OVERLORD had gone forward in the United Kingdom. As the invasion date neared, attention was turned increasingly to the task of bringing the American resources built up in Britain to bear on the enemy across the Channel.
It was against this strategic background that the transportation tasks involved in the U.S. Army’s build-up were performed and that the organization and procedures necessary to that accomplishment were gradually developed.
Initial Flow of Troops and Cargo to the United Kingdom
The post-Pearl Harbor movement of U.S. troops into the United Kingdom got under way on 15 January 1942 when the veteran Army transport, Chateau Thierry, and the British troopship, Strathaird, left New York with 4,058 troops. The commanding officer, Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle, was critical of conditions on the Strathaird, which carried most of the personnel. Reflecting the scarcity of shipping, the troop quarters were crowded, and enemy action could have resulted in more-than-normal casualties. Both transports arrived safely at Belfast in Northern Ireland, where the troops, composed chiefly of elements of the 34th Infantry Division, disembarked in the morning hours of 26 January 1942.8
Because of the critical situation in the Pacific, comparatively few additional U.S. troops reached the British Isles during the first quarter of 1942. A second convoy, nine vessels carrying 8,555 troops, sailed from New York for Belfast on 19 February. The next major movement did not develop until 30 April, when a total of 13,924 U.S. Army personnel embarked on eight ships. After temporary service as troop carriers in the Pacific, the mammoth British passenger ships Queen Mary and
Queen Elizabeth were placed in the New York-United Kingdom shuttle service in May and June, respectively.9 At the close of June 1942, 56,090 U.S. Army troops had landed in the United Kingdom. Of this total, 41,205 or 73.4 percent were then stationed in Northern Ireland, but with MAGNET in discard and BOLERO under way, the bulk of the troops arriving thereafter were to debark in England and Scotland.10
During the warmer months of the year the build-up of American personnel in Britain was augmented appreciably by “double bunking.” To attain the maximum passenger lift many of the troops slept in shifts, occupying bunks in rotation; they were given two meals daily, which involved almost continuous mess operations. The first such shipment left New York on 31 May, when 8,018 passengers were crowded aboard the Thomas H. Barry, Siboney, and Munargo. Subsequently, it became a common practice to load transports beyond normal troop carrying capacity after due provision had been made for lifesaving equipment and other essentials.11
The troop build-up was accompanied by a progressive accumulation of materiel in the United Kingdom. U.S. Army cargo discharged at British ports increased from 441 measurement tons in January 1942 to 279,092 measurement tons in June. As in the case of the troops, all cargo at first flowed to the Belfast area, but beginning in May 1942 the ports on the west coast of England, as well as in the Clyde area of Scotland, commenced to receive American cargo and soon outstripped North Ireland in importance.12
Development of the Transportation Organization
Success in the BOLERO program was dependent upon the development of an efficient supply and transportation organization for the U.S. Army in the British Isles. When the first American troops landed, there was neither a Services of Supply nor a chief of transportation, and several months elapsed before this situation changed.
The first American contingent placed no great burden on British transport, but larger troop movements were bound to create problems. Sensing the need of closer liaison on transportation matters, the interested British agencies in April 1942 asked that U.S. Army personnel be assigned to assist. In response, the War Department advised Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney, then in command of the U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles (USAFBI), that Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Frank S. Ross and four assistants would be sent to London, at the same time recommending that Ross serve as Chaney’s chief of transportation. General Chaney concurred concerning Ross and requested an additional twelve officers as the nucleus of a transportation staff of fifty or sixty officers that would be needed before the arrival of a large body of U.S. troops.13
Meanwhile, an Army Services of Supply had been created in Washington as part of the War Department reorganization in March 1942. Within SOS, an organization was set up to take over transportation functions formerly performed by G-4 and the Quartermaster Corps. It was expected that parallel SOS organizations would be activated in the overseas commands, and the War Department took the initiative in organizing an SOS for the United Kingdom. At a staff conference in Washington on 7 May 1942, Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, SOS, announced that Maj. Gen. (later Lt. Gen.) John C. H. Lee had been chosen to head the Services of Supply in the British Isles. General Lee was to prepare preliminary plans, decide on a tentative organization, and then leave for London. The head of each supply service at Washington was asked to submit the names of his two best men, of whom one was to be selected for Lee’s staff. General Gross, then chief of the SOS Transportation Service (later Transportation Corps), strongly recommended Colonel Ross, already earmarked for duty with General Chaney. Ross then became chief of Transportation Service under General Lee.14
Born in Colorado on 9 March 1893, Ross had spent his early years in Texas, where during summer vacations he had worked on a railroad. He began his military career in 1916 as a private in the Texas National Guard. After serving in World War I he remained as an officer in the U.S. Army. On 7 December 1941, he was already stationed in Washington, D.C., as chief of the Port and Water Section, Transportation Branch, G-4. In late April 1942 Ross was ready to join the 10th Armored Division. He was, in fact, none too enthusiastic about going to the British Isles as a staff officer since he preferred a combat assignment, but he saw the potential importance of the task. Lean, energetic, high-strung, Ross was to serve throughout the war as the U.S. Army chief of transportation for the European theater.15
Ross had begun planning an organization before he received his appointment to Lee’s staff. At this time the SOS in Washington was contemplating considerable expansion of the functions of its Transportation Service. Patterning his organization on this concept, Ross assembled officers to staff the rail, water, and motor divisions, and to plan for the organization of units to be employed in operating and maintaining small landing craft during the Channel crossing. He came into Lee’s organization fully convinced of the necessity for integrating all theater Army transportation activities, other than air, and expected that this doctrine would be accepted.16
The Transportation Office
Headquarters, Services of Supply, USAFBI, was activated under General Lee on 24 May 1942, the day he and a
group of his staff officers arrived.17 A member of this party, Colonel Ross immediately began to assemble and organize his headquarters staff. His knowledge of Army transportation in World War I had convinced him of the advisability of having not only transportation experts drawn from civilian life but also “a leavening of Army officers.” The professional soldiers could supply the supervision that he believed had been woefully lacking in the American Expeditionary Forces in 1917-18. In furtherance of this policy, wherever possible Ross placed a Regular Army officer in a key position but selected an officer with the appropriate civilian technical background to serve as assistant. The resultant pooling of experience was intended to insure smooth operation from both the military and the technical points of view. For deputy chief of transportation, Ross chose Col. Norman A. Ryan, who combined a substantial military background with more than thirty years of railway experience.18
On 11 June 1942 an initial allotment of 135 officers reported for duty in the Office of the Chief of Transportation, then temporarily located at No. 1 Great Cumberland Place in London. Most of the men had little or no experience in the transportation field and of course knew nothing of local conditions.19
Up to this time there was no formal theater directive defining the authority and functions of the SOS and its subordinate services in the theater, since there were differences between General Lee, who with the War Department desired an organization with broad administrative and supply responsibilities, and General Chaney, who believed that the SOS should have more limited powers. Formal definition of the scope and extent of the SOS, including its transportation organization, had to await a change in theater organization and command.20
On 8 June 1942 the European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA) was established as successor to the U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles. General Chaney was replaced as theater commander by Maj. Gen. (later General of the Army) Dwight D. Eisenhower on 24 June.21 The question of the organization of transportation in the theater was raised immediately. Writing to General Eisenhower on 22 June, Somervell requested his opinion regarding the desirability of creating in overseas theaters a “separate transport corps entirely divorced from the Quartermaster Corps,” and whether that service should also operate railroads. Eisenhower replied that it was essential “that all forms of transportation—motor, rail, water—be closely coordinated.” He was in complete agreement with his SOS commander, General Lee, who had already set up a transportation service and assigned it responsibility for the operation of all means of surface transportation in the communications zone, including ports, motor transport, and military railways. He concluded that a transportation service should be organized separate from the Quartermaster Corps, and that the operation of railroads, then charged to the Chief of Engineers, should come under the Chief of
Transportation Service. On 19 July Somervell informed Eisenhower that the Secretary of War had approved the creation of a Transportation Corps that would be responsible for all rail and water activities. With regard to motor transport, on the other hand, Somervell had taken steps to centralize the procurement and maintenance of vehicles in the Ordnance Department, and had left the truck companies in the Quartermaster Corps. The truck units in the theater, he stated, could be attached as circumstances warranted to the Transportation Service, a division, a corps, or the quartermaster or other staff officers.22
In the meantime, work on a general order defining the role of the SOS in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) had gone forward, and on 20 July 1942 a theater directive was issued outlining the structure and functions of General Lee’s organization. Included was provision for a Chief of Transportation Service on the special staff of the Commanding General, SOS. This provided formal recognition for a Transportation Service exercising transportation functions previously divided between the Quartermaster and the Engineers.23
In the following month the Transportation Service in ETO was redesignated the Transportation Corps, following the pattern already set by the parent organization in Washington. Since the Corps was new and not thoroughly understood either in the zone of interior or overseas, Ross’s organization was subject to frequent adjustments. Pursuant to a War Department directive of August 1942 that assigned vehicle maintenance to the Ordnance Department and left truck operations with the Quartermaster Corps, Ross was deprived unexpectedly of all motor transport functions other than movement control on the highways. However, in July 1943 he was again assigned responsibility for motor transport operations. Meanwhile, Ross’s functions pertaining to rail transportation had been given War Department sanction in mid-November 1942, when it broadened the scope of the Transportation Corps to include all military railway activities except construction.24
Other adjustments had to be made in relation to the SOS base command structure that evolved in the United Kingdom. Deciding to decentralize his operations, General Lee in the summer of 1942 set up skeleton territorial base sections, which in the ensuing months grew into full-fledged organizations. Ultimately five base sections were established. (Map 2) Base section commanders were made responsible for administration and supply, and for all SOS operations in their areas not exempted by the commanding general. A number of activities, among them Transportation Service including port operations, initially were exempted from base section control, but this arrangement soon came up for reconsideration. Base section commanders were dissatisfied with the degree of control exercised by the chiefs of technical services over exempted activities. A firm believer in base sections, Lee steadily increased their authority, and in August 1943 completely abolished exempted activities, making base section
Transportation Regions in the United Kingdom
commanders responsible for all SOS operations in their respective areas.25
This decentralization of the control of transportation operations to the base sections limited the chief of transportation to technical direction. The change was particularly important in the realm of port operations—the largest U.S. transportation activity in the United Kingdom. Some base section commanders gave the term technical direction a liberal interpretation, permitting the chief of transportation considerable leeway in dealing with the ports. Others, understandably jealous of their prerogatives, closely controlled the activities of their port commanders. Ross never concurred in the arrangement that placed the ports under the base sections, believing that its success was too dependent on the personalities and caliber of the several base section commanders, and that the interjection of a headquarters between the chief of transportation and the ports handicapped effective supervision and coordination. As will be seen, the vague line of demarkation between base section control and technical direction in some instances created difficulties in the conduct of port operations. The larger problem of decentralized versus centralized control of transportation activities was to come up again on the European continent, as well as in other overseas commands.26
In July 1942, in order to obtain more space and a better location, General Lee moved SOS headquarters from London to Cheltenham, a former resort city in Gloucestershire. However necessary, this transfer posed a problem for the chief of transportation. He could function only by cooperating with the U.S. supply services at Cheltenham, but at the same time he could not operate without maintaining liaison with the British transportation agencies in London. Ross therefore had to divide his staff. The principal administrative duties and the operating functions that involved the supply services were centered at Cheltenham, but many of the personnel, especially those in planning and liaison activities, stayed in London in order to keep in direct contact with the British. A special courier service had to be devised to facilitate interoffice communication, since Cheltenham was about ninety miles from London. Maintenance of a split staff proved undesirable, and in mid-August Ross began the gradual return of his Cheltenham organization to London. There, suitable space was found in Self-ridge’s Annex, which housed the Transportation Corps headquarters until its move to France.27
Aside from two small branches for control and statistical purposes, the staff of the theater chief of transportation, as it was organized on 1 November 1942, was concerned with three types of activity: operations, administration, and planning and liaison. Operations, which included control of American rail and highway movements and supervision of work done at the ports, was headed by Col. Donald S. McConnaughy. Administration, then under Lt. Col. James R. Worthington, involved the usual housekeeping functions, together with cable communications. Planning dealt primarily with the transportation aspects of pending operational
projects, and liaison was almost entirely with the British. Planning and liaison were assigned to Col. (later Brig. Gen.) George C. Stewart, until he left for North Africa and was replaced by Lt. Col. (later Col.) David W. Traub on 13 November 1942.28
Meanwhile, the contemplated invasion of North Africa had begun to have a disturbing effect upon the Transportation Corps in the British Isles. The first blow fell on the planning staff. In late August 1942, except for the executive who remained to insure the continuity of plans for operations in the United Kingdom, all the planning personnel had to work on the transportation aspects of the projected assault.29 In the same month a small liaison group, headed by Colonel McConnaughy, was assigned to assist the British in effecting outbound movements in support of TORCH. Since the infant Transportation Corps was not yet prepared to perform the task, the British assumed responsibility for the movement of all American as well as British personnel and material leaving the United Kingdom for North Africa. The liaison group represented the U.S. Army interest at the British War Office, assisting in the screening of requests for moves and determining their priority. Later known as the Export Movement Division, this organization disbanded in the spring of 1943 when the volume of outbound traffic for the North African theater had fallen off.30
The North African invasion not only created a diversion in planning activities, but also cut deeply into the strength of the Transportation Corps in the United Kingdom. In mid-October 1942, Ross reported that transfers to the TORCH operation had seriously depleted his staff, although he believed it would be possible to rebuild rapidly on the framework remaining in the United Kingdom, if the BOLERO program should be revived. Shortly thereafter Ross was assigned to temporary duty in North Africa, and in his absence Colonel Ryan assumed charge of the transportation office. During this period many transportation officers left the British Isles to serve in North Africa. Some, such as Colonel Stewart, remained with the forces in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, but others, including Ross, had only temporary assignments. Several transportation units, among them the 3rd Port and three port battalions, also were sent from the United Kingdom to take part in the North African campaign.31
Although greatly reduced, the Transportation staff that remained in Britain experienced no difficulties because the load was slackening. In the six months from November 1942 to May 1943, the bulk of the available U.S. Army personnel and cargo flowed into North Africa rather than the United Kingdom. American personnel debarking at British ports fell to a low of 1,277 in March 1943, and in that month the total discharge of U.S. Army cargo was only 65,767 measurement tons. 32
Despite certain adverse factors, the North African operation benefited the
U.S. Army transportation organization in the British Isles. Personnel losses, some only temporary, were offset by experience gained. Valuable “know-how” had been acquired in helping to outload the task force units that sailed from the United Kingdom. Both Ross and his associates in North Africa profited by the first-hand experience obtained in unloading troops and cargo and operating ports and railways in an active theater. On the whole, it was fortunate that this foretaste of wartime conditions came before the Transportation Corps had to support the invasion of Normandy.33
Ross reached North Africa on 11 November 1942, departed on 26 January 1943 for a brief stay in the United States, and then returned to London.34 Soon thereafter, he reorganized his headquarters in order to simplify administrative procedures, to differentiate between operating and traffic control agencies, and to effect decentralization. In addition to a Control Section under his direct supervision, the new organizational pattern provided assistant chiefs of transportation for administration, for planning (including intelligence, statistical, and historical functions), for traffic control (meaning simply movement control), and for operations (comprising such operating agencies as the ports and the military railways together with the functions relating to packing and marking, training, tracing lost shipments, and moving perishables).35
In July 1943 General Ross made further changes.36 The Military Railways Branch, formerly under Operations, was given separate status as the Military Railways Division. Operations was redesignated the Marine Operations Division, and the motor transport functions recently recovered by the theater chief of transportation were placed under a new Motor Transport Division. Later, the Traffic Control Division was redesignated the Movements Division, and a new Supply Division was established. As shown in Chart 1, on 9 January 1944 the transportation office had seven divisions, each headed by an assistant chief of transportation. With this organization Ross was ready to meet the responsibilities of D Day.
At the close of January 1944 the principal functions of the European theater chief of transportation were to give technical supervision to the operation of all port facilities under U.S. Army control; to effect and control the transportation of U.S. personnel and cargo from ships to destinations in the theater, and subsequent movement by rail, highway, or water; to operate and maintain military railways under U.S. Army jurisdiction; to control U.S. Army movements by motor vehicles and to operate motor transport not assigned to other services or commands; to advise the commanding general of the theater Services of Supply as to limitations imposed by transportation facilities on tactical operations; and to recommend policy on all Transportation Corps matters in the European theater.37
During the fall of 1943 Ross had also begun to adapt his organization to
Chart 1: Organization of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, SOS, ETOUSA: January 1944
Source: Rpt, Consolidated Historical Report on Transportation Corps Activities in the European Theater of Operations, Mov 1942 Through V-E Day, Chart IV, OCT HR ETO.
projected operations on the Continent by creating the Advance Echelon, which began detailed planning for OVERLORD and later became part of the Forward Echelon, Communications Zone.38
The Problem of Personnel
The Transportation Corps in the United Kingdom, like other technical services, had to contend throughout the war with two basic handicaps. One was the Army policy of limiting service troops to a minimum, so as to provide the maximum shipping space for combat units. The other was a growing shortage of manpower, which forced acceptance of men with little or no transportation experience.39
Early in June 1942 the troop basis set up for U.S. Army transportation activity in the United Kingdom contemplated a headquarters staff, two traffic control units, and four port organizations. The traffic control units, then known as group regulating stations, each had 75 officers and 300 enlisted men. Specifically devised by Ross to provide overhead personnel, they could be used “anywhere for anything.”40 Each port headquarters was to have attached to it four port battalions, two service battalions, and certain other necessary service units.
The first American port personnel had reached Belfast in May. Other transportation units began arriving in the United Kingdom in June and July. The initial port headquarters, the 3rd, debarked on 23 June. To gain experience, it was assigned to the Bristol Channel area for on-the-job training with the British. On 13 July the 4th Port landed and was stationed in the Mersey area. In the same month the 1st Group Regulating Station reached the theater. Subsequently, the requirements of the North African invasion led to a temporary suspension of the movement of transportation troops into Britain and to withdrawals among those units that had arrived.41
Largely because of the diversion of personnel to North Africa, the theater chief of transportation’s headquarters organization in February 1943 numbered only 55 officers, 5 warrant officers, and 120 enlisted men. Under its supervision were the 1st Group Regulating Station and the 4th and 5th Ports.42 Meanwhile Ross, during his brief visit to Washington, had sought among other things to establish new personnel requirements for the Transportation Corps in the European theater. On 5 March 1943 he received an allotment of thirty-seven officers to perform administrative, personnel, planning, procurement, highway, marine, and railway functions, but he pressed for more. He was especially anxious to obtain more regulating groups, claiming that he could not function without them. He could not, he added, continue to cry on the shoulders of the British for help. If necessary, he was
willing to take youngsters fresh from officer candidate schools in the United States and to train them after arrival overseas.43
The theater chief of transportation was disappointed with the personnel sent to him in the first half of 1943. The enlisted men, in particular, lacked both experience and education. He found it hard to understand why he was given shoe repair men, laundrymen, sewing machine operators, and tailors. Specifically, he wanted white enlisted men who could read and write, an essential requirement if they were to keep track of freight and perform the other necessary documentation. For traffic regulating groups, he also needed men who could deal with both military and civilian personnel and could work in close harmony with their British counterparts. The officers he received often failed to measure up to the desired standards. Some were deficient in discipline, courtesy, and technical qualifications. Many were older men who did not hold up well under the long and arduous hours of work that were required.44
Because of the difference between American and European customs and methods, a special school was established for the orientation of newly arrived Transportation Corps officers and enlisted men. The first session, held at Seamills Camp near Avonmouth, was opened on 1 August 1943. The instruction stressed matters peculiar to the United Kingdom and the Continent and explained in detail the wartime operations of the Transportation Corps. Ross considered the results excellent.45
Prodded by vigorous protests from ETOUSA, General Gross and his staff tried hard to eliminate poor timber from Transportation Corps units destined for the United Kingdom. Improvement resulted, and as the year drew to a close there was less criticism of incoming personnel. Early in September 1943 Ross commented favorably on the 4th Regulating Group, from which misfits and other unqualified personnel had been screened before the unit left the United States.46
Nonetheless, the situation during the ensuing months was difficult. As late as 6 June 1944 the theater chief of transportation was worried by delays in the arrival of personnel and the need of employing green men. He believed that the Transportation Corps should have had the services of many qualified men who had been assigned to less important positions elsewhere. He reported, however, that with few exceptions the performance of recently received units had been good. The main problem was that these troops could not acquire sufficient experience in the theater before the invasion began.47
Coordination of U.S. and British Transportation
One of the first jobs facing the Transportation Corps in the United Kingdom was to effect a satisfactory working relationship with the pertinent British military and civilian agencies. With British
transport facilities already hard hit by the war, effective and coordinated control of American and British traffic was necessary to avoid port congestion and to prevent a breakdown of the railways. Even before the Americans arrived, British trains were carrying far larger passenger loads, although usually for shorter distances, than most U.S. trains. To the formidable British traffic was added, in 1942, the burden of American personnel, equipment, and supplies for the build-up.48
The British early in World War II had instituted a strict control of all transportation, military and civilian. On the civilian side, to attain more effective coordination of port management and inland transport, the new and powerful British Ministry of War Transport (BMWT) had been formed in May 1941 by a fusion of the former Ministries of Shipping and Transport. Under Lord Leathers, the BMWT exercised pervasive control over shipping, port operations, and inland transport. To the Americans, the more important BMWT agencies were the Diversion Committee, which directed ships still at sea to their destination ports; the Sea Transport Service, which among other things had charge of the berthing and unloading of all U.S. vessels for a time; and the regional port directors, who controlled port operations. The British railways were operated by civilians at the direction of the Railway Executive Committee. Other BMWT divisions controlled the allocation of civilian motor transport, coasters, and inland waterway facilities within the United Kingdom.49
On the military side, the Quarter-Master-General of the British Army had a Movements Control Directorate, usually known as “Q” Movements. It was headed by a director of movements, who had two deputies, one for stores (that is, freight) and the other for personnel. Q Movements was represented at every level of command. Assigned to each of the British military commands were movement control officers, who in turn operated through subordinates, generally intermediate district officers, and, in the lowest echelon, the railway traffic officers (RTO’s) stationed at all principal points. A central headquarters in London coordinated all British movements involving one or more commands. At the ports, the British movement control organization was represented by embarkation commandants and teams of embarkation staff officers and RTO’s. The Quarter-Master-General also had a director of transportation, who was responsible for the construction of port and rail facilities and for their technical operation when not performed by a civilian agency. The Royal Air Force had its own movement control organization, set up parallel to and working in close conjunction with the British Army Movements Control Directorate.50
The theater chief of transportation stressed the necessity of maintaining close liaison with the British on all transportation activity. Aside from establishing numerous contacts with the British Ministry of War Transport regarding ship
diversions, rail operations, and other matters, he worked closely with the British director of transportation (Maj. Gen. Donald J. McMullen), particularly with respect to the procurement of railway equipment. Of necessity, too, Ross had to set up effective liaison with the British director of movements (Maj. Gen. Noel G. Holmes). Controlling all British military movements in the United Kingdom, the Movements Directorate served as mentor and model in the development of a parallel American organization.51
U.S. Liaison and Organization for Movement Control
From the first, the staff of the U.S. transportation organization followed British procedures and learned by working alongside British movement control personnel. Soon after reaching London, Ross established informal liaison with the British Director of Movements through Maj. Louis Zinnecker, who had been handling transportation matters for General Chaney. During the transitional period, while the newly arrived personnel became familiar with British methods, Major Zinnecker remained temporarily as liaison officer until replaced on 8 June 1942 by Colonel Stewart. At that time, two officers were placed under Stewart, one detailed to the British deputy director of movements for personnel (Brigadier C. S. Napier), and the other assigned to the deputy director of movements for stores (Brigadier W. D. A. Williams). This marked the inauguration of an increasingly important liaison activity.52
As American traffic expanded, the liaison begun at London had to be extended throughout the United Kingdom. During July and August 1942 the theater chief of transportation established a movement control organization patterned after that of the British. In the top echelon were U.S. regional transportation officers, whose areas corresponded to those of the British military commands and whose major staff function was to maintain liaison with the British on transportation matters. Under the regional transportation officers were operating agencies headed by district transportation officers. In the lowest echelon were the local railway traffic officers. Although staffed by U.S. Army personnel, the new organization followed the prevailing British pattern, and its personnel frequently shared quarters and facilities with their British counterparts. The arrangement worked well, and Ross’s only complaint was that the British were too polite and did not put his men to work quickly enough.53
At first the British wanted to absorb the American personnel into their own movement control system, but Ross disagreed, believing that the establishment of a U.S. Army organization able to act for itself was an essential prerequisite to its ultimate transfer to the Continent, where it would operate its own line of communications. Equally undesirable was the development of a completely separate U.S. movement control organization, for the British and Americans then would both be doing the same type of work and competing for available transport facilities. The solution adopted was to set up a system of joint
traffic control, whereby each individual engaged in this activity—whether British or American—was held responsible for his respective movements. In practice, U.S. and British movement control personnel cooperated freely, the former relieving the latter as rapidly as possible in the areas where American troops had become the principal users of transportation.54
The first U.S. Army Regional Transportation Office in the United Kingdom was established in Northern Ireland on 14 July 1942. By mid-August five others had been set up in the British Isles.55 Since they paralleled the British military commands, the six transportation regions did not coincide with the four base sections (Northern Ireland, Western, Eastern, and Southern), set up by the Services of Supply in July 1942. This necessitated a departure from the British system, under which movement control personnel were directly responsible to the director of movements in London. To provide the necessary coordination, the regional transportation officers were placed on the special staffs of the base section commanders, with the theater chief of transportation exercising technical supervision over their operations. In practice, the regional transportation officer nearest a base section headquarters became the base section transportation officer for that base section, and Ross later recommended that the term “regional transportation officer” be dropped, since it was peculiar to the United Kingdom.56 Including the Central Base Section (London) and two additional regions, by 1943 there were eight transportation regions and five base sections. (See Map 2.)
As the representative of the theater chief of transportation the regional transportation officer supervised all U.S. Army traffic under his jurisdiction, maintaining constant liaison on transportation matters with the British authorities and with the American units within his region. Any unit that desired to move had first to consult the district transportation officer to make the necessary arrangements.57 All movements of American personnel and freight were under his direct supervision, as were also the railway traffic officers assigned to his district.
Operating at the ports, depots, and principal railway stations utilized by U.S. troops, the railway traffic officer represented the theater chief of transportation at the lowest echelon in movement control.58 As the local trouble shooter, he sought to expedite the movement of U.S. troops, supplies, and equipment. He helped provide prompt and dependable transportation by maintaining close liaison with British movement control officers and civilian railway personnel. At big depots he dealt almost exclusively with freight, arranging for rail cars, supervising their loading and dispatch, completing the necessary documentation, and keeping the depot commander informed on all transportation matters. At large railway
stations, on the other hand, the RTO was concerned chiefly with personnel. He supervised the loading and unloading of U.S. troops and accompanying equipment, and performed a wide variety of personal services. At one time or another practically every American soldier had reason to be grateful for service received from the officer with the brassard reading “R.T.O. U.S.A.” The average RTO had to arrange travel accommodations for about two hundred persons daily. If more than twenty persons were involved, clearance had to be obtained from the District Transportation Officer. American military personnel traveling on orders were required only to submit a copy of their orders to the RTO at the station, who then issued a travel warrant for use as a ticket.
The RTO had many duties and problems. He had to keep records of both personnel and freight movements. Lost or misplaced baggage, particularly barracks bags, was a daily headache. Since the British railways ordinarily lacked dining car service, the RTO had to assist when U.S. troop trains made a so-called “refreshment halt.” A frequent problem was the American soldier on furlough who lacked funds to return to his camp. In September 1942 the Transportation Corps devised a system of repayment warrants, whereby the RTO could arrange for rail travel and the cost was deducted from the soldier’s next pay. As the local field agent of the theater chief of transportation, the RTO constituted a basic element in movement control for the U.S. Army, first within the British Isles and later on the Continent.59
American railway traffic officers were drawn initially from the 1st Group Regulating Station, a traffic control unit that arrived in Liverpool on 12 July 1942 and was dispersed in small detachments throughout Great Britain. These men were trained beside their British counterparts and instructed to keep their eyes and ears open and mouths shut. In the meantime, they were urged to learn the British control system and to attempt no innovations. By September 1942 they were replacing the British RTO’s and taking hold in good fashion.60
As was to be expected, the American RTO’s experienced some difficulty in adjusting themselves to British methods of traffic control. They often tended to speed up operations and press for additional railway equipment to the annoyance of their British colleagues. Eventually, however, the American and British RTO’s came to understand each other better, as a result of their close association and their work on similar problems.61
Under the system outlined above, the theater chief of transportation, working in close cooperation with British transportation and movement control agencies in London, the nerve center of British transportation, exercised control over all American personnel and cargo movements to and from the ports and between the regions and base sections. Regional transportation officers, operating under his technical supervision, were responsible for implementing directives of the theater chief of transportation governing interregional moves and for directly arranging for local moves in conjunction with their
local British opposite numbers. Under the supervision of the Army regional transportation officers, the district transportation officers and the RTO’s performed the actual operational aspects of traffic control.62
Procedures Governing the Movement of Traffic
In the course of building its movement control organization, the Transportation Corps evolved procedures governing the flow of American men and materials into British ports and their distribution to the interior. These procedures were designed to regulate the flow into the main stream of British traffic under tight schedules and over heavily burdened transportation facilities. They encompassed movements from the point of departure in the zone of interior to their ultimate destinations in the United Kingdom.63
In the case of inbound cargo, aside from forecast and sailing cables received from the United States, Transportation Corps headquarters in London got its first inkling of what to expect from the cargo-loading cable dispatched for each outbound vessel by the U.S. port of embarkation. The port of embarkation also forwarded two copies of each ship’s manifest by air. The cargo-loading cable, containing a general description of the cargo in the ship, by hatch and deck level, was intended primarily to facilitate the selection of a port of discharge in the United Kingdom. The manifest, listing in detail what the ship carried, among other things enabled the supply services to nominate depots for the reception of the cargo.
Approximately one week before the estimated time of arrival of the convoy with which the ship had sailed, the BMWT Diversion Committee met to determine the port best suited to receive the vessel. At this meeting were represented all agencies interested in importing, warehousing, shipping, receiving, and moving cargo into the United Kingdom, including the British Q Movements and the U.S. Transportation Corps. The decision of the Diversion Committee was sometimes a compromise, since the most conveniently located port with respect to the destination of the bulk of the cargo might already be too congested to accommodate additional shipping. Such factors as availability of berths and labor, the ship’s draft, special types of cargo-handling equipment that might be required, and the availability of transport to the interior were all taken into consideration. The Diversion Committee, of course, considered ships other than those with U.S. Army cargo, selecting ports for as many as 500 ships a month.
Before the Diversion Committee met, Transportation Corps headquarters in London, on the basis of the cargo-loading cable, had selected a tentative port and determined from the theater U.S. chiefs of services the depots and warehouses to which they desired the cargo transported. If the manifest arrived early enough before the Diversion Committee meeting, it was “broken down,” a process that involved extraction of the items pertaining to the respective supply services, which,
on the basis of the likely port, indicated the desired inland depot destinations. Armed with such information, the Transportation Corps representative gave the Diversion Committee the facts upon which a definite port allocation of the vessel was made.
Upon the assignment of a definite port, the theater chief of transportation notified the interested port commander and chiefs of services. After the latter had made a final revision of desired destinations, the Freight Branch in Transportation Corps headquarters prepared cargo disposal instructions, showing the number of the vessel, port of discharge, date of berthing, marking of the cargo, number of packages, type of cargo, destination to which the cargo was to be moved, and the suggested means of transport and the British agency or services involved. In the case of shipments by rail, the chief means of transport, the railroads to be used and the destination depot, or the station nearest to the destination, were shown. These instructions were distributed to port commanders, all chiefs of services, regional transportation officers, and interested British agencies.
Cargo disposal instructions ordinarily were in the hands of the port commanders and the transportation agencies concerned forty-eight hours before the vessel was to be berthed, in order to give them time to plan for discharge and port clearance. As each carload, truckload, or bargeload was dispatched from a port to a depot, the RTO at the port notified the depot commander through his RTO by teletyped Traffic Dispatch Advice, giving the number of the rail car or other carrier, a brief description of its contents, and the time of dispatch from the port.
So far as inbound personnel were concerned, Washington normally notified the theater chief of transportation by cable of contemplated shipments of units, and later informed him of the convoys with which the units were scheduled to sail. On the basis of this information, Corps headquarters obtained from the theater G-3 the destinations desired and published a forecast of arrivals for the use of all agencies involved. When the convoys sailed, the U.S. ports of embarkation cabled confirmation directly to the theater chief of transportation, who then set in motion the arrangements for reception of the units and their movement inland. In the case of the Queens, which crossed so quickly and carried such large numbers that the usual sailing cable did not allow enough time to prepare for debarkation, an earlier cable notice was sent that might be only 80 percent correct as to numbers and units and yet would enable planning to begin in the theater before the final cable arrived.
Upon receipt of the sailing cable from the U.S. port, the Transportation Corps Passenger Branch in London met with representatives of Q Movements and the British railways to work out the details of securing rail equipment, scheduling trains, and planning stops for meals. Movement instructions were prepared and jointly signed by the theater chief of transportation and the British director of movements. Indicating the port and date of arrival and the strength of units, the instructions were issued to the port commanders and RTO’s concerned.
For large shipments, the main difficulty was to obtain enough railway equipment without disrupting British traffic. Because of the possibility of enemy air action and the pressure for a quick turnaround of transports, it was necessary to effect prompt debarkation and clearance of incoming passengers. Since trains ran on extremely close schedules, their spotting,
loading, and departure had to be timed to the minute—a complex and delicate task. Indeed, the scheduling of trains dictated the entire debarkation procedure.
The debarkation of troops, like the discharge and clearance of cargo, was the responsibility of the port commander. Before the vessel docked, his boarding party informed the troops on security regulations and gave the transport commander and unit commanders the plan of debarkation. Upon debarkation, the troops, under the guidance of an RTO, marched directly from the pier to trains waiting nearby. After supervising their entrainment and completing arrangements for indicated refreshment stops, the RTO notified the transportation officer at point of destination. At the end of the rail journey the men were met by the RTO in charge of their onward movement to the assigned camp or billet, which might be reached on foot or by truck.
The regulation of the flow of American traffic in the United Kingdom was obviously a complicated undertaking, involving the coordination of shipping, port facilities, inland transportation, the desires of the various U.S. supply services, and the diverse if not conflicting interests of British and American agencies. At the same time as he was creating his own organization and coordinating his transportation activities with those of the British, the theater chief of transportation had the continuing task of receiving, identifying, and distributing the cargo essential to the build-up. This proved to be no simple task.64
Cargo Reception, Identification, and Distribution
From the outset General Ross had difficulty getting adequate and timely data on vessels bringing U.S. military cargo to the United Kingdom. Advance information regarding the type and amounts of cargo was urgently needed to facilitate discharge and distribution, as well as to expedite return of the ships to the zone of interior. Late receipt of such data adversely affected control of inbound U.S. Army cargo, particularly when data arrived so late that the depot destinations could not be secured in time for the Diversion Committee meeting. Throughout the summer of 1942 Ross repeatedly requested that he be kept fully and promptly advised of all inbound shipments for the U.S. Army. On occasion he discovered that British agencies received cargo data four to five days earlier than he did. He complained, in particular, that the sailing cables and cargo manifests from New York reached him spasmodically.65
At the New York Port of Embarkation, which had the primary supply responsibility for the European theater, the port commander stated that the cables were dispatched through the Signal Corps not later than twenty-four hours after sailing, and that the manifests were being forwarded by air in the distinctive envelopes the theater had requested. Yet even if the cables were sent out promptly, they were often slow in reaching the theater, since they were routed through Washington. After arrival in the United Kingdom, additional time was lost in decoding, paraphrasing, and delivering the message. As a matter of fact, the Signal Corps was so burdened with wartime traffic that Ross
had to set up his own cable section. As to the cargo manifests, even when they were forwarded by air, delivery might be delayed by adverse weather conditions.
Moved by the plight of the theater, the Chief of Transportation in Washington initiated corrective action. Late in August 1942, with the cooperation of the State Department, General Gross inaugurated an officer courier system to transmit shipping papers by air to the United Kingdom.66 In the following month, at the request of the European theater, the Transportation Corps adopted a standardized cargo-loading cable for the United Kingdom. It gave the name, code number, destination, status, and physical characteristics, together with a brief description of the cargo carried. The newly devised cargo-loading cable was a great improvement; it could be used in place of a missing manifest in order to effect the proper disposition of cargo.67
Vessels from the United States normally proceeded under escort to a rendezvous near the British Isles, where the convoy was broken up. The respective ships were then assigned by the BMWT Diversion Committee to the British ports best able at the time to receive the passengers and cargo. Because of severe enemy air attacks in the southern and eastern coastal areas, most American cargo entered through ports in North Ireland and the British west coast ports along the Clyde, the Mersey, and the Bristol Channel. The crowded condition of the ports, scarcity of inland depot space, frequent night raids by German bombers, and ever-present shipping shortages all pointed up the desirability of expediting port clearance and vessel turnaround through advance planning for cargo distribution.68
Despite determined efforts to effect improvement, the European theater continued to be plagued until well into 1943 by delayed, inadequate, or missing data on inbound cargo. The cargo-loading cable on the SS Abraham Baldwin, for example, did not come through until 29 January 1943, the very day the vessel was to be considered by the Diversion Committee. Since the meeting was to be held at 10:30 A. M., there was obviously no time left to determine the inland destinations, and the American representatives had to attend the meeting without knowing where the U.S. Army cargo was to be delivered. In March, the theater chief of transportation reported that five cargo ships had arrived without the slightest advance information from the United States. He therefore urged that “dynamite” be placed under the persons responsible at the ports of Boston and New York.69
In response to repeated complaints from the theater, General Gross on 17 April 1943 issued instructions to the port commander at New York that henceforth the theater chief of transportation was to be directly advised of all cargo shipments to
the United Kingdom, irrespective of the nature or of the type of ship, with the single exception of equipment carried by troops. Shortly afterward, arrangements were made to send cargo cables directly from New York to London, rather than via Washington, thereby saving time. Gross also stationed an officer at the New York port for a thirty-day period to check the transmission of cargo information. Ross soon reported a great improvement in the receipt of cargo manifests, but noted that the cargo-loading cables were still causing difficulty.70
The problem of delay in the receipt of cargo-loading cables was then attacked by the installation of additional circuits, and marked improvement followed. By July 1943 the difficulty had been largely eliminated, and during September timely ad-vices were received for 94 percent of the ships bringing U.S. Army cargo to the United Kingdom. In August all necessary papers were received at least five days before the arrival of the ships in the British Isles.71
Early in 1944 the Chief of Transportation in Washington undertook an experimental program to develop a standard manifest to satisfy both the overseas commanders and the ports of embarkation. Two types resulted: one for information required by transportation agencies, and the other for data needed by supply agencies. The transportation manifest, supported by the standardized shipping documents introduced by the U.S. Army in 1943, made up the supply manifest. Transmitted by air to the theater, the supply manifest provided advance data on incoming shipments. Coupled with other measures to facilitate cargo identification, the shipping procedures in effect by D Day 1944 were adequate to keep the European theater fully and promptly informed on all inbound cargo.72
Packing, Marking, and Zoning
The European theater chief of transportation also had to contend with poor packing and marking, which slowed both port clearance and ultimate distribution to the depots. Army procedures in these matters had not been adapted to wartime requirements, and other overseas commands encountered much the same problem.73 As early as March 1942, deficiencies were noted in the marking and packing of equipment sent to Northern Ireland. During the ensuing summer Ross’s complaints were loud and long. He reported that at Liverpool he had watched the discharge of a vessel in which 30 percent of the cargo had no markings at all and much of the remainder was so poorly marked that the supply services had to open and examine
practically half of what they received before proper distribution could be made. In an explosive account Ross told of opening an unmarked crated cardboard box which contained a complete shelter tent packed in excelsior, of finding two new engines completely ruined because of poor packing, and of seeing a carefully crated empty wooden reel with no clue as to the shipper. He noted dozens of boxes with addresses in lead pencil on one side, or other illegible or unsuitable markings. Moreover, the packing followed commercial peacetime procedures and was wholly inadequate for wartime conditions. Fully half the cargo was in uncrated pasteboard cartons that would not stand rough handling and exposure to rain.74
Better methods of packing and marking obviously were needed, and this was primarily a responsibility of the supply services in the zone of interior, working under the supervision of Army Service Forces (ASF) headquarters. The Transportation Corps assisted, by setting up an inspection system at ports on both sides of the Atlantic so that unsatisfactory marking and packing would be reported. Early in August 1942, Ross informed Gross that he was establishing an inspection service at U.K. ports. Gross replied that he had taken similar measures and was having the problem thoroughly studied, but he pointed out that information on which to base remedial action would have to come chiefly from the theater.75
Despite some improvement, by the fall of 1942 the shortcomings of the Army marking system had created serious problems in the European theater. There, the routing and distribution of supplies to the proper destination was hindered by the lack of a simple clear-cut system of code marking that would facilitate identification of the container or group of containers. The prevailing marking practice ignored the necessity of reconsigning a large percentage of shipments received in the theater, and it did not provide in sufficient detail for the prominent display of the code marking itself in a uniform location on the container. The theater therefore recommended a revision providing for more detailed, clearer, and more uniform marking procedures, but, chiefly because of preoccupation with the North African invasion, nothing came of this proposal. The TORCH operation revealed various deficiencies in packing and marking which were duly noted in the European theater. The principal development that followed in the British Isles was the activation in December 1942 of a ten-man mobile packing unit, which served as a training group, demonstrating proper packing and marking techniques to selected personnel of service and tactical units.76
The European theater again urged revision of the marking procedure, and in
December 1942 sent two officers to the zone of interior to propose the so-called UGLY system.77 This new scheme called for numbering requisitions so that the overseas command could readily identify all items en route in a convoy through the receipt of a cargo cable listing the identifying numbers and the cargo tonnage under each number. The Chief of Transportation in Washington did not accept the plan as presented, but by 23 March 1943 a satisfactory compromise was reached. Applied at first only to the United Kingdom, the new marking system identified shipments by the requisition number, which also appeared on the cargo manifest and in the cargo cable. By September 1943 complaints from the theater had decreased about 90 percent.78
The new marking system was followed on 1 June 1943 by a new War Department directive, of general application, which aimed at providing secrecy while insuring an uninterrupted flow of materiel to over-sea consignees. Three general methods of marking overseas shipments were prescribed: (1) by shipment numbers (groups of three or more digits) for troop movements or special supply movements; (2) by shipping designators (words or pronounceable combinations of four letters) for routine shipments of supplies; (3) by marking “in the clear” when specifically authorized. The Chief of Transportation at Washington was charged with the supervision of the marking system as it applied to all classes of supplies consigned to overseas destinations through U. S. Army ports of embarkation.
As described in the directive, the over-sea address usually was in three parts. The first, intended primarily for transportation agencies, always included the shipping designator on the shipment. The second part normally consisted of the abbreviation for the shipping service and the class of supply indicated by a Roman numeral. The third part, designed mainly for the overseas commander, comprised a combination of letters and numbers to designate the specific shipment or ultimate consignee. A typical overseas address might read “BOBO—QM II—A322.” Provision was also made for other markings, including a description of the container’s contents, its weight, cubage, and package number, its priority, and its service color.79
Elaborate additional marking to indicate the depot of origin or a partial shipment did not develop until October 1943, when the complete identification system known as ISS (Identification of Separate Shipments) was put into effect for all theaters. By June 1944 further refinements had been added, such as a symbol showing the time priority of the shipment and the assignment of numbers to line items on the requisition.80 Given proper marking, over-sea port personnel could readily identify incoming cargo and effect the desired distribution within the theater.
Closely related to the marking problem was the concurrent need of a workable zoning system, whereby shipments could
be consigned to definite areas within the United Kingdom. Throughout 1942 cargo vessels were loaded simply for NABOB (Northern Ireland) and/or WILDFLOWER (Great Britain). Early in 1943, at the suggestion of the British Ministry of War Transport, Colonel Ryan proposed a plan whereby Great Britain was to be divided into areas to which specific U.S. Army shipments would be sent. The suggestion was favorably received in Washington, and it was put into effect as soon as theater approval of a plan had been obtained.81
The new zoning plan was designed to simplify the diversion of incoming cargo vessels and to help relieve the strain on British railways by eliminating wasteful crosshauls. As set up in April 1943, Zone I comprised the United Kingdom north of a line of county boundaries drawn through London and Banbury; Zone II consisted of the area south of this line, including the port of London. Provision was also made for a possible Zone III in Northern Ireland. Zones were to be served by ports within their area, although most cargo entering the Clyde in Zone I had to be forwarded by coaster to ports in Zone II. As many ships as practicable were to be loaded in the United States with cargo required in a single zone. The change began with the July 1943 requisitions.82
The shipping designator UGLY (Great Britain) was to be employed when the zone of destination was unknown or immaterial. The shipping designator for Zone I was Soxo, for Zone II, GLUE. In October 1943, when Zone III was established in Northern Ireland, it became known as BANG. Normal allocations of cargo were: 41 percent to Zone I, 53 percent to Zone II, and 6 percent to Zone 111.83
Both in the United States and in the United Kingdom, the packing and marking of U.S. cargo had to be supervised and policed continually so as to detect lapses from prescribed procedures and insure improvement. Within the theater the Transportation Corps regularly prepared inspection reports noting deficiencies and making recommendations. Ross’s staff sometimes suggested changes, such as an improved packing for .30-caliber rifles that was calculated to save approximately 50 percent in shipping space. They made special studies of the packing and marking of spare parts for Quartermaster Corps items and those of other supply services. Despite continual improvement, inspections of inbound U.S. Army cargo continued to reveal occasional shortcomings. In April 1944 Ross complained of the loss of eggs in the shell because of poor crating and storing, and of field ranges packed in inadequate containers with wasted space. Nonetheless, considerable progress was made in packing and marking, and the major faults had been overcome.84
Organizational Equipment and Supplies
In addition to the difficulties experienced because of faulty packing and marking, the theater was confronted with
the problem of getting organizational equipment and supplies delivered promptly, so that the troops could have them soon after arrival. Since troops moving to Britain generally sailed on ships that traveled faster than the freighters carrying their impedimenta, a time lag was inevitable. Until production could be stepped up, the organizational equipment sent overseas frequently was that which the unit had used in training, and it could not be released until unit training had been completed. Even when all the organizational equipment for a given unit was loaded in the same convoy it might be spread over several cargo ships and discharged at different British ports, necessitating further sorting and assembly in the theater. The uncertain troop basis for the United Kingdom also made planning difficult.85
In the first half of 1942 equipment shortages in units leaving the United States were frequent, and they usually were filled by stripping other units in the zone of interior, leaving the latter with the task of replacement. During this period the units destined for the British Isles normally crated their own equipment and “force marked” it before departing. Generally, such units did not receive their equipment until they had been overseas for at least 30 days, but often not for 80 to 120 days. Behind this unsatisfactory situation lay the difficulty in locating and delivering the equipment after discharge at United Kingdom ports and the frequency of insecure packing and poor marking, which delayed distribution within the theater. Apart from improved packing and marking, the obvious remedy was the shipment of organizational equipment in advance of the troops, or, as it was commonly called, preshipment.86
Accordingly, with a view to utilizing available cargo space and taking advantage of the long summer days for discharging, General Gross pushed the advance shipment of equipment and supplies to the United Kingdom. Unfortunately, many items preshipped during the summer of 1942 became “buried” in British depots and could not be found when wanted for the North African invasion.87 The blame for this state of affairs, which by September was so serious as to imperil the projected TORCH operation, could be placed upon both the zone of interior and theater. Poor packing and marking in the United States and lack of depot and other service personnel and hasty port clearance and storage in the United Kingdom were the chief contributing factors. Ultimately, after much scurrying about on both sides of the Atlantic, Eisenhower’s requirements were met, but on a reduced scale. The last-minute duplication of items, which presumably had been shipped in advance to the British Isles, left the War Department with an unfavorable impression of the preshipment program, despite the basic soundness of this approach to the problem of getting troop units and their impedimenta together soon after the arrival of the troops overseas.88
The ensuing North African campaign stimulated interest in the handling of both personal and organizational equipment. As a result of his brief tour of duty in North Africa, and mindful of the implications for the Transportation Corps, Ross spoke out against requiring soldiers to carry more equipment than they had need for.89 Meanwhile, General Lee had suggested reducing the size and weight of the “A” and “B” barracks bags, noting that the “B” type might contain anything from carbines to libraries.90 In this connection Maj. Gen. Leonard T Gerow, then commanding the 29th Infantry Division, prepared a staff study showing that substantial reduction could be made in the tonnage of TAT (to accompany troops) equipment and supplies. On the other hand, such personal baggage and organizational equipment as might be loaded aboard the troopships took that much of a load off the freighters—an important consideration in view of the severe shortage of cargo shipping.
Gerow stressed the fact that clothing and equipment shipped in bulk from depots was compactly packed, better crated, and required less space than that carried by individuals in barracks bags. He further suggested that, if stocks permitted, the heavy weapons and combat vehicles that could not accompany the troops be turned in by alerted divisions for reissue to new divisions being formed, and that the necessary replacements be shipped direct from the manufacturer to the United Kingdom, properly marked for the unit concerned. When the matter reached the theater commander late in December 1942, he declared that it was highly important to stock enough materiel in all categories to equip incoming units immediately upon arrival so as to reduce the loss of time in training, and directed that General Gerow’s suggestions be thoroughly explored.91
Early in 1943 the Chief of Transportation in Washington received a proposal from an Air Corps officer that organizational equipment be shipped direct from depots or factories and issued to units upon arrival overseas. At about the same time, General Somervell, returning from a tour of the theaters, stressed the importance of getting equipment to the theaters ahead of or at the same time as troops.92 Beginning in late February 1943 the Chief of Transportation actively agitated in the War Department for the adoption of a preshipment program. Such a program was of course subject to the availability of shipping, and would impose additional responsibilities on the U.S. ports of embarkation and the theater. Other difficulties could easily arise because of changes in priorities or destinations of units, practices that were currently all too frequent.
But preshipment provided the only practical means of achieving the desired end.93
Meanwhile, the European theater had recommended that each soldier embarking thereto carry a single barracks bag, and that the normal contents of the “B” bag, such as overshoes, extra blankets, and impregnated clothing, be shipped in bulk for issue to troops upon arrival. Except for general-purpose vehicles, all shipments of organizational equipment under the Tables of Basic Allowances were to be made in bulk. Additional service troops were requested to handle receipts and issues under the new plan, which was calculated to lessen damage to equipment in transit and to conserve shipping space. The prevailing system was termed unsatisfactory. From the training standpoint alone the theater was dissatisfied, and it cited many examples of delays and shortages. Having received no reply to two cables dispatched in February 1943, the theater commander inquired again in March as to the status of his request, which he termed “a matter of grave importance.”94
In response to this prodding, Somervell informed the European theater on 8 March 1943 that its situation was known and appreciated but that corrective action depended primarily on shipping cargo in advance of troops. Such preshipment was deemed currently undesirable because of (a) changing troop requirements usually caused by last-minute requests from the theater; (b) the shipping shortage and specifically the lack of cargo space on the large, fast troop carriers to the British Isles; and (c) the necessity of allowing the troops to retain their equipment for training purposes as long as possible before movement overseas. Since simultaneous arrival of troops and cargo could not be effected, it was believed more practicable to have the troops arrive in the theater in advance of the equipment so as to assist in its unloading, assembly, distribution, and servicing.95
However, the situation was already in process of change. As the result of decisions at Casablanca to undertake new Mediterranean operations, troop sailings to the United Kingdom scheduled for the second quarter of 1943 were cut back sharply. This made available approximately 350,000 measurement tons of surplus cargo space, which had been allocated to carry equipment accompanying troops. Maximum utilization of this cargo space appeared essential, if the necessary supplies and equipment were to be provided for the very heavy troop movements that were contemplated during the latter part of the year. Moreover, advance shipment would take advantage of the summer months, when the long hours of daylight would minimize enemy air activity and permit maximum operations at the British ports. Although the planners in the War Department’s Operations Division were mindful of the previous unfortunate experience in connection with the North African invasion, they acceded to the desires of the theater and the Army Service Forces, and on 16 March endorsed pre-shipment in principle. By mid-April, ASF
had worked out the details of a limited preshipment program.96
Under the ASF plan, preshipment was authorized for (1) organizational equipment, less general-purpose vehicles of units ordered to the United Kingdom, such equipment to be called to the port one month before the scheduled sailing date; (2) Class IV supplies and equipment to be requisitioned by the theater on the basis of the total troop strength;97 (3) boxed general-purpose vehicles and major items of equipment for which production exceeded current requirements for all units in the troop basis; and (4) a reserve of forty-five days of combat maintenance for the entire troop basis. The movement of such cargo was to be effected as early as practicable, but in priority below that for meeting the needs of the North African theater, two Pacific operations, and the training requirements for troop units then in the United States or to be activated in 1943. Every effort, said Maj. Gen. LeRoy Lutes, must be made to release cargo to the ports, even if unbalanced shipments should result. Boxed vehicles, tanks, prefabricated buildings, and other bulky items were especially desired. The prime requisite was immediate availability.98
In May ASF secured Operations Division approval to further broaden the pre-shipment program. Since the troop basis set up for the theater was highly tentative, permission was granted to ship equipment for “type” rather than specific units. Thus equipment could be shipped in bulk for storage and ultimate issue to types of units that would eventually arrive in the United Kingdom.99 By this time, the Battle of the Atlantic had reached the turning point, and reduced shipping losses and greater vessel production pointed to an increasing cargo lift.
The preshipment program soon ran into difficulty, largely because of continued uncertainty regarding the size of the troop build-up in Britain, the grave shortage of equipment and other available cargo, and the low priority accorded BOLERO shipments through 1943.100 Already subject to higher priority demands from active theaters and to requirements for training in the United States, the slender stockpile of organizational equipment available in the zone of interior also had to be drawn upon for the rearmament of certain French divisions in North Africa. Although the domestic production of equipment increased, shortages persisted in many items.101 In these circumstances, only a limited amount of
equipment could be made available for preshipment.
From the beginning preshipment lagged, and during the summer of 1943 it failed to attain the original objective—the maximum utilization of the available cargo space. In the period May through December 1943 advance shipments made from Boston and New York totaled 2,427,646 measurement tons, or about 40 percent of all cargo shipped to the United Kingdom. By far the largest amount forwarded by a single technical service—the Ordnance Department—consisted of vehicles and ammunition. In no instance did any technical service ship all its cargo scheduled for movement. As will be seen, it was not until after late 1943, when a new high priority was accorded all equipment and supplies for the European theater, that sufficient cargo materialized to fill available cargo space. In the first five months of 1944, advance shipments to the United Kingdom reached a total of 1,863,629 measurement tons. As before, Ordnance items predominated.102
Although only a partial success, the preshipment program benefited the Army in the long run, since cargo shipped in advance meant that much less to be forwarded in the future. Apart from a very real value in easing the burden of shipping and cargo distribution in the theater during the crucial months preceding D Day, advance shipment offered three important advantages. First, more units could be assured of receiving reasonably complete equipment immediately upon arrival in the United Kingdom. Next, units about to be sent overseas could release their old equipment in the zone of interior, thus lessening overseas maintenance and replacement in the theater. Lastly, equipment was sent factory-packed and factory-marked, thereby conserving shipping space and reducing substantially loss or damage en route. In reviewing the subject in 1945, a general board, established in the European theater, concluded that advance shipment “solved to a most satisfactory extent the problem of promptly and properly equipping units arriving in the British Isles.103
Ships, Troops, and Cargo for the Build-up
Under the BOLERO program, the flow of troops and cargo fluctuated considerably with changes in the shipping situation, shifts in strategic planning, and higher priority demands arising in other overseas areas. These factors not only affected the volume of shipments that could be directed to the United Kingdom in any given period but also made it difficult to achieve a balance of vessels, troops, and cargo that would avoid either wasting precious ship space or holding men and materiel in idleness in the zone of interior. The delivery to Britain of the quantities of personnel, supplies, and equipment required for the invasion of the Continent proved a complex and often frustrating task.
The job of transporting BOLERO troops and cargo to the United Kingdom would have been even more difficult had not British assistance been available in the form of troop and cargo space. This was especially true of troop space because of the large and fast passenger liners the British Ministry of War Transport assigned
to the shuttle run between New York and the United Kingdom. During the period from 1 January 1942 through 31 May 1944, ships under British control transported a total of 1,006,104 passengers from the United States to Britain.104
The British were also able to furnish the Americans with a portion of their material requirements, thereby lightening the burden on shipping. Begun as a supply expedient during the extreme shipping crisis of 1942, local procurement in the United Kingdom later developed into a regular practice with the U.S. Army. Theater records indicate that of a total of 23,237,407 measurement tons of materials assembled in the United Kingdom from June 1942 through May 1944, 9,191,117 measurement tons were supplied by the British.105
Nevertheless, the bulk of the supplies and equipment needed in the European theater and practically all U.S. troops came directly from the United States and were delivered almost exclusively by water. The First BOLERO Key Plan, 31 May 1942, contemplated an ultimate U.S. troop strength in the British Isles of 1,049,000 men, to be achieved as rapidly as shipping would allow. To secure the necessary troop lift, ships had to be drawn from all possible sources—the War Shipping Administration, the U.S. Navy, and the British Ministry of War Transport. With the help of the British Queens, the Wakefield and the West Point of the U.S. Navy, and a number of other Army, Navy, WSA, and BMWT vessels, U.S. troop movements to the United Kingdom gradually increased. During the period June–August 1942, debarkation of U. S. Army personnel in the United Kingdom totaled 119,474.106
Although the movement of troops to the United Kingdom had proceeded according to schedule, the concurrent shipments of cargo soon began to lag, but through no fault of the theater. Indeed, in June 1942 Ross had advised Gross that the anticipated heavy movements of cargo during the summer months would cause no port congestion in the theater as long as the arrivals were properly spaced. A lack of cargo in the States and a shortage of bottoms accounted for the lag in the arrival of cargo in the United Kingdom. The latter was so pronounced that in August General Somervell complained to the War Shipping Administration of its failure to make cargo ships available as promised.107
The recurring shortage of ships and cargo, together with losses at sea and demands of other theaters, caused the U.S. Army to fall considerably short of the initial BOLERO goal of 320,000 long tons to be discharged each month in the British Isles. During June, July, and August of 1942 cargo landed monthly in the United Kingdom did not exceed 441,256 measurement tons (186,281 long tons).108
Table 1: U.S. Army troops debarked in the United Kingdom, by port area, January 1942–June 1944 a
| All Ports | Northern Ireland | Mersey | Bristol Channel | Clyde | Other b | ||
| Month | Cumulative | Monthly | |||||
| Total | 1,792,512 | 104,459 | 580,340 | 166,115 | 937,654 | 3,944 | |
| 1942 | |||||||
| January | 4,058 | 4,058 | 4,058 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| February | 4,058 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| March | 11,962 | 7,904 | 7,9C4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| April | 11,962 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| May | 36,644 | 24,682 | 22,113 | 431 | 2,121 | 17 | 0 |
| June | 56,090 | 19,446 | 7,130 | 90 | 0 | 12,226 | 0 |
| July | 82,249 | 26,159 | 272 | 7,385 | 2 | 18,500 | 0 |
| August | 156,118 | 73,869 | 2,545 | 17,718 | 13,538 | 40,068 | 0 |
| September | 184,927 | 28,809 | 325 | 143 | 16 | 28,325 | 0 |
| October | 224,765 | 39,838 | 44 | 6,526 | 3,897 | 29,356 | 15 |
| November | 232,517 | 7,752 | 152 | 512 | 170 | 6,918 | 0 |
| December | 241,839 | 9,322 | 262 | 15 | 10 | 9,035 | 0 |
| 1943 | |||||||
| January | 255,190 | 13,351 | 0 | 370 | 560 | 12,421 | 0 |
| February | 256,596 | 1,406 | 0 | 778 | 471 | 157 | 0 |
| March | 257,873 | 1,277 | 0 | 620 | 185 | 472 | 0 |
| April | 259,951 | 2,078 | 0 | 1,574 | 501 | 3 | 0 |
| May | 279,171 | 19,220 | 0 | 9 | 268 | 18,943 | 0 |
| June | 329,143 | 49,972 | 0 | 5,774 | 626 | 43,571 | 1 |
| July | 382,417 | 53,274 | 171 | 11,936 | 176 | 40,748 | 143 |
| August | 424,098 | 41,681 | 1 | 10,445 | 178 | 31,021 | 36 |
| September | 505,214 | 81,116 | 1 | 36,156 | 5,400 | 39,533 | 26 |
| October | 610,771 | 105,557 | 13,893 | 34,017 | 13,798 | 42,756 | 1,093 |
| November | 784,631 | 173,860 | 0 | 60,168 | 19,723 | 93,888 | 71 |
| December | 918,347 | 113,716 | 21,741 | 32,193 | 7,263 | 72,335 | 184 |
| 1944 | |||||||
| January | 1,084,752 | 166,405 | 5,391 | 62,007 | 23,120 | 75,866 | 21 |
| February | 1,221,436 | 136,684 | 4,898 | 48,585 | 14,937 | 67,916 | 348 |
| March | 1,345,848 | 124,412 | 2,660 | 36,087 | 16,447 | 68,359 | 859 |
| April | 1,562,547 | 216,699 | 10,898 | 79,817 | 28,388 | .97,373 | 223 |
| May | 1,671,010 | 108,463 | 0 | 70,505 | 13,814 | 23,356 | 788 |
| June | 1,792,512 | 121,502 | 0 | 56,479 | 506 | 64,491 | 26 |
a Troops debarked include personnel redeployed from Iceland and Mediterranean as well as shipments from the United States.
b Other ports include those in the Humber, Thames, and Scottish East areas.
c The figure for debarkations in Clyde area during April 1944, listed as 105,987 in the TC Historical Report, Volume III, has been corrected to conform to later consolidated and cumulative data.
Source: Hist Rpt, TC ETO, Vol. III, Ch. VI, Table, UK Troop Arrivals by Port Areas, January 1942–June 1944, OCT HB ETO; TC SOS ETO MPR, 30 Jun 44, Table I, U. S. Troops Debarked Monthly in the United Kingdom, AG Adm 451 ETO.
Table 2: U.S. Army cargo landed in the United Kingdom, by port area, January 1942–June 1944
(measurement tons)
| Month | All Ports | Northern Ireland | Mersey | Clyde | Bristol Channel | Humber | Other | |
| Cumulative | Monthly | |||||||
| Total | 15,573,989 | 559,888 | 5,160,855 | 1,401,796 | 5,588,682 | 1,284,973 | 1,577,795 | |
| 1942 | ||||||||
| January | 411 | 411 | 411 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| February | 23,476 | 23,065 | 23,065 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| March | 58,398 | 34,922 | 34,922 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| April | 74,257 | 15,859 | 15,589 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| May | 176,415 | 102,158 | 34,256 | 28,938 | 21,488 | 1,651 | 842 | 14,983 |
| June | 279,092 | 102,677 | 59,440 | 24,451 | 12,742 | 4,558. | 0 | 1,486 |
| July | 472,927 | 193,835 | 38,421 | 119,675 | 12,405 | 23,334 | 0 | 0 |
| August | 914,183 | 441,256 | 58,762 | 151,969 | 31,355 | 167,893 | 24,706 | 6,571 |
| September | 1,511,471 | 597,288 | 16,825 | 256,933 | 75,464 | 180,316 | 54,775 | 12,975 |
| October | 1,873,834 | 362,363 | 7,140 | 268,100 | 39,358 | 35,036 | 9,015 | 3,714 |
| November | 2,039,834 | 165,503 | 3,013 | 95,614 | 35,423 | 31,117 | 336 | 0 |
| December | 2,179,996 | 140,659 | 1,933 | 82,971 | 13,916 | 31,881 | 7,385 | 2,573 |
| 1943 | ||||||||
| January | 2,297,909 | 117,913 | 1,079 | 56,723 | 16,642 | 36,540 | 1,590 | 5,339 |
| February | 2,373,475 | 75,566 | 744 | 45,049 | 142 | 25,943 | 0 | 3,688 |
| March | 2,439,242 | 65,767 | 0 | 24,208 | 4,304 | 34,212 | 470 | 2,573 |
| April | 2,550,487 | 111,245 | 0 | 32,064 | 3,814 | 73,548 | 1,031 | 788 |
| May | 2,637,543 | 87,056 | 0 | 12,245 | 12,015 | 55,195 | 3,461 | 4,140 |
| June | 2,986,443 | 348,900 | 0 | 103,423 | 43,967 | 170,703 | 6,671 | 24,136 |
| July | 3,656,467 | 670,024 | 13,643 | 229,157 | 43,631 | 272,977 | 40,575 | 70,041 |
| August | 4,409,896 | 753,429 | 53,094 | 185,482 | 46,495 | 302,217 | 48,280 | 117,861 |
| September | 5,187,998 | 778,102 | 20,440 | 206,682 | 75,891 | 301,760 | 72,596 | 100,733 |
| October | 6,144,886 | 956,888 | 22,163 | 259,652 | 49,109 | 340,348 | 73,297 | 212,319 |
| November | 6,935,640 | 790,754 | 11,177 | 219,905 | 60,182 | 302,880 | 85,491 | 111,119 |
| December | 7,943,790 | 1,008,150 | 30,827 | 227,448 | 43,381 | 453,548 | 94,040 | 158,906 |
| 1944 | ||||||||
| January | 8,830,149 | 886,359 | 14,511 | 285,260 | 71,800 | 301,119 | 71,893 | 141,776 |
| February | 9,646,097 | 815,948 | 48,872 | 205,761 | 81,616 | 314,367 | 45,647 | 119,685 |
| March | 11,089,345 | 1,443,248 | 26,856 | 427,301 | 128,787 | 638,062 | 86,237 | 136,005 |
| April | 12,567,996 | 1,478,651 | 17,887 | 367,746 | 82,026 | 692,958 | 119,978 | 198,056 |
| May | 14,050,290 | 1,482,294 | 2,480 | 627,668 | 131,691 | 417,897 | 219,679 | 82,879 |
| June | 15,573,989 | 1,523,699 | 2,068 | 616,430 | 264,152 | 378,622 | 216,978 | 45,449 |
Source: TC SOS ETO MPR, 30 Jun 44, Table 6B—U. S. Army Cargo by Port Areas—Measurement Tons, AG Adm 451 ETO.
Despite severe handicaps, at the close of August 1942 some progress had been made in expediting the delivery of troops and cargo for the BOLERO program. After that month and in fact until well into 1943, because of the requirements of the North African campaign, the flow of both men and materiel to the British Isles was sharply reduced, although it was never entirely halted. In September 1942 the number of incoming U.S. military personnel fell to 28,809, as compared with 73,869 in the preceding month. During the period from October 1942 through April 1943 troop debarkations totaled only 75,024. The discharge of U.S. Army cargo at British ports was similarly affected, declining from 362,363 measurement tons in October 1942 to only 65,767 measurement tons in March 1943.
The North African invasion not only reduced BOLERO traffic to a trickle but also drew heavily on the men and materials already assembled in the United Kingdom. In the period from October 1942 through February 1943, a total of 150,693 troops and 348,905 long tons of cargo was shipped from the United Kingdom. As a result of these outloadings, actual troop strength in the United Kingdom declined from 223,794 to 104,510, and a serious supply shortage developed. Thereafter, the United States met most of the North African requirements, and few troops and only modest amounts of cargo were forwarded from the United Kingdom, but a drain had been placed on BOLERO from which the European theater did not soon re-cover.109
Revival of the hard-hit BOLERO program hinged primarily upon getting enough ships to lift the troops and cargo required to undertake an invasion of the Continent. Referring to the world-wide shipping situation General Somervell observed, “Our plans to carry out a determined and effective offensive during 1943 and to strike further decisive blows in 1944 are measured almost entirely by the shipping which can be made available for military operations.”110
In the spring of 1943 the available shipping for the United Kingdom was not in balance. Cargo space was in excess because it had been allocated on the basis of a troop build-up that had so dwindled that fewer than 5,000 men actually debarked during the three months from 1 February through 30 April. This was one of the considerations that led to the preshipment plan whereby the available cargo vessels were to be utilized for the advance shipment of organizational equipment and supplies to Britain so that incoming American troops would find their impedimenta on hand upon arrival.111 In this connection Brig. Gen. Robert H. Wylie, Assistant Chief of Transportation, in Washington, recommended that supplies for BOLERO be forwarded as early as possible, irrespective of the monthly troop movement schedule. Wylie had noted the difficulties that arose in the British Isles because of the small number of widely dispersed depots, the inadequate transportation facilities, the shortage of manpower for distribution and warehousing, and the resultant time lag in the assembly, or “marrying up,” of troop
units and their equipment. The problem was further aggravated by the fact that approximately ten cargo ships were required to bring the organizational equipment and supplies for the men aboard only one of the Queens.112
Despite hopeful planning it was not easy to achieve a balance between the available cargo and cargo space for the United Kingdom. Efforts to fill the ships often were hampered by the failure of organizational impedimenta to arrive at the port as expected. Because of the unsatisfactory training status of the units involved, their equipment could not be released in time for shipment. On 15 April 1943 the Water Division in Washington, which had general supervision of the movement of cargo for the build-up, reported that, instead of the estimated 79,000 measurement tons, the total organizational equipment available for April shipment would do well to total 18,000 measurement tons. Various items scheduled to move either failed to materialize or took less space than originally estimated. Cargo listed as immediately available often did not reach the port until much later. To avoid unused ship space, the Transportation Corps shipped what cargo could be obtained. Ross naturally complained. With limited Army port personnel and the prevailing shortage of British labor, he looked for trouble from inbound cargoes that included a wide variety of supplies and involved an unusual amount of sorting.113
Despite a marked increase in shipments of BOLERO cargo during the last half of 1943, more cargo space was offered than could be filled. Cargo discharged in the United Kingdom increased from 348,900 measurement tons in June to 670,024 measurement tons in July, and with the exception of a dip in November continued to increase, reaching a peak of 1,008,150 measurement tons in December. Nevertheless, the tonnage shipped fell far short of the total scheduled for movement. Largely because of the low priority given the European theater and the still lower priority given cargo for preshipment, a large part of the material requested by the theater simply could not be sent, despite the constant effort by ASF headquarters, the Office of the Chief of Transportation, and the New York Port of Embarkation to fill available shipping space. Periodic calculations of the Water Division included ominous figures under the heading, “Additional Cargo Required to Fill Shipping Space Available.”114 The cargo estimate for November 1943, in particular, noted a shortage of 467,000 measurement tons, despite the pressure the Water Division continuously exerted to get cargo to the ports.115
The scarcity of BOLERO cargo was well known to both Somervell and Gross. Indeed, further serious shortages were anticipated because of the requirements of forces in other theaters, changes in the strategic situation, and production uncertainties in the zone of interior.116 The situation was viewed with grave misgivings. As one observer noted, if the theater’s requirements were as large as projected, then the continuous failure to ship the desired amounts could lead to “an impossible backlog” of cargo to be moved during the spring of 1944, conceivably necessitating revision of the strategic plan.117
During this period the build-up of troops, like that of cargo, did not proceed according to plan. After reaching a low point in March 1943, troop arrivals gradually increased. Throughout the summer and fall the trend was upward, except in August when heavy movements for the September invasion of the Italian mainland led to a sharp drop in personnel sent to the United Kingdom. By October, however, it had become evident that the BOLERO troop movement was falling behind the estimate projected at QUADRANT. The Transportation Corps was not meeting its commitments because of a shortage in troop space, aggravated by delays in deliveries of converted ships. The prevailing trend, if continued, could bring a deficit of approximately 75,000 men, or roughly five divisions, by the invasion date.118
The failure to move the planned troops and cargo meant that the resulting deficiencies would have to be made up in the remaining months before the invasion. This had to be accomplished, regardless of the pressure this last-minute effort was bound to exert upon the overburdened ports and railways of Britain. So far as troops were concerned, the requirements were met, but only by heavy debarkations, which reached a peak of 216,699 men in April 1944. Indeed, more troops arrived in the six months ending 31 May 1944, than in the entire period from January 1942 through November 1943.
Meanwhile, the War Department had taken steps to eliminate a major obstacle in the flow of cargo. On 21 December 1943, it removed the low priority assigned to materials moving into the European theater, and replaced it with a new high priority for all equipment and supplies, including the special requirements of operational projects.119 This measure, coupled with increased domestic production, soon brought a flood of cargo to the Atlantic seaboard. The main limiting factor then became the capacity of the ports, railways, and depots of the United Kingdom. By March 1944, the increase in the amount of cargo available was reflected in the discharge of record tonnages in the United Kingdom. From December 1943 through May 1944 a total of 7,115,356 measurement tons was discharged, as contrasted with the 6,935,640 measurement tons previously landed in the United Kingdom. In the three months ending 31 May 1944 alone 4,404,193 measurement tons were unloaded.
Although postponement of the invasion to the first week in June provided an
additional month for discharge operations, it was still a tight squeeze to satisfy the cargo requirements of the U.S. Army within the prescribed time limit. Various expedients had to be employed in order to minimize possible port, rail, and depot congestion in the British Isles. After conferring with the theater, General Gross set up a special pool of fifty-four “prestowed” vessels, which were to be used primarily as floating warehouses. Carrying general cargo and ammunition in balanced lots, these ships were to move to the United Kingdom, where they would remain until called forward by the theater commander for discharge directly on the Continent. This plan avoided the necessity of discharging, storing, and reloading the cargo in the United Kingdom.120
The last-minute expedients also included the so-called “commodity loaders.” These were vessels loaded with a specific type of cargo, such as rations, vehicles, or ammunition, to fill an immediate on-the-spot requirement. Designed for easy discharge and quick dispatch of the cargo to dumps in the assault area, the ships were not restricted in number as were the pre-stowed vessels, and they did not require as elaborate advance planning.121
Both the prestowed and the commodity-loaded vessels generally entailed a loss of cargo space, since they usually could not be loaded “full and down.” They played an important role in the invasion of the Continent, but their use as floating depots drew sharp criticism because it immobilized ships urgently needed as carriers in both the Atlantic and the Pacific.
The use of prestowed and commodity-loaded vessels provided only partial relief for the hard-pressed transportation facilities in the United Kingdom. Ships intended for discharge on the Continent were not dispatched to Britain before May 1944. Meanwhile, the U.K. ports and inland carriers had begun to show signs of congestion. Cargo piled up at the ports, particularly in the Bristol Channel area, and the British had to place embargoes on civilian rail traffic in order to keep the lines clear for military freight and to prevent bottlenecks at important junctions. In these circumstances, although there already was a backlog of cargo at the New York Port of Embarkation, the theater decided to reduce the monthly discharge ceiling for U.K. ports for May and June from 140 to 120 ships. Actual vessel arrivals during May, however, exceeded the ceiling. Moreover, the mounting of the cross-Channel invasion, begun in the same month, further limited the capacity of the ports and the means of interior transport. As a result, berths could not be found for thirty-eight vessels, which had to lie idle at anchor. To deal with this situation, the theater made preparations to place much of the cargo from these ships in temporary dumps behind the port areas, but this proved unnecessary. Through careful Transportation Corps planning all cargo was discharged and forwarded to destination. Nevertheless, the problem of finding sufficient port capacity was not completely solved until shortly before D Day, when
the British agreed to a reduction in their import program.122 Despite diversions, delays, and uncertainty, the BOLERO program was successful in bringing to the United Kingdom the men and materials needed for the assault on the Continent.
Port Operations
The first requisite for the smooth flow of troops and supplies into the United Kingdom was efficient port operations. When Colonel Ross reached the British Isles, the U.S. Army already had a small port organization in Northern Ireland. Soon thereafter he extended American port activity to the Glasgow, Liverpool, and Bristol Channel areas, all of which had the great advantage of being relatively safe from enemy action by air and by sea. Subsequently, as the need arose, he placed organizations at other ports, notably at London and Southampton.
With respect to the ports, the theater chief of transportation had two major sets of problems. The first was primarily organizational and fell almost wholly within the purview of the U.S. Army as it functioned within the theater. The second was mainly operational and had broader and more intricate aspects, involving as it did the use of British port facilities and British labor to meet varying American needs. It must also be remembered that, regardless of their importance, the requirements of the U.S. Army never constituted more than a fraction of the enormous tonnages that had to be delivered through U.K. ports to support the civilian population and the wartime economy of Great Britain. During the course of the war, the British imported approximately 25,000,000 long tons per year, roughly ten times the total U.S. cargo discharged in the United Kingdom during 1943.123
From the organizational standpoint, the theater chief of transportation was hampered by not having a free hand in the management of U.S. Army port activity. As already indicated, the assignment of control of the ports to the base sections limited him to technical supervision, although of necessity he dealt directly with the port commanders on a day-to-day operating basis. General Ross never approved of the arrangement. From his point of view, subordinating the ports to the base sections simply meant interposing another headquarters between his office and the port commander. Interference by a base section commander, no matter how well-intentioned, could and on occasion did seriously upset port operations. Although much depended upon the personalities involved, the arrangement was conducive to misunderstandings and bickering. In particular, as D Day approached and time grew short and tempers shorter, the relations between the staffs of the theater chief of transportation and the Southern Base Section became strained, since they did not see eye to eye on the outloading of troops and cargo for the Normandy invasion. The port personnel also objected to the interference of the Southern Base Section in technical matters.124
Another major organizational problem involved the development of American port organizations suited to operations in the United Kingdom. The initial headquarters organization provided by the War Department was the so-called mobile port,
with a staff that supervised port operations and performed the necessary administrative and supply functions.125 Ross soon found this unit inadequate for his needs. Also, since no two ports had to deal with exactly the same shipping problems, he proposed a flexible organization, with the strength dependent on the workload.126
While flexibility was obviously necessary as a means of meeting local requirements, the new Table of Organization and Equipment for a major port headquarters (over-sea), approved in November 1943, called for a reduction in the normal strength from 579 to 519 officers and men. The resultant reorganization was effected at the several ports in the United Kingdom early in 1944. Headed by a port commander, who might have the rank of brigadier general, the new port headquarters was designed to function with two port directors: one for services (including administration and the several supply services); and the other for operations (including a transportation division and a water division). Port battalions, Quartermaster truck companies, harbor craft units, ship maintenance and repair companies, and other service and operating units were to be attached as required by local conditions and the amount of traffic to be handled.127
The personnel provided to man the U.S. port organizations were often a source of disappointment to the theater chief of transportation. Although he realized that the Transportation Corps faced a growing scarcity of qualified technicians, he objected to being given officers who were unable or unwilling to adapt themselves to operating conditions. Admitting that on occasion he had been overly critical of some personnel sent to him from the zone of interior, Ross reminded Gross in June 1944 that it had been necessary to relieve more than half the port commanders originally assigned to the United Kingdom.128
The port organizational problems, however, were minor in comparison with those in the operational category. Although the British ports were among the best in the world, they lacked modern equipment when judged by American standards, had suffered from enemy air raids, and were very poorly manned. The longshore labor force was seriously depleted, military service having drawn off many of the younger and more efficient men. In the beginning the British Sea Transport Service of necessity took charge of berthing and unloading all American vessels, and British movement control officers regulated the inland traffic to and from the ports. As rapidly as possible, the theater chief of transportation arranged to assume these functions for the U.S. Army, in line with his determination to develop a transportation organization that could operate independently. It was impracticable to assign separate ports entirely to the Americans but the U.S. Army was gradually given control of American ships in British ports. This transfer had been largely completed by 1943.129
From the outset, Ross counted on the maximum utilization of British port equipment and British labor, but he realized that the local resources would have to be
supplemented from the United States. In mid-May 1942 he requisitioned sufficient American equipment to operate twenty-four berths simultaneously, and in June he foresaw an ultimate need of sixteen port battalions and eight service battalions. Shortly thereafter, British port facilities capable of handling 120 ships a month were allocated to the U.S. Army.130
As additional cargo-handling equipment arrived from the United States, including that brought by various port units, the shortcomings of the British installations were partially offset. A port survey by a qualified American civilian in December 1942 pointed out the advantages to be gained by further modernization, but neither Ross nor Gross was certain that the British would use equipment such as fork-lift trucks. In March 1943 Gross remarked that the reluctance of union labor in the United Kingdom to employ laborsaving devices presented a problem difficult of solution. Yet he hoped, somewhat too optimistically as events were to prove, that the use of modern equipment by American port battalions would eventually lead the British port authorities to appreciate its desirability and to request its adoption.131
Apart from inadequate facilities and equipment, the principal limiting factor at the ports was the grave shortage of labor, which persisted throughout 1942 and well into the next year. The pinch began to be felt most severely in the summer of 1943, when incoming tonnage was on the increase after the comparative lull during the North African campaign. It was a common practice to assign only enough men to work one or two hatches. Even when enough British labor was available, the Army might get only six hours for eight hours of pay. Americans found it hard to appreciate the British custom of taking “tea breaks” in the morning and afternoon. When the dockers took the break first and were followed a little later by the crane operators, operations might be halted from forty minutes to an hour, since the dockers could not function without cranes.132
During that summer strikes and disputes over wages and hours, combined with a scarcity of longshore labor and unsatisfactory performance by men on the job, slowed the discharge of U.S. Army cargo and delayed the turnaround of American ships in United Kingdom ports. British authorities had hitherto been reluctant to concede the necessity of employing U.S. military personnel for handling cargo, but by mid-July 1943 a lack of civilian longshoremen had developed in practically every area, the shortage averaging 850 men per day in all ports. In view of this development, the British finally conceded that U.S. troops would have to be used. During August the general labor shortage became more acute, and practically all vessels were delayed in discharging because of insufficient labor. Ross therefore requested the shipment of nine more port battalions as rapidly as possible, which would complete the fifteen
units allotted to the BOLERO program.133
The arrival of additional American port battalions in the fall of 1943 helped relieve but did not solve the labor problem. At the outset the performance of the new port battalions was unimpressive. A report prepared on 21 October by Ross’s headquarters revealed that at a number of ports British civilians, working the same types of ships and cargo, were discharging more tons per gang per hour than the American battalions.134 With experience and training the troops soon did much better. But even so, in February 1944 General Gross noted that the number of measurement tons unloaded in the United Kingdom per working day per ship was low as compared with the average rate for overseas ports-942 measurement tons as against 1,128 measurement tons.135 This poor showing was attributed in part to the unwillingness of British labor to use modern dock equipment, but General Ross felt that it could be traced mainly to the sheer inability of the older British workers to operate at a faster pace. Inadequate and inefficient civilian labor and a lack of modern equipment continued to plague U.S. Army operations at most British ports throughout the build-up.136
In general, the development of American port activities followed a basic pattern. Initially completely dependent on the British, U.S. Army personnel quickly established close relations with British port and transportation authorities and oriented themselves to British methods of operation; then, as the necessary personnel and experience were obtained, they gradually were given considerable freedom of action in handling U.S. Army personnel and cargo. Using British port facilities and relying heavily on British labor and equipment, the American port commanders of necessity continued to work closely with the British military and the civilian agencies that dealt with port management, port operation and clearance, movement control, the provision of labor, and other port activities.
While conforming to this general pattern of development, American activities at the individual ports naturally varied because of their differing missions and facilities and their peculiar organizational and operating problems. A brief review will serve to indicate the principal characteristics and major accomplishments of the several British ports used by the U.S. Army during the BOLERO period.
Northern Ireland Ports
As has been already noted, the first United Kingdom port used by the Americans in World War II was Belfast, in Northern Ireland. The port facilities were adequate despite some damage from enemy bombing, but modern mechanical equipment was lacking. Two privately owned floating cranes were available for heavy lifts, but additional cargo-handling
equipment had to be supplied by the U.S. Army. Troops disembarked either directly from transports or from tenders loaded at anchorage in the Belfast Lough. The Sydenham berth was very convenient for receiving assembled aircraft, being near an airport to which the aircraft could be towed on barges. The ability to operate under lights and around the clock, if required, was a prime asset.137
The first American port organization to reach the United Kingdom landed in Northern Ireland in mid-May 1942. Commanded by Col. Richard Stockton, VI, it began activity at Belfast and then extended its jurisdiction to include Londonderry, Lisahally, Larne, Coleraine, and a few other minor installations. Later the headquarters was redesignated Northern Ireland Ports. British authorities technically were in charge until 21 September 1942, when the American port commander was given complete responsibility for U.S. Army port operations.
Stockton had no easy assignment. His staff was small, and he was heavily dependent upon the British. Moreover, he found the local U.S. Army quartermaster reluctant to surrender the control that he had exercised over U.S. Army transportation up to that time. To make matters more difficult, the port commander had been placed under the Northern Ireland Base Command, when it was established on 1 June 1942, and on occasion Stockton found himself caught between conflicting orders. For example, the theater chief of transportation had directed that civilian labor be employed in so far as possible, but the base commander gave contrary instructions.138
Cargo discharge presented a major difficulty. A local stevedoring firm had a virtual monopoly, furnishing longshore men, gear, and insurance for a fee equalling 20 percent of the gross payroll. Judged by American standards the labor was inefficient, and the contract put a premium on slow discharge. Indeed, the American corporation charged with servicing the aircraft landed in Northern Ireland preferred to have its own personnel receive the planes from the ship’s gear, rather than risk damage by local workmen. Nevertheless, local longshoremen were assigned to the job and drew wages while doing nothing. The stevedoring firm also sought to have all American vessels handled at Belfast, although discharge could be accomplished more rapidly and cheaply at other ports in the area. Despite protests by the port commander, this unsatisfactory situation obtained until the summer of 1943, when a new stevedoring contract, embodying better financial terms and encouraging prompt discharge, was secured.139
Belfast and its subports were found convenient places to discharge deck cargo, notably aircraft, leaving the remainder of the ship’s load to be discharged in Britain. Port personnel in Northern Ireland
outloaded part of the force sent to North Africa, and in the fall of 1942 the bulk of the U.S. combat troops, equipment, and supplies assembled in Ulster was withdrawn for that operation. Inbound traffic declined thereafter, and virtually ceased in the first half of 1943. During this period port operations were managed by a small cadre, which in June 1943 comprised only seven officers and twenty-six enlisted men. In the ensuing months cargo and troop arrivals picked up and the port organization was temporarily enlarged, but by D Day American activity at the Northern Ireland ports had again dwindled to negligible proportions.140
Clyde Area Ports
Although considerable cargo was received, the primary mission of the Clyde area ports was the reception of troops. More than half of the U.S. debarkations to 30 May 1944-873,160 of the 1,671,-010—came through these installations.141 The Clyde area included the ports of Greenock and Gourock; the deep broad anchorage known as the Tail of the Bank, which was situated near the mouth of the Clyde River; and the port of Glasgow, some fifteen miles up the river. Glasgow possessed outstanding facilities, the King George V docks being regarded as among the best in the United Kingdom. All piers had an adequate number of movable electric cranes. Because of the narrow and comparatively shallow channel leading to Glasgow, the larger troop transports anchored at the Tail of the Bank, from which the incoming personnel were moved by tender to Gourock and Greenock.142
The first Clyde area port commander, Capt. (later Col.) Kenneth D. McKenzie, was appointed on 8 June 1942; he was succeeded in the following month by Lt. Col. (later Col.) James A. Crothers. As at Belfast, the Americans in the Clyde area at first depended heavily upon the British. Troop debarkations were handled by the British embarkation commandant, with U.S. port personnel providing liaison; the British movement control organization arranged for the transportation of personnel and cargo to and from the port; and the Sea Transport Service was responsible for berthing and discharging American vessels.
The assumption of greater responsibility by the U.S. Army followed the arrival of the 5th Port on 11 September 1942.143 Early in November 1942, by agreement between the theater chief of transportation and the British director of movements, the U.S. port commander for the Clyde area assumed responsibility for the movement of U.S. Army personnel and cargo in and out of the area. This action was followed, on 27 April 1943, by a formal agreement between the British embarkation commandant and the U.S. commanding officer of the Clyde area ports, whereby the latter became responsible for unloading troop transports carrying a preponderance of U.S. Army personnel. Some control of cargo
operations was exercised by the British Sea Transport Service until June 1943. Thereafter the Americans were in full charge of their own port operations.
Although granted a large measure of independence, the Americans continued to work in close collaboration with the British. Aside from contacts with the British embarkation commandant, the British Movement Control, and the British Sea Transport Service, the U.S. port personnel maintained close liaison with the Clyde Navigation Trust, the port regional director, the Ministry of War Transport, the Ministry of Labour, the Admiralty Berthing Office, the Clyde Anchorages, and various stevedoring firms. Despite some misunderstandings, excellent cooperation was maintained, and the British military and civilian authorities provided valuable assistance.144
Operating from Nissen huts erected on the piers, the men of the 5th Port were active at each of the principal docks in the Clyde area ports. During the winter of 1942–43, rain, fog, high winds, and heavy seas, combined with the wartime blackout, greatly hampered cargo discharge. Nevertheless, large numbers of assembled aircraft were unloaded, together with many vehicles, harbor craft, locomotives, and other heavy items, which this port area was well equipped to handle. In the summer of 1943 an acute shortage of civilian labor necessitated the use of troops, first to remove baggage and organizational equipment, and later to discharge other cargo. Beginning in October of that year, U.S. Army personnel received technical instruction at the nearby Renfrew Airdrome in the unloading of aircraft, a task subsequently assigned to a special group of the 502nd Port Battalion. During the following May the 5th Port passed the million mark in measurement tons discharged under its supervision. Both May and June 1944 were record months for cargo operations.145
Meanwhile, more troops had landed in the Clyde area than anywhere else in the United Kingdom. With the exception of the six months following October 1942, when BOLERO was subordinated to Mediterranean operations, personnel debarkations were heavy, reaching a peak of approximately 100,000 in April 1944.146 The Queen Mary, Queen Elizabeth, and other large troopships brought many American units to the Tail of the Bank. Debarkation from anchorage at this point entailed careful coordination with the British in order to obtain the tenders for the passage from ship to shore, as well as the rail equipment to deliver the incoming personnel to their destinations.
After the U.S. port commander assumed full responsibility for unloading troopships in April 1943, a standard debarkation procedure was developed. As explained in the discussion of the movement control system, rail equipment was secured, and detailed train schedules were
worked out in advance in London.147 Since troop trains from the Mersey area as well as those from the Clyde area passed through junction points such as Crewe, careful planning of train movements was essential in order to avoid tie-ups. In the case of American troop debarkations, London provided the port commander with movement instructions, including the time of arrival, the strength of the units, and the train schedules. Under the port commander, a commissioned boarding officer supervised the debarkation of the troops from transport to tender to train, according to the predetermined schedule. At Gourock and Greenock local military bands with their skirling bagpipes and brilliant tartans welcomed the new arrivals, while the American Red Cross provided refreshments.148
The ports in the Clyde area gave vital support to the North African invasion, the majority of the men in the first three U.K. convoys for North Africa embarking in this area. Although no troops were out-loaded for the Normandy assault, personnel attached to the 5th Port helped equip and service more than one hundred of the MTVs (motor transport vessels) that were employed in the cross-Channel operation. Many experienced officers and men of the 5th Port, including three port battalions, and most of the harbor craft, were withdrawn for service on the Continent.149
The Mersey Ports
The Mersey River area, lying midway on the British west coast, was the point of entry for heavy shipments of both troops and freight. Centering in Liverpool, it included the docks at Birkenhead and Garston and the nearby port of Manchester. In addition to excellent railway connections, the area was served by inland waterways, notably the Manchester Ship Canal, and sufficient lighters and tugs were available to aid in the discharge of vessels and to clear cargo from the port. Despite the damage inflicted by the Luftwaffe, the port facilities were largely operative. As at other English ports, the docks were old and the cargo-handling equipment was inadequate, especially for heavy lifts; the cobblestone surfaces also were a drawback to efficient operation.150
A U.S. Army port command was established in the Mersey area on 18 June 1942. Headed briefly by Maj. John M. Gaffney, the port operation was placed under the command of Lt. Col. (later Col.) Cleland C. Sibley on 9 July.151 Shortly thereafter the 4th Port arrived in the United Kingdom, and was assigned to the Mersey area. As was the case at other ports, a period of orientation and dependence on the British preceded the assumption of control of operations by the Americans. Colonel Sibley was fortunate in obtaining the services of a British civilian who was experienced in cargo operations and had entry to shipping and other agencies in
Liverpool affecting U.S. port activities. In a short time, cooperative working relationships were established with officials of the Mersey Dock and Harbor Board, which controlled and operated the Liverpool Port Area, with the regional port director, and with local representatives of the Ministry of War Transport, the Ministry of Labour, and the British Movement Control. In late August 1942, as soon as the necessary personnel were trained, the U.S. port commander assumed control of embarkation, debarkation, entraining, and detraining where American troops were concerned; and on 1 September he began to take over movement functions previously exercised by the British with respect to cargo. In practice, Colonel Sibley worked closely with the British embarkation commandant on personnel movements, and the staffs of the two men operated together under the direction of one or the other, depending on whether the troops involved were American or British. Sibley stated later that this teamwork between the U.S. Army and the British civilian and military authorities was indispensable in accomplishing the mission of his port command.152
The Mersey ports ranked second to the Clyde area ports in total personnel received and were surpassed only by the Bristol Channel ports with regard to cargo unloaded before D Day. The wide dispersion of the Mersey port area facilitated the berthing and discharge of incoming vessels but increased the burden of administration and operation. A telephone network linked seven miles of sprawling docks. The landing stages, or floating docks, at Liverpool usually were employed for debarking troops, although some passengers were discharged to tenders in mid-stream.153
At first all cargo discharge was performed by British civilians. Later, both British and U.S. military personnel had to be used. According to Colonel Sibley, there were never enough men to fill every job or to work around the clock. As a rule, the Liverpool laborer worked only at the dock of his choice, and he shunned all overtime. Indeed, a general strike developed in mid-August 1943 in protest against overtime. The port commander thereupon completed discharge by using all military labor that could be rounded up, and the strike was settled with the longshoremen accepting such overtime as was required. The arrival of several American port battalions in the fall of 1943 and the use of British service troops eased the burden. Nevertheless, the heavy inbound traffic in the first half of 1944 placed a severe strain on the available labor supply.154
The subport of Manchester was connected with the Mersey River by a canal so shallow that cargo ships had to be lightened for the passage. Port labor was scarce in this highly industrialized area, necessitating the employment of a port battalion. Manchester was especially useful for unloading heavy cargo, such as steel, and the ability to bring such
material inland by water netted substantial savings in railway freight charges.155
The Mersey River ports loaded many ships for the North African invasion. In the summer of 1943 they debarked many German and Italian prisoners of war. Early in January 1944 the 4th Port, then slated for service in France, was relieved by the 15th Port, which thereafter supervised the U.S. Army port operations in the Mersey area.156
Bristol Channel Ports
In the Bristol Channel area the U.S. Army mainly used the ports of Swansea, Barry, Cardiff, Newport, and Avonmouth. The largest amount of U.S. Army cargo assembled in the United Kingdom was received through these five ports. They had the important advantage of being located near the largest number of the U.S. Army depots in Great Britain, thus minimizing the amount of inland transportation required.
On 22 June 1942, Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Edward H. Lastayo was designated to command the Bristol Channel ports. The port headquarters, originally located near Avonmouth, was transferred in August to a more convenient location in Newport. The 3rd Port functioned in this area until it left for North Africa in the fall of 1942. Thereafter, a detachment of the 5th Port supervised the U.S. Army port operations until July 1943, when it was absorbed by the 11th Port.157 To assist in handling the heavy increase in traffic, the 17th and part of the 16th Port were attached to the 11th Port early in 1944. Earmarked to take part in beach operations in Normandy, the 11th Port began a gradual withdrawal from the port area in March. At that time, Colonel Crothers, formerly the port commander at Glasgow, assumed command of the 17th Port and was designated commander of the ports in the Bristol Channel area. By 16 April 1944 the 17th Port, assisted by the 16th Port, had taken over port operations. The two organizations worked together until the latter’s departure for duty on the Continent in June.158
The docks in the Bristol area were adequate, but there were a number of handicaps. The exceptional high tide created problems. The facilities had been designed chiefly for bulk shipments and were not readily adaptable to the prompt forwarding of mixed American cargoes. The lack of sorting space at Newport, Cardiff, and Barry was a serious problem. Sheds were acquired at St. Mellons to receive, identify, and dispatch a large part, of the cargo discharged at those ports.
At the outset, the British supervised port operations, while 3rd Port personnel worked individual ships and acquired valuable experience for their North African mission. In mid-August 1942, somewhat earlier than at other British ports, the Americans took over responsibility for handling their own cargo ships and assumed movement control for U.S. freight.
As at other ports, it proved highly advantageous to establish close working relationships with the local British military and civilian agencies.159
As a rule, cargo was discharged by civilian labor, which at times was unsatisfactory both in quality and in quantity. By arrangement with the labor unions, U.S. Army port personnel were placed in the hatch gangs solely for purposes of observation and training. At first the unions stoutly resisted any attempt to employ U.S. troops as longshoremen, even though the civilian labor force clearly could not continue to carry the entire load. Several brief strikes occurred. In June 1943 at Avonmouth, for example, the local unions, supported by the British Ministry of Labour at London, prevented the port commander from using a port battalion to speed up the discharge of a ship. Later, however, the British furnished additional workers, and permitted the use of American port troops where the need arose.160
At the height of their activity, from July 1943 to June 1944, the Bristol Channel ports consistently unloaded well over 300,000 measurement tons of cargo per month. In the peak month, April 1944, inbound material came to 692,958 measurement tons, and inbound troops totaled 28,388. The troop and cargo figures for that month highlight the impressive contribution toward victory made by U.S. Army port personnel in the Bristol Channel area.161
Eastern and Southern Ports
The Northern Ireland, Clyde, and Bristol Channel port areas bore the brunt of the BOLERO program until the summer of 1943, when increasingly heavy inbound shipments compelled the use of ports that were more directly exposed to enemy action. Indeed, as early as mid-August 1942 the theater chief of transportation had assigned 1st Lt. Thomas S. Lowry to serve in Hull as acting port commander of the Humber River Ports. On 6 September a subport was set up at Immingham, on the south bank of the Humber. Lowry’s staff was small, the activity was light, and on 30 November 1942 the Humber River ports were closed. In the following spring they were reopened, chiefly for cargo reception. After its arrival in late July 1943 the 12th Port, headed by Col. Bert C. Ross, functioned at Hull and Immingham. U.S. Army operations at Hull suffered from the prevailing shortage of civilian dockworkers, and most of the unloading there had to be done by troops of the 498th Port Battalion.162
Because of the continuing danger from enemy air attacks, no substantial use was made of the excellent discharge facilities at London until 1943. In April eight vessels, carrying lend-lease cargo originally destined for the Soviet Union, were diverted to London. Since these ships carried ammunition, they were dispersed
along the Thames River to minimize the risk. Having no port personnel, the regional transportation officer at London drafted local railway traffic officers to assist in supervising the discharge operations. Working an average of eighty-two hours a week, these RTO’s supervised cargo discharge until mid-July 1943, when the 14th Port, under the command of Brig. Gen. Joseph L. Phillips, arrived and took over this activity.163 In the following December the 12th Port began relieving the 14th Port, which was slated to expand its operations at Southampton and Plymouth and prepare for the cross-Channel attack. By the end of January 1944 the 12th Port was operating in London, Hull, and Immingham, and it continued to do so until transferred to Normandy shortly after D Day.164
During the last half of 1943 the 14th Port supervised the discharge of approximately 350,000 measurement tons of cargo at London, Southampton, and Plymouth. Of that amount, 162,224 measurement tons were received at Southampton. After being relieved at London, the 14th Port confined its work to Plymouth and Southampton, of which the latter was to become the main installation.
Plymouth, a victim of the German blitz, had only a limited cargo capacity. Early in 1944 it came under the jurisdiction of the newly arrived 13th Port, which pushed through the faltering barge-construction program at Truro, Totnes, and Hayle, outloaded large amounts of ammunition at the old Cornish port of Fowey for the invasion of Normandy, and dispatched thousands of troops and vehicles from Plymouth and Falmouth for the cross-Channel attack.165
Southampton became the principal U.S. port on the south coast. In peacetime a thriving passenger port and a familiar gateway for visitors to the British Isles, it had suffered severely from enemy bombing. As a result, the port had remained idle for some time, and much of its cargo-handling equipment had been removed to other ports. Yet despite the considerable damage, Southampton remained one of the best ports in England. Deep water and relatively little tide made it a port of few locks, and there were numerous modern piers as well as seven graving docks for ship repair. Although many British officials feared that the port was too vulnerable, the Americans reopened it in the summer of 1943, and the fears were soon found to be without foundation.
Early U.S. operations were handicapped by the shortage of cargo-handling equipment and by labor troubles. Labor at Southampton, as elsewhere in Britain, was in short supply and none too efficient. During the summer and fall of 1943 the activity of the 14th Port at Southampton was interrupted by a number of strikes, several of which represented protests
against the presence of American military police who were stationed in the hatches to prevent pilferage. Nevertheless, by October cargo operations had increased substantially.166
Early in 1944 the headquarters of the 14th Port was moved from London to Southampton. Fairly compact office space and a sufficient number of billets were obtained in and near the city by using various structures, including the Blighmont Barracks, a wing of the Civic Center, a school, and two hotels. In the ensuing months cargo-handling facilities were greatly improved and, except for minor squabbles, labor disputes practically ceased.
Southampton together with the other ports along the southern and eastern shores of Great Britain, including the Thames and Humber River areas, contributed substantially to the build-up in the British Isles by receiving cargo diverted from the heavily burdened Bristol Channel and Mersey River ports, particularly after July 1943. But Southampton’s principal wartime contribution was to be made as a port of embarkation rather than as a port of discharge. In the months preceding the cross-Channel assault the emphasis in Transportation Corps operations increasingly shifted from receiving personnel and cargo to planning and preparing for the outbound movement to the Continent. Since southern England was close to Normandy and the scene of the greatest concentration of American troops, the ports in that area were the logical installations from which to mount and support the invading forces.
During May 1944, with Lt. Col. Leo J. Meyer in command, all cargo-discharge operations ceased at Southampton, and the port personnel concentrated their efforts on preparations for the Normandy invasion.167 From D Day onward the Southampton Port of Embarkation had a key role in the outbound movement of U.S. troops, equipment, and supplies to the Continent. A major port activity at this time was the loading of vehicles and drivers aboard specially converted Liberty ships for delivery across the Channel. Because of its proximity to the Continent, its excellent facilities, and the experienced Army port organization, Southampton remained active to the end of the war. The port was also destined to play a prominent part in the redeployment and repatriation of American troops and in the movement of British war brides to the United States.168
The British ports obviously had a large responsibility in the build-up of American strength in the United Kingdom. By the end of June 1944 the U.S. Army port organizations, with British cooperation and assistance, had landed in the United Kingdom a total of 1,792,512 U.S. Army troops and 15,573,699 measurement tons of cargo. Beginning on D Day, almost all the U.S. military resources slowly built up since January 1942 had to be shipped out during a relatively short period in a sort of BOLERO in reverse. Although this
activity ultimately was bound to reduce the importance of the U.K. ports, all were under great and continuous pressure during the critical spring and summer of 1944.
Railway Transportation
The movement of U.S. Army personnel and cargo between the various ports and destinations in the interior was largely the task of the British railways, though motor and inland water transportation were also used. The railroads had early felt the impact of war. From 1 September 1939 on they were under wartime controls. Because of the emergency all freight cars were pooled, traffic was regulated on a priority basis, and passenger movements were curtailed. When American troops first began to debark, the British railways were already suffering from at least three serious handicaps: (1) a critical shortage of manpower, arising from the diversion of railway employees to wartime assignments; (2) a sharp reduction in railway equipment because of overseas requirements, the losses of the British Expeditionary Forces in France after Dunkerque, abnormal wear and tear resulting from unusually heavy domestic traffic, and restricted new production, especially of locomotives; and (3) a limited capacity to move tanks, other armored vehicles, and bulky Engineer and Air Forces items, attributable in part to small cars and in part to clearance restrictions such as those imposed by tunnels.169
When Britain entered the war, her railways had 19,463 locomotives, 1,241,711 freight cars, and 45,838 passenger cars with a total seating capacity of 2,655,000. The total route mileage was 19,273 miles, practically all of which was laid with standard-gauge track. Judged by American standards, the number of units of equipment was large in relation to the mileage, but the capacity per unit was small. The British freight car, or “goods wagon,” for example, might move an average of only five to six tons as compared with an average of forty tons carried in the American boxcar.170 Also much smaller than its American counterpart, the British passenger car was designed to effect ready discharge of passengers from many compartments and at numerous stops. Upon his arrival in England, Colonel Ross was much impressed with the heavy movement of passenger trains, which he described as frequent and as crowded as those of the New York City subway.171
Since short hauls were the rule, the U.S. Army made no effort to set up the customary staging system for troops debarking in the British Isles. Thanks to the meticulous scheduling of trains, newly arrived troops were able to march directly from shipside to railway cars for the journey inland. The shortage of rolling stock and the competing demands of the civilian economy made close coordination necessary in order to effect the prompt movement of either troops or freight. All military traffic was subject to the
jurisdiction of the joint American and British movement control organization, in which the Transportation Corps was most commonly represented by the ubiquitous RTO.
Because of the dependence of the Army upon rail transport,172 the serious shortage of steam locomotives that developed in Great Britain during 1942 had disturbing implications for the BOLERO program. To meet the grave need of additional motive power, plans were made for the procurement in the United States of 400 locomotives of the 2-8-0 type, comparable to the British “Austerity” class engines.173 Simply designed so as to permit rapid production, these locomotives were to be used first on the British railways and later by the U.S. Army on the Continent. Fifteen switching locomotives also were required for moving freight cars at the U.S. Army depots in the United Kingdom. The theater requisition for these 415 locomotives, together with the usual spare parts, accessories, and tools, was forwarded in mid-August 1942.174
During the summer and fall of 1942 there were growing indications of impending difficulty. The outloading of troops and cargo for the North African invasion added appreciably to the burden of the railways. In appraising the situation Ross found the British railway men generally cooperative, but handicapped by the equipment shortage. At the same time, he complained that the U.S. Army supply services on occasion were unable to indicate the proper depot destination for cargo and were quite lax in unloading wagons promptly. Also, from time to time the supply services demanded embargoes on certain depots, which if granted would have resulted in congestion at the ports, where the docks had to be kept clear both to make space for incoming cargo and to guard against loss through enemy air attack. By October 1942 it was obvious that unless additional locomotives were procured, rail transportation might bog down badly. Fortunately, tangible American aid arrived soon. In November the first of the 2-8-0 locomotives was landed at Cardiff, Wales, where it was received with appropriate fanfare.175
In an effort to stave off the impending crisis in railway transportation, W. Averell Harriman, the U.S. lend-lease representative in London, himself an executive of a large American rail line, arranged to have Otto Jabelmann, mechanical engineer of the Union Pacific Railroad, sent to London in late 1942 to look into the British locomotive situation. Jabelmann died before his study was completed, but his findings, which became available in January 1943, indicated: (1) a serious deficiency of motive power, arising from greatly increased traffic; (2) a decrease in the production of new locomotives; and (3) insufficient maintenance, resulting in too high a percentage of locomotives being laid up for repairs. Blackout restrictions also contributed to abnormal operating difficulties. According to Jabelmann, the 400 American locomotives ordered for BOLERO traffic—of which only 26 had
been delivered up to 28 December 1942—were urgently needed as a stopgap measure until British locomotive construction picked up.176
Early in 1943 General Lee put pressure on Washington to speed up the delivery of American-built locomotives to the United Kingdom. The need was urgent. So far excellent weather had forestalled serious difficulty on the British railways, but between 1,000 and 1,500 trains had been canceled per week, chiefly because of lack of power. By 28 May 1943 a total of 184 U.S. Army 2-8-0 locomotives had been received, of which about 100 already were being operated on the British main lines.177
A definite understanding with the British concerning the employment of the BOLERO locomotives was not obtained until mid-May 1943. Though regarded as U.S. Army property, this equipment was to be placed in a joint stockpile under American and British control. As the locomotives arrived they were sent to a civilian railway shop for final assembly and adjustment before assignment to the British railways. The British Railway Executive Committee had general supervision of the BOLERO locomotives, but the theater chief of transportation kept detailed records of their utilization, operating condition, and location, so as to be able to recall them on short notice if they should be needed for military purposes.178 Of these locomotives, only 396 figured in the final accounting. Under the original agreement, the British railways were to maintain the locomotives in good running order and to return them when requested in the same condition as when received, subject to normal wear and tear.179
The principal problem with respect to the BOLERO locomotives was to assure adequate maintenance, since the British were short of labor and were therefore inclined to pay little attention to such comparatively new equipment. The Americans, on the other hand, realized that unless sufficient maintenance were provided, the locomotives might not be serviceable when needed for U.S. Army operations on the Continent. Accordingly, at the direction of the theater chief of transportation, U.S. Army inspectors kept careful watch on both the maintenance and use of this equipment.180
As D Day approached General Ross increased his pressure on the British for proper maintenance of the BOLERO locomotives, but because of the critical labor shortage his efforts were not very productive. Beginning early in 1944 the American 2-8-0 locomotives were progressively recalled by the U.S. Army to be prepared
for service on the Continent, and at the end of March 355 of them had been assembled at Ebbw Junction. The return was on such short notice that the British had no time for overhauling and reconditioning, which had to be accomplished by the Americans.181 The 2-8-0’s were a great aid to the British railways in handling wartime traffic and represented the major American contribution to the relief of the overburdened transportation facilities of the United Kingdom.
Other equipment was also loaned to the British railways, including 50 0-6-0 type steam locomotives for use in the coal mines and at British ports, 700 flatcars for moving oversize loads, 500 tank cars for carrying petroleum products, and 42 refrigerator cars for transporting U.S. Army perishable supplies. All this equipment was subject to return on fourteen days’ notice. In mid-February 1944, on recommendation of General Ross, General Lee directed that no U.S. Army rolling stock earmarked for operation on the Continent should be released to the British railways without specific authorization by the theater chief of transportation.182
The Transportation Corps did not undertake any railway operations in the United Kingdom except at the U.S. Army depots. In October 1942, at the urgent request of the British who were then hard pressed by the demands of the TORCH undertaking, U.S. railway troops began taking over responsibility for switching and maintaining the tracks at these installations. Although temporarily handicapped by the transfer of rail personnel to North Africa, by April 1943 Transportation Corps troops were doing the switching at eight U.S. Army depots, using eighteen locomotives for the purpose. As additional railway operating troops became available, this activity was expanded.183
The British Isles formed a useful training center for American railway troops, most of whom were without firsthand knowledge of the European railway systems. The theater chief of transportation therefore assigned various military railway units to U.S. Army depots and to British railway installations so that the men could obtain the technical training and practical experience required for military railway operations on the Continent.184
The United Kingdom also served as a convenient base at which to assemble and store railway rolling stock for ultimate use in France. Some of this equipment came from British sources, but most of it arrived from the United States in knocked-down form. The assembly and storage of railway cars developed into a major enterprise, concerning which further details will be
given in the account of Transportation Corps supply activities.185
While fulfilling its responsibilities for rail transportation in the United Kingdom, the Transportation Corps developed plans for rail operations on the Continent. The Transportation Corps Military Railway Division had been working on rail equipment requirements since 1942, and the Transportation Corps Advance Echelon, set up in mid-September 1943, gave increasing attention to plans for rail as well as other transportation activities following the cross-Channel assault. On 20 March 1944 the 2nd Military Railway Service headquarters, under Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Burpee, arrived in England and began to prepare to take control of U.S. military railway operations in northern France. By D Day detailed plans had been worked out for the transfer of U.S. rail personnel and equipment to the Continent and for the operations to be undertaken thereafter.186
Motor Transport
The U.S. Army at first made only limited use of the motor vehicles in the United Kingdom, in part because of serious shortages of gasoline, oil, and tires, and in part because of the narrow and winding roads, which were usually flanked by hedges that tended to obscure the driver’s vision. Americans also had some anxious moments learning to drive on the left side and under blackout restrictions. But when it became obvious that the British railways could not bear the entire burden, increasing use had to be made of motor transport.187
The theater chief of transportation had a dual interest in motor transport: as a means of moving troops and freight, and as an activity involving traffic control. At the outset he was assigned responsibility for the operation, maintenance, and movement control of motor vehicles. In midsummer of 1942 the War Department transferred functions pertaining to the development, procurement, and issue, as well as heavier classes of maintenance, from the Quartermaster Corps to the Ordnance Department. The operations of truck troop units remained a responsibility of the Quartermaster Corps. The European theater followed suit on 1 September, thereby limiting the Transportation Corps to movement control for U.S. Army traffic on the highways. This change came as an unexpected blow to General Ross. Although he professed no desire to retain responsibility for the maintenance, assembly, or distribution of motor vehicles, he thought it a mistake to remove the operation of trucking units from his jurisdiction. Despite the disadvantage of divided responsibility for motor transport, this situation prevailed for almost a year.188
The Transportation Corps was responsible for arranging all U.S. movements by highway to and from the ports, and for the control of all motor traffic involving convoys of fifty or more vehicles (twenty or more vehicles when moving through London, Edinburgh, or Glasgow). The
theater chief of transportation exercised control of American road movements through the same regional organization already set up to control U.S. rail moves. Upon request of a depot or troop unit, the regional transportation officer, working in close coordination with representatives of the British Movement Control and the U.S. Army provost marshal, issued movement instructions covering dates, schedules, routes, staging, and traffic control. Implementation of these instructions was the responsibility of the district transportation officers and the railway transportation officers under them. Traffic control was performed by the base section provost marshal, the British Movement Control, or the civil police. Later, convoys of less than fifty vehicles moving within a district or between districts in the same region were handled directly by the district transportation officer concerned.189
The U.S. movement control organization assisted in reducing the waste of mileage, gasoline, rubber, and manpower caused when motor convoys returned empty. Late in 1942 the British War Office suggested a return-loads plan, designed to promote the maximum utilization of drivers and vehicles. General Lee accepted this plan and charged the theater chief of transportation with the responsibility for securing return loads for U.S. Army trucks. The plan was limited to vehicles dispatched on journeys in excess of twenty-five miles. The U.S. Army dispatching officer would notify the regional transportation officer or the nearest RTO of the number of vehicles available for loading, their types and capacities, and the time of arrival at destination. If the RTO was unable to secure a return load he telephoned the regional transportation officer, who arranged for a load through the British Military Transport liaison officer. No return was to involve civilian traffic, deviate from a direct route by more than ten miles except in an emergency, or interfere with military operational moves.
Other measures were adopted to insure that U.S. Army vehicles had pay loads on every trip. Whenever possible casual shipments were pooled and transported in British commercial vehicles. Newly arrived organizational vehicles were used to forward freight to inland points while en route to their respective units. Periodic surveys were made of the utilization of motor transport, particularly for the heavy traffic between the ports and the depots. From its inception through 4 March 1944 the conservation effort, including the return-loads plan, resulted in an estimated saving of $686,002.20.190
Control of the operation of motor transport vehicles was returned to the Transportation Corps in the summer of 1943. Studies conducted while this activity was under the Quartermaster Corps had indicated that the separation of movement control and operational functions did not lend itself to the efficient use of equipment. As a corrective measure the vehicles of certain motor transport units were pooled, to be used where and when needed; and, with the concurrence of the
chief quartermaster of the theater, the operation of all motor transport not specifically assigned to other agencies was reassigned to the Transportation Corps in July. Anticipating this change, General Ross had already established the Motor Transport Division in his headquarters under Lt. Col (later Col.) Loren A. Ayers, who had been active in U.S. Army motor transportation since 1941.191
As organized on 26 January 1944, the Motor Transport Division had three branches, concerned respectively with requirements, allocations to the base sections, and unit training. The troop units under its control at this time consisted of Quartermaster truck companies, Quartermaster car companies for carrying personnel, amphibian truck companies, and headquarters and headquarters detachments of Quartermaster battalions (mobile). Each of these units, with its equipment, was assigned to a specific base section for rations, quarters, administration, and day-to-day operational control. The mission of the Motor Transport Division was to provide general-purpose motor transport for the use of all elements of the Services of Supply and to relieve the hard-pressed rail and inland waterway facilities. The division determined the over-all requirements, allocated vehicles and troop units to the base sections, and supervised the utilization of the vehicles and the training and utilization of the personnel.192
In the field, the port commanders supervised and directed the operation of the vehicles and troop units allotted to them by the base sections. Other motor transport units in the base sections were controlled by the regional transportation officers through their district transportation officers and RTO’s. The regional transportation officers operated motor transport pools, organized provisional trucking units, and allocated vehicles to meet peak loads in the region and to assist other base sections. Under the regional transportation officers, the district transportation officers directed the operation of Transportation Corps motor transport units, issued orders for the movement of troops and freight, and coordinated movements to other districts or regions through the regional office. The RTO’s, functioning under the district transportation officers, controlled the operation of Transportation Corps trucking units to and from their installations.193
When the Motor Transport Division was established, motor transport was still a relatively minor activity, but the strain on railroad facilities caused by the heavy inbound traffic necessitated increased reliance on truck transportation beginning in the latter half of 1943. By March 1944, approximately one third of all U.S. Army cargo cleared from United Kingdom ports was being shipped by highway. This traffic was handled in part by Transportation Corps motor transport units and in part by civilian carriers secured through the British Ministry of War Transport. Road movements within and between
regions also increased. Convoys of fifty or more vehicles, controlled by motor convoy officers, numbered 4,080 in March 1944, almost ten times the number handled in the previous November. As D Day drew near, the principal problem confronting the motor transport units under the jurisdiction of the theater chief of transportation was a shortage of 150 officers, which had an adverse effect upon training, administration, and operation.194
Shortly after its creation, the Motor Transport Division began to prepare for the invasion of Normandy. Plans were worked out in the summer of 1943 regarding the number of troop units and the number and types of equipment to be used, and the assignment of extra drivers to permit round-the-clock operations. The theater Transportation Corps was unable to secure approval for the number of truck companies it considered necessary. To add to its troubles the procurement of heavy-duty equipment that it requisitioned was delayed, forcing the acceptance of less desirable types. The provision of personnel to serve as extra drivers was not authorized until the spring of 1944, a delay adversely affecting their quality and training. These developments were to have serious consequences during the rapid advance of the U.S. Army on the Continent after the St. Lô break-through.195
In the last months before the cross-Channel assault, the Motor Transport Division worked closely with the Transportation Corps Advance Echelon in developing detailed plans for motor transport activities on the Continent. The bulk of the staff of the Motor Transport Division was eventually taken over by the Advance Echelon, which moved to France after D Day. The rear echelon in London became the Motor Transport Division of the United Kingdom Base Section. Meanwhile, a month before the invasion, a Motor Transport Brigade was established as part of the Advance Section, Communications Zone, and prepared to assume control of initial zone of communications motor transport activities on the Continent.196
Equipment and Supplies
The first equipment requisitioned by the Transportation Corps in the United Kingdom was intended for U.S. Army port operations. The theater chief of transportation did not become directly responsible for the procurement of military railway equipment until late 1942, when that function was transferred from the theater chief of engineers. Nevertheless, in July of that year Ross had begun to explore the possibility of fabricating all required railway rolling stock in the British Isles, using imported American steel. The project was never carried out, in large measure because of the shortage of qualified British labor.197
Freight Cars for the Continent
Meanwhile, Maj. Frank E. Cheshire, an officer experienced in the field of rail-
way equipment, had been assigned to assess the freight car requirements for the European theater. Personal observation in the United Kingdom had impressed him with the utility of the small British 4-wheel goods wagon, or freight car. Accordingly, in the summer of 1942 he designed a similar knocked-down 4-wheel, 20-ton freight car that required a minimum of material and shipping space, was easy to assemble, and had an expected service life of four to five years. Although other types would be needed, this car was considered basic. Initially, some 22,400 cars of this type (open and box) were projected. Each car was to be so fitted as to be readily interchangeable with British equipment. Further savings in metal and in weight were to be achieved by using plywood for the roof, sides, and ends. Cheshire’s original design was rejected as impractical by the U.S. Army Engineer Board, but a modified 4-wheel 20-ton car was adapted for Army use. It was built with heavier steel sections than Cheshire had deemed necessary, and the fabrication was by riveting rather than by welding as he had advo-cated.198
After consultation with the theater, the War Department drew up a program for the shipment of 29,000 railway cars to the United Kingdom. As visualized on 1 September 1942, the requirements included 16,000 20-ton boxcars, 9,600 gondolas of 20-ton and 40-ton capacity, 3,200 56-ton flatcars, and smaller numbers of tank, brake van, and refrigerator cars. All railway cars were to be fabricated in the zone of interior and shipped knocked-down for assembly overseas. Shipment was to be at the rate of 2,500 cars month beginning in October 1942.199
During the winter of 1942–43 the Transportation Corps in the United Kingdom negotiated with the British to obtain the Hainault railway sheds and siding near London as a plant for the erection of the knocked-down, American-built freight cars. Originally planned to serve the London subway but never completed, the site was deemed the most desirable for this project despite some danger of air attack. Initially, two railway tracks were to be constructed, one for assembly and erection, and the other for storage. Although the Transportation Corps had completed plans to use the facilities at Hainault in March 1943, the installation was not formally activated as a Transportation Corps depot until mid-July. Up to that time only 356 knocked-down cars had been re-ceived.200
The activity at Hainault afforded valuable training. Assembling a 20-ton boxcar, for instance, took place in eleven stages, ending with the touch-up paint and the stencil that identified the car as a unit of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps. From July to September 1943 a
detachment of the 729th Railway Operating Battalion, consisting of mechanics recruited from U.S. railroads, pioneered in the assembly work at Hainault. Thereafter, the 756th Railway Shop Battalion under Lt. Col. Howard U. Bates rolled up an impressive record. The heaviest production was attained in June 1944 when 1,147 cars were erected.201
In addition to the Hainault facilities, other installations were set up to handle Transportation Corps equipment, spare parts, and supplies for use in the United Kingdom and on the Continent. By mid-August 1943, depots had been established at Ebbw Junction to store spare parts for locomotive repairs and at Highbridge to store spare parts for 0-6-0 locomotives and organizational equipment for port and railway units. Transportation sections also functioned at four general depots in the United Kingdom: Sudbury-Egginton, Moreton-on-Lugg, Wem, and Burton-on-Trent. The first three were concerned with the assembly and storage of knocked-down railway cars, and the fourth housed spare parts for 2-8-0 locomotives and the overflow of organizational equipment.202
Although the assembly of 20-ton freight cars accounted for the bulk of the car-erection project, special attention had to be given to refrigerator cars. During the summer of 1943, because of unusually warm weather, the scarcity of suitable rail equipment, and the problem of getting ice, the U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps experienced difficulty in moving perishables over the British railways. In an effort to safeguard the food destined for American military personnel, the theater requested that unassembled refrigerator cars be given priority shipment from the United States. By 30 September 1943, 100 had arrived in the United Kingdom.203
By 30 May 1944 a total of 20,351 wagons or cars of all types had reached the theater, including 9,270 20-ton boxcars, 5,050 20-ton gondolas, 2,891 40-ton gondolas, 1,530 56-ton flatcars, and smaller numbers of 20-ton caboose, 40-ton tank, and refrigerator cars. Most of the 7,106 erected units had been assembled at Hainault, but appreciable numbers were set up at Sudbury-Egginton and Moreton-on-Lugg.204
Hospital Trains and Unit Cars
The arrangement for the assembly of American rolling stock in the United Kingdom included only freight cars. Other arrangements had to be made, therefore, to provide the specialized railway equipment required to move sick and wounded U.S. Army personnel within the theater.
Despite wartime shortages of materiel and labor, some progress was made during 1943–44 in obtaining hospital trains. This was accomplished through the cooperation of the theater chief of transportation
and the chief surgeon with the assistance of the British. By late June 1943 a decision had been reached in Washington that, in order to save shipping space, hospital trains would be procured in the United Kingdom. Some old British cars held over from World War I were pressed into service, and additional hospital trains were made up from available wooden cars. The conversion work was accomplished under U.S. Army supervision at the Swindon railway shops.205 By 1 September 1943 fifteen hospital trains had been made available in the United Kingdom, and three self-contained ambulance-unit cars, designed to transport small groups of casualties, were in process of conversion from British railway equipment.206
A hospital train consisted of fourteen cars: seven or eight ward cars equipped with triple-deck hospital beds or litter racks, a pharmacy-office-surgery car containing an operating room with the minimum equipment, kitchen cars, sleeping cars for the train personnel, and a utility car to provide heat. Made up of old and hastily converted equipment, the hospital trains fell far short of American specifications. The wooden cars were hazardous in case of fire or accident, and the heating and ventilation were found inadequate.
The hospital trains were employed in the United Kingdom to move patients from one hospital to another or to the ports for evacuation to the United States. The chief surgeon of the theater provided the medical staff, equipment, and supplies, and controlled the utilization of the trains. Their operation as railway equipment was supervised by the theater chief of transportation, who also furnished a small maintenance crew. By D Day twenty-seven hospital trains intended for use on the Continent had been converted or were nearing completion. At the end of 1944 twenty-five such trains had been ferried across the Channel and placed in operation in France. A number were continued in use in the United Kingdom after the invasion to move casualties from a number of transit hospitals on the south coast of England to general hospitals in the interior. Later, all patients were debarked at Southampton, whence hospital trains carried them directly to the general hospitals.207
Marine Equipment
The port operating equipment received in the United Kingdom in 1942 was chiefly that that accompanied the port battalions. Much of this equipment was diverted to North Africa, compelling the theater chief of transportation to start anew to obtain the equipment required for port operations in the United Kingdom and on the Continent. For the first phase of the invasion (D Day to D plus 90) the U.S. Army
requirements for the Continent were determined jointly with the British with a view to setting up a joint stockpile. For the second phase (after D plus 90), the American requirements for the Continent were calculated by the chief of transportation’s Planning Division and submitted to the War Department as special Transportation Corps projects.208 Among the marine items included in approved Transportation Corps projects were 473 104-foot knocked-down steel barges and 400 60-foot knocked-down wooden barges, together with oil tankers, launches, marine tractors, tugs, and towboats.209
Aside from receiving and maintaining all U.S. Army port and marine equipment, the Transportation Corps supervised the assembly of the items which were shipped in knocked-down condition. The erection of barges was begun early in 1944 by private British contractors working under the supervision of the theater chief of transportation. The wooden barges were set up at Totnes and the steel barges at Hayle and Truro. The program called for 120 steel barges and 220 wooden barges to be ready for use by 31 May 1944. To meet this goal, General Ross requested that the 386th Port Battalion, a Negro unit, be used along with British civilians at Totnes. The labor unions objected, but eventually agreed to an arrangement whereby U.S. Army personnel were allowed to assist in the work as a means of obtaining practical training essential to future military operations.
Despite considerable difficulty in attaining the scheduled production, by the end of May 1944 a total of 176 steel barges had been assembled at Hayle and Truro, and at Totnes all 400 wooden barges were completed two weeks ahead of the target date. Other assembly activities included the erection of 30-ton and 60-ton floating cranes at various ports.210
As the invasion date drew near, marine equipment poured into the British Isles. More than 100 tugs, up to 86 feet in length, were shipped as deck cargo. The larger seagoing tugs generally proceeded to the theater under their own power, while other floating equipment, notably the oil barges and car floats to be used for cross-Channel ferrying of petroleum products and railway rolling stock, had to be towed on the hazardous passage across the Atlantic. These craft were to play a vital role in the invasion of France. At Southampton, for example, three tugs of the 329th Harbor Craft Company towed units for the artificial harbor to the far shore, and a fourth was active in the initial Normandy landings. The failure of twenty-three large ocean-going tugs to arrive by D Day was a serious blow. Production difficulties were blamed for this deficiency, which was made up as far as possible by substituting other craft from the United States.211
Spare Parts and Supplies
Because of the relatively slow increase in Transportation Corps personnel in the United Kingdom, supply was not a pressing problem until 1943. During 1942 a substantial amount of equipment and supplies was obtained from the British, including 70,000 life belts; 3 harbor craft; 10 mobile cranes; 3 diesel locomotives; 100 motor coaches converted for use as ambulances; and 30 tons of locomotive spare parts for both heavy and running repairs. Thereafter requirements mounted. In addition to current requirements, the theater chief of transportation had to contribute to the joint American-British stockpile being built up for use on the Continent from D Day to D plus 90.212
From the beginning General Ross was faced with the problem of securing sufficient spare parts, and in the fall of 1943 he was especially concerned over spare parts for the 400 BOLERO 2-8-0 locomotives. Late in the year Maj. John W. Marsh, assigned by Ross to investigate the spare parts situation in the United Kingdom, found that, apart from a lack of information as to what was needed and what was available, confusion existed as to identification and nomenclature. Marsh also found that the spare parts depot at Burton-on-Trent was an old wooden building with no lighting and with other deficiencies, and that the officer-in-charge there was handicapped by a lack of mechanical equipment and by unfamiliarity with the names and functions of many of the parts carried in stock. In his report, Marsh recommended that railway spare parts be shipped from the United States automatically, that is, periodically without waiting for requisitions; that a standard nomenclature be adopted; that a spare parts catalog be pre pared; and that a qualified storekeeper be assigned to the European theater to supervise the storage and issue of railway equipment and parts.213
The spare parts problem was accentuated by the comparatively wide range of transportation items that ultimately had to be procured. Unfortunately, much of this equipment was not standardized. Moreover, being a newly established technical service, the Transportation Corps had only begun to establish the needed equipment catalogs, standard nomenclature lists, and technical manuals, and lacked the accumulated experience with respect to replacement and mortality factors that the other technical services had developed through the years. Eventually, as such aids were developed and the requisite experience was gained, the spare parts situation became much less acute.214
In recognition of the growing significance of his supply activity, General Ross established a new Supply Division under Col. Leonard F. Felio in October 1943. The division was made responsible for the procurement, storage, and issue of all transportation equipment authorized for Transportation Corps units, as well as the Transportation Corps supplies and equipment required for operational projects on the Continent. As previously noted, during 1943 the Transportation Corps obtained considerable additional depot space for the storage and issue of its materiel,
much of which was intended for use on the Continent, and at the close of June 1944 the Corps occupied 143,000 square feet of covered space, 4,157,000 square feet of open space, and 136,000 square feet of shop space, distributed among ten depots. By that time the Supply Division had reviewed and approved more than 2,400 requisitions and had issued approximately 4,000 shipping releases, indicating to the ports of discharge, RTO’s, and receiving units concerned the disposition of supplies scheduled to arrive.215
During the critical period April—June 1944, besides receiving supplies from the United States and issuing organizational equipment to units, the Supply Division had to arrange for the movement of transportation equipment to the Continent. Since not enough port equipment had arrived to permit issuance of the entire amount authorized for each unit, the Supply Division and the Marine Operations Division had to apportion the available items among the ports in the United Kingdom and on the Continent. Air shipment was requested for many spare parts for marine engines, tugs, and tankers.
The Supply Division was responsible for keeping stock records of all items on hand and en route, for issuing equipment to newly arrived units, for establishing requirements for all equipment and supplies not automatically provided, and for maintaining liaison with appropriate British agencies with a view to local procurement wherever possible. It had mastered these details fairly well by the time activities were transferred to the Continent.216
The Situation on D Day
During the build-up period the Transportation Corps, with the aid of the British, successfully handled the transportation activities involved in the accumulation of American men and materials in the United Kingdom. As strategic planning firmed up and inbound traffic reached large-scale proportions in the latter half of 1943, the Transportation Corps gave increasing attention to preparations for the invasion of the Continent.217 On 6 June 1944 General Ross expressed his belief that preparations for the most part had been successful. This was true despite the delay in the arrival of certain large tugs, the late arrival of personnel, and the failure to obtain desired heavy-duty motor vehicles.218 Ahead lay the task of transferring a large part of the men and supplies accumulated in Britain to the Continent, and undertaking there the transportation operations required for the support of U.S. forces in combat. Before going into that, however, it is necessary to discuss transportation problems in North Africa and the Mediterranean.